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Speaker 1: Hello, Odd Lots listeners, you were about to hear a

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Speaker 1: conversation about the troubles at New York Community Bank Corp.

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Speaker 1: We recorded this interview on February sixth, and his statement

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Speaker 1: to the market, NYCB said that his deposits have increased

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Speaker 1: since the end of last year and that liquidity remains ample.

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Speaker 1: A spokesperson for the company did not respond to a

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Speaker 1: separate quest for comment from Oddlots and now here's our

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Speaker 1: episode a New York Community Bank Corp. Hello, and welcome

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Speaker 1: to another episode of the.

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Speaker 2: Odd Lots podcast.

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Speaker 3: I'm Joe Wisenthal and I'm Tracy Allaway.

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Speaker 1: Tracy banking troubles again. Obviously, we had that little, I

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Speaker 1: don't know many mini crisis at the uffle Kerfuffle last

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Speaker 1: March with SVB and a couple other banks, and then recently,

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Speaker 1: I think just last week. We're recording this Tuesday, February sixth, another.

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Speaker 3: One, that's right. So we saw New York Community NYCB.

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Speaker 3: Their shares felt something like almost forty percent in a

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Speaker 3: single day after they released a bunch of announcements. So

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Speaker 3: let's see, I'm trying to remember all of them. So

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Speaker 3: they missed on earnings per share. They cut their dividend

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Speaker 3: and they increased their reserves for bad loans. So basically

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Speaker 3: the provisions are the amount of money they set aside

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Speaker 3: to cover souring credit. And of course this set off

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Speaker 3: a wave of conversation and analysis about how much of

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Speaker 3: that issue has to do with NYCB specifically, or whether

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Speaker 3: it's saying something broader about the outlook for these loans.

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Speaker 3: And I should just say that in its statement, NYCB

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Speaker 3: specifically cited commercial real estate and multifamily as well, which

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Speaker 3: is sort of the I always call it the forgotten

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Speaker 3: CRE because everyone focuses on offices, but multifamily also falls

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Speaker 3: into the CRE category.

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Speaker 1: Yeah right, we did that episode a few months ago.

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Speaker 1: I think in October we did an episode on multifamily

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Speaker 1: because we know that we know that there was just

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Speaker 1: this incredible boom right in twenty twenty one and social

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Speaker 1: media influencers. We're like raising money on Instagram for you know,

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Speaker 1: sun Belt cire and so there is this big question

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Speaker 1: about the category. More broadly, this is of course not

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Speaker 1: a sun Belt story. It's New York Community Bank Orp.

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Speaker 1: But it gets this question of like, oh, is this

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Speaker 1: something idiosyncratic to the bank, Where is this broader are

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Speaker 1: we gonna see multifamily problems elsewhere? It feels like each

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Speaker 1: one of these banks that's gotten into trouble over the

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Speaker 1: last couple of years, there is this furious debate. It's like,

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Speaker 1: it's just it's just idiosyncratic. It's just Silicon Valley, it's

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Speaker 1: just crypto exposure, it's just New York. But then eventually

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Speaker 1: you have enough idiosyncratics when people start to go worry.

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Speaker 1: They're like, are there things going wrong? Are there similarities

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Speaker 1: with other banks?

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Speaker 3: Yeah? And it's funny you mentioned the multifamily episode. I

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Speaker 3: think that was with Lee Everett. He was basically saying

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Speaker 3: that was the next shoe to drop in the troubled

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Speaker 3: cre category. But we did actually do an episode even

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Speaker 3: before then titled the NYC Landlord who says the golden

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Speaker 3: age of being a landlord is over.

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Speaker 1: That's right, So we did do a New York specific one.

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Speaker 1: Our guest then, Ben Carlos, type in local real estate

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Speaker 1: guy who owns residential real estate. He also does some

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Speaker 1: data stuff and other things, and he basically came on

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Speaker 1: He's like, look, my family has been in this business

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Speaker 1: of renting out apartments for a long time, and the

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Speaker 1: business is going bad. This is not a business I

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Speaker 1: really want to be in it anymore. He mentioned that

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Speaker 1: he would be selling off some or all of his

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Speaker 1: assets over time. I think he specifically said he wouldn't

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Speaker 1: be doing a fire sell or like a mass liquidation,

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Speaker 1: but that he wanted to get out of business. He

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Speaker 1: also said that he was interested in ways to essentially

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Speaker 1: not just get out of the business, not just remove

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Speaker 1: his defecto long position, but seeing if there were ways

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Speaker 1: to bet on the downside. It was this, there is

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Speaker 1: like a combination of like, okay, gimbiism in New York

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Speaker 1: seems to be on the rise, so there perhaps is

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Speaker 1: going to be more supply plus a sort of shifting

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Speaker 1: political landscape. But I think this is key, such that

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Speaker 1: regulations will make life harder for landlords.

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Speaker 3: Yes, this is the return to I mean it never

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Speaker 3: went away completely, but a newfound popularity of rent control

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Speaker 3: and the issues that maybe causes for landlords. And of course,

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Speaker 3: I mean the backdrop to all of this is that

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Speaker 3: interest rates have gone up spectacularly and so why deal

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Speaker 3: with tenants and policy when you can just put your

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Speaker 3: money in a money market fund and earn five percent?

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Speaker 2: Yeah, that's right.

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Speaker 1: And also you know, in New York specifically, we have

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Speaker 1: an affordability crisis, and we have an affordability crisis even

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Speaker 1: among individuals and families that make a lot of money.

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Speaker 1: So plenty of New York City professionals who are rent

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Speaker 1: who make decent incomes still find this housing market very frustrating,

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Speaker 1: feel that they're paying way more than they should be

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Speaker 1: in getting squeezed. And of course, you know, people with

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Speaker 1: good money and professional jobs historically have had a lot

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Speaker 1: of political power, and so this idea that okay, there

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Speaker 1: is this very powerful renter class in New York City

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Speaker 1: specifically that politicians have to listen to, which sort of

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Speaker 1: tilts the dot, turns the dial more towards pro tenant

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Speaker 1: policies that landlords may not like. Well, on that note,

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Speaker 1: I'm very excited we have Ben back on the podcast.

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Speaker 2: Ben, thank you so much for joining.

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Speaker 4: Us, Thanks for having me.

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Speaker 2: Let's talk before.

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Speaker 1: We get into the conversation, because we want to talk

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Speaker 1: to you about this real estate market. We want to

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Speaker 1: talk to you about CB specifically and what's going on

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Speaker 1: with them. I mentioned in the intro that you said

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Speaker 1: on our episode early last year that you're not just

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Speaker 1: interested in getting out of the space selling off of

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Speaker 1: your assets, but also exploring ways to essentially shorten the space.

