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Speaker 1: Welcome to Stuff you Should Know, a production of iHeartRadio.

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Speaker 2: Hey, and welcome to the podcast. I'm Josh and there's

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Speaker 2: Chuck and we are just flying the friendly skies with

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Speaker 2: our co pilot Jerry and our other copilot God. And

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Speaker 2: this is stuff you should know. I thought it was

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Speaker 2: dog Yeah yeah.

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Speaker 1: Okay, Well before we get going, there is kind of

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Speaker 1: an exciting thing we need to mention. And we're gonna

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Speaker 1: mention this. You know, you're probably gonna get sick of

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Speaker 1: us talking about it. But stuff you should know is

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Speaker 1: going on a cruise, Yeah, sea cruise, and not just

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Speaker 1: like so long, suckers, we're going on vacation, right, it's

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Speaker 1: like a stuff cruise with other like stuff they don't

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Speaker 1: want you to know is going to be there. We're

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Speaker 1: doing our live podcast on board and it's like, hey,

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Speaker 1: stuff you should know listeners, Come come cruise with us.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, come cruise with us. I think that's the message

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Speaker 2: that we're out right now. Is on Virgin Voyages. It's

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Speaker 2: just pretty swank, and it's October second to the seventh.

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Speaker 2: It's five day cruise from New York City to Bermuda

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Speaker 2: and back. Even they bring you back to your car.

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Speaker 1: I think I think that's kind of key. Yeah, it's

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Speaker 1: an adults only thing, yep. And I think the name

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Speaker 1: of it is the Big Apple to Bermuda Cruise. And yeah,

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Speaker 1: it's gonna be a lot of fun. So you know,

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Speaker 1: like I said, we're doing our live podcast and we're

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Speaker 1: gonna be doing some other fun events that they haven't

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Speaker 1: told us about yet. The feeling will be like trivia

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Speaker 1: and stuff like that. But Jerry is going, and that's

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Speaker 1: reason enough to sign up. I think.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, you can verify in person that Jerry is.

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Speaker 1: It's right. You might be able to rub some suntan

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Speaker 1: lotion on her back too.

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Speaker 2: So where do people go to sign up for this

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Speaker 2: sea cruise?

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Speaker 1: Yeah, you know what I would do. I think we're

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Speaker 1: gonna have some like super specific information coming, but just

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Speaker 1: get on your search engine and check out stuff at

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Speaker 1: sea Virgin Voyages and that'll direct you. I can't wait.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, I can't wait either. We'll see all of you

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Speaker 2: in October on the high seas.

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Speaker 1: That's right. This episode is not about ships. Actually, it's

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Speaker 1: about a plane.

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Speaker 2: Which is technically a ship. It's an airship.

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Speaker 1: An airship. Yeah, yeah, that's a good way.

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Speaker 2: To say it. Yeah, that's how most people say it.

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Speaker 1: I'm trying to watch what I say about this one

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Speaker 1: because it's pretty touchy.

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Speaker 2: It is touchy, but it's just such a shameful chapter

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Speaker 2: in the history of what was long regarded one of

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Speaker 2: the best engineering firms in the world, the Boeing Corporation.

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Speaker 2: They made great airplanes, They were very innovative, they made

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Speaker 2: very safe airplanes. They cared about the details. They put

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Speaker 2: engineering standards before profit, and all of that just got

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Speaker 2: wiped out in the course of a few years, from

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Speaker 2: about two thoy eighteen to nineteen. All of it just

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Speaker 2: wentroop when it came to light that they had flip

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Speaker 2: flopped that a few years before and profits now came

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Speaker 2: before standards.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, you know, we'll talk about in more detail, but

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Speaker 1: you know, the end result, as everybody knows at this point,

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Speaker 1: is two of their seven thirty seven Max planes crashed,

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Speaker 1: fell out of the sky. Yeah, and killed a lot

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Speaker 1: of people. Super sad and it's very sort of anger

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Speaker 1: inducing when you know the story behind it all. So

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Speaker 1: we're gonna detail that now starting. I guess we should

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Speaker 1: say that the seven thirty seven Max airplane that we're

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Speaker 1: talking about was a brand new fleet that was gonna

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Speaker 1: replace the old seven thirty sevens and compete with their rival, Airbus,

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Speaker 1: the Airbus A three twenty neo.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, and Airbus has long been Boeing's rival since Boeing

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Speaker 2: bought McDonald Douglass back in I think the nineties, and

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Speaker 2: so it's just been Boeing Airbus head to head to

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Speaker 2: supply the world with their airplanes and the seven thirty

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Speaker 2: seven Max. The reason that they were updating the seven

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Speaker 2: thirty sevens is one, like you said, these were old

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Speaker 2: seven thirty sevens that needed to be replaced. But also

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Speaker 2: so that Airbus A three twenty neo it was like

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Speaker 2: a step up, like it was the same kind of body,

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Speaker 2: like I think a narrow body is what it's called

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Speaker 2: narrowbody mid sized plane as the seven thirty seven. So

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Speaker 2: companies now had an option they could be like, well,

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Speaker 2: we're going to go with this Airbus instead of replacing

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Speaker 2: the Bowings with Boeings. So Boeing said, good god, we've

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Speaker 2: got to get out there and give them something that

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Speaker 2: they're going to want. Besides this A three twenty neo.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, for sure, I think should should we save talk

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Speaker 1: of the actual incidents untill later, I.

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Speaker 2: Think just mentioning that they happened was enough for now.

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Speaker 1: All right, Well, what you're gonna hear is gonna infuriate

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Speaker 1: you a little bit. It's also gonna shine a bit

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Speaker 1: of a light on some of the which will also

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Speaker 1: infuriate you. Just some of the systemic problems with the

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Speaker 1: airline industry as a whole and how these planes are

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Speaker 1: approved for being safe to fly in the sky. And

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Speaker 1: the FAA is going to take some hits deservedly. But

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Speaker 1: we should probably start out by talking about Boeing. You know,

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Speaker 1: you mentioned that they were, you know, dedicated to the

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Speaker 1: top notch engineering for decades and decades, but starting in

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Speaker 1: the nineties that started to change, right.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, there was a CEO that kind of kicked it

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Speaker 2: all off. His name was Philip Condit, and in nineteen

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Speaker 2: ninety seven he said, we're going to acquire McDonald douglas.

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Speaker 2: Like I said, up to that point, McDonald douglas was

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Speaker 2: also a neck and neck competitor with Boeing, But rather

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Speaker 2: than making their name as also like a great engineering

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Speaker 2: firm with innovation and a mind to safety, McDonald douglas

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Speaker 2: is like, no, we're just going to cut costs Yeah,

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Speaker 2: Whereas Boeing, if they were going to design a new plane,

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Speaker 2: or if they were going to come up with a

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Speaker 2: new plane, they would start from scratch and design a

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Speaker 2: new plane and probably set all the industry standards for

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Speaker 2: decades to follow. What McDonald Douglas did was they would

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Speaker 2: design a plane and then they would go back to

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Speaker 2: it over a decade and decad decade after decade and

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Speaker 2: just kind of revamp it and update. Yet that is

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Speaker 2: essentially what you call clue g. It can be done,

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Speaker 2: obviously because they were doing it, but it is so

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Speaker 2: much worse than designing a new plane from scratch. It's

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Speaker 2: just it costs a lot less and it takes a

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Speaker 2: lot less time.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, because over those decades, over those thirty to forty years,

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Speaker 1: there have been so many innovations in flight technology that, like,

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Speaker 1: you could build a really great airplane from the ground

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Speaker 1: up if that's what you wanted to do. We should

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Speaker 1: mention that all of that. Did you name that first

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Speaker 1: CEO from ninety seven, Yeah, Philip Condit, Okay, so he

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Speaker 1: was the first guy. The other thing that he did,

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Speaker 1: and this was a little bit later, this was I

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Speaker 1: think four years after he was named CEO he he

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Speaker 1: didn't split up Boeing like a breakup, but he split

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Speaker 1: them up physically, and that he moved their headquarters from

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Speaker 1: their longtime home in Seattle to Chicago. And he did

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Speaker 1: this for allows three million bucks a year. It was

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Speaker 1: sixty million dollars in state and local tax credit over

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Speaker 1: a twenty year period. Three million bucks a year for

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Speaker 1: a company like this is like chicken scratch.

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Speaker 2: Yeah.

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Speaker 1: So it was a bit of a head scratcher move

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Speaker 1: because you had a company that had everything under one

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Speaker 1: roof in Seattle, and now you had these Seattle based

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Speaker 1: engineers working there, and you had the C suite in Chicago.

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Speaker 1: And that's anytime that happens that. I mean, I know

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Speaker 1: people can work remotely and stuff like that, but it

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Speaker 1: seemed like a great idea to have everything there in Seattle.

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Speaker 2: Yeah. And plus up to that point, with the executives

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Speaker 2: and the decision makers working very closely with like the

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Speaker 2: engineers and product division, those engineers knew the executives, they

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Speaker 2: had a working relationship with them, so they felt comfortable

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Speaker 2: saying like, I don't really think we should do that

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Speaker 2: because it's going to make the plane fall out of

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Speaker 2: the sky and the executives would listen, this is like

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Speaker 2: they didn't know these people anymore. It just got separated.

