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Speaker 1: By now, we all know Google and other tech companies

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Speaker 1: are collecting huge amounts of information about our digital and

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Speaker 1: actual lives, what we search for, what we watch and

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Speaker 1: listen to, and where we are at any given time.

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Speaker 1: In large part, that's so advertisers who pay for that

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Speaker 1: data can pester us to buy things. But Bloomberg's Davy

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Speaker 1: Alba and Julia Love report that this vastrophe of personal

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Speaker 1: information about millions of people is now increasingly also being

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Speaker 1: sought by police departments across the US. They're asking judges

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Speaker 1: for warrants to compel Google to turn over location and

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Speaker 1: other user data.

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Speaker 2: Google says that it receives more than sixty thousand search warrants,

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Speaker 2: and this was true in the US last year. That's

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Speaker 2: more than double the number from twenty nineteen.

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Speaker 3: I think these requests put Google in a difficult because

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Speaker 3: these are court orders. They're not just.

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Speaker 1: Optional and later, Mesa Arizona detective Travis Stobb tells us

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Speaker 1: how police use this information.

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Speaker 4: It's another tool on our toolkit, and it's a welcome one.

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Speaker 4: It just gives us another avenue to turn to when

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Speaker 4: we're coming up dry on more traditional investigative techniques.

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Speaker 1: I'm Wescsova today on the Big Take Cops cast a

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Speaker 1: Digital dragnet I asked Davy why she and Julia decided

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Speaker 1: to look into how police departments are using all this

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Speaker 1: information that Google collects about us.

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Speaker 2: I think we've known that Google is collecting an enormous

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Speaker 2: amount of data on each every one of us. Basically,

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Speaker 2: if you have a Google account, you are handing over

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Speaker 2: data on where you've been, what you've searched, and Google

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Speaker 2: slurps up all this data to use in a lot

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Speaker 2: of cases for advertising. So you have all of this

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Speaker 2: history that you're keeping with Google that's in your account,

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Speaker 2: and it just so happens that cops are also interested

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Speaker 2: in that when they are trying to solve a crime.

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Speaker 2: So we suspected that there was this match between all

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Speaker 2: the data that we were giving Google and users are

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Speaker 2: giving Google and the way that the cops try to

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Speaker 2: mind that data to solve these crimes that have taken place.

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Speaker 2: And we wanted to know whether cops were using this

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Speaker 2: for very serious crimes or if they were also interested

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Speaker 2: in this data for petty ones theft, graffiti, vandalism. And

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Speaker 2: what we found was that this practice was incredibly widespread

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Speaker 2: all over the US. Tiny police departments all over the

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Speaker 2: country are using Google data to try to solve crimes,

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Speaker 2: and the crimes weren't always necessarily serious ones. They did

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Speaker 2: include some of these more minor offenses as well.

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Speaker 1: And Julia, how'd you find this out?

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Speaker 3: If cops want to dip into Doodle's data, they have

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Speaker 3: to obtain a search warrant from a judge. The company

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Speaker 3: will not simply open up its files for any law

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Speaker 3: enforcement officer who comes knocking.

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Speaker 4: They have to have a.

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Speaker 3: Valid court order, and so in order to do this,

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Speaker 3: police officers will write up an affidavid that explains the

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Speaker 3: crime that occurred and why they feel that Doodle might

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Speaker 3: have information that could be helpful in building out the investigation.

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Speaker 3: So we sought to get our hands on those search warrants.

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Speaker 3: We knew that was the best way that we could

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Speaker 3: see what cops were actually requesting.

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Speaker 2: Unfortunately, for US, search warrants are public records, so we

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Speaker 2: could actually visit the courthouses and collect them for our

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Speaker 2: reporting purposes.

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Speaker 1: Julia, When a police department gets a warrant for Google

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Speaker 1: to give the information, what exactly are they asking for?

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Speaker 1: What kind of information do they want Google to.

