1 00:00:00,240 --> 00:00:04,720 Speaker 1: From UFOs to psychic powers and government conspiracies. History is 2 00:00:04,800 --> 00:00:09,119 Speaker 1: riddled with unexplained events. You can turn back now or 3 00:00:09,200 --> 00:00:12,079 Speaker 1: learn the stuff they don't want you to know. A 4 00:00:12,240 --> 00:00:26,360 Speaker 1: production of I Heart Brading. Hello, welcome back to the show. 5 00:00:26,400 --> 00:00:29,440 Speaker 1: My name is Matt, my name is Noel. They called 6 00:00:29,440 --> 00:00:32,479 Speaker 1: me Bet. We're joined as always with our super producer 7 00:00:32,600 --> 00:00:37,000 Speaker 1: Paul Mission controlled decans. Most importantly, you are you. You 8 00:00:37,120 --> 00:00:40,520 Speaker 1: are here, and that makes this the stuff they don't 9 00:00:40,720 --> 00:00:44,880 Speaker 1: want you to know. This is deep water, folks, fellow 10 00:00:44,880 --> 00:00:50,320 Speaker 1: conspiracy realists. Earlier years ago, your faithful correspondence created a 11 00:00:50,479 --> 00:00:53,440 Speaker 1: video related to this topic. We've talked about it in 12 00:00:53,640 --> 00:00:58,160 Speaker 1: past episodes as well. Uh. Funny story, Matt, it could 13 00:00:58,200 --> 00:01:03,280 Speaker 1: actually be difficult for a casual YouTube browser to find 14 00:01:04,120 --> 00:01:09,560 Speaker 1: our Octopus episode about the death of journalists Danny Castelero. Yes, 15 00:01:09,760 --> 00:01:13,440 Speaker 1: but I think I got it on like the YouTube 16 00:01:13,560 --> 00:01:18,080 Speaker 1: front page. If you go to YouTube slash conspiracy stuff, 17 00:01:18,120 --> 00:01:22,520 Speaker 1: it's on a playlist down there, and uh, I'm gonna 18 00:01:22,520 --> 00:01:26,120 Speaker 1: make sure it's there by the time you hear this episode. Awesome. Yeah, 19 00:01:26,240 --> 00:01:30,759 Speaker 1: we've uh we meaning meaning Matt and partners of ours 20 00:01:31,000 --> 00:01:35,440 Speaker 1: are putting in some work to uh to do even 21 00:01:35,480 --> 00:01:38,679 Speaker 1: more cool stuff with the YouTube channel. So check that 22 00:01:38,720 --> 00:01:42,360 Speaker 1: out after you have checked out the book that we 23 00:01:42,400 --> 00:01:45,800 Speaker 1: came out with and left a and left a review 24 00:01:46,080 --> 00:01:50,640 Speaker 1: on your review platform of choice, whether that's Amazon, good Reads, 25 00:01:51,200 --> 00:01:55,000 Speaker 1: or you know your own thing. And can we just say, um, Ben, 26 00:01:55,160 --> 00:01:57,200 Speaker 1: you always say that you're the most important part of 27 00:01:57,280 --> 00:02:01,400 Speaker 1: the show, and we all three stand I that absolutely true. 28 00:02:01,760 --> 00:02:04,480 Speaker 1: We appreciate all of the feedback and all of the 29 00:02:04,480 --> 00:02:08,200 Speaker 1: suggestions episodes, and just for you being you know, part 30 00:02:08,280 --> 00:02:10,160 Speaker 1: of the stuff that I want you to know, family, 31 00:02:10,240 --> 00:02:12,120 Speaker 1: and uh, it would just mean the world to us 32 00:02:12,160 --> 00:02:15,520 Speaker 1: to you know, really support the show um by grabbing 33 00:02:15,560 --> 00:02:18,040 Speaker 1: this book, and it will keep us from getting fired 34 00:02:18,280 --> 00:02:22,720 Speaker 1: by our corporate overlrrence. So seriously, you know, do us 35 00:02:22,760 --> 00:02:27,120 Speaker 1: a solid. It's holiday times, Yeah, yeah, it's holiday times. 36 00:02:27,200 --> 00:02:30,240 Speaker 1: So if you want to, uh, if you want to 37 00:02:30,280 --> 00:02:35,840 Speaker 1: get something that speaks to the interests of your loved ones, 38 00:02:36,040 --> 00:02:39,160 Speaker 1: your friends or family, or you feel like you might 39 00:02:39,320 --> 00:02:44,399 Speaker 1: be need to talk a crazy relative off a cognitive ledge, 40 00:02:44,639 --> 00:02:46,400 Speaker 1: this is the book for you. And if you don't 41 00:02:46,400 --> 00:02:49,280 Speaker 1: like it, give it to your enemies. That will show them. Uh. 42 00:02:49,400 --> 00:02:53,840 Speaker 1: Speaking of fellow conspiracy realist, let's give a shout out 43 00:02:53,919 --> 00:02:58,359 Speaker 1: to Connor, who played a big part in getting this 44 00:02:58,440 --> 00:03:03,760 Speaker 1: episode back in the front of our minds. We know 45 00:03:04,040 --> 00:03:07,160 Speaker 1: that there are a lot of attempts to bury some 46 00:03:07,240 --> 00:03:11,400 Speaker 1: of the information we're going to talk about today. We 47 00:03:11,440 --> 00:03:14,200 Speaker 1: want to bring this story again to the forefront of 48 00:03:14,240 --> 00:03:19,080 Speaker 1: publicly available discourse. This maybe the first episode in a series. 49 00:03:19,280 --> 00:03:23,200 Speaker 1: The rabbit hole just goes too deep. But we will 50 00:03:23,200 --> 00:03:25,480 Speaker 1: give you the facts and then we will share with 51 00:03:25,520 --> 00:03:29,360 Speaker 1: you the craziness. You can call that a promise that 52 00:03:29,520 --> 00:03:32,280 Speaker 1: is going to be one of many terrible puns in 53 00:03:32,360 --> 00:03:38,480 Speaker 1: today's show. No E Yes promise, no E P R 54 00:03:38,560 --> 00:03:41,720 Speaker 1: O M I S. It's an acronym for a kind 55 00:03:41,720 --> 00:03:46,880 Speaker 1: of case management software. I know, snooze fest, but let's 56 00:03:46,920 --> 00:03:49,360 Speaker 1: get into it. What is the acronym stand for? Well, 57 00:03:49,360 --> 00:03:57,960 Speaker 1: originally it was Project Management Integrated System originally cool, totally 58 00:03:57,960 --> 00:04:01,480 Speaker 1: get what that is. Yeah, But the one, the thing 59 00:04:01,520 --> 00:04:04,080 Speaker 1: we know it as and the thing we're going to 60 00:04:04,160 --> 00:04:11,080 Speaker 1: focus on, is called Prosecutors like prosecutor Prosecutors Management information System. Yeah. 61 00:04:11,160 --> 00:04:14,640 Speaker 1: And to understand why this was such a big deal 62 00:04:15,400 --> 00:04:18,560 Speaker 1: in the first place, Uh, you have to understand something 63 00:04:18,600 --> 00:04:22,359 Speaker 1: that is going to be gonna be so obvious to 64 00:04:22,560 --> 00:04:26,360 Speaker 1: many people who have worked in government. So the US government, 65 00:04:26,640 --> 00:04:31,120 Speaker 1: despite being the world's most dangerous military and despite having 66 00:04:31,520 --> 00:04:34,240 Speaker 1: tons of money to throw at any given problem, the 67 00:04:34,360 --> 00:04:38,120 Speaker 1: US government in many ways is pretty archaic. You know. 68 00:04:38,400 --> 00:04:43,120 Speaker 1: You will see everything from people still using typewriters to 69 00:04:43,760 --> 00:04:49,040 Speaker 1: uh light legacy proprietary systems and no one will change 70 00:04:49,120 --> 00:04:52,559 Speaker 1: them just because the expense is too much and people 71 00:04:52,600 --> 00:04:56,480 Speaker 1: already know the equipment, etcetera, etcetera. UH. And this is 72 00:04:56,520 --> 00:05:00,479 Speaker 1: this can be surprising, you know, because often US in 73 00:05:01,240 --> 00:05:08,000 Speaker 1: fiction you will see different government agencies portrayed as uh 74 00:05:08,200 --> 00:05:11,680 Speaker 1: using the latest technology, you know what I mean. Like 75 00:05:11,880 --> 00:05:14,800 Speaker 1: you watch law enforcement shows like Law and Order, s 76 00:05:14,880 --> 00:05:18,880 Speaker 1: VU or something, and their office looks amazing. It's so 77 00:05:19,000 --> 00:05:23,080 Speaker 1: well lit, and they've got all these great computers. Everyone's 78 00:05:23,120 --> 00:05:26,960 Speaker 1: so good looking. Everyone could be a waiter in Los Angeles. 79 00:05:27,000 --> 00:05:31,760 Speaker 1: It's amazing. But that's not the case, and it hasn't 80 00:05:31,800 --> 00:05:34,560 Speaker 1: been the case for a long long time, a lot 81 00:05:34,600 --> 00:05:39,240 Speaker 1: of times, for decades. Even now, people are dealing with 82 00:05:40,240 --> 00:05:44,280 Speaker 1: mountains and trolls of paperwork and data and you have 83 00:05:44,400 --> 00:05:47,679 Speaker 1: to check for one thing, and you find yourself looking 84 00:05:47,720 --> 00:05:51,560 Speaker 1: for a needle in a Haystack, you don't have good 85 00:05:51,600 --> 00:05:56,080 Speaker 1: case management. And that's where a promise came in. In 86 00:05:56,080 --> 00:06:02,120 Speaker 1: this sense, cases cases kind of a legal term that 87 00:06:02,240 --> 00:06:06,480 Speaker 1: it goes beyond that, and management describes everything that pertains 88 00:06:06,520 --> 00:06:11,800 Speaker 1: to a specific case. So Promise has this ability when 89 00:06:11,880 --> 00:06:15,640 Speaker 1: it comes out to give a total rundown of all 90 00:06:15,920 --> 00:06:18,960 Speaker 1: federal cases. It just hoovers them up any case where 91 00:06:19,040 --> 00:06:21,840 Speaker 1: lawyer has been involved, and you can cross check it 92 00:06:21,920 --> 00:06:26,200 Speaker 1: with defendants. You can cross check that specific lawyer, that court, 93 00:06:26,760 --> 00:06:29,440 Speaker 1: you can see how it all worked out, etcetera, etcetera. 