1 00:00:00,080 --> 00:00:05,840 Speaker 1: As the integration with Credit Sweet came, I'm not sure 2 00:00:05,880 --> 00:00:09,680 Speaker 1: as the sale of the century. Just to remind people, 3 00:00:10,600 --> 00:00:13,680 Speaker 1: ULYS had a very viable strategy of its own prior 4 00:00:13,720 --> 00:00:17,239 Speaker 1: to the events of March the fifteenth, and in the 5 00:00:17,400 --> 00:00:19,800 Speaker 1: end we were faced to the position where we felt 6 00:00:19,800 --> 00:00:23,080 Speaker 1: the right thing to do for the system and also 7 00:00:23,160 --> 00:00:27,880 Speaker 1: for our stakeholders was to step in and effectively rescue 8 00:00:27,920 --> 00:00:33,080 Speaker 1: Credit Suite, and we all benefited from that because the consequences. 9 00:00:32,760 --> 00:00:34,720 Speaker 2: Of resolution, which could. 10 00:00:34,479 --> 00:00:38,360 Speaker 1: Have happened unequivocally, and the FSB has said that too, 11 00:00:38,720 --> 00:00:43,080 Speaker 1: would have meant significant contagion and the system. So the 12 00:00:43,120 --> 00:00:46,239 Speaker 1: result then, since the deal's now going quite well, everybody's 13 00:00:46,280 --> 00:00:48,479 Speaker 1: saying it was the sale of the century, but at 14 00:00:48,479 --> 00:00:50,479 Speaker 1: the time it was actually a very high risk. 15 00:00:51,760 --> 00:00:54,840 Speaker 2: Problem to deal with. The integration is going very well. 16 00:00:55,040 --> 00:00:57,560 Speaker 1: I was very lucky we as a board and the 17 00:00:57,600 --> 00:01:01,560 Speaker 1: shareholders were very lucky to get Surgero or Modback who 18 00:01:01,640 --> 00:01:05,680 Speaker 1: knew the bank inside out and already downsized in the 19 00:01:05,720 --> 00:01:06,640 Speaker 1: relevant areas. 20 00:01:06,680 --> 00:01:08,400 Speaker 2: And this is a massive integration. 21 00:01:08,959 --> 00:01:10,880 Speaker 1: As I said, it's the first time ever to g 22 00:01:11,080 --> 00:01:14,000 Speaker 1: Ciphies or G Sibbs as then out Goold we're put 23 00:01:14,040 --> 00:01:19,080 Speaker 1: together the market likes what we're doing so far. The 24 00:01:19,200 --> 00:01:23,640 Speaker 1: relatively easy bit was done first, which was the initial downsizing. 25 00:01:24,200 --> 00:01:26,319 Speaker 1: But to put it in context, Stephanie, as you know, 26 00:01:26,680 --> 00:01:32,399 Speaker 1: credits Fees had one one hundred legal subsidiaries, so very messy, 27 00:01:32,480 --> 00:01:35,040 Speaker 1: convoluted organizational structure. 28 00:01:34,920 --> 00:01:37,000 Speaker 2: And as anybody who's done integration. 29 00:01:36,760 --> 00:01:39,680 Speaker 1: Knows, that's the bit you need to tackle to get 30 00:01:39,680 --> 00:01:42,520 Speaker 1: the costs out. So I think twenty twenty four is 31 00:01:42,520 --> 00:01:45,280 Speaker 1: going to be a very hard year of heavy lifting 32 00:01:45,400 --> 00:01:49,080 Speaker 1: to as we publicly said, merge the parent banks by June, 33 00:01:49,680 --> 00:01:52,840 Speaker 1: merged the significant subsidiaries by June, and then we can 34 00:01:52,880 --> 00:01:55,600 Speaker 1: start really attacking those allocated and stuck costs. 35 00:01:55,800 --> 00:01:56,840 Speaker 2: So you mentioned June. 36 00:01:57,720 --> 00:01:59,920 Speaker 3: Is that going to be a sort of key mar 37 00:02:00,160 --> 00:02:03,000 Speaker 3: stone that Cherilders and others should be looking at, or 38 00:02:04,080 --> 00:02:06,680 Speaker 3: when will you say, actually we have now done the 39 00:02:06,720 --> 00:02:07,240 Speaker 3: hard work. 40 00:02:07,960 --> 00:02:09,760 Speaker 1: Well, I think we've done the hard work and the 41 00:02:09,800 --> 00:02:12,799 Speaker 1: exit of twenty twenty six when we've given our exit 42 00:02:12,919 --> 00:02:16,680 Speaker 1: rate and our costing can ratio goals, and our the 43 00:02:16,800 --> 00:02:19,160 Speaker 1: full of costs that we'll take out. But I think 44 00:02:19,200 --> 00:02:22,320 Speaker 1: as we get through twenty twenty four organizationally, we'll be 45 00:02:22,360 --> 00:02:24,800 Speaker 1: in a much better position and then we can really 46 00:02:24,800 --> 00:02:26,959 Speaker 1: start tackling a lot of stock costs. 47 00:02:27,440 --> 00:02:28,639 Speaker 2: There was a lot of talk. 48 00:02:29,919 --> 00:02:31,880 Speaker 3: The start of people trying to get to grips with 49 00:02:32,400 --> 00:02:35,480 Speaker 3: the extent of the outflows and credit space, how they 50 00:02:35,480 --> 00:02:38,679 Speaker 3: were being dealt with. So what's the Are you confident 51 00:02:38,720 --> 00:02:40,480 Speaker 3: that that is all behind you now that you have 52 00:02:40,520 --> 00:02:41,120 Speaker 3: and you've resulted? 53 00:02:41,160 --> 00:02:43,640 Speaker 1: I think so we showed in Q three and Q 54 00:02:44,600 --> 00:02:47,240 Speaker 1: and we will show that those outflows slowed down and 55 00:02:47,280 --> 00:02:51,720 Speaker 1: in fact reversed. We actually have had new money both 56 00:02:51,760 --> 00:02:56,639 Speaker 1: in the deposit channels as well as the wealth management channels. 57 00:02:57,040 --> 00:02:59,760 Speaker 1: So we're confident that we're rebuilding that now. The degree 58 00:02:59,800 --> 00:03:02,160 Speaker 1: to which we can make up all of that loss, 59 00:03:02,200 --> 00:03:06,399 Speaker 1: we don't know. I mean, obviously clients had other alternatives. 60 00:03:06,400 --> 00:03:09,680 Speaker 1: There were some funds went to the Swiss conternal banks, 61 00:03:10,040 --> 00:03:14,520 Speaker 1: some of the foreign banks, particularly in Asia. 62 00:03:13,560 --> 00:03:15,680 Speaker 2: Gathered some of those moneys from Credit Suite. 