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Speaker 3: Give In the case of location warrants, this is all

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Speaker 3: about where a specific device was at at a particular

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Speaker 3: moment in time. Google is able to pull in information

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Speaker 3: from whyfy hotspots, the phones, GPS, sell tower connections, and

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Speaker 3: that gives them a pretty good ability to estimate where

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Speaker 3: a particular device was at a diven time.

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Speaker 1: Within several feet actually, and so Davey, it seems like

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Speaker 1: they're casting a pretty wide net here they are.

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Speaker 2: The way it works is the police will give let's

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Speaker 2: say four coordinates. These are just x y coordinates on

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Speaker 2: a map, and then with these four points, they'll draw

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Speaker 2: a shape around a certain area and we'll say, okay, Google,

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Speaker 2: give me all of the devices that have been in

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Speaker 2: this polygon over a certain amount of time. So some

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Speaker 2: of the warrants we've seen have covered just minutes. So

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Speaker 2: when the police know when a crime has occurred, they

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Speaker 2: can say, okay, within a five minute period, tell us

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Speaker 2: who was in this area. But we've also seen law

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Speaker 2: enforcement agencies going to Google asking them for how many

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Speaker 2: devices were in the area for up to a week.

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Speaker 1: Julia, can you give us some examples of times where

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Speaker 1: police departments went to Google and said, we want this information.

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Speaker 3: In one case, a woman's purse was stolen in the

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Speaker 3: parking lot of a target in Scottsdale, Arizona. In that case,

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Speaker 3: the police sought a warrant for Doodle's location data information

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Speaker 3: for people who were in that parking lot at the

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Speaker 3: time that the woman's purse was grabbed. In another case

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Speaker 3: that we found out of Raleigh, North Carolina, a detective

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Speaker 3: was warming up his car in the morning and he

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Speaker 3: ran into his apartment to get something, leaving the car running,

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Speaker 3: and when he came back, the vehicle had vanished with

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Speaker 3: some police dear inside, including a police radio. And so

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Speaker 3: the Raleigh Police Department obtained one warrant for Doodle's location

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Speaker 3: data to see who had been in the neighborhood at

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Speaker 3: the time of the trime.

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Speaker 1: And Julia, what did the Raleigh Police Department say about

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Speaker 1: the case?

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Speaker 3: The Raleigh Police Department said that they ultimately did not

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Speaker 3: recover that radio that they were seeking to find. They

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Speaker 3: also said they always strive to recover stolen.

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Speaker 1: Property, Dave, Even though we all have Google accounts, these

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Speaker 1: warrants don't cover, you know, tens of millions of people.

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Speaker 1: They only cover whatever devices may have been in a

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Speaker 1: particular area. At a particular time around a crime scene.

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Speaker 1: Is that right?

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Speaker 2: Yes, that is correct. But the pool of people that

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Speaker 2: the cops and Google are drawing this data from is

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Speaker 2: a huge pool, and that can be, you know, incredibly invasive.

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Speaker 2: Your stuff can get ensnared in the warrants, Julia.

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Speaker 1: So Google gets all of these warrants telling them they

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Speaker 1: have to give up information. How does the company deal

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Speaker 1: with this? What's their position about all of these requestsing

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Speaker 1: you have to give up the user data of your customers.

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Speaker 3: I think these requests put Goodle in a difficult spot because,

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Speaker 3: on the one hand, these are court orders. They're not

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Speaker 3: just optional, as a former Doodle leadal director told us.

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Speaker 3: But at the same time, the company really values safeguarding

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Speaker 3: its users privacy, and so it has to walk this

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Speaker 3: line between helping law enforcement with their investigations and also

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Speaker 3: not letting any detective rifle through any user's data.

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Speaker 1: So when Google gets a warrant to hand over some information,

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Speaker 1: what do they do?