94 00:06:29,520 --> 00:06:33,159 Speaker 1: It's really convenient. It's kind of automation, right, and this 95 00:06:33,279 --> 00:06:38,000 Speaker 1: is for large government entities. That's a godsend. Uh you're 96 00:06:38,080 --> 00:06:40,240 Speaker 1: hearing this now and you might be thinking, okay, yeah, 97 00:06:40,320 --> 00:06:43,800 Speaker 1: that's good. It makes people's job easier. What gives what's 98 00:06:43,800 --> 00:06:47,960 Speaker 1: the big deal? Well, uh, it get we'll get to that. 99 00:06:48,040 --> 00:06:50,920 Speaker 1: It gets weird. We have to introduce something that used 100 00:06:50,960 --> 00:06:54,880 Speaker 1: to be a nonprofit the creators of Promise in his law, 101 00:06:56,279 --> 00:06:58,680 Speaker 1: which is not a kind of cold slaw, which was 102 00:06:58,720 --> 00:07:02,200 Speaker 1: disapplining to me. So in slap, oh gosh, it's hard 103 00:07:02,200 --> 00:07:04,719 Speaker 1: to not even say it with that slaw. Let's just 104 00:07:04,880 --> 00:07:08,400 Speaker 1: let's try it ins law in his law was originally 105 00:07:08,480 --> 00:07:11,920 Speaker 1: an acronym all its own, the Institute of Law and 106 00:07:12,040 --> 00:07:15,559 Speaker 1: Social Research. And you know, in general on the show, 107 00:07:15,680 --> 00:07:20,080 Speaker 1: what do we usually notice when we have absurdly snoozy, 108 00:07:20,200 --> 00:07:25,840 Speaker 1: innocuous names. Okay, we'll leave it to you to decide, 109 00:07:25,960 --> 00:07:34,680 Speaker 1: but just from various activity, the various masquerading behind this banality. Uh, 110 00:07:34,720 --> 00:07:37,720 Speaker 1: it's nineteen seventy three. The scene is set and there's 111 00:07:37,760 --> 00:07:41,720 Speaker 1: this fellow named William A. Hamilton's. Uh, he's trying to 112 00:07:41,760 --> 00:07:44,600 Speaker 1: get his shot. It's a different kind of shot though. Hamilton's. 113 00:07:44,600 --> 00:07:49,280 Speaker 1: This Hamilton's founded ends law with grants and contracts from 114 00:07:49,280 --> 00:07:54,320 Speaker 1: the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. This is what ultimately lead 115 00:07:54,880 --> 00:07:59,280 Speaker 1: to promise with with with no E promise it sounds 116 00:07:59,280 --> 00:08:02,120 Speaker 1: like eighties man, like like a new age ban or 117 00:08:02,120 --> 00:08:04,559 Speaker 1: a new way of band or something. It does kind 118 00:08:04,600 --> 00:08:06,760 Speaker 1: of yeah, man, I mean they could even go the 119 00:08:06,800 --> 00:08:10,160 Speaker 1: extra step and call it promise with a Z. Nobody 120 00:08:10,200 --> 00:08:12,520 Speaker 1: take that idea. That's the best idea we've had this morning. 121 00:08:13,520 --> 00:08:15,800 Speaker 1: And well, in this thing that he was he was 122 00:08:15,880 --> 00:08:19,760 Speaker 1: creating this software or that Hamilton had an idea to create, 123 00:08:20,000 --> 00:08:22,240 Speaker 1: he was trying to bring the d o J the 124 00:08:22,280 --> 00:08:25,480 Speaker 1: Department of Justice into a new age where you could 125 00:08:25,480 --> 00:08:28,800 Speaker 1: easily find information regarding the cases you have to deal 126 00:08:28,840 --> 00:08:31,800 Speaker 1: with it, rather than, like you said, running around and 127 00:08:31,840 --> 00:08:35,120 Speaker 1: looking at files and file cabinets, because there were so 128 00:08:35,440 --> 00:08:41,720 Speaker 1: many dang file cabinets, like just rooms dedicated ballroom sized 129 00:08:41,880 --> 00:08:45,480 Speaker 1: rooms dedicated to files. And hey, now it's in your computer, 130 00:08:45,760 --> 00:08:50,200 Speaker 1: or it could be if you use Promise software. Yeah, exactly. This, 131 00:08:50,640 --> 00:08:55,840 Speaker 1: So this idea is brilliant, and ins Law is originally 132 00:08:55,880 --> 00:09:01,000 Speaker 1: funded as a nonprofit. It starts as nonprofit, comes from 133 00:09:01,040 --> 00:09:05,600 Speaker 1: this thing called the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, which would 134 00:09:06,120 --> 00:09:10,640 Speaker 1: provide grants and contracts for this sort of research. Promise 135 00:09:10,720 --> 00:09:14,360 Speaker 1: gets designed by Hamilton's and Company in the late nineteen 136 00:09:14,440 --> 00:09:17,760 Speaker 1: seventies and eighties, and like you said, Matt, it's bringing 137 00:09:17,880 --> 00:09:22,760 Speaker 1: things into the computer age. In spring of one, the 138 00:09:22,800 --> 00:09:27,959 Speaker 1: Reagan administration said Promise is one of our greatest assets. 139 00:09:28,160 --> 00:09:36,440 Speaker 1: By three, Promise has transformed fundamentally, and ins Law has 140 00:09:36,480 --> 00:09:42,160 Speaker 1: also transformed. They're no longer a nonprofit company. They have 141 00:09:42,679 --> 00:09:44,240 Speaker 1: these are all just the facts. We're not to the 142 00:09:44,240 --> 00:09:49,000 Speaker 1: crazy stuff yet. But they start fighting with the d 143 00:09:49,040 --> 00:09:51,520 Speaker 1: o J or they start having what corporate America calls 144 00:09:51,520 --> 00:09:57,120 Speaker 1: a healthy conversation because they because in his law made 145 00:09:57,120 --> 00:10:03,559 Speaker 1: this promise software for the government with government funding, they 146 00:10:03,600 --> 00:10:07,600 Speaker 1: can't claim ownership. They don't have proprietary rights. So when 147 00:10:07,640 --> 00:10:10,640 Speaker 1: they go private, they make a new, souped up version 148 00:10:10,920 --> 00:10:13,960 Speaker 1: of promise. You know, think of it like compare. I 149 00:10:14,000 --> 00:10:18,280 Speaker 1: think it's comparable to um a PS five compared to 150 00:10:18,320 --> 00:10:20,800 Speaker 1: a PS two. Right for all the gamers out there. 151 00:10:21,320 --> 00:10:26,719 Speaker 1: And the d o J does say, hey, they've got 152 00:10:26,720 --> 00:10:28,720 Speaker 1: a good claim to this because they went private and 153 00:10:28,760 --> 00:10:33,640 Speaker 1: they made their own thing. But uh medic until they 154 00:10:33,679 --> 00:10:36,160 Speaker 1: saw how much it would cost to like license this offer. 155 00:10:37,120 --> 00:10:41,000 Speaker 1: Probably you're probably right, and it's no, it's no wonder 156 00:10:41,120 --> 00:10:45,720 Speaker 1: like this was crazy good stuff. It's a program that 157 00:10:45,800 --> 00:10:50,440 Speaker 1: makes it made it easy to monitor defendants, lawyers, and judges. 158 00:10:51,240 --> 00:10:55,160 Speaker 1: But astute observers noticed this same kind of system, the 159 00:10:55,200 --> 00:11:00,440 Speaker 1: same kind of approach could help you track terrorists, drugs plers, 160 00:11:00,800 --> 00:11:06,120 Speaker 1: human traffickers, political dissidents, and anyone could use it if 161 00:11:06,120 --> 00:11:09,640 Speaker 1: they had the program. This set the stage for a 162 00:11:09,720 --> 00:11:12,719 Speaker 1: ton of court battles between ins law and the d 163 00:11:12,840 --> 00:11:16,559 Speaker 1: o J. And as we'll see, a ton of allegations. 164 00:11:16,600 --> 00:11:18,559 Speaker 1: It's a story a lot of people don't talk about 165 00:11:18,600 --> 00:11:22,840 Speaker 1: these days. Uh. More and more sources over the years 166 00:11:23,240 --> 00:11:26,760 Speaker 1: have alleged that Promise grew way beyond what it was 167 00:11:26,840 --> 00:11:30,480 Speaker 1: meant to do, and as it grew, it grew beyond 168 00:11:30,520 --> 00:11:35,880 Speaker 1: the law. So what's what's the reason this is on 169 00:11:36,120 --> 00:11:40,520 Speaker 1: a show that applies critical thinking to conspiracy theories. Is 170 00:11:40,600 --> 00:11:44,720 Speaker 1: it possible that intelligence officials, not just from the US 171 00:11:45,440 --> 00:11:49,800 Speaker 1: took this software, souped it up, weaponized it, and use 172 00:11:49,880 --> 00:11:56,160 Speaker 1: it to spy on other governments and other legitimate private institutions. 173 00:11:56,760 --> 00:11:59,920 Speaker 1: Did they build a back door to the world. Well, 174 00:12:00,080 --> 00:12:02,640 Speaker 1: we're gonna pause for a word from our sponsored If 175 00:12:02,679 --> 00:12:11,880 Speaker 1: we don't get castle Erot, we'll be right back. Here's 176 00:12:11,960 --> 00:12:17,720 Speaker 1: where it gets crazy, Okay, So he said, the Hamilton's family, 177 00:12:18,520 --> 00:12:22,400 Speaker 1: they're they're fighting with the Department of Justice. What did 178 00:12:22,400 --> 00:12:28,320 Speaker 1: the Hamilton's say, Well, the Hamilton's family really did enter 179 00:12:28,400 --> 00:12:33,800 Speaker 1: into quite a brutal and nasty, very bitter confrontation over 180 00:12:33,920 --> 00:12:37,240 Speaker 1: the software. The Washington Post report at the Hamilton's believe 181 00:12:37,320 --> 00:12:40,640 Speaker 1: the government was had it out for them, was trying 182 00:12:40,679 --> 00:12:44,840 Speaker 1: to ruin their reputations, ruin their livelihood, take away everything 183 00:12:44,840 --> 00:12:47,920 Speaker 1: that they built. Um, they believe the promise was getting 184 00:12:47,920 --> 00:12:50,480 Speaker 1: wrapped up in some sort of global network of foreign 185 00:12:50,480 --> 00:12:54,319 Speaker 1: and domestic intelligence agencies, which we're using it to spy 186 00:12:54,600 --> 00:12:58,720 Speaker 1: on other institutions. Um. They also believe there was a 187 00:12:58,880 --> 00:13:03,760 Speaker 1: genuine spiracy happening, one that would eventually lead to the 188 00:13:03,800 --> 00:13:08,640 Speaker 1: death of the journalists that you mentioned, Ben, Danny Castelaro, 189 00:13:09,000 --> 00:13:10,839 Speaker 1: Can we pause here for a moment and just talk 190 00:13:10,880 --> 00:13:13,959 Speaker 1: about the potential What could a state actor use this 191 00:13:14,080 --> 00:13:17,640 Speaker 1: software for? Right, And we're talking about spying. So it's 192 00:13:17,679 --> 00:13:20,760 Speaker 1: collecting the data in this case in the United States 193 00:13:20,800 --> 00:13:24,600 Speaker 1: for the Department of Justice. That's a lot of information. Right. 