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Speaker 1: Of course, you've done some work on that, including on NYCB,

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Speaker 1: So I think we should start with a disclosure.

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Speaker 2: Where are you at right now with this? Sure?

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Speaker 4: So, you know, after our episode last year, and really

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Speaker 4: really before it, I was exploring, you know, the various

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Speaker 4: ways that one could approach shorting multifamily to you know,

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Speaker 4: express the thesis that I talked about on that podcast.

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Speaker 4: And you know, I found out a couple of things,

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Speaker 4: one of which shorting is very hard and requires a

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Speaker 4: lot of capital. But in doing so, I settled on

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Speaker 4: New York Comedy Bank as a target, and spoke to

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Speaker 4: and advised several hedge funds on New York Commedy Bank

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Speaker 4: being a good target based on you know, totally public information.

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Speaker 4: I can't speak to what trades, if any, they executed

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Speaker 4: on this. All I can say is that I neither

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Speaker 4: I nor my firm were or are short New or

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Speaker 4: Commedy Bank, and I have not received or are not not

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Speaker 4: entitled to any compensation tied directly or indirectly to the

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Speaker 4: performance of that stock.

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Speaker 1: But you were paid, yes, for your advisory services or

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Speaker 1: your consulting services to the hedge Fund. Correct, And just

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Speaker 1: to be clear, you said on the podcast last year

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Speaker 1: that you were planning on getting out of the residential

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Speaker 1: real estate business in New York City.

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Speaker 2: What's happened between then and now on that front.

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Speaker 4: We've sold one of our buildings, we still have a

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Speaker 4: few more to sell off.

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Speaker 3: So maybe just to begin with, can you talk a

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Speaker 3: little bit about NYCB's relationship to multifamily, Like what is

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Speaker 3: the exposure here? So they mention a multifamily portfolio, what

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Speaker 3: is that? How did they come to own it, and

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Speaker 3: what does it look like?

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Speaker 4: Yeah, so they are, by their own account, I think,

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Speaker 4: the second largest multi family lender in the country, and

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Speaker 4: multi family loans represent to forty four percent of their

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Speaker 4: entire loan book, not just real estate loans, and twenty

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Speaker 4: two percent of their entire loan book is a particular

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Speaker 4: type of multifamily loan, which is rent stabilized. It loans

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Speaker 4: on rent stabilized buildings in New York City, and this

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Speaker 4: is a business they've been huge in for five decades.

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Speaker 4: They are currently the biggest lender on rent stabilized buildings,

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Speaker 4: even more so than the now failed Signature Bank. And

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Speaker 4: the growth of New York comed Back as an institution

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Speaker 4: is really tied up in the fortunes and evolution of

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Speaker 4: the rent stabilized market over the past thirty years. So,

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Speaker 4: you know, let me ask the two of you if

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Speaker 4: you ever lived in an apartment in New York City

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Speaker 4: within a building that was built prior to nineteen seventy

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Speaker 4: four and contained six or more residential units.

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Speaker 3: Yes, but it hasn't been rent stabilized exactly.

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Speaker 4: And did you pay like, what it felt like, a

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Speaker 4: really high rent for it?

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Speaker 3: Oh my god, I am still paying a really high

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Speaker 3: rent for it.

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Speaker 4: Go on, Well, there was a time that all apartments

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Speaker 4: and buildings like that were rent stabilized, and the reason

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Speaker 4: that you paid a very high rent for that ancient

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Speaker 4: apartment is deeply tied up in the story of New

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Speaker 4: York Comedy Bank over these past thirty years.

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Speaker 3: Wait, so what is the allure of rent controlled apartments?

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Speaker 3: Because if I think about I want to be a

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Speaker 3: real estate developer or a lender in New York, you know,

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Speaker 3: I want some luxury building that's all shiny and new,

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Speaker 3: and I can charge an incredibly high amount for people

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Speaker 3: to live there. I don't necessarily think oh, I'm going

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Speaker 3: to go into rent stabilized properties.

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Speaker 4: Right. So, historically, up up until the early nineteen nineties,

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Speaker 4: the allure of these properties was a lot less than

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Speaker 4: it became, and it was largely based on, you know,

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Speaker 4: the solidity of it as a business. You know, the

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Speaker 4: rents are low, so the occupancy always stays high, and

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Speaker 4: it's a it was a bond of business. And what

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Speaker 4: changed in the early nineties is, you know, New York

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Speaker 4: City at that time was in really bad shape. There's

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Speaker 4: a lot of high budget deficits, high crime, all these

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Speaker 4: foreclosed buildings costing city hundreds millions dollars in property tax revenue.

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Speaker 4: And in response to that, dynamic landlords claimed that the

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Speaker 4: foreclosures and the blight were the faults of rent regulations.

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Speaker 4: And if you think about this doesn't really make sense

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Speaker 4: because you know, it's a self serving argument and sort

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Speaker 4: of gets the causality backwards. Like every city in the

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Speaker 4: country was having major problems resulting from deindustrialization, white flight,

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Speaker 4: and these other you know, mega trends, most of which

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Speaker 4: did not have any form of rent regulation. So the

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Speaker 4: real estate industry's claim was like, all right, if you

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Speaker 4: let us raise the rents then we'll fix up the buildings,

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Speaker 4: property taxes will go up, et cetera. Politicians and the

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Speaker 4: New York City Council bought that and implemented a policy

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Speaker 4: called vacancy decontrol, which allowed apartments to be deregulated in

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Speaker 4: the buildings that we talked about. Once they once the

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Speaker 4: legal rents breached a threshold of at the time was

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Speaker 4: two thousand dollars. That was later raised several times, and

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Speaker 4: I think before it went away it was the highest

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Speaker 4: was twenty seven hundred dollars. So, you know, at the time,

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Speaker 4: legislators from places like Bushwick, which were very poor, where

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Speaker 4: you know, the highest rent in the neighborhood was five

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Speaker 4: hundred dollars. They could never imagine that a rent could

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Speaker 4: get to two thousand dollars, so.

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Speaker 3: They thought they had a long way to go until

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Speaker 3: they would reach that cap.

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Speaker 2: Yeah.

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Speaker 4: So you know, incidentally, that's in nineteen ninety four. A

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Speaker 4: little bank known as Queens County Savings Bank goes public

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Speaker 4: the year before in nineteen ninety three, that later becomes

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Speaker 4: New York Community Bank. So what happens between nineteen ninety

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Speaker 4: four and twenty nineteen New York City's economy booms. Like

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Speaker 4: many other urban markets around the country, population growth job

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Speaker 4: growth far up housing construction, which then sends rents on

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Speaker 4: existing housing soaring. So this makes for a very good

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Speaker 4: combination for landlords. The apartment value of apartment buildings increases,

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Speaker 4: liquidity in the debt and equity markets for a apartment

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Speaker 4: buildings in New York sty increases, and New York Community

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Speaker 4: Bank really grows along with its landlord clients. Becomes the

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Speaker 4: biggest lender on these rent stabilized buildings, provides acquisition loans

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Speaker 4: for the landlords to expand, It provides refinancing after refinancing,

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Speaker 4: allowing their clients to take money out of these buildings.

