1 00:00:03,200 --> 00:00:07,960 Speaker 1: This is Bloomberg Law with June Brussel from Bloomberg Radio. 2 00:00:09,320 --> 00:00:13,240 Speaker 1: Chief Justice John Roberts has often talked about the independence 3 00:00:13,280 --> 00:00:16,680 Speaker 1: of the judiciary and how partisanship has no place on 4 00:00:16,720 --> 00:00:19,439 Speaker 1: the bench. The best way to do our job is 5 00:00:19,480 --> 00:00:23,840 Speaker 1: to work together in a collegial way. No, I'm not 6 00:00:23,920 --> 00:00:29,400 Speaker 1: talking about mere civility, although that helps. I am instead 7 00:00:29,440 --> 00:00:32,879 Speaker 1: talking about a shared commitment to a genuine exchange of 8 00:00:32,960 --> 00:00:37,200 Speaker 1: ideas and views through each step of the decision process. 9 00:00:38,159 --> 00:00:41,159 Speaker 1: We need to know at each step that we are 10 00:00:41,200 --> 00:00:45,080 Speaker 1: in this together. But a new study shows that federal 11 00:00:45,080 --> 00:00:48,360 Speaker 1: Appeals Court judges may not feel like they're in it 12 00:00:48,479 --> 00:00:52,680 Speaker 1: together when sitting on Bank. It shows a dramatic spike 13 00:00:52,720 --> 00:00:56,320 Speaker 1: in both partisan splits and partisan reversals when all the 14 00:00:56,400 --> 00:00:59,920 Speaker 1: judges on a circuit here a case together. The study 15 00:01:00,040 --> 00:01:03,440 Speaker 1: by Neil Devons and Alison or Lawson, professors at William 16 00:01:03,480 --> 00:01:08,720 Speaker 1: and Mary Law School, is called weaponizing, and Professor Devon's 17 00:01:08,800 --> 00:01:12,240 Speaker 1: joins me, now you'll explain what a review on Bonk is. 18 00:01:12,760 --> 00:01:16,920 Speaker 1: So on bond is where all the judges who sit 19 00:01:17,120 --> 00:01:20,039 Speaker 1: on a circuit of the Federal Court of Appeals here 20 00:01:20,080 --> 00:01:25,000 Speaker 1: are case together, as opposed to what happens almost always, 21 00:01:25,120 --> 00:01:28,480 Speaker 1: which are three judge panels, and on bond is used 22 00:01:28,480 --> 00:01:33,039 Speaker 1: for two types of situations. One is where there's a 23 00:01:33,120 --> 00:01:37,360 Speaker 1: conflict between panels, so you have two groups or three 24 00:01:37,560 --> 00:01:40,959 Speaker 1: who have different views as to what the legal answer is, 25 00:01:41,040 --> 00:01:43,720 Speaker 1: what right, what the right answers to the question, and 26 00:01:43,760 --> 00:01:45,760 Speaker 1: so you have to resolve the conflict so that the 27 00:01:45,800 --> 00:01:48,440 Speaker 1: circuit has a law of the circuit. And then the 28 00:01:48,560 --> 00:01:54,160 Speaker 1: second way that on bond is used is cases of imports, 29 00:01:54,400 --> 00:01:58,760 Speaker 1: so the most important cases, the circuit gets the most consequential, 30 00:01:58,760 --> 00:02:02,600 Speaker 1: the most controversial cases, and that's what the on bond 31 00:02:02,640 --> 00:02:06,360 Speaker 1: process operates as. And it's also very different from other 32 00:02:06,760 --> 00:02:11,200 Speaker 1: situations where you have a reviewing court being higher in 33 00:02:11,280 --> 00:02:13,840 Speaker 1: the hierarchy of courts. So you have the district Court 34 00:02:13,919 --> 00:02:16,000 Speaker 1: is reviewed by the Court of Appeals, is reviewed by 35 00:02:16,000 --> 00:02:18,440 Speaker 1: the U. S. Supreme Court. Each of the three courts 36 00:02:18,520 --> 00:02:22,200 Speaker 1: is a distinctive court with different personnel. On bond is 37 00:02:22,240 --> 00:02:26,840 