WEBVTT - RERUN: Hacking for Dollars

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<v Speaker 1>Get in touch with technology with tech Stuff from how

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<v Speaker 1>stuff works dot com. Hey there, everybuddy, Welcome to tech Stuff.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm Jonathan Strickland. I'm your host and the executive producer

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<v Speaker 1>of this show there at how Stuff Works, and I

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<v Speaker 1>heeart radio and a love of all things tech, and

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<v Speaker 1>we are doing another classic episode of tech Stuff hacking

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<v Speaker 1>for dollars. I got to talk with Shannon Morse of

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<v Speaker 1>Hack five and we talked all about how hackers make

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<v Speaker 1>money and both in in legal and nefarious ways. And

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<v Speaker 1>this is going to be the last of our classic

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<v Speaker 1>episodes covering my vacation time, I will be back in

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<v Speaker 1>the studio recording brand new episodes. So I thank you

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<v Speaker 1>very much for your patience. I hope you guys have

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<v Speaker 1>enjoyed this look back on some past episodes of tech Stuff.

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<v Speaker 1>Let's join past Jonathan and Shannon right now. Hi, how

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<v Speaker 1>are you Jonathan, I'm doing great. How are you? I'm awesome. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>thank you so much for having me on. This is

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<v Speaker 1>a great show and I love listening to it, so

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<v Speaker 1>I'm super happy to be on. Yeah, excellent. Now, this

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<v Speaker 1>is of course the second time we've had you on,

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<v Speaker 1>so I will work very hard to to increase that number.

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<v Speaker 1>I want to at least get us up to double

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<v Speaker 1>digits with that. But I got Shannon on the show

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<v Speaker 1>specifically to talk about an area that she talks about

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<v Speaker 1>a lot, the realm of hacking, and specifically I wanted

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<v Speaker 1>to do kind of an episode about how do hacker,

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<v Speaker 1>how do you make money? How do you make a

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<v Speaker 1>career out of hacking? And uh and really to frame

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<v Speaker 1>this conversation, I think one of the most important things

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<v Speaker 1>to do is to sort of define your terms. And

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<v Speaker 1>as it turns out, the term hacker is is actually

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<v Speaker 1>a very broad term that can apply to a lot

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<v Speaker 1>of different things, and not all of them are that

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<v Speaker 1>nefarious evil infiltrate a system and steal all the corporate

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<v Speaker 1>secrets kind of approach to hacking that Hollywood often presents

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<v Speaker 1>right right exactly. I actually asked this question to a

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<v Speaker 1>lot of people, especially when I first meet them. Since

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<v Speaker 1>I'm so closely affiliated with a lot of the info

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<v Speaker 1>set community, I want to surround myself with positive people.

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<v Speaker 1>So you'll notice with the hacker definition, you can either

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<v Speaker 1>get a very negative vibe from somebody or a very

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<v Speaker 1>positive vibe. Oftentimes, with the negative vibe, you'll get somebody

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<v Speaker 1>who says, oh, that's the person who stole my credit

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<v Speaker 1>card data when I went to a restaurant the other day.

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<v Speaker 1>But on the positive side, you'll get somebody that says, oh,

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<v Speaker 1>they're the kind of people that will like break something

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<v Speaker 1>apart and then put it back together in a way

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<v Speaker 1>that it wasn't supposed to be put back together to

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<v Speaker 1>make it do something cool. And that's a hack in

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<v Speaker 1>in mainstream. Uh So that's the way I see it.

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<v Speaker 1>I see hackers as being people who um reverse engineer

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<v Speaker 1>different software, different hardware. It could just be a bicycle,

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<v Speaker 1>for example, and put it back together in a way

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<v Speaker 1>to make it harder, better, faster, and stronger. Nice the

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<v Speaker 1>old daft punk approach, of course, Yeah, I agree entirely. Uh.

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<v Speaker 1>The the original term hacker was really all about people

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<v Speaker 1>who have almost an insatiable curiosity to learn how stuff works.

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<v Speaker 1>Oddly enough, I share that quality, having worked at how

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<v Speaker 1>stuff works for a decade. Uh. But yeah, to understand

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<v Speaker 1>how it works and then to make stuff do things

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<v Speaker 1>it wasn't necessarily intended to do. Not for nefarious purposes necessarily,

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<v Speaker 1>although that could clearly be an application, but just for

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<v Speaker 1>curiosity's sake. Can can I take these elements that are

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<v Speaker 1>meant to do this one thing and do something completely

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<v Speaker 1>transformative with it, whether it is hardware or software. And

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<v Speaker 1>we've seen some really cool stuff come out of that.

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<v Speaker 1>I mean, I would argue that a lot of the

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<v Speaker 1>things you see in the cosplay world and the steampunk world,

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<v Speaker 1>those are all taking elements of hacking. Maker Fair is

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<v Speaker 1>really just a hacker's paradise when you get down to it,

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<v Speaker 1>especially for hardware hacks. Absolutely, I'm kind of sad I'm

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<v Speaker 1>gonna miss Make Her Fair this year. I haven't been

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<v Speaker 1>to one yet. I've been to a small one here

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<v Speaker 1>in Atlanta, very very modest maker Fair. Everyone there was

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<v Speaker 1>great and passionate and intelligent, but it was, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>a much smaller scale than something you would see in

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<v Speaker 1>the Bay Area. But but that's the kind of thing

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<v Speaker 1>that hacker means to me. Now that being said, in

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<v Speaker 1>this episode, we're really going to be focusing on on

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<v Speaker 1>sort of the computer oriented, really the software side of hacking.

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<v Speaker 1>Uh And a large part of it's going to be

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<v Speaker 1>on the the the bad guy, the naughty bits as

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<v Speaker 1>I call it in our notes about hacking, simply to

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<v Speaker 1>talk about what are the ways that hackers cause or

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<v Speaker 1>the malicious hackers cause problems? How do they expect to

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<v Speaker 1>profit from that? And also that, well, we'll look at

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<v Speaker 1>ways that hackers who don't follow that path, who are

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<v Speaker 1>looking to help people, not hurt people, how do they

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<v Speaker 1>make a living? Because it's one of those things where

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<v Speaker 1>you kind of take it for granted when you see

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<v Speaker 1>the Hollywood depiction of a hacker, the person sitting down.

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<v Speaker 1>Usually they're sitting at a keyboard and for some reason

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<v Speaker 1>they're monitor only is monochromatic green. Yes, that's so true. Well,

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<v Speaker 1>they're using the old Apple to E terminals. Terminals are

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<v Speaker 1>actually written and green oftentimes, but you can change the

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<v Speaker 1>colors to rainbow colors if you choose. That is a hack,

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<v Speaker 1>it's a real life hack. Yeah, yeah, And usually you

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<v Speaker 1>see them sitting down and then they cause some sort

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<v Speaker 1>of mischief, sometimes bordering on sabotage. But then you when

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<v Speaker 1>you think about it outside the context of that scene,

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<v Speaker 1>you think, how did they expect to profit from this?

