1 00:00:03,800 --> 00:00:06,680 Speaker 1: Welcome to Stuff to Blow Your Mind from how Stuff 2 00:00:06,680 --> 00:00:13,720 Speaker 1: Works dot com. Hey, welcome to Stuff to Blow your Mind. 3 00:00:13,760 --> 00:00:16,320 Speaker 1: My name is Robert Lamb and I'm Julie Douglass. Julie, 4 00:00:16,320 --> 00:00:19,120 Speaker 1: what did you do this weekend? Oh? Well, I had 5 00:00:19,160 --> 00:00:22,560 Speaker 1: the privilege of going to see David Eagleman speak at 6 00:00:22,560 --> 00:00:26,799 Speaker 1: the Decatur Book Festival. And uh, I'm talking about science 7 00:00:27,400 --> 00:00:31,800 Speaker 1: hunky nous all rolled together in one package. He un No, 8 00:00:31,840 --> 00:00:34,040 Speaker 1: it's not really hunky, but you know, the media sort 9 00:00:34,080 --> 00:00:37,120 Speaker 1: of plays that image out as suppose yeah, I would. 10 00:00:37,159 --> 00:00:38,879 Speaker 1: You know, he's an attractive guy. He's up there with 11 00:00:38,920 --> 00:00:42,720 Speaker 1: like Brian Cox, not Brian Cox the old grizzly actor, 12 00:00:42,800 --> 00:00:46,560 Speaker 1: but Brian Cox, the young cosmologist in terms of like, yeah, 13 00:00:46,560 --> 00:00:48,840 Speaker 1: you're sort of if they had like a teen magazine 14 00:00:48,920 --> 00:00:52,040 Speaker 1: for science, two year old science geeks, Eagleman would be 15 00:00:52,080 --> 00:00:54,240 Speaker 1: on the cover every other month. Yeah, I'd be like 16 00:00:54,360 --> 00:00:57,680 Speaker 1: saber tooth tiger Beat, yeah or something like that. Definitely, 17 00:00:57,720 --> 00:00:59,960 Speaker 1: he he would fulfill that role. And he's got fancy jacket, 18 00:01:00,160 --> 00:01:03,120 Speaker 1: but more and more importantly, he's got fancy thoughts. Yes, 19 00:01:03,240 --> 00:01:05,840 Speaker 1: that's the most important part. And he's great at relating 20 00:01:05,959 --> 00:01:08,720 Speaker 1: these thoughts to a general audience, which we all love, 21 00:01:08,760 --> 00:01:10,160 Speaker 1: I mean, because that's that's the whole thing is, like 22 00:01:10,200 --> 00:01:11,920 Speaker 1: scientists can do their own their own thing in a 23 00:01:11,959 --> 00:01:14,880 Speaker 1: bubble all day and it's great, but somebody has to 24 00:01:15,000 --> 00:01:18,400 Speaker 1: bring that knowledge to the outside world. And it's great 25 00:01:18,400 --> 00:01:20,759 Speaker 1: when the scientists can do it themselves. Eagleman has also 26 00:01:20,800 --> 00:01:23,800 Speaker 1: been on Colbert Report. People probably seen him there. He's 27 00:01:23,800 --> 00:01:25,959 Speaker 1: all over the place to total media darling. Yeah, and 28 00:01:26,040 --> 00:01:28,479 Speaker 1: we've actually talked about him before in a podcast about 29 00:01:28,520 --> 00:01:32,119 Speaker 1: possibility andism. Oh yeah, yeah, which he is. He's actually 30 00:01:32,120 --> 00:01:34,480 Speaker 1: sort of founded this idea of Yeah, that's what I 31 00:01:34,480 --> 00:01:36,880 Speaker 1: actually yeah, I interviewed him about that. Yeah. Yeah, he 32 00:01:36,920 --> 00:01:38,440 Speaker 1: took a few minutes out of his time to talk 33 00:01:38,480 --> 00:01:40,399 Speaker 1: to me. But in this podcast, we're talking about a 34 00:01:40,400 --> 00:01:44,319 Speaker 1: little something called free will. What Yeah, free will, which 35 00:01:44,319 --> 00:01:47,080 Speaker 1: is which is like the one of the big ideas 36 00:01:47,520 --> 00:01:50,240 Speaker 1: of human culture and what it is to be human, 37 00:01:50,280 --> 00:01:54,240 Speaker 1: the idea that obviously we make choices in life and 38 00:01:54,280 --> 00:01:56,640 Speaker 1: those choices lead us where we need to be. And 39 00:01:56,720 --> 00:01:59,880 Speaker 1: we we recently recorded and published in an episode about 40 00:02:00,160 --> 00:02:03,480 Speaker 1: decision fatigue. So so this kind of plays nicely with 41 00:02:03,520 --> 00:02:05,440 Speaker 1: that or in a in a way kind of conflicts 42 00:02:05,480 --> 00:02:08,200 Speaker 1: with it at times at times, but sometimes they sort 43 00:02:08,200 --> 00:02:10,880 Speaker 1: of melt together because and that we were talking about 44 00:02:10,880 --> 00:02:12,960 Speaker 1: how we were we have so many choices in any 45 00:02:12,960 --> 00:02:15,160 Speaker 1: given day, little choices and big choices that it just 46 00:02:15,280 --> 00:02:20,160 Speaker 1: wears us out. But but there's a theme here. There's 47 00:02:20,240 --> 00:02:24,359 Speaker 1: finite mental energy, finite mental energy which plays into, as 48 00:02:24,400 --> 00:02:28,760 Speaker 1: we'll find out, free will or our perception that we 49 00:02:28,800 --> 00:02:32,440 Speaker 1: have free will. Yeah, and at hard here we have 50 00:02:32,480 --> 00:02:37,360 Speaker 1: a very old idea too, the idea very old philosophical 51 00:02:37,880 --> 00:02:42,400 Speaker 1: religious discussion of whether we are in charge of our 52 00:02:42,440 --> 00:02:44,720 Speaker 1: own destiny, if we're really the captains of our soul 53 00:02:45,800 --> 00:02:48,919 Speaker 1: or yeah, like Invictus, or if we're destined to do things, 54 00:02:49,000 --> 00:02:51,520 Speaker 1: if our fate is outside of our own control. Now, 55 00:02:51,560 --> 00:02:53,440 Speaker 1: the old days, it was kind of a question of 56 00:02:53,600 --> 00:02:55,760 Speaker 1: whether we were this self moving soul or it's the 57 00:02:55,800 --> 00:02:59,120 Speaker 1: gods or the fates or some of their force is 58 00:02:59,120 --> 00:03:02,200 Speaker 1: is writing the book and we're just carrying along with it. 59 00:03:02,280 --> 00:03:05,120 Speaker 1: But today the discussion is steeped in neuroscience with a 60 00:03:05,200 --> 00:03:08,320 Speaker 1: nice sprinkling of philosophy or a layer of Chico philosophy 61 00:03:08,360 --> 00:03:11,160 Speaker 1: on top. Well, you can't separate the philosophy from this, right, 62 00:03:11,240 --> 00:03:13,240 Speaker 1: This is just one of those subjects that, yeah, you can, 63 00:03:13,360 --> 00:03:15,200 Speaker 1: you can pour a bunch of neuroscience on, and you 64 00:03:15,200 --> 00:03:17,880 Speaker 1: should because it's pretty illuminating. But at the end of 65 00:03:17,919 --> 00:03:20,600 Speaker 1: the day, it's still is this. It's still a big 66 00:03:20,680 --> 00:03:22,919 Speaker 1: question mark. And that's what's really exciting about it too, 67 00:03:23,000 --> 00:03:25,120 Speaker 1: is that in some of these older philosophical arguments that 68 00:03:25,120 --> 00:03:26,880 Speaker 1: they've been around forever, but now we have these new 69 00:03:26,960 --> 00:03:30,760 Speaker 1: ideas and neuroscience, these new findings. It's forcing the philosophers 70 00:03:30,800 --> 00:03:33,440 Speaker 1: to like kind of rush in and make sense of things, 71 00:03:33,480 --> 00:03:36,040 Speaker 1: and they're kind of, uh, you know, I'm kind of 72 00:03:36,080 --> 00:03:37,520 Speaker 1: having fun with the idea here. But it's kind of 73 00:03:37,560 --> 00:03:39,360 Speaker 1: like if you have like a fire department and hasn't 74 00:03:39,360 --> 00:03:42,040 Speaker 1: been a fire in town in years and years and years, 75 00:03:42,040 --> 00:03:43,800 Speaker 1: and there's finally a little blaze and all these old 76 00:03:43,800 --> 00:03:45,800 Speaker 1: guys are like, yeah, let's get in there and do it. 77 00:03:45,840 --> 00:03:48,760 Speaker 1: In a way, it's kind of like fresh philosophical territory 78 00:03:49,080 --> 00:03:51,920 Speaker 1: and that they get to tackle old arguments but in 79 00:03:51,960 --> 00:03:54,760 Speaker 1: a light of new scientific discoveries. Yeah, and we're going 80 00:03:54,800 --> 00:03:57,560 Speaker 1: to talk about that, particularly in the context of David 81 00:03:57,560 --> 00:04:01,360 Speaker 1: Eagleman's Incognito. This is his new book, The Secret Lives 82 00:04:01,440 --> 00:04:04,600 Speaker 1: of the brain, and Eagleman claims that the brain is 83 00:04:04,680 --> 00:04:08,240 Speaker 1: running the show incognito, hence the title, and that this consciousness, 84 00:04:08,320 --> 00:04:13,600 Speaker 1: this I that we feel that I, Julie Um really 85 00:04:13,680 --> 00:04:16,039 Speaker 1: is just a bit player to the vast network of 86 00:04:16,040 --> 00:04:20,400 Speaker 1: our neural circuitry. Okay um, So this is a quote. 87 00:04:20,440 --> 00:04:22,600 Speaker 1: He says, we are not at the center of ourselves, 88 00:04:22,640 --> 00:04:25,400 Speaker 1: but instead like the Earth in the Milky Way and 89 00:04:25,440 --> 00:04:27,680 Speaker 1: the milky Way in the universe, far out on a 90 00:04:27,760 --> 00:04:32,039 Speaker 1: distant edge, hearing little of what's transpiring. So, in a 91 00:04:32,080 --> 00:04:34,160 Speaker 1: simple sense, instead of going with the idea I am 92 00:04:34,240 --> 00:04:37,480 Speaker 1: my brain or and it's more like I am a 93 00:04:37,600 --> 00:04:40,080 Speaker 1: character in the story that is told by my brain, 94 00:04:40,480 --> 00:04:42,919 Speaker 1: or something to that effect. Well, yeah, And he uses 95 00:04:42,920 --> 00:04:45,520 Speaker 1: the analogy of a newspaper, like your brain sort of 96 00:04:45,560 --> 00:04:50,000 Speaker 1: gathering all of this data and doing all the legwork. Um, 97 00:04:50,040 --> 00:04:54,360 Speaker 1: you know, the brain sort of like these localized population, 98 00:04:54,480 --> 00:04:56,400 Speaker 1: sort of like you you see in a newspaper, these 99 00:04:56,440 --> 00:04:59,719 Speaker 1: local communities, and all of a sudden that the headline 100 00:04:59,720 --> 00:05:03,840 Speaker 1: gets served up in your brain and you the reader, 101 00:05:04,120 --> 00:05:07,920 Speaker 1: I take all the credit for the headline, Like can 102 00:05:07,920 --> 00:05:10,160 Speaker 1: you read it and think, oh, yeah, I knew that, 103 00:05:10,560 --> 00:05:13,919 Speaker 1: But in fact, he's saying that these these ideas, these 104 00:05:14,120 --> 00:05:18,960 Speaker 1: um concepts, our choices are really just a result of 105 00:05:19,040 --> 00:05:23,280 Speaker 1: this activity, activity bubbling in our brains for sometimes years, 106 00:05:23,360 --> 00:05:28,000 Speaker 1: you know, sometimes months, hours, um coming up with these concepts. 