Speaker 1: a situation where you have the judges who sit on 38 00:02:26,880 --> 00:02:30,280 Speaker 1: the same court reviewing the work of a panel of 39 00:02:30,360 --> 00:02:34,520 Speaker 1: judges from that court, and you actually nullify the panel 40 00:02:34,560 --> 00:02:37,440 Speaker 1: of judges decision and it is thrown out. It's not 41 00:02:37,520 --> 00:02:40,400 Speaker 1: in the federal report or anymore, and instead you get 42 00:02:40,440 --> 00:02:43,320 Speaker 1: a new decision from the on bond court. So it's 43 00:02:43,400 --> 00:02:47,160 Speaker 1: the only instance where the review of a decision is 44 00:02:47,240 --> 00:02:50,640 Speaker 1: done sort of horizontally by the same level of judges 45 00:02:50,680 --> 00:02:53,600 Speaker 1: as opposed to vertically by a higher court. Is that 46 00:02:53,840 --> 00:02:58,040 Speaker 1: sort of awkward to have them reversing what their fellow 47 00:02:58,120 --> 00:03:03,080 Speaker 1: judges have ruled. Yeah, it is very awkward, and that 48 00:03:03,520 --> 00:03:06,400 Speaker 1: is part of the reason that typically Federal Court of 49 00:03:06,440 --> 00:03:09,200 Speaker 1: Appeals judges do not like to hear cases on bonk 50 00:03:09,720 --> 00:03:12,800 Speaker 1: because you were essentially saying to your colleagues, you know, 51 00:03:12,840 --> 00:03:17,200 Speaker 1: the work you did was not satisfactory to all the 52 00:03:17,280 --> 00:03:20,400 Speaker 1: judges who said on this circuit. So that type of 53 00:03:20,440 --> 00:03:24,240 Speaker 1: review has the risk of creating ill will. And so 54 00:03:24,520 --> 00:03:29,680 Speaker 1: issues of collegiality are particularly relevant and on bond because 55 00:03:29,760 --> 00:03:32,960 Speaker 1: it has a group of judges to emphacisely what you said, 56 00:03:33,240 --> 00:03:36,280 Speaker 1: reviewing the handiwork, not of judges on a different court, 57 00:03:36,320 --> 00:03:39,400 Speaker 1: but judges on their court. So why did you decide 58 00:03:39,440 --> 00:03:43,640 Speaker 1: to do this study? Well, as is well known, over 59 00:03:43,840 --> 00:03:47,560 Speaker 1: the past several decades, the parties have drifted further and 60 00:03:47,600 --> 00:03:50,960 Speaker 1: further part from each other. There's a shopper partisan divide 61 00:03:51,000 --> 00:03:55,800 Speaker 1: between Republicans and Democrats now as compared to earlier times 62 00:03:55,880 --> 00:04:02,559 Speaker 1: when Democrats included conservatives southern Democrats and Republicans included progressive 63 00:04:02,680 --> 00:04:06,120 Speaker 1: Northern Rockefeller Republicans. So now we live in the world 64 00:04:06,320 --> 00:04:10,160 Speaker 1: where the party divide is also in ideological divide, and 65 00:04:10,640 --> 00:04:14,520 Speaker 1: starting in particularly with Ronald Reagan, presidents of paid attention 66 00:04:14,560 --> 00:04:17,800 Speaker 1: to ideology and appointing judges and needless to say, as 67 00:04:17,839 --> 00:04:20,320 Speaker 1: we saw with Merrick Garland and the refusal to hold 68 00:04:20,320 --> 00:04:23,920 Speaker 1: hearings from Eric Garland, the end of the silibuster or 69 00:04:24,000 --> 00:04:27,479 Speaker 1: lower court judges when Obama was president and for Supreme 70 00:04:27,520 --> 00:04:31,799 Speaker 1: Court justices when Trump was president. We've seen this intense 71 00:04:32,279 --> 00:04:37,000 Speaker 1: politicization of the appointment and confirmation process as well. So 72 00:04:37,279 --> 00:04:39,280 Speaker 1: we live in a world