WEBVTT - Tech News: Big Tech, Big Problems

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<v Speaker 1>Welcome to tech Stuff, a production from I Heart Radio.

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<v Speaker 1>Hey there, and welcome to tech Stuff. I'm your host,

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<v Speaker 1>Jonathan Strickland. I'm an executive producer with I Heart Radio.

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<v Speaker 1>And how the tech are you? It's time for the

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<v Speaker 1>tech news for Thursday, March one, twenty two. We should

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<v Speaker 1>all be thankful that a news episode did not fall

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<v Speaker 1>on April one, because who knows what would have happened. Then.

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<v Speaker 1>I do know what's gonna happen. Now. We're gonna complain

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<v Speaker 1>a lot about big tech because there are a lot

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<v Speaker 1>of stories that just continue to put a lot of

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<v Speaker 1>companies in a pretty bad light. And I would love

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<v Speaker 1>for that not to be the case. But here we are,

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<v Speaker 1>so let's get started. Now. A lot of the news,

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<v Speaker 1>like I said, is going to be about big tech

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<v Speaker 1>shenanigans in this episode, not as many as as I

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<v Speaker 1>originally had lined up. In fact, I threw out a

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<v Speaker 1>ton of stories because the episode was starting to go

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<v Speaker 1>too long, and and also it just I was starting

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<v Speaker 1>to get beaten down by it. So anyway, one of

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<v Speaker 1>the things that I read about today which I found

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<v Speaker 1>interesting is an organization called the Tech Oversight Project that

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<v Speaker 1>has created a wiki specifically to help folks read up

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<v Speaker 1>on the various issues surrounding big tech over the last

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<v Speaker 1>several years, like things that big tech companies have done

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<v Speaker 1>that have been, you know, not good. The wiki is

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<v Speaker 1>fittingly called the big Tech Wiki, and you can read

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<v Speaker 1>a great article about this resource and the organization behind

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<v Speaker 1>it over on gizmoto dot com. The article is titled

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<v Speaker 1>Watchdog Group publishes Encyclopedia of all the nasty things big

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<v Speaker 1>Tech has done, and it's by Mac Dagaron. But one

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<v Speaker 1>caveat because the article itself reveals this, it's not actually

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<v Speaker 1>all the nasty things big tech has done, because even

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<v Speaker 1>with more than ninety pages of documentation, it's just scratching

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<v Speaker 1>the surface. But the wiki collects this documentation about things

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<v Speaker 1>like anti competitive practices, UH, the spread of misinformation, how

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<v Speaker 1>these companies are funding political lobbying groups to shape legislation

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<v Speaker 1>in their favor, and controversial partnerships with other entities, such

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<v Speaker 1>as for example, Google's work with the U. S Military,

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<v Speaker 1>and stuff like facial recognition which could potentially be weaponized.

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<v Speaker 1>And it's a good article, so I do recommend you

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<v Speaker 1>check it out, and the resource, the actual wiki itself,

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<v Speaker 1>can help you catch up on all the exhausting amount

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<v Speaker 1>of skullduggery that's been going on in the big tech

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<v Speaker 1>sector for quite some time. I should also add that

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<v Speaker 1>the project receives funds from the Ahmadyar Network, which politically

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<v Speaker 1>is a left leaning organization. Now, I say that simply

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<v Speaker 1>because I think it's always good to keep in mind

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<v Speaker 1>the perspective that was used to cover certain issues. I mean,

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<v Speaker 1>for that matter, I actually, no surprise, I leaned pretty

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<v Speaker 1>hard left myself, So I'm not saying that my perspective

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<v Speaker 1>is the correct one. I don't necessarily believe that I

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<v Speaker 1>know how I feel, but I would. It would be

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<v Speaker 1>way too much hubris for me to say my way

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<v Speaker 1>is the right way. But you should check out the

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<v Speaker 1>article and the wiki if you want to get angry

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<v Speaker 1>at big companies like Google, Meta, Apple, Microsoft, those kind

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<v Speaker 1>of things. Now, along those lines, CNBC published an article

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<v Speaker 1>titled how Google and Amazon bankrolled a grassroots activist group

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<v Speaker 1>of small business owners to lobby against big tech oversight.

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<v Speaker 1>There's a heck of a long headline, and that's just

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<v Speaker 1>the kind of thing that the Big Tech Wiki would cover.

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<v Speaker 1>So in that article, CNBC reporters reveal that the lobbying

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<v Speaker 1>group is called the Connected Commerce Council, and it's supposed

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<v Speaker 1>to represent small businesses and Amazon and Google are simply

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<v Speaker 1>referred to as partners in the group. But apparently at

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<v Speaker 1>least some of the business is listed as members of

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<v Speaker 1>the group never actually joined it. Many had not even

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<v Speaker 1>heard of the group, according to them, and yet their

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<v Speaker 1>businesses were listed on the roster. Now, the implication is

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<v Speaker 1>that this makes this a an AstroTurf campaign. AstroTurf is

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<v Speaker 1>a term used to describe a situation where companies create

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<v Speaker 1>what is supposed to look like a grassroots political movement,

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<v Speaker 1>but is an actuality an attempt to push against legislation

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<v Speaker 1>that would restrict or regulate the companies, or in some case,

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<v Speaker 1>push for legislation that would give those companies more advantages.

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<v Speaker 1>And astroturfing is pretty insidious. It's also a pretty common tactic.

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<v Speaker 1>We've also seen big tech companies try to leverage small

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<v Speaker 1>business in a way to excuse certain policies and practices.

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<v Speaker 1>Meta has done this a lot as well, claiming that

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<v Speaker 1>certain restrictions to its advertising strategy would harm small businesses.