194 00:13:24,880 --> 00:13:27,760 Speaker 1: That's people who are who have cases against them, that's 195 00:13:27,800 --> 00:13:31,920 Speaker 1: people who are prosecuting those cases. That's everybody involved in 196 00:13:31,960 --> 00:13:34,640 Speaker 1: the process. I'm assuming it's a ton of documentation on 197 00:13:34,679 --> 00:13:38,320 Speaker 1: each one of those cases, on individuals and you know, 198 00:13:38,400 --> 00:13:45,640 Speaker 1: companies and agencies, government agencies. Uh. If that software was available, 199 00:13:45,720 --> 00:13:49,199 Speaker 1: let's say in a different country, Uh, let's just throw 200 00:13:49,240 --> 00:13:51,840 Speaker 1: it out there, like Iran in this time. Right. If 201 00:13:51,880 --> 00:13:54,400 Speaker 1: Iran had this software and they were using it for 202 00:13:54,480 --> 00:13:58,880 Speaker 1: their own judicial system in their Department of Justice, and 203 00:13:58,920 --> 00:14:01,320 Speaker 1: then the US or somebody else had a back door 204 00:14:01,360 --> 00:14:05,440 Speaker 1: into that system, they could see everything that was happening 205 00:14:05,760 --> 00:14:09,960 Speaker 1: at the law's highest echelons in that country echelon, oh echelon. 206 00:14:11,400 --> 00:14:14,360 Speaker 1: But I mean that could be a serious weapon for 207 00:14:14,400 --> 00:14:21,840 Speaker 1: an intelligence agency or for just a country's external security services. Yeah, 208 00:14:21,920 --> 00:14:26,520 Speaker 1: the potential is there. There's also given that visibility, there's 209 00:14:26,640 --> 00:14:30,160 Speaker 1: also the ability to make a hefty profit in and 210 00:14:30,360 --> 00:14:35,120 Speaker 1: off the book's way. Like so another I was trying 211 00:14:35,160 --> 00:14:38,600 Speaker 1: to think of a good comparison, right, because most people 212 00:14:38,960 --> 00:14:43,240 Speaker 1: listening to this show are not high level state intelligence 213 00:14:43,720 --> 00:14:51,160 Speaker 1: entities nor global financial institutions. So imagine it this way. Um, 214 00:14:51,320 --> 00:14:54,680 Speaker 1: imagine you know, like a phone is a terrible example. 215 00:14:55,000 --> 00:14:57,840 Speaker 1: Imagine you have a car. You need a key for 216 00:14:57,920 --> 00:14:59,920 Speaker 1: your car, and there are only one or two come 217 00:15:00,000 --> 00:15:03,320 Speaker 1: Benese that make car keys, right, so you buy from 218 00:15:03,360 --> 00:15:05,400 Speaker 1: them so you don't have to build your own car 219 00:15:05,480 --> 00:15:10,040 Speaker 1: key company. And then later you find out that this 220 00:15:10,360 --> 00:15:15,080 Speaker 1: manufacturer of keys has put a little thing into your 221 00:15:15,200 --> 00:15:18,440 Speaker 1: key that lets them know every time you take your 222 00:15:18,440 --> 00:15:21,840 Speaker 1: car somewhere where it goes, what speed you're at, what 223 00:15:22,040 --> 00:15:26,880 Speaker 1: you know your latitude and longitude are. And also it 224 00:15:26,960 --> 00:15:30,720 Speaker 1: can remotely start the car when you're not around. Stuff 225 00:15:30,760 --> 00:15:33,200 Speaker 1: like that, and that that sounds very sci fi, but 226 00:15:33,280 --> 00:15:38,520 Speaker 1: that's essentially the allegation regarding Promise. It's a backdoor into 227 00:15:38,560 --> 00:15:42,200 Speaker 1: the world, and it's under the guise of, hey, here's 228 00:15:42,240 --> 00:15:45,480 Speaker 1: a convenient way to collect all your stuff. You know, 229 00:15:45,600 --> 00:15:48,920 Speaker 1: we'll make us breadsheet for you while we learn everything 230 00:15:49,120 --> 00:15:51,800 Speaker 1: you want to keep secret. And the concept here, at 231 00:15:51,840 --> 00:15:54,920 Speaker 1: least from the perspective of ins law, is that the 232 00:15:55,000 --> 00:15:59,080 Speaker 1: US government in some capacity and or maybe other governments 233 00:15:59,360 --> 00:16:02,200 Speaker 1: have created that back door, like that's what they're saying, 234 00:16:02,680 --> 00:16:07,720 Speaker 1: right And Danny Castilero, as we've established in other episodes 235 00:16:07,760 --> 00:16:12,400 Speaker 1: and videos, Danny Castilero was a journalist and writer who 236 00:16:12,560 --> 00:16:18,840 Speaker 1: was found dead in West Virginia. His wrist have been 237 00:16:18,880 --> 00:16:23,120 Speaker 1: slashed tend to twelve times, is officially ruled a suicide. 238 00:16:23,960 --> 00:16:29,760 Speaker 1: Many people have challenged that official conclusion because he was 239 00:16:29,880 --> 00:16:34,440 Speaker 1: working on a story that he called the Octopus and 240 00:16:34,760 --> 00:16:37,200 Speaker 1: check out check out our previous work on that it 241 00:16:37,440 --> 00:16:41,040 Speaker 1: is a doozy. As a matter of fact, Promise is 242 00:16:41,080 --> 00:16:44,480 Speaker 1: a doozy. The Hamilton's claimed the software was stolen and 243 00:16:44,600 --> 00:16:48,120 Speaker 1: Danny was allegedly going to meet a source about the Octopus. 244 00:16:48,200 --> 00:16:51,440 Speaker 1: By the way, can I just say ten to twelve times. 245 00:16:52,160 --> 00:16:56,840 Speaker 1: How do you explain ten to twelve slashes being self inflicted? Yeah, 246 00:16:56,880 --> 00:16:59,040 Speaker 1: there are a lot of questions if you look at 247 00:16:59,080 --> 00:17:03,360 Speaker 1: the circumstance, as Castolero did appear to leave a suicide note, 248 00:17:03,480 --> 00:17:06,320 Speaker 1: there was no sign of forced entry nor struggled. There 249 00:17:06,400 --> 00:17:09,160 Speaker 1: was also the presence of alcohol in the hotel room 250 00:17:09,160 --> 00:17:14,480 Speaker 1: where it was found, and police, uh police and the 251 00:17:14,520 --> 00:17:18,760 Speaker 1: medical examiners there in Martinsburg did conclude it was a suicide. 252 00:17:19,760 --> 00:17:22,520 Speaker 1: But people think it was close to connecting a lot 253 00:17:22,560 --> 00:17:27,200 Speaker 1: of dots about Promise and how it was seated throughout 254 00:17:27,280 --> 00:17:32,199 Speaker 1: the world, the claim that the Hamilton's have or you know, 255 00:17:32,320 --> 00:17:34,960 Speaker 1: if you believe some of the other narratives out there 256 00:17:35,000 --> 00:17:38,560 Speaker 1: are still all alleged, then they will say that this 257 00:17:38,600 --> 00:17:40,920 Speaker 1: stuff was taken by the d o J the new 258 00:17:41,040 --> 00:17:46,120 Speaker 1: version of Promise, and a guy named Earl Bryan, who 259 00:17:46,320 --> 00:17:51,160 Speaker 1: was an envoy to Iran under the Reagan and then 260 00:17:51,359 --> 00:17:56,040 Speaker 1: the hw Bush administration weaponized it or oversaw it being 261 00:17:56,160 --> 00:18:00,720 Speaker 1: bugged to create that backdoor. They started selling it to 262 00:18:01,080 --> 00:18:07,040 Speaker 1: all sorts of folks. Another person the Hamilton's and various 263 00:18:07,119 --> 00:18:10,440 Speaker 1: journalists alleged was involved with this theft is a guy 264 00:18:10,560 --> 00:18:15,560 Speaker 1: named Rafi Etat, who was at the time the director 265 00:18:15,840 --> 00:18:20,199 Speaker 1: of the Israeli intelligence agency La Him or l A 266 00:18:20,359 --> 00:18:25,840 Speaker 1: K E. M. So the ideas they distributed this stuff 267 00:18:25,880 --> 00:18:30,040 Speaker 1: after they took it two allies to enemies alike throughout 268 00:18:30,040 --> 00:18:33,840 Speaker 1: the world via different proxies, sometimes direct, you know, and 269 00:18:33,880 --> 00:18:39,879 Speaker 1: then sometimes not so direct. And this had what's called 270 00:18:39,960 --> 00:18:46,240 Speaker 1: sig and signals intelligence surveillance technology that US and Israeli 271 00:18:46,280 --> 00:18:50,879 Speaker 1: intelligence services could access in a way that didn't allow 272 00:18:50,920 --> 00:18:53,120 Speaker 1: them to be caught. You wouldn't It would be very 273 00:18:53,160 --> 00:18:56,640 Speaker 1: difficult for you to know that someone was sneaking in 274 00:18:56,720 --> 00:19:00,480 Speaker 1: through the kitchen window essentially. And we say US and 275 00:19:00,560 --> 00:19:05,320 Speaker 1: Israeli because those are the two intelligence organizations that are 276 00:19:05,359 --> 00:19:09,600 Speaker 1: most often accused of this. Again, a lot of this 277 00:19:09,800 --> 00:19:12,640 Speaker 1: is alleged, but we are going to talk about some 278 00:19:12,680 --> 00:19:17,240 Speaker 1: connections here, some strange connections that it was Connor that 279 00:19:17,280 --> 00:19:19,680 Speaker 1: brought them to to my eyes at least, I think 280 00:19:19,680 --> 00:19:22,919 Speaker 1: to everybody here, right, Connor Connor made me aware of 281 00:19:22,920 --> 00:19:27,600 Speaker 1: the situation regarding a lot of the Israeli intelligence information. 