today with as much more 73 00:04:39,279 --> 00:04:41,920 Speaker 1: of a team mentality, you know, the Democratic team and 74 00:04:41,960 --> 00:04:45,480 Speaker 1: the Republican team, and that there's loyalty to your team 75 00:04:45,960 --> 00:04:48,400 Speaker 1: you see down the world of politics. We see that 76 00:04:48,760 --> 00:04:53,719 Speaker 1: in this personal lives and social media, and so Ali Larson, 77 00:04:53,800 --> 00:04:57,080 Speaker 1: my co author, and I, so it would be useful 78 00:04:57,400 --> 00:05:01,360 Speaker 1: to see whether that full of station has billed over 79 00:05:01,720 --> 00:05:04,320 Speaker 1: to the federal courts of appeals so that the on 80 00:05:04,440 --> 00:05:08,880 Speaker 1: bond process was one where there were increasing use of 81 00:05:08,920 --> 00:05:13,400 Speaker 1: on Bank to have the majority political party on a 82 00:05:13,520 --> 00:05:18,600 Speaker 1: circuit overturned panel decisions from the minority political party. So 83 00:05:18,680 --> 00:05:22,800 Speaker 1: it was on Bank becoming a partisan political weapon, just 84 00:05:23,080 --> 00:05:27,880 Speaker 1: as partisanship has been growing throughout the nation in all 85 00:05:27,960 --> 00:05:31,840 Speaker 1: sorts of ways. So has on Bank been captured this way? 86 00:05:31,920 --> 00:05:35,280 Speaker 1: Has it been transformed this way? So we just wanted 87 00:05:35,279 --> 00:05:39,560 Speaker 1: to look at that, and it has obvious ramifications, did 88 00:05:39,600 --> 00:05:42,120 Speaker 1: not just the decision making of the Federal Court of Appeals, 89 00:05:42,120 --> 00:05:47,719 Speaker 1: but of sort of larger questions regarding the legiality, judicial independence, 90 00:05:48,080 --> 00:05:50,560 Speaker 1: the commitments to the rule of law, the notion that 91 00:05:50,720 --> 00:05:54,520 Speaker 1: judges are above politics. So for all those reasons, we 92 00:05:54,600 --> 00:05:56,440 Speaker 1: thought it would be useful to take a look at 93 00:05:56,480 --> 00:05:59,720 Speaker 1: how on Bank has changed over the years. So tell 94 00:05:59,800 --> 00:06:01,640 Speaker 1: us at about the results of the study that you 95 00:06:01,720 --> 00:06:05,720 Speaker 1: did with Professor Allison Laarson. So what we found was 96 00:06:05,839 --> 00:06:09,640 Speaker 1: reassuring and troubling at the same time. I'll start with 97 00:06:09,680 --> 00:06:12,039 Speaker 1: the reassuring part of what we found and I'll shift 98 00:06:12,040 --> 00:06:16,120 Speaker 1: to the troubling part if that's okay. So, notwithstanding the 99 00:06:16,160 --> 00:06:20,159 Speaker 1: fact that partisanship and ideology start to play a more 100 00:06:20,200 --> 00:06:25,520 Speaker 1: pronounced role. When Ronald Reagan was president, we didn't see 101 00:06:25,680 --> 00:06:30,360 Speaker 1: that impact on bontasis you're making up until the Trump 102 00:06:30,360 --> 00:06:35,040 Speaker 1: era the last three years. So in other words, partisan splits, 103 00:06:35,080 --> 00:06:38,560 Speaker 1: paris and reversals, the notion of a majority party of 104 00:06:38,560 --> 00:06:42,560 Speaker 1: the circuit overturning the decisions of a minority party. We 105 00:06:42,640 --> 00:06:45,680 Speaker 1: didn't see any impact with respect to the wise and 106 00:06:45,720 --> 00:06:51,040 Speaker 1: polonization and partisanship for Monald Reagan through Donald Trump. So 107 00:06:51,160 --> 00:06:56,720 Speaker 1: it seems that values of collegiality, judicial independence, commitments to 108 00:06:56,760 --> 00:06:59,960 Speaker 1: the rule of law, that these values were very strong 109 00:07:00,000 --> 00:07:04,480 Speaker 1: long and even though the judges themselves were further apart 110 00:07:04,560 --> 00:07:09,160 Speaker 1: ideologically the Democratic and Republican appointees, it wasn't filling over 111 00:07:09,240 --> 00:07:13,840 Speaker 1: to on bond up until two thousand eighteen, essentially. But 112 00:07:14,040 --> 00:07:17,880 Speaker 1: during the Trump era, over the last three years two 113 00:07:17,880 --> 00:07:21,480 Speaker 1: thousand and eighteen, two thousand nine, two thousand twenty, we 114 00:07:21,560 --> 00:07:26,240 Speaker 1: saw a dramatic spike up on essentially doubling the number 115 00:07:26,240 --> 00:07:30,000 Speaker 1: of partisans on bond decisions as compared to earlier eras, 116 00:07:30,000 --> 00:07:34,640 Speaker 1: so statistically significant spike up and that obviously is troubling. 117 00:07:35,280 --> 00:07:39,760 Speaker 1: And then the paper considers whether this is a short 118 00:07:39,920 --> 00:07:44,840 Speaker 1: term phenomenon associated with things specific to Donald Trump. There 119 00:07:44,880 --> 00:07:48,600 Speaker 1: are certain cases, like the monuments clause cases, the immigration 120 00:07:48,720 --> 00:07:51,640 Speaker 1: cases that were tied to things that were unique to 121 00:07:51,680 --> 00:07:56,080 Speaker 1: Donald Trump. Or alternatively, whether this spiked up is just 122 00:07:56,480 --> 00:07:59,360 Speaker 1: that the parts and ship is finding the tactic size 123 00:07:59,800 --> 00:08:02,280 Speaker 1: and we now live in this new world of partisanship, 124 00:08:02,760 --> 00:08:05,840 Speaker 1: and on Bond is reflective of that new world, and 125 00:08:05,880 --> 00:08:07,920 Speaker 1: it just took a while to get there, and we 126 00:08:07,960 --> 00:08:10,320 Speaker 1: don't know. We'll find out over the next few years 127 00:08:10,320 --> 00:08:12,560 Speaker 1: what happens. I want to break it down a little bit. 128 00:08:12,600 --> 00:08:15,840 Speaker 1: First of all, how do you define a partisan split 129 00:08:16,320 --> 00:08:19,320 Speaker 1: on an on bank panel? Is it all the Democratic 130 00:08:19,320 --> 00:08:22,520 Speaker 1: appointed judges on one side and all the Republican appointed 131 00:08:22,600 --> 00:08:25,720 Speaker 1: judges on the other? Essentially, yes, we allow for maybe 132 00:08:25,720 --> 00:08:30,520 Speaker 1: one defector, but essentially you have a split where the 133 00:08:30,600 --> 00:08:33,080 Speaker 1: Republicans are on one side, the Democrats are one side. 134 00:08:33,120 --> 00:08:36,320 Speaker 1: Sometimes it's a perfect split, sometimes it's a near perfect split, 135 00:08:36,720 --> 00:08:41,080 Speaker 1: but it's essentially a Democrat Republican split. Both the Democratic 136 00:08:41,120 --> 00:08:46,079 Speaker 1: appointed judges and the Republican judges engaged in this. Yeah, 137 00:08:46,320 --> 00:08:48,880 Speaker 1: one of the things to study. Fine, and I wouldn't 138 00:08:48,880 --> 00:08:51,800 Speaker 1: necessarily say this is heartening, but to say that it's 139 00:08:51,840 --> 00:08:56,359 Speaker 1: not a question of only Republicans are doing this to democrats? 