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Speaker 2: And this transition really kind of became complete when a

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Speaker 2: guy named Harry Stone Cipher took over from Philip Condit

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Speaker 2: in two thousand and three. He became CEO. He used

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Speaker 2: to be a general electric, but he was most recently

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Speaker 2: with McDonald douglas. And even though that Boeing acquired McDonald douglas,

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Speaker 2: McDonald douglas influenced Boeing's culture. Boeing's culture became that same

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Speaker 2: cost cutting like focus, shareholder holder verse. Yes, exactly, that

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Speaker 2: kind of focus that became what Boeing adopted after guys

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Speaker 2: like Kerry stone Cipher took over Boeing.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, he has a quote he been uh he said

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Speaker 1: when people say I changed the culture of Boeing, that

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Speaker 1: was the intent, so that so that it is run

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Speaker 1: like a business rather than a great engineering firm. And

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Speaker 1: that's one of those quotes where I was like, bro,

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Speaker 1: you just said that out loud to the press, Like right,

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Speaker 1: no one wants to hear that. Yeah, well, I guess

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Speaker 1: shareholders did, but exactly everyone else the public at large

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Speaker 1: ones safe planes that don't fall out of the sky.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, but he was putting a signal out, a bats

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Speaker 2: signal of sort saying like, hey, investors, come invest in Boeing,

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Speaker 2: We're gonna make a of course, some money for you.

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Speaker 2: And they started to The next CEO is Jim McNerney,

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Speaker 2: and he was the one who you can really put

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Speaker 2: the most most of the blame for the design of

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Speaker 2: the seven thirty seven Max from him onward. Essentially every

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Speaker 2: single CEO had some sort of direct personal blame for

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Speaker 2: what happened, but he was the one who was like,

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Speaker 2: we need to get this plane out, We need to

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Speaker 2: get it out fast, we need to cut every corner

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Speaker 2: we possibly can to save time and money. Go.

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Speaker 1: Yeah. So he ran the company until twenty fifteen, so

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Speaker 1: he oversaws sort of all of that planning and development basically.

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Speaker 1: And then after that CEO, Man, I just hate saying

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Speaker 1: that CEO over and over a bad days in my mouth.

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Speaker 1: The new guy's name was Dennis Muhlenberg, and he, you know,

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Speaker 1: obviously inherited quite a mess after what we're about to

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Speaker 1: talk about.

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Speaker 2: Right, So, like I said, like these guys were saying, like,

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Speaker 2: come on, we got to get going, Like Airbus is

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Speaker 2: already several steps ahead, and we need to get this

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Speaker 2: thing out so people can start ordering before Airbus just

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Speaker 2: sucks all of the market share out of US. I

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Speaker 2: saw that they put countdown clocks for different deadlines all

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Speaker 2: throughout the office, in meeting rooms, conference rooms, there was

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Speaker 2: constantly a clock counting down while you were at work. Yeah,

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Speaker 2: engineers got the impression. And sometimes we're told directly like

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Speaker 2: keep your mouth shut.

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Speaker 1: Yeah.

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Speaker 2: The head of the project for the seven thirty seven

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Speaker 2: Max people didn't report directly to them anymore. They reported

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Speaker 2: to their heads, and their heads may or may not

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Speaker 2: have told that project manager about any problems that came up.

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Speaker 2: So this whole rushed project also had like an aura

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Speaker 2: of just keep your mouth shut, do not do anything

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Speaker 2: to delay this.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, for sure. And you know, as we'll see later,

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Speaker 1: there were whistleblowers. But when it takes a like somebody

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Speaker 1: requesting whistleblow or protection to come forward, especially with I

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Speaker 1: mean in any corporation, but especially when it's something that's

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Speaker 1: dealing with like public safety, that's not how it should be.

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Speaker 1: You know, you should be able to to say hey,

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Speaker 1: at your work, this is without fear of being of

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Speaker 1: a reprisal. You know, like, we're not doing the right

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Speaker 1: thing here, right.

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Speaker 2: And it used to be you didn't even need to

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Speaker 2: whistle blow. You would go to the executives and be like, hey,

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Speaker 2: this is a real problem, this is not safe, and

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Speaker 2: they would listen to you. That wasn't the case anymore.

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Speaker 1: Should we take a break?

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Speaker 2: Sure?

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Speaker 1: All right, let's take a break and we'll come back

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Speaker 1: with the design phase right after this. All right, we're back.

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Speaker 1: I know we talked a little bit at first about

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Speaker 1: how they decided to sort of revamp this decade's old

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Speaker 1: fleet design wise, instead of starting from scratch with all

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Speaker 1: this great new technology. But that's what they did. They

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Speaker 1: took that seven thirty seven body, they made a lot

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Speaker 1: of changes, It added bigger engines. And one of the

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Speaker 1: things that was the result, and they knew this by

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Speaker 1: twenty twelve, basically was that they had created a problem,

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Speaker 1: a balance problem, whereas at certain speeds you could potentially

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Speaker 1: go into a stall because the airplane's nose drifted upward.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, because they basically took the same plane and just

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Speaker 2: put giant engines that the plane was never designed for,

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Speaker 2: and it just knocked it out of balance. Right, And

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Speaker 2: you would say, well, why didn't they just move the wings.

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Speaker 2: There was a good reason they didn't move the wings,

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Speaker 2: because the more changes you make to an airplane, the

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Speaker 2: more likely it is that all the pilots at all

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Speaker 2: the different airlines that fly that plane are going to

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Speaker 2: need updated training. Right, the FA will require it. Airlines

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Speaker 2: don't like that. That's an added cost to the plane

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Speaker 2: you're selling them, So they did. They bent themselves into

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Speaker 2: pretzels trying to avoid making actual big changes. They just tried.

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Speaker 2: They were playing whack a mole with all the problems

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Speaker 2: that came up, with an eye toward not actually doing

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Speaker 2: the one thing that would solved the problem, which is

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Speaker 2: redesigned the wings. So what they came up with instead

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Speaker 2: was some software that would take over and make the

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Speaker 2: nose go back level whenever it got out of a

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Speaker 2: suitable angle of attack.

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Speaker 1: It's called yeah, it's called the And this is the

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Speaker 1: real sort of well I was going to say the

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Speaker 1: real villain, but the real villains were the humans behind

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Speaker 1: this decision. But we're talking about the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation

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Speaker 1: System the MCAS, and this thing, like you said, I

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Speaker 1: don't know if it was clear, but it literally takes

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Speaker 1: over controls of the plane and takes like supposedly takes

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Speaker 1: care of the issue for the pilot instead of saying like, hey,

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Speaker 1: you know, let's redesign this plane or at least train

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Speaker 1: these pilots to rectify this on their own with with

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Speaker 1: their hands on on the wheel. Now, what's that thing.

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Speaker 2: Called the stick? I think they call it the stick?

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Speaker 1: Is it the stick in big planes too? Probably, I'm

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Speaker 1: pretty sure, just a larger stick. Yeah, the big on

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Speaker 1: the truck, the big stick. They said, we designed this

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Speaker 1: wizbang software that's going to do that for you. And

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Speaker 1: when they went around to test flight mode, I think

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Speaker 1: it was like twenty sixteen, the MCAS was still a

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Speaker 1: pretty small part of this whole thing, but it was

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Speaker 1: part of the aircraft.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, And then they started testing this new design and

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Speaker 2: simulators and I know, at least once, I think in

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Speaker 2: twenty twelve, they the I think the head test pilot

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Speaker 2: for Boeing took ten seconds to override the mcast and

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Speaker 2: crashed and they were like, oh, okay, we need to

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Speaker 2: keep working on this. So again they're back to playing

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Speaker 2: whack a mole. Like the band aid that they put

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Speaker 2: on the issue of the imbalance, which was the software

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Speaker 2: now has its own so now they're fixing those, and

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Speaker 2: then that would bring up more bugs and more bugs,

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Speaker 2: so they had to fix those and those and those,

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Speaker 2: And this was where the design for the Boeing seven

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Speaker 2: thirty seven Max like really started to get out of hand.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, for sure, because like I said, it was a

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Speaker 1: pretty small part of the system at first. It had

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Speaker 1: kind of that one function I think initially, or was

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Speaker 1: supposed to. But by the time you're playing whack the mole,

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Speaker 1: it keeps growing and growing and you're like, well, then

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Speaker 1: the software will solve this problem, and then the software

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Speaker 1: should solve this problem, and all of a sudden as

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Speaker 1: it's interacting with these plane systems. It's a huge part

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Speaker 1: of flying this plane.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, and they had to integrate it with the existing software.

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Speaker 2: They couldn't redo the software or the flight controls or else. Again,

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Speaker 2: you have pilot training that you've just triggered, right, So

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Speaker 2: they were just basically hammering this thing into place as

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Speaker 2: best they could. The way that it finally worked was

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Speaker 2: there were two sensors on the nose that since the

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Speaker 2: angle of the plane right, and when the sensors sent

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Speaker 2: information saying, hey, this plane's at way too steep of

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Speaker 2: an angle, it could stall out if it goes any further.

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Speaker 2: If it goes any further up, the MCAST system literally,

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Speaker 2: like you said, took over the flight controls and then

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Speaker 2: leveled the plane back out. Right. There was a huge

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Speaker 2: issue that they made it. They designed it which still

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Speaker 2: befuddles engineers aerospace engineers today, so that only one of

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Speaker 2: those sensors saying the plane's angle was wrong could trigger

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Speaker 2: the MCAST. Like, there was no redundancy. So if one

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Speaker 2: of those sensors was faulty and the other was fine,

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Speaker 2: it didn't matter. The faulty one was going to tell

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Speaker 2: the MCAST to level out, even if the plane's angle

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Speaker 2: wasn't actually an issue.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, like the whole idea there is, if one sensor

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Speaker 1: goes off, you want to have that other sensor that

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Speaker 1: aligns with it and says, yeah, we're getting the same

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Speaker 1: readings or whatever, which is you know, it's that backup,

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Speaker 1: it's that redundancy that you need. You need that matching

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Speaker 1: data before that thing engages itself. So they said, you

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Speaker 1: know what, we've done our calculations, and we think it's

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Speaker 1: much simpler this way, and the risk of catastrophic failure

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Speaker 1: is quote almost inconceivable. Yeah, I think they figured the

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Speaker 1: probability was one per two hundred and twenty three trillion

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Speaker 1: hours of flight. So they said, you know what, we

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Speaker 1: don't need this redundancy, it's not necessary.