282 00:19:28,240 --> 00:19:30,400 Speaker 1: And it's do can we shout out? Is it okay 283 00:19:30,400 --> 00:19:33,640 Speaker 1: if we shout out muck rock? Oh? Yeah, of course, Yeah, 284 00:19:33,760 --> 00:19:37,080 Speaker 1: muck Rock and the excellent work by the journalist Emma 285 00:19:37,320 --> 00:19:40,320 Speaker 1: north Best. Yeah, muck Rock is a really interesting model. 286 00:19:40,359 --> 00:19:43,000 Speaker 1: We were talking about this off air. Oh yeah, it's 287 00:19:43,040 --> 00:19:44,800 Speaker 1: super cool. I I didn't know much about it. We've 288 00:19:44,800 --> 00:19:47,320 Speaker 1: looked at muck Rock articles before because it's one of 289 00:19:47,359 --> 00:19:52,400 Speaker 1: the best places to find like the government documents through 290 00:19:52,560 --> 00:19:57,040 Speaker 1: FOIA requests, because the website is just it's filled with them. 291 00:19:57,160 --> 00:20:02,000 Speaker 1: And this person, Emma Northwest, found so many documents regarding 292 00:20:02,000 --> 00:20:06,400 Speaker 1: the Promise software and Insulaw affair and Danny Cassolero. So 293 00:20:06,680 --> 00:20:09,240 Speaker 1: kudos to you if you're out there listening. M a 294 00:20:09,440 --> 00:20:13,760 Speaker 1: nice work. Yeah, a lot got in the trenches on 295 00:20:13,840 --> 00:20:17,160 Speaker 1: the foias, you know, the Freedom of Information Act request 296 00:20:18,040 --> 00:20:20,480 Speaker 1: and we looked at this, we looked at the work 297 00:20:20,520 --> 00:20:26,200 Speaker 1: of other authors and journalists and here's the primary narrative 298 00:20:26,640 --> 00:20:31,119 Speaker 1: or the private primary allegations. So this theft and this 299 00:20:31,280 --> 00:20:35,200 Speaker 1: con job is apparently done through a company that Earl 300 00:20:35,280 --> 00:20:41,800 Speaker 1: Brian controls company named Hadron, and another company called Systematics Inc. 301 00:20:42,200 --> 00:20:47,560 Speaker 1: Again kind of an innoguous name, suspiciously so uh, Systematics Inc. 302 00:20:47,640 --> 00:20:51,520 Speaker 1: Is run by a guy named Jackson Stevens. And there's 303 00:20:51,520 --> 00:20:55,680 Speaker 1: another company called deag him. We're not native speakers here, 304 00:20:55,680 --> 00:20:59,040 Speaker 1: but that's spelled d E g e M. It is 305 00:20:59,160 --> 00:21:03,119 Speaker 1: run by guy named Robert Maxwell, who was famous in 306 00:21:03,119 --> 00:21:07,240 Speaker 1: the conspiracy world for several things, for being the father 307 00:21:07,320 --> 00:21:13,400 Speaker 1: of Galaine, Maxwell, for being heavily linked to Massad and 308 00:21:13,680 --> 00:21:18,800 Speaker 1: uh spycraft excuse me, tradecraft, and also being a media mogul, 309 00:21:19,640 --> 00:21:24,639 Speaker 1: and for the very suspicious circumstances surrounding his untimely death. 310 00:21:25,240 --> 00:21:27,840 Speaker 1: He's got a lot going on. He's got a lot, 311 00:21:28,119 --> 00:21:30,879 Speaker 1: He's got a lot, and he is an episode of 312 00:21:30,920 --> 00:21:34,320 Speaker 1: his own. Basically, what we're doing here is we're kind 313 00:21:34,320 --> 00:21:37,240 Speaker 1: of going down a rabbit hole, but it's like a 314 00:21:37,240 --> 00:21:40,919 Speaker 1: a rabbit hole with a lot of capillary holes associated, 315 00:21:40,960 --> 00:21:46,680 Speaker 1: so we're walking by a lot of other rabbit holes. Yeah, yeah, 316 00:21:46,760 --> 00:21:49,639 Speaker 1: Just so that's why we're saying this might be uh 317 00:21:49,800 --> 00:21:51,800 Speaker 1: the beginning of a series, you know. As a matter 318 00:21:51,800 --> 00:21:53,840 Speaker 1: of fact, I hope no way it takes this idea. 319 00:21:53,840 --> 00:21:55,520 Speaker 1: I want to do a long form show on this. 320 00:21:55,720 --> 00:21:58,320 Speaker 1: I just might have to. I'm into it too deep 321 00:21:58,880 --> 00:22:04,160 Speaker 1: for the war is we're gonna exercise these demons? Yes, yes, 322 00:22:04,400 --> 00:22:07,440 Speaker 1: there we go. Let's rope them in as well. Let's 323 00:22:07,480 --> 00:22:13,200 Speaker 1: Rope in ed Lorraine. So there were other companies involved 324 00:22:13,240 --> 00:22:19,640 Speaker 1: with this theft and the illegal selling of this software. Uh. 325 00:22:19,760 --> 00:22:25,200 Speaker 1: There was a letter sent to a guy named William F. Weld, 326 00:22:25,400 --> 00:22:29,879 Speaker 1: who was the United States Assistant Attorney General for the 327 00:22:29,920 --> 00:22:34,679 Speaker 1: Criminal Division, and they said, look, the people who at 328 00:22:34,720 --> 00:22:39,160 Speaker 1: this letter said, look, this stuff is going wild. It's 329 00:22:39,160 --> 00:22:42,480 Speaker 1: been sold to some folks. Uh, and you might not 330 00:22:42,640 --> 00:22:46,440 Speaker 1: want these folks having these capabilities. One of the one 331 00:22:46,480 --> 00:22:52,760 Speaker 1: of the most notorious alleged um recipients of promise. It's 332 00:22:52,760 --> 00:22:57,119 Speaker 1: a guy named Khalid bin Muffles, who was his past 333 00:22:57,240 --> 00:23:00,600 Speaker 1: now died in two thousand nine, a Saudi Arabian billionaire 334 00:23:01,200 --> 00:23:05,920 Speaker 1: and former chairman of the National Commercial Bank. Uh. This 335 00:23:07,320 --> 00:23:10,879 Speaker 1: dude powerful man in the world of finance. Do we 336 00:23:10,920 --> 00:23:14,240 Speaker 1: even bring up? Uh, what's his name? Maxwell allegedly had 337 00:23:14,240 --> 00:23:18,840 Speaker 1: ties to the Soviet Union as well Business times. M Yes, 338 00:23:18,960 --> 00:23:22,520 Speaker 1: come on all of these time. Okay, okay, all right, 339 00:23:22,600 --> 00:23:26,040 Speaker 1: all right, I'm gonna confuse everybody. I do apologize. I 340 00:23:26,040 --> 00:23:27,800 Speaker 1: didn't mean to take it back to Maxwell. It's just 341 00:23:28,000 --> 00:23:30,919 Speaker 1: as we're all noting here, this does get really confusing, 342 00:23:31,080 --> 00:23:33,160 Speaker 1: and you may have to, you know, do that old 343 00:23:33,680 --> 00:23:36,720 Speaker 1: back fifteen seconds thing a couple of times. But don't worry. 344 00:23:36,800 --> 00:23:39,199 Speaker 1: That's okay, You're all the information is going to be 345 00:23:39,200 --> 00:23:43,320 Speaker 1: in here. M hmm. Yeah. And honestly, I think you 346 00:23:43,359 --> 00:23:46,400 Speaker 1: have to. But if if this becomes a long form 347 00:23:46,440 --> 00:23:49,040 Speaker 1: podcast just on this, you know, like if they're a 348 00:23:49,119 --> 00:23:52,320 Speaker 1: dozen episodes and whatever, even just eight, we could probably 349 00:23:52,359 --> 00:23:54,800 Speaker 1: do it in eight. Then it's gonna need to have 350 00:23:55,040 --> 00:23:59,439 Speaker 1: a play along at home board, you know, so we 351 00:23:59,480 --> 00:24:03,199 Speaker 1: could all map this together. I am so not kidding. 352 00:24:03,640 --> 00:24:09,000 Speaker 1: This should be done. Let's write another book first, they 353 00:24:09,480 --> 00:24:12,240 Speaker 1: then release the podcast, so you have both together while 354 00:24:12,320 --> 00:24:16,840 Speaker 1: you I like to play along at home things help 355 00:24:16,880 --> 00:24:19,960 Speaker 1: to do more of that. Uh So you see, al righty, 356 00:24:20,040 --> 00:24:23,040 Speaker 1: this is getting This is getting dirty, folks. And to 357 00:24:23,119 --> 00:24:25,359 Speaker 1: be completely candid, I want to be careful how I 358 00:24:25,480 --> 00:24:32,280 Speaker 1: say this. In general, it is surprising how past a 359 00:24:32,320 --> 00:24:37,639 Speaker 1: certain threshold right of prestige, past a certain level of 360 00:24:37,800 --> 00:24:43,879 Speaker 1: rarefied air, things like intelligence agencies and spying, and the 361 00:24:43,920 --> 00:24:47,600 Speaker 1: world of finance and private industry and the world of government, 362 00:24:48,200 --> 00:24:51,240 Speaker 1: they all start to meld together. It really is. You know, 363 00:24:51,280 --> 00:24:53,560 Speaker 1: we've used this example so many times in the past, 364 00:24:53,640 --> 00:24:57,960 Speaker 1: but someone's just holding up one finger or two fingers 365 00:24:58,400 --> 00:25:00,520 Speaker 1: and you can't see the rest of the frame. They 366 00:25:00,520 --> 00:25:03,320 Speaker 1: look like two separate entities, but if you draw back 367 00:25:04,040 --> 00:25:07,240 Speaker 1: you see the whole hand. Right. They're being sold as 368 00:25:07,280 --> 00:25:12,240 Speaker 1: separate things to you the public, but behind closed doors, 369 00:25:13,000 --> 00:25:15,520 Speaker 1: you'd be surprised how much of a vent diagram there is. 370 00:25:16,600 --> 00:25:20,239 Speaker 1: I think we all are and have been continually. So 371 00:25:20,280 --> 00:25:24,440 Speaker 1: then if this promise software does what it's purported to do, right, 372 00:25:24,560 --> 00:25:28,879 Speaker 1: have that backdoor into other countries judicial and intelligence systems. 