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<v Speaker 1>You know, they try to position it so it's not

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<v Speaker 1>about hurting the bottom line of the big company, but

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<v Speaker 1>rather it's the equivalent of think of the children. Is

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<v Speaker 1>really what it comes down to, and it can be

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<v Speaker 1>pretty shady stuff. Now that being said, this article also

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<v Speaker 1>mentions that there are legitimate small businesses that are really

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<v Speaker 1>part of the organization, so it's not like just a

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<v Speaker 1>dummy group or anything like that. There are actual small

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<v Speaker 1>businesses represented in the ranks that really do want to

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<v Speaker 1>be there, and there are several that are in favor

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<v Speaker 1>of the group and the group's policies, and they say

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<v Speaker 1>that the group keeps them up to date on proposed

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<v Speaker 1>legislation that could impact their businesses. So you might say,

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<v Speaker 1>is this a real AstroTurf case or does it only

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<v Speaker 1>appear that way due to the involvement of big tech

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<v Speaker 1>companies that are particularly politically active, And I honestly don't

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<v Speaker 1>know the answer to that. In a similar story, the

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<v Speaker 1>Washington Post published an article revealing that Meta has been

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<v Speaker 1>paying a consulting firm called Targeted Victory, and Targeted Victory

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<v Speaker 1>primarily caters to US Republican candidates during election cycles. Specifically,

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<v Speaker 1>Meta has hired on the consulting firm in order to

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<v Speaker 1>create a kind of smear campaign against rival social media

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<v Speaker 1>platform TikTok. Now, according to the Post, the goal was

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<v Speaker 1>to reach out to various news outlets, and we're primarily

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<v Speaker 1>talking about regional or local news outlets, and then convince

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<v Speaker 1>them to run pieces criticizing TikTok and making various claims

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<v Speaker 1>about TikTok's potential for harm, particularly for younger people. Now,

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<v Speaker 1>some of those claims I think have some merit to them.

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<v Speaker 1>I do think social platforms can facilitate harm, not that

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<v Speaker 1>they're necessarily harmful just by themselves, but that you know,

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<v Speaker 1>they are very effective at transmitting harm. In fact, Meta

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<v Speaker 1>thinks this too about its own platforms, according to those

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<v Speaker 1>internal documents that Francis Hogan leaked last year. But some

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<v Speaker 1>of the narratives pushed by Targeted Victory are at best

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<v Speaker 1>insincere and at worst are an outright form of misinformation.

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<v Speaker 1>According to the Post, some of the stories Targeted Victory

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<v Speaker 1>pushed were about harmful trends that had supposedly originated and

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<v Speaker 1>propagated across TikTok, when, in fact, and at least a

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<v Speaker 1>couple of those cases, those trends actually got their start

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<v Speaker 1>on Facebook. So, in other words, the stuff Facebook was

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<v Speaker 1>indirectly accusing TikTok of through targeted victory, we're actually examples

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<v Speaker 1>of Facebook's own shortcomings. Now, to be fair, Meta slash

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<v Speaker 1>Facebook does have some distance from these efforts because it's

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<v Speaker 1>essentially paid Targeted Victory to do the dirty work, so

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<v Speaker 1>Facebook's not directly involved, and the goals of that dirty

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<v Speaker 1>work are twofold. One is to try to level the

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<v Speaker 1>playing field a little bit between Meta and TikTok, because,

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<v Speaker 1>as we've seen with Meta's financial report earlier this year,

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<v Speaker 1>the company has been struggling to attract younger users and

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<v Speaker 1>has cited TikTok as being one of the big reasons

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<v Speaker 1>for that. Now, another goal is to deflect attention away

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<v Speaker 1>from Meta and onto someone else, because Meta's been in

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<v Speaker 1>the center of a of a target for a while

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<v Speaker 1>now for good reason. But the company would really rather

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<v Speaker 1>someone else take that place, and TikTok would sure be

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<v Speaker 1>a nice substitute. And you know, TikTok, being a company

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<v Speaker 1>that's owned by a larger Chinese conglomerate is a pretty

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<v Speaker 1>good target if that's your goal. I mean, there are

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<v Speaker 1>some legitimate concerns to have about TikTok, so it's not

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<v Speaker 1>like all of these attacks have no substance to them.

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<v Speaker 1>There are reasons to be concerned. Now, my own point

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<v Speaker 1>of view is TikTok isn't that great and it does

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<v Speaker 1>merit some scrutiny, But then I say the same thing

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<v Speaker 1>about Meta. Both of them need to be scrutinized, potentially regulated,

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<v Speaker 1>uh certainly held accountable for when they do things that

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<v Speaker 1>are harmful. Anyway, it's interesting to see big tech behaving

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<v Speaker 1>more and more like the ugliest facets of the political process.

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<v Speaker 1>And by interesting I mean discouraging but not surprising. Staying

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<v Speaker 1>on this topic a bit longer, Global Witness, which has

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<v Speaker 1>frequently been a thorn and Meta's side, released a report

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<v Speaker 1>yesterday saying Facebook's algorithm appears to be amplifying climate denial

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<v Speaker 1>posts rather than offering up links to more reliable sources

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<v Speaker 1>on the subject of climate change. So they actually ran

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<v Speaker 1>a bit of an experiment. They created a couple of

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<v Speaker 1>dummy accounts, Jane and John, both of which were supposed

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<v Speaker 1>to represent climate skeptics. Now, the John account was set

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<v Speaker 1>to follow legit scientific organizations, so it was liking pages

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<v Speaker 1>that belonged to actually actual credible scientific groups and and institutions.