107 00:05:28,080 --> 00:05:31,120 Speaker 1: It is not the eye saying, oh, yeah, I had 108 00:05:31,160 --> 00:05:33,279 Speaker 1: that idea, and we're going to talk about that how 109 00:05:33,279 --> 00:05:36,200 Speaker 1: because right now that sounds really abstract, but we're gonna 110 00:05:36,200 --> 00:05:38,040 Speaker 1: talk about some studies that bear this out at a 111 00:05:38,080 --> 00:05:40,640 Speaker 1: physical level. It also makes me think of The Daily 112 00:05:40,680 --> 00:05:42,400 Speaker 1: Show to a certain extent, because if you if you 113 00:05:42,400 --> 00:05:44,560 Speaker 1: just tune into The Daily Show, as I'm sure a 114 00:05:44,560 --> 00:05:46,960 Speaker 1: lot of a lot of you guys do, it's easy 115 00:05:47,000 --> 00:05:48,640 Speaker 1: to think, oh, man, that John Stewart is a really 116 00:05:48,680 --> 00:05:51,280 Speaker 1: funny guy. He's so clever. He is and he is, 117 00:05:51,320 --> 00:05:54,320 Speaker 1: he's a very clever guy, very funny guy. But that 118 00:05:54,440 --> 00:05:57,000 Speaker 1: show is coming at the end of the whole day 119 00:05:57,040 --> 00:06:02,440 Speaker 1: of writing, a team of writers cracking a out around 120 00:06:02,440 --> 00:06:05,360 Speaker 1: the table. Yeah, and you know, just working, working, putting 121 00:06:05,360 --> 00:06:07,200 Speaker 1: all this work into it, all for just a few 122 00:06:07,240 --> 00:06:10,159 Speaker 1: minutes of payoff. But if you're not privy to that information, 123 00:06:10,400 --> 00:06:12,280 Speaker 1: it's just like, well, look at that guy's that guy 124 00:06:12,320 --> 00:06:14,960 Speaker 1: is awesome. Yeah, and this analogy. Yeah that John John 125 00:06:15,000 --> 00:06:17,320 Speaker 1: Stewart is the eye of the brain. Yeah, and John 126 00:06:17,320 --> 00:06:20,719 Speaker 1: Stewart is an illusion. And that is so okay. What 127 00:06:20,760 --> 00:06:23,600 Speaker 1: do we do when we have consciousness or I as 128 00:06:23,640 --> 00:06:25,919 Speaker 1: a bit player on the sidelines, what do we do 129 00:06:25,960 --> 00:06:30,480 Speaker 1: with this information? Well, we could freak out, I guess 130 00:06:29,800 --> 00:06:33,960 Speaker 1: that's one way some people are yeh, because it's I mean, 131 00:06:34,040 --> 00:06:38,440 Speaker 1: it really turns everything we sort of believe on its head. 132 00:06:38,520 --> 00:06:40,560 Speaker 1: We really want to believe in this idea of the 133 00:06:40,560 --> 00:06:43,520 Speaker 1: self moving soul, and the idea that we're making choices 134 00:06:43,560 --> 00:06:46,680 Speaker 1: and getting stuff done, and the idea that we're just 135 00:06:46,760 --> 00:06:49,799 Speaker 1: this kind of surface illusion on a on a sea 136 00:06:49,920 --> 00:06:52,280 Speaker 1: of cognitive depth. It's it's really kind of hard to swallow, 137 00:06:52,360 --> 00:06:55,600 Speaker 1: and it makes you. I mean Daniel Dinnett, for instance, 138 00:06:55,839 --> 00:06:57,760 Speaker 1: he argues that we kind of have to tweak the 139 00:06:57,839 --> 00:07:00,320 Speaker 1: language a little to make sense of it all, taking 140 00:07:00,320 --> 00:07:03,440 Speaker 1: the stance that we need to redefine what free will is. Yeah, yeah, 141 00:07:03,560 --> 00:07:07,719 Speaker 1: interesting enough. Freud actually sort of to tap into this, 142 00:07:07,720 --> 00:07:10,680 Speaker 1: this idea or actually this problem a long time ago 143 00:07:11,040 --> 00:07:13,440 Speaker 1: when he was thinking about his own relationship to his 144 00:07:13,520 --> 00:07:16,960 Speaker 1: father and realizing that although he had he admired his 145 00:07:16,960 --> 00:07:19,480 Speaker 1: his father there were all the things that play sort 146 00:07:19,520 --> 00:07:23,080 Speaker 1: of shame and um also at times hatred and love, 147 00:07:23,160 --> 00:07:26,440 Speaker 1: all these different things bubbling underneath the surface of subconscious, 148 00:07:26,600 --> 00:07:30,320 Speaker 1: the subconscious, you know, our buddy Freud and the subconscious. 149 00:07:30,640 --> 00:07:33,640 Speaker 1: And that's when he decided to say to himself, well, okay, 150 00:07:33,640 --> 00:07:36,160 Speaker 1: if I've got all these hidden mental processes, then free 151 00:07:36,240 --> 00:07:38,880 Speaker 1: choice is either an illusion or at the very least 152 00:07:38,920 --> 00:07:42,440 Speaker 1: it's playing second fiddle to the unconscious. Wow, there you go. 153 00:07:42,600 --> 00:07:44,640 Speaker 1: So you know, of course he didn't have neuroscience to 154 00:07:44,640 --> 00:07:46,440 Speaker 1: back him up at that time, but he had an 155 00:07:46,440 --> 00:07:49,880 Speaker 1: inkling that this was the case. Although he got ladies 156 00:07:50,040 --> 00:07:54,040 Speaker 1: all wrong, I will say, yeah, unfortunate. So yeah, it 157 00:07:54,080 --> 00:07:55,840 Speaker 1: forces us to ask the question like how does an 158 00:07:55,880 --> 00:07:58,560 Speaker 1: idea even form? Because the way we feel it, the 159 00:07:58,560 --> 00:08:02,040 Speaker 1: way we experience it is eureka, right, that light bulb 160 00:08:02,080 --> 00:08:03,840 Speaker 1: going off above the head. Well, and that's why why 161 00:08:03,840 --> 00:08:05,520 Speaker 1: a lot of people say, yeah, we do have free will, 162 00:08:05,520 --> 00:08:08,560 Speaker 1: because I feel like I made that choice right. You 163 00:08:08,640 --> 00:08:10,200 Speaker 1: look look at some of these other ideas and it's 164 00:08:10,240 --> 00:08:11,920 Speaker 1: it maybe seems like it's a little more like a 165 00:08:12,560 --> 00:08:14,360 Speaker 1: like when you turn on the hot water, you know, 166 00:08:14,520 --> 00:08:17,760 Speaker 1: and the hot water comes out of the faucet, but 167 00:08:17,800 --> 00:08:20,000 Speaker 1: there's really a lot going on behind the wall and 168 00:08:20,160 --> 00:08:24,200 Speaker 1: under the house. There was this guy named Johann Frederick Herbart, 169 00:08:25,200 --> 00:08:29,480 Speaker 1: German philosopher and psychologists. He argued that ideas might best 170 00:08:29,520 --> 00:08:34,040 Speaker 1: be understand is a structured mathematical framework. So an idea 171 00:08:34,280 --> 00:08:36,200 Speaker 1: is opposed by an opposite idea. You know, it's kind 172 00:08:36,240 --> 00:08:39,400 Speaker 1: of like the to use a very simple analogy, Um, 173 00:08:39,640 --> 00:08:42,079 Speaker 1: like the devil and the angel on the shoulder. One 174 00:08:42,120 --> 00:08:45,400 Speaker 1: idea is opposed by an opposite is happening underneath us, 175 00:08:45,520 --> 00:08:47,480 Speaker 1: right that we're not aware of this. We're not conscious 176 00:08:47,480 --> 00:08:49,200 Speaker 1: of this. Yeah, so they're not maybe on your shoulder. 177 00:08:49,200 --> 00:08:51,600 Speaker 1: Maybe they're like hanging out in your armpits, you know, 178 00:08:51,920 --> 00:08:54,760 Speaker 1: as they should, and they're they're contrasting back and forth 179 00:08:54,760 --> 00:08:56,200 Speaker 1: at the devil and the angel, that guy, I think 180 00:08:56,200 --> 00:08:57,679 Speaker 1: we should do this, I think we should do that. 181 00:08:58,000 --> 00:09:01,040 Speaker 1: And eventually one of these guys is beaten down below 182 00:09:01,080 --> 00:09:04,880 Speaker 1: the threshold of awareness, and so the idea is sort 183 00:09:04,880 --> 00:09:08,920 Speaker 1: of discounted right when it runs contrary. But if there 184 00:09:09,040 --> 00:09:12,040 Speaker 1: is another idea that that has sort of a network 185 00:09:12,040 --> 00:09:15,880 Speaker 1: of support already some proof right of the pudding, then 186 00:09:15,920 --> 00:09:18,640 Speaker 1: it rises to the top and it becomes something that 187 00:09:18,679 --> 00:09:22,760 Speaker 1: we're aware of, which I think is really fascinating. Uh, 188 00:09:22,800 --> 00:09:27,160 Speaker 1: that you have these thoughts struggling at these deeper levels 189 00:09:27,240 --> 00:09:29,640 Speaker 1: and they kind of get kicked out sometimes. Yeah. Yeah. 190 00:09:29,679 --> 00:09:32,680 Speaker 1: He he coined the term appreciative mass to indicate that 191 00:09:32,720 --> 00:09:36,079 Speaker 1: an idea becomes conscious not in isolation, but only in 192 00:09:36,160 --> 00:09:40,160 Speaker 1: assimilation with a with a complex of other ideas already 193 00:09:40,160 --> 00:09:42,000 Speaker 1: in consciousness. And I was thinking about that. I was 194 00:09:42,040 --> 00:09:43,880 Speaker 1: thinking again that back to this idea that we have 195 00:09:43,920 --> 00:09:46,199 Speaker 1: a finite amount of mental energy, which we talked about 196 00:09:46,320 --> 00:09:48,839 Speaker 1: with decision fatigue, and it would make sense that you 197 00:09:48,880 --> 00:09:52,640 Speaker 1: would tamp down what seemed contrary to yourself because your 198 00:09:52,640 --> 00:09:55,719 Speaker 1: brain really has to sort of fold up in a sense. 199 00:09:55,840 --> 00:10:00,720 Speaker 1: Can you imagine being completely aware at every goal moment? 