63 00:03:16,080 --> 00:03:19,880 Speaker 1: But we feel pretty optimistic now that people feel very 64 00:03:19,919 --> 00:03:21,760 Speaker 1: comfortable with UBS as a brand. 65 00:03:23,080 --> 00:03:25,360 Speaker 3: One of the questions that people had having seen and 66 00:03:25,360 --> 00:03:27,760 Speaker 3: obviously there had been problems with Credit suitee building up 67 00:03:28,680 --> 00:03:32,120 Speaker 3: they've been approached to there have been a risk, a 68 00:03:32,200 --> 00:03:35,200 Speaker 3: tolerance for risk or risk appetite that was certainly different 69 00:03:36,680 --> 00:03:38,960 Speaker 3: from UBS. How are you finding it as you on 70 00:03:39,120 --> 00:03:43,560 Speaker 3: board the credit switee clients that adjustment of risk appetite, 71 00:03:43,560 --> 00:03:45,600 Speaker 3: How is it working well? 72 00:03:46,560 --> 00:03:50,280 Speaker 1: I think Credit Suite had four different businesses, so you 73 00:03:50,320 --> 00:03:53,880 Speaker 1: have to specify where the issues were, and I've been 74 00:03:53,960 --> 00:03:56,960 Speaker 1: very public about the issues that Credit Suite were in 75 00:03:57,000 --> 00:04:01,000 Speaker 1: the investment bank, by and large, that's where we have 76 00:04:01,120 --> 00:04:02,280 Speaker 1: the cultural issues. 77 00:04:02,320 --> 00:04:05,600 Speaker 2: That's where the losses had been made. That's where I 78 00:04:05,640 --> 00:04:09,520 Speaker 2: felt that had been bad behavior. What we've now got 79 00:04:09,560 --> 00:04:12,120 Speaker 2: with the integration is credit SEEZ. 80 00:04:12,200 --> 00:04:16,960 Speaker 1: People who come into more UBS feel very comfortable with UBS, 81 00:04:17,040 --> 00:04:19,920 Speaker 1: so it is a one firm. I think Sergio has 82 00:04:19,960 --> 00:04:23,120 Speaker 1: done a good job of welcoming people. I was pretty 83 00:04:23,160 --> 00:04:25,839 Speaker 1: outspoken at the time about the cultural risks, and I 84 00:04:25,839 --> 00:04:30,120 Speaker 1: do believe that culture is a defining challenge for any institution. 85 00:04:30,720 --> 00:04:33,760 Speaker 1: But on the whole, we've been pleasantly surprised by what 86 00:04:33,800 --> 00:04:37,960 Speaker 1: we've got. The Swiss Bank is very similar to UBS, 87 00:04:38,000 --> 00:04:40,640 Speaker 1: so that's kind of plug and play from a cultural 88 00:04:40,680 --> 00:04:44,200 Speaker 1: point of view. The asset management division wasn't really big 89 00:04:44,320 --> 00:04:46,919 Speaker 1: enough to make a difference, and the wealth management business 90 00:04:47,360 --> 00:04:48,520 Speaker 1: our certain. 91 00:04:48,200 --> 00:04:49,800 Speaker 2: Areas has just been added on. 92 00:04:50,240 --> 00:04:53,440 Speaker 1: As you know, we did downsize the investment bank, and indeed, 93 00:04:53,839 --> 00:04:56,640 Speaker 1: in fairness to accidentally, they've been trying to downsize the 94 00:04:56,680 --> 00:04:58,800 Speaker 1: investment bank credits suite anyway. 95 00:04:58,839 --> 00:05:01,920 Speaker 2: So to a large extent, a lot of bad actors. 96 00:05:01,560 --> 00:05:04,680 Speaker 1: Had gone, and the people we've brought in on the 97 00:05:04,680 --> 00:05:07,680 Speaker 1: whole have actually, you know, it is worked quite well. 98 00:05:07,720 --> 00:05:11,520 Speaker 2: We've been quite surprised, just sort of stepping back a bit. 99 00:05:11,720 --> 00:05:14,719 Speaker 3: I mean you talk about there were various outcomes that 100 00:05:14,720 --> 00:05:17,200 Speaker 3: could have happened with credit squeeze. I mean, one overwhelming 101 00:05:17,240 --> 00:05:22,920 Speaker 3: people feeling that people had after was Wow, this has 102 00:05:22,960 --> 00:05:25,279 Speaker 3: been building in kind of plain sight for a long time. 103 00:05:25,320 --> 00:05:27,400 Speaker 3: And I know that you had sort of been preparing 104 00:05:27,480 --> 00:05:30,240 Speaker 3: quietly for sort of whatever was going to happen with 105 00:05:30,279 --> 00:05:32,240 Speaker 3: credit space, because it was obvious that something was going 106 00:05:32,279 --> 00:05:36,159 Speaker 3: to come to a head. What lessons do you looking back? 107 00:05:36,320 --> 00:05:40,000 Speaker 3: Do you think the regulators should have been tougher? Should 108 00:05:40,040 --> 00:05:43,039 Speaker 3: they now be tougher? I mean it's hard to see 109 00:05:43,080 --> 00:05:44,880 Speaker 3: and exactly obviously there isn't going to be the same 110 00:05:44,920 --> 00:05:49,560 Speaker 3: situation arise because there's no other big bank in Switzerland, 111 00:05:49,600 --> 00:05:53,159 Speaker 3: But should they be taking lessons from that whole? 112 00:05:53,440 --> 00:05:57,160 Speaker 1: Well, as you know there is a parliamentary investigation at 113 00:05:57,160 --> 00:06:00,000 Speaker 1: the moment, and there are all sorts of other rapports 114 00:06:00,279 --> 00:06:04,600 Speaker 1: coming through, some interesting, some not so interesting. There's a 115 00:06:04,640 --> 00:06:09,720 Speaker 1: little bit of revisionism going on from certain quarters, I think, 116 00:06:09,880 --> 00:06:13,719 Speaker 1: and I've said this before, I don't think the regulators 117 00:06:13,720 --> 00:06:18,479 Speaker 1: had sufficient powers in Switzerland to enforce compliance. 118 00:06:18,560 --> 00:06:22,200 Speaker 2: It's very clear that Findnman knew what was going. 