373 00:25:29,400 --> 00:25:32,280 Speaker 1: That's one thing that's powerful, right, and that would be 374 00:25:32,280 --> 00:25:35,879 Speaker 1: a tool for an intelligence agency or you know, a 375 00:25:35,920 --> 00:25:38,760 Speaker 1: government to use and utilize. And you can see that 376 00:25:38,840 --> 00:25:41,919 Speaker 1: if if it can really do that, that's perfect motivation. 377 00:25:42,320 --> 00:25:47,440 Speaker 1: But another motivation that could exist here is money, right, Yeah, yeah, 378 00:25:47,520 --> 00:25:51,640 Speaker 1: Brian Earl. Brian, the story goes, was out to make 379 00:25:51,680 --> 00:25:55,679 Speaker 1: a profit from this, right, and some of this money 380 00:25:55,720 --> 00:26:00,359 Speaker 1: could also be funneled into off the book's projects, stuff 381 00:26:00,400 --> 00:26:06,240 Speaker 1: like the Iran Contra scandal. That's another huge allegation there. Uh. 382 00:26:06,440 --> 00:26:10,600 Speaker 1: The idea was that the n s A and other 383 00:26:10,640 --> 00:26:14,760 Speaker 1: intelligence agencies could steal other countries secrets, and if they 384 00:26:14,760 --> 00:26:18,640 Speaker 1: were the operators of this, if they were sloppy or unethical, 385 00:26:18,880 --> 00:26:22,360 Speaker 1: then they could go sell those secrets somewhere else, right, 386 00:26:22,440 --> 00:26:27,160 Speaker 1: do a quid pro quo intelligence trade, or just say hey, 387 00:26:27,320 --> 00:26:29,520 Speaker 1: give me some money and I'll tell you. You You know 388 00:26:29,880 --> 00:26:34,679 Speaker 1: x Y and z uh Maxwell. Robert Maxwell, according to 389 00:26:34,720 --> 00:26:39,200 Speaker 1: the allegations again sold more than maybe more than half 390 00:26:39,200 --> 00:26:44,280 Speaker 1: a billion dollars off these bootleg copies of Promise and 391 00:26:45,640 --> 00:26:47,760 Speaker 1: we get to now we get to the land of 392 00:26:47,800 --> 00:26:52,399 Speaker 1: like sworn Affidavit's how much do you believe these people 393 00:26:52,440 --> 00:26:55,800 Speaker 1: who are claiming firsthand knowledge of this. There's a book 394 00:26:55,800 --> 00:26:58,920 Speaker 1: by a guy named Gordon Thomas. It's called Gideon's Spies, 395 00:26:59,080 --> 00:27:03,159 Speaker 1: The Secret History of Massaud. This is an authorized history 396 00:27:03,160 --> 00:27:06,040 Speaker 1: of Massaud as well, So that's that's very important. It's 397 00:27:06,080 --> 00:27:09,960 Speaker 1: not made as a hit piece. The intelligence Agency Massade 398 00:27:09,960 --> 00:27:15,120 Speaker 1: signed off on the publication in two thousand and This 399 00:27:15,200 --> 00:27:20,720 Speaker 1: is where they talk about rafi Aton, his disclosures regarding 400 00:27:20,800 --> 00:27:24,919 Speaker 1: Earl Brian, regarding what went down with Promise in slaw 401 00:27:25,119 --> 00:27:31,800 Speaker 1: also release their own kind of Charlie Day conspiracy board compilation. 402 00:27:32,600 --> 00:27:34,640 Speaker 1: And I don't want to sound dismissive. They what they 403 00:27:34,640 --> 00:27:37,280 Speaker 1: did is they connected a ton of dots. This is 404 00:27:37,320 --> 00:27:40,840 Speaker 1: a memo that's forty five pages long, and it really 405 00:27:40,880 --> 00:27:45,359 Speaker 1: appears to corroborate some big parts of the of the 406 00:27:45,440 --> 00:27:49,359 Speaker 1: overall narrative if it's true, if it was what was 407 00:27:49,400 --> 00:27:51,439 Speaker 1: going on, there are I mean, there are just a 408 00:27:51,440 --> 00:27:53,880 Speaker 1: ton of dots and it would maybe look a bit 409 00:27:54,000 --> 00:27:56,320 Speaker 1: nuts if you put it all together and laid it 410 00:27:56,359 --> 00:27:59,399 Speaker 1: out in a forty five page document, which is not 411 00:27:59,560 --> 00:28:05,680 Speaker 1: great for law because they don't hate look great either way. Yeah, 412 00:28:05,760 --> 00:28:08,160 Speaker 1: I mean, let's let's talk maybe a little bit about 413 00:28:08,200 --> 00:28:14,760 Speaker 1: how the theft allegedly occurred. So there's Bill Hamilton's and 414 00:28:14,800 --> 00:28:17,560 Speaker 1: there's a guy named Dean Meryl who was vice president 415 00:28:17,560 --> 00:28:21,399 Speaker 1: of Inns Law for a time, and they they had 416 00:28:21,440 --> 00:28:25,959 Speaker 1: a weird um true crime moment. They were identifying some 417 00:28:26,040 --> 00:28:29,760 Speaker 1: photographs and they claimed they had been visited by a 418 00:28:29,800 --> 00:28:33,840 Speaker 1: man calling himself Dr Ben or that's the last name, 419 00:28:34,600 --> 00:28:40,320 Speaker 1: be Ben dash O r Rh. It's a last name. 420 00:28:40,320 --> 00:28:44,880 Speaker 1: He can't you know, anything goes when its last names, 421 00:28:44,880 --> 00:28:48,640 Speaker 1: Like when you meet a Frederick or a fred you know, 422 00:28:50,160 --> 00:28:53,600 Speaker 1: I wish to see the face mets making. So. Uh 423 00:28:53,880 --> 00:28:58,240 Speaker 1: So this guy claims to be a prosecutor from the 424 00:28:58,320 --> 00:29:02,680 Speaker 1: Nation of Israel and says, hey, I'm really impressed with promise, 425 00:29:03,720 --> 00:29:07,000 Speaker 1: especially this new souped up thirty two bit version you have. 426 00:29:07,840 --> 00:29:12,000 Speaker 1: But this guy doesn't buy anything that day. He never 427 00:29:12,040 --> 00:29:15,960 Speaker 1: comes back, and no one knows why at the time. 428 00:29:16,360 --> 00:29:19,080 Speaker 1: Like if you've ever worked in sales, whether you're selling 429 00:29:19,360 --> 00:29:23,120 Speaker 1: cars or computers, you know, sometimes people walk in, they 430 00:29:23,120 --> 00:29:26,080 Speaker 1: look around, and then they leave. You know, they might 431 00:29:26,080 --> 00:29:29,400 Speaker 1: come back, they might not. So that's what they're thinking. Uh, 432 00:29:30,360 --> 00:29:35,560 Speaker 1: until later this all lines up because they recognize a 433 00:29:35,680 --> 00:29:40,240 Speaker 1: second guy from a photograph and he looks like or 434 00:29:41,520 --> 00:29:44,040 Speaker 1: but that's not the name he's identified by when they 435 00:29:44,040 --> 00:29:49,200 Speaker 1: see this photograph. It's a ruff eaton. Remember the guy 436 00:29:49,240 --> 00:29:53,800 Speaker 1: in charge of this Israeli intelligence services, isn't that fun? Yeah? 437 00:29:54,080 --> 00:29:56,560 Speaker 1: He was in charge of these Reeli Defense Forces Anti 438 00:29:56,720 --> 00:30:03,120 Speaker 1: terrorism intelligence unit. Yeah, so you know, uh getting information 439 00:30:03,440 --> 00:30:09,800 Speaker 1: on terrorist activities and uh attempting to prevent those sorts 440 00:30:09,800 --> 00:30:15,240 Speaker 1: of activities from taking place. Right. Anti terrorism units are 441 00:30:15,280 --> 00:30:21,480 Speaker 1: all about prediction and prevention ideally, And the d o 442 00:30:21,600 --> 00:30:26,320 Speaker 1: J apparently sends him over to look at this property 443 00:30:26,840 --> 00:30:30,000 Speaker 1: that the ens law folks say they're planning to steal. 444 00:30:30,120 --> 00:30:33,400 Speaker 1: They think d o J factions are already planning to 445 00:30:33,480 --> 00:30:38,240 Speaker 1: do a heist on this and Utah and apparently likes 446 00:30:38,240 --> 00:30:40,960 Speaker 1: what he sees. We do know that d o J 447 00:30:41,240 --> 00:30:46,920 Speaker 1: documents record someone calling themselves Dr Ben Or leaving the 448 00:30:46,960 --> 00:30:51,680 Speaker 1: Department of Justice on May six with a copy of 449 00:30:51,760 --> 00:30:58,640 Speaker 1: promise on his person on a computer tape. Remember right, right, 450 00:30:58,720 --> 00:31:03,000 Speaker 1: right right no USBs. So, according to federal court documents, 451 00:31:03,040 --> 00:31:07,880 Speaker 1: promise was actually stolen uh from inslaw Um by the 452 00:31:07,920 --> 00:31:13,640 Speaker 1: Department of Justice directly after Eton's nineteen three visits to 453 00:31:13,960 --> 00:31:20,000 Speaker 1: inns law Um. The later Congressional investigation preferred to use 454 00:31:20,160 --> 00:31:26,960 Speaker 1: the word misappropriated. It's a fun one, um spend much anybody, uh, 455 00:31:27,000 --> 00:31:31,120 Speaker 1: And according to sworn Affid, David's promise was then given 456 00:31:31,240 --> 00:31:34,720 Speaker 1: or sold at a profit to Israel and as many 457 00:31:34,760 --> 00:31:39,240 Speaker 1: as eighty other countries by Dr Earl W. Bryan, a 458 00:31:39,320 --> 00:31:43,640 Speaker 1: man with very close personal ties in business too, then 459 00:31:44,080 --> 00:31:54,280 Speaker 1: President Ronald Reagan and then Presidential counsel Edwin mee Man. 460 00:31:55,000 --> 00:31:57,760 Speaker 1: Rabbit Holes upon rabbit holes. Well, yeah, and unless you 461 00:31:57,800 --> 00:32:02,080 Speaker 1: think we're just pulling this from random weird websites or 462 00:32:02,120 --> 00:32:04,960 Speaker 1: someone just writing about this having an opinion, this comes 463 00:32:05,040 --> 00:32:09,240 Speaker 1: from Wired, right Ben. Yeah, Yeah, this there's uh, there's 464 00:32:09,240 --> 00:32:14,360 Speaker 1: a great series of articles by the journalist Richard L. Fricker, 465 00:32:15,040 --> 00:32:18,120 Speaker 1: you can find well. One of the articles is the 466 00:32:18,160 --> 00:32:23,040 Speaker 1: in slaw Octopus. This is from So again, the story 467 00:32:23,080 --> 00:32:26,360 Speaker 1: doesn't get a lot of scrutiny in the public eye, 468 00:32:26,720 --> 00:32:30,040 Speaker 1: but it's important to know that there are people who 469 00:32:30,280 --> 00:32:35,360 Speaker 1: have gone into the trenches deep to figure this stuff 470 00:32:35,400 --> 00:32:40,520 Speaker 1: out with Foy your request with interviews, even when the 471 00:32:40,640 --> 00:32:43,880 Speaker 1: sources themselves are saying, here's what I know what happened. 