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<v Speaker 1>So that's kind of what we're looking at. Yeah, Because

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<v Speaker 1>it's always important to me to reiterate to that there

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<v Speaker 1>are always going to be two sides of a coin.

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<v Speaker 1>To everything in life. Of course, there are going to

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<v Speaker 1>be bad guys in the realm in the world who

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<v Speaker 1>do nefarious hacks, but there's also a lot of good

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<v Speaker 1>guys too, And personally, for me, the reason why I'm

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<v Speaker 1>so interested in researching this is because it has made

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<v Speaker 1>me a much more privacy and security guard person. I've

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<v Speaker 1>gotten a lot better at my own protections online, and

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<v Speaker 1>I feel like if somebody else can understand what a

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<v Speaker 1>hacker does on the bad side as well as the

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<v Speaker 1>good side, they can better protect themselves too, And that's

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<v Speaker 1>what I've always tried to teach people. Yeah, I think

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<v Speaker 1>all you have to really do is attend one def

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<v Speaker 1>con and really have that driven home. I have not

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<v Speaker 1>yet gone to a def con, mostly because I don't

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<v Speaker 1>know that I could part with my smartphone for that

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<v Speaker 1>long and I certainly wouldn't take it with me. Bring

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<v Speaker 1>a burner phone, you'll be fine. Yeah, that that's me Jonathan,

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<v Speaker 1>the guy who carries the burner. Uh. It makes sense,

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<v Speaker 1>I mean, when you're doing something like that. So, for

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<v Speaker 1>those who don't know, def Con is a large hacker

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<v Speaker 1>based conference largely looking at the realm of information security

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<v Speaker 1>UM and often they will you'll have entire presentations dedicated

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<v Speaker 1>to showing off vulnerabilities and security, again not necessarily so

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<v Speaker 1>that people can take advantage of them, but rather to

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<v Speaker 1>raise awareness and to kind of force the hands of

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<v Speaker 1>the parties that are responsible for that software to take

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<v Speaker 1>action and fix a problem. Right Like, that was what

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<v Speaker 1>we saw with the hack about remotely taking control of

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<v Speaker 1>a person's vehicle. Uh specifically Jeep was really having that issue.

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<v Speaker 1>Those one of those things where the researchers were saying, look,

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<v Speaker 1>we're bringing this to light, not so that we can

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<v Speaker 1>create an era where people are terrified of their vehicles

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<v Speaker 1>that someone's going to take remote control of their car,

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<v Speaker 1>but rather to really drive home the fact that the

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<v Speaker 1>information security is now it's important everywhere. It's not just

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<v Speaker 1>your phone, it's not just your computer. As the Internet

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<v Speaker 1>of Things continues to blossom, it's everything. Yes, I agree,

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<v Speaker 1>And in that sense, those researchers were trying to use

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<v Speaker 1>something the old school term is called responsible disclosure, where

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<v Speaker 1>they explain some kind of vulnerability that they found to

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<v Speaker 1>the company in hopes that the company will fix this

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<v Speaker 1>problem before it becomes mainstream and before it gets out

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<v Speaker 1>into the wild. In the case of Jeep. I believe,

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<v Speaker 1>if my memory serves me right, that Jeep did not

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<v Speaker 1>necessarily release a patch for this vulnerability. So then the

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<v Speaker 1>researchers decided to go out publicly about the information that

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<v Speaker 1>they found, and then Jeep decided to fix it once

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<v Speaker 1>everybody else knew about it, right, And then sometimes that's

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<v Speaker 1>what it takes. And then and I've had the same

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<v Speaker 1>discussion offline with a mutual friend of ours, Brian Brushwood.

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<v Speaker 1>Brian is a stage magician. He has a show called

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<v Speaker 1>Scam School. It's all about social engineering. One of the

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<v Speaker 1>things I have talked about with Brian is that his show,

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<v Speaker 1>he often shows how to do certain types of scams

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<v Speaker 1>or tricks, but they're mostly in the bar bet world, right, Like,

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<v Speaker 1>not stuff that you would do to ruin someone's life,

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<v Speaker 1>but something that you know you might want to you

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<v Speaker 1>might win a free beer that way. Totally use some

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<v Speaker 1>of those myself. Yeah, And he showed off. He had

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<v Speaker 1>an episode where he showed off this guy who had

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<v Speaker 1>was demonstrating a well known vulnerableity of a popular bike

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<v Speaker 1>lock that has been off the market for a couple

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<v Speaker 1>of years because of this vulnerability. But that particular vulnerability

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<v Speaker 1>meant that you could use a regular plastic pen, remove

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<v Speaker 1>the pen part of the pen, use the casing, and

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<v Speaker 1>jam them into the lock and pop the lock open hole. Right.

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<v Speaker 1>And so people were complaining in the comments. They were saying,

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<v Speaker 1>you're you're, you're publicizing this vulnerability. And I said, guess what,

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<v Speaker 1>the bad guys already know about this vulnerability. What they're

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<v Speaker 1>doing is publicizing it to a public that might be

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<v Speaker 1>still vulnerable to it so that they don't fall victim.

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<v Speaker 1>And that, to me is a very important part of

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<v Speaker 1>hackers across the board. They they serve a very important

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<v Speaker 1>purpose to alert folks to potential dangers before it gets

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<v Speaker 1>too late. Yeah. Absolutely, And and you're those hackers are

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<v Speaker 1>the people that are generally working to make a better

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<v Speaker 1>world for consumers, a better about a private and secure

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<v Speaker 1>world for consumers. But then, of course, on the other hand,

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<v Speaker 1>are the batties. Yeah, let's talk about some of them.

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<v Speaker 1>So I kind of gave some weird little titles for

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<v Speaker 1>this when I was typing it up, because in the

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<v Speaker 1>middle of a week, I get bored. Shannon has to

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<v Speaker 1>be honest, And so when I was making an outline

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<v Speaker 1>kind of for us to work from, I started coming

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<v Speaker 1>up with goofy subtitles. So this whole section is titled

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<v Speaker 1>the Naughty Bits in our Notes, and the first one

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<v Speaker 1>is malware moo law as in people who make money

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<v Speaker 1>through the development or distribution of malware. And malware, as

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<v Speaker 1>I've said on this show many times in order to

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<v Speaker 1>define it, it's really software that is intended to do

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<v Speaker 1>something that is ultimately harmful to the person who runs

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<v Speaker 1>that software on their machine. It covers a wide array

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<v Speaker 1>of different sub categories, like, uh, you know, this is

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<v Speaker 1>the sort of term that we normally would have in

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<v Speaker 1>the old days just called a computer virus, But computer

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<v Speaker 1>virus is a very specific thing, and malware covers more

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<v Speaker 1>stuff than just viruses, also worms and all sorts of stuff. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>there's there's malware for Java and Flash. If you still

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<v Speaker 1>have Flash installed, I highly recommend that you uninstall it

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<v Speaker 1>if you don't need it. There's malware for browsers. There's

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<v Speaker 1>malware for advertisements online for sponsors that you'll see like

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<v Speaker 1>on on different websites. That was a very recent problem

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<v Speaker 1>that a lot of news publications had with yeah, big

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<v Speaker 1>name news publicly. Yeah, so that was a big one.