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Speaker 3: Google receives thousands of requests from law enforcement and the

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Speaker 3: United States each year, and so they've come up with

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Speaker 3: some formulas to respond to the common requests to give

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Speaker 3: their legal specialists a roadmap to follow. Law enforcement will

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Speaker 3: request information about devices that were present near the time

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Speaker 3: of the crime, and Doodle will simply provide a list

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Speaker 3: of anonymous device ideas that do not reveal which person

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Speaker 3: was tied to that device. Law enforcement will carefully go

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Speaker 3: over this list and they'll identify a subset of devices

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Speaker 3: that they would like expanded information about to see where

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Speaker 3: the device was before and after the time of the crime,

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Speaker 3: to help them decide who they really want to focus on,

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Speaker 3: and Doodle will provide account information that's usually the name

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Speaker 3: that the account was registered under and an email address

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Speaker 3: for that final batch of users.

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Speaker 1: Davy Julia said earlier that Google gets thousands of these

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Speaker 1: requests for information a year. Just how many do they get?

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Speaker 4: So?

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Speaker 2: Google says that it receives more than sixty thousand search

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Speaker 2: warrants and this was true in the US last year.

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Speaker 2: That's more than double the number from twenty nineteen, and

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Speaker 2: their company provides at least some information in about eighty

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Speaker 2: percent of cases.

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Speaker 1: You said, there's this group of people at Google whose

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Speaker 1: job it is to do this. Who are they?

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Speaker 2: It's a team known as the Legal Investigation Support Team

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Speaker 2: or LIS. Their whole job is to review search warrants

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Speaker 2: and subpoenas, and they try to push back on as

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Speaker 2: many as they can using what they have at their disposal.

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Speaker 2: So let's say someone misspelled a Gmail account and it's

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Speaker 2: gamil dot com instead of Gmail dot com. Once these

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Speaker 2: warrants are served to Google, Google does have an obligation

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Speaker 2: to respond, a legal obligation, And so when they go

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Speaker 2: through these warrants and try to sort through them and

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Speaker 2: scrutinize them, they are trying to make sure they're doing

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Speaker 2: it just as precisely as possible, you know, to the

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Speaker 2: letter of the law, to make sure that they can

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Speaker 2: only give up people's information when it is absolutely necessary and.

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Speaker 3: I would say also the minimum amount of information necessary

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Speaker 3: to comply with this request.

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Speaker 1: So Google is only one of many services that are

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Speaker 1: tracking us and gathering up our information. What about Apple

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Speaker 1: and Apple Maps, which also helps you get around and

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Speaker 1: tracks your location. Do they also give up this kind

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Speaker 1: of information in response to warrants?

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Speaker 3: Law enforcement and experts have told us that Google is

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Speaker 3: the only company that can provide this detailed list of

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Speaker 3: which devices were present at a diven time, and Apple,

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Speaker 3: in its transparency reports discloses that it does receive some

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Speaker 3: geofence warrants, as these location warrants are known, but they

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Speaker 3: say that they are not capable of complying with those warrants.

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Speaker 2: But it doesn't actually matter because a lot of people

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Speaker 2: who have iPhones have Google apps on them. So if

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Speaker 2: you think about I have to get to a friend's

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Speaker 2: birthday party and how do I get there, I'll fire

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Speaker 2: up Google Maps and see the best subway route, and

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Speaker 2: that information is something that Google can see and does have.

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Speaker 1: Google sent Bloomberg a statement in response to questions about

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Speaker 1: these warrants about user data. They said with all law

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Speaker 1: enforcement demands, including reverse warrants, they have a rigorous process

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Speaker 1: designed to protect their private see of their users while

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Speaker 1: supporting the important work of law enforcement. They said they

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Speaker 1: examine each demand for legal validity consistent with developing case law,

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Speaker 1: and they routinely push back against overbroad or otherwise inappropriate

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Speaker 1: demands for user data, including objecting to some demands entirely.