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<v Speaker 1>The Jane account was directed to like a couple of

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<v Speaker 1>pages that related to climate change skepticism. Then they sat

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<v Speaker 1>back and looked to see what kind of content was

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<v Speaker 1>being recommended in the respective news feeds, and they saw

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<v Speaker 1>that Jane's news feed began creating, you know, seeing way

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<v Speaker 1>more climate denial content in that feed. And on top

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<v Speaker 1>of that, two thirds of the pages that included climate

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<v Speaker 1>change misinformation were not labeled as such, so there was

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<v Speaker 1>no warning. They're saying, you know, this is not necessarily

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<v Speaker 1>reliable information and you should really look to such and

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<v Speaker 1>such a place to get more reliable info. Now, the

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<v Speaker 1>feed for John didn't have this problem. John didn't get

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<v Speaker 1>the notifications of um, you know, posts that included climate

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<v Speaker 1>denialism in it. So while John was seeing more information

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<v Speaker 1>from legitimate sources, Jane saw progressively extremist content on the subject.

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<v Speaker 1>So once again we see how Facebook's algorithm, coupled with

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<v Speaker 1>Meta's insufficient flagging process leads to the amplification of misinformation.

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<v Speaker 1>Will be coming back to that in just a moment,

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<v Speaker 1>because we have another story that that touches on this.

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<v Speaker 1>But before we get to that, let's take a quick break.

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<v Speaker 1>So before the break, I talked about how Meta was

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<v Speaker 1>failing to sufficiently label climate change misinformation as such, while

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<v Speaker 1>it's not doing much better when it comes to preventing

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<v Speaker 1>disinformation about the ongoing war in Ukraine either. According to

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<v Speaker 1>the Center for Countering Digital Hate the c c d H,

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<v Speaker 1>Facebook only manages to label about of all posts pushing

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<v Speaker 1>misinformation and conspiracy theories surrounding that the ongoing war in Ukraine,

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<v Speaker 1>so that means eighty percent of those posts are just

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<v Speaker 1>slipping by unlabeled, and these include messages such as a

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<v Speaker 1>claim that the United States has been supplying bioweaponry to

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<v Speaker 1>the Ukraine to use against Russian soldiers, a claim that

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<v Speaker 1>has no basis in evidence or real support, and yet

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<v Speaker 1>is a conspiracy theory that is propagating pretty quickly across

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<v Speaker 1>social platforms like Facebook. So four out of the five

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<v Speaker 1>posts that are pushing this in similar misinformation campaigns are

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<v Speaker 1>going through without Facebook abling the post without so much

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<v Speaker 1>as a missing context label, let alone and outright false

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<v Speaker 1>information label. Im Ron Ahmed, the head of the c

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<v Speaker 1>c d H, said, if our researchers can identify false

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<v Speaker 1>information about Ukraine openly circulating on its platform, it is

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<v Speaker 1>within Meta's capability to do the same. That's a pretty

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<v Speaker 1>sick burn because I mean it's hard to argue against

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<v Speaker 1>that statement. Right, if some outside group can come in

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<v Speaker 1>and say, look, we're finding it all over your your platform,

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<v Speaker 1>and it's your platform, clearly you should be able to

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<v Speaker 1>find it too, how do you how do you argue

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<v Speaker 1>against that? So Ahmed went on to reiterate the platforms

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<v Speaker 1>like Facebook profit off of misinformation, which I kind of

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<v Speaker 1>touched on before the break, and you know, we've said

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<v Speaker 1>it many times. Misinformation quote unquote drives engagement and that

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<v Speaker 1>is a major metric that Facebook relies upon while executing

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<v Speaker 1>its revenue strategy. So engagement from revenue standpoint is good,

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<v Speaker 1>and you know, you just have to distance yourself from

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<v Speaker 1>what type of engagement you're talking about. It's unfortunate and

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<v Speaker 1>it's something again, it's not new. We've talked about this

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<v Speaker 1>many times on this show. And we are not yet

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<v Speaker 1>done with Meta, the company and another one called Sama

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<v Speaker 1>s a m A which Meta contracts with in order

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<v Speaker 1>to run content moderation operations in Africa on Facebook. They

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<v Speaker 1>have been named in a lawsuit in Kenya, and the plaintiff,

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<v Speaker 1>Daniel Motog says that Sama violated Kenya's laws around employee health,

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<v Speaker 1>safety and privacy. So content moderation on Facebook is a

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<v Speaker 1>really tough gig, and in some regions it can be

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<v Speaker 1>downright traumatizing because it's your job to look through stuff

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<v Speaker 1>that gets flat flagged on Facebook and figure out, okay,

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<v Speaker 1>does this in fact violate books policies? And in some

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<v Speaker 1>cases it is incredibly evident that it violates policies. But

0:15:06.720 --> 0:15:10.240
<v Speaker 1>in the process of reviewing the content, you're exposed to

0:15:10.280 --> 0:15:14.760
<v Speaker 1>some really dreadful stuff. Motong says that the first video

0:15:14.800 --> 0:15:19.120
<v Speaker 1>he remembers moderating had a video of a beheading in it.

0:15:19.560 --> 0:15:22.320
<v Speaker 1>Now I know that if I were exposed to that

0:15:22.440 --> 0:15:27.160
<v Speaker 1>kind of content, it would definitely have a massively negative

0:15:27.160 --> 0:15:31.240
<v Speaker 1>psychological impact on me, to put it lightly. Motan says

0:15:31.320 --> 0:15:34.320
<v Speaker 1>that Somema deceived employees. It gave them kind of a

0:15:34.320 --> 0:15:38.600
<v Speaker 1>bait and switch offer. According to Motong, the employees were

0:15:38.640 --> 0:15:40.480
<v Speaker 1>told they were going to work at a call center,

0:15:40.960 --> 0:15:44.120
<v Speaker 1>and then once they signed on, they found out, no,

0:15:44.240 --> 0:15:46.040
<v Speaker 1>it's not a call center, You're actually going to do