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<v Speaker 1>But you'll see maw'd all over the place, and luckily

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<v Speaker 1>we do have anti malware software that we can use

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<v Speaker 1>to protect our computers from it, and we can also

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<v Speaker 1>block certain ports on the routers that can hopefully protect

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<v Speaker 1>you from Mauer. But there's also a lot of cases

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<v Speaker 1>where maware is distributed and built so quickly that a

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<v Speaker 1>lot of those anti Mauer software are not updated quick enough.

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<v Speaker 1>So in that case, we need to do the best

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<v Speaker 1>that we can to protect ourselves and keep Mauer from

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<v Speaker 1>getting out from the deep web. Yeah, you know, it

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<v Speaker 1>used to be, uh that you really all you needed

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<v Speaker 1>to worry about was just don't go to the more

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<v Speaker 1>seedy elements of the web, and you were generally all right, right, Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>It's kind of like avoiding a bad neighborhood. Like, obviously,

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<v Speaker 1>if you don't want to get robbed, there's certain neighborhoods

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<v Speaker 1>that you should probably shouldn't walk around in by yourself

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<v Speaker 1>at night, right, And this is kind of similar in

0:12:19.200 --> 0:12:21.960
<v Speaker 1>that case where you avoid the deep web unless you

0:12:22.040 --> 0:12:24.400
<v Speaker 1>really want to be on somebody's like hit list or

0:12:24.400 --> 0:12:27.120
<v Speaker 1>something like that. Yeah. Yeah, if you're if you suddenly

0:12:27.120 --> 0:12:29.400
<v Speaker 1>think that you want to come across as a big shot. Look,

0:12:29.440 --> 0:12:32.439
<v Speaker 1>if you're not a big shot. Don't do that. It's

0:12:32.480 --> 0:12:34.240
<v Speaker 1>kind of like, kind of like walking up to someone

0:12:34.280 --> 0:12:36.720
<v Speaker 1>who works in a carnival and claiming that you're with

0:12:36.800 --> 0:12:38.480
<v Speaker 1>it and for it. If you don't know what that means,

0:12:38.520 --> 0:12:41.440
<v Speaker 1>you do not say that. Okay, I think I just

0:12:41.480 --> 0:12:46.480
<v Speaker 1>gave terrible advice to an entire population of listeners. Don't don't.

0:12:46.559 --> 0:12:50.319
<v Speaker 1>Don't talk to Carney's unless you are one. Alright, so, uh,

0:12:50.360 --> 0:12:53.080
<v Speaker 1>and I love you Carney's, I love you all. So.

0:12:53.320 --> 0:12:56.480
<v Speaker 1>The the thing that we're getting across, though, is that

0:12:56.640 --> 0:12:59.719
<v Speaker 1>today that's not as big a guarantee as it used

0:12:59.720 --> 0:13:02.720
<v Speaker 1>to be. Right like ten years ago, you'd say, look,

0:13:02.800 --> 0:13:06.840
<v Speaker 1>just be careful. Don't download unusual files. Don't don't run

0:13:07.000 --> 0:13:11.320
<v Speaker 1>a file that's linked in your email without checking it

0:13:11.360 --> 0:13:14.360
<v Speaker 1>out first. Don't don't, you know, be careful opening up

0:13:14.400 --> 0:13:17.520
<v Speaker 1>emails from things that you don't recognize. Be careful with

0:13:17.600 --> 0:13:22.600
<v Speaker 1>PDF files. Be careful with stuff, especially unsolicited stuff that

0:13:22.679 --> 0:13:26.600
<v Speaker 1>has come to you, because that raises the chances that's

0:13:26.600 --> 0:13:29.480
<v Speaker 1>something hinky is going on. It doesn't necessarily mean it's

0:13:29.520 --> 0:13:34.000
<v Speaker 1>definitely a problem, but it's potentially a problem, and it's

0:13:34.040 --> 0:13:36.720
<v Speaker 1>better to be safe than sorry. Make sure you have

0:13:36.800 --> 0:13:40.079
<v Speaker 1>good and uh anti virus software on your computer, make

0:13:40.080 --> 0:13:42.240
<v Speaker 1>sure you have a nice strong firewall, all of these

0:13:42.320 --> 0:13:45.720
<v Speaker 1>kind of things. Those used to be pretty good at

0:13:45.800 --> 0:13:49.559
<v Speaker 1>keeping of the malware away from you if you were

0:13:49.600 --> 0:13:54.319
<v Speaker 1>being a fairly responsible ned is in these days, they

0:13:54.360 --> 0:13:57.920
<v Speaker 1>definitely help these days. These days, the attacks are sometimes

0:13:57.960 --> 0:14:00.600
<v Speaker 1>getting like in the case of the advertise eismans on

0:14:00.679 --> 0:14:05.200
<v Speaker 1>news sites. These are attacks that are going through avenues

0:14:05.200 --> 0:14:08.040
<v Speaker 1>that you want at one point would have considered perfectly safe.

0:14:08.920 --> 0:14:11.200
<v Speaker 1>Not that it's happening all the time, but the fact

0:14:11.200 --> 0:14:15.559
<v Speaker 1>that it can happen tells you that it requires an

0:14:15.640 --> 0:14:18.960
<v Speaker 1>extra level of vigilance beyond what we used to say

0:14:19.080 --> 0:14:23.080
<v Speaker 1>was was sufficient. Yeah. Absolutely, A data collection for a

0:14:23.080 --> 0:14:27.720
<v Speaker 1>lot of this matare is extremely Uh. It's high sensitive

0:14:27.840 --> 0:14:32.440
<v Speaker 1>in the fact that a user's data can get so

0:14:32.520 --> 0:14:35.160
<v Speaker 1>much money on the on the deep web, so much

0:14:35.200 --> 0:14:39.560
<v Speaker 1>money really, particularly a collection of user data. That's where

0:14:39.560 --> 0:14:42.440
<v Speaker 1>the big money is, right. I did an episode once

0:14:42.520 --> 0:14:45.200
<v Speaker 1>where we tried to break down how much is your

0:14:45.240 --> 0:14:50.160
<v Speaker 1>personal information worth? Yeah, it really depends. It depends upon

0:14:50.240 --> 0:14:53.000
<v Speaker 1>what information you're talking about, Like how extensive is that

0:14:53.040 --> 0:14:56.640
<v Speaker 1>profile on a person? But yeah, it's not much in

0:14:56.680 --> 0:14:58.720
<v Speaker 1>the grand scheme of things like, to you, it's worth

0:14:58.800 --> 0:15:01.760
<v Speaker 1>a lot right you a person, Shannon, you as a person,

0:15:01.840 --> 0:15:04.240
<v Speaker 1>that information is worth a lot of money to you

0:15:04.960 --> 0:15:08.240
<v Speaker 1>because it's who you are. To someone else, it's worth

0:15:08.640 --> 0:15:11.560
<v Speaker 1>pennies on the dollar, really, depending upon depending upon the