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Speaker 1: They said for years they've supported legislative reform to government

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Speaker 1: practices around access to user data, including proposing substantive guardrails

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Speaker 1: on access to data and limits on the overuse of

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Speaker 1: GAG orders, which they say contribute to a lack of transparency.

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Speaker 1: I'll talk more with Julia and Davy a little later.

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Speaker 1: After the break, a detective tells us how police use

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Speaker 1: the data Google hands over. Now, let's get a look

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Speaker 1: at how law enforcement uses this information in real life.

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Speaker 1: I have a stop as an officer with a Mesa,

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Speaker 1: Arizona Police Department which has sought search warrants for Google data. Travis,

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Speaker 1: can you tell me what it's like to be a

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Speaker 1: detective working a case, especially when you're running out of

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Speaker 1: avenues to pursue and you just can't quite find the

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Speaker 1: person who committed the crime.

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Speaker 4: Well, every case is different, obviously, and there comes with

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Speaker 4: it a certain frustration when you're not able to get

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Speaker 4: a break in the case, and you feel a lot

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Speaker 4: of pressure both externally and internally, especially in these instances

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Speaker 4: where you have someone who continues to engage in armed

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Speaker 4: robbery after armed robbery and you want to get them

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Speaker 4: caught before someone gets hurt, or just stop them from

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Speaker 4: doing what they're doing. And so the ability to leverage

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Speaker 4: this Google data was a welcome addition to our toolkit

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Speaker 4: for sure.

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Speaker 1: So tell me about a case where you use this

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Speaker 1: warrant and what happened me personally.

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Speaker 4: It's still under investigation, but it was a late night

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Speaker 4: gun store burglary where a device is inside of a

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Speaker 4: business that's empty, that's right next to the gun store,

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Speaker 4: and so that produces a very viable lead for us

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Speaker 4: to follow up on. And I've assisted other agencies as

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Speaker 4: well with analyzing the results from their Google warrants, in

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Speaker 4: particular some road rage type shootings where some aspect of

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Speaker 4: the crime is captured on video, and you can compare

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Speaker 4: the video surveillance with the data you get from Google

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Speaker 4: to potentially identify the suspect. Unfortunately, my own personal experience

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Speaker 4: hasn't been as successful as others. I strike out far

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Speaker 4: more often than I succeed.

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Speaker 1: Can you walk us through the process of what it's

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Speaker 1: like to try to get this information from Google?

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Speaker 4: The current process right now begins with a search warrant

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Speaker 4: to obtain device IDs that are within a set geographical area.

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Speaker 4: So when we request this data from Google, we're asking

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Speaker 4: them to search within a geo fence, and that is

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Speaker 4: a geographical area defined by latitude and longitude, typically four points.

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Speaker 4: It's a square around a given area. We explain the

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Speaker 4: circumstances of the crime and what we're hoping to obtain

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Speaker 4: from Google and how it will assist our investigation.

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Speaker 1: How easy is it to get a warrant like that

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Speaker 1: from a judge.

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Speaker 4: Here in Maricopa County. We have to really work it.

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Speaker 4: There's been some recent court rulings in case law that

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Speaker 4: shine a spotlight on these kind of warrants some privacy concerns,

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Speaker 4: and so we work with those commissioners at our initial

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Speaker 4: appearance court at the Search Warrant Center to really make

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Speaker 4: sure that we're keeping our scope narrow, that we're not

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Speaker 4: being overly broad, that we are doing everything we can

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Speaker 4: to ensure that we're not infringing upon the privacy of

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Speaker 4: those persons who are not involved in the crime but

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Speaker 4: are simply in the area. So we work really hard

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Speaker 4: to make sure that we tailor the geo fence in

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Speaker 4: such a manner that it zeros in on the area

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Speaker 4: where the crime was committed.

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Speaker 1: Has a judge ever turned you down when you ask

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Speaker 1: for one of these warrants or asked you to refine

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Speaker 1: the information.