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Speaker 4: And you know, during this process, where like the BET

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Speaker 4: is basically all right, market rents are, it's worth deregulating

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Speaker 4: these buildings all over the city. Because the spread between

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Speaker 4: market rents and the regulator rents is so high, the

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Speaker 4: pricing on these assets gets totally out of whack. The

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Speaker 4: spread between buildings that are selling in the Bronx which

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Speaker 4: have a very weak credit profile, and buildings that are

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Speaker 4: selling in Manhattan really narrows. And that continues for the

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Speaker 4: next twenty years.

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Speaker 1: Sorry, just to back up, I'm just because I want

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Speaker 1: to be precise. What specifically did the New York City

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Speaker 1: Council do in the early nineties. When you say that

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Speaker 1: twenty seven hundred, what happens then?

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Speaker 4: Okay? So up until that point, rents on a rent

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Speaker 4: on a regular department like the one that Tracy lived in,

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Speaker 4: could only be raised a certain.

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Speaker 3: Amount of I didn't live in a regulated apartment. Well

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Speaker 3: it was, yes, sorry, yes, it's previous life.

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Speaker 4: Yes. And up until that point, the rents could only

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Speaker 4: be raised by a certain amount based on what the

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Speaker 4: Rent Guidelines Board issues each year. Okay, and starting there

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Speaker 4: was some erosion of that system prior to nineteen ninety four,

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Speaker 4: but the big change in nineteen ninety four was that

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Speaker 4: the apartment could become completely deregulated once once it breaches

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Speaker 4: that two thousand dollars threshold, So instead of being able

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Speaker 4: to only go up three percent a year, it could

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Speaker 4: go from two thousand to four thousand. And there's also

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Speaker 4: a bonus for when an apartment goes vacant, so every

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Speaker 4: time an apartment turns over from tenant to tenant, the

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Speaker 4: rent could be increased twenty percent, as opposed to just

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Speaker 4: the rent guidelines board amount.

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Speaker 3: So the obvious question here is that would seem to

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Speaker 3: create an incentive structure for landlords to basically try to

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Speaker 3: get to the twenty seven hundred or twenty eight hundred

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Speaker 3: threshold so that they could then raise the rent to

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Speaker 3: whatever the market can bear. Did we see that behavior

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Speaker 3: and how exactly do they try to speed up that process?

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Speaker 4: Yes, so there are three ways that they try to

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Speaker 4: speed up that process. One is buyouts, offering people money

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Speaker 4: to leave, which is legal. Others are harassment of tenants

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Speaker 4: out of buildings and using all sorts of means. And

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Speaker 4: the third is inflating the cost of renovations that they're

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Speaker 4: doing that are used to justify increases, because that was

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Speaker 4: always another way to increase rents. Was like, if you

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Speaker 4: need to put in a new boiler in the building,

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Speaker 4: you could amortize the cost of that improvement across all

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Speaker 4: the rents and the buildings in the building. If you

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Speaker 4: need to redo the plumbing in a particular apartment, you

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Speaker 4: could amortize the cost over that.

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Speaker 1: Sorry, something I'm still confused by, even post nineteen ninety four,

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Speaker 1: and I've only lived in New York almost twenty years now,

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Speaker 1: But every once in a while you like hear some

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Speaker 1: story about so and so has an apartment on the

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Speaker 1: Upper east Side and they're living in it and their

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Speaker 1: grandmother is still there.

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Speaker 3: It is still like crazy, this is a friend's plot line.

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Speaker 2: Right, yeah, something like that.

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Speaker 1: How did those stories exist in a post ninety four world?

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Speaker 4: Sure, so one, there's still the very old system of

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Speaker 4: rent control, so like that is a very small number

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Speaker 4: of units, but also does represent some of those situations.

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Speaker 1: So we're talking about a difference between rent.

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Speaker 2: Control rent staabilized. I see, I see.

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Speaker 1: So the rent control like they're just like this is

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Speaker 1: it and this is the price where someone is That

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Speaker 1: actually was not changed. What changed was these was the

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Speaker 1: units that were designed to just go very slowly.

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Speaker 4: Correct. Well, I mean rent control is also designed to

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Speaker 4: go out very slowly in a way. But once a

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Speaker 4: rent control, once a tenant at this point, once a

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Speaker 4: tenant in a rent control unit vacates that it becomes

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Speaker 4: rent stabilized and it sort of enters into the new system.

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Speaker 2: I see.

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Speaker 4: But to answer your broader point, which I think speaks

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Speaker 4: to this dynamic here is post ninety four. You know

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Speaker 4: this trade of you know, improving the apartment either actually

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Speaker 4: or on paper in order to get the rent above

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Speaker 4: the deregulation threshold. Really only works in strong submarkets, So

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Speaker 4: there was a time every apartment a building of a

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Speaker 4: certain size in below below ninety sixth Street was rent stabilized.

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Speaker 4: But Manhattan is the highest rent market in New York City,

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Speaker 4: so all of those apartments are excuse me, a huge

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Speaker 4: portion of those apartments were deregulated because there was enough

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Speaker 4: spread in there for the landlord to be able to

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Speaker 4: for it to be worth doing the work. Same thing

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Speaker 4: in places like Park Slope and sort of Western Brooklyn Queens,

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Speaker 4: you know, the gentrifying areas of the city, whereas in

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Speaker 4: the non gentrifying areas. The ways this policy mainly manifests

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Speaker 4: itself was in just increasing the rents higher than they

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Speaker 4: otherwise could be. But rents never are much more rarely

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Speaker 4: reached the threshold.

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Speaker 2: To be able to deregulate it.

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Speaker 3: Can you talk to us a little bit about the

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Speaker 3: financing picture. To what degree did this dynamic become, I

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Speaker 3: guess well known in the fundraising side of this whole thing.

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Speaker 3: So was it pretty easy to get loans an additional

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Speaker 3: capital in order to either buy more properties on the

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Speaker 3: assumption that you could eventually get to that threshold and

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Speaker 3: raise the rent or to fund renovation to try to

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Speaker 3: get to that threshold.