119 00:06:22,000 --> 00:06:25,800 Speaker 1: On and had worn the board and management at Credit Suite, 120 00:06:25,800 --> 00:06:29,360 Speaker 1: but for some reason Credit Site management and board did 121 00:06:29,400 --> 00:06:33,120 Speaker 1: not respond sufficiently. So I think we'll deal with that, 122 00:06:33,200 --> 00:06:35,760 Speaker 1: and in fact, the Finance Finister didn't speak about this yesterday. 123 00:06:35,760 --> 00:06:39,280 Speaker 1: I'm an interview with Francine, so let's not jump to that. 124 00:06:39,920 --> 00:06:42,800 Speaker 1: But the big message here is that there was clearly 125 00:06:42,839 --> 00:06:47,000 Speaker 1: a failure by board, management and the shareholders of Credit 126 00:06:47,040 --> 00:06:51,679 Speaker 1: Suite to hold Credit Suite accountable for a viable business model. Now, 127 00:06:51,800 --> 00:06:56,120 Speaker 1: I don't think it's the duty of regulators to a 128 00:06:56,120 --> 00:06:58,440 Speaker 1: pine or police a business model. I think that is 129 00:06:58,480 --> 00:07:01,599 Speaker 1: the duty of board and shareholders, and I think that's 130 00:07:01,640 --> 00:07:04,360 Speaker 1: one of the big lessons we'll learn here. How is 131 00:07:04,400 --> 00:07:07,640 Speaker 1: that achieved going forward? There are ways regulators can reinforce that. 132 00:07:08,960 --> 00:07:12,720 Speaker 1: The UK is the senior manager regime. The occ in 133 00:07:12,760 --> 00:07:16,080 Speaker 1: the US as camels the asset learnings where they can 134 00:07:16,120 --> 00:07:19,240 Speaker 1: police it. But ultimately I think shareholders have to be 135 00:07:19,280 --> 00:07:22,400 Speaker 1: far more active and hold board's much more accountable, which 136 00:07:22,400 --> 00:07:24,679 Speaker 1: is why I'm a big supporter of the senior manager 137 00:07:24,720 --> 00:07:27,360 Speaker 1: regime or something like that in Switzerland. 138 00:07:28,280 --> 00:07:29,440 Speaker 2: And will are the risks live? 139 00:07:29,520 --> 00:07:34,800 Speaker 3: If you're looking in the financial system broadly, quite a 140 00:07:34,840 --> 00:07:38,520 Speaker 3: lot of optimism now relative to maybe six months ago 141 00:07:38,920 --> 00:07:41,720 Speaker 3: among the streets of Davos. 142 00:07:42,440 --> 00:07:44,360 Speaker 2: What would you worry about? What do we do? Yeah? 143 00:07:44,400 --> 00:07:46,400 Speaker 1: Last time I said this, I got into trouble and 144 00:07:47,440 --> 00:07:50,600 Speaker 1: one of my major investors immediately jumped in and homed 145 00:07:50,600 --> 00:07:51,239 Speaker 1: in an area. 146 00:07:51,280 --> 00:07:52,760 Speaker 2: I just want to make a general point. 147 00:07:53,320 --> 00:07:56,520 Speaker 1: Since two thousand and eight, there has been a massive 148 00:07:56,600 --> 00:08:01,680 Speaker 1: movement of assets from the regulated banking sector into the NBFI, 149 00:08:01,840 --> 00:08:04,760 Speaker 1: the so called shadow banking sector. The numbers are two 150 00:08:04,880 --> 00:08:07,680 Speaker 1: hundred and twenty trillion to two hundred and forty trillion dollars. 151 00:08:08,120 --> 00:08:10,600 Speaker 1: All I'm saying is that since that sector is not 152 00:08:10,680 --> 00:08:15,640 Speaker 1: sufficiently regulated by definition, that is where you will probably 153 00:08:15,680 --> 00:08:20,120 Speaker 1: see crisis coming out. I'm not sure those crises would 154 00:08:20,160 --> 00:08:23,520 Speaker 1: be systemic. I think there'll be more of a fiduciary nature, 155 00:08:24,880 --> 00:08:27,520 Speaker 1: but they can have a waterfall effects. So I do think, 156 00:08:27,560 --> 00:08:30,400 Speaker 1: and we know that the FSB is now looking at 157 00:08:30,440 --> 00:08:33,719 Speaker 1: shadow banking and seeing if they can get more visibility 158 00:08:33,760 --> 00:08:35,480 Speaker 1: into it. So I'm not going to pick up one 159 00:08:35,520 --> 00:08:37,480 Speaker 1: specific asset class in that sector. 160 00:08:37,640 --> 00:08:38,360 Speaker 2: It could be anywhere. 161 00:08:38,400 --> 00:08:41,920 Speaker 1: And Mark ran back on your immediately behind it, and 162 00:08:42,000 --> 00:08:45,000 Speaker 1: John Ray and everybody else, and I did not talk 163 00:08:45,040 --> 00:08:46,000 Speaker 1: about private credit. 164 00:08:46,080 --> 00:08:48,679 Speaker 2: They did. I'm not sure that the one and a 165 00:08:48,720 --> 00:08:49,760 Speaker 2: half trillion. 166 00:08:49,440 --> 00:08:53,079 Speaker 1: Dollar private credit market is particularly systemic, but the point 167 00:08:53,160 --> 00:08:55,680 Speaker 1: is that these things can have a snowball effect. So 168 00:08:55,760 --> 00:08:58,600 Speaker 1: I do think that regulators are looking in the wrong place. 169 00:08:58,760 --> 00:09:03,200 Speaker 1: Looking to over regulate the banks, looking for more capital 170 00:09:03,200 --> 00:09:06,079 Speaker 1: in the banking system is the wrong issue. 171 00:09:06,160 --> 00:09:06,440 Speaker 2: All right. 172 00:09:06,440 --> 00:09:08,160 Speaker 3: I'm going to push back a bit on this because 173 00:09:08,400 --> 00:09:13,560 Speaker 3: obviously it's not in isolation that we've decided to regulate 174 00:09:13,600 --> 00:09:17,400 Speaker 3: banks much more than these other institutents. It's because actually, 175 00:09:17,440 --> 00:09:21,359 Speaker 3: now several times of looking, it's been harder to identify 176 00:09:21,480 --> 00:09:25,560 Speaker 3: systemic or serious risks in the non banking sector, largely 177 00:09:25,600 --> 00:09:26,840 Speaker 3: because of the lack of leverage. 