200 00:10:01,240 --> 00:10:04,960 Speaker 1: Like if if your brain flagged every stimuli that that 201 00:10:05,040 --> 00:10:08,079 Speaker 1: was floating past, I mean you would be you might 202 00:10:08,080 --> 00:10:11,160 Speaker 1: actually be mad, right yeah, because I mean, we'll we'll 203 00:10:11,200 --> 00:10:13,800 Speaker 1: discuss a little Morris. That's the podcast unrolls, and there's 204 00:10:13,840 --> 00:10:16,120 Speaker 1: a lot of stimuli because on one one level light 205 00:10:16,200 --> 00:10:17,920 Speaker 1: right now, we're just talking about the stuff going on 206 00:10:18,440 --> 00:10:21,920 Speaker 1: inside your brain. It's facing facing choices and weighing one 207 00:10:21,960 --> 00:10:25,280 Speaker 1: choice against the other. So it's all the hard mathematical programming, 208 00:10:25,320 --> 00:10:27,440 Speaker 1: if you will, beny the operating system that would be 209 00:10:27,440 --> 00:10:30,719 Speaker 1: actually perceive or are. But then there's also going to 210 00:10:30,760 --> 00:10:33,240 Speaker 1: be all this environmental stimuli coming at us and all 211 00:10:33,280 --> 00:10:36,360 Speaker 1: these influences that are taking hold of biological biological level. 212 00:10:36,720 --> 00:10:40,280 Speaker 1: So yeah, it's impossible for me to imagine like what 213 00:10:40,320 --> 00:10:42,240 Speaker 1: that would be like if you were actually conscious of 214 00:10:42,280 --> 00:10:44,480 Speaker 1: all these things, I mean to a certain extent. Uh, 215 00:10:44,559 --> 00:10:46,400 Speaker 1: you know, we've talked about people who are who engage 216 00:10:46,400 --> 00:10:49,120 Speaker 1: in meditation, Like a lot of that is trying to 217 00:10:49,160 --> 00:10:53,120 Speaker 1: become conscious of thought, becoming conscious of how the environment 218 00:10:53,160 --> 00:10:55,880 Speaker 1: is affecting you. But even that is only like if 219 00:10:56,000 --> 00:10:58,439 Speaker 1: if you know, if if we are experiencing this this 220 00:10:58,559 --> 00:11:02,400 Speaker 1: surface layer above an ocean and of cognitive wheels and 221 00:11:02,600 --> 00:11:06,559 Speaker 1: and and gears, and even even like deep practice meditation 222 00:11:06,720 --> 00:11:08,240 Speaker 1: is not going to take you all the way down 223 00:11:08,280 --> 00:11:10,560 Speaker 1: to the bottom. But with so paradox all about that 224 00:11:10,720 --> 00:11:13,280 Speaker 1: is that if you're going to get to that sort 225 00:11:13,320 --> 00:11:16,319 Speaker 1: of level of awareness, you have to tamp down so 226 00:11:16,440 --> 00:11:19,520 Speaker 1: much else, right, Like your your brain is still going 227 00:11:19,559 --> 00:11:22,640 Speaker 1: to have to batten down the hatches and say, Okay, 228 00:11:22,640 --> 00:11:24,840 Speaker 1: that's just a dog barking, if that's just this and 229 00:11:24,880 --> 00:11:29,440 Speaker 1: that in order to become very aware of what your own, 230 00:11:30,679 --> 00:11:33,640 Speaker 1: well your own not your own thoughts, but the important thoughts, 231 00:11:34,200 --> 00:11:37,120 Speaker 1: like on some level, you're still having a cherry pick 232 00:11:37,240 --> 00:11:40,319 Speaker 1: through the mind and figure out what's important and what's 233 00:11:40,360 --> 00:11:42,839 Speaker 1: not important. And so I think that's why I think 234 00:11:42,840 --> 00:11:45,680 Speaker 1: this is so interesting, because because Eagleman sort of pointed 235 00:11:45,679 --> 00:11:48,480 Speaker 1: to this too and um in the book and also 236 00:11:48,520 --> 00:11:53,880 Speaker 1: in his talk, that we're really the only animal that 237 00:11:53,960 --> 00:11:57,080 Speaker 1: has sort of like a computer, Like if you can 238 00:11:57,120 --> 00:12:00,760 Speaker 1: imagine a computer taking itself apart and taken the camera 239 00:12:00,840 --> 00:12:03,160 Speaker 1: and aimed at ourselves to figure out what in the 240 00:12:03,200 --> 00:12:05,360 Speaker 1: world is going on? You mean, you obviously don't see 241 00:12:05,360 --> 00:12:07,840 Speaker 1: this in the animal world, and if it were going on, 242 00:12:07,880 --> 00:12:10,120 Speaker 1: we wouldn't be privy to it, right, That sort of 243 00:12:10,559 --> 00:12:13,160 Speaker 1: part and parcel of why this is so fascinating and 244 00:12:13,240 --> 00:12:15,920 Speaker 1: mysterious that we are trying at the end of the 245 00:12:16,000 --> 00:12:17,840 Speaker 1: day to get to this question of who am I? 246 00:12:17,920 --> 00:12:19,920 Speaker 1: Who is this person in my head talking to me 247 00:12:20,320 --> 00:12:23,640 Speaker 1: and this consciousness and am I really making the decisions 248 00:12:23,640 --> 00:12:27,360 Speaker 1: in my life? And he talks again about our brains 249 00:12:27,559 --> 00:12:30,960 Speaker 1: again battening down the hatches with these predictive models. And 250 00:12:31,000 --> 00:12:33,080 Speaker 1: we've talked about this before that you know, this is 251 00:12:33,120 --> 00:12:36,520 Speaker 1: really important from an evolutionary standpoint that we would have 252 00:12:36,600 --> 00:12:39,360 Speaker 1: to come up with these predictive models of operating because 253 00:12:39,360 --> 00:12:43,720 Speaker 1: every time we came into a new situation, if every 254 00:12:43,760 --> 00:12:46,960 Speaker 1: single bit of information that was beamed toward us was 255 00:12:47,160 --> 00:12:50,440 Speaker 1: being judged, it would be really hard to react. Right, 256 00:12:50,559 --> 00:12:52,600 Speaker 1: So there are certain things that you have to model 257 00:12:52,640 --> 00:12:55,240 Speaker 1: blueprint for yourself. So you come into a room you 258 00:12:55,320 --> 00:12:57,920 Speaker 1: expected to, or you expect a window, you expect this, 259 00:12:58,440 --> 00:13:00,959 Speaker 1: so on and so forth. And she was actually talking 260 00:13:00,960 --> 00:13:03,880 Speaker 1: about how our visual cortex is the model generator for that. 261 00:13:04,120 --> 00:13:06,760 Speaker 1: For this, it receives data from the bretna and then 262 00:13:06,800 --> 00:13:12,400 Speaker 1: it sends its predictions based on past experience to the thalamus, 263 00:13:12,440 --> 00:13:15,920 Speaker 1: which runs a report on the differences of what came 264 00:13:15,920 --> 00:13:19,280 Speaker 1: in and what was expected. And this is really important 265 00:13:19,320 --> 00:13:24,920 Speaker 1: because our expectations certainly color our perceptions um and actually 266 00:13:24,960 --> 00:13:27,800 Speaker 1: what we think is going on. So then the thalamus 267 00:13:27,840 --> 00:13:30,200 Speaker 1: sends the report back to the visual cortex and it 268 00:13:30,360 --> 00:13:33,920 Speaker 1: updates its models. So it's constantly doing this and when 269 00:13:34,000 --> 00:13:36,040 Speaker 1: you think about it that way, it's really cool, right. 270 00:13:36,360 --> 00:13:39,840 Speaker 1: But on the other hand, what things are we missing, 271 00:13:39,880 --> 00:13:42,960 Speaker 1: what things are we tamping down that are going on 272 00:13:43,080 --> 00:13:45,760 Speaker 1: that that that don't fit into the model, That could 273 00:13:45,880 --> 00:13:48,480 Speaker 1: perhaps give us a little bit more information about choices 274 00:13:48,520 --> 00:13:50,480 Speaker 1: that we might or might not make if we had 275 00:13:50,520 --> 00:13:53,480 Speaker 1: more access to that information. Yeah, the I mean, the 276 00:13:53,520 --> 00:13:56,040 Speaker 1: whole visual realm of this alone is fascinating. Was reading 277 00:13:56,080 --> 00:13:58,280 Speaker 1: the articles to see You, sent by Susan Blackmark. There's 278 00:13:58,320 --> 00:13:59,760 Speaker 1: a whole section too, for she was going into the 279 00:13:59,760 --> 00:14:03,160 Speaker 1: way way sound is interpreted in the brain. But just 280 00:14:04,000 --> 00:14:08,120 Speaker 1: but there are like various theories about just how we see, uh, 281 00:14:08,200 --> 00:14:10,240 Speaker 1: not in terms of how the eyes work, but how 282 00:14:10,280 --> 00:14:13,160 Speaker 1: the brain makes sense of that data. Because our entire 283 00:14:13,200 --> 00:14:15,560 Speaker 1: field of vision is not a precision instrument. It's like 284 00:14:15,720 --> 00:14:18,720 Speaker 1: there's like a tiny area of precision site and the 285 00:14:18,760 --> 00:14:21,000 Speaker 1: rest is kind of vague. Side And Daniel Bennet, who 286 00:14:21,120 --> 00:14:24,160 Speaker 1: mentioned earlier, who's a philosopher, he's one of the old 287 00:14:24,200 --> 00:14:27,520 Speaker 1: fireman rushed in to extinguish the blazes or or at 288 00:14:27,600 --> 00:14:29,960 Speaker 1: least deal with the blazes that have risen up in 289 00:14:30,000 --> 00:14:31,920 Speaker 1: the way of all this New New York scientific data. 290 00:14:32,480 --> 00:14:35,120 Speaker 1: But he he makes a lot of arguments based on 291 00:14:35,160 --> 00:14:36,520 Speaker 1: the way our eyes work and I thought one of 292 00:14:36,560 --> 00:14:38,640 Speaker 1: the most interesting things that he pointed out was if 293 00:14:38,640 --> 00:14:42,120 Speaker 1: you go to a mirror and look, you look at 294 00:14:42,120 --> 00:14:44,520 Speaker 1: one eye and then you look at the other, and 295 00:14:44,560 --> 00:14:47,840 Speaker 1: if you try and see your eyes moving from one 296 00:14:47,840 --> 00:14:50,800 Speaker 1: eye to the next, you can't see it. The brain 297 00:14:50,960 --> 00:14:54,080 Speaker 1: doesn't read about this. I was like, this is such 298 00:14:54,080 --> 00:14:57,640 Speaker 1: a stonar moment. Did you do like I do when 299 00:14:57,640 --> 00:14:59,160 Speaker 1: you ran to the bathroom