0:15:11.600 --> 0:15:16.600
<v Speaker 1>amount of information. But the smellware often is giving hackers

0:15:16.640 --> 0:15:21.040
<v Speaker 1>access to massive amounts of info about a huge number

0:15:21.080 --> 0:15:24.960
<v Speaker 1>of people, and in numbers there is more value, and

0:15:25.000 --> 0:15:27.840
<v Speaker 1>that's where they will sell that. Sometimes they sell it

0:15:27.920 --> 0:15:31.600
<v Speaker 1>to companies that are just interested in getting information so

0:15:31.640 --> 0:15:35.200
<v Speaker 1>that they can do targeted advertising. So it might be

0:15:35.400 --> 0:15:40.160
<v Speaker 1>that the ultimate use of your information isn't as bad

0:15:40.200 --> 0:15:42.040
<v Speaker 1>as it could be. It just means you're going to

0:15:42.080 --> 0:15:45.920
<v Speaker 1>get some ads, but still not fun to think about

0:15:46.080 --> 0:15:48.200
<v Speaker 1>and to think that you know, now these companies have

0:15:48.320 --> 0:15:51.640
<v Speaker 1>access to information about you that you probably would rather

0:15:51.680 --> 0:15:55.920
<v Speaker 1>they not have, particularly in targeted advertising. The famous story

0:15:56.080 --> 0:15:59.480
<v Speaker 1>about target when they started sending ads to a young

0:15:59.560 --> 0:16:03.160
<v Speaker 1>lady that were related to pregnancy, and then her dad

0:16:03.200 --> 0:16:05.480
<v Speaker 1>got really really ticked off about it. But it turned

0:16:05.480 --> 0:16:08.720
<v Speaker 1>out that little girl was pregnant, yeah, and that it

0:16:08.800 --> 0:16:11.520
<v Speaker 1>was it was because the algorithms had picked up through

0:16:11.560 --> 0:16:14.560
<v Speaker 1>her search habits that she was pregnant based upon the

0:16:14.560 --> 0:16:17.640
<v Speaker 1>search terms she was putting in, and so they proactively

0:16:17.680 --> 0:16:21.560
<v Speaker 1>sent her some coupons for pregnancy related items. The dad

0:16:21.560 --> 0:16:24.280
<v Speaker 1>got very upset. Then the dad ended up apologizing to Targets,

0:16:24.320 --> 0:16:26.760
<v Speaker 1>saying that he was unaware at the time of the

0:16:26.800 --> 0:16:30.320
<v Speaker 1>full situation. Well, in that case, it was search algorithms.

0:16:30.360 --> 0:16:33.520
<v Speaker 1>It wasn't a hacker who had gained access to stuff

0:16:33.520 --> 0:16:36.040
<v Speaker 1>and then sold it. But there are other cases where

0:16:36.040 --> 0:16:39.800
<v Speaker 1>that does happen, where you know, just a database of info,

0:16:40.320 --> 0:16:43.120
<v Speaker 1>and a lot of times they will release this malware

0:16:43.240 --> 0:16:46.560
<v Speaker 1>in something that's called an exploit kit. So generally, these

0:16:46.600 --> 0:16:50.160
<v Speaker 1>exploit kits are like a batch of similar malware that

0:16:50.200 --> 0:16:53.360
<v Speaker 1>will work across several different platforms. So that whether that's

0:16:53.400 --> 0:16:56.240
<v Speaker 1>several different types of software like job and flash, or

0:16:56.280 --> 0:17:00.160
<v Speaker 1>several different browsers. It could be several different operating systems too,

0:17:00.320 --> 0:17:03.400
<v Speaker 1>So you might see an exploit kit that works on

0:17:03.840 --> 0:17:09.360
<v Speaker 1>Lenox four but also works on Windows XP up through

0:17:09.440 --> 0:17:12.560
<v Speaker 1>eight or something like that. Right, And what's crazy is

0:17:12.600 --> 0:17:14.960
<v Speaker 1>that when you start looking at I mean, this is

0:17:15.000 --> 0:17:16.600
<v Speaker 1>one of the things that hackers do, right, They'll look

0:17:16.600 --> 0:17:18.960
<v Speaker 1>at operating systems and what the market penetration is for

0:17:18.960 --> 0:17:21.479
<v Speaker 1>those systems because that that's that shows you where your

0:17:21.480 --> 0:17:24.520
<v Speaker 1>target rich environment is. Right, So if you have Windows seven,

0:17:24.840 --> 0:17:30.399
<v Speaker 1>guess what you are prime target for for malware because

0:17:30.400 --> 0:17:34.800
<v Speaker 1>that is by far the largest um that that has

0:17:34.840 --> 0:17:37.600
<v Speaker 1>the greatest market share of any operating system right now,

0:17:38.000 --> 0:17:44.080
<v Speaker 1>Windows XP still it's number three, number three, and it

0:17:44.160 --> 0:17:46.800
<v Speaker 1>has not been supported by Window formed by Microsoft for

0:17:46.880 --> 0:17:51.199
<v Speaker 1>two years. This, by the way, bad thing. If you

0:17:51.240 --> 0:17:54.160
<v Speaker 1>want to be really secure with your your computer information,

0:17:54.200 --> 0:17:55.919
<v Speaker 1>you don't want to be using and operate system that

0:17:55.960 --> 0:17:58.399
<v Speaker 1>no longer gets support from the company that made it,

0:17:59.680 --> 0:18:02.600
<v Speaker 1>because because that means no vulnerabilities will be patched. From

0:18:02.640 --> 0:18:04.639
<v Speaker 1>that moment forward, you're pretty much on your own. You

0:18:04.640 --> 0:18:07.399
<v Speaker 1>have gone into the dark forest, and you forgot to

0:18:07.440 --> 0:18:11.720
<v Speaker 1>bring your flashlight. It's pretty dangerous. UM. One of the

0:18:11.760 --> 0:18:14.040
<v Speaker 1>things that you kind of uh that that I think

0:18:14.600 --> 0:18:16.480
<v Speaker 1>it leads in from what you were saying before with

0:18:16.560 --> 0:18:21.000
<v Speaker 1>these exploit kits. One of the most terrifying aspects of

0:18:21.040 --> 0:18:23.719
<v Speaker 1>this type of malware and and the fact that that

0:18:23.760 --> 0:18:27.600
<v Speaker 1>people can use it for nefarious purposes and monetary gain,

0:18:28.480 --> 0:18:31.200
<v Speaker 1>is that you also have a population of people who

0:18:31.240 --> 0:18:34.160
<v Speaker 1>don't even understand how the malware works. They don't even

0:18:34.920 --> 0:18:38.240
<v Speaker 1>Script kitties is what I'm getting at. Script kitties, that's

0:18:38.280 --> 0:18:42.720
<v Speaker 1>the term we use for people who are, uh, they're

0:18:42.760 --> 0:18:47.040
<v Speaker 1>benefiting from the the work that hackers have done. Hackers

0:18:47.040 --> 0:18:49.720
<v Speaker 1>are the ones who are actually putting together the software.