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Speaker 4: Yes, it was pretty easy and became particularly so in

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Speaker 4: the early two thousands, early to late two thousands, you know,

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Speaker 4: with sort of the broader sheends in real estate of institutionalization,

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Speaker 4: more private equity, and you know, became a more sophisticated

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Speaker 4: business that was putting more capital in more places. So

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Speaker 4: prior to let's say two thousand, the rent stabilized business

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Speaker 4: was a pretty sleep still a pretty sleepy business in

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Speaker 4: so far as like what type of capital played in it.

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Speaker 3: So like mom and pop, mom and pop and apartment building.

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Speaker 4: Okay, And you know there were certainly large landlords at

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Speaker 4: that point that it accumulated a lot of these properties.

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Speaker 4: But you know, private equity firms were not a big

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Speaker 4: player at that time. But in particularly in the two thousands,

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Speaker 4: the private equity and both on and also private credit

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Speaker 4: and New York coming back to the world really put

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Speaker 4: a lot of capital into this sector, and largely based

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Speaker 4: on the premise that they would be able to raise

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Speaker 4: these rents a lot more.

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Speaker 1: Let's talk a little bit more about that, because Tracy

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Speaker 1: mentioned in the beginning like setting aside everything you know,

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Speaker 1: it doesn't seem like rent control or rent stabilized buildings

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Speaker 1: or any of these buildings are like a particularly exciting

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Speaker 1: place to lend in. But if everyone thinks the place

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Speaker 1: is not an exciting place to lend and then intuitively

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Speaker 1: there's sort of like above market opportunities for the one

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Speaker 1: player that goes in. And we see this all the

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Speaker 1: time and all kinds of markets where like, yes, like

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Speaker 1: you can make a lot of money in distressed assets

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Speaker 1: of all sorts because most people don't want it. So

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Speaker 1: if you put in a new legwork to make it work,

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Speaker 1: you can make a lot of money. Talk to us

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Speaker 1: a little bit more about like the relationship that New

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Speaker 1: York Community Bank Corp. Had with a fellow landlords in

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Speaker 1: your world, why landlords liked working with them, why they

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Speaker 1: liked working with landlords, and why this was you know,

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Speaker 1: the profits that they accrued during the good times.

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Speaker 4: Sure, so the New Yor Community Bank really, like many

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Speaker 4: community banks, it's a relationship bank, and clearly as part

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Speaker 4: of its strategy it was building relationships with rand stabilized landlords.

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Speaker 4: So this has several benefits them. Obviously, making loans is

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Speaker 4: what a bank does. But also these community banks typically

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Speaker 4: require anyone getting a commercial mortgage from them to have

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Speaker 4: deposits at this bank as well, saying and also like

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Speaker 4: the deposits from tenant security deposits held in these buildings

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Speaker 4: excuse me, at New York Commedy Bank. So it became

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Speaker 4: a way for the New York community banks of the

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Speaker 4: world to really build their deposit bases and their loan

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Speaker 4: books on a product type in which there's a lot

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Speaker 4: of product. You know, there's a lot of these buildings

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Speaker 4: that need loans, and it's also kind of complicated. So

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Speaker 4: like lenders from out of town you know there, you know,

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Speaker 4: which were coming to land on office buildings and you know,

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Speaker 4: all sorts of other assets were less inclined to land

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Speaker 4: on rent stabilized buildings, not because of any sort of

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Speaker 4: accurate assessment of risk, but just because like it's easier

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Speaker 4: for some for some French bank to you know, loan

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Speaker 4: on an office building then figure out the rent stabilization code.

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Speaker 3: So if we're looking at all the headwinds that are

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Speaker 3: facing this particular segment, in addition to things like the

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Speaker 3: fact that rates have gone up enormously, I think there

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Speaker 3: was a more recent change to policy in twenty nineteen.

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Speaker 3: Can you walk us through what exactly that was and

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Speaker 3: how it sort of changed the picture for multifamily.

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Speaker 4: Sure, So, prior to twenty nineteen, you know, the bad

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Speaker 4: behavior that we talked about earlier of harassment, the lack

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Speaker 4: of houses construction, and you know, the general dynamics in

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Speaker 4: New York Cities housing market had really produced a terrible situation.

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Speaker 4: We have, you know, rent housing burden for tenants across

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Speaker 4: the city is way up record levels, homelessness is way up.

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Speaker 4: And twenty nineteen, a finally unified statewide coalition of tenant

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Speaker 4: groups called Housing Justice for All capitalized on the post

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Speaker 4: Trump progressive resurgence to pass the Housing Stability and Tenant

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Speaker 4: Protection Act of twenty nineteen, which is now known as

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Speaker 4: the HSTPA. This bill did many things, but for the

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Speaker 4: purpose of this conversation, the most important things it did

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Speaker 4: is it ended vacancy de control, so you can no

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Speaker 4: longer deregulate rent stabilized apartments.

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Speaker 1: So that reduced as your incentive to harass your tenants.

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Speaker 4: Theoretically, and it removed the twenty percent vacancy bonus. Can't

404
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Speaker 4: you know, you can't raise the regulated rent by twenty

405
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Speaker 4: percent on turnover, and it also severely curtailed the degree

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Speaker 4: to which landlords could recapture the renovation costs in rents.

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Speaker 1: It's funny, So I I want to go here actually

408
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Speaker 1: at some point in the conversation because right around the corner,

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Speaker 1: little did we know in twenty nineteen that a couple

410
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Speaker 1: years later we'd have like the worst inflation in forty years.

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Speaker 1: And we know that it was like a real headache

412
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Speaker 1: and a very costly headache for landlords to get contractors

413
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Speaker 1: in and renovate and floors and air conditioners and anything

414
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Speaker 1: else that landlords would have to deal with. So I

415
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Speaker 1: was sort of curious about that. Okay, it sort of

416
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Speaker 1: like curtails the ability to recapture renovation costs, but objectively,

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Speaker 1: the cost of renovation did.

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Speaker 2: Explode, right two years later?

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Speaker 1: Can you talk a little bit more about the intersection

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Speaker 1: of these regulations with just the reality that you don't

421
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Speaker 1: even have to not even for like sort of nefarious

422
00:22:46,560 --> 00:22:49,440
Speaker 1: purposes or purposes of raising the rent, like renovation costs

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Speaker 1: really did.

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Speaker 4: Explode, right, So I think you know, the regulations inflation

425
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Speaker 4: and interest rates changing are really accelerants to what was

426
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Speaker 4: sort of an evitable trend on these buildings. So you know,

427
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Speaker 4: post HSTPA, the liquidity in the market for these buildings

428
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Speaker 4: just dries up. There's no price discovery. Most sellers don't

429
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Speaker 4: want to crystallize their losses. Most buyers don't know how

430
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Speaker 4: to price the assets, you know, in a large part

431
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Speaker 4: because the issues that we just discussed, and brokers in

432
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Speaker 4: the sector are buying large like indulging their client's delusion.