178 00:09:26,880 --> 00:09:28,760 Speaker 2: You know, I'm speaking as an economist. 179 00:09:28,880 --> 00:09:31,440 Speaker 3: It's very hard to get a big crisis without a 180 00:09:31,480 --> 00:09:34,120 Speaker 3: lot of leverage. And if you look at the banking 181 00:09:34,160 --> 00:09:37,160 Speaker 3: system has a structural way that they can then make 182 00:09:37,280 --> 00:09:41,000 Speaker 3: it very easily turn some financial problem into a broader 183 00:09:41,000 --> 00:09:43,520 Speaker 3: economic problem that you just don't see in these institutions. 184 00:09:43,559 --> 00:09:44,800 Speaker 2: So they have to be breaking the law. 185 00:09:44,840 --> 00:09:47,040 Speaker 3: When you talk about a fiduciary crisis, they have to 186 00:09:47,080 --> 00:09:49,920 Speaker 3: be exercising fraud on quite a grand scale. 187 00:09:49,960 --> 00:09:52,600 Speaker 1: No fiduciary crisis can moost be duty of care. It's 188 00:09:52,679 --> 00:09:56,360 Speaker 1: not breaking the law. It's still advised management. It's getting 189 00:09:56,400 --> 00:09:58,840 Speaker 1: into exotica that hasn't been sufficient. 190 00:09:58,880 --> 00:09:59,960 Speaker 2: So let's give you an example. 191 00:10:00,400 --> 00:10:04,000 Speaker 1: Crypto happened not to be a crisis because that three 192 00:10:04,040 --> 00:10:07,360 Speaker 1: point six trillion dollars market capitalization of the peak had 193 00:10:07,440 --> 00:10:11,480 Speaker 1: not got into the mainstream of financial housekeeping, if you want. 194 00:10:11,760 --> 00:10:15,200 Speaker 1: But if it had had, although it wasn't breaking the law, 195 00:10:15,520 --> 00:10:18,079 Speaker 1: it could have had a snowball effect. So I think, 196 00:10:18,440 --> 00:10:20,480 Speaker 1: you know, just for the because the regulators say that 197 00:10:20,520 --> 00:10:23,000 Speaker 1: we know banks and there's leverage there and by the way, 198 00:10:23,240 --> 00:10:26,760 Speaker 1: eight happened, right, which I accept banks needed more capital 199 00:10:26,800 --> 00:10:29,439 Speaker 1: and so on, just to say as indeed, one senior 200 00:10:29,480 --> 00:10:32,240 Speaker 1: regulator said to me, the more we get assets out 201 00:10:32,280 --> 00:10:35,000 Speaker 1: of the banking sector to shadow banking. We don't care 202 00:10:35,080 --> 00:10:38,600 Speaker 1: because there's no leverage is actually missing the point in 203 00:10:38,640 --> 00:10:41,000 Speaker 1: many ways. And by the way, there is implicit leverage 204 00:10:41,440 --> 00:10:45,760 Speaker 1: in low investment grade products and so on, by definition. 205 00:10:45,559 --> 00:10:49,000 Speaker 2: Is part of the capital stack. I guess it comes back. 206 00:10:49,080 --> 00:10:51,800 Speaker 3: It comes back to I mean, of course you're right, 207 00:10:52,000 --> 00:10:53,400 Speaker 3: and then I think the focus would have to be 208 00:10:53,440 --> 00:10:57,040 Speaker 3: on specific areas, particularly if you have very liquid assets 209 00:10:57,200 --> 00:11:00,000 Speaker 3: that are being claimed to be easily tradable and liquid. 210 00:11:00,080 --> 00:11:00,560 Speaker 2: Yeah, sort of thing. 211 00:11:00,600 --> 00:11:03,079 Speaker 3: But I guess I guess it's just that the other 212 00:11:03,200 --> 00:11:05,079 Speaker 3: The main point is just because something is a lot 213 00:11:05,120 --> 00:11:08,080 Speaker 3: of money doesn't mean that maybe we should be paying 214 00:11:08,080 --> 00:11:10,000 Speaker 3: a bit more attention to it, but doesn't mean immediately 215 00:11:10,040 --> 00:11:11,880 Speaker 3: that it has to be regulated more because it may 216 00:11:12,160 --> 00:11:13,400 Speaker 3: have underlying assets. 217 00:11:14,240 --> 00:11:16,679 Speaker 1: No, what I'm saying is, if you don't know what 218 00:11:16,720 --> 00:11:19,000 Speaker 1: the risks are in that two hundred and twenty to 219 00:11:19,000 --> 00:11:22,120 Speaker 1: two hundred and forty trillion dollar pool, that's probably a 220 00:11:22,120 --> 00:11:24,160 Speaker 1: little bit of an oversight. 221 00:11:25,559 --> 00:11:27,640 Speaker 3: So the interesting challenge that you have at the moment 222 00:11:27,760 --> 00:11:29,520 Speaker 3: is people think that you should be trying to make 223 00:11:29,760 --> 00:11:34,280 Speaker 3: targeting more higher return, making more money. Do you think 224 00:11:34,360 --> 00:11:39,280 Speaker 3: you're not ambitious enough. Yes, the return, yes ubs some returnal. 225 00:11:39,400 --> 00:11:44,080 Speaker 1: We have given you know, a fifteen percent target exit 226 00:11:44,280 --> 00:11:46,160 Speaker 1: ro E at the end of. 227 00:11:46,080 --> 00:11:48,160 Speaker 2: Twenty twenty six, you. 228 00:11:48,120 --> 00:11:51,959 Speaker 1: Know, as a as a as a guideline, and obviously 229 00:11:52,240 --> 00:11:55,720 Speaker 1: there maybe upside on that. I think we are not 230 00:11:55,760 --> 00:11:58,760 Speaker 1: being cautious. I think we're being very practical. I've also 231 00:11:58,800 --> 00:12:02,400 Speaker 1: said all along that you is a global bank, it 232 00:12:02,520 --> 00:12:06,360 Speaker 1: is a wealth manager primarily. It's very important on March 233 00:12:06,400 --> 00:12:09,040 Speaker 1: the nineteenth that we restricted the amount of our capital 234 00:12:09,280 --> 00:12:11,320 Speaker 1: that we would put at risk in the investment bank 235 00:12:11,360 --> 00:12:13,120 Speaker 1: and took it down from where it was. 236 00:12:13,679 --> 00:12:15,960 Speaker 2: So if we look at where our goals. 