0:18:49.760 --> 0:18:52.760
<v Speaker 1>They're the ones who have identified the vulnerability and then

0:18:52.800 --> 0:18:55.640
<v Speaker 1>exploited it in some way. Script kitties are the ones

0:18:55.680 --> 0:18:59.320
<v Speaker 1>who essentially they're given a set of skeleton keys, and

0:18:59.400 --> 0:19:03.560
<v Speaker 1>they didn't make the skeleton keys, they're just using them. Um.

0:19:03.600 --> 0:19:06.960
<v Speaker 1>And it's scary because you don't need a level of expertise.

0:19:07.119 --> 0:19:09.280
<v Speaker 1>You might think, oh, well, I'm kind of safe from

0:19:09.320 --> 0:19:12.160
<v Speaker 1>hackers because how many people are actually hackers? How many

0:19:12.160 --> 0:19:16.120
<v Speaker 1>people really know how this system works. Well, you don't

0:19:16.200 --> 0:19:18.040
<v Speaker 1>have to really know how the system works. If you

0:19:18.080 --> 0:19:21.240
<v Speaker 1>have a tool that exploits a vulnerability. Oh absolutely. Although

0:19:21.280 --> 0:19:24.080
<v Speaker 1>I really hate the word script kittie, I will put

0:19:24.119 --> 0:19:27.080
<v Speaker 1>it out there because I feel like if you're interested

0:19:27.280 --> 0:19:31.240
<v Speaker 1>in information security, and if you're interested in becoming a

0:19:31.280 --> 0:19:35.000
<v Speaker 1>good hacker, then you do start somewhere. And everybody is

0:19:35.000 --> 0:19:37.120
<v Speaker 1>going to start with the easy tools that are out

0:19:37.160 --> 0:19:40.080
<v Speaker 1>there and that are available for free. For example, one

0:19:40.119 --> 0:19:42.240
<v Speaker 1>thing that I learned how to use a couple of

0:19:42.280 --> 0:19:45.280
<v Speaker 1>years back was this tool called wire shark. It easily

0:19:45.359 --> 0:19:48.479
<v Speaker 1>lets you see everything that's happening on your wireless network,

0:19:48.600 --> 0:19:51.879
<v Speaker 1>or you can use it for um, any computers that

0:19:51.920 --> 0:19:54.280
<v Speaker 1>are on your on your network, like behind your router,

0:19:54.640 --> 0:19:56.679
<v Speaker 1>so you can see everything that's going on and you

0:19:56.720 --> 0:20:01.439
<v Speaker 1>don't necessarily have to learn or understand what's going on

0:20:01.520 --> 0:20:04.600
<v Speaker 1>behind it to be able to read what's on your

0:20:04.600 --> 0:20:07.560
<v Speaker 1>screen happening right in front of you. I think it's

0:20:07.640 --> 0:20:11.840
<v Speaker 1>really important though, for people who might be called script

0:20:11.920 --> 0:20:16.120
<v Speaker 1>kitties to look at as being beneficial and that they

0:20:16.200 --> 0:20:19.280
<v Speaker 1>can grow from that process. They can start from being

0:20:19.320 --> 0:20:22.000
<v Speaker 1>a beginner and say, okay, well I need to understand

0:20:22.040 --> 0:20:24.280
<v Speaker 1>the theory. Now I can move on from being a

0:20:24.320 --> 0:20:27.800
<v Speaker 1>script kittie quote unquote to becoming somebody who is an

0:20:27.840 --> 0:20:32.240
<v Speaker 1>expert in some kind of information security out there. Yeah.

0:20:32.280 --> 0:20:34.640
<v Speaker 1>I when I think of the term script kitty, in

0:20:34.680 --> 0:20:36.760
<v Speaker 1>my mind, it's a very it's a subset of the

0:20:36.760 --> 0:20:40.840
<v Speaker 1>people that typically get labeled as such. That subset being

0:20:41.320 --> 0:20:43.840
<v Speaker 1>people who have little to no interest in actually learning

0:20:43.960 --> 0:20:48.320
<v Speaker 1>how to hack or program. Uh, people who want a

0:20:48.440 --> 0:20:53.560
<v Speaker 1>very very fast track way to gain either a reputation

0:20:54.280 --> 0:20:57.280
<v Speaker 1>by being the person who took down a system by

0:20:57.400 --> 0:21:00.879
<v Speaker 1>whatever means, or by making a whole lot of money

0:21:00.920 --> 0:21:04.680
<v Speaker 1>really fast for relatively little effort. Those are the ones

0:21:04.720 --> 0:21:07.040
<v Speaker 1>I specifically think of when I think of script kitty.

0:21:07.080 --> 0:21:09.600
<v Speaker 1>But you are absolutely right, you have to start somewhere

0:21:09.760 --> 0:21:12.160
<v Speaker 1>if you're interested in that is. I'm kind of defensive

0:21:12.200 --> 0:21:14.480
<v Speaker 1>with that because I I was called a script katie

0:21:14.480 --> 0:21:17.960
<v Speaker 1>when I first started up started off learning about hacking

0:21:17.960 --> 0:21:21.520
<v Speaker 1>and information security. People would be like, oh, she's just

0:21:21.560 --> 0:21:23.560
<v Speaker 1>a script katty, and I'd be like, well, I actually

0:21:23.600 --> 0:21:25.359
<v Speaker 1>want to understand the theory. I want to learn how

0:21:25.359 --> 0:21:27.360
<v Speaker 1>to program. I want to learn how to code. I'm

0:21:27.359 --> 0:21:30.119
<v Speaker 1>no longer called that because I have learned how to

0:21:30.119 --> 0:21:32.960
<v Speaker 1>write certain kinds of code. I have learned how to program.

0:21:33.000 --> 0:21:35.240
<v Speaker 1>I can make my r do we know, do whatever

0:21:35.280 --> 0:21:37.960
<v Speaker 1>I want. So at this point in my stage, I've

0:21:38.000 --> 0:21:41.760
<v Speaker 1>surpassed that moment of being a nube and I've gone

0:21:41.760 --> 0:21:46.760
<v Speaker 1>on to learning things and being able to understand specific

0:21:46.840 --> 0:21:48.719
<v Speaker 1>tests and get them to do what I want them

0:21:48.760 --> 0:21:51.840
<v Speaker 1>to do without finding tutorials online. Yea, so now I

0:21:51.880 --> 0:21:55.000
<v Speaker 1>make my own tutorials. Seeing Now that's nice because when

0:21:55.000 --> 0:21:57.119
<v Speaker 1>I started at how stuff works. They call me that

0:21:57.160 --> 0:22:01.160
<v Speaker 1>weird bald guy, and today they still do. So some

0:22:01.280 --> 0:22:04.720
<v Speaker 1>labels just stick, is what I'm saying. So yeah, so,

0:22:04.720 --> 0:22:08.040
<v Speaker 1>so that kind of covers the malware approach. People can

0:22:08.080 --> 0:22:12.199
<v Speaker 1>make money through malware, either by selling your information UM,