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Speaker 4: So you know, this puts people like excuping lenders near

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Speaker 4: community Bank in a difficult position because, like, in addition

435
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Speaker 4: to not wanting to mark down the value their collateral

436
00:23:34,880 --> 00:23:37,240
Speaker 4: like I need lender wouldn't in this case doing so,

437
00:23:37,320 --> 00:23:39,159
Speaker 4: would you know, put some of their posits at a

438
00:23:39,200 --> 00:23:42,480
Speaker 4: lot of the deposits at risk as well. And they don't

439
00:23:42,680 --> 00:23:45,640
Speaker 4: know what the future holds. Like everyone in this world

440
00:23:45,800 --> 00:23:47,760
Speaker 4: of rend stabilized buildings is sort of engage in this

441
00:23:47,840 --> 00:23:51,200
Speaker 4: collective delusion. They're waiting for the Supreme Court to overturn

442
00:23:51,240 --> 00:23:55,920
Speaker 4: rank control, They're waiting for the legislature to weaken the AHASTPA.

443
00:23:56,200 --> 00:24:01,359
Speaker 4: And I think this is where they really miscalculated, and

444
00:24:01,440 --> 00:24:05,960
Speaker 4: I really sort of bought into their own propaganda from

445
00:24:06,119 --> 00:24:08,560
Speaker 4: you know, thirty years ago, which is that you know,

446
00:24:08,600 --> 00:24:11,240
Speaker 4: they think that real estate investment drives economic conditions, but

447
00:24:11,280 --> 00:24:14,400
Speaker 4: really economic conditions tend to drive real estate investment. And

448
00:24:14,800 --> 00:24:16,440
Speaker 4: they would have known this if they had looked at

449
00:24:16,480 --> 00:24:19,480
Speaker 4: the data from the rent stabilized building sector, which showed

450
00:24:20,040 --> 00:24:23,080
Speaker 4: that this trade really started to taper off before the

451
00:24:23,160 --> 00:24:27,800
Speaker 4: HSTPA in twenty seventeen, the amount of rent stabilized buildings

452
00:24:27,800 --> 00:24:30,359
Speaker 4: being traded. So the question is why, and the reason,

453
00:24:30,520 --> 00:24:32,359
Speaker 4: I think is pretty simple. If you look at the

454
00:24:32,400 --> 00:24:35,520
Speaker 4: history of this the deregulation, there were fewer and fewer

455
00:24:35,520 --> 00:24:39,879
Speaker 4: buildings in which this deregulatory trade actually worked because you know,

456
00:24:40,160 --> 00:24:42,040
Speaker 4: if market rents are not high enough, it doesn't make

457
00:24:42,040 --> 00:24:43,760
Speaker 4: any more, it doesn't make sense to invest all this

458
00:24:43,800 --> 00:24:46,960
Speaker 4: money in these buildings. So, after all the deregulation that

459
00:24:47,040 --> 00:24:50,000
Speaker 4: happened over those preceding twenty five years, the vast majority

460
00:24:50,040 --> 00:24:53,199
Speaker 4: of events stabilized stock and therefore collatter on near community

461
00:24:53,240 --> 00:24:58,040
Speaker 4: bank loans remains concentrated in lower income submarkets. So this

462
00:24:58,119 --> 00:25:01,600
Speaker 4: is always subprime real estate. And the buildings are you know,

463
00:25:01,640 --> 00:25:04,600
Speaker 4: they're century old, they're expensive to maintain, The tenants have

464
00:25:04,600 --> 00:25:07,040
Speaker 4: a weak credit profile. So even if the laws did

465
00:25:07,080 --> 00:25:09,800
Speaker 4: allow for higher increases than they do now, at some

466
00:25:09,800 --> 00:25:12,160
Speaker 4: point you can't pull blood from a stone. Big rent

467
00:25:12,200 --> 00:25:15,800
Speaker 4: increases are going to increasingly show up and increase collection costs,

468
00:25:16,080 --> 00:25:19,680
Speaker 4: legal fees, et cetera, all while operating costs, to your point, Joe,

469
00:25:19,720 --> 00:25:22,800
Speaker 4: are increasing on these ancient buildings. And if you think about,

470
00:25:22,840 --> 00:25:25,359
Speaker 4: like the other buildings in these neighborhoods, the vast majority

471
00:25:25,400 --> 00:25:28,560
Speaker 4: of other multi family buildings once built after nineteen seventy

472
00:25:28,560 --> 00:25:32,280
Speaker 4: four in places like the South Bronx, literally require subsidies

473
00:25:32,280 --> 00:25:32,719
Speaker 4: to operate.

474
00:25:33,960 --> 00:25:38,000
Speaker 3: What's the future of these buildings now? So one thing

475
00:25:38,040 --> 00:25:41,320
Speaker 3: that you see landlords say nowadays is because of the

476
00:25:41,480 --> 00:25:45,920
Speaker 3: changes to rent control that they aren't motivated to get

477
00:25:46,119 --> 00:25:49,400
Speaker 3: new tenants in. So, you know, why spend a load

478
00:25:49,440 --> 00:25:53,000
Speaker 3: of money renovating an apartment getting it up to standard

479
00:25:53,280 --> 00:25:55,440
Speaker 3: if you're not going to be able to make up

480
00:25:55,640 --> 00:25:59,280
Speaker 3: that investment by charging market rent. Just leave it empty.

481
00:26:00,080 --> 00:26:01,399
Speaker 3: So are we just going to end up in a

482
00:26:01,400 --> 00:26:04,919
Speaker 3: situation where apartments are empty? Or at some point do

483
00:26:05,440 --> 00:26:09,439
Speaker 3: landlords maybe crystallize their losses and start saying, you know what,

484
00:26:09,520 --> 00:26:11,480
Speaker 3: I'm just going to sell this off. Maybe a developer

485
00:26:11,480 --> 00:26:15,680
Speaker 3: can knock down the building, build something new. What actually happens, So.

486
00:26:17,280 --> 00:26:19,800
Speaker 4: It's obviously going to vary a lot between landlords and landlord.