0:15:46.160 --> 0:15:50.480
<v Speaker 1>content moderation on Facebook. Motong also says that some mfl

0:15:50.640 --> 0:15:54.000
<v Speaker 1>far short of Kenya's requirements for employers to offer sufficient

0:15:54.040 --> 0:15:57.440
<v Speaker 1>mental health resources to their employees. And this is not

0:15:57.520 --> 0:16:00.600
<v Speaker 1>the first time we've seen complaints relating to data and

0:16:00.680 --> 0:16:02.640
<v Speaker 1>the mental health of people who are tasked with the

0:16:02.720 --> 0:16:07.200
<v Speaker 1>job of content moderation. Um, So we'll have to see

0:16:07.200 --> 0:16:11.080
<v Speaker 1>what the outcome of this particular lawsuit is and whether

0:16:11.200 --> 0:16:15.040
<v Speaker 1>or not it will precipitate any meaningful change in the

0:16:15.120 --> 0:16:18.440
<v Speaker 1>process of content moderation and how the companies that are

0:16:18.480 --> 0:16:24.480
<v Speaker 1>tasked with doing that are held accountable for employee welfare. Okay,

0:16:24.600 --> 0:16:27.920
<v Speaker 1>while we add Apple into the mix of stories here,

0:16:28.160 --> 0:16:30.520
<v Speaker 1>we're still, by the way, also he being criticism on

0:16:30.600 --> 0:16:35.560
<v Speaker 1>Meta and Facebook, or at least pointing out something that's troubling.

0:16:36.600 --> 0:16:40.760
<v Speaker 1>Bloomberg reports that both Meta and Apple have handed over

0:16:40.920 --> 0:16:47.200
<v Speaker 1>user data to hackers who fraudulently submitted emergency data requests. Now,

0:16:47.240 --> 0:16:50.440
<v Speaker 1>tech companies generally try to hold off on just handing

0:16:50.560 --> 0:16:54.400
<v Speaker 1>user data over to authorities as a means of establishing

0:16:54.440 --> 0:16:56.880
<v Speaker 1>trust with users. Right, if you find out that a

0:16:56.880 --> 0:17:03.239
<v Speaker 1>particular platform is frequently sharing user information with any agency

0:17:03.280 --> 0:17:05.720
<v Speaker 1>out there, it's probably gonna make you get the he

0:17:05.840 --> 0:17:09.960
<v Speaker 1>b gebs. Well, when companies are compelled by law, they

0:17:10.040 --> 0:17:12.320
<v Speaker 1>will do it. I mean, obviously they don't want to

0:17:12.320 --> 0:17:16.200
<v Speaker 1>break the law, and an emergency data request represents an

0:17:16.280 --> 0:17:18.520
<v Speaker 1>urgent need for information. It could be in a case

0:17:18.680 --> 0:17:21.120
<v Speaker 1>where a person has gone missing, for example, it could

0:17:21.160 --> 0:17:25.080
<v Speaker 1>literally be life or death. So emergency data requests, unlike

0:17:25.119 --> 0:17:28.560
<v Speaker 1>other types of authority data requests, do not require a

0:17:28.600 --> 0:17:32.200
<v Speaker 1>court order, and a hacker group called Recursion Team are

0:17:32.240 --> 0:17:36.720
<v Speaker 1>thought to be at least partly responsible for these fraudulent requests. Now,

0:17:36.720 --> 0:17:39.680
<v Speaker 1>on the one hand, it's easy to accuse the companies

0:17:39.720 --> 0:17:42.520
<v Speaker 1>of Apple and Meta of not doing due diligence to

0:17:42.680 --> 0:17:46.560
<v Speaker 1>ensure that incoming requests are actually legitimate. But on the

0:17:46.600 --> 0:17:50.399
<v Speaker 1>other hand, the very nature of emergency requests indicates that

0:17:50.600 --> 0:17:54.760
<v Speaker 1>a speedy response can be absolutely critical. I think in

0:17:54.800 --> 0:17:57.960
<v Speaker 1>this particular case, the real problem lies in the process

0:17:58.000 --> 0:18:01.480
<v Speaker 1>more than with Apple and met as actions, and the

0:18:01.520 --> 0:18:03.879
<v Speaker 1>fact that it was possible for hackers to compromise that

0:18:04.000 --> 0:18:07.639
<v Speaker 1>process is something we should really look at. Over in

0:18:07.720 --> 0:18:11.919
<v Speaker 1>the UK case involving a Twitter user reminded me of

0:18:11.960 --> 0:18:14.600
<v Speaker 1>the limits of free speech and how they are different

0:18:14.640 --> 0:18:18.200
<v Speaker 1>in different parts of the world. Joseph Kelly was found

0:18:18.200 --> 0:18:22.560
<v Speaker 1>guilty of sending a quote unquote grossly offensive tweet and

0:18:22.640 --> 0:18:26.720
<v Speaker 1>a judge subsequently has sentenced Kelly to one hundred fifty

0:18:26.840 --> 0:18:30.840
<v Speaker 1>hours of community service. So you might wonder, well, what

0:18:30.880 --> 0:18:36.119
<v Speaker 1>was this tweet that merited uh, that kind of sentence. Well,

0:18:36.200 --> 0:18:38.840
<v Speaker 1>it had to do with Sir Tom Moore, who was

0:18:39.080 --> 0:18:42.479
<v Speaker 1>a man who, leading up to his one birthday, was

0:18:43.280 --> 0:18:46.240
<v Speaker 1>doing laps around his garden. He did a hundred laps

0:18:46.280 --> 0:18:48.359
<v Speaker 1>around his garden and it was all in a way

0:18:48.359 --> 0:18:52.479
<v Speaker 1>to raise money for the UK's National Health Service in