140 00:08:56,400 --> 00:09:00,000 Speaker 1: Are only democrats are doing this two republicans. There are 141 00:09:00,280 --> 00:09:05,479 Speaker 1: circuits where you have a majority democratic circuit that's policing 142 00:09:05,640 --> 00:09:10,240 Speaker 1: Republican panels. So this occurred on the d C Circuit 143 00:09:10,360 --> 00:09:15,480 Speaker 1: in subpoena cases involving Don McGann and Michael Flynn. Occurred 144 00:09:16,000 --> 00:09:19,880 Speaker 1: on the Fourth Circuits, another democratic majority circuit, in cases 145 00:09:19,920 --> 00:09:24,840 Speaker 1: involving emolumous clause. So there are clear examples of democratic 146 00:09:24,920 --> 00:09:29,200 Speaker 1: dominated circuits policing Republican panels. And then there are examples 147 00:09:29,200 --> 00:09:34,160 Speaker 1: in the other direction of Republican dominated circuits apparently policing 148 00:09:34,240 --> 00:09:38,800 Speaker 1: democratic panels. So in the Sixth Circuits, which has a 149 00:09:38,840 --> 00:09:42,680 Speaker 1: majority judges appointed by Republicans, a three judge panel held 150 00:09:42,679 --> 00:09:46,760 Speaker 1: in the fourtune Amendment protected the fundamental rights of basic 151 00:09:46,880 --> 00:09:50,880 Speaker 1: minimum education and that Detroit schools are violating that right. 152 00:09:51,360 --> 00:09:54,760 Speaker 1: And that was a democratic panel. But the Sixth Circuit, 153 00:09:55,000 --> 00:09:59,679 Speaker 1: a Republican circuit, overturned that democratic panel. And then another 154 00:10:00,000 --> 00:10:04,640 Speaker 1: ample was the Eleventh Circuit ruling on bond that this 155 00:10:04,760 --> 00:10:09,160 Speaker 1: concerned fellows voting in Florida, concluding on bonds that fellas 156 00:10:09,240 --> 00:10:12,680 Speaker 1: could not vote up voting in Florida one felons to vote, 157 00:10:12,720 --> 00:10:15,680 Speaker 1: and that was done on bond by a Republican dominated circuits. 158 00:10:16,320 --> 00:10:19,679 Speaker 1: How much of a difference is there in these partisan 159 00:10:19,960 --> 00:10:25,240 Speaker 1: type rulings from before Trump. We studied over sixt eight 160 00:10:25,520 --> 00:10:28,040 Speaker 1: decade period. So we started by looking at on bond 161 00:10:28,120 --> 00:10:30,959 Speaker 1: in the nineteen sixties and then we brought it all 162 00:10:30,960 --> 00:10:33,920 Speaker 1: the way up through and I'll just give you the 163 00:10:34,000 --> 00:10:38,800 Speaker 1: numbers leading up to Trump. So in the decades before Trump, 164 00:10:39,559 --> 00:10:43,319 Speaker 1: it is twenty five percent in eighty six eight, eight 165 00:10:45,080 --> 00:10:51,680 Speaker 1: ninety six to two thousand six two thousand, eight sixteen 166 00:10:51,679 --> 00:10:55,280 Speaker 1: and a half percent two thousand sixteen two thousand seventeen. 167 00:10:55,800 --> 00:10:59,920 Speaker 1: And then with Trump it's thirty five artists in reversal. 168 00:11:00,720 --> 00:11:04,439 Speaker 1: And that's where there's a majority of one party policing 169 00:11:05,080 --> 00:11:07,559 Speaker 1: the panel, which is a majority of the other party, 170 00:11:07,800 --> 00:11:11,280 Speaker 1: and twenty seven percent of the typus list who has 171 00:11:11,320 --> 00:11:15,280 Speaker 1: divided almost perfectly along party lawrence. So it was going 172 00:11:15,400 --> 00:11:20,400 Speaker 1: down until until Trump. Yes, it was going down until Trump. 173 00:11:21,040 --> 00:11:24,960 Speaker 1: Not profoundly, you know, not necessarily statifically significantly down, but 174 00:11:25,200 --> 00:11:30,200 Speaker 1: going down from Reagan until Trump and then doubling with Trump. 