487
00:26:19,840 --> 00:26:23,320
Speaker 4: Some are in better financial positions than others. But to

488
00:26:23,359 --> 00:26:25,840
Speaker 4: your point, Tracy, it doesn't really make sense to invest,

489
00:26:26,119 --> 00:26:29,040
Speaker 4: you know, conventional for profit capital in these buildings, certainly

490
00:26:29,080 --> 00:26:33,040
Speaker 4: at anywhere approaching the values of the past. So I think,

491
00:26:33,320 --> 00:26:35,840
Speaker 4: you know, broadly speaking, we're sort of in the standoff

492
00:26:36,000 --> 00:26:39,760
Speaker 4: between these rents stabilise building donors their lenders, and on

493
00:26:39,800 --> 00:26:43,879
Speaker 4: the other side, the government because these buildings need subsidies

494
00:26:44,119 --> 00:26:47,400
Speaker 4: to survive. But if I'm the government, and I guess

495
00:26:47,400 --> 00:26:49,840
Speaker 4: we're all the government away as tax payers, we don't

496
00:26:49,880 --> 00:26:53,159
Speaker 4: want to subsidize buildings at above market value. But on

497
00:26:53,240 --> 00:26:55,960
Speaker 4: the other hand, you don't want buildings to degrade to

498
00:26:56,040 --> 00:26:59,159
Speaker 4: a point where subsitdy becomes way more expensive, and not

499
00:26:59,200 --> 00:27:01,720
Speaker 4: to mention, the tenants living in the buildings increasingly suffer.

500
00:27:02,080 --> 00:27:04,960
Speaker 4: So doesn't seem like we're at the point politically where

501
00:27:05,280 --> 00:27:08,440
Speaker 4: that people can come to an agreement on injecting capital

502
00:27:08,440 --> 00:27:10,920
Speaker 4: into these buildings. But I think that's an inevitability.

503
00:27:10,960 --> 00:27:14,720
Speaker 1: But just going back, your basic argument here is that

504
00:27:15,160 --> 00:27:18,280
Speaker 1: you know, okay, like you bet on this deregulation trade,

505
00:27:18,280 --> 00:27:21,600
Speaker 1: maybe the Supreme Court will one day say all rent

506
00:27:21,640 --> 00:27:25,880
Speaker 1: control or something is illegal, or rent stabilization regimes are legal,

507
00:27:25,960 --> 00:27:29,560
Speaker 1: or maybe the government will water down some of the

508
00:27:29,640 --> 00:27:32,239
Speaker 1: twenty nineteen the New York State government or something will

509
00:27:32,280 --> 00:27:35,479
Speaker 1: water down the twenty nine teen policies. But your basic

510
00:27:35,640 --> 00:27:39,879
Speaker 1: argument is that even if that were true, that gap

511
00:27:39,920 --> 00:27:42,159
Speaker 1: between what these building the fair market value of these

512
00:27:42,200 --> 00:27:44,800
Speaker 1: buildings today under current law, and the sort of dream

513
00:27:44,920 --> 00:27:48,640
Speaker 1: legal changes aren't that big or aren't as big as

514
00:27:48,680 --> 00:27:52,080
Speaker 1: some of the call option embedded is not as great

515
00:27:52,119 --> 00:27:53,760
Speaker 1: as some of these investors imagine.

516
00:27:53,760 --> 00:27:57,560
Speaker 4: Correct. In some cases, the call option is very valuable,

517
00:27:57,600 --> 00:28:00,359
Speaker 4: Like if it's a fully rent stabilized building on the

518
00:28:00,440 --> 00:28:04,280
Speaker 4: Upper West Side, you know, they're basically you're buying the land.

519
00:28:04,359 --> 00:28:06,760
Speaker 4: That land there is very valuable. But the if it's

520
00:28:06,760 --> 00:28:11,160
Speaker 4: a fully renstabilized buildings in Eastern Queens or the South Bronx,

521
00:28:11,760 --> 00:28:14,080
Speaker 4: that land is not very valuable. So the idea that

522
00:28:14,119 --> 00:28:17,080
Speaker 4: they're going to demolish it anytime soon doesn't really hold up.

523
00:28:17,119 --> 00:28:20,040
Speaker 4: So I think, you know, we're dealing with a disconnect

524
00:28:20,080 --> 00:28:25,280
Speaker 4: between what the market in its collective delusion valued these

525
00:28:25,320 --> 00:28:29,480
Speaker 4: buildings at before and what they're fundamentally valued at based

526
00:28:29,520 --> 00:28:31,960
Speaker 4: on you know, cash flow and fundamentals of these buildings,

527
00:28:32,400 --> 00:28:36,840
Speaker 4: and a change in law doesn't change that very much

528
00:28:37,160 --> 00:28:40,200
Speaker 4: simply because of where the real estate is located and

529
00:28:40,760 --> 00:28:42,320
Speaker 4: the credit profile that tends in the.

530
00:28:59,480 --> 00:29:04,360
Speaker 1: Setting side the investor upside potential from a regulatory change.

531
00:29:04,480 --> 00:29:07,760
Speaker 1: One of the arguments that the anti rent control argue

532
00:29:07,800 --> 00:29:10,120
Speaker 1: people make is like, and you sort of did touch

533
00:29:10,160 --> 00:29:13,600
Speaker 1: on this, that it is a perverse or bad situation

534
00:29:14,120 --> 00:29:17,200
Speaker 1: for people living in a building if their owner has

535
00:29:17,240 --> 00:29:22,600
Speaker 1: either no interest or financing capacity to keep that building up.

536
00:29:22,840 --> 00:29:25,760
Speaker 1: So then essentially the person is living in an asset

537
00:29:25,800 --> 00:29:29,880
Speaker 1: that continually gets degraded or does it get fixed that often,

538
00:29:29,920 --> 00:29:31,959
Speaker 1: and the building is falling apart. How real is that

539
00:29:32,000 --> 00:29:33,840
Speaker 1: for some people in some buildings that phenomenon.

540
00:29:33,880 --> 00:29:37,120
Speaker 4: I think it's very real. But it's I think that

541
00:29:37,120 --> 00:29:40,200
Speaker 4: that argument from landlords really tends to fall on to

542
00:29:40,320 --> 00:29:43,600
Speaker 4: fiars because people were living in conditions like that under

543
00:29:43,600 --> 00:29:46,400
Speaker 4: the old rehip. It's not like all the money that

544
00:29:46,440 --> 00:29:48,240
Speaker 4: was being made in this business was being plowed back

545
00:29:48,240 --> 00:29:51,240
Speaker 4: into investing these buildings. These buildings are the least well

546
00:29:51,320 --> 00:29:53,680
Speaker 4: kept in the entire city. They were before and they

547
00:29:53,680 --> 00:29:57,200
Speaker 4: are now. So it's certainly a very real dynamic that

548
00:29:57,840 --> 00:30:01,600
Speaker 4: you know, these buildings require capital, and they have owners

549
00:30:01,600 --> 00:30:07,400
Speaker 4: that for both rational economic and moral reasons or ideological reasons,

550
00:30:07,680 --> 00:30:10,640
Speaker 4: don't want to invest capital in those buildings. However, a

551
00:30:10,720 --> 00:30:12,880
Speaker 4: lot of the problem goes back to having a really

552
00:30:12,920 --> 00:30:17,400
Speaker 4: inept regulatory app apparatus for housing, because in many cases

553
00:30:18,000 --> 00:30:20,920
Speaker 4: these landlords are legally obligated to provide to make these

554
00:30:21,240 --> 00:30:23,840
Speaker 4: or make sure these buildings aren't good prepare, and have

555
00:30:23,920 --> 00:30:25,320
Speaker 4: not been doing so for quite some time.