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Speaker 2: Which is still it's just insane, like that is a

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Speaker 2: basic principle. Redundancy is a basic principle of any engineering, right,

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Speaker 2: And it's just I don't I still couldn't find why

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Speaker 2: they made that decision, why it was so much harder

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Speaker 2: for that to have the sensors have to match. It's

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Speaker 2: just nuts. But as we'll see, somebody clearly forgot to

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Speaker 2: carry the one because that that calculation they came up

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Speaker 2: with for that probability was not yeah, correctrect So there

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Speaker 2: was another thing that they did. They didn't tell anybody

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Speaker 2: about the mcast.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, this is the one that really gets me.

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Speaker 2: They created this was brand new. No one had ever

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Speaker 2: created something like the mcast before. It wasn't like they

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Speaker 2: took an existing software and just kind of redesigned it.

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Speaker 2: They made new software to do a brand new thing

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Speaker 2: that hadn't been done before. And then they didn't tell

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Speaker 2: anyone about it. And again, just want to reiterate, the

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Speaker 2: MCAST took over the controls from the pilot. If you

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Speaker 2: were the pilot, you were no longer in control of

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Speaker 2: the plane while the MCAST was bringing the nose back

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Speaker 2: down to a more suitable angle of attack. Imagine that

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Speaker 2: happening and you having no idea what's going on because

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Speaker 2: you don't know the MCAST exists.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, and all of this is because they don't want

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Speaker 1: to make the again, make the plane less appealing to

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Speaker 1: buyers to airlines because they're gonna have to invest a

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Speaker 1: lot of money in like pilot retraining and even as

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Speaker 1: simple things as like you know, flight manuals and stuff

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Speaker 1: like that. Yeah, supposedly, I mean, it was reported at

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Speaker 1: least that Boeing made a deal with Southwest Air that said, hey,

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Speaker 1: if you buy enough planes from us, and if you

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Speaker 1: don't require your special training for the pilots, like save

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Speaker 1: yourself some money, we'll give you a discount on these planes.

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Speaker 1: And Boeing lobbied the FAA, like actively lobbied them to

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Speaker 1: allow them not to make any mention of the MCST

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Speaker 1: in the manual, like we don't even want this in

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Speaker 1: the flight manual, And the FAA said.

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Speaker 2: Sure, Yeah, they said, okay, Boeing told them that it

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Speaker 2: was such a minor part of an already existing system,

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Speaker 2: I think the existing air speed sensor system, that it

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Speaker 2: was not worth mentioning, and the FAA, like you said,

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Speaker 2: they're like, sure, that's fine. They also didn't even put

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Speaker 2: an indicator light for it in there. That's how secret

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Speaker 2: they kept this thing, so you would have no idea

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Speaker 2: it was on right, So this was like that was

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Speaker 2: you might be stunned that the FAA just went along

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Speaker 2: with that. It also shows you that they didn't They

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Speaker 2: had no idea what the m cast was. They didn't

377
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Speaker 2: go and look and say, well, let us see if

378
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Speaker 2: it's actually important or not tell us what this thing is.

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Speaker 2: Later on, FAA officials, some of them would testify they

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Speaker 2: didn't get the mcast, they didn't understand what it was,

381
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Speaker 2: and they really were encouraged not to ask too many questions,

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Speaker 2: so they just said, sure, if you guys don't think

383
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Speaker 2: that it's worth mentioning, we won't make you.

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Speaker 1: Yeah for sure, and you know this is all you know,

385
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Speaker 1: how I mentioned the beginning part of the systemic failures

386
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Speaker 1: of just how things work, So we should talk a

387
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Speaker 1: little bit about that. As far as the FAA is concerned,

388
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Speaker 1: because when they were formed in nineteen fifty eight, it

389
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Speaker 1: was pretty clear right out of the gate that their

390
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Speaker 1: kind of co mandates could often be in conflict with

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Speaker 1: one another, which was to promote the interest of the

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Speaker 1: aviation industry and very important to promote the safety of

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Speaker 1: the flying public. So they knew pretty quickly that like

394
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Speaker 1: those like I said, those don't always align. So Congress

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Speaker 1: in I think nineteen sixty seven said, all right, maybe

396
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Speaker 1: we should have a new agency that really guides the

397
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Speaker 1: safety side. So they created National Transportation Safety Board, and

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Speaker 1: they're like, they'll they'll keep everybody safe and recommend regulations

399
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Speaker 1: to the FAA to enforce, but they can't demand that.

400
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Speaker 1: The FAA has never had to do the things that

401
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Speaker 1: they're suggested to do.

402
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Speaker 2: Right, it's just the NTSB is looking out for the

403
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Speaker 2: safety but the FAA doesn't have to enact it because

404
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Speaker 2: again that might conflict with the interests of the aviation industry.

405
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Speaker 2: And that stuck out to me, Chuck, that the safety

406
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Speaker 2: of the flying public isn't always in the interests of

407
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Speaker 2: the aviation industry. It should one hundred percent of the

408
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Speaker 2: time be in the interests of the aviation industry. Yeah,

409
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Speaker 2: that's just my take, hot take.

410
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Speaker 1: But what ended up happening was the FAA said, all right, well,

411
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Speaker 1: you know, we're good at the industry stuff, so why

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Speaker 1: don't we just let Boeing, like they know planes, why

413
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Speaker 1: don't we let them handle their own certification process. And

414
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Speaker 1: it wasn't. I mean, that seems to be sort of

415
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Speaker 1: standard practice. It wasn't like some big exception was made, right.

416
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Speaker 2: Yeah. No, they have a name for it, organizational designation authorization.

417
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Speaker 2: The FAA can say, like you just said, you know

418
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Speaker 2: a lot about what we want and what we require.

419
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Speaker 2: We're just going to let you go through and verify

420
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Speaker 2: that all this stuff adheres to FAA requirements and guidelines,

421
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Speaker 2: and then you come back and tell us if it does.

422
00:22:18,280 --> 00:22:22,240
Speaker 2: You plane maker, certify your own plane and tell us

423
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Speaker 2: if we should certify it in turn. And that's exactly

424
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Speaker 2: what it is. That's that process.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, they're like, hey, here's what you do. Just do

426
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Speaker 1: it all, then send me an email that just says

427
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Speaker 1: all good.

428
00:22:35,080 --> 00:22:38,560
Speaker 2: Right, write an email to the president, but like it's

429
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Speaker 2: from me, and then I'll sign it.

430
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Speaker 1: So this is part of a bigger problem that actually

431
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Speaker 1: has a name. It's called regulatory capture, and it's this

432
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Speaker 1: idea that when people are working closely together, like the

433
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Speaker 1: FAA works closely with the airline industry and Boeing, that

434
00:22:59,040 --> 00:23:01,440
Speaker 1: they know, they know these people, and they end up

435
00:23:02,960 --> 00:23:05,919
Speaker 1: I don't want to necessarily say sighting, but they end

436
00:23:06,000 --> 00:23:11,240
Speaker 1: up more sympathetic to the industry side than the public

437
00:23:11,280 --> 00:23:14,240
Speaker 1: that they're supposed to be protecting because they don't work

438
00:23:14,280 --> 00:23:16,520
Speaker 1: with the public at large every day. They work with

439
00:23:16,560 --> 00:23:17,880
Speaker 1: these people every day exactly.

440
00:23:18,160 --> 00:23:22,280
Speaker 2: That's the same reason why you should avoid ever agreeing

441
00:23:22,320 --> 00:23:27,760
Speaker 2: to mediation instead of a lawsuit, because the mediators typically,

442
00:23:27,960 --> 00:23:30,400
Speaker 2: even though they won't say they do, they will typically

443
00:23:30,440 --> 00:23:33,320
Speaker 2: work for the people paying them, and the chances of

444
00:23:33,680 --> 00:23:38,040
Speaker 2: your company that say you're going into mediation with hiring

445
00:23:38,080 --> 00:23:41,440
Speaker 2: them again are far greater than you ever hiring them.

446
00:23:41,960 --> 00:23:45,639
Speaker 2: It's not exactly the same thing, but it's they have

447
00:23:45,680 --> 00:23:49,280
Speaker 2: a working relationship that just can't be avoided, and that

448
00:23:49,440 --> 00:23:52,920
Speaker 2: also is supported by another issue called the revolving door.

449
00:23:53,880 --> 00:23:56,640
Speaker 2: Regulatory capture is very much supported by the revolving door

450
00:23:56,680 --> 00:23:59,959
Speaker 2: and vice versa, which is you are a friendly regulated

451
00:24:00,720 --> 00:24:04,480
Speaker 2: and the company you're regulating later on is like, hey,

452
00:24:04,560 --> 00:24:07,040
Speaker 2: we want to hire you. We think you've done a

453
00:24:07,080 --> 00:24:08,879
Speaker 2: great job, and we want you to come work for

454
00:24:08,960 --> 00:24:11,000
Speaker 2: us for gobs of money. And it can go the

455
00:24:11,080 --> 00:24:14,959
Speaker 2: other way too. A friendly colleague can go become a regulator,

456
00:24:15,000 --> 00:24:17,639
Speaker 2: and you know, you just kind of expect them to

457
00:24:17,680 --> 00:24:20,760
Speaker 2: turn a blind eye when you need them to. That's

458
00:24:20,880 --> 00:24:23,840
Speaker 2: just a huge problem, especially when you're talking about huge

459
00:24:24,119 --> 00:24:29,359
Speaker 2: like life and death stuff like designing and certifying airplanes

460
00:24:29,520 --> 00:24:33,040
Speaker 2: or you know, pharmaceutical makers and the FDA. They're frequently

461
00:24:33,040 --> 00:24:36,800
Speaker 2: talked about as regulatory capture and a revolving door.