0:22:12.240 --> 0:22:16.800
<v Speaker 1>they might do so by another method, which kind of

0:22:16.880 --> 0:22:19.600
<v Speaker 1>leads into this idea of ransomware. So this would be

0:22:19.640 --> 0:22:23.760
<v Speaker 1>malware specific type of malware that UM locks down your

0:22:23.800 --> 0:22:26.560
<v Speaker 1>machine in some way so that you can no longer

0:22:26.640 --> 0:22:29.119
<v Speaker 1>access it, and then you essentially get a message saying, hey,

0:22:29.200 --> 0:22:31.199
<v Speaker 1>if you want if you want your data back, if

0:22:31.240 --> 0:22:33.000
<v Speaker 1>you want access to your data, if you want to

0:22:33.000 --> 0:22:35.360
<v Speaker 1>be able to do all this stuff, and you want

0:22:35.359 --> 0:22:37.920
<v Speaker 1>our hands out of your business, then you've got to

0:22:37.920 --> 0:22:41.320
<v Speaker 1>pay us some moolah, some money. Shannon and I will

0:22:41.320 --> 0:22:44.199
<v Speaker 1>have more to say about how hackers make all the

0:22:44.320 --> 0:22:47.280
<v Speaker 1>dollar dollar bills y'all in just a moment, but first

0:22:47.359 --> 0:22:57.880
<v Speaker 1>let's take a quick break. Yeah. So, basically what happens

0:22:57.880 --> 0:23:01.160
<v Speaker 1>with ransomware is, uh, it is just like you said,

0:23:01.200 --> 0:23:04.560
<v Speaker 1>a type of aware that gets distributed in one way,

0:23:04.600 --> 0:23:07.600
<v Speaker 1>shape or form onto somebody's computer and it ends up

0:23:07.680 --> 0:23:10.480
<v Speaker 1>encrypting their data. It could be a whole hard drive.

0:23:10.520 --> 0:23:12.800
<v Speaker 1>It could be a folder of data. It's some kind

0:23:12.800 --> 0:23:16.280
<v Speaker 1>of important data that they have sitting on their computer. Uh.

0:23:16.320 --> 0:23:20.439
<v Speaker 1>And in many cases, a thief the hacker will ask

0:23:20.520 --> 0:23:23.959
<v Speaker 1>them in an email or maybe an encrypted text document

0:23:24.040 --> 0:23:27.760
<v Speaker 1>that's now surreptitiously on their computer out of nowhere, to

0:23:28.680 --> 0:23:31.080
<v Speaker 1>send them a certain amount of bitcoins, and they tell

0:23:31.119 --> 0:23:33.000
<v Speaker 1>them how to set up a bitcoin wallets so that

0:23:33.040 --> 0:23:35.600
<v Speaker 1>they can send the bitcoins to them for them to

0:23:35.640 --> 0:23:39.160
<v Speaker 1>get a pass code to unlock their encrypted data. Now,

0:23:39.200 --> 0:23:42.040
<v Speaker 1>the weird part is they already own this data is

0:23:42.040 --> 0:23:44.120
<v Speaker 1>on their own hard drive. It could be anything from

0:23:44.119 --> 0:23:46.959
<v Speaker 1>like kids photos, it could be tax documents. But in

0:23:47.000 --> 0:23:48.960
<v Speaker 1>any case, it's going to be some kind of important

0:23:49.000 --> 0:23:52.040
<v Speaker 1>information that people don't want to lose because it might

0:23:52.080 --> 0:23:55.280
<v Speaker 1>be years and years of information that's just on that computer.

0:23:55.880 --> 0:23:58.159
<v Speaker 1>So of course people are going to send them bitcoins.

0:23:58.560 --> 0:24:00.919
<v Speaker 1>And I think last night Act to Bitcoin was a

0:24:00.960 --> 0:24:03.000
<v Speaker 1>few hundred bucks, so it ends up being quite a

0:24:03.000 --> 0:24:04.680
<v Speaker 1>bit of money that they have to send to get

0:24:04.680 --> 0:24:08.000
<v Speaker 1>their information unlocked. Yeah, and this is this is the

0:24:08.000 --> 0:24:12.040
<v Speaker 1>type of malware. When we were talking about the advertising

0:24:12.119 --> 0:24:15.679
<v Speaker 1>that was targeting people through massive news sites. If I'm

0:24:15.720 --> 0:24:19.159
<v Speaker 1>not mistaken. It was specifically ransomware. It was the kind

0:24:19.160 --> 0:24:23.240
<v Speaker 1>of stuff that was encrypting users. Uh yeah, yeah, so

0:24:23.280 --> 0:24:26.679
<v Speaker 1>it wasn't just malware. It was ransomware that was infecting computers.

0:24:26.720 --> 0:24:28.640
<v Speaker 1>Because malware can do other stuff too, right, it can

0:24:28.800 --> 0:24:34.160
<v Speaker 1>It can create something like a backdoor access. So yeah,

0:24:34.359 --> 0:24:36.880
<v Speaker 1>hackers can take control of your machine or just monitor

0:24:36.920 --> 0:24:38.879
<v Speaker 1>what you're doing. Even if they don't want to take control.

0:24:39.240 --> 0:24:41.360
<v Speaker 1>They can put in key loggers so they can see

0:24:41.359 --> 0:24:44.200
<v Speaker 1>what all your passwords are. Um, so you might want

0:24:44.200 --> 0:24:47.480
<v Speaker 1>to think about using things like a really good password manager.

0:24:48.040 --> 0:24:51.399
<v Speaker 1>UM that's what I use and and I love mine.

0:24:52.000 --> 0:24:55.600
<v Speaker 1>Uh yeah, so the things where you don't have to

0:24:55.600 --> 0:24:57.360
<v Speaker 1>type the password and so you don't have to worry

0:24:57.359 --> 0:24:59.399
<v Speaker 1>about key loggers picking up on that kind of stuff.

0:25:01.000 --> 0:25:03.240
<v Speaker 1>But we'll talk more about that in just a second.

0:25:03.359 --> 0:25:05.440
<v Speaker 1>So one of the other ones I wanted to talk about,

0:25:05.480 --> 0:25:07.959
<v Speaker 1>This one is kind of a gray area because, uh,

0:25:08.119 --> 0:25:12.399
<v Speaker 1>this is this. I titled this section spies like us um,

0:25:12.400 --> 0:25:16.480
<v Speaker 1>and by this I meant state sponsored hackers. People who

0:25:16.560 --> 0:25:21.960
<v Speaker 1>are hacking on behalf of a specific state or nation

0:25:22.080 --> 0:25:25.840
<v Speaker 1>or government. Um. Sometimes they may be doing so not

0:25:26.040 --> 0:25:29.760
<v Speaker 1>with the Uh why should I say like, not with

0:25:29.840 --> 0:25:33.760
<v Speaker 1>the express permission of the nation. It may turn out

0:25:33.800 --> 0:25:36.040
<v Speaker 1>that the state says, hey, we didn't tell them to

0:25:36.080 --> 0:25:38.280
<v Speaker 1>do this. They're just doing it because they love us

0:25:38.359 --> 0:25:41.560
<v Speaker 1>so much and they hate and they hate you guys,

0:25:42.119 --> 0:25:44.960
<v Speaker 1>and that's why they're doing it. Um. Whether that's true

0:25:45.040 --> 0:25:48.119
<v Speaker 1>or not depends upon the situation. I would I would

0:25:48.280 --> 0:25:51.399
<v Speaker 1>think that if I were running a government and I

0:25:51.440 --> 0:25:55.480
<v Speaker 1>had employed a bunch of hackers to infiltrate or sabotage

0:25:55.960 --> 0:25:59.680
<v Speaker 1>another nations systems, I also would like some plausible deniability

0:25:59.680 --> 0:26:03.040
<v Speaker 1>in their Hey, I didn't tell him to do it.