175 00:11:31,440 --> 00:11:35,520 Speaker 1: So is that statistically significant? Oh? Yeah, We we checked 176 00:11:35,520 --> 00:11:38,520 Speaker 1: out the spike up and the spike after, and the 177 00:11:38,520 --> 00:11:43,719 Speaker 1: Trump ever was statistically significant. Is this possibly then a 178 00:11:43,840 --> 00:11:47,600 Speaker 1: blip on the screen, a moment in time. Yeah, So 179 00:11:48,000 --> 00:11:50,199 Speaker 1: this is the question we were talking about just a 180 00:11:50,280 --> 00:11:53,880 Speaker 1: second ago. Where some of these cases, like the subpoena 181 00:11:54,000 --> 00:11:59,280 Speaker 1: cases involving Don Again and Michael Flynn, the emoluments claus 182 00:11:59,800 --> 00:12:03,920 Speaker 1: in aegration, many of the on bond cases over the 183 00:12:04,000 --> 00:12:07,839 Speaker 1: last three years involved, for lack of every way, putting 184 00:12:07,840 --> 00:12:14,400 Speaker 1: into Trump dockets. Okay, trump initiatives, either personal or policy initiatives, 185 00:12:14,559 --> 00:12:18,800 Speaker 1: and those cases with a different president will also disappear. 186 00:12:19,559 --> 00:12:23,439 Speaker 1: Whether there will be a Biden docket that will divide 187 00:12:23,880 --> 00:12:27,080 Speaker 1: the courts on bond is yet to be seen. It 188 00:12:27,160 --> 00:12:30,040 Speaker 1: may not happen, but this may be Trump only it 189 00:12:30,080 --> 00:12:32,920 Speaker 1: maybe a blift. On the other hand, it may be 190 00:12:33,160 --> 00:12:37,480 Speaker 1: that the partisan divide has finally the past. The size 191 00:12:38,400 --> 00:12:43,600 Speaker 1: and the judicial independence, collegiality norms that carried the day 192 00:12:43,960 --> 00:12:48,480 Speaker 1: up until two thousand seventeen have now given way to 193 00:12:48,720 --> 00:12:52,680 Speaker 1: these norms of party identity and charters and decision making. 194 00:12:53,440 --> 00:12:57,040 Speaker 1: And that's something that obviously we don't know for sure 195 00:12:57,280 --> 00:12:59,520 Speaker 1: what's going to happen, and That's what we need to 196 00:12:59,559 --> 00:13:03,160 Speaker 1: see over the next several years as to whether things 197 00:13:03,400 --> 00:13:07,160 Speaker 1: stabilize and return to how they were, or whether essentially 198 00:13:07,960 --> 00:13:11,080 Speaker 1: with Trump, were just in the new world and this 199 00:13:11,240 --> 00:13:13,599 Speaker 1: is a time where the partisan divide is going to 200 00:13:13,880 --> 00:13:16,920 Speaker 1: just still over to more and more things, including online 201 00:13:16,920 --> 00:13:21,720 Speaker 1: decision making. Do you think that this shows that Justice 202 00:13:21,840 --> 00:13:25,640 Speaker 1: Roberts was incorrect when he said there are no Obama judges, 203 00:13:26,240 --> 00:13:32,079 Speaker 1: no Bush judges, no Trump judges. Well, it's yes and 204 00:13:32,160 --> 00:13:37,040 Speaker 1: no answer if whatef Justice Roberts is saying is that 205 00:13:37,400 --> 00:13:40,040 Speaker 1: the judges are committed to the rule of law and 206 00:13:40,120 --> 00:13:44,280 Speaker 1: not to a political party. That seems to have held 207 00:13:44,360 --> 00:13:48,360 Speaker 1: true up until two thousand and eighteen. And then the 208 00:13:48,480 --> 00:13:54,480 Speaker 1: question becomes whether two thousand eight into two thousand twenty 209 00:13:54,960 --> 00:13:58,280 Speaker 1: is a total transformation where we now do have this 210 00:13:58,440 --> 00:14:01,880 Speaker 1: paris and divide, or whether two thousand eighteen to two 211 00:14:02,120 --> 00:14:05,320 Speaker 1: twenty is just related to the Trump docket. So before 212 00:14:05,640 --> 