462
00:24:37,840 --> 00:24:41,440
Speaker 1: Yeah. I mean, I'm just a dummy podcaster, so I

463
00:24:41,480 --> 00:24:43,919
Speaker 1: don't know how any of this stuff works. But it

464
00:24:44,000 --> 00:24:45,920
Speaker 1: seems to me like there should be like a rule

465
00:24:46,040 --> 00:24:50,240
Speaker 1: or a law that says, you know, choose your path,

466
00:24:50,359 --> 00:24:52,680
Speaker 1: Like you can't go work for the FAA for ten

467
00:24:52,800 --> 00:24:55,239
Speaker 1: years and then go work for Boeing right after that

468
00:24:55,400 --> 00:24:58,720
Speaker 1: with some plumb job or some pharmaceutical company and then

469
00:24:58,760 --> 00:25:01,160
Speaker 1: you go work for the FDA. Like it's just such

470
00:25:01,200 --> 00:25:02,600
Speaker 1: an obvious conflict, you know.

471
00:25:02,720 --> 00:25:04,800
Speaker 2: Yeah, I don't remember if you and I recorded the

472
00:25:04,840 --> 00:25:07,160
Speaker 2: episode on it or not. I feel like we did

473
00:25:07,240 --> 00:25:10,640
Speaker 2: years back. I definitely wrote an article about this, and

474
00:25:10,680 --> 00:25:13,600
Speaker 2: people have proposed that over the years. I think three

475
00:25:13,720 --> 00:25:17,119
Speaker 2: years is typically the average, which makes sense, Like a

476
00:25:17,160 --> 00:25:19,800
Speaker 2: lot of people change at a company in three years,

477
00:25:19,840 --> 00:25:23,040
Speaker 2: so that would probably actually do it. But it's just

478
00:25:23,119 --> 00:25:26,080
Speaker 2: like just added to the pile of problems that we

479
00:25:26,200 --> 00:25:29,080
Speaker 2: have to solve to get things on track around here.

480
00:25:31,240 --> 00:25:33,840
Speaker 1: I propose we take a sort of a quicker break

481
00:25:33,840 --> 00:25:37,840
Speaker 1: here than we normally would because we've got the crashes

482
00:25:37,880 --> 00:25:41,800
Speaker 1: coming up. And after that, it's you know, what do

483
00:25:41,840 --> 00:25:42,120
Speaker 1: you think?

484
00:25:42,320 --> 00:25:43,280
Speaker 2: I agree?

485
00:25:43,600 --> 00:25:45,760
Speaker 1: Okay, I'm not quite sure. I was trying to say there,

486
00:25:45,800 --> 00:25:48,400
Speaker 1: but still, we'll be right back and we'll talk about

487
00:25:48,800 --> 00:25:50,399
Speaker 1: what happened with these planes right after this.

488
00:26:07,520 --> 00:26:10,880
Speaker 2: Okay, chuck, So we're back, and we're gonna go back

489
00:26:10,880 --> 00:26:16,119
Speaker 2: to March twenty seventeen, and I guess this month is

490
00:26:16,160 --> 00:26:19,640
Speaker 2: when the FAA certified the seven thirty seven Max eight

491
00:26:20,359 --> 00:26:23,600
Speaker 2: to fly. A few months later, the Max nine was

492
00:26:23,640 --> 00:26:26,840
Speaker 2: certified to fly, and both of these planes, I think

493
00:26:26,880 --> 00:26:29,720
Speaker 2: they were the first seven thirty seven Maxes to hit

494
00:26:29,760 --> 00:26:32,520
Speaker 2: the skies. And one thing you want to point out

495
00:26:32,600 --> 00:26:36,280
Speaker 2: is when the FAA certifies a new plane to fly,

496
00:26:37,640 --> 00:26:43,720
Speaker 2: they and the European the EU Aviation Authority they're basically

497
00:26:44,080 --> 00:26:46,680
Speaker 2: their stamps tell the rest of the world like, these

498
00:26:46,720 --> 00:26:48,960
Speaker 2: planes are fine, you can buy them and fly them,

499
00:26:48,960 --> 00:26:52,040
Speaker 2: you can put them into your airline fleet. Other countries

500
00:26:52,080 --> 00:26:54,480
Speaker 2: have their own aviation authority, sure, but they do not

501
00:26:54,640 --> 00:26:57,560
Speaker 2: have the resources that like the FAA or the EU's

502
00:26:58,359 --> 00:27:02,120
Speaker 2: Aviation Authority have, and so they're relied upon, Like their

503
00:27:02,160 --> 00:27:07,159
Speaker 2: credibility is important worldwide. So this is why. One reason

504
00:27:07,200 --> 00:27:09,560
Speaker 2: also it was such a big deal that the fa

505
00:27:09,680 --> 00:27:11,919
Speaker 2: just completely fell down on the job.

506
00:27:12,720 --> 00:27:16,040
Speaker 1: Yeah, because they're supposed to be the gold standards worldwide,

507
00:27:16,040 --> 00:27:16,520
Speaker 1: like you said.

508
00:27:16,600 --> 00:27:16,679
Speaker 2: So.

509
00:27:16,960 --> 00:27:22,479
Speaker 1: On October twenty ninth, twenty eighteen, Lion Air flight it

510
00:27:22,520 --> 00:27:26,320
Speaker 1: was the seven thirty seven Max eight crashed into the

511
00:27:26,400 --> 00:27:31,879
Speaker 1: Java Sea very shortly after takeoff from Indonesia, and the

512
00:27:31,920 --> 00:27:35,719
Speaker 1: flight crew communicated with air traffic control that basically they

513
00:27:35,720 --> 00:27:38,879
Speaker 1: were having trouble with flight control, they were having trouble

514
00:27:38,880 --> 00:27:42,639
Speaker 1: with their altitude, and then the plane just disappears from radar,

515
00:27:42,720 --> 00:27:46,040
Speaker 1: and I think it was about thirteen minutes later it

516
00:27:46,119 --> 00:27:48,520
Speaker 1: plunged into the Java See at about four hundred miles

517
00:27:48,560 --> 00:27:51,320
Speaker 1: an hour and killed all one hundred and eighty nine

518
00:27:51,320 --> 00:27:51,960
Speaker 1: people on board.

519
00:27:52,040 --> 00:27:55,239
Speaker 2: Yeah. Yeah, and all of this was I think, like

520
00:27:55,280 --> 00:27:57,439
Speaker 2: you said, thirteen minutes after the plane took off. So

521
00:27:57,480 --> 00:28:00,479
Speaker 2: that angle of attack thing. We know enough now to

522
00:28:00,520 --> 00:28:03,440
Speaker 2: know what was going on. At the time, no one

523
00:28:03,480 --> 00:28:08,760
Speaker 2: had any idea what was going on, and so Boeing said, oh,

524
00:28:08,800 --> 00:28:11,240
Speaker 2: there's this thing called the mcast that we put in.

525
00:28:12,119 --> 00:28:15,000
Speaker 2: Just here's some information about it, and if anything like

526
00:28:15,040 --> 00:28:18,359
Speaker 2: this ever happens to you, here's the procedure to override

527
00:28:18,359 --> 00:28:21,400
Speaker 2: it and you'll be all good. Just it was still

528
00:28:21,440 --> 00:28:24,639
Speaker 2: it was pilot error, everybody. That's that's what the problem was.

529
00:28:24,680 --> 00:28:26,000
Speaker 2: That's what Boeing blamed it on.

530
00:28:26,960 --> 00:28:31,200
Speaker 1: Yeah, so that was crash number one. Then, I guess

531
00:28:31,200 --> 00:28:33,760
Speaker 1: about five months later, in March of twenty nineteen, an

532
00:28:33,760 --> 00:28:39,480
Speaker 1: Ethiopian Airlines flight crashed near at Geer, Ethiopia. This was

533
00:28:39,720 --> 00:28:43,640
Speaker 1: six minutes after takeoff, and all one hundred and fifty

534
00:28:43,680 --> 00:28:46,360
Speaker 1: seven passengers and crew obviously on board, died.

535
00:28:46,800 --> 00:28:49,480
Speaker 2: And that what made that crash even worse, Chuck, is

536
00:28:49,480 --> 00:28:54,000
Speaker 2: that those airline pilots followed that procedure that Boeing had

537
00:28:54,000 --> 00:28:58,800
Speaker 2: told the world about after the Lion airflight a few

538
00:28:58,840 --> 00:29:02,160
Speaker 2: months before, and it still didn't work because there was

539
00:29:02,160 --> 00:29:05,640
Speaker 2: a software glitch with the mcass and it kept reactivating

540
00:29:05,680 --> 00:29:09,200
Speaker 2: and reactivating and they couldn't override it, and that's when

541
00:29:09,200 --> 00:29:13,000
Speaker 2: it crashed. So even with this workaround that Boeing came

542
00:29:13,120 --> 00:29:16,600
Speaker 2: up with, it still wasn't fixing the problem. And after

543
00:29:16,640 --> 00:29:20,720
Speaker 2: that second crash, it was quite clear that Boeing had

544
00:29:20,760 --> 00:29:24,720
Speaker 2: screwed up royally, and also that the FAA had let

545
00:29:24,760 --> 00:29:28,120
Speaker 2: them do that and still certified these planes that were

546
00:29:28,440 --> 00:29:31,160
Speaker 2: way too dangerous to carry human beings.