0:26:03.119 --> 0:26:05.640
<v Speaker 1>I just said, man, it's It's kind of like there's

0:26:05.720 --> 0:26:09.840
<v Speaker 1>there's a story that a king of England once yelled out,

0:26:09.880 --> 0:26:12.640
<v Speaker 1>who will rid me of this meddlesome priest? And then

0:26:12.640 --> 0:26:15.119
<v Speaker 1>a couple of nights went often ridded him of his

0:26:15.480 --> 0:26:18.520
<v Speaker 1>that meddlesome priest, and it turned out that he was

0:26:18.760 --> 0:26:22.840
<v Speaker 1>he was just mad and just talking out loud. And

0:26:22.880 --> 0:26:25.360
<v Speaker 1>then one of his dearest friends ended up being murdered

0:26:25.400 --> 0:26:27.640
<v Speaker 1>by a couple of nights because they heard the guy

0:26:27.720 --> 0:26:29.359
<v Speaker 1>talking and said, hey, we should get rid of them.

0:26:29.359 --> 0:26:32.280
<v Speaker 1>We'll get rewarded. Um. That's why the states argue, I

0:26:32.280 --> 0:26:34.440
<v Speaker 1>don't know that that's always the case. Also, by the way,

0:26:34.560 --> 0:26:37.119
<v Speaker 1>for you listeners out there who recognize who I'm talking about,

0:26:37.160 --> 0:26:39.439
<v Speaker 1>send me an email and prove it, because I'm a

0:26:39.480 --> 0:26:43.199
<v Speaker 1>medievalist and I love that stuff. Um. But yeah, this

0:26:43.280 --> 0:26:45.439
<v Speaker 1>is something that we see. You know, you often will

0:26:45.440 --> 0:26:47.760
<v Speaker 1>hear stories about Chinese hackers or Russian hackers. There was

0:26:47.800 --> 0:26:52.679
<v Speaker 1>a story, UH several years ago about how UH information

0:26:52.720 --> 0:26:57.200
<v Speaker 1>security experts were noticing some artifacts in our power grid

0:26:57.280 --> 0:27:02.080
<v Speaker 1>system that were indicative of UH people who had infiltrated

0:27:02.119 --> 0:27:04.359
<v Speaker 1>that system and planted some stuff in there so that

0:27:04.400 --> 0:27:07.440
<v Speaker 1>they could monitor things or perhaps even jump back into

0:27:07.440 --> 0:27:10.560
<v Speaker 1>the power grid system should UH push come to shove

0:27:10.600 --> 0:27:13.439
<v Speaker 1>in some sort of political situation. They had traced it

0:27:13.480 --> 0:27:16.439
<v Speaker 1>back to either China or Russia. It's pretty tricky to

0:27:16.600 --> 0:27:20.399
<v Speaker 1>actually figure out where attacks ultimately originate from, because if

0:27:20.400 --> 0:27:23.680
<v Speaker 1>you're really good, you can cover your tracks pretty well. Um.

0:27:23.920 --> 0:27:26.359
<v Speaker 1>But the United States has done it too. You might

0:27:26.400 --> 0:27:29.080
<v Speaker 1>have heard about Stuck's Net. That was the that was

0:27:29.119 --> 0:27:32.879
<v Speaker 1>the computer virus that was designed to um to to

0:27:33.119 --> 0:27:37.000
<v Speaker 1>spin a centrifuge in a nuclear facility at a speed

0:27:37.160 --> 0:27:40.280
<v Speaker 1>greater than what it was supposed to spin at, and

0:27:40.440 --> 0:27:42.720
<v Speaker 1>originally I think the hope was that it would cause

0:27:42.760 --> 0:27:47.480
<v Speaker 1>a catastrophic failure and perhaps perhaps even destroy the facility.

0:27:47.800 --> 0:27:50.320
<v Speaker 1>As it turned out, it caused a failure, but not

0:27:50.440 --> 0:27:54.440
<v Speaker 1>at that level. But that those are examples of something

0:27:54.440 --> 0:27:59.480
<v Speaker 1>that's technically legal within the country because it's it's endorsed

0:27:59.600 --> 0:28:04.800
<v Speaker 1>or at least permitted by a government, but you don't

0:28:04.840 --> 0:28:08.160
<v Speaker 1>want it out there because it seems pretty darn shady

0:28:08.240 --> 0:28:13.200
<v Speaker 1>to anybody else. Yeah. Yeah, So state sponsored hacks are

0:28:13.560 --> 0:28:18.040
<v Speaker 1>more worrisome to me because they oftentimes have much larger targets.

0:28:18.640 --> 0:28:22.800
<v Speaker 1>For example, they might target a large government facility, like

0:28:23.080 --> 0:28:26.280
<v Speaker 1>I don't know, the Pentagon, So I worried about those

0:28:26.359 --> 0:28:30.240
<v Speaker 1>because those kind of servers have a lot of information

0:28:30.280 --> 0:28:33.119
<v Speaker 1>on the citizens of any sort of country. Uh So,

0:28:33.160 --> 0:28:35.920
<v Speaker 1>anytime you see these in the news, it's it's always like, oh, well,

0:28:36.000 --> 0:28:39.720
<v Speaker 1>this this hack was done by Chinese state sponsored hackers,

0:28:39.840 --> 0:28:44.200
<v Speaker 1>or Russian state sponsored hackers, or American state sponsored hackers,

0:28:44.200 --> 0:28:47.520
<v Speaker 1>and these are Korea. North Korea would be another big one. Yeah. Yeah,

0:28:47.560 --> 0:28:50.800
<v Speaker 1>So so they are either it might be a tinam

0:28:50.800 --> 0:28:54.400
<v Speaker 1>of hackers that are kind of comprised together in a

0:28:54.640 --> 0:28:58.560
<v Speaker 1>illegitimate company who are hired by a government or like

0:28:58.640 --> 0:29:02.920
<v Speaker 1>you say, where they may not necessarily have any affiliation

0:29:03.120 --> 0:29:07.160
<v Speaker 1>quote unquote with the government, but the government ends them

0:29:07.160 --> 0:29:10.320
<v Speaker 1>paying them in some way, shape or form for their

0:29:10.400 --> 0:29:13.640
<v Speaker 1>infiltration because it ends up helping the government in some

0:29:13.680 --> 0:29:17.320
<v Speaker 1>way or another. And so it's it's a very sticky

0:29:17.360 --> 0:29:20.240
<v Speaker 1>scenario when you start dealing with these state sponsored hackers,

0:29:20.280 --> 0:29:24.160
<v Speaker 1>because it's it's hard to understand, Um, how are we

0:29:24.200 --> 0:29:27.360
<v Speaker 1>going to, you know, penalize them? Who do we penalize

0:29:27.360 --> 0:29:30.080
<v Speaker 1>Do we penalize government or the hackers themselves? Are both?