0:18:52.520 --> 0:18:55.520
<v Speaker 1>the early days of the pandemic. Sir Tom more than

0:18:56.560 --> 0:19:00.280
<v Speaker 1>not too long later passed away, and one day after

0:19:00.320 --> 0:19:04.600
<v Speaker 1>his passing, Kelly posted his tweet, which was the only

0:19:04.800 --> 0:19:08.639
<v Speaker 1>good brit soldier is a deed one burn, old fella

0:19:08.800 --> 0:19:13.560
<v Speaker 1>burn because he's you know, tweeting in a Scottish accent,

0:19:13.600 --> 0:19:17.000
<v Speaker 1>which I will not do because I can't. Now I

0:19:17.040 --> 0:19:20.720
<v Speaker 1>think anyone could agree that that tweet was at the

0:19:20.920 --> 0:19:26.239
<v Speaker 1>very least in very poor taste. Two uh to you know,

0:19:26.440 --> 0:19:31.320
<v Speaker 1>you had a country in mourning because Tom, Sir Tom

0:19:31.440 --> 0:19:34.880
<v Speaker 1>had had really inspired a lot of people, and so

0:19:34.920 --> 0:19:39.040
<v Speaker 1>then he he ends up saying this very you know, uh,

0:19:39.280 --> 0:19:43.160
<v Speaker 1>unsympathetic thing. Now the question is did that break the law?

0:19:43.440 --> 0:19:50.240
<v Speaker 1>Specifically didn't break Section on seven of the UK's Communications Act. Now,

0:19:50.280 --> 0:19:53.639
<v Speaker 1>when that Act was passed, that section was originally meant

0:19:53.680 --> 0:19:57.840
<v Speaker 1>to create accountability for people who were doing stuff like

0:19:58.000 --> 0:20:02.560
<v Speaker 1>making obscene telephone call. That's what it was to refer to.

0:20:03.000 --> 0:20:05.400
<v Speaker 1>But in the years since it has expanded to cover

0:20:05.560 --> 0:20:10.480
<v Speaker 1>social media posts as well. The grossly offensive part really

0:20:10.560 --> 0:20:13.880
<v Speaker 1>becomes tricky simply because you have to decide what are

0:20:13.880 --> 0:20:18.600
<v Speaker 1>the criteria you're using to determine if something is grossly offensive.

0:20:18.600 --> 0:20:23.040
<v Speaker 1>I mean, grossly offensive is a subjective thing, right, You

0:20:23.119 --> 0:20:25.479
<v Speaker 1>might be offended by something I'm not offended by, and

0:20:25.600 --> 0:20:30.840
<v Speaker 1>vice versa. Kelly, by the way, he deleted his message

0:20:31.760 --> 0:20:34.639
<v Speaker 1>just twenty minutes after he posted it, and his lawyer

0:20:34.840 --> 0:20:37.359
<v Speaker 1>in the trial argued that Kelly had made the tweet

0:20:37.400 --> 0:20:40.879
<v Speaker 1>while he was intoxicated, like he wasn't you know, sober

0:20:40.920 --> 0:20:43.439
<v Speaker 1>when he did it. But none of that managed to

0:20:43.440 --> 0:20:47.160
<v Speaker 1>get him off the hook. And so now he's sentenced

0:20:47.200 --> 0:20:50.680
<v Speaker 1>to do a hundred fifty hours of community service. Uh.

0:20:50.760 --> 0:20:53.520
<v Speaker 1>For people in the United States, that probably comes as

0:20:53.520 --> 0:20:57.480
<v Speaker 1>a shock because here we could tweet something like that

0:20:57.960 --> 0:21:01.320
<v Speaker 1>and yeah, we might be called out for being insensitive

0:21:01.840 --> 0:21:05.520
<v Speaker 1>or or you know, having really bad taste or just

0:21:05.600 --> 0:21:08.479
<v Speaker 1>being tacky or whatever it may be. But you wouldn't

0:21:08.520 --> 0:21:12.080
<v Speaker 1>expect anyone to be held accountable and have to do

0:21:12.160 --> 0:21:16.040
<v Speaker 1>community service in return for doing that. Now, in the UK,

0:21:16.160 --> 0:21:19.080
<v Speaker 1>there is an a new bill that will be coming

0:21:19.200 --> 0:21:21.680
<v Speaker 1>law later on. It will becoming effective soon. It's called

0:21:21.680 --> 0:21:24.760
<v Speaker 1>the Online Safety Bill that will end up replacing the

0:21:24.800 --> 0:21:29.920
<v Speaker 1>old UK's Communications Act, So that will end up having

0:21:29.960 --> 0:21:32.639
<v Speaker 1>a new set of rules. However, there's still measures in

0:21:32.720 --> 0:21:36.720
<v Speaker 1>place where there's pretty vague language that you know, how

0:21:37.080 --> 0:21:41.080
<v Speaker 1>the the nation could handle messages that are considered to

0:21:41.080 --> 0:21:46.320
<v Speaker 1>be quote unquote harmful, Like who determines what constitutes harm

0:21:46.400 --> 0:21:49.640
<v Speaker 1>and how do you determine accountability for those things. So

0:21:49.760 --> 0:21:53.320
<v Speaker 1>if you are in the UK and you can't tweet

0:21:53.359 --> 0:21:59.680
<v Speaker 1>something nice, don't tweet anything at all. I guess okay.