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Speaker 4: Yes. Probably about half of the Google geofence warrants that

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Speaker 4: I've written have undergone a refinement process after being submitted

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Speaker 4: the first time. Round and again, it's just trying to

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Speaker 4: zero in strictly on the information that we want to

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Speaker 4: obtain and keep out that extraneous information.

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Speaker 1: All right, So you get your warrant from the judge

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Speaker 1: and you take it to Google. What are you asking

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Speaker 1: Google for in a typical case, like how do you say, hey,

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Speaker 1: I want information?

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Speaker 4: So Google retains all this data on any device that

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Speaker 4: has an Android platform or a Google app on it,

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Speaker 4: such as the Gmail app or Google Maps. And what

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Speaker 4: we're essentially asking from Google is to provide us the

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Speaker 4: data that they keep stored within their servers that provides

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Speaker 4: locational data for devices that are running some sort of

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Speaker 4: Google platform or app. And their locational data is based

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Speaker 4: off of a variety of different things, whether it's the

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Speaker 4: GPS on the phone, or it's connecting to Wi Fi,

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Speaker 4: it's connecting to a cell phone tower, and it comes

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Speaker 4: with varying degrees of accuracy. But ultimately, what we want

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Speaker 4: from them is any device that is within this pre

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Speaker 4: defined geographical boundary, and that is the geo fence. If

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Speaker 4: we have a murder that's committed inside of a residence,

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Speaker 4: I typically four point the corners of that residence. The

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Speaker 4: property itself and if we have, say a getaway path,

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Speaker 4: we know that the suspect fled down the street in

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Speaker 4: a certain direction, then I'll four point the sidewalk in

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Speaker 4: the street where he fled, and we're narrowing those geographical

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Speaker 4: boundaries the geo fence so as not to overlap houses

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Speaker 4: of people who are uninvolved. We're looking just for that

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Speaker 4: area where the suspect was.

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Speaker 1: So you go to Google with this information within this

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Speaker 1: geo fence, where does it go from there?

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Speaker 4: When they return the information to us, they identified the

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Speaker 4: devices through an anonymized alphanumeric code. It's very long and

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Speaker 4: it contains absolutely zero identifying information about the account holder.

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Speaker 4: And this is to protect the privacy of those devices

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Speaker 4: that will inevitably capture that are uninvolved. So it's upon

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Speaker 4: us as detectives to study all the devices that have

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Speaker 4: been provided and determine which ones are most likely connected

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Speaker 4: to the crime that we're investigating, while filtering out those

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Speaker 4: that we believe are uninvolved. At that point, we write

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Speaker 4: a second search warrant for further locational data on those

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Speaker 4: devices that we believe are most likely involved, and that information,

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Speaker 4: when it's returned to us from Google, will show locational

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Speaker 4: data for those devices an hour prior to and an

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Speaker 4: hour after the timeframe set within an original warrant, and

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Speaker 4: it will give us locational data that falls outside of

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Speaker 4: the geo fence, and we can use this to maybe

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Speaker 4: determine where people go and see if these devices are

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Speaker 4: in fact involved in the manner that we originally thought.

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Speaker 4: It's further clarifying information, but at that point we still

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Speaker 4: have no account information, no identifying information on who the

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Speaker 4: actual owner is of that device. It's not until we

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Speaker 4: get the data back from that second search warrant and

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Speaker 4: we can further narrow down the scope of what we're

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Speaker 4: looking for. And then we write a third search warrant,

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Speaker 4: and that search warrt is the one where we get

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Speaker 4: actual account information, account data, we identify the person who

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Speaker 4: is associated to that phone.

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Speaker 1: So has access to this kind of information changed the

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Speaker 1: way your investigations into crimes work.