237 00:12:15,640 --> 00:12:18,559 Speaker 1: Are, we look at people like Morgan Stanley who gave 238 00:12:18,600 --> 00:12:22,960 Speaker 1: their earnings yesterday and reaffirm their own rot targets at 239 00:12:22,960 --> 00:12:25,760 Speaker 1: twenty percent. So I think that there's plenty of room 240 00:12:25,800 --> 00:12:29,040 Speaker 1: for UVS to perform and perform well. But rather than 241 00:12:29,080 --> 00:12:33,719 Speaker 1: over promising, let's integrate the two operations. Then let's get 242 00:12:33,760 --> 00:12:37,360 Speaker 1: a proper, pro former business. And then by twenty twenty 243 00:12:37,440 --> 00:12:39,840 Speaker 1: six we have proven the case, and I think then 244 00:12:39,880 --> 00:12:43,240 Speaker 1: there is significant upside for UVS because. 245 00:12:43,040 --> 00:12:45,400 Speaker 3: If you look across the market, I mean, with so 246 00:12:45,520 --> 00:12:49,040 Speaker 3: much focus on the wealth management where you can reliably 247 00:12:49,120 --> 00:12:52,599 Speaker 3: get returns with a two in front of it and 248 00:12:52,640 --> 00:12:54,199 Speaker 3: not a one. I mean, is that what you're expect? 249 00:12:54,240 --> 00:12:56,120 Speaker 3: Would you be disappointed if you weren't getting to that 250 00:12:56,200 --> 00:12:57,600 Speaker 3: over the next I. 251 00:12:57,559 --> 00:13:00,280 Speaker 1: Think we've given guidance that were comfortable to Sting for 252 00:13:00,320 --> 00:13:03,240 Speaker 1: the time being, and my view is it's always better 253 00:13:03,280 --> 00:13:05,880 Speaker 1: to be cautious in the guidance you give. 254 00:13:05,920 --> 00:13:07,600 Speaker 2: And if you over deliver, that's great. 255 00:13:09,280 --> 00:13:11,880 Speaker 3: Have you thought about moving the primary listening to the US? 256 00:13:12,120 --> 00:13:16,160 Speaker 3: You could probably moving the primary listing to the US. 257 00:13:16,440 --> 00:13:19,840 Speaker 3: No kind of thing that blue people are bloomberg think about. 258 00:13:20,000 --> 00:13:22,920 Speaker 2: No, you don't have to be quite a good headline, 259 00:13:22,920 --> 00:13:23,760 Speaker 2: though I quite like it. 260 00:13:23,760 --> 00:13:25,520 Speaker 1: Well, you know it's I thought, I just check, you know, 261 00:13:25,600 --> 00:13:28,000 Speaker 1: which is just get lynched in Barnhofstras. 262 00:13:28,360 --> 00:13:29,240 Speaker 2: No. I can see. 263 00:13:29,440 --> 00:13:32,120 Speaker 3: I can see there would be certain challenges attached to it, 264 00:13:32,360 --> 00:13:35,360 Speaker 3: but as a straight you would also can see how 265 00:13:35,400 --> 00:13:37,559 Speaker 3: you would get an immediate valuation boo. And of course 266 00:13:37,600 --> 00:13:39,640 Speaker 3: we're seeing we are seeing some of that movement going 267 00:13:39,640 --> 00:13:40,280 Speaker 3: across the lad and I. 268 00:13:40,320 --> 00:13:44,040 Speaker 1: Think there is huge value to being Switzerland and Swiss based. 269 00:13:44,320 --> 00:13:50,160 Speaker 1: March the fifteenth, Switzerland faced potential huge embarrassment in financial markets. 270 00:13:50,559 --> 00:13:53,960 Speaker 1: By March the nineteenth, when the deal was done, Switzerland 271 00:13:53,960 --> 00:13:57,239 Speaker 1: had reaffirmed because it had a strong savior in UBS, 272 00:13:57,559 --> 00:14:01,199 Speaker 1: that Switzerland is the center of global wealth management. There 273 00:14:01,280 --> 00:14:04,880 Speaker 1: is a significant calling card for Switzerland. So that's why 274 00:14:04,920 --> 00:14:09,200 Speaker 1: I get somewhat irritated when people say the bank's balance 275 00:14:09,280 --> 00:14:12,360 Speaker 1: even relation to GDP. I'm not sure that's particularly meaningful 276 00:14:12,400 --> 00:14:16,320 Speaker 1: statistic anyway. What's meaningful is the nature of our business, 277 00:14:16,320 --> 00:14:18,880 Speaker 1: and the nature of our business is that we're primarily 278 00:14:19,160 --> 00:14:21,920 Speaker 1: a wealth manager, which is a fee based business. Right, 279 00:14:22,320 --> 00:14:26,480 Speaker 1: I think it is a gold carrot standard for Switzerland 280 00:14:26,520 --> 00:14:29,600 Speaker 1: to have UVS here and to be based here, and 281 00:14:29,640 --> 00:14:31,960 Speaker 1: by the way, all the other parts of the Swiss 282 00:14:31,960 --> 00:14:35,120 Speaker 1: ecosystem in wealth management to benefit from that too. 283 00:14:35,920 --> 00:14:39,000 Speaker 3: Do you have The answer is maybe no, But there 284 00:14:39,040 --> 00:14:41,200 Speaker 3: is quite a lot of discussion now around the reopening 285 00:14:41,200 --> 00:14:43,240 Speaker 3: of negotiations between Switzerland and the EU. 286 00:14:44,960 --> 00:14:49,560 Speaker 2: Do you do you have a stake in that? As UBS? 287 00:14:49,720 --> 00:14:50,040 Speaker 2: Do you have? 288 00:14:50,440 --> 00:14:53,640 Speaker 1: We're a third country, as the EU likes to remind us, 289 00:14:53,640 --> 00:14:57,000 Speaker 1: we in the UK are both third countries, and that's 290 00:14:57,080 --> 00:14:58,960 Speaker 1: just the nature of the club and the EU. And 291 00:14:59,000 --> 00:15:03,000 Speaker 1: you make a decision the EU itself has got fundamental problems. 292 00:15:03,000 --> 00:15:05,160 Speaker 1: And you've heard me talk about this before. I mean 293 00:15:06,120 --> 00:15:09,680 Speaker 1: European equity market capitalization as a percentage of the overall 294 00:15:09,720 --> 00:15:12,640 Speaker 1: pie is fifty percent less than what it was thirteen 295 00:15:12,720 --> 00:15:16,480 Speaker 1: years ago. Banking in Europe accounts for eighty percent of lending. 