0:21:59.720 --> 0:22:03.239
<v Speaker 1>I have a couple more stories that are less you know,

0:22:03.880 --> 0:22:07.560
<v Speaker 1>the triolic, But we're gonna take another quick break and

0:22:07.600 --> 0:22:17.879
<v Speaker 1>we'll be right back. All right, Let's get to the

0:22:18.000 --> 0:22:21.399
<v Speaker 1>last couple of news stories for this episode. One of

0:22:21.480 --> 0:22:25.920
<v Speaker 1>those is that Canadian politicians have drafted an emissions reduction

0:22:26.040 --> 0:22:30.200
<v Speaker 1>plan that will require all new cars sold in Canada

0:22:30.320 --> 0:22:35.080
<v Speaker 1>to be zero emission vehicles by the year twenty five. Uh,

0:22:35.240 --> 0:22:38.960
<v Speaker 1>that's passenger cars, I should add, And this would put

0:22:39.000 --> 0:22:41.640
<v Speaker 1>Canada on a growing list of countries that are setting

0:22:41.960 --> 0:22:45.560
<v Speaker 1>similar deadlines for when car companies will no longer be

0:22:45.640 --> 0:22:50.600
<v Speaker 1>allowed to sell new internal combustion engine vehicles in those countries. UH.

0:22:50.680 --> 0:22:53.640
<v Speaker 1>That list notably does not include the United States. There

0:22:53.760 --> 0:22:59.240
<v Speaker 1>is no federal mandate that follows this trend, but there

0:22:59.240 --> 0:23:02.480
<v Speaker 1>have been a and orso states that have listed their

0:23:02.480 --> 0:23:07.000
<v Speaker 1>own state deadlines for that. And honestly, once you start

0:23:07.080 --> 0:23:13.800
<v Speaker 1>getting to a certain tipping point, there becomes a a

0:23:13.960 --> 0:23:17.840
<v Speaker 1>movement within the automotive industry where you would expect everyone

0:23:17.920 --> 0:23:21.639
<v Speaker 1>to switch over to electric anyway or some other zero

0:23:21.720 --> 0:23:25.560
<v Speaker 1>emission vehicle design anyway, because it would just make more

0:23:25.640 --> 0:23:28.880
<v Speaker 1>sense from a manufacturing standpoint to go that way rather

0:23:29.000 --> 0:23:33.119
<v Speaker 1>than divide it up. So it may be that we

0:23:33.320 --> 0:23:37.440
<v Speaker 1>don't ever see the US create a similar national policy,

0:23:37.480 --> 0:23:42.800
<v Speaker 1>but if enough states follow that trend, then the effect

0:23:42.840 --> 0:23:45.200
<v Speaker 1>will be the same. And like I said, it only

0:23:45.200 --> 0:23:49.680
<v Speaker 1>applies to passenger cars, you know Canada's policy. Uh. In

0:23:49.680 --> 0:23:52.920
<v Speaker 1>industry cars like things that are being used for enterprise purposes,

0:23:53.359 --> 0:23:57.040
<v Speaker 1>they will have a longer timeline in order to convert

0:23:57.080 --> 0:23:59.240
<v Speaker 1>over to zero emissions, which makes sense. I mean, like,

0:23:59.280 --> 0:24:02.720
<v Speaker 1>if you're talking about things like heavy duty hauling vehicles

0:24:02.880 --> 0:24:07.040
<v Speaker 1>or really strong construction vehicles, you're talking about stuff that

0:24:07.080 --> 0:24:09.760
<v Speaker 1>has power needs that you know might not be met

0:24:09.840 --> 0:24:14.920
<v Speaker 1>with current zero emission systems in place. So that does

0:24:15.000 --> 0:24:18.240
<v Speaker 1>make a little more sense. But yes, we are seeing

0:24:18.320 --> 0:24:23.480
<v Speaker 1>another country say no more internal combustion engine vehicles here,

0:24:23.640 --> 0:24:28.600
<v Speaker 1>at least no new ones after a certain date. And finally,

0:24:29.160 --> 0:24:32.800
<v Speaker 1>some security researchers demonstrated that it's possible to hack into

0:24:32.840 --> 0:24:36.879
<v Speaker 1>a communications satellite and broadcast a video feed to a

0:24:37.000 --> 0:24:41.239
<v Speaker 1>large region. Now, to be clear, the researchers did this

0:24:41.280 --> 0:24:44.440
<v Speaker 1>with permission, so it's not like they were secretly hacking

0:24:44.480 --> 0:24:47.640
<v Speaker 1>into a satellite feed and taking it over and creating

0:24:47.840 --> 0:24:53.720
<v Speaker 1>pirate satellite television. But they were given the opportunity to

0:24:53.840 --> 0:24:57.680
<v Speaker 1>attempt to access a Canadian satellite that was no longer

0:24:57.760 --> 0:24:59.880
<v Speaker 1>going to be used. It had passed out of its

0:25:00.040 --> 0:25:04.120
<v Speaker 1>useful life expectancy, but it had not yet been transferred

0:25:04.280 --> 0:25:08.720
<v Speaker 1>to a graveyard orbit. I talked about this briefly earlier

0:25:08.760 --> 0:25:12.480
<v Speaker 1>this week in an episode about orbits. A graveyard orbit

0:25:12.840 --> 0:25:15.800
<v Speaker 1>is an orbit where you just you push stuff when

0:25:15.840 --> 0:25:19.320
<v Speaker 1>you're when it's no longer useful, and it gets it

0:25:19.359 --> 0:25:21.120
<v Speaker 1>out of the way so that you can put more

0:25:21.240 --> 0:25:25.080
<v Speaker 1>useful stuff in that orbit. And it typically is is

0:25:25.240 --> 0:25:29.840
<v Speaker 1>at an orbit that just isn't really well suited for

0:25:29.880 --> 0:25:34.960
<v Speaker 1>any practical purposes here on Earth. So pushing a communication

0:25:35.000 --> 0:25:37.280
<v Speaker 1>satellite out to a graveyard orbit means that would no

0:25:37.320 --> 0:25:40.719
<v Speaker 1>longer really align properly to transmit back to Earth. So