547
00:29:31,640 --> 00:29:34,440
Speaker 1: Yeah, the whole seven thirty seven Max fleet was grounded

548
00:29:34,440 --> 00:29:37,480
Speaker 1: at that point for twenty months. It was the biggest

549
00:29:38,280 --> 00:29:41,120
Speaker 1: sort of grounding like that in aviation history. It took

550
00:29:41,120 --> 00:29:43,840
Speaker 1: out four hundred and fifty planes from the sky, and

551
00:29:43,960 --> 00:29:46,640
Speaker 1: you know, its sindrils ran all throughout the airline industry,

552
00:29:46,760 --> 00:29:51,680
Speaker 1: like travel stock prices, obviously Southwest. You know I mentioned

553
00:29:51,880 --> 00:29:55,920
Speaker 1: like supposedly having that better deal, they had to ground

554
00:29:56,000 --> 00:30:01,120
Speaker 1: I think thirty of their fifty eight plane stop.

555
00:30:01,200 --> 00:30:01,400
Speaker 2: Yeah.

556
00:30:01,440 --> 00:30:04,680
Speaker 1: Fleet, fleet, that's the word, the fleet with the sticks,

557
00:30:04,920 --> 00:30:07,520
Speaker 1: that's right. I mean, it's clear I'm not an aviator,

558
00:30:07,560 --> 00:30:09,520
Speaker 1: you guys. I'm sure that's not a surprise to anyone,

559
00:30:09,920 --> 00:30:12,600
Speaker 1: but governing bodies really kind of came in quickly. After

560
00:30:12,600 --> 00:30:16,040
Speaker 1: that point, they launched investigations not just into Boeing but

561
00:30:16,080 --> 00:30:19,600
Speaker 1: also into the FAA. And you know, they did the

562
00:30:19,640 --> 00:30:21,720
Speaker 1: thing you do, which you start issuing statements like that

563
00:30:21,760 --> 00:30:25,200
Speaker 1: are really angry, and then there are press releases and

564
00:30:25,240 --> 00:30:29,080
Speaker 1: there are denials, and then CEOs come and go. Obviously,

565
00:30:29,560 --> 00:30:33,560
Speaker 1: lawsuits and at least one criminal charge would come and

566
00:30:34,080 --> 00:30:38,800
Speaker 1: regulatory actions. But while this is going on, there's still

567
00:30:39,280 --> 00:30:41,240
Speaker 1: like problems with this plane.

568
00:30:41,800 --> 00:30:44,920
Speaker 2: Yeah. And the reason they grounded all seven thirty seven

569
00:30:45,040 --> 00:30:48,680
Speaker 2: max is everywhere in the world for twenty months. It

570
00:30:48,720 --> 00:30:50,480
Speaker 2: was supposed to be a very short time, but it

571
00:30:50,520 --> 00:30:52,760
Speaker 2: turned out to be twenty months is because these were

572
00:30:52,800 --> 00:30:55,880
Speaker 2: brand new planes that dropped out of the sky. Remember

573
00:30:55,920 --> 00:30:59,120
Speaker 2: that one in two hundred and thirty two trillion chants

574
00:30:59,120 --> 00:31:03,200
Speaker 2: of the function, this is two. Yeah. The the Lion

575
00:31:03,320 --> 00:31:07,120
Speaker 2: air plane had eight hundred hours of flight time. The

576
00:31:07,200 --> 00:31:10,360
Speaker 2: Ethiopian air had just thirteen hundred and thirty hours. Yeah,

577
00:31:10,440 --> 00:31:13,240
Speaker 2: so this happened two times in just twenty one hundred

578
00:31:13,240 --> 00:31:14,720
Speaker 2: and thirty flight hours.

579
00:31:15,000 --> 00:31:15,320
Speaker 1: Yeah.

580
00:31:15,360 --> 00:31:17,640
Speaker 2: Boy, there's some some Josh Clark matth in there that

581
00:31:17,680 --> 00:31:19,360
Speaker 2: we just edited out, chuck, right.

582
00:31:20,960 --> 00:31:24,080
Speaker 1: So in October twenty eighteen, this is a year after

583
00:31:24,120 --> 00:31:27,400
Speaker 1: that Lion Air crash, the CEO of who I mentioned

584
00:31:27,400 --> 00:31:31,360
Speaker 1: earlier at the time, Dennis Muhlenberg, was called before Congress,

585
00:31:31,640 --> 00:31:33,719
Speaker 1: which is what you do. You got to take your

586
00:31:33,760 --> 00:31:35,520
Speaker 1: lumps and go in there and get yelled at, basically,

587
00:31:36,000 --> 00:31:38,160
Speaker 1: and the whole time he's insisting the plane is safe

588
00:31:38,760 --> 00:31:41,320
Speaker 1: and in that hearing and I remember watching some of

589
00:31:41,320 --> 00:31:47,680
Speaker 1: this stuff. Connecticut Senator Richard Blumenthal said after that second crash,

590
00:31:47,760 --> 00:31:49,840
Speaker 1: he met with Boeing reps in his office and they

591
00:31:49,840 --> 00:31:52,760
Speaker 1: said what Josh Clark would say one day is that

592
00:31:52,800 --> 00:31:57,040
Speaker 1: it was pilot air, which like, that's just complete fabrication.

593
00:31:57,200 --> 00:32:01,320
Speaker 2: Yeah, I mean they yeah, it's just so scummy, you know,

594
00:32:01,440 --> 00:32:04,560
Speaker 2: to be that responsible for the deaths of hundreds of people,

595
00:32:04,920 --> 00:32:08,440
Speaker 2: terrible deaths, and then just to blame two people who

596
00:32:08,440 --> 00:32:11,280
Speaker 2: are for people I guess who are blameless, and that's

597
00:32:11,440 --> 00:32:15,160
Speaker 2: just I just think that's terrible. And you might say, well, okay,

598
00:32:15,320 --> 00:32:17,600
Speaker 2: what's wrong with Muhlenberg. He was the one who inherited

599
00:32:17,600 --> 00:32:21,480
Speaker 2: the problem. He's to blame because he didn't ground that

600
00:32:21,640 --> 00:32:25,560
Speaker 2: the seven thirty seven maxes. The FAA made Boeing do that,

601
00:32:25,960 --> 00:32:27,680
Speaker 2: so he had the option to do this. He had

602
00:32:27,720 --> 00:32:29,200
Speaker 2: the opportunity to and he didn't.

603
00:32:29,760 --> 00:32:33,520
Speaker 1: Yeah, for sure. You know, obviously the FAA, we've been

604
00:32:33,680 --> 00:32:36,200
Speaker 1: pretty hard on here, and they were found responsible for

605
00:32:36,280 --> 00:32:39,640
Speaker 1: good reason. There was a twenty twenty congressional report that

606
00:32:39,760 --> 00:32:44,360
Speaker 1: said Boeing in the FAA jointly were responsible for these

607
00:32:44,360 --> 00:32:47,760
Speaker 1: two plane crashes. And the FAA this whole time is

608
00:32:47,880 --> 00:32:50,760
Speaker 1: insisting that it did the right thing. It's like, we,

609
00:32:51,840 --> 00:32:53,640
Speaker 1: you know, did everything like we were supposed to as

610
00:32:53,680 --> 00:32:58,360
Speaker 1: far as certification goes, but it seems to be a

611
00:32:58,400 --> 00:33:02,040
Speaker 1: systemic thing where and stepped forward before this and said,

612
00:33:03,480 --> 00:33:05,960
Speaker 1: you can't allow them to certify themselves because they may

613
00:33:05,960 --> 00:33:08,000
Speaker 1: have been telling the truth when they said they follow

614
00:33:08,000 --> 00:33:10,080
Speaker 1: a procedure, but the procedure was wrong exactly.

615
00:33:10,320 --> 00:33:14,400
Speaker 2: Yeah. So when that report came out, the shares of

616
00:33:14,440 --> 00:33:19,760
Speaker 2: bow of Boeing plummeted as far as fines go and

617
00:33:19,960 --> 00:33:23,680
Speaker 2: actual money that they had to shell out from this. Yeah,

618
00:33:23,800 --> 00:33:27,320
Speaker 2: that FA fined Boeing seventeen million dollars in twenty twenty one,

619
00:33:27,480 --> 00:33:33,360
Speaker 2: seventeen million with an m yeah, for using unapproved or

620
00:33:33,440 --> 00:33:37,160
Speaker 2: non conforming parts or mislabeling the parts. Neither of these

621
00:33:37,480 --> 00:33:40,360
Speaker 2: those things had anything to do with the crashes. So

622
00:33:40,520 --> 00:33:44,680
Speaker 2: Boeing was never fined for those two crashes by the FAA.

623
00:33:45,640 --> 00:33:47,600
Speaker 1: Yeah, was that just them trying to be like, hey,

624
00:33:47,680 --> 00:33:50,120
Speaker 1: let's slap them with something so the public sees that

625
00:33:50,240 --> 00:33:50,920
Speaker 1: had like that's.

626
00:33:50,840 --> 00:33:56,120
Speaker 2: My interpretation, Yes, And that's the the little pussy cat

627
00:33:57,000 --> 00:34:01,240
Speaker 2: bite that they came up with, right, Is that a thing?

628
00:34:01,560 --> 00:34:02,480
Speaker 1: Wow? Sure.

629
00:34:02,960 --> 00:34:05,360
Speaker 2: The other thing is is the FAA didn't start issuing

630
00:34:05,360 --> 00:34:08,960
Speaker 2: penalties like that until the Justice Department filed suit against

631
00:34:09,040 --> 00:34:14,680
Speaker 2: Boeing for defrauding the United States government by saying this

632
00:34:14,760 --> 00:34:18,360
Speaker 2: thing is fine, you can go ahead and certify at FAA.