472 00:32:44,600 --> 00:32:47,200 Speaker 1: I may not be able to prove it to your satisfaction. 473 00:32:47,840 --> 00:32:50,440 Speaker 1: So yeah, in New York Times is writing about this 474 00:32:50,480 --> 00:32:53,120 Speaker 1: as well. Why don't we take a quick break here 475 00:32:53,160 --> 00:32:56,160 Speaker 1: from sponsor, come back and just talk more about the 476 00:32:57,040 --> 00:32:59,239 Speaker 1: more recent reporting on this stuff, people who have been 477 00:32:59,240 --> 00:33:08,480 Speaker 1: looking into it, and we're back. So, as we said, 478 00:33:09,000 --> 00:33:12,120 Speaker 1: people have been connecting some troubling dots and making some 479 00:33:12,240 --> 00:33:17,040 Speaker 1: serious allegations, linking promise to everything from the Iran contrast 480 00:33:17,080 --> 00:33:23,000 Speaker 1: scandal to terroristic activities you name it, right up to 481 00:33:23,120 --> 00:33:26,720 Speaker 1: including Epstein activities. By the way, where did his money 482 00:33:26,720 --> 00:33:31,400 Speaker 1: come from? Right? And there's one book that got a 483 00:33:31,440 --> 00:33:33,440 Speaker 1: great right up in the New York Times called The 484 00:33:33,560 --> 00:33:37,440 Speaker 1: Eye of Washington. It's published by It was written by 485 00:33:37,600 --> 00:33:43,240 Speaker 1: two French investigative journalists, and they claim that Promise was 486 00:33:43,360 --> 00:33:49,120 Speaker 1: stolen and that the US Justice Department created a conspiracy. 487 00:33:49,160 --> 00:33:54,600 Speaker 1: They conspired to pull a wide scale cover up of 488 00:33:54,640 --> 00:33:58,240 Speaker 1: what happened. And they further alleged that this went past 489 00:33:58,920 --> 00:34:03,040 Speaker 1: you know, political lines. This went past you know, um 490 00:34:03,200 --> 00:34:09,520 Speaker 1: Reagan Republicanism, past Clinton Democrats stuff. The New York Times 491 00:34:09,560 --> 00:34:13,120 Speaker 1: put it this way. They're quoting one of the authors, 492 00:34:13,160 --> 00:34:18,239 Speaker 1: Fabrizio Calvy. Quote. According to Calvi, the real news in 493 00:34:18,280 --> 00:34:21,880 Speaker 1: his book is the revelation that the National Security Administration 494 00:34:22,040 --> 00:34:25,600 Speaker 1: the n s A has been seeding computers abroad with 495 00:34:25,760 --> 00:34:31,640 Speaker 1: Promise embedded smart chips smart standing for systems management automated 496 00:34:31,719 --> 00:34:36,640 Speaker 1: reasoning tools. Their code named Petrie p E t r 497 00:34:36,719 --> 00:34:41,480 Speaker 1: i E. They're capable of covertly downloading data and transmitting 498 00:34:41,520 --> 00:34:45,840 Speaker 1: it using electrical wiring as an antenna to U S 499 00:34:45,880 --> 00:34:51,799 Speaker 1: intelligence satellites. What hence the book's cover blurb quote, the 500 00:34:51,920 --> 00:34:57,800 Speaker 1: vastest espionage operation of this end of the century. Who 501 00:34:58,760 --> 00:35:03,000 Speaker 1: bold claim, but seemingly accurate given what we already know 502 00:35:03,239 --> 00:35:07,160 Speaker 1: just thus far. Well, I mean, think about that concept. 503 00:35:07,440 --> 00:35:10,440 Speaker 1: D n s A is giving these chips out, the 504 00:35:10,600 --> 00:35:14,680 Speaker 1: smart chips that can do this transmitting to a satellite 505 00:35:14,719 --> 00:35:20,640 Speaker 1: just from the chip itself. That's nuts, yeah, nuts and bananas, 506 00:35:21,320 --> 00:35:23,320 Speaker 1: and it goes, it goes further. We have to remember 507 00:35:23,400 --> 00:35:27,399 Speaker 1: this is also during the heavy days of the Cold War, 508 00:35:28,120 --> 00:35:32,600 Speaker 1: and you were called we earlier said that the US 509 00:35:32,680 --> 00:35:38,520 Speaker 1: and various US factions aren't always selling this openly, as 510 00:35:38,560 --> 00:35:43,280 Speaker 1: in they're not always being identified as the source. Instead, 511 00:35:43,280 --> 00:35:46,560 Speaker 1: they're going through proxies. So if you want to put 512 00:35:46,600 --> 00:35:51,120 Speaker 1: your ears on your geo political nemesis, the Soviet Union, 513 00:35:51,800 --> 00:35:54,320 Speaker 1: you can't come to them. And you're like, hey, guys, 514 00:35:54,360 --> 00:35:57,640 Speaker 1: this is me Johnny blue Jeans from the CIA. You 515 00:35:57,719 --> 00:36:00,960 Speaker 1: want to buy some chips? I love I love that 516 00:36:01,040 --> 00:36:04,880 Speaker 1: concept though, just like, hey, we've got chips. They're cheap 517 00:36:05,800 --> 00:36:09,160 Speaker 1: and they're smart, we have an acronym and everything. You 518 00:36:09,200 --> 00:36:12,120 Speaker 1: guys are going, this one's a spicy chip. Well yeah, 519 00:36:12,200 --> 00:36:14,080 Speaker 1: So so what you do is you go you get 520 00:36:14,080 --> 00:36:16,440 Speaker 1: a company, a third party company to do it that 521 00:36:16,920 --> 00:36:19,560 Speaker 1: doesn't seem to be connected to you in any way. Yep. 522 00:36:19,880 --> 00:36:23,759 Speaker 1: And that's where Robert Maxwell, who was so extra, as 523 00:36:23,800 --> 00:36:27,480 Speaker 1: we said, shows up in this story again. He is 524 00:36:28,120 --> 00:36:32,840 Speaker 1: allegedly the liaison for the US to sell a bugged 525 00:36:33,400 --> 00:36:37,919 Speaker 1: version of promise to the Soviet government. And according to 526 00:36:37,960 --> 00:36:43,120 Speaker 1: this this book from these authors, uh Israel knew about this, 527 00:36:44,320 --> 00:36:48,320 Speaker 1: and their knowledge about this was something that they used 528 00:36:48,320 --> 00:36:53,800 Speaker 1: to leverage the US to pressure the US two stop 529 00:36:53,920 --> 00:36:58,959 Speaker 1: shipping arms to Iraq before the Gulf War. They said, look, 530 00:36:59,760 --> 00:37:01,880 Speaker 1: if you if we can't get on the same page 531 00:37:01,880 --> 00:37:05,279 Speaker 1: about this Johnny Blue jeans, then we're gonna tell the 532 00:37:05,360 --> 00:37:10,680 Speaker 1: Russians that we know all about your precious back door. Uh. 533 00:37:10,920 --> 00:37:14,320 Speaker 1: The U S, as history would prove, called that bluff 534 00:37:15,239 --> 00:37:20,319 Speaker 1: to their detriment. Uh. And they quote people here, there's 535 00:37:20,360 --> 00:37:25,239 Speaker 1: another guy named Ari ben manashe Uh, this is um. 536 00:37:25,719 --> 00:37:28,480 Speaker 1: This guy could also be his own episode. Frequently. He 537 00:37:28,600 --> 00:37:34,160 Speaker 1: told these authors that in the Soviets did get worried 538 00:37:34,160 --> 00:37:38,440 Speaker 1: about what was going down, and they shut down all 539 00:37:38,480 --> 00:37:41,120 Speaker 1: of the computers and the g r U that's the 540 00:37:41,120 --> 00:37:44,400 Speaker 1: Soviets by agency at the time, for an entire week. 541 00:37:44,920 --> 00:37:50,160 Speaker 1: They said, we're bugged, you know, shut it down. What 542 00:37:50,239 --> 00:37:53,720 Speaker 1: else could you do? You know, especially if you don't 543 00:37:53,800 --> 00:37:57,280 Speaker 1: exactly know how everything works, You just know that there's 544 00:37:57,840 --> 00:38:00,200 Speaker 1: there's some holes right your cheddar cheese all of a 545 00:38:00,239 --> 00:38:03,480 Speaker 1: sudden looking a lot like Swiss. Sorry for the food things. 546 00:38:03,800 --> 00:38:08,920 Speaker 1: I'm Hungry Friday International Sandwich tape. By the way, it's 547 00:38:14,360 --> 00:38:18,520 Speaker 1: it's always you guys. There's a firehouse subs down the 548 00:38:18,600 --> 00:38:20,600 Speaker 1: road for me now, and I cannot wait. I'm gonna 549 00:38:20,640 --> 00:38:23,640 Speaker 1: do that right after this. I have a Jersey Mix 550 00:38:24,040 --> 00:38:28,200 Speaker 1: waiting for me. Wend exit the session. I know we 551 00:38:28,280 --> 00:38:30,880 Speaker 1: have to do meetings and stuff after this, but I 552 00:38:31,440 --> 00:38:35,480 Speaker 1: might just take a stroll as well. Uh, this episode 553 00:38:35,560 --> 00:38:37,399 Speaker 1: is not brought to you by quiz Nos, but oh 554 00:38:37,440 --> 00:38:40,600 Speaker 1: how we wish it was. Uh, they're just sandwiches in general. 555 00:38:40,680 --> 00:38:44,719 Speaker 1: Let's just get the concept of sandwiches still exist. I 556 00:38:44,760 --> 00:38:49,040 Speaker 1: don't know, I don't know, weird little little monster things 557 00:38:49,080 --> 00:38:52,080 Speaker 1: that were in the quiz Nos commercials. You can't do this. 558 00:38:54,040 --> 00:38:57,399 Speaker 1: We can't do this right now. There's this is so complicated. 