0:25:40.760 --> 0:25:43.840
<v Speaker 1>if if they had waited longer, this really wouldn't have

0:25:43.880 --> 0:25:47.879
<v Speaker 1>been a possibility. But because that satellite was no longer

0:25:48.280 --> 0:25:52.040
<v Speaker 1>in service but still reachable, it also meant there were

0:25:52.040 --> 0:25:55.840
<v Speaker 1>no competing signals being sent to that satellite. So if

0:25:55.880 --> 0:25:58.880
<v Speaker 1>you could send a signal to the satellite, it could

0:25:58.960 --> 0:26:03.159
<v Speaker 1>then be it back down to Earth. Now, accessing the

0:26:03.200 --> 0:26:07.280
<v Speaker 1>satellite required using an uplink facility. This is essentially a

0:26:07.320 --> 0:26:11.480
<v Speaker 1>place that has a powerful satellite dish antenna and a

0:26:11.600 --> 0:26:15.640
<v Speaker 1>really powerful amplifier and sending the right kind of signal

0:26:15.920 --> 0:26:18.880
<v Speaker 1>that was strong enough to reach the satellite in question.

0:26:19.359 --> 0:26:22.959
<v Speaker 1>Like you couldn't just do this with a simple radio

0:26:23.000 --> 0:26:25.159
<v Speaker 1>antenna or something like that. You have to have a

0:26:25.240 --> 0:26:30.960
<v Speaker 1>very concentrated, powerful beam of of signal to go up

0:26:31.080 --> 0:26:34.040
<v Speaker 1>and reach the satellite, and then the satellite in fact

0:26:34.160 --> 0:26:36.879
<v Speaker 1>did beam that signal back down to Earth. So the

0:26:36.960 --> 0:26:40.919
<v Speaker 1>researchers showed there are no actual security measures in place

0:26:41.160 --> 0:26:45.480
<v Speaker 1>on the satellites themselves. There's like there's no there's no

0:26:45.560 --> 0:26:49.840
<v Speaker 1>like password or authentication or anything like that. If you

0:26:49.880 --> 0:26:52.879
<v Speaker 1>are capable of sending the signal to the satellite, then

0:26:53.119 --> 0:26:54.880
<v Speaker 1>it will just do its job and send it back

0:26:54.880 --> 0:26:57.800
<v Speaker 1>down to Earth. Now you can kind of understand why

0:26:57.960 --> 0:27:01.280
<v Speaker 1>there aren't any real protective measures on the satellite themselves,

0:27:01.359 --> 0:27:05.440
<v Speaker 1>because you know, in order to even get this to work,

0:27:05.480 --> 0:27:08.159
<v Speaker 1>you first have to have access to something like an

0:27:08.240 --> 0:27:11.120
<v Speaker 1>uplink facility. That is not an easy thing to do.

0:27:11.880 --> 0:27:13.880
<v Speaker 1>So it's not like you can go to your local

0:27:13.920 --> 0:27:17.879
<v Speaker 1>electronics store and buy a consumer electronics version of a

0:27:17.920 --> 0:27:22.040
<v Speaker 1>massively powerful transmitter and amplification system. Plus you'd have to

0:27:22.040 --> 0:27:24.399
<v Speaker 1>have a way to identify where the satellite is and

0:27:24.480 --> 0:27:28.680
<v Speaker 1>target it and track it. But the researcher showed it

0:27:28.800 --> 0:27:32.160
<v Speaker 1>was at least possible, and in fact, it's not even

0:27:32.200 --> 0:27:36.000
<v Speaker 1>that difficult once they had that access to the uplink center,

0:27:36.440 --> 0:27:41.200
<v Speaker 1>so hackers could potentially get access to an uplink center

0:27:41.400 --> 0:27:46.640
<v Speaker 1>and cause problems that way. And also they pointed out

0:27:46.680 --> 0:27:49.439
<v Speaker 1>that just like in the past, it's still possible to

0:27:49.520 --> 0:27:54.240
<v Speaker 1>hijack a working communication satellite, one that's still in service,

0:27:54.800 --> 0:27:59.040
<v Speaker 1>as long as you send a signal that's stronger than

0:27:59.160 --> 0:28:02.240
<v Speaker 1>the official And in fact, this has happened in the past.

0:28:02.920 --> 0:28:05.919
<v Speaker 1>In the mid nineteen eighties. You lived on the East Coast,

0:28:05.920 --> 0:28:09.359
<v Speaker 1>and we're a subscriber to HBO, it's possible that you

0:28:09.400 --> 0:28:13.600
<v Speaker 1>witnessed this yourself because and I think it was six

0:28:13.640 --> 0:28:16.959
<v Speaker 1>there was a disgruntled technician who was working at an

0:28:17.040 --> 0:28:22.119
<v Speaker 1>uplink facility in Florida who used that facility to override

0:28:22.600 --> 0:28:27.119
<v Speaker 1>the official New York Facilities HBO signal to a particular

0:28:27.119 --> 0:28:31.000
<v Speaker 1>communication satellite. So, in other words, you have this this

0:28:31.119 --> 0:28:34.359
<v Speaker 1>facility in New York, it's beaming the HBO feed up

0:28:34.359 --> 0:28:37.399
<v Speaker 1>to a communication satellite which is beaming that back down

0:28:37.440 --> 0:28:40.240
<v Speaker 1>to Earth on the East coast of the United States.