and tried it out for 300 00:14:59,160 --> 00:15:01,320 Speaker 1: about ten minutes? I didn't. I just had the moment 301 00:15:01,360 --> 00:15:03,360 Speaker 1: in my head. I was like, whoa, because you know 302 00:15:03,440 --> 00:15:06,040 Speaker 1: that your brain does that, right, but you you believe 303 00:15:06,240 --> 00:15:09,680 Speaker 1: that everything that your eyes are telling you or the truth. Yeah, 304 00:15:10,040 --> 00:15:12,800 Speaker 1: And so it creates this moment of wow, Okay again 305 00:15:12,880 --> 00:15:16,760 Speaker 1: here I am questioning reality around me, if if my 306 00:15:16,800 --> 00:15:20,080 Speaker 1: brain is has these blind spots, or if things just 307 00:15:20,160 --> 00:15:23,520 Speaker 1: aren't that important that it's not reporting things to me. Yeah, which, 308 00:15:23,520 --> 00:15:26,080 Speaker 1: of course that leads us right into change blindness, this 309 00:15:26,560 --> 00:15:29,760 Speaker 1: idea that um and then there are various studies along 310 00:15:29,800 --> 00:15:31,800 Speaker 1: this this line as well that that have shown that 311 00:15:31,840 --> 00:15:34,520 Speaker 1: you you make minute changes to say, picture between picture 312 00:15:34,520 --> 00:15:37,840 Speaker 1: A and picture BT, and people want will inevitably like, 313 00:15:37,880 --> 00:15:39,680 Speaker 1: they'll stare at it and will eventually get it and 314 00:15:39,680 --> 00:15:41,200 Speaker 1: they'll be like, oh, well, this is the difference. I 315 00:15:41,240 --> 00:15:43,760 Speaker 1: feel like there are numerous examples of this too, various. 316 00:15:43,840 --> 00:15:45,360 Speaker 1: Can you spot the difference between this picture and this 317 00:15:45,440 --> 00:15:47,920 Speaker 1: which I think Uffington Post or somebody does that. But yeah, 318 00:15:47,920 --> 00:15:50,240 Speaker 1: that the brain is just blind to it unless you 319 00:15:50,280 --> 00:15:53,840 Speaker 1: actually center your processing on it for for several seconds 320 00:15:54,040 --> 00:15:56,160 Speaker 1: in the case of some of these. Yeah, it's it's 321 00:15:56,280 --> 00:15:59,160 Speaker 1: very it's really fascinating. And right after this break, we're 322 00:15:59,160 --> 00:16:02,760 Speaker 1: going to talk about how all of this really serves EO. 323 00:16:05,120 --> 00:16:08,120 Speaker 1: This podcast is brought to you by Intel, the sponsors 324 00:16:08,160 --> 00:16:12,640 Speaker 1: of Tomorrow and the Discovery Channel. At Intel, we believe 325 00:16:12,720 --> 00:16:16,600 Speaker 1: curiosity is the spark which drives innovation. Join us at 326 00:16:16,640 --> 00:16:20,520 Speaker 1: curiosity dot com and explore the answers to life's questions. 327 00:16:23,360 --> 00:16:26,960 Speaker 1: And we're back. So ego, Yeah, the ego and the 328 00:16:26,960 --> 00:16:31,040 Speaker 1: illusion of consciousness. That's right, Implicit egotism is what we're 329 00:16:31,080 --> 00:16:34,080 Speaker 1: talking about again. Eagleman is talking about this in the 330 00:16:34,120 --> 00:16:37,960 Speaker 1: context of why we may or may not have free Well. 331 00:16:38,200 --> 00:16:40,760 Speaker 1: He talks about psychologist John Jones, who was looking to 332 00:16:40,760 --> 00:16:44,120 Speaker 1: see if he could detect a pattern in a literative 333 00:16:44,760 --> 00:16:48,480 Speaker 1: romantic pairings. Oh yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, I love this. 334 00:16:48,760 --> 00:16:52,240 Speaker 1: He examined fifteen thousand public records from two counties in 335 00:16:52,280 --> 00:16:54,560 Speaker 1: Georgia and Florida, and he saw that there was a 336 00:16:54,600 --> 00:16:57,479 Speaker 1: pattern that emerged that was greater than chance that cutles 337 00:16:57,480 --> 00:17:00,480 Speaker 1: with the same first letter of their first names. We're 338 00:17:00,480 --> 00:17:05,280 Speaker 1: getting hitched to one another. I don't know about that, 339 00:17:05,359 --> 00:17:07,320 Speaker 1: I know, I know, yeah, yeah, Well, there was some 340 00:17:07,560 --> 00:17:09,159 Speaker 1: there was some information that was like, you've got to 341 00:17:09,200 --> 00:17:11,560 Speaker 1: be kidding. It doesn't it doesn't feel like we could 342 00:17:11,600 --> 00:17:16,399 Speaker 1: be so easily manipulated or self manipulated on that level. 343 00:17:16,560 --> 00:17:19,600 Speaker 1: But there are a ton of studies that are coming out, 344 00:17:19,640 --> 00:17:22,720 Speaker 1: like if your name is Dennis, then you're more likely 345 00:17:22,800 --> 00:17:27,320 Speaker 1: to be a dentist or Denise. Um. There's these associations, 346 00:17:27,760 --> 00:17:30,600 Speaker 1: and I think it the studies said that, like it 347 00:17:30,640 --> 00:17:32,560 Speaker 1: implied that I would have been more likely to run 348 00:17:32,560 --> 00:17:35,720 Speaker 1: a hardware store or something than become a writer. So 349 00:17:37,320 --> 00:17:42,120 Speaker 1: r it was something about like both both possibilities were 350 00:17:42,119 --> 00:17:46,320 Speaker 1: equally kind of dreadful to me. But but then also 351 00:17:46,359 --> 00:17:48,600 Speaker 1: it's yeah, the whole you're more likely to marry somebody 352 00:17:48,600 --> 00:17:51,439 Speaker 1: with the same letter of Well, now this isn't happening, like, 353 00:17:52,920 --> 00:17:55,720 Speaker 1: you know, this isn't a great occurrence, but it's significant 354 00:17:55,840 --> 00:18:00,719 Speaker 1: enough that it raises eyebrows and Eagleman say, in this idea, 355 00:18:00,840 --> 00:18:04,640 Speaker 1: this implicit egotism is a result of us being so 356 00:18:04,760 --> 00:18:07,640 Speaker 1: enamored with ourselves that we can't help but find reflections 357 00:18:07,720 --> 00:18:10,959 Speaker 1: of ourselves and others, and it could be behind they 358 00:18:10,960 --> 00:18:13,760 Speaker 1: need to align ourselves with that familiar feeling on some 359 00:18:13,880 --> 00:18:17,240 Speaker 1: unconscious level. Oh yes, and then this is also where 360 00:18:17,320 --> 00:18:21,080 Speaker 1: Resputin comes in, the idea that if you tell somebody 361 00:18:21,119 --> 00:18:24,560 Speaker 1: that they share a birthday with Resputin, they're more likely 362 00:18:24,600 --> 00:18:28,639 Speaker 1: to be sympathetic towards the Resputin or or to behave 363 00:18:28,720 --> 00:18:32,320 Speaker 1: more gregarious themselves. Right, yeah, Yeah, there's a university study. 364 00:18:32,359 --> 00:18:34,560 Speaker 1: They took a bunch of college kids. They had this 365 00:18:34,720 --> 00:18:37,440 Speaker 1: same essay. The only thing they fussed with is they 366 00:18:37,520 --> 00:18:40,720 Speaker 1: in the biographical data on the essay. They matched it 367 00:18:40,800 --> 00:18:43,680 Speaker 1: to each person's birthday. So the person reading it and 368 00:18:43,720 --> 00:18:46,399 Speaker 1: then you know, half the class it was it just 369 00:18:46,440 --> 00:18:48,879 Speaker 1: had a random birthday that didn't match theirs. So of 370 00:18:48,920 --> 00:18:52,600 Speaker 1: course the birthdays that match, those students were more likely 371 00:18:52,640 --> 00:18:55,040 Speaker 1: to say that Resputin was a stand up citizen or 372 00:18:55,080 --> 00:18:58,960 Speaker 1: something along those lines. Are report that on a biographical level, 373 00:18:59,040 --> 00:19:01,840 Speaker 1: this guy was pretty great, not necessarily like that the 374 00:19:01,880 --> 00:19:04,359 Speaker 1: content of the essay itself. So if one were to 375 00:19:04,400 --> 00:19:07,359 Speaker 1: be deceptive when applying for a job, and I'm not 376 00:19:07,440 --> 00:19:09,399 Speaker 1: arguing that one should, because you can get a lot 377 00:19:09,560 --> 00:19:11,120 Speaker 1: and do a lot of trouble for things like this, 378 00:19:11,200 --> 00:19:14,520 Speaker 1: but if you were to lie and say that you 379 00:19:14,560 --> 00:19:17,240 Speaker 1: had the same birthday as the person hiring you or 380 00:19:17,320 --> 00:19:21,159 Speaker 1: is your boss, that would theoretically be beneficial. Yeah, but 381 00:19:21,240 --> 00:19:23,600 Speaker 1: I mean all this points back to the fact that 382 00:19:23,680 --> 00:19:27,800 Speaker 1: we can't help but find commonalities with one another. Our 383 00:19:27,840 --> 00:19:30,920 Speaker 1: brain is sort of hard wired to for these sort 384 00:19:30,920 --> 00:19:34,000 Speaker 1: of confirmation biases, which we've talked about before. Yeah, it's 385 00:19:34,080 --> 00:19:35,919 Speaker 1: I mean we've talked before in the in the past, 386 00:19:36,040 --> 00:19:38,280 Speaker 1: we form these stories where the center of the story, 387 00:19:38,320 --> 00:19:40,800 Speaker 1: where the center of this world view. No matter what 388 00:19:40,840 --> 00:19:43,520 Speaker 1: other characters are involved, be it God or just the 389 00:19:43,680 --> 00:19:46,600 Speaker 1: neighbor across the street, it all ultimately comes down to 390 00:19:46,640 --> 00:19:47,919 Speaker 1: what am I getting out of it? How does it 391 00:19:47,960 --> 00:19:50,399 Speaker 1: relate to me. It's a story, there's a main character. 