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Speaker 4: Not really. It's for me in particular. As I said before,

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Speaker 4: I haven't had a ton of luck with it. It's

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Speaker 4: another tool on our toolkit, and it's a welcome one,

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Speaker 4: but it doesn't change the fundamentals really of how we

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Speaker 4: proceed with our investigations. It just gives us another avenue

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Speaker 4: to turn to when we're coming up dry on more

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Speaker 4: traditional investigative techniques. We want to use it as kind

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Speaker 4: of a measure of last resort. There's other quicker avenues

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Speaker 4: of investigation that can be taken at the beginning, and

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Speaker 4: we want to go through and exhaust those first. We're

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Speaker 4: not necessarily wanted to jump onto the geofense warrant right

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Speaker 4: away when we could produce a suspect through other methods

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Speaker 4: a lot quicker because there is a time delay in

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Speaker 4: obtaining this information from Google, processing it, submitting the second warrant,

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Speaker 4: waiting it takes a little bit.

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Speaker 1: Are there any kind of crimes where you just don't

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Speaker 1: use this to afore.

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Speaker 4: We've been cautious in how we apply this, making sure

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Speaker 4: that we use it for serious crimes only. We would

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Speaker 4: not want to be using this for misdemeanor crimes, lower

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Speaker 4: level offenses. You know, we're looking at felony crimes. We're

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Speaker 4: looking at part one crimes, which are going to be burglaries, arsons,

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Speaker 4: sex assaults, armed robberies, murders, the serious crimes. That's when

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Speaker 4: we're going to use an investigative technique like this.

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Speaker 1: You talked a lot about how Google takes all these

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Speaker 1: measures to animize the data. But as someone who's used

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Speaker 1: this and seen it used, do you have privacy concerns

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Speaker 1: about this to a certain extent?

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Speaker 4: I do you know my personal beliefs, Hue towards a

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Speaker 4: certain amount of privacy of the individual is very important

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Speaker 4: to me. I take it very seriously, and so when

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Speaker 4: the courts have privacy concerns, I take those seriously. It's

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Speaker 4: reassuring to me that the information that comes back to

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Speaker 4: us from Google, it's anonymized and it doesn't contain any

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Speaker 4: personal information whatsoever about the person whose device it is

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Speaker 4: that we've captured in this geofence. Even more to the point,

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Speaker 4: the anonymized ideas that they assign to these devices is

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Speaker 4: only good for ninety days and then it's deleted and

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Speaker 4: there's no record of it. The pace at which technology advances,

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Speaker 4: the courts can't keep up with it, and so it's

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Speaker 4: upon us to make sure that we're doing all that

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Speaker 4: we can to minimize those issues. And I think in

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Speaker 4: this regard the search warrants and the way Google disseminates

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Speaker 4: that data, I think it's done a really good job

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Speaker 4: of protecting the privacy of individuals in regards to this

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Speaker 4: investigative technique.

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Speaker 1: Detective, appreciate your time, thanks for giving us this inside view.

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Speaker 4: Thank you very much for having me on.

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Speaker 1: When we come back Bloomberg's Julia Love and Davey Alba

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Speaker 1: tell us about the pushback in some places against the

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Speaker 1: use of these warrants. Julia, do we have any idea

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Speaker 1: about whether this works. Does all this information in this

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Speaker 1: very complicated system lead to crimes being solved at a

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Speaker 1: higher rate.

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Speaker 3: We have certainly heard success stories, but we also found

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Speaker 3: many tases where this information did not pan out for

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Speaker 3: law enforcement. With the taste of that stolen purse in Scottsdale, Arizona,

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Speaker 3: the detective told me that he decided not to proceed

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Speaker 3: because he didn't think that this tool was going to

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Speaker 3: pan out for him.

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Speaker 2: We've talked to a police officer who said that they

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Speaker 2: were able to identify two suspects in a murder at

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Speaker 2: a local park.