633
00:34:18,920 --> 00:34:22,239
Speaker 2: And there was actually a criminal misconduct facet to the

634
00:34:22,280 --> 00:34:25,879
Speaker 2: whole thing as well. And I think Boeing negotiated a

635
00:34:25,920 --> 00:34:30,399
Speaker 2: two point five billion dollar payment are fine to the

636
00:34:30,520 --> 00:34:33,759
Speaker 2: United States to basically say like, just here, make this

637
00:34:33,840 --> 00:34:36,799
Speaker 2: go away. Here's some money. They also had to pay

638
00:34:36,840 --> 00:34:40,160
Speaker 2: eight point three billion dollars to the airlines and then

639
00:34:40,440 --> 00:34:44,040
Speaker 2: man the victims families all I think three hundred and

640
00:34:44,080 --> 00:34:47,719
Speaker 2: forty five victims families. There was one hundred million dollar

641
00:34:47,880 --> 00:34:51,480
Speaker 2: pot set aside for them as part of this negotiated

642
00:34:52,120 --> 00:34:55,960
Speaker 2: agreement with the Justice Department. That's the thing that I

643
00:34:56,000 --> 00:34:58,000
Speaker 2: saw though. When I was looking that up, chuck on

644
00:34:59,480 --> 00:35:03,080
Speaker 2: like like a Google search or whatever. Yeah, the reporting

645
00:35:03,080 --> 00:35:06,799
Speaker 2: on it said that Boeing is dedicating one hundred million

646
00:35:06,840 --> 00:35:09,840
Speaker 2: dollars to victims. Families Almost across the board, all of

647
00:35:09,840 --> 00:35:12,960
Speaker 2: the rere like they weren't forced to. It's disgusting because

648
00:35:13,000 --> 00:35:15,800
Speaker 2: it also shows that all of these outlets were basically

649
00:35:15,880 --> 00:35:17,960
Speaker 2: just copying the Boeing press release.

650
00:35:18,400 --> 00:35:22,240
Speaker 1: Yeah, yeah, for sure, you did mention a criminal charge.

651
00:35:22,280 --> 00:35:26,360
Speaker 1: There was one. There was one individual that faced criminal charges.

652
00:35:26,719 --> 00:35:29,840
Speaker 1: It was a former lead technical pilot named Mark Forlkner,

653
00:35:30,600 --> 00:35:34,920
Speaker 1: and he is the guy who convinced the FAA that

654
00:35:35,000 --> 00:35:38,680
Speaker 1: the MCST was not something worthy of including in the

655
00:35:38,680 --> 00:35:41,560
Speaker 1: flight manual. I think it was exposed later on in

656
00:35:41,560 --> 00:35:45,400
Speaker 1: internal emails. He was frustrated about mcast in the email

657
00:35:45,800 --> 00:35:48,239
Speaker 1: and he said, quote I basically lied to the FAA

658
00:35:49,000 --> 00:35:52,560
Speaker 1: end quote. And he was found not guilty of defrauding

659
00:35:52,640 --> 00:35:56,800
Speaker 1: federal regulators. And that was that was the only person

660
00:35:56,840 --> 00:35:58,560
Speaker 1: to be brought up on criminal charges.

661
00:35:58,680 --> 00:36:02,399
Speaker 2: Yeah. After that, the JAY said, Okay, we're closing this case.

662
00:36:02,440 --> 00:36:06,840
Speaker 2: It's done. As you can imagine, the families of the

663
00:36:07,000 --> 00:36:10,920
Speaker 2: victims were not at all happy with any of this. Yeah,

664
00:36:10,920 --> 00:36:14,120
Speaker 2: so the whole thing put to rest. Everybody's moving on.

665
00:36:15,480 --> 00:36:18,360
Speaker 2: This is what was that twenty twenty one, I think

666
00:36:18,560 --> 00:36:22,480
Speaker 2: when that whole thing got settled. Yeah, And then three

667
00:36:22,560 --> 00:36:26,280
Speaker 2: years later, less than three years later, there was another

668
00:36:26,640 --> 00:36:30,720
Speaker 2: catastrophic incident with another Boeing seven thirty seven Max.

669
00:36:31,960 --> 00:36:34,239
Speaker 1: Yeah. And I remember when this one happened, after all

670
00:36:34,239 --> 00:36:37,120
Speaker 1: the other stuff, it was just like what is because

671
00:36:37,600 --> 00:36:39,520
Speaker 1: I mean, I feel like there was this weird certain

672
00:36:39,560 --> 00:36:43,120
Speaker 1: amount of national pride with Boeing even at one point,

673
00:36:43,160 --> 00:36:45,880
Speaker 1: like I remember growing up hearing about like Boeing, like

674
00:36:45,920 --> 00:36:49,520
Speaker 1: this great company of engineers, like these brilliant people. And

675
00:36:49,560 --> 00:36:51,600
Speaker 1: then by the time this happened in twenty twenty four,

676
00:36:52,719 --> 00:36:54,480
Speaker 1: I'm not even in like a plane head, and I

677
00:36:54,560 --> 00:36:56,960
Speaker 1: was like, what is happening with this like once great company?

678
00:36:57,560 --> 00:37:02,760
Speaker 1: And that's when Alaska Airlines flight depressurized rapidly at sixteen

679
00:37:02,800 --> 00:37:06,239
Speaker 1: thousand feet because a door plug blew out and there

680
00:37:06,280 --> 00:37:07,680
Speaker 1: was a hole in the side of the plane.

681
00:37:07,719 --> 00:37:10,520
Speaker 2: Yeah. Door plug is essentially a panel that covers an

682
00:37:10,680 --> 00:37:16,240
Speaker 2: unused emergency exit, and that panel came off, blew off,

683
00:37:16,680 --> 00:37:20,560
Speaker 2: and just by total luck or the grace of God,

684
00:37:20,600 --> 00:37:23,640
Speaker 2: depending on your view, of what's going on behind the universe.

685
00:37:25,360 --> 00:37:28,760
Speaker 2: There was nobody seated right there. Yeah, And the reason

686
00:37:28,800 --> 00:37:31,560
Speaker 2: why this was lucky is because parts of the seats

687
00:37:31,600 --> 00:37:34,720
Speaker 2: were sucked out, and there would be a good chance

688
00:37:34,800 --> 00:37:37,080
Speaker 2: that a human sitting in one of those seats would

689
00:37:37,120 --> 00:37:40,640
Speaker 2: have been sucked out. At sixteen thousand feet, it's mind

690
00:37:40,680 --> 00:37:44,880
Speaker 2: boggling that nobody was killed or I think seriously injured.

691
00:37:44,920 --> 00:37:47,520
Speaker 2: Even than that. It's just it was it could have

692
00:37:47,600 --> 00:37:52,080
Speaker 2: been so bad and lucky for Boeing it wasn't.

693
00:37:52,800 --> 00:37:56,760
Speaker 1: Yeah. Initial reports intigated that they couldn't find the bolts

694
00:37:57,239 --> 00:37:59,319
Speaker 1: that were to hold that plug in place, and then

695
00:38:00,000 --> 00:38:02,560
Speaker 1: apparently there were signs that they never maybe there were

696
00:38:02,600 --> 00:38:05,040
Speaker 1: never bolts in place to begin with, and that a

697
00:38:05,080 --> 00:38:09,120
Speaker 1: Boeing worker removed that door plug for some routine maintenance

698
00:38:09,360 --> 00:38:12,040
Speaker 1: didn't put the bolts back in. At this point, the

699
00:38:12,120 --> 00:38:15,960
Speaker 1: FAA is like, all right, this can't you know? This

700
00:38:16,000 --> 00:38:18,360
Speaker 1: is such a public thing. After the disaster of the

701
00:38:18,360 --> 00:38:22,760
Speaker 1: two crashes, they grounded the planes again. They said, quote,

702
00:38:22,760 --> 00:38:25,120
Speaker 1: this should never have happened and it cannot happen again.

703
00:38:26,160 --> 00:38:30,560
Speaker 1: And when they did follow up investigations, it, I mean,

704
00:38:30,640 --> 00:38:32,960
Speaker 1: it seemed kind of like a clown show going on

705
00:38:33,680 --> 00:38:36,759
Speaker 1: at Spirit Aero Systems that like the factory where these

706
00:38:36,800 --> 00:38:37,799
Speaker 1: things were being put together.

707
00:38:37,840 --> 00:38:40,840
Speaker 2: One of their suppliers, Yeah, this was not good a

708
00:38:40,880 --> 00:38:44,600
Speaker 2: good look. There were assemblers who were in charge of

709
00:38:44,640 --> 00:38:48,799
Speaker 2: putting plane stuff together. They were jump up and down

710
00:38:48,840 --> 00:38:51,239
Speaker 2: on airplane parts and like kick it into place to

711
00:38:51,280 --> 00:38:53,640
Speaker 2: make the drill holes line up the way that they

712
00:38:53,680 --> 00:38:57,240
Speaker 2: should a part like that for something like an airplane,

713
00:38:57,239 --> 00:38:59,680
Speaker 2: and the Boeing of yesteryear would have immediately been sent

714
00:38:59,719 --> 00:39:02,200
Speaker 2: back and supplier would have been sweating that they were

715
00:39:02,239 --> 00:39:05,399
Speaker 2: going to get dropped for somebody else. That's not the case,

716
00:39:05,520 --> 00:39:08,360
Speaker 2: or that certainly wasn't the case with their vendor. Spirit.

717
00:39:09,760 --> 00:39:11,920
Speaker 2: There were other problems that also came up with the

718
00:39:12,000 --> 00:39:15,520
Speaker 2: Max too that were didn't even have anything to do

719
00:39:15,600 --> 00:39:20,319
Speaker 2: with the mcast, but were still both potentially catastrophic themselves.