392 00:19:50,440 --> 00:19:52,520 Speaker 1: I'm the main character. If there's another character in it, 393 00:19:52,760 --> 00:19:55,320 Speaker 1: I need to know what the relationship is. And Yeah, 394 00:19:55,320 --> 00:19:57,560 Speaker 1: it's funny because we can't. We try to inhabit someone 395 00:19:57,560 --> 00:19:59,840 Speaker 1: else's perspective, but we can't help coloring that with our 396 00:20:00,119 --> 00:20:03,280 Speaker 1: perspective all the time, and on the unconscious level. Right, 397 00:20:03,320 --> 00:20:05,560 Speaker 1: So if I'm like, oh, Wow, I really love that 398 00:20:05,560 --> 00:20:07,440 Speaker 1: blue and gray shirt that you're wear right now, that's 399 00:20:07,640 --> 00:20:10,000 Speaker 1: that's one of my favorite colors, and all of a sudden, 400 00:20:10,040 --> 00:20:13,560 Speaker 1: I feel like, man, I'm really connecting with Robert today. He's, 401 00:20:14,040 --> 00:20:16,640 Speaker 1: you know, maybe not even understanding it because you've got 402 00:20:16,680 --> 00:20:19,680 Speaker 1: my favorite colors on. So all these things are, these 403 00:20:19,720 --> 00:20:23,399 Speaker 1: these underpinnings are holding together these ideas that rise to 404 00:20:23,440 --> 00:20:25,880 Speaker 1: the top without us even knowing. So though it may 405 00:20:25,960 --> 00:20:29,159 Speaker 1: feel sort of ridiculous that these couples are getting married 406 00:20:29,200 --> 00:20:32,840 Speaker 1: on because they have the first initials they share that 407 00:20:33,359 --> 00:20:35,879 Speaker 1: in their first names, there may be something to it 408 00:20:35,920 --> 00:20:38,760 Speaker 1: in other instances, right, I mean, we we'd like to 409 00:20:38,760 --> 00:20:42,080 Speaker 1: believe that our romantic relationships are deeper than that. Yeah, 410 00:20:42,080 --> 00:20:44,560 Speaker 1: well I didn't. I didn't marry somebody just because she 411 00:20:44,720 --> 00:20:46,760 Speaker 1: had the same first letter on her first name as me. 412 00:20:47,440 --> 00:20:51,000 Speaker 1: I did it because her pupils were dilated. Oh yes, yes, 413 00:20:51,280 --> 00:20:54,160 Speaker 1: um nice, that's giving ahead with that. But we'll we'll 414 00:20:54,160 --> 00:20:56,520 Speaker 1: explain that. Well, and Egan then I also talked about 415 00:20:56,520 --> 00:20:59,320 Speaker 1: this too, and in an instance, what's called priming, which 416 00:20:59,359 --> 00:21:03,199 Speaker 1: sort of creates this atmosphere in which is more favorable 417 00:21:03,320 --> 00:21:05,760 Speaker 1: to get the results that you want. And he talked 418 00:21:05,760 --> 00:21:08,960 Speaker 1: about this, uh the Decater Book Festival and saying that 419 00:21:09,000 --> 00:21:11,000 Speaker 1: there was an experiment in which people were asked to 420 00:21:11,040 --> 00:21:14,240 Speaker 1: talk about their mothers. They were given either like a 421 00:21:14,280 --> 00:21:18,480 Speaker 1: warm beverage to drink or a cold beverage. And again, 422 00:21:18,520 --> 00:21:20,679 Speaker 1: you would not think that we could be so easily manipulated. 423 00:21:20,920 --> 00:21:24,760 Speaker 1: Those with warm beverages, they had warm memories of their mothers. 424 00:21:24,800 --> 00:21:27,879 Speaker 1: Those with cold beverages, Uh, it was it was it 425 00:21:27,960 --> 00:21:32,560 Speaker 1: was snow cold. Yeah, it was cold. Breezeville. Prime to 426 00:21:33,040 --> 00:21:35,760 Speaker 1: to remind everybody, We've we've discussed it in some previous 427 00:21:35,800 --> 00:21:38,119 Speaker 1: podcasts because it is one of the forms of memory 428 00:21:38,119 --> 00:21:40,240 Speaker 1: at work in the human mind. There's not just one 429 00:21:40,320 --> 00:21:42,639 Speaker 1: gear of memory, of there there are multiple gears. Memory 430 00:21:42,720 --> 00:21:45,840 Speaker 1: is a is a chorus of different cognitive elements, and 431 00:21:45,840 --> 00:21:47,840 Speaker 1: priming is one of those that There's been cases where 432 00:21:47,840 --> 00:21:51,840 Speaker 1: an individual's brain has been damaged and one form of memories, 433 00:21:51,880 --> 00:21:56,320 Speaker 1: say remembering facts or or something spatial or what have 434 00:21:56,480 --> 00:21:59,440 Speaker 1: you will be disabled, but the priming will still be active. 435 00:21:59,720 --> 00:22:02,320 Speaker 1: So that's what we're talking about here. Yeah, your brains 436 00:22:02,359 --> 00:22:04,919 Speaker 1: are tagging certain things that you've seen this over and 437 00:22:04,960 --> 00:22:08,560 Speaker 1: over again. Political ads we've talked about before, and Engleman 438 00:22:08,600 --> 00:22:12,240 Speaker 1: talks about a political ad from when Bush and we're 439 00:22:12,440 --> 00:22:15,359 Speaker 1: running against each other and the Bush campaign had a 440 00:22:16,119 --> 00:22:18,720 Speaker 1: really kind of funny commercial, well not funny depending on 441 00:22:18,760 --> 00:22:22,439 Speaker 1: your sense of humor there, But basically what goes across 442 00:22:22,480 --> 00:22:25,359 Speaker 1: the screen with flashes is rats. But what you find 443 00:22:25,400 --> 00:22:28,440 Speaker 1: out as is the word kind of zooms back around, 444 00:22:28,560 --> 00:22:33,000 Speaker 1: is that it's bureaucrats. It's actually being broadcast on the television, 445 00:22:33,040 --> 00:22:37,120 Speaker 1: but of course your mind is already thinking rats negative. 446 00:22:37,240 --> 00:22:40,120 Speaker 1: Eagleman also talked a little bit about face blindness, which, 447 00:22:40,119 --> 00:22:42,520 Speaker 1: of face blindness is one of those things it's like 448 00:22:43,160 --> 00:22:45,840 Speaker 1: trust any neuroscientists to bring it out in a conversation 449 00:22:45,880 --> 00:22:48,280 Speaker 1: at least once, because it's pretty fascinating when area of 450 00:22:48,280 --> 00:22:50,760 Speaker 1: the brain that deals with visual perception or facial features 451 00:22:50,840 --> 00:22:53,200 Speaker 1: ends up not working. You see faces that you don't 452 00:22:53,200 --> 00:22:55,560 Speaker 1: identify those with the people. There have been experiments that 453 00:22:55,640 --> 00:22:59,160 Speaker 1: show that even individuals with facial blindness there's some sort 454 00:22:59,160 --> 00:23:01,480 Speaker 1: of priming memory is there. They can they can see 455 00:23:01,480 --> 00:23:03,880 Speaker 1: it in like facial tips. Yeah, they see it activated, right, 456 00:23:03,960 --> 00:23:06,120 Speaker 1: So they can't necessarily recognize the person, but they see 457 00:23:06,160 --> 00:23:08,600 Speaker 1: activity going on where the brain is saying, okay, there's 458 00:23:08,600 --> 00:23:11,800 Speaker 1: something for something there. This ties in with the recent 459 00:23:11,880 --> 00:23:14,199 Speaker 1: episode we did about false memories, where you can have 460 00:23:14,240 --> 00:23:16,720 Speaker 1: a memory that is false. I think it is true, 461 00:23:17,160 --> 00:23:20,400 Speaker 1: but somewhere in the cognitive depths, your brain knows it's 462 00:23:20,440 --> 00:23:23,359 Speaker 1: not true. So this is an example of at the 463 00:23:23,480 --> 00:23:26,040 Speaker 1: surface level, we don't know whose face that is, but 464 00:23:26,160 --> 00:23:29,040 Speaker 1: deep down inside us the brain knows. And all this 465 00:23:29,119 --> 00:23:30,920 Speaker 1: I keep coming back to a quote that I'm taking 466 00:23:30,920 --> 00:23:34,720 Speaker 1: out of context from the Mahaparata where Christians Christians says 467 00:23:34,760 --> 00:23:38,560 Speaker 1: there is another intelligence beyond the mind, where he's not 468 00:23:38,600 --> 00:23:41,600 Speaker 1: talking about the illusion of free will exactly, but I 469 00:23:41,680 --> 00:23:44,200 Speaker 1: keep coming back to that, the idea that that our mind, 470 00:23:44,240 --> 00:23:46,720 Speaker 1: as we experience it, is this thin layer, and beyond 471 00:23:46,800 --> 00:23:50,280 Speaker 1: that there's this whole other system, this sort of shadow 472 00:23:50,320 --> 00:23:52,480 Speaker 1: mind that's running the show. Well, it's funny you say 473 00:23:52,520 --> 00:23:56,080 Speaker 1: that because in the book Incognato, Eagleman talks about Samuel 474 00:23:56,119 --> 00:23:59,960 Speaker 1: Taylor College's poem Kubla con and Kubla insanity to Kubla 475 00:24:00,000 --> 00:24:02,680 Speaker 1: on a stately pleasure dome decree, that's the one. Yes, 476 00:24:03,440 --> 00:24:06,840 Speaker 1: I know that's still that's that's nice. Um. But he 477 00:24:06,880 --> 00:24:09,200 Speaker 1: talks about as an example of us losing the center 478 00:24:09,200 --> 00:24:12,240 Speaker 1: of ourselves and who is really the person who is 479 00:24:12,640 --> 00:24:16,200 Speaker 1: creating or making decisions, because he says, who exactly wrote 480 00:24:16,200 --> 00:24:18,399 Speaker 1: the poem? And he says, and he brings us up 481 00:24:18,440 --> 00:24:20,720 Speaker 1: because obviously we know that College did. But he says, 482 00:24:21,080 --> 00:24:24,280 Speaker 1: since College wrote it primarily under the influence of opium, 483 00:24:24,320 --> 00:24:29,520 Speaker 1: which allowed College to access his subconscious it wasn't the 484 00:24:29,600 --> 00:24:33,280 Speaker 1: college that was aware. That was the sober eye Collorridge. 485 00:24:33,440 --> 00:24:36,800 Speaker 1: So who wrote it? College or the opium? I'd say 486 00:24:36,800 --> 00:24:40,480 Speaker 1: a little both. Alright, fair enough, author, I'll go with that. 487 00:24:41,080 --> 00:24:44,920 Speaker 1: Let's talk about dilating pupils. Yes, this is where we're 488 00:24:44,920 --> 00:24:47,800 Speaker 1: really getting into the biological roots of things. The rat 489 00:24:47,840 --> 00:24:50,440 Speaker 1: like hind brain backing up the brain that we experienced. 490 00:24:50,480 --> 00:24:53,920 Speaker 1: There's this one study that Equalman mentions where people were 491 00:24:54,280 --> 00:24:57,600 Speaker 1: nine particularly we're given, uh, we're given all these different 492 00:24:57,600 --> 00:25:00,440 Speaker 1: photos of women and judge them on attractiveness, and the 493 00:25:00,480 --> 00:25:03,720 Speaker 1: women was dilated. Pupils were the ones that they overwhelmingly liked. 