296 00:15:16,520 --> 00:15:19,600 Speaker 1: It's almost the inverse in the US. It's no surprise 297 00:15:19,640 --> 00:15:22,480 Speaker 1: that access to markets allowed the US and access to 298 00:15:22,520 --> 00:15:26,240 Speaker 1: credit to recover just more quickly. So the EU has Switzerland, 299 00:15:26,280 --> 00:15:29,160 Speaker 1: by the way, is a market based system, so UBS 300 00:15:29,200 --> 00:15:31,400 Speaker 1: has a lot to bring in that in terms of helping. 301 00:15:31,680 --> 00:15:34,800 Speaker 1: But the EU has got to understand and indeed China 302 00:15:34,920 --> 00:15:39,480 Speaker 1: understands this potentially that they need to redevelop their banking union, 303 00:15:39,520 --> 00:15:43,000 Speaker 1: capital markets, union and so on. No sign of that, No, 304 00:15:43,080 --> 00:15:45,520 Speaker 1: there is a sign of that, there's been. It's a 305 00:15:45,520 --> 00:15:50,160 Speaker 1: pity you didn't Francine didn't ask Christine because recently the 306 00:15:50,200 --> 00:15:53,280 Speaker 1: President of the euro Group, Pascal of Donahue, they've done 307 00:15:53,320 --> 00:15:57,040 Speaker 1: work in Europe that realized that Europe is actually positively 308 00:15:57,600 --> 00:16:01,320 Speaker 1: not benefiting from having vibrant cap markets. To the tune 309 00:16:01,360 --> 00:16:04,400 Speaker 1: that's significant pools of money a moving into the US, 310 00:16:04,440 --> 00:16:06,720 Speaker 1: which is the only viable market. So I do think 311 00:16:06,760 --> 00:16:08,320 Speaker 1: that it's going to take a long time. Things in 312 00:16:08,360 --> 00:16:11,200 Speaker 1: Europe always take a long time, but I think Europe 313 00:16:11,200 --> 00:16:15,760 Speaker 1: realizes that they need strategically access to better markets and 314 00:16:16,480 --> 00:16:19,760 Speaker 1: somehow to work out the banking union despite the European 315 00:16:19,800 --> 00:16:23,880 Speaker 1: invested interests. Yes, but similar reports. 316 00:16:23,600 --> 00:16:26,720 Speaker 3: Have been done for at least twenty years and could 317 00:16:26,720 --> 00:16:29,640 Speaker 3: probably go back and find fifty year old. But there's 318 00:16:29,680 --> 00:16:32,120 Speaker 3: been an understanding of those benefits, but there's not been 319 00:16:32,160 --> 00:16:34,600 Speaker 3: the political will. And I don't think do you see 320 00:16:34,800 --> 00:16:35,640 Speaker 3: political will well. 321 00:16:35,640 --> 00:16:38,360 Speaker 1: I mean one of the tragedies of the EU is 322 00:16:38,360 --> 00:16:41,440 Speaker 1: that Britain left right, and Britain was a leader in 323 00:16:41,520 --> 00:16:45,480 Speaker 1: market proficiency and skill and expertise, and Europe itself is 324 00:16:45,560 --> 00:16:48,240 Speaker 1: essentially a closed market. So I think Europe is now 325 00:16:48,280 --> 00:16:50,800 Speaker 1: having to find its way without Britain, and I think 326 00:16:50,840 --> 00:16:51,960 Speaker 1: that has been the difference. 327 00:16:53,520 --> 00:16:57,040 Speaker 3: I spoke to one CEO just an advance of coming 328 00:16:57,080 --> 00:16:59,840 Speaker 3: here and asked him about why he was coming, what 329 00:16:59,880 --> 00:17:04,240 Speaker 3: he expected to gain from Devils, and he said, there's 330 00:17:04,240 --> 00:17:05,120 Speaker 3: lots of things people. 331 00:17:04,880 --> 00:17:06,520 Speaker 2: Talk about devils. I don't care about. 332 00:17:06,800 --> 00:17:08,680 Speaker 3: What I do care about is finding out from my 333 00:17:08,840 --> 00:17:12,240 Speaker 3: peers how they're solving for the possibility that we might 334 00:17:12,280 --> 00:17:14,720 Speaker 3: be back in the nineteen thirties and heading for some 335 00:17:14,880 --> 00:17:18,719 Speaker 3: kind of global conflict, looking at the geopolitical risks around, 336 00:17:18,760 --> 00:17:20,800 Speaker 3: how do you solve for that? Does it How does 337 00:17:21,560 --> 00:17:23,960 Speaker 3: geopolitical risks that we see effect the way you think 338 00:17:24,000 --> 00:17:25,600 Speaker 3: about ubs business. 339 00:17:25,800 --> 00:17:29,760 Speaker 1: Well, you have to think geopolitically, and it's a mine field. 340 00:17:29,800 --> 00:17:32,520 Speaker 1: We have the big question in the room, which is 341 00:17:33,520 --> 00:17:37,159 Speaker 1: US China relations. China is twenty percent of global GDP, 342 00:17:37,359 --> 00:17:40,800 Speaker 1: sixty five percent of marginal growth over the last decade. 343 00:17:41,920 --> 00:17:44,159 Speaker 1: You know, obviously it doesn't suit anybody to have the 344 00:17:44,280 --> 00:17:48,760 Speaker 1: US and China at war and US being neutral essentially 345 00:17:49,400 --> 00:17:52,280 Speaker 1: a European institution in the middle of that. You know, 346 00:17:52,359 --> 00:17:56,200 Speaker 1: we saw what happened with the Ukraine conflict when sanctions 347 00:17:56,200 --> 00:17:58,720 Speaker 1: were imposed and for the first time ever, a number 348 00:17:58,720 --> 00:18:02,480 Speaker 1: of countries joined sanctions. This is not good, right, So 349 00:18:02,560 --> 00:18:05,879 Speaker 1: clearly we take these into account, but you just have 350 00:18:05,960 --> 00:18:08,080 Speaker 1: to have a judgment on these. My personal view is 351 00:18:08,119 --> 00:18:11,080 Speaker 1: that you know, the US does almost seven hundred billion 352 00:18:11,119 --> 00:18:14,440 Speaker 1: dollars of trade with China. I think both sides of 353 00:18:14,480 --> 00:18:16,880 Speaker 1: the House and the US particularly going into election year, 354 00:18:17,359 --> 00:18:20,720 Speaker 1: or anti China because that is useful rhetoric, But I 355 00:18:20,760 --> 00:18:23,760 Speaker 1: think the Americans are very practical people, so I suspect 356 00:18:24,240 --> 00:18:27,879 Speaker 1: the hotspots will be focused on technology and defense and 357 00:18:27,960 --> 00:18:30,639 Speaker 1: the rest of the stuff carries on. And certainly I 358 00:18:30,640 --> 00:18:33,800 Speaker 1: think Presidency's meeting at the end of last year at 359 00:18:33,840 --> 00:18:37,680 Speaker 1: President Biden was a big breakthrough. So, yes, we see 360 00:18:37,680 --> 00:18:40,240 Speaker 1: the time around risk, We see this well, we think 361 00:18:40,280 --> 00:18:41,480 Speaker 1: we can navigate those. 362 00:18:41,560 --> 00:18:44,600 Speaker 2: So geopolitics is just a fact of life. 363 00:18:44,720 --> 00:18:47,479 Speaker 3: But being a truly global wealth management firm, how has 364 00:18:47,480 --> 00:18:54,440 Speaker 3: it affected the way you think about diversification China itself, Well, 365 00:18:54,600 --> 00:18:56,359 Speaker 3: you're reviewing that all the time. 366 00:18:58,000 --> 00:19:01,520 Speaker 2: UBS is growth. Primarily we will come from two sources. 367 00:19:01,920 --> 00:19:05,800 Speaker 1: It will come from China, Asia Greater Asia, and it 368 00:19:05,840 --> 00:19:07,639 Speaker 1: will come from the United States, where we have a 369 00:19:07,680 --> 00:19:11,399 Speaker 1: significant subsidiary which we will continue to grow. And that 370 00:19:11,520 --> 00:19:15,320 Speaker 1: is our strategy. So if China suddenly freezes, we have 371 00:19:15,400 --> 00:19:15,960 Speaker 1: a problem. 372 00:19:16,280 --> 00:19:16,520 Speaker 2: Right. 373 00:19:17,320 --> 00:19:19,480 Speaker 1: I do not believe that that is a central case. 374 00:19:19,520 --> 00:19:21,800 Speaker 1: I think that is a tail risk, and we will 375 00:19:21,880 --> 00:19:25,560 Speaker 1: react accordingly, as indeed we did react when Russia and 376 00:19:25,600 --> 00:19:29,119 Speaker 1: the Ukraine started and the sanctions came in, which were 377 00:19:29,200 --> 00:19:32,920 Speaker 1: not popular, and clearly sanctions in any wealth management complex 378 00:19:33,240 --> 00:19:36,080 Speaker 1: are not popular. But we will act in accordance with 379 00:19:36,119 --> 00:19:38,840 Speaker 1: the law and in accordance with the business ethos. 380 00:19:39,640 --> 00:19:43,040 Speaker 3: I should ask you the same question that Francine asked 381 00:19:43,080 --> 00:19:43,760 Speaker 3: Christine Lagard. 382 00:19:43,800 --> 00:19:46,199 Speaker 2: How are you thinking about the US election? You know, 383 00:19:46,320 --> 00:19:48,760 Speaker 2: I'm just a humble banker. I mean, what do I 384 00:19:48,840 --> 00:19:49,320 Speaker 2: know about? 385 00:19:52,280 --> 00:19:54,480 Speaker 3: Always have to start worrying when people start talking about 386 00:19:54,480 --> 00:19:57,159 Speaker 3: themselves as humble or anything, when they have such a 387 00:19:57,280 --> 00:19:58,200 Speaker 3: large finactulence. 388 00:19:58,320 --> 00:20:04,480 Speaker 2: Well, the Brits made of empire, so I'm interested. 389 00:20:05,280 --> 00:20:08,320 Speaker 3: We're nearly out of time, but obviously having gone through 390 00:20:08,400 --> 00:20:10,679 Speaker 3: I mean it did you talked about culture right at 391 00:20:10,720 --> 00:20:14,560 Speaker 3: the beginning? I mean it looked like an almighty despite 392 00:20:15,280 --> 00:20:18,159 Speaker 3: a lot of the people involved, all big Swiss. It 393 00:20:18,720 --> 00:20:22,760 Speaker 3: seemed on the outside like an extraordinary culture clash, or 394 00:20:22,800 --> 00:20:25,199 Speaker 3: at least was going to be an interesting journey to 395 00:20:25,280 --> 00:20:29,200 Speaker 3: combine those two cultures and culture. I mean, I worked 396 00:20:29,200 --> 00:20:33,879 Speaker 3: at JP Morgan. It's so important at a bank, and 397 00:20:33,920 --> 00:20:36,040 Speaker 3: somewhere like JP Morgan, they've done such a sort of 398 00:20:36,040 --> 00:20:40,000 Speaker 3: extraordinary job of combining customer appeal with a very very 399 00:20:40,000 --> 00:20:42,680 Speaker 3: strong internal culture. Have you changed the way you think 400 00:20:42,720 --> 00:20:45,960 Speaker 3: about institutional culture a result. 401 00:20:45,680 --> 00:20:48,160 Speaker 1: Of the last No, I agree with you. I've always 402 00:20:48,200 --> 00:20:51,520 Speaker 1: been a believer in culture. It's no accident that the 403 00:20:51,600 --> 00:20:54,040 Speaker 1: survivors in two thousand and eight were the firms that 404 00:20:54,119 --> 00:20:55,679 Speaker 1: had everybody messed up. 405 00:20:55,760 --> 00:20:57,840 Speaker 2: I get that, But the firms that had. 406 00:20:57,720 --> 00:20:59,760 Speaker 1: The strong cultures are the ones who were able to 407 00:21:00,040 --> 00:21:04,080 Speaker 1: pair themselves and a tone and move forward. I think 408 00:21:04,240 --> 00:21:07,080 Speaker 1: UBS is a very strong culture. And the Germans have 409 00:21:07,200 --> 00:21:09,840 Speaker 1: this phrase that the fish stinks from the head, so 410 00:21:09,920 --> 00:21:12,640 Speaker 1: I think culture comes from the top, and that's why 411 00:21:12,720 --> 00:21:14,720 Speaker 1: one of the reasons when we did the acquisition of 412 00:21:14,720 --> 00:21:17,800 Speaker 1: Credits Sweez, we made these comments about culture and we 413 00:21:17,840 --> 00:21:19,919 Speaker 1: are trying to get people to come into what is 414 00:21:19,960 --> 00:21:21,480 Speaker 1: a strong culture at UBS. 415 00:21:21,840 --> 00:21:23,000 Speaker 2: I mean you mentioned JP. 416 00:21:23,160 --> 00:21:26,560 Speaker 1: It's interesting people forget that JP Morgan ceased to exist 417 00:21:26,960 --> 00:21:29,200 Speaker 1: in nineteen ninety nine and it was bought by Chase, 418 00:21:29,240 --> 00:21:31,119 Speaker 1: which is why, as an ex Morgan. 