559 00:38:57,520 --> 00:39:03,560 Speaker 1: I'm a sandwiches now, Okay, yeah, well just explained the 560 00:39:03,600 --> 00:39:06,640 Speaker 1: complicated with Just use more sandwich metaphors please, Okay, yeah, yeah, 561 00:39:06,640 --> 00:39:09,120 Speaker 1: I got you all right, So as it can. If 562 00:39:09,280 --> 00:39:13,239 Speaker 1: conspiracies are sandwiches promises a dagwood sandwich. You know what 563 00:39:13,680 --> 00:39:15,839 Speaker 1: it's like, easily a foot and a half high. It's 564 00:39:15,880 --> 00:39:18,399 Speaker 1: got a ton of ingredients and you don't know where 565 00:39:18,440 --> 00:39:20,719 Speaker 1: they all come from. Right, So you can't eat it 566 00:39:20,719 --> 00:39:23,160 Speaker 1: in one bite. You can't even take a bite. You 567 00:39:23,200 --> 00:39:25,279 Speaker 1: gotta eat it like like an elephant, you know, one 568 00:39:25,320 --> 00:39:27,880 Speaker 1: piece at a time. Yeah. Yeah, Or it's like one 569 00:39:27,920 --> 00:39:30,880 Speaker 1: of those pastrami samp No. No, we're sick with dagwood. 570 00:39:30,920 --> 00:39:33,440 Speaker 1: We're not bringing cats into this k A t Z. 571 00:39:33,960 --> 00:39:36,600 Speaker 1: So the thing is parts of the U. S Government 572 00:39:37,200 --> 00:39:42,319 Speaker 1: agree with these allegations. Remember, governments are rarely monolithic, even 573 00:39:42,360 --> 00:39:44,520 Speaker 1: if they appear to be. So there's a lot of 574 00:39:44,560 --> 00:39:48,200 Speaker 1: infighting in the North Korean government for instance, right, and 575 00:39:48,239 --> 00:39:51,520 Speaker 1: people often think of that as a monolithic thing. Uh. 576 00:39:52,040 --> 00:39:54,600 Speaker 1: The Congress of the U S has a problem with this. 577 00:39:54,800 --> 00:40:00,439 Speaker 1: House Judiciary Committee releases a report in September. They say 578 00:40:00,480 --> 00:40:04,400 Speaker 1: they have found and confirmed evidence raising quote serious concerns 579 00:40:05,080 --> 00:40:09,040 Speaker 1: that high level officials at the d o J premeditated. 580 00:40:09,120 --> 00:40:11,920 Speaker 1: So they executed a plan that they had thought about 581 00:40:12,719 --> 00:40:19,240 Speaker 1: two take promise from this company in Slaw and destroy 582 00:40:19,440 --> 00:40:23,480 Speaker 1: the company Inslaw. Inslaw was driven into bankruptcy by the way. 583 00:40:24,080 --> 00:40:26,920 Speaker 1: The committee said, we need to have an independent council 584 00:40:27,040 --> 00:40:30,959 Speaker 1: on this, and no one paid attention. That's it, that's 585 00:40:31,280 --> 00:40:34,120 Speaker 1: I mean that's the head, like why why why would 586 00:40:34,120 --> 00:40:37,359 Speaker 1: they just steal this. It's not like it's not like 587 00:40:37,400 --> 00:40:42,799 Speaker 1: the government is necessarily hurting for money, right they if 588 00:40:42,840 --> 00:40:46,080 Speaker 1: they feel there is a strong enough need, the US 589 00:40:46,200 --> 00:40:50,120 Speaker 1: government can and will make it rain. Right, whether we're 590 00:40:50,120 --> 00:40:53,759 Speaker 1: talking weapons, whether we're talking propaganda, whether we're talking about 591 00:40:53,800 --> 00:40:57,239 Speaker 1: cool hard cash, they will do it. But it's weird 592 00:40:57,320 --> 00:41:00,800 Speaker 1: because I'm trying to imagine that that kind of spending 593 00:41:00,800 --> 00:41:04,400 Speaker 1: being on the books, right, somebody's gonna know about that spending, uh, 594 00:41:04,640 --> 00:41:07,919 Speaker 1: in a report somewhere. If you could find a way 595 00:41:07,960 --> 00:41:09,920 Speaker 1: to generate money there was a little more off the 596 00:41:09,920 --> 00:41:13,359 Speaker 1: books for like you were talking about Aron Contra, You're 597 00:41:13,360 --> 00:41:16,240 Speaker 1: gonna do it because you need money, you need funding 598 00:41:16,280 --> 00:41:19,239 Speaker 1: for that kind of stuff. Right, And maybe this is 599 00:41:19,280 --> 00:41:22,359 Speaker 1: even a was viewed and this is Matt talking, this 600 00:41:22,440 --> 00:41:26,839 Speaker 1: is an opinion. Maybe it was viewed as a less 601 00:41:26,920 --> 00:41:30,880 Speaker 1: nefarious way to generate that kind of money, you know, 602 00:41:31,040 --> 00:41:35,279 Speaker 1: rather than helping traffickers or profiting from drugs that were 603 00:41:35,280 --> 00:41:38,960 Speaker 1: being trafficked. Yeah, yeah, you know, And that's that's quite 604 00:41:39,000 --> 00:41:42,200 Speaker 1: possible that that was one of the perspectives, right. Uh, 605 00:41:42,239 --> 00:41:45,440 Speaker 1: there could be a greater good argument as well, you know, 606 00:41:45,480 --> 00:41:49,879 Speaker 1: I can't remember which government official or high mucky muck 607 00:41:49,960 --> 00:41:53,320 Speaker 1: in some kind of global corporation said that they were 608 00:41:53,840 --> 00:41:57,040 Speaker 1: profiting off a thing that they thought was also helping 609 00:41:58,280 --> 00:42:02,200 Speaker 1: the American cause. They and they were asked, well, what 610 00:42:02,200 --> 00:42:04,360 Speaker 1: are you doing? Are you just trying to make a buck? 611 00:42:04,880 --> 00:42:06,920 Speaker 1: Is that your goal? Or is your goal really to 612 00:42:07,680 --> 00:42:10,400 Speaker 1: help make the world a better place? And without missing 613 00:42:10,440 --> 00:42:13,400 Speaker 1: a beat, the guy said, why can't I have both goals? 614 00:42:14,120 --> 00:42:16,880 Speaker 1: Which sounds a little greedy, but you know, we weren't 615 00:42:16,920 --> 00:42:20,520 Speaker 1: at that hearing. So yeah, there are a lot of perspectives, 616 00:42:20,520 --> 00:42:23,759 Speaker 1: a lot of rationalizations, but there are also even more questions. 617 00:42:24,160 --> 00:42:26,840 Speaker 1: And this is where we get toward the end of this. 618 00:42:27,040 --> 00:42:32,879 Speaker 1: So did the government let associates of government officials sell 619 00:42:32,920 --> 00:42:36,319 Speaker 1: this stuff to foreign governments and then use that software 620 00:42:37,320 --> 00:42:42,840 Speaker 1: to track dissidents right and attract money instead of legal cases. 621 00:42:42,920 --> 00:42:47,560 Speaker 1: That's what Promise was originally designed for. Wired again a 622 00:42:47,600 --> 00:42:51,200 Speaker 1: series of excellent articles and Wired uh they noted quote 623 00:42:51,239 --> 00:42:54,800 Speaker 1: each new set of allegations leads to new sets of possibilities, 624 00:42:54,840 --> 00:42:58,800 Speaker 1: which makes the story still more difficult to comprehend. Amen, 625 00:42:58,960 --> 00:43:06,560 Speaker 1: dude a man? So uh. The FBI eventually opens case 626 00:43:06,760 --> 00:43:10,560 Speaker 1: on ins law, the inslaw scandal, the promise affair, and 627 00:43:10,600 --> 00:43:14,840 Speaker 1: it's it's fifty one major case, and they do it 628 00:43:14,880 --> 00:43:17,840 Speaker 1: way after, you know, like they do in the nineties. 629 00:43:18,480 --> 00:43:21,200 Speaker 1: Just for a sense of contexts about what the FBI 630 00:43:21,280 --> 00:43:26,960 Speaker 1: considers major cases. Other things would include Osama bin Laden, 631 00:43:28,160 --> 00:43:31,960 Speaker 1: the events of September eleven two one, the big anthrax 632 00:43:32,040 --> 00:43:36,440 Speaker 1: scare that everybody just sort of forgot about d C 633 00:43:36,600 --> 00:43:42,560 Speaker 1: sniper Oklahoma City bombing be another one. Uh. There was 634 00:43:42,600 --> 00:43:45,799 Speaker 1: a summary sent to the FBI director in two and 635 00:43:45,840 --> 00:43:50,680 Speaker 1: they said, look, we know that in slaw did sign 636 00:43:50,719 --> 00:43:55,360 Speaker 1: a contract. They got nine point nine million dollars in 637 00:43:55,440 --> 00:44:00,040 Speaker 1: eighties money. Two install This stuff and all these of 638 00:44:00,080 --> 00:44:02,960 Speaker 1: an attorney offices goes back when Reagan was on all 639 00:44:02,960 --> 00:44:07,799 Speaker 1: the notes, just like mugging, and it was all the notes. 640 00:44:07,840 --> 00:44:11,560 Speaker 1: Who is a regular Michael McDonald? All right, we gotta 641 00:44:11,640 --> 00:44:13,840 Speaker 1: do it, guys. What is nine point nine million dollars 642 00:44:13,840 --> 00:44:19,040 Speaker 1: in eighties money inflation calculator time. Yes, so it's tripled. 643 00:44:19,040 --> 00:44:24,160 Speaker 1: A hundred dollars is now worth three hundred and seven 644 00:44:24,239 --> 00:44:26,879 Speaker 1: dollars fifty seven cents. So let's say, let's just say 645 00:44:26,880 --> 00:44:30,560 Speaker 1: three a little more. If all those eighties babies had 646 00:44:30,600 --> 00:44:34,799 Speaker 1: just saved you know, their birthday money, and there would 647 00:44:34,800 --> 00:44:36,879 Speaker 1: be there will be running the world at the very 648 00:44:36,960 --> 00:44:39,960 Speaker 1: least they're there their mint condition Masters of the Universe 649 00:44:40,000 --> 00:44:44,480 Speaker 1: action figures. Uh for shame. It's a lot of money, 650 00:44:44,520 --> 00:44:47,440 Speaker 1: But again for an entity as large as the US government, 651 00:44:48,080 --> 00:44:50,960 Speaker 1: that's not money that will break the bank unless it's 652 00:44:51,000 --> 00:44:54,840 Speaker 1: politically convenient to pretend like it will. So the d 653 00:44:54,960 --> 00:44:58,960 Speaker 1: O J would later go on to say, Hey, Promise 654 00:44:59,520 --> 00:45:02,160 Speaker 1: just didn't out the mustard for us. It couldn't keep 655 00:45:02,239 --> 00:45:05,440 Speaker 1: up with all the stuff we needed it to do. However, 656 00:45:06,920 --> 00:45:12,120 Speaker 1: that appears to be um a misappropriation of the truth. 