720
00:39:21,440 --> 00:39:24,479
Speaker 1: Yeah, there was an air pressure sensor that seems pretty

721
00:39:24,520 --> 00:39:27,359
Speaker 1: vital to me as a nonpilot that would ensure that

722
00:39:27,760 --> 00:39:31,040
Speaker 1: pilots had enough air to not lose consciousness. I guess

723
00:39:30,840 --> 00:39:32,279
Speaker 1: in the event of something better, it.

724
00:39:32,239 --> 00:39:34,480
Speaker 2: Should be important to you as a passenger.

725
00:39:33,960 --> 00:39:37,400
Speaker 1: Too, Yeah, it is. They also found loose bolts in

726
00:39:37,400 --> 00:39:42,240
Speaker 1: the rudder system. And by this point, like it's pretty

727
00:39:42,280 --> 00:39:46,439
Speaker 1: obvious that the FAA was complicit and this whole sort

728
00:39:46,480 --> 00:39:49,480
Speaker 1: of shoddy operation going down with the seven thirty seven Max.

729
00:39:51,239 --> 00:39:55,000
Speaker 1: They were non compliant with FAA regulations. And if the

730
00:39:55,080 --> 00:39:58,759
Speaker 1: FAA's saying they don't know about that, then that's on there.

731
00:39:58,960 --> 00:40:03,040
Speaker 2: There was no argument or justification that FAA could put

732
00:40:03,080 --> 00:40:06,480
Speaker 2: forward that exonerated them in even a little bit, you know.

733
00:40:07,160 --> 00:40:10,839
Speaker 1: Yeah, And here's the thing. Before that door plug blew out,

734
00:40:11,600 --> 00:40:14,879
Speaker 1: just before that, the FAA had gone to Congress and said, hey,

735
00:40:15,239 --> 00:40:16,719
Speaker 1: I think it's all good now, can we go back

736
00:40:16,760 --> 00:40:20,520
Speaker 1: to letting Boeing certify their own planes? And then after

737
00:40:20,560 --> 00:40:23,800
Speaker 1: that door blowout they or plug blowout, they withdrew that request.

738
00:40:24,080 --> 00:40:28,320
Speaker 2: And this is the last CEO, Dave Calhoun. The reason

739
00:40:28,680 --> 00:40:31,200
Speaker 2: he was a problem or an issue as well is

740
00:40:31,200 --> 00:40:35,040
Speaker 2: because he didn't change Boeing enough for this door plug

741
00:40:35,080 --> 00:40:38,919
Speaker 2: incident to not happen. So there was there were two

742
00:40:39,000 --> 00:40:43,719
Speaker 2: high profile whistleblower deaths. Thirty two people came forward to

743
00:40:43,800 --> 00:40:50,000
Speaker 2: seek whistleblower federal protection to complain against Boeing. Two of

744
00:40:50,040 --> 00:40:54,479
Speaker 2: them died, and it turns out both of them died well,

745
00:40:54,760 --> 00:40:58,920
Speaker 2: one died by suicide, another one died of MRSA, so

746
00:40:58,960 --> 00:41:03,080
Speaker 2: I guess natural disease. But the guy who died by suicide,

747
00:41:03,080 --> 00:41:05,239
Speaker 2: of course, there was a conspiracy theory that he was

748
00:41:05,280 --> 00:41:09,400
Speaker 2: actually murraid. He had just given a deposition in Charleston

749
00:41:09,520 --> 00:41:12,239
Speaker 2: when he was found dead of a gunshot wound in

750
00:41:12,280 --> 00:41:14,880
Speaker 2: his truck in a holiday in parking lot where he

751
00:41:14,960 --> 00:41:20,120
Speaker 2: was staying after giving that deposition. And apparently there's all

752
00:41:20,160 --> 00:41:24,359
Speaker 2: sorts of evidence, including CCTV or security camera footage that

753
00:41:24,400 --> 00:41:28,040
Speaker 2: show that this was suicide. The point is that doesn't

754
00:41:28,360 --> 00:41:31,960
Speaker 2: exonerate Boeing in his suicide note, he actually named Boeing

755
00:41:32,440 --> 00:41:35,360
Speaker 2: as a huge reason for this, because they ruined his life.

756
00:41:35,400 --> 00:41:38,640
Speaker 1: He said, yeah, he requested to be buried face down

757
00:41:38,719 --> 00:41:40,440
Speaker 1: so they could quote kiss his ass.

758
00:41:40,719 --> 00:41:41,160
Speaker 2: Yeah.

759
00:41:41,239 --> 00:41:45,799
Speaker 1: So uh yeah, it very very sad obviously. So they

760
00:41:45,800 --> 00:41:49,920
Speaker 1: are identifying all these issues with the seven thirty seven MAX.

761
00:41:50,000 --> 00:41:54,440
Speaker 1: The most scathing stuff obviously would come from the NTSB

762
00:41:54,640 --> 00:41:58,360
Speaker 1: because their separate from the AAA, and they basically have

763
00:41:58,480 --> 00:42:03,360
Speaker 1: taken to bypassing the FAA by issuing their own safety

764
00:42:03,400 --> 00:42:06,400
Speaker 1: notices directly and not like going through them. Yeah, and

765
00:42:06,600 --> 00:42:09,719
Speaker 1: I think in June twenty twenty five. Just last year,

766
00:42:10,320 --> 00:42:13,360
Speaker 1: they issued a bulletin of a possible engine problem on

767
00:42:13,400 --> 00:42:14,640
Speaker 1: the seven thirty seven Max.

768
00:42:15,040 --> 00:42:19,359
Speaker 2: Yeah. Yeah, I feel like airlines should should alert you.

769
00:42:19,520 --> 00:42:21,400
Speaker 2: I know they're not going to, but I feel like

770
00:42:21,440 --> 00:42:24,400
Speaker 2: they should give you a choice, like this is a

771
00:42:24,400 --> 00:42:25,680
Speaker 2: seven thirty seven Max.

772
00:42:25,760 --> 00:42:28,480
Speaker 1: Well you can see what plane it is like when

773
00:42:28,480 --> 00:42:29,240
Speaker 1: you book the flight.

774
00:42:29,480 --> 00:42:31,600
Speaker 2: Yeah, that they switch them sometimes too.

775
00:42:32,120 --> 00:42:35,000
Speaker 1: Yeah, I'm gonna start looking though, man, after this, Oh.

776
00:42:34,880 --> 00:42:37,319
Speaker 2: I do, I do. I don't think I've ever been

777
00:42:37,360 --> 00:42:39,680
Speaker 2: on board a Max, but I feel like it's just

778
00:42:39,719 --> 00:42:41,440
Speaker 2: the roll of the dice every time, you know.

779
00:42:42,120 --> 00:42:45,560
Speaker 1: Yeah, I mean, yeah, It's something I'm paying a lot

780
00:42:45,560 --> 00:42:46,840
Speaker 1: more attention to now. Obviously.

781
00:42:47,640 --> 00:42:51,720
Speaker 2: We also can't not mention another thing that happened after

782
00:42:52,080 --> 00:42:57,239
Speaker 2: the Alaska Airline blowout that had nothing to do with

783
00:42:57,320 --> 00:43:01,640
Speaker 2: their airline division or airplane division, but still was Boeing

784
00:43:01,680 --> 00:43:04,560
Speaker 2: and it was a terrible look. It was an aerospace thing.

785
00:43:05,640 --> 00:43:09,040
Speaker 2: When the star Liner test flight to the ISS did

786
00:43:09,040 --> 00:43:10,120
Speaker 2: not go very well.

787
00:43:10,640 --> 00:43:13,200
Speaker 1: Yeah, they, I mean, there were a lot of failures there.

788
00:43:13,560 --> 00:43:14,880
Speaker 1: We're not going to get into all of them, but

789
00:43:14,920 --> 00:43:17,840
Speaker 1: it was a test flight carrying a couple of astronauts

790
00:43:17,880 --> 00:43:21,520
Speaker 1: to the ISS and they ended up stuck there. I

791
00:43:21,600 --> 00:43:23,400
Speaker 1: think it was supposed to be a little more than

792
00:43:23,400 --> 00:43:26,400
Speaker 1: a week and it turned into nine months and SpaceX

793
00:43:26,440 --> 00:43:27,640
Speaker 1: had to go get them.

794
00:43:28,320 --> 00:43:31,799
Speaker 2: It's just not a good look, right, it's not. I mean,

795
00:43:31,880 --> 00:43:35,040
Speaker 2: luckily Wilmore and Williams, the two astronauts made it back

796
00:43:35,040 --> 00:43:39,920
Speaker 2: to Earth safely, and the star Liner uncrude remotely controlled

797
00:43:39,960 --> 00:43:43,480
Speaker 2: made it back to Earth safely. But still it's just

798
00:43:43,719 --> 00:43:46,319
Speaker 2: like your stock price goes down every time. And the

799
00:43:46,320 --> 00:43:48,440
Speaker 2: reason I mentioned it is because every step of the

800
00:43:48,480 --> 00:43:51,799
Speaker 2: way with the seven thirty seven Max, all of it

801
00:43:51,880 --> 00:43:56,320
Speaker 2: followed that like psychopathic corporate logic, where the shareholder's return

802
00:43:56,360 --> 00:43:59,440
Speaker 2: on investment is the most important thing. It is more

803
00:43:59,480 --> 00:44:06,520
Speaker 2: important in morality, safety, practicality, sensibility, anything, right. And so

804
00:44:06,640 --> 00:44:12,520
Speaker 2: the whole like sad trombone like twist, I guess is

805
00:44:12,560 --> 00:44:17,240
Speaker 2: that the seven thirty seven Max cost Boeing investors eighty

806
00:44:17,320 --> 00:44:21,440
Speaker 2: seven billion dollars right over the six years from twenty

807
00:44:21,520 --> 00:44:24,120
Speaker 2: eighteen to twenty twenty four. It didn't make them money.