419 00:21:30,880 --> 00:21:33,040 Speaker 2: Stanley guy, we never called it JP Morgan. 420 00:21:33,119 --> 00:21:36,480 Speaker 3: But you know, that's one of the amazing achievements. Yeah, 421 00:21:36,520 --> 00:21:38,600 Speaker 3: we think it's over one hundreds of years old. 422 00:21:38,520 --> 00:21:42,200 Speaker 1: Absolutely well run, but anyway, but it has reaffirmed a 423 00:21:42,280 --> 00:21:45,440 Speaker 1: culture and that's very much Jamie bringing that top down 424 00:21:45,480 --> 00:21:47,520 Speaker 1: as well, and then it gets through into every standard 425 00:21:47,840 --> 00:21:51,960 Speaker 1: and the way you reinforce culture's behavior, an example and 426 00:21:52,040 --> 00:21:56,200 Speaker 1: punishment and so on. So I'm confident you know it's 427 00:21:56,240 --> 00:21:58,800 Speaker 1: a pity. I mean credit Sweeze had a specific culture. 428 00:21:58,840 --> 00:22:02,120 Speaker 1: You'll remember back in the nineties and the early noughties. 429 00:22:02,400 --> 00:22:06,840 Speaker 1: It had a culture of innovation, originality, entrepreneurialism. 430 00:22:07,160 --> 00:22:09,800 Speaker 2: It was just allowed to go unchecked. So I think 431 00:22:09,840 --> 00:22:11,480 Speaker 2: culture now done. 432 00:22:11,520 --> 00:22:14,159 Speaker 1: Tarrillo, when he was governor in charge of supervision at 433 00:22:14,160 --> 00:22:17,160 Speaker 1: the FED, wanted to try and regulate for culture. 434 00:22:17,840 --> 00:22:21,280 Speaker 2: But it's impossible to regulate for culture. Culture is what 435 00:22:21,400 --> 00:22:21,800 Speaker 2: it is. 436 00:22:22,119 --> 00:22:24,919 Speaker 1: So you have to look at management standards, behavior and 437 00:22:25,000 --> 00:22:25,320 Speaker 1: so on. 438 00:22:26,119 --> 00:22:26,719 Speaker 2: Very quickly. 439 00:22:27,640 --> 00:22:31,959 Speaker 3: You've already kind of talked about expectations for the successor 440 00:22:32,119 --> 00:22:32,960 Speaker 3: for Sergiomorti. 441 00:22:34,600 --> 00:22:37,960 Speaker 2: Not in any hurry, please, but you have I mean, 442 00:22:38,040 --> 00:22:39,600 Speaker 2: looking at the example of Morgus Stanley. 443 00:22:40,160 --> 00:22:43,320 Speaker 3: There's been the words bloodless coup have been mentioned, A 444 00:22:43,320 --> 00:22:46,879 Speaker 3: certain kind of timescale has been mentioned. But will you 445 00:22:47,000 --> 00:22:49,760 Speaker 3: be talking more about that over the course of this 446 00:22:49,960 --> 00:22:50,480 Speaker 3: we will. 447 00:22:50,320 --> 00:22:52,400 Speaker 1: I mean, by the way, I don't understand the bloodless 448 00:22:52,440 --> 00:22:56,560 Speaker 1: coup because James for years has had this worked out. 449 00:22:56,600 --> 00:22:59,240 Speaker 1: And part of the reason I left Augus Stanley when 450 00:22:59,240 --> 00:23:01,960 Speaker 1: I did nineteen was to make sure there was room 451 00:23:02,000 --> 00:23:04,919 Speaker 1: for people to come up and be checked, and so 452 00:23:05,160 --> 00:23:07,680 Speaker 1: it was actually very well thought out and planned. 453 00:23:07,880 --> 00:23:09,560 Speaker 2: It doesn't seem to be a criticism when you say. 454 00:23:09,520 --> 00:23:13,680 Speaker 1: But coup sounds like, you know, it wasn't it happened. 455 00:23:14,560 --> 00:23:17,399 Speaker 1: It was sort of backroom deal or whatever you know. 456 00:23:17,840 --> 00:23:20,800 Speaker 1: At ubs. We definitely one of the reasons when I 457 00:23:20,840 --> 00:23:24,760 Speaker 1: brought Sergio back. The board brought Sergio back once I 458 00:23:24,760 --> 00:23:26,639 Speaker 1: gave him two conditions. One is I needed him to 459 00:23:26,640 --> 00:23:28,240 Speaker 1: be here for a certain amount of time to get 460 00:23:28,240 --> 00:23:31,240 Speaker 1: through the integration. And secondly, I said, you have to 461 00:23:31,280 --> 00:23:35,080 Speaker 1: get us a bench, a succession bench, right which we're 462 00:23:35,119 --> 00:23:37,920 Speaker 1: working on, and it takes us some time to work 463 00:23:37,960 --> 00:23:40,560 Speaker 1: out with that benches. And once you've identified that bench, 464 00:23:41,119 --> 00:23:43,280 Speaker 1: then you don't just anoint that person. You're going to 465 00:23:43,280 --> 00:23:47,320 Speaker 1: make sure that that person, male or female, has sufficient 466 00:23:47,400 --> 00:23:50,600 Speaker 1: experience and breadth to be able to slot into that role. 467 00:23:51,119 --> 00:23:53,879 Speaker 1: So you know, we will be open about it. But 468 00:23:54,040 --> 00:23:56,720 Speaker 1: certainly people in banking have a habit of saying, if 469 00:23:56,720 --> 00:24:01,280 Speaker 1: somebody's thinking about succession, then their chapter zero. For Sergio's 470 00:24:01,320 --> 00:24:05,120 Speaker 1: chapter is not over, so you know, we really expect 471 00:24:05,480 --> 00:24:06,560 Speaker 1: him to be around for a while. 472 00:24:06,640 --> 00:24:06,840 Speaker 2: Yet