657 00:45:12,640 --> 00:45:16,400 Speaker 1: I promise is still being was still being used, at 658 00:45:16,480 --> 00:45:19,400 Speaker 1: least by parts of the U. S Government, as recently 659 00:45:19,520 --> 00:45:24,040 Speaker 1: is seen in the New Jersey court system. It's like saying, 660 00:45:25,680 --> 00:45:28,319 Speaker 1: I am not going to pay for the sandwich. I 661 00:45:28,400 --> 00:45:34,239 Speaker 1: demand a refund. It was terrible. While you're eating it, right, 662 00:45:34,360 --> 00:45:37,000 Speaker 1: you're at the counter, you're eating it. You're saying it's 663 00:45:37,080 --> 00:45:41,200 Speaker 1: terrible while you finish the sandwich. Okay, well not all 664 00:45:41,239 --> 00:45:43,600 Speaker 1: of these are gonna be winners. Yeah, off the dome 665 00:45:43,640 --> 00:45:49,080 Speaker 1: with this. So uh, how how far did promise get Uh, 666 00:45:49,120 --> 00:45:52,799 Speaker 1: it's been in Ireland. Uh, it's been in the Netherlands. 667 00:45:53,239 --> 00:45:57,439 Speaker 1: Room uses it in their tax office. And honestly it's 668 00:45:57,480 --> 00:46:00,960 Speaker 1: not all illegal use. Promise is being legally used in 669 00:46:01,239 --> 00:46:04,200 Speaker 1: multiple countries around the world. It just gets tricky when 670 00:46:04,239 --> 00:46:08,600 Speaker 1: you ask who's using it illegally, whether to spy on people, 671 00:46:08,760 --> 00:46:13,760 Speaker 1: as the allegations go, or whether just using a bootleg copy. Uh, 672 00:46:13,760 --> 00:46:17,720 Speaker 1: this is only scratching the surface of all the allegations. 673 00:46:17,760 --> 00:46:21,280 Speaker 1: Maybe a quick roll call about this stuff we haven't 674 00:46:21,360 --> 00:46:24,200 Speaker 1: really gotten to, each of which could probably be their 675 00:46:24,200 --> 00:46:28,200 Speaker 1: own episodes. Well, I mean, first of all, definitely Robert Maxwell. 676 00:46:28,560 --> 00:46:31,640 Speaker 1: We mentioned him several times since Connor wrote in, and 677 00:46:31,680 --> 00:46:34,040 Speaker 1: I think it's time to just drill down and do 678 00:46:34,080 --> 00:46:37,719 Speaker 1: a Robert Maxwell episode. Yeah. We also need to talk 679 00:46:37,760 --> 00:46:42,600 Speaker 1: about the allegations that off the books profits from Promise 680 00:46:42,880 --> 00:46:45,880 Speaker 1: somehow made their way to partially fund the operations of 681 00:46:45,960 --> 00:46:50,239 Speaker 1: Jeffrey Epstein. Those are the allegations, right proven maybe through 682 00:46:51,719 --> 00:46:57,440 Speaker 1: maybe Uh Casilero probably need to bring Danny Castolero's story 683 00:46:57,480 --> 00:47:00,279 Speaker 1: back into the mix, and I think we only do. 684 00:47:00,560 --> 00:47:04,160 Speaker 1: We were talking about the strangeness of his you know, 685 00:47:04,239 --> 00:47:08,760 Speaker 1: untimely death. Noal there's something that Emma north Best found 686 00:47:09,480 --> 00:47:12,680 Speaker 1: that I think we could use as like our primary 687 00:47:12,760 --> 00:47:16,160 Speaker 1: fire for that. It was let me just look it up, guys, 688 00:47:16,200 --> 00:47:19,839 Speaker 1: I've gotta right here something that she posted on muck 689 00:47:19,920 --> 00:47:25,880 Speaker 1: Rock Ma titled recently released evidence shows FBI may have 690 00:47:26,000 --> 00:47:32,399 Speaker 1: investigated Danny Cassallero's death through two thousand seventeen. So then 691 00:47:32,480 --> 00:47:37,160 Speaker 1: they would have been despite the official conclusions of the autopsy, 692 00:47:37,320 --> 00:47:41,880 Speaker 1: they would have continued trying to answer some questions, well, 693 00:47:42,040 --> 00:47:45,439 Speaker 1: despite the statements that yeah, there's nothing to see here, 694 00:47:45,520 --> 00:47:47,600 Speaker 1: like literally, it was just we don't need to look 695 00:47:47,640 --> 00:47:50,560 Speaker 1: into this. This is a clear case of suicide. According 696 00:47:50,600 --> 00:47:52,239 Speaker 1: to them, we don't need to look into it. But 697 00:47:52,800 --> 00:47:56,920 Speaker 1: according to these documents, maybe they were. But again it's 698 00:47:57,040 --> 00:48:00,360 Speaker 1: may have investigated, so we need to look into it, agreed. 699 00:48:00,880 --> 00:48:05,200 Speaker 1: And there's even more, you know, the allegations surrounding how, 700 00:48:05,280 --> 00:48:08,840 Speaker 1: when and why various governments or intelligence agencies may have 701 00:48:08,920 --> 00:48:13,359 Speaker 1: weaponized promise against other nations, other institutions. What did they 702 00:48:13,400 --> 00:48:17,440 Speaker 1: do with it? You know what what happened once this 703 00:48:17,600 --> 00:48:21,600 Speaker 1: Pandora's jar was unscrewed upon the world. We want to 704 00:48:21,600 --> 00:48:24,560 Speaker 1: hear your thoughts, folks. We're gonna return to this, but 705 00:48:24,719 --> 00:48:27,960 Speaker 1: in the meantime we want to thank all our fellow 706 00:48:27,960 --> 00:48:31,560 Speaker 1: conspiracy realists. Take a page from Connor's book, Right to 707 00:48:31,640 --> 00:48:34,880 Speaker 1: us with your opinions, right to us, with your perspective. 708 00:48:35,040 --> 00:48:37,600 Speaker 1: We try to be easy to find online. We do. 709 00:48:37,800 --> 00:48:40,400 Speaker 1: You can find us on Facebook, Twitter and YouTube with 710 00:48:40,440 --> 00:48:44,200 Speaker 1: the handle conspiracy Stuff. Keeping on that YouTube space. It's 711 00:48:44,239 --> 00:48:48,439 Speaker 1: gonna be some fun stuff afoot there very soon. Um, 712 00:48:48,600 --> 00:48:53,640 Speaker 1: conspiracy stuff on those platforms. Facebook group, Uh, same deal, 713 00:48:54,160 --> 00:48:58,439 Speaker 1: conspiracy stuff show on Instagram, and there's also fun stuff happening. Um. 714 00:48:58,600 --> 00:49:00,480 Speaker 1: We also have a book, marr. I mean that I 715 00:49:00,480 --> 00:49:03,120 Speaker 1: have mentioned, which you can get an audio or textual 716 00:49:03,200 --> 00:49:07,080 Speaker 1: form anywhere that fine literature is sold. It's called stuff 717 00:49:07,120 --> 00:49:09,439 Speaker 1: they don't want you to know. Give it a read. 718 00:49:09,640 --> 00:49:12,960 Speaker 1: I think you'll enjoy it if you enjoy this show. Um. 719 00:49:13,080 --> 00:49:15,360 Speaker 1: We also have a telephone number. We do have a 720 00:49:15,400 --> 00:49:17,279 Speaker 1: telephone number. But I do want to mention one thing 721 00:49:17,320 --> 00:49:20,120 Speaker 1: on that YouTube channel. If you go over there right now, 722 00:49:20,280 --> 00:49:23,960 Speaker 1: YouTube dot com slash conspiracy Stuff, click on the playlist 723 00:49:24,120 --> 00:49:28,360 Speaker 1: titled Drugs, Wars and Profits. You will find the Danny 724 00:49:28,400 --> 00:49:32,280 Speaker 1: Castelero video and the in slaw Fare video. It's titled 725 00:49:32,520 --> 00:49:37,280 Speaker 1: tentacles of the octopus. And uh, if you do want 726 00:49:37,320 --> 00:49:40,239 Speaker 1: to give us a call, we can't wait to hear 727 00:49:40,280 --> 00:49:42,640 Speaker 1: from you. We have a phone number. It's true. Uh, 728 00:49:42,680 --> 00:49:45,759 Speaker 1: those are not unfounded allegations. That phone number is one 729 00:49:45,840 --> 00:49:48,919 Speaker 1: eight three three st d w y t K. You'll 730 00:49:49,000 --> 00:49:51,040 Speaker 1: hear a voice that lets you know you're in the 731 00:49:51,120 --> 00:49:53,520 Speaker 1: right place. You'll hear a beep like soap beep, and 732 00:49:53,520 --> 00:49:56,480 Speaker 1: then you'll have three minutes go nuts, get weird with it. 733 00:49:56,840 --> 00:49:59,760 Speaker 1: Give yourself a moniker, a code name, a cool nickname. 734 00:50:00,120 --> 00:50:02,280 Speaker 1: Tell us whether or not we can use your message 735 00:50:02,280 --> 00:50:04,799 Speaker 1: and or voice on the air, and most importantly, do 736 00:50:05,000 --> 00:50:08,320 Speaker 1: not censor yourself. If you need more than three minutes 737 00:50:09,040 --> 00:50:11,400 Speaker 1: right to us, give us all the links, take us 738 00:50:11,440 --> 00:50:13,960 Speaker 1: to the edge of the rabbit hole. We will do 739 00:50:14,000 --> 00:50:15,799 Speaker 1: the rest. All you have to do is drop us 740 00:50:15,800 --> 00:50:18,239 Speaker 1: a line at our good old fashioned email address where 741 00:50:18,280 --> 00:50:40,040 Speaker 1: we are conspiracy at iHeart radio dot com. Stuff they 742 00:50:40,080 --> 00:50:41,960 Speaker 1: don't want you to know is a production of I 743 00:50:42,120 --> 00:50:45,200 Speaker 1: heart Radio. For more podcasts from my heart Radio, visit 744 00:50:45,239 --> 00:50:48,000 Speaker 1: the i heart Radio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you 745 00:50:48,040 --> 00:50:49,200 Speaker 1: listen to your favorite shows.