556
00:30:25,520 --> 00:30:28,160
Speaker 1: So ben obviously people are going to need a place

557
00:30:28,200 --> 00:30:30,800
Speaker 1: to live. This real estate isn't going away. Are these

558
00:30:31,000 --> 00:30:34,480
Speaker 1: investible assets? Is there a play here for some of

559
00:30:34,520 --> 00:30:35,200
Speaker 1: this real estate?

560
00:30:36,080 --> 00:30:38,000
Speaker 4: I don't want to leave listeners with the impression that

561
00:30:38,040 --> 00:30:43,240
Speaker 4: these are like uninvestable buildings. They're fundamentally depreciating assets. But

562
00:30:43,320 --> 00:30:46,760
Speaker 4: like as many Bloomberg listeners would know, like there's plenty

563
00:30:46,760 --> 00:30:49,560
Speaker 4: of financial assets out there that have depreciating cash flows,

564
00:30:49,840 --> 00:30:52,560
Speaker 4: what really needs to happen here is these buildings need

565
00:30:52,600 --> 00:30:56,960
Speaker 4: to be valued at a values that reflect their fundamentals.

566
00:30:57,160 --> 00:30:59,360
Speaker 4: We're starting to see previews of this where like some

567
00:30:59,440 --> 00:31:03,760
Speaker 4: of these stabilized buildings are leased entirely to city programs

568
00:31:04,160 --> 00:31:07,440
Speaker 4: or entirely to tenants with Section eight vouchers. So there's

569
00:31:07,440 --> 00:31:10,959
Speaker 4: gonna be various forms through which capital isn't injecting these

570
00:31:10,960 --> 00:31:14,160
Speaker 4: buildings to stabilize them, whether it's providing boucher's to tenants,

571
00:31:14,400 --> 00:31:17,680
Speaker 4: city leasing it directly, nonprofits taking them over and getting

572
00:31:17,800 --> 00:31:21,600
Speaker 4: you know, government financing, and every possible formation in between them.

573
00:31:21,600 --> 00:31:24,760
Speaker 4: There's no civil serviable fixing these buildings because they're all

574
00:31:24,760 --> 00:31:27,680
Speaker 4: in their unique situation and you know, we have so

575
00:31:28,560 --> 00:31:31,280
Speaker 4: little open housing that it's not like the tenants have

576
00:31:31,600 --> 00:31:36,400
Speaker 4: anywhere that they can go. So it's a very live issue.

577
00:31:36,120 --> 00:31:38,840
Speaker 1: All right, Ben Carlos Taipan, thank you so much for

578
00:31:38,960 --> 00:31:41,880
Speaker 1: coming on to odd Laws. Fascinating sort of like New

579
00:31:41,960 --> 00:31:43,840
Speaker 1: York City real Estate and history.

580
00:31:43,960 --> 00:31:46,560
Speaker 2: That did a great job of clearing up how we

581
00:31:46,600 --> 00:31:47,400
Speaker 2: got in this position.

582
00:31:47,720 --> 00:32:02,320
Speaker 1: Thanks roving us, Tracy. I thought there were a lot

583
00:32:02,320 --> 00:32:05,120
Speaker 1: of interesting points in there. One thing in particular I

584
00:32:05,240 --> 00:32:09,280
Speaker 1: just start on and it's not directly related to the regulation.

585
00:32:09,600 --> 00:32:12,680
Speaker 1: This idea like the relationship lenders. You know, it reminds

586
00:32:12,720 --> 00:32:15,560
Speaker 1: me of SVB. It's like you have this expectation that

587
00:32:15,560 --> 00:32:18,840
Speaker 1: that's where you hold the security deposits, et cetera. And

588
00:32:18,880 --> 00:32:21,440
Speaker 1: it kind of brings me down. It depresses me a

589
00:32:21,480 --> 00:32:23,040
Speaker 1: little bit because the idea.

590
00:32:23,040 --> 00:32:25,200
Speaker 3: On a relationship with your bank, well, I.

591
00:32:25,240 --> 00:32:28,280
Speaker 1: Like the idea of financial institutions that actually get to

592
00:32:28,320 --> 00:32:31,640
Speaker 1: know a space that like build up a specific needs

593
00:32:31,720 --> 00:32:35,480
Speaker 1: rather than like pure commodity lending, or.

594
00:32:35,560 --> 00:32:39,040
Speaker 3: It seems counterintuitive because you think they should be developing

595
00:32:39,280 --> 00:32:43,360
Speaker 3: expertise and good risk management skills in a particular sector,

596
00:32:43,480 --> 00:32:46,280
Speaker 3: but instead, so far, what we've seen is it tends

597
00:32:46,320 --> 00:32:48,000
Speaker 3: to lead to I guess over exposure.

598
00:32:48,320 --> 00:32:51,040
Speaker 1: I guess one thing also that is maybe unique and

599
00:32:51,120 --> 00:32:53,960
Speaker 1: very different from an SVB other than the you know,

600
00:32:54,000 --> 00:32:57,280
Speaker 1: one thing that's in similarity obviously is the expectation of

601
00:32:57,280 --> 00:33:00,280
Speaker 1: holding deposits, the focus on one industry. But that's one

602
00:33:00,320 --> 00:33:02,840
Speaker 1: thing that's different and interesting is and I thought it

603
00:33:02,880 --> 00:33:05,880
Speaker 1: was a fascinating point that I hadn't thought of because

604
00:33:05,920 --> 00:33:09,920
Speaker 1: of the sort of complexity of New York City housing law.

605
00:33:09,960 --> 00:33:12,960
Speaker 1: And I'm sure we basically just scratch the surface that

606
00:33:13,040 --> 00:33:17,600
Speaker 1: it sort of naturally repels most capital like, as you said,

607
00:33:17,600 --> 00:33:20,160
Speaker 1: a French bank isn't going to sort of like really

608
00:33:20,200 --> 00:33:22,880
Speaker 1: like take the time to really deal with like a

609
00:33:22,960 --> 00:33:25,760
Speaker 1: post nineteen seventy four houses, pre nineteen seventy four houses,

610
00:33:25,800 --> 00:33:28,560
Speaker 1: all that, and so it sort of creates the situation

611
00:33:28,760 --> 00:33:33,080
Speaker 1: where one type of bet ends up being concentrated in

612
00:33:33,120 --> 00:33:35,120
Speaker 1: the hands of one or a small number of players

613
00:33:35,120 --> 00:33:37,960
Speaker 1: that actually put into the legwork to understand the market.