494 00:25:04,200 --> 00:25:07,040 Speaker 1: Like half of the photos contained women with dilated pupils. 495 00:25:07,040 --> 00:25:08,720 Speaker 1: And when we say dilated pupil, say, we're not huge, 496 00:25:08,760 --> 00:25:11,200 Speaker 1: and we're talking about a couple of millimeters, right, It's 497 00:25:11,240 --> 00:25:13,879 Speaker 1: not something that you would be like, ah, dilated pupils 498 00:25:13,920 --> 00:25:16,200 Speaker 1: that one so not like full on. I just came 499 00:25:16,240 --> 00:25:20,720 Speaker 1: from the optometrist office and concert just took off my 500 00:25:20,920 --> 00:25:24,600 Speaker 1: granny and glasses from my dilated eyes. So his point 501 00:25:24,720 --> 00:25:28,120 Speaker 1: was that these men were scanning these faces within seconds 502 00:25:28,119 --> 00:25:31,120 Speaker 1: and making these choices, and on some level they were 503 00:25:31,160 --> 00:25:36,400 Speaker 1: detecting what that she was really into the situation right 504 00:25:36,440 --> 00:25:40,959 Speaker 1: that she was, she was rare to go. This is 505 00:25:41,040 --> 00:25:44,840 Speaker 1: apparently a sign of sexual readiness, this dilated eyes. So 506 00:25:45,119 --> 00:25:48,320 Speaker 1: tuck that in the back of your your brains, folks. Um. Now, 507 00:25:48,760 --> 00:25:52,159 Speaker 1: we're not advocating, ladies that you dilate your eyes before 508 00:25:52,160 --> 00:25:55,000 Speaker 1: a big date, because disaster will want sue when you 509 00:25:55,040 --> 00:26:00,119 Speaker 1: try and try. Yeah yeah, Belladonna opium. Dilated eye is 510 00:26:00,320 --> 00:26:04,359 Speaker 1: never any classes. It's not really necessary. But that's just 511 00:26:04,480 --> 00:26:07,480 Speaker 1: one aspect of why we do the things we do, 512 00:26:07,600 --> 00:26:09,600 Speaker 1: or we make the choices that we do. And Eagleman 513 00:26:09,640 --> 00:26:11,960 Speaker 1: is talking about this again from an evolutionary perspective or 514 00:26:12,000 --> 00:26:15,640 Speaker 1: biological perspective. We've seen this over and over again. Oh, 515 00:26:15,680 --> 00:26:17,760 Speaker 1: there was the study we have with the strippers, yeah, 516 00:26:17,840 --> 00:26:21,560 Speaker 1: laptop dances. Yeah, from the was this the University of Nevada, 517 00:26:21,560 --> 00:26:24,480 Speaker 1: I believe, and they found that the strippers who are 518 00:26:24,520 --> 00:26:27,760 Speaker 1: ovulating received higher tips than those who are not, which 519 00:26:27,800 --> 00:26:29,720 Speaker 1: which meant that on on a on a very basic 520 00:26:29,760 --> 00:26:32,640 Speaker 1: biological level, and the men liked the women who were 521 00:26:32,720 --> 00:26:35,920 Speaker 1: better potential biological mates at any given moment. And we're 522 00:26:35,920 --> 00:26:38,560 Speaker 1: talking about like an average of sixty eight dollars and 523 00:26:38,600 --> 00:26:42,400 Speaker 1: tips right as opposed to non ovulating women whose averages 524 00:26:42,440 --> 00:26:46,359 Speaker 1: around like thirty five bucks. So there's quite a difference. 525 00:26:46,520 --> 00:26:48,159 Speaker 1: So both of these really point of the idea that, 526 00:26:48,280 --> 00:26:51,679 Speaker 1: especially when it comes to choices regarding mating and survival 527 00:26:51,760 --> 00:26:55,080 Speaker 1: and these very primal biological things, there's somebody else calling 528 00:26:55,119 --> 00:26:57,720 Speaker 1: the shots. I mean, it's kind of a an overstatement 529 00:26:57,720 --> 00:27:00,480 Speaker 1: of the obvious to a certain extent, because they're shortage 530 00:27:00,480 --> 00:27:02,560 Speaker 1: of jokes about that. You know about like men don't 531 00:27:02,600 --> 00:27:05,879 Speaker 1: think with their brain, they think with their well and 532 00:27:05,880 --> 00:27:09,080 Speaker 1: they they talked. They also talk about in the book 533 00:27:09,160 --> 00:27:11,639 Speaker 1: Um David Ggelman talks about how women will select a 534 00:27:11,760 --> 00:27:15,159 Speaker 1: partner when they are ovulating based on how much facial 535 00:27:15,160 --> 00:27:18,600 Speaker 1: hair and how broad their shoulders are, because they want 536 00:27:18,680 --> 00:27:22,639 Speaker 1: somebody who's husky and protective and strong. Yeah, yeah, they 537 00:27:22,640 --> 00:27:24,639 Speaker 1: want the incredible hulk. Well when when is it? Then 538 00:27:24,720 --> 00:27:27,400 Speaker 1: they want somebody who is kind and delicate when they're 539 00:27:27,440 --> 00:27:30,840 Speaker 1: not ovulating. There they look for people who have softer features, 540 00:27:30,920 --> 00:27:33,600 Speaker 1: and having a broadcast just doesn't matter as much. The 541 00:27:33,640 --> 00:27:35,840 Speaker 1: idea is that they're looking for someone who can nurture, 542 00:27:35,880 --> 00:27:39,320 Speaker 1: learn more his words, not mine, Because when I read 543 00:27:39,320 --> 00:27:41,920 Speaker 1: stuff like this sometimes I have to raise my eyebrow 544 00:27:41,920 --> 00:27:44,320 Speaker 1: in a big question mark because sometimes I think this 545 00:27:44,440 --> 00:27:48,359 Speaker 1: is overstated to a certain degree. Yeah, yeah, none of 546 00:27:48,359 --> 00:27:51,000 Speaker 1: these are the hard and fast rule by which to live. 547 00:27:51,080 --> 00:27:53,240 Speaker 1: But but again it chose that that again their stuff 548 00:27:53,280 --> 00:27:56,520 Speaker 1: going on at a biological level, that if it's not 549 00:27:56,680 --> 00:28:00,560 Speaker 1: robbing us of our free will completely, it's at least 550 00:28:00,720 --> 00:28:03,920 Speaker 1: limiting the number of options. It's steering us towards certain choices, 551 00:28:03,960 --> 00:28:07,399 Speaker 1: if not choosing them outright. For the surface, and it 552 00:28:07,440 --> 00:28:11,240 Speaker 1: begs the question, so does free will really exist? And 553 00:28:11,480 --> 00:28:14,120 Speaker 1: Eagleman says the argument for these the existence of free 554 00:28:14,119 --> 00:28:17,119 Speaker 1: will is essentially that it's a direct subjective experience. And 555 00:28:17,119 --> 00:28:19,119 Speaker 1: I talked about this earlier. I feel like I just 556 00:28:19,200 --> 00:28:22,240 Speaker 1: made a choice to scratch my arms, so therefore I 557 00:28:22,280 --> 00:28:25,159 Speaker 1: feel like I made a choice the objective forward being feel. 558 00:28:25,240 --> 00:28:28,600 Speaker 1: But Eagleman brings up a really interesting study by I 559 00:28:28,600 --> 00:28:32,399 Speaker 1: believe he's a neuroscientist Labette, who had a finger raising experiment. 560 00:28:32,920 --> 00:28:36,719 Speaker 1: And in the nineteen sixties, Benjamin Labette put electrodes on 561 00:28:36,760 --> 00:28:39,080 Speaker 1: his test subject's head and asked them to lift their 562 00:28:39,120 --> 00:28:42,160 Speaker 1: finger whenever they got the urged to do so, okay, 563 00:28:42,520 --> 00:28:45,520 Speaker 1: and it seems pretty straightforward, right. They were given a 564 00:28:45,560 --> 00:28:47,840 Speaker 1: timer and asked to note the exact movement that they 565 00:28:47,920 --> 00:28:51,360 Speaker 1: felt the urge. People reported the urge about a quarter 566 00:28:51,440 --> 00:28:54,160 Speaker 1: of a second before they actually move their fingers. The 567 00:28:54,280 --> 00:28:56,800 Speaker 1: curious part is that the E E G read out 568 00:28:56,840 --> 00:28:59,600 Speaker 1: from the electrodes reported the activity in their brain rose 569 00:29:00,040 --> 00:29:03,680 Speaker 1: out one full second before they actually felt the urge 570 00:29:03,760 --> 00:29:06,680 Speaker 1: to move. So why is this important? I mean because 571 00:29:06,680 --> 00:29:09,080 Speaker 1: it's basically saying that there are parts of the brain 572 00:29:09,160 --> 00:29:12,920 Speaker 1: that are making decisions well before you become conscious of it. Wow. 573 00:29:12,960 --> 00:29:14,800 Speaker 1: So it's like John Stewart just made a funny joke. 574 00:29:15,120 --> 00:29:18,160 Speaker 1: Know that joke was written six hours ago by like 575 00:29:18,240 --> 00:29:22,360 Speaker 1: four dudes, and it was already determined funny and served 576 00:29:22,440 --> 00:29:27,200 Speaker 1: up right, approved by a committee, stamped, typed up, signed, 577 00:29:27,720 --> 00:29:30,600 Speaker 1: handed over, and delivered yeah yeah, which all flies in 578 00:29:30,640 --> 00:29:32,600 Speaker 1: the face of the argument that, well, I feel like 579 00:29:32,640 --> 00:29:34,840 Speaker 1: I just made a choice to scratch my arm. Yeah, 580 00:29:34,920 --> 00:29:36,880 Speaker 1: well you were kind of served up the information to 581 00:29:36,920 --> 00:29:39,800 Speaker 1: do it. You know, this other, this other part of 582 00:29:39,840 --> 00:29:42,400 Speaker 1: your brain that's working under the covers, is not necessarily 583 00:29:42,440 --> 00:29:45,680 Speaker 1: giving a direct subjective experience, and it raises all sorts 584 00:29:45,720 --> 00:29:47,840 Speaker 1: of interesting questions about then, then what do we do 585 00:29:47,880 --> 00:29:50,360 Speaker 1: with this information? How does it change the world we 586 00:29:50,400 --> 00:29:52,360 Speaker 1: live in? I was checking out the author or Scott 587 00:29:52,400 --> 00:29:54,840 Speaker 1: Baker's blog, re Pound Brain. He was talking about going 588 00:29:54,840 --> 00:29:58,200 Speaker 1: to see a talk by Daniel Dennett, who mentioned earlier 589 00:29:58,240 --> 00:30:03,040 Speaker 1: the Philosopher, and then was discussing two recent studies by UM. 590 00:30:03,240 --> 00:30:05,760 Speaker 1: It's a cooperation between the University of Minnesota and the 591 00:30:05,840 --> 00:30:10,400 Speaker 1: University of British Columbia, and they found that college students, 592 00:30:10,480 --> 00:30:14,520 Speaker 1: when exposed to arguments that were not completely in charge 593 00:30:14,880 --> 00:30:17,440 Speaker 1: of our choices, that free will is either an illusion 594 00:30:17,680 --> 00:30:20,360 Speaker 1: or not near as big a factor in our choices 595 00:30:20,400 --> 00:30:22,280 Speaker 1: as we think it is they were more likely to 596 00:30:22,360 --> 00:30:25,760 Speaker 1: cheat first on a mathematics test, then on a on 597 00:30:25,800 --> 00:30:28,760 Speaker 1: another form of tests. But that that raises an interesting question. 