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Speaker 3: We spoke with one detective in Arizona who told us

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Speaker 3: about a victory that his colleague had with these geofence warrants,

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Speaker 3: and it was a case of catalytic converter theft in

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Speaker 3: a parking structure and using a geofence warrant. They were

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Speaker 3: able to find a device that was present near the

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Speaker 3: power box at the exact moment that the power was

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Speaker 3: shut off in the parking structure.

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Speaker 1: Davy, We talked earlier about how a lot of people's

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Speaker 1: data can wind up in one of these warrants and

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Speaker 1: these requests for information. Have they ever led to people

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Speaker 1: being wrongfully arrested?

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Speaker 2: Yes, we do know of at least one crime from

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Speaker 2: twenty eighteen where a man in Arizona was wrongly arrested

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Speaker 2: for murder based on the location of his phone. What

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Speaker 2: actually happened in that case was the man had left

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Speaker 2: his phone in a vehicle that a friend took, and

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Speaker 2: then the fact that the phone was in the car

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Speaker 2: sort of pinpointed him as a possible suspect. But he

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Speaker 2: actually was not present in that case, and he was

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Speaker 2: wrongly accused and arrested.

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Speaker 1: And what happened in that case.

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Speaker 3: Police ultimately arrested another suspect.

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Speaker 1: And he was ultimately cleared of charges. Yes, Davy, Is

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Speaker 1: anyone pushing back against these kinds of warrants saying that

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Speaker 1: Google shouldn't have the handover users data if the police

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Speaker 1: asked for it.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, we have spoken to law professors and privacy advocates.

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Speaker 2: It's who say that this practice is incredibly invasive and

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Speaker 2: that Google should not have this data in the first place.

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Speaker 3: There's an important legal battle happening in Colorado. A group

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Speaker 3: of teenagers were charged with murder for an arson case

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Speaker 3: that happened there a few years ago. The police found

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Speaker 3: them through Doodle's search data for people who searched the

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Speaker 3: address of the house around the time of the fire.

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Speaker 3: But one of the defendant's lawyers are arguing that this

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Speaker 3: was an illegal search, and so that is posing the

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Speaker 3: first known challenge to the validity of this technique in

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Speaker 3: the country.

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Speaker 1: Davey, as you continue to report this story, what are

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Speaker 1: you looking for? Where do you think it goes from here?

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Speaker 2: I think that we will see more scrutiny on these practices,

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Speaker 2: and we may see more public outcry from folks who

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Speaker 2: are concerned that they could get ensnared in these warrants.

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Speaker 2: You know, there is that question of how the public

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Speaker 2: will react to the increased practice of using warrants to

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Speaker 2: locate suspects. I think there's a question about how the

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Speaker 2: law will evolve to include the fact that this is

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Speaker 2: now possible so, for instance, in the case of wire tapping,

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Speaker 2: that is a police technique that can only be used

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Speaker 2: for very serious cases like kidnapping, murder, drug trafficking, and

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Speaker 2: the like. But there's still no federal law that exists

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Speaker 2: for regulating this kind of technique where cops can go

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Speaker 2: to Google for location and search data, so it'll be

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Speaker 2: interesting to see how that evolves.

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Speaker 1: Davey Julia, thanks so much for coming on the show.

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Speaker 2: Thanks for having us. It was a pleasure.

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Speaker 4: Thank you.

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Speaker 1: Thanks for listening to us here at The Big Take.

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Speaker 1: It's a daily podcast from Bloomberg and iHeartRadio. For more

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Speaker 1: Email us questions or comments to Big Take at Bloomberg

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Speaker 1: dot nem. The supervising producer of The Big Take is

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Speaker 1: Vicky Bergolina. Our senior producer is Katherine Fink. This episode

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Speaker 1: was produced by Sam Gabauer and Christine Driscoll. Rafieol mcili

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Speaker 1: is our engineer. Our original music was composed by Leo Sidron.

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Speaker 1: I'm west Kasova. We'll be back on Monday with another

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Speaker 1: Big Take. Have a great weekend,