614
00:33:38,160 --> 00:33:41,000
Speaker 3: Yeah, the other thing I thought was interesting about that

615
00:33:41,080 --> 00:33:46,120
Speaker 3: particular dynamic was it kind of leads to a situation where, Okay,

616
00:33:46,200 --> 00:33:50,120
Speaker 3: there's not a big natural body of capital in this

617
00:33:50,320 --> 00:33:53,080
Speaker 3: space for you know, the various reasons that we laid out,

618
00:33:53,120 --> 00:33:56,040
Speaker 3: But if you do the work, do your due diligence,

619
00:33:56,200 --> 00:33:59,120
Speaker 3: put that effort in, you can get in and then

620
00:33:59,640 --> 00:34:02,040
Speaker 3: make a lot of money because the dynamic almost becomes

621
00:34:02,040 --> 00:34:07,000
Speaker 3: self reinforcing. Right. It's like you have this business model

622
00:34:07,040 --> 00:34:11,799
Speaker 3: that's basically predicated on the value of your building going up,

623
00:34:11,880 --> 00:34:14,239
Speaker 3: and then you have lenders who are very into that

624
00:34:14,440 --> 00:34:17,640
Speaker 3: dynamic as well, and you have more money coming in

625
00:34:17,719 --> 00:34:21,640
Speaker 3: vis private equity, private capital, which Ben also mentioned. It

626
00:34:21,640 --> 00:34:25,040
Speaker 3: feels like it almost becomes this little like tiny feedback

627
00:34:25,080 --> 00:34:29,320
Speaker 3: loop feeding on itself. The other thing that this is related,

628
00:34:29,360 --> 00:34:31,920
Speaker 3: but the other thing that interested me was the idea that, well,

629
00:34:32,080 --> 00:34:36,680
Speaker 3: these were always subprime assets, right. But again, that ecosystem

630
00:34:36,800 --> 00:34:41,600
Speaker 3: of players were sort of telling themselves a different story,

631
00:34:42,080 --> 00:34:45,239
Speaker 3: and everyone agreed on that story at the same time.

632
00:34:45,280 --> 00:34:47,960
Speaker 3: And that's fine as long as everyone can keep agreeing.

633
00:34:47,960 --> 00:34:50,600
Speaker 3: But then when the environment starts to change, when interest

634
00:34:50,680 --> 00:34:53,560
Speaker 3: rates start to go up, operational costs go up, it

635
00:34:53,640 --> 00:34:55,160
Speaker 3: kind of falls apart totally.

636
00:34:55,239 --> 00:34:57,799
Speaker 1: I thought that was a really fascinating point that even if,

637
00:34:57,880 --> 00:35:01,920
Speaker 1: like you got the dream free market wish list, that

638
00:35:01,960 --> 00:35:04,600
Speaker 1: many of these buildings just do not have the embedded

639
00:35:04,680 --> 00:35:07,839
Speaker 1: value that a lot of the investors sort of assumed

640
00:35:07,960 --> 00:35:10,600
Speaker 1: or imagined that they would. That's like a really interesting

641
00:35:10,800 --> 00:35:13,040
Speaker 1: debate there. I also thought it was interesting, you know

642
00:35:13,440 --> 00:35:16,640
Speaker 1: that in the old old days that rent stabilized billance.

643
00:35:16,680 --> 00:35:18,880
Speaker 1: As he described it, it's a bond business, and so

644
00:35:18,920 --> 00:35:20,720
Speaker 1: it's almost like when it got out of the business

645
00:35:20,719 --> 00:35:23,319
Speaker 1: of being a bond business, where suddenly people started maybe

646
00:35:23,400 --> 00:35:26,280
Speaker 1: thinking of it as like an equity business. Yes, Upside

647
00:35:26,320 --> 00:35:30,480
Speaker 1: exactly showed the seeds of its eventual demise because you

648
00:35:30,600 --> 00:35:32,920
Speaker 1: keep pushing to try to get out of the bond

649
00:35:32,920 --> 00:35:35,600
Speaker 1: asset class to get something more like equity market.

650
00:35:35,680 --> 00:35:38,680
Speaker 3: Right, and that's when the story becomes really important, the

651
00:35:38,719 --> 00:35:40,759
Speaker 3: story being like, well, we're getting close to the twenty

652
00:35:40,760 --> 00:35:43,480
Speaker 3: eight hundred threshold and we're going to renovate and eventually

653
00:35:43,480 --> 00:35:45,320
Speaker 3: get over it, and then we'll make tons of money

654
00:35:45,360 --> 00:35:48,080
Speaker 3: because this is going to be a shiny new designer

655
00:35:48,120 --> 00:35:51,560
Speaker 3: apartment or something like that. On that happy note, shall

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Speaker 3: we leave it there?

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00:35:52,080 --> 00:35:52,719
Speaker 2: Let's leave it there.

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Speaker 3: Okay, this has been another episode of the All Thoughts podcast.

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00:35:56,080 --> 00:35:58,960
Speaker 3: I'm Tracy Alloway. You can follow me at Tracy Alloway.

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00:35:59,120 --> 00:36:01,960
Speaker 1: I'm Joe Why Isn't? You can follow me at the Stalwart.

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00:36:02,280 --> 00:36:05,640
Speaker 1: Follow our guest Ben Carlos type and he's at so Bendito.

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00:36:05,960 --> 00:36:09,520
Speaker 1: Follow our producers Carmen Rodriguez at Carmen Arman, dash Ol

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Speaker 1: Bennett at Dashbot and Kelbrooks at kel Brooks. And thank

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Speaker 1: you to our producer Moses Ondem. From our Odlots content,

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00:36:16,680 --> 00:36:19,359
Speaker 1: you can check out Bloomberg dot com slash odd lots,

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Speaker 1: where you have transcript, a blog and the newsletter, and

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Speaker 1: check out the discord twenty four to seven. You could

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Speaker 1: chat with fellow listeners on all these topics, including plenty

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Speaker 1: of conversation about New York City real estate discord dot gg, Slash.

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Speaker 3: Odlots and if you enjoy adlots, if you like it

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Speaker 3: when we do deep dives into multifamily, the Forgotten cre

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Speaker 3: then please leave us a positive review on your favorite

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Speaker 3: podcast platform. And remember, if you are a Bloomberg subscriber,

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Speaker 3: you can listen to all our odlots episodes absolutely AD free.

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Speaker 3: All you have to do is connect your Bloomberg subscription

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Speaker 3: with Apple Podcasts. Thanks for listening in