598 00:30:28,800 --> 00:30:31,160 Speaker 1: If we were to live in a world where everyone 599 00:30:31,280 --> 00:30:32,920 Speaker 1: is thinking, well, we're not really in charge, there's no 600 00:30:33,040 --> 00:30:35,360 Speaker 1: such thing as free will, I'm just privy to all 601 00:30:35,400 --> 00:30:38,479 Speaker 1: these other forces beneath the surface of things. Then am 602 00:30:38,520 --> 00:30:41,720 Speaker 1: I more likely to make bad choices just because I 603 00:30:41,760 --> 00:30:44,600 Speaker 1: don't feel like they're my choices? Well, and that's what 604 00:30:44,760 --> 00:30:47,200 Speaker 1: Jennet and others argue, right, Like, you can't blame your 605 00:30:47,200 --> 00:30:51,160 Speaker 1: brain or or your lack of awareness for bad choices. Yeah, 606 00:30:51,240 --> 00:30:53,160 Speaker 1: you can't be on trial for murder and say my 607 00:30:53,200 --> 00:30:55,640 Speaker 1: brain made me do it. To a certain extent, you can, 608 00:30:55,800 --> 00:30:58,960 Speaker 1: but but but not not across the board. We can't 609 00:30:59,000 --> 00:31:01,640 Speaker 1: blame our brains because is we still are our brains, 610 00:31:01,960 --> 00:31:04,600 Speaker 1: even if there's a lot more going on on underneath, 611 00:31:04,640 --> 00:31:07,400 Speaker 1: even if we're at the periphery. Really, Yeah, Eagleman was 612 00:31:07,400 --> 00:31:09,960 Speaker 1: talking about this, and he was he brought up actually 613 00:31:10,000 --> 00:31:15,200 Speaker 1: Turetts and parasomnias as an example of what he calls automatism, 614 00:31:15,240 --> 00:31:17,200 Speaker 1: And he's saying that someone with Touretts could be said 615 00:31:17,200 --> 00:31:19,520 Speaker 1: to have no free will since the neural circuit trees 616 00:31:19,600 --> 00:31:23,080 Speaker 1: making decisions for him or her right and decisions that 617 00:31:23,080 --> 00:31:26,200 Speaker 1: they're consciously aware of, they can't do anything to stop it. 618 00:31:26,320 --> 00:31:28,320 Speaker 1: And of course when you've got a parasomnia though you're 619 00:31:28,360 --> 00:31:31,040 Speaker 1: not quite aware. This is for people who didn't hear 620 00:31:31,080 --> 00:31:34,400 Speaker 1: the parasomnia episode, this is crazy sleep. This is sleep 621 00:31:34,400 --> 00:31:37,680 Speaker 1: eating sleep. Um. Some people who have r b D 622 00:31:37,840 --> 00:31:40,360 Speaker 1: when actually act out their dreams, which you can be 623 00:31:40,440 --> 00:31:43,640 Speaker 1: quite frightening. Sleep sleep. Karate is pretty much from yeah, 624 00:31:43,680 --> 00:31:46,120 Speaker 1: that's that's the shorthand for that, um, But it's really 625 00:31:46,160 --> 00:31:50,760 Speaker 1: sort of redefining again what free will is. And what 626 00:31:50,840 --> 00:31:53,040 Speaker 1: he says is that we should come up with something 627 00:31:53,080 --> 00:31:56,640 Speaker 1: called the principle of sufficient automatism. So he says, in 628 00:31:56,720 --> 00:32:00,560 Speaker 1: legal parlance, automatism is is basically someone doing something and 629 00:32:00,600 --> 00:32:03,080 Speaker 1: the root cause for it is a biological process for 630 00:32:03,120 --> 00:32:05,560 Speaker 1: which the person has little or no control over. His 631 00:32:05,640 --> 00:32:09,080 Speaker 1: example would be, for instance, like a person isn't culpable 632 00:32:09,160 --> 00:32:12,680 Speaker 1: for an accident if they had a seizure right and 633 00:32:12,720 --> 00:32:16,360 Speaker 1: they caused a traffic accident. Interesting story, I know somebody 634 00:32:16,400 --> 00:32:19,240 Speaker 1: who was in a traffic accident, uh, and it was 635 00:32:19,280 --> 00:32:22,360 Speaker 1: caused by an individual who had a seizure, and the 636 00:32:22,400 --> 00:32:27,800 Speaker 1: insurance company involved claimed act of God active God. It's 637 00:32:27,840 --> 00:32:29,360 Speaker 1: got to be like a state by state thing in 638 00:32:29,360 --> 00:32:32,360 Speaker 1: the US, because, Yeah, I wonder if they all call it, 639 00:32:32,600 --> 00:32:34,719 Speaker 1: call it active God or or in this case, that's 640 00:32:34,720 --> 00:32:38,800 Speaker 1: supposed to be called automatism. M hmm, there you go. 641 00:32:39,200 --> 00:32:42,480 Speaker 1: We'll see. That's a whole another podcast for psycholinguism, right 642 00:32:42,800 --> 00:32:45,840 Speaker 1: and how we described meaning to language? So Egoman though 643 00:32:45,880 --> 00:32:48,160 Speaker 1: he takes this example and he says, Okay, the person 644 00:32:48,200 --> 00:32:50,200 Speaker 1: didn't have a choice in the matter, right, the perion 645 00:32:50,240 --> 00:32:51,960 Speaker 1: that had the seizure, they didn't want to have a 646 00:32:51,960 --> 00:32:54,120 Speaker 1: seizure and they didn't want to cause an accident. So 647 00:32:54,280 --> 00:32:57,720 Speaker 1: he wonders if this biological process quote describe most or 648 00:32:57,880 --> 00:32:59,840 Speaker 1: some would argue all of what's going on in our 649 00:33:00,040 --> 00:33:03,880 Speaker 1: rains given the steering power of our genetics, childhood experiences, 650 00:33:04,320 --> 00:33:08,800 Speaker 1: environmental talks and hormones, neurotransmitters, and neurocircuitry, enough of our 651 00:33:08,880 --> 00:33:13,440 Speaker 1: decisions are beyond our explicit control that we arguably are 652 00:33:13,520 --> 00:33:16,320 Speaker 1: not the ones in charge. In other words, free will 653 00:33:16,680 --> 00:33:19,080 Speaker 1: may exist, but if it does, it has a very 654 00:33:19,200 --> 00:33:22,040 Speaker 1: little room in which to operate. So he says we 655 00:33:22,080 --> 00:33:26,000 Speaker 1: should reframe it as this principle of sufficient automatism. Basically, 656 00:33:26,000 --> 00:33:28,720 Speaker 1: the principle arises naturally from the understanding that free will, 657 00:33:28,760 --> 00:33:31,040 Speaker 1: if it is, if it does exist, is only a 658 00:33:31,040 --> 00:33:35,280 Speaker 1: small factor writing on top of enormous automated machinery, so 659 00:33:35,360 --> 00:33:37,720 Speaker 1: small that we may be able to think about bad 660 00:33:37,760 --> 00:33:39,880 Speaker 1: decisions being made in the same way that we think 661 00:33:39,920 --> 00:33:43,360 Speaker 1: about any other physical process, like diabetes or lung disease. 662 00:33:44,480 --> 00:33:46,680 Speaker 1: I don't know, is he is he letting us off 663 00:33:46,760 --> 00:33:49,520 Speaker 1: too easily? You think? I don't think. I mean he 664 00:33:49,520 --> 00:33:51,640 Speaker 1: he out you know, in his Bookie outright came out 665 00:33:51,680 --> 00:33:54,280 Speaker 1: and said, I'm not making the argument, and I don't 666 00:33:54,280 --> 00:33:57,080 Speaker 1: think it. There's a risk that we're going to unlock 667 00:33:57,120 --> 00:33:59,160 Speaker 1: the doors in the prisons and say, oh, you guys 668 00:33:59,160 --> 00:34:01,200 Speaker 1: go free. There's no sich thing as free will, so 669 00:34:01,720 --> 00:34:03,840 Speaker 1: carry on. No, I agree, but I think he's still 670 00:34:04,120 --> 00:34:07,840 Speaker 1: posing that question do we have free will? And he's 671 00:34:07,880 --> 00:34:11,439 Speaker 1: sort of saying, no, we don't, but possibly we could 672 00:34:11,440 --> 00:34:13,560 Speaker 1: act on it within seconds. Well, this is me, not 673 00:34:13,680 --> 00:34:17,200 Speaker 1: him freere Perhaps all zen meditation experts right, and we 674 00:34:17,200 --> 00:34:19,680 Speaker 1: could monitor every thought, because when we get down to it, 675 00:34:19,719 --> 00:34:23,920 Speaker 1: the experience is that we have free will unless we 676 00:34:24,800 --> 00:34:28,680 Speaker 1: really work on ourselves to change the way we experienced 677 00:34:28,719 --> 00:34:31,799 Speaker 1: the world. It's this weird paradox in the in the 678 00:34:31,840 --> 00:34:34,120 Speaker 1: way we are the experience, you know, we are this, 679 00:34:34,320 --> 00:34:37,440 Speaker 1: uh like like, how do you change that? How how 680 00:34:37,480 --> 00:34:40,480 Speaker 1: do we do that? Could you become the brain without 681 00:34:40,480 --> 00:34:43,480 Speaker 1: this subsurface of perceived free will? I don't know, I 682 00:34:43,480 --> 00:34:45,640 Speaker 1: don't know. I think that's why neuroscience is so fascinating, 683 00:34:45,680 --> 00:34:48,680 Speaker 1: and I think that's that's why he leaves the door open, 684 00:34:48,920 --> 00:34:51,200 Speaker 1: even though he says I pretty much side with other 685 00:34:51,239 --> 00:34:54,480 Speaker 1: neuroscientists and saying that we don't necessarily have the free will, 686 00:34:54,600 --> 00:34:56,799 Speaker 1: or at least it's not what we think it is. 687 00:34:57,320 --> 00:35:00,560 Speaker 1: It's it's definitely a different creature than what we've been discussing. 