0:28:40.680 --> 0:28:44.239
<v Speaker 1>This person in Florida decides, I'm going to use the

0:28:44.280 --> 0:28:47.680
<v Speaker 1>Florida's uplinks center to override that signal. I'll just send

0:28:47.680 --> 0:28:50.200
<v Speaker 1>a stronger signal to that satellite and then I'll have

0:28:50.320 --> 0:28:54.720
<v Speaker 1>control the technician going by the name Captain Midnight took

0:28:54.760 --> 0:28:57.440
<v Speaker 1>over a few minutes of airtime on HBO and used

0:28:57.480 --> 0:29:02.160
<v Speaker 1>it to drumroll please complain about how expensive it was

0:29:02.200 --> 0:29:05.960
<v Speaker 1>to get HBO added on too. Consumer satellite services, good

0:29:06.040 --> 0:29:09.320
<v Speaker 1>use of time anyway, things haven't really changed that much

0:29:09.360 --> 0:29:12.960
<v Speaker 1>since the nineteen eighties. Is still possible to take over

0:29:13.040 --> 0:29:17.080
<v Speaker 1>a satellite by sending a stronger signal to that satellite,

0:29:18.040 --> 0:29:20.440
<v Speaker 1>although you can also run the risk of damaging a

0:29:20.480 --> 0:29:22.800
<v Speaker 1>satellite in the process if the signals get to be

0:29:22.880 --> 0:29:26.640
<v Speaker 1>too strong. This is not that different from how radio works.

0:29:26.640 --> 0:29:30.640
<v Speaker 1>In fact, radio works exactly the same way. We saw

0:29:30.680 --> 0:29:33.000
<v Speaker 1>that and so did television. We saw that in the

0:29:33.120 --> 0:29:35.520
<v Speaker 1>in the nineteen eighties as well, with the infamous Max

0:29:35.600 --> 0:29:40.600
<v Speaker 1>Headroom incident that was over the air broadcast, not not satellite,

0:29:40.920 --> 0:29:43.000
<v Speaker 1>but yeah, same sort of thing. If you're able to

0:29:43.080 --> 0:29:47.920
<v Speaker 1>send out a stronger signal than an official one over

0:29:47.960 --> 0:29:51.320
<v Speaker 1>a particular frequency, then that's what people are gonna get.

0:29:51.520 --> 0:29:54.600
<v Speaker 1>That's how pirate radio can be a thing. Um, and

0:29:54.720 --> 0:30:01.080
<v Speaker 1>it's illegal anyway. Uh. In an era of state sponsored

0:30:01.120 --> 0:30:05.720
<v Speaker 1>hacker groups and propaganda campaigns, this knowledge kind of raises

0:30:05.800 --> 0:30:09.120
<v Speaker 1>up some troubling possibilities, Like you could easily imagine a

0:30:09.160 --> 0:30:12.880
<v Speaker 1>scenario where a country uses its own up link facilities

0:30:13.200 --> 0:30:18.120
<v Speaker 1>to target a satellite that's that's orbiting a nearby region

0:30:18.680 --> 0:30:22.520
<v Speaker 1>that happens to be an adversary of that country, and

0:30:22.600 --> 0:30:27.720
<v Speaker 1>to take over that satellite and broadcast propaganda or shut

0:30:27.760 --> 0:30:30.800
<v Speaker 1>it down. Even like, you can easily imagine that, and

0:30:30.880 --> 0:30:34.320
<v Speaker 1>the fact that there aren't these security measures on the

0:30:34.320 --> 0:30:38.840
<v Speaker 1>satellite themselves makes that a possibility. Or you could even

0:30:38.840 --> 0:30:42.480
<v Speaker 1>have state sponsored hackers trying to get access to uplinks

0:30:42.560 --> 0:30:46.120
<v Speaker 1>centers that are in other countries and and achieve the

0:30:46.160 --> 0:30:49.760
<v Speaker 1>same goal. Uh so, maybe this will lead to changes

0:30:50.240 --> 0:30:54.520
<v Speaker 1>in security around satellites. I think making sure that the

0:30:54.560 --> 0:30:58.800
<v Speaker 1>up links centers are really secure is important because again,

0:30:58.840 --> 0:31:01.200
<v Speaker 1>if you don't have access to an uplink center, you're

0:31:01.240 --> 0:31:03.440
<v Speaker 1>not gonna send a signal strong enough in the first

0:31:03.440 --> 0:31:07.600
<v Speaker 1>place to make it an issue. So protect those first.

0:31:07.600 --> 0:31:11.080
<v Speaker 1>But I think also it might be time to start in,

0:31:11.320 --> 0:31:15.360
<v Speaker 1>you know, figuring out security for the satellites themselves. Okay,

0:31:15.880 --> 0:31:19.440
<v Speaker 1>those are the news stories I chose to cover on Thursday,

0:31:19.480 --> 0:31:22.640
<v Speaker 1>March two. Like I said, there were a ton more,

0:31:23.280 --> 0:31:27.080
<v Speaker 1>but uh yeah, I was already getting pretty grouchy, as

0:31:27.120 --> 0:31:29.880
<v Speaker 1>you can tell, and I figured that this was a

0:31:29.920 --> 0:31:33.200
<v Speaker 1>good mixture to kind of share with all of you.

0:31:33.560 --> 0:31:35.680
<v Speaker 1>If you have suggestions for topics I should cover in

0:31:35.880 --> 0:31:38.120
<v Speaker 1>episodes of tech Stuff, reach out to me on Twitter.

0:31:38.520 --> 0:31:41.080
<v Speaker 1>The handle for the show is text Stuff H s

0:31:41.280 --> 0:31:49.680
<v Speaker 1>W and I'll talk to you again really soon. Text

0:31:49.680 --> 0:31:53.160
<v Speaker 1>Stuff is an I Heart Radio production. For more podcasts

0:31:53.160 --> 0:31:55.920
<v Speaker 1>from my heart Radio, visit the i Heart Radio app,

0:31:56.080 --> 0:31:59.200
<v Speaker 1>Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.

0:32:00.920 --> 0:32:01.400
<v Speaker 1>Eight