00:14:10,079 Speaker 1: two thousand eighteen, I think you can say that Chief 213 00:14:10,120 --> 00:14:14,040 Speaker 1: Justice Roberts view that the judge is identified with the 214 00:14:14,120 --> 00:14:18,080 Speaker 1: rule of law, norms of judicial independence and pleegiality. I 215 00:14:18,120 --> 00:14:20,960 Speaker 1: think Chief Justice Roberts was right as to whether Chief 216 00:14:21,000 --> 00:14:25,440 Speaker 1: Justice Roberts's right. Post two thousand eighteen, that's a little 217 00:14:25,920 --> 00:14:28,400 Speaker 1: up in the air. It may be that we do 218 00:14:28,480 --> 00:14:31,600 Speaker 1: have Trump and Obama judges, but let's see what happens 219 00:14:31,680 --> 00:14:36,280 Speaker 1: going forward and whether the partisan divide continues or whether 220 00:14:36,360 --> 00:14:39,240 Speaker 1: there's a return to normalcy. So the jury is a 221 00:14:39,280 --> 00:14:41,680 Speaker 1: little bit still out on that question as well, But 222 00:14:41,800 --> 00:14:44,320 Speaker 1: I think he was generally correct up until two thousand 223 00:14:44,360 --> 00:14:46,840 Speaker 1: eighteen at least. Do you think that the appointment of 224 00:14:46,920 --> 00:14:51,840 Speaker 1: more moderate judges by Biden might help deflect this? Well, 225 00:14:51,880 --> 00:14:55,400 Speaker 1: I think what may matter the most is whether the 226 00:14:55,480 --> 00:14:59,240 Speaker 1: judge is appointed by President Biden are committed to collegiality 227 00:14:59,280 --> 00:15:02,720 Speaker 1: and judicial into peasant and whether they try to work 228 00:15:03,120 --> 00:15:07,640 Speaker 1: as part of a circuit which is committed to not 229 00:15:08,440 --> 00:15:12,200 Speaker 1: democratic goals, but committed instead of rule of law goals. 230 00:15:12,480 --> 00:15:15,240 Speaker 1: So a lot of this is depends on the outlook 231 00:15:15,440 --> 00:15:17,960 Speaker 1: of the buyer, and the point sees is their outlooks 232 00:15:17,960 --> 00:15:23,040 Speaker 1: that they're seeking the ideologically counterbalanced Trump appointees, in which Kate, 233 00:15:23,880 --> 00:15:26,440 Speaker 1: you're going to have a partisan divide and this is 234 00:15:26,480 --> 00:15:32,080 Speaker 1: likely to continue, or will they instead say partisanship is 235 00:15:32,120 --> 00:15:35,520 Speaker 1: a problem, I'm committed to law values, I'm going to 236 00:15:35,600 --> 00:15:39,720 Speaker 1: try to mitigate this turns to partisanship, so we need 237 00:15:39,800 --> 00:15:43,000 Speaker 1: to see who president buyer the points and what their 238 00:15:43,040 --> 00:15:46,200 Speaker 1: orientation is. Thanks for being on the Bloomberg Law Show, Neil. 239 00:15:46,480 --> 00:15:49,360 Speaker 1: That's Professor Neil Devans of William and Mary Law School. 240 00:15:50,400 --> 00:15:52,720 Speaker 1: And that's it for this edition of The Bloomberg Law Show. 241 00:15:53,080 --> 00:15:55,080 Speaker 1: Remember you can always at the latest legal news on 242 00:15:55,080 --> 00:15:58,479 Speaker 1: our Bloomberg Law Podcast. You can find them on Apple Podcasts, 243 00:15:58,520 --> 00:16:02,200 Speaker 1: Spotify and at w w W dot Bloomberg dot com, 244 00:16:02,280 --> 00:16:06,080 Speaker 1: slash podcast Slash Law. I'm June gross O. Thanks so 245 00:16:06,160 --> 00:16:08,720 Speaker 1: much for listening, and please tune into The Bloomberg Law 246 00:16:08,800 --> 00:16:11,600 Speaker 1: Show every week night at ten pm Eastern right here 247 00:16:11,640 --> 00:16:12,680 Speaker 1: on Bloomberg Radio.