808
00:44:24,400 --> 00:44:28,440
Speaker 2: It cost them money in share price drops over and

809
00:44:28,480 --> 00:44:32,040
Speaker 2: over and over again, because one thing after another just

810
00:44:32,120 --> 00:44:35,200
Speaker 2: kept going and Airbus was eating Boeing's lunch all of

811
00:44:35,239 --> 00:44:36,120
Speaker 2: these years too.

812
00:44:36,600 --> 00:44:39,239
Speaker 1: Yeah, it's a I mean there's a lesson in there.

813
00:44:40,239 --> 00:44:43,640
Speaker 1: No one will heat it, of course, but there's a lesson.

814
00:44:43,960 --> 00:44:46,839
Speaker 2: Yes there is, Chuck, You got anything else?

815
00:44:47,080 --> 00:44:49,279
Speaker 1: I got nothing else. I mean, they're they're still out there, right,

816
00:44:49,320 --> 00:44:50,600
Speaker 1: the seven thirty seven Max.

817
00:44:51,400 --> 00:44:54,200
Speaker 2: Yeah, they got recertified by the FAA. I think the

818
00:44:54,280 --> 00:44:57,480
Speaker 2: last one was towed out of groundage. I don't know

819
00:44:57,520 --> 00:45:00,480
Speaker 2: if that's the word or not the union saying. And

820
00:45:00,760 --> 00:45:04,320
Speaker 2: it was declared ready for delivery to China on August

821
00:45:04,360 --> 00:45:07,719
Speaker 2: twenty ninth, twenty twenty five. So there is a very

822
00:45:07,760 --> 00:45:10,319
Speaker 2: good chance that you will fly on a seven thirty

823
00:45:10,360 --> 00:45:12,160
Speaker 2: seven Max at some point in your life if you

824
00:45:12,239 --> 00:45:12,799
Speaker 2: fly a lot.

825
00:45:13,080 --> 00:45:13,279
Speaker 1: Yeah.

826
00:45:15,040 --> 00:45:17,200
Speaker 2: Oh, and also just real quick, they also have the

827
00:45:17,280 --> 00:45:19,520
Speaker 2: Max seven and the Max nine are the newest ones,

828
00:45:19,600 --> 00:45:22,880
Speaker 2: and they're having trouble getting those certified because they're having

829
00:45:23,160 --> 00:45:26,279
Speaker 2: an issue that they are can't figure out how to

830
00:45:26,360 --> 00:45:28,040
Speaker 2: fix yet. Yeah.

831
00:45:29,080 --> 00:45:32,239
Speaker 1: Software is a great thing. So I'm not bagging on

832
00:45:32,400 --> 00:45:35,200
Speaker 1: the software industry, but like, I have a car that

833
00:45:35,280 --> 00:45:38,480
Speaker 1: has like a lot of newer cars are like very

834
00:45:38,560 --> 00:45:41,120
Speaker 1: software based, as a lot of people know. Yeah, and

835
00:45:41,239 --> 00:45:42,520
Speaker 1: sometimes it'll just do something.

836
00:45:42,920 --> 00:45:45,040
Speaker 2: Yeah, we had our brick once.

837
00:45:45,840 --> 00:45:48,359
Speaker 1: Yeah, it happens. I've seen it happen in my own car,

838
00:45:48,520 --> 00:45:51,520
Speaker 1: and like, that's not a plane with hundreds of passengers,

839
00:45:51,560 --> 00:45:52,000
Speaker 1: you know, No.

840
00:45:52,320 --> 00:45:54,719
Speaker 2: No, thankfully we were parked and couldn't get it back on.

841
00:45:54,880 --> 00:45:57,680
Speaker 2: But yeah, I can't imagine how terrifying that would be

842
00:45:57,760 --> 00:46:00,200
Speaker 2: if if it happened while you were driving, you know. Yeah,

843
00:46:01,160 --> 00:46:03,520
Speaker 2: we should also say talking about software, it was widely

844
00:46:03,600 --> 00:46:07,920
Speaker 2: reported that Boeing had hired had outsourced their software coding

845
00:46:08,000 --> 00:46:11,840
Speaker 2: to Indian companies to curry favor with India so they

846
00:46:11,880 --> 00:46:15,520
Speaker 2: could sell more jets there. That's true. I think they

847
00:46:15,560 --> 00:46:19,000
Speaker 2: were recent college graduates who were being paid nine dollars

848
00:46:19,080 --> 00:46:22,280
Speaker 2: an hour, who were entrusted with very important software stuff.

849
00:46:22,320 --> 00:46:25,600
Speaker 2: But none of them worked on the mcast, right, which

850
00:46:25,719 --> 00:46:27,560
Speaker 2: was the thing that caused those two crashes.

851
00:46:27,600 --> 00:46:28,200
Speaker 1: Obvious, that's right.

852
00:46:29,680 --> 00:46:32,080
Speaker 2: I think that's it for the seven thirty seven. Max.

853
00:46:33,560 --> 00:46:35,680
Speaker 2: I got to dedicate this one to my dad because

854
00:46:35,680 --> 00:46:38,920
Speaker 2: he's the one who gave me my interest in engineering,

855
00:46:38,960 --> 00:46:40,920
Speaker 2: because he was an engineer.

856
00:46:40,600 --> 00:46:42,239
Speaker 1: All these yehes, I knew that that's great.

857
00:46:42,640 --> 00:46:44,480
Speaker 2: Well, since Chuck said that was great that I just

858
00:46:44,560 --> 00:46:47,600
Speaker 2: dedicated this episode to my dad as foretold in two

859
00:46:47,600 --> 00:46:50,520
Speaker 2: thousand and eight. We just opened listener mail here in

860
00:46:50,600 --> 00:46:51,480
Speaker 2: twenty twenty six.

861
00:46:54,280 --> 00:46:56,680
Speaker 1: All right, this is from Alexa from Seattle. It's a

862
00:46:56,960 --> 00:46:59,200
Speaker 1: short and suitet. Hey, guys, just wanted to add to

863
00:46:59,280 --> 00:47:02,680
Speaker 1: the topic of the cherry blossom trees. And I remember

864
00:47:02,960 --> 00:47:04,879
Speaker 1: when we recorded this, I was like, I know, there's

865
00:47:04,920 --> 00:47:07,560
Speaker 1: some places that are known for their cherry blossoms that

866
00:47:07,600 --> 00:47:10,719
Speaker 1: were not going to mention, and luckily Alexa wrote in

867
00:47:11,560 --> 00:47:14,320
Speaker 1: Seattle loves their cherry blossoms, guys. The quad at you

868
00:47:14,480 --> 00:47:17,920
Speaker 1: Dub is probably the most popular spot for cherry blossom viewing,

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00:47:17,960 --> 00:47:20,239
Speaker 1: and it's always packed with people. All over the city.

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00:47:20,239 --> 00:47:23,120
Speaker 1: You'll find cherry blossoms blooming and events themed around the

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00:47:23,239 --> 00:47:28,080
Speaker 1: cherry blossoms, including food items and anime conventions. Nice cherry

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00:47:28,080 --> 00:47:30,640
Speaker 1: blossoms bloom in the spring when we get random breaks

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00:47:30,640 --> 00:47:34,640
Speaker 1: from the bleak winter weather, and it's absolutely beautiful. And Alexa,

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00:47:34,719 --> 00:47:38,160
Speaker 1: I can confirm, but I think my first two trips

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00:47:38,200 --> 00:47:40,759
Speaker 1: to Seattle were in spring and I got like the

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00:47:40,960 --> 00:47:43,759
Speaker 1: best weather, and I think I saw cherry blossoms and

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00:47:43,880 --> 00:47:46,560
Speaker 1: I was like, what's the deal with this place being gloomy?

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00:47:46,640 --> 00:47:47,880
Speaker 1: Like this place is incredible.

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00:47:48,120 --> 00:47:50,799
Speaker 2: I remember that too. I think we've done at least five,

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00:47:51,000 --> 00:47:53,800
Speaker 2: maybe six shows there over the years, and this past

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00:47:53,840 --> 00:47:56,520
Speaker 2: one in January was the first time I ever rained

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00:47:56,560 --> 00:47:57,560
Speaker 2: while I was in Seattle.

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00:47:57,800 --> 00:48:01,040
Speaker 1: Yeah, we got big time seatle on this last trip

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00:48:01,400 --> 00:48:01,719
Speaker 1: we did.

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00:48:01,960 --> 00:48:05,040
Speaker 2: We did that was smart to choose a Seattle one

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00:48:05,080 --> 00:48:07,239
Speaker 2: because that's where Boeing's from, so that fits this one

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00:48:07,440 --> 00:48:08,000
Speaker 2: very nicely.

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00:48:08,440 --> 00:48:08,960
Speaker 1: Fantastic.

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00:48:10,080 --> 00:48:16,000
Speaker 2: That was from Alexa. That's right, Alexa, send email no thanks, Alexa,

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00:48:16,120 --> 00:48:18,239
Speaker 2: Oh my god. If you want to be like if

891
00:48:18,280 --> 00:48:20,200
Speaker 2: you want to be like Alexa and send us an

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00:48:20,239 --> 00:48:22,480
Speaker 2: email and have us thank you like you're a robot,

893
00:48:22,719 --> 00:48:25,200
Speaker 2: we will do that. All you have to do is

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00:48:25,239 --> 00:48:29,719
Speaker 2: send your email off to stuff podcast at iHeartRadio dot com.

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00:48:34,040 --> 00:48:36,880
Speaker 1: Stuff you Should Know is a production of iHeartRadio. For

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00:48:37,040 --> 00:48:41,160
Speaker 1: more podcasts my heart Radio, visit the iHeartRadio app, Apple Podcasts,

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00:48:41,320 --> 00:48:43,160
Speaker 1: or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.