688 00:35:01,120 --> 00:35:03,520 Speaker 1: But he says that he feels like neuroscience is too 689 00:35:03,560 --> 00:35:07,399 Speaker 1: young and in a field right now to really definitively 690 00:35:07,480 --> 00:35:10,799 Speaker 1: answer this question. And it does make me think back 691 00:35:10,840 --> 00:35:14,160 Speaker 1: to the Blue Brain project, which we've talked about. This 692 00:35:14,719 --> 00:35:17,360 Speaker 1: building the computer or the digital model of the brain, 693 00:35:17,560 --> 00:35:21,280 Speaker 1: right trying to re engineer like our billion neurons and 694 00:35:21,320 --> 00:35:23,839 Speaker 1: see this detail at a cellular level and see if 695 00:35:23,840 --> 00:35:25,800 Speaker 1: it can tell us and the answer to these questions 696 00:35:25,840 --> 00:35:28,359 Speaker 1: about who we are. If this consciousness this I does 697 00:35:28,400 --> 00:35:31,680 Speaker 1: it really exist in this brain floating around? Yeah, As 698 00:35:31,719 --> 00:35:33,920 Speaker 1: we've mentioned before, I think it's it's like I'm one extreme. 699 00:35:33,960 --> 00:35:37,560 Speaker 1: You can look at such revelations as um terrifying, and 700 00:35:37,600 --> 00:35:39,600 Speaker 1: on the other side you can look at it as enlightenment. 701 00:35:39,920 --> 00:35:42,400 Speaker 1: And I think ultimately it's going to be ideally somewhere 702 00:35:42,400 --> 00:35:45,000 Speaker 1: in between where to see the enlightening aspects of it 703 00:35:45,040 --> 00:35:47,680 Speaker 1: but also see the sobering aspects of it as well. 704 00:35:47,760 --> 00:35:49,880 Speaker 1: So on one level you can say, well, I'm not 705 00:35:49,960 --> 00:35:52,359 Speaker 1: really completely in charge of all my choices and look 706 00:35:52,400 --> 00:35:54,120 Speaker 1: at that in so far as it keeps you from 707 00:35:54,160 --> 00:35:56,680 Speaker 1: beating yourself up too much, but also don't cling to 708 00:35:56,719 --> 00:35:58,920 Speaker 1: it so much that you just run around doing whatever 709 00:35:58,960 --> 00:36:02,160 Speaker 1: the heck entered your mind and didn't bang every impulse. Personally, 710 00:36:02,280 --> 00:36:04,520 Speaker 1: I think that it's it's actually pretty liberating because I 711 00:36:04,560 --> 00:36:06,320 Speaker 1: think that it gives us another way to think about 712 00:36:06,320 --> 00:36:09,360 Speaker 1: our actions and perhaps even sort of back up a 713 00:36:09,360 --> 00:36:12,080 Speaker 1: little bit and rethink them in a way that we 714 00:36:12,120 --> 00:36:14,520 Speaker 1: make better choices, if at all possible. If that little 715 00:36:14,640 --> 00:36:18,320 Speaker 1: middle second window does exist where we can make decisions 716 00:36:18,320 --> 00:36:22,600 Speaker 1: that I the consciousness that we that are aware. Then hey, okay, 717 00:36:22,640 --> 00:36:25,480 Speaker 1: even even better to know that that exists and take 718 00:36:25,520 --> 00:36:27,680 Speaker 1: hold of it. Yeah, well, it's kind of like to 719 00:36:27,719 --> 00:36:29,719 Speaker 1: come back to John Stewart. When John Stewart reads a joke, 720 00:36:30,120 --> 00:36:32,600 Speaker 1: he knows that that this was written hours ago by 721 00:36:32,600 --> 00:36:33,960 Speaker 1: a team of riders. We still have to add to 722 00:36:34,000 --> 00:36:36,319 Speaker 1: deliver it. So there you go. Maybe there's a model there. 723 00:36:36,719 --> 00:36:39,080 Speaker 1: I think there's a unifying theory of mine right there, 724 00:36:39,080 --> 00:36:41,200 Speaker 1: and have to do with John Stewart. Yeah, yeah, I'm 725 00:36:41,200 --> 00:36:43,680 Speaker 1: gonna I'm gonna patent that. Speaking of free will, some 726 00:36:43,760 --> 00:36:46,560 Speaker 1: of our listeners had the free will to send us 727 00:36:46,560 --> 00:36:53,320 Speaker 1: in some emails. Maybe maybe there were suggestions in this 728 00:36:53,440 --> 00:36:55,359 Speaker 1: creepy voice. But if you got there, you got one. 729 00:36:55,440 --> 00:36:58,520 Speaker 1: Oh yeah, I've got one. Well normally I read them, 730 00:36:58,520 --> 00:37:00,040 Speaker 1: but I know you had one that wasn't need to 731 00:36:59,880 --> 00:37:02,919 Speaker 1: do to your heart. Yeah. This is from Spencer and 732 00:37:03,040 --> 00:37:06,600 Speaker 1: he was talking about the podcast that we recently did 733 00:37:06,800 --> 00:37:11,360 Speaker 1: about cycolinguistics and our treatment of animals and eating animals. 734 00:37:11,800 --> 00:37:17,600 Speaker 1: Believe it was called Don't Eat the Pandada. And he writes, um, 735 00:37:17,600 --> 00:37:20,000 Speaker 1: and I'll skip around this a little bit because it's longer. 736 00:37:20,280 --> 00:37:23,640 Speaker 1: Was very thoughtful email, says I myself am a metatarian 737 00:37:23,760 --> 00:37:25,959 Speaker 1: who has always struggled with the idea of not having 738 00:37:25,960 --> 00:37:28,279 Speaker 1: to participate or even think about the process by which 739 00:37:28,280 --> 00:37:30,400 Speaker 1: the animal went from breathing and living to sitting on 740 00:37:30,440 --> 00:37:34,319 Speaker 1: my plate, all seasoned and delicious for me personally, The 741 00:37:34,360 --> 00:37:37,040 Speaker 1: internal struggle began when I was invited on a hunt 742 00:37:37,080 --> 00:37:41,320 Speaker 1: with my cousin when I was sixteen. Um. I agreed 743 00:37:41,440 --> 00:37:43,800 Speaker 1: enthusiastically and was taken to a farmer's field. Will re 744 00:37:43,840 --> 00:37:48,840 Speaker 1: drove most of the way and we just uh for 745 00:37:48,920 --> 00:37:50,640 Speaker 1: this a little bit. We spotted a group of deer 746 00:37:50,680 --> 00:37:52,719 Speaker 1: who must have been suitable for shooting us. My cousin 747 00:37:52,760 --> 00:37:57,920 Speaker 1: directed me to take any because like farmers field. Now, 748 00:37:58,120 --> 00:38:01,560 Speaker 1: I'm sorry, yeah, Manby's coming into this, dude. My cousin 749 00:38:01,680 --> 00:38:04,000 Speaker 1: directing me and take aim Adam matured dough, which I did. 750 00:38:04,080 --> 00:38:06,919 Speaker 1: Upon firing the shot and seeing that my actions had 751 00:38:06,920 --> 00:38:09,400 Speaker 1: directly resulted in the struggle an imminent death of a 752 00:38:09,400 --> 00:38:12,640 Speaker 1: beautiful animal, immediately started crying. Since that day, I've always 753 00:38:12,680 --> 00:38:15,279 Speaker 1: had an issue with the death of other animals for 754 00:38:15,320 --> 00:38:17,920 Speaker 1: our enjoyment, until that first pie of a juicy burger 755 00:38:18,080 --> 00:38:21,640 Speaker 1: or other savory meat concoction that I mysteriously and suddenly 756 00:38:21,640 --> 00:38:24,799 Speaker 1: forget I ever took issue with how I got how 757 00:38:24,840 --> 00:38:27,160 Speaker 1: it got to my mouth. And then he talks about 758 00:38:27,239 --> 00:38:29,279 Speaker 1: his wife who was in the four h Beef Club 759 00:38:29,360 --> 00:38:32,040 Speaker 1: for many years, and how when you're in the club, 760 00:38:32,120 --> 00:38:35,439 Speaker 1: you basically raise a calf and you get to show 761 00:38:35,480 --> 00:38:37,600 Speaker 1: it off and it's like this great experience and you've 762 00:38:37,640 --> 00:38:39,960 Speaker 1: bonded with this animal. And he said that of course, 763 00:38:40,000 --> 00:38:42,920 Speaker 1: when the young for hrs are showing their calves at 764 00:38:42,920 --> 00:38:45,640 Speaker 1: the auction, many inevitably start crying as their animals are 765 00:38:45,719 --> 00:38:48,040 Speaker 1: lead away for slaughter, whereupon everyone takes a few minutes 766 00:38:48,080 --> 00:38:50,279 Speaker 1: to calm down and get ready for delicious beefs upper 767 00:38:50,400 --> 00:38:52,279 Speaker 1: after the event. Thanks so much for the podcast. It 768 00:38:52,480 --> 00:38:56,719 Speaker 1: always as promise, has blewn my mind, So I thought 769 00:38:56,719 --> 00:38:59,600 Speaker 1: that was just really interesting too. Again, we're talking about 770 00:38:59,680 --> 00:39:01,440 Speaker 1: the things that we do and the things that we 771 00:39:01,560 --> 00:39:04,640 Speaker 1: think in how sometimes they're not quite squared together. So 772 00:39:05,160 --> 00:39:07,719 Speaker 1: thank you very much Fance for for sending that to us. 773 00:39:08,440 --> 00:39:10,680 Speaker 1: If you have any thoughts you'd like to share with us. 774 00:39:10,680 --> 00:39:13,000 Speaker 1: You've got some some cool study you ran across, some 775 00:39:13,160 --> 00:39:15,360 Speaker 1: idea that you think would make for a cool episode 776 00:39:15,360 --> 00:39:17,120 Speaker 1: of this podcast, you should share it with us and 777 00:39:17,320 --> 00:39:19,600 Speaker 1: with the other listeners. You can log on a Facebook 778 00:39:19,719 --> 00:39:22,440 Speaker 1: and find us on there as below the Mind, and 779 00:39:22,480 --> 00:39:25,080 Speaker 1: we're also on Twitter as below the Mind, and we 780 00:39:25,239 --> 00:39:27,799 Speaker 1: update those regularly with all sorts of cool stuff, and 781 00:39:27,840 --> 00:39:29,719 Speaker 1: you can always send us an email at blow the 782 00:39:29,760 --> 00:39:36,360 Speaker 1: Mind at how stuff works dot com. Be sure to 783 00:39:36,440 --> 00:39:39,200 Speaker 1: check out our new video podcast, Stuff from the Future. 784 00:39:39,560 --> 00:39:41,879 Speaker 1: Join how Stuff Work staff as we explore the most 785 00:39:41,880 --> 00:39:44,719 Speaker 1: promising and perplexing possibilities of tomorrow.