0:29:30.320 --> 0:29:33.200
<v Speaker 1>Like who was actually involved? It might end up being

0:29:33.320 --> 0:29:36.320
<v Speaker 1>how do we address the underlying situation that led to

0:29:36.400 --> 0:29:40.680
<v Speaker 1>the employment of hackers in the first place? Um, which

0:29:40.800 --> 0:29:45.720
<v Speaker 1>can get pretty pretty delicate. Another great example or him

0:29:45.760 --> 0:29:48.600
<v Speaker 1>not too long ago, or at least one that may

0:29:48.720 --> 0:29:51.160
<v Speaker 1>or may not have been involved in may or may

0:29:51.200 --> 0:29:53.600
<v Speaker 1>not have involved a state sponsored hacker I'm still somewhat

0:29:54.600 --> 0:29:58.120
<v Speaker 1>skeptical of that would be the Sony hack. Oh yeah,

0:29:58.320 --> 0:30:01.520
<v Speaker 1>because the Sony hack, the Wes government essentially was pointing

0:30:01.520 --> 0:30:04.240
<v Speaker 1>fingers to North Korea, saying the hackers must have come

0:30:04.280 --> 0:30:07.200
<v Speaker 1>from North Korea. Look at this IP address, which we

0:30:07.240 --> 0:30:09.840
<v Speaker 1>don't even need to go into detail right now, except

0:30:09.840 --> 0:30:12.520
<v Speaker 1>to say that an IP address does not proof make

0:30:12.800 --> 0:30:16.200
<v Speaker 1>But at any rate, they're they're pointing over at North

0:30:16.280 --> 0:30:18.760
<v Speaker 1>Korea saying, we think the attacks came from there. The

0:30:19.000 --> 0:30:22.080
<v Speaker 1>attack appears to be politically motivated North Korea for its part,

0:30:22.120 --> 0:30:24.720
<v Speaker 1>the government, which, by the way, North Korea not shy

0:30:24.840 --> 0:30:27.920
<v Speaker 1>about taking credit for stuff. But they said, no, no,

0:30:28.040 --> 0:30:30.240
<v Speaker 1>we didn't. We we didn't ask for this, but we're

0:30:30.280 --> 0:30:34.800
<v Speaker 1>totally cool with it happening. Um, So you know, it's

0:30:34.800 --> 0:30:37.000
<v Speaker 1>one of those. It's also very muddy because obviously when

0:30:37.040 --> 0:30:39.600
<v Speaker 1>you're talking about things like espionage or sabotage or any

0:30:39.640 --> 0:30:43.400
<v Speaker 1>of those things, Uh, you don't. You don't come out

0:30:43.440 --> 0:30:45.600
<v Speaker 1>and talk more about it, you don't. That ends up

0:30:45.640 --> 0:30:48.360
<v Speaker 1>being closed away. Um. In fact, I should, I should

0:30:48.360 --> 0:30:50.240
<v Speaker 1>really throw that over to the stuff they don't want

0:30:50.280 --> 0:30:52.240
<v Speaker 1>you to know guys and have them do an episode

0:30:52.280 --> 0:30:54.960
<v Speaker 1>on it, because I would be a lot of fun. Uh.

0:30:55.040 --> 0:30:59.680
<v Speaker 1>And then we've got got the the traditional at least,

0:30:59.680 --> 0:31:02.200
<v Speaker 1>I would argue the traditional concept of a hacker from

0:31:02.200 --> 0:31:06.120
<v Speaker 1>the Hollywood perspective. The black hats, the ones that are

0:31:06.160 --> 0:31:08.280
<v Speaker 1>wearing the hoodies and they're sitting at a keyboard and

0:31:08.280 --> 0:31:13.000
<v Speaker 1>they're typing really fast on a green and black screen over. Yes,

0:31:13.120 --> 0:31:18.720
<v Speaker 1>they've got got some junk food snail and they have

0:31:18.760 --> 0:31:21.320
<v Speaker 1>a ton of different windows popping up on their computer

0:31:21.400 --> 0:31:24.240
<v Speaker 1>really really fast. You can't make out anything that's happening.

0:31:24.440 --> 0:31:27.800
<v Speaker 1>It's entirely not true. That's not how it works. It's

0:31:27.840 --> 0:31:32.200
<v Speaker 1>actually a somewhat slow process to get um basically, to

0:31:32.280 --> 0:31:35.600
<v Speaker 1>get reconnaissance and to get into any kind of network. Uh.

0:31:35.640 --> 0:31:38.400
<v Speaker 1>The only things I've done, of course, are completely legal.

0:31:38.880 --> 0:31:42.160
<v Speaker 1>I've had an authorization by everybody who I have tested

0:31:42.240 --> 0:31:47.560
<v Speaker 1>my my abilities on. Right. Yeah, so black hats, that's

0:31:47.560 --> 0:31:51.760
<v Speaker 1>that's another awkward definition because it's not one that I

0:31:51.880 --> 0:31:54.240
<v Speaker 1>like to use all the time because black hat hacker

0:31:54.360 --> 0:31:58.200
<v Speaker 1>means that there's it makes hackers have more of a

0:31:58.280 --> 0:32:01.320
<v Speaker 1>negative appeal to a lot of people. So I always

0:32:01.360 --> 0:32:04.160
<v Speaker 1>just call them black hat thiefs. Yeah. No, that's a

0:32:04.160 --> 0:32:07.120
<v Speaker 1>great way of putting it, because, uh, typically you'll see

0:32:07.160 --> 0:32:10.440
<v Speaker 1>things like um uh, the idea of infiltrating a system

0:32:10.480 --> 0:32:12.880
<v Speaker 1>in order to steal information, perhaps to sell it to

0:32:12.920 --> 0:32:16.080
<v Speaker 1>someone else, or to hold it against the party that

0:32:16.120 --> 0:32:19.280
<v Speaker 1>you've stolen it from. Um, you know, so it might

0:32:19.280 --> 0:32:24.720
<v Speaker 1>be extortion as opposed to uh to stealing and selling. Uh. Also,

0:32:24.800 --> 0:32:27.080
<v Speaker 1>we should go ahead and point out something else that

0:32:27.120 --> 0:32:30.280
<v Speaker 1>I'll talk about in a future episode, but I've mentioned

0:32:30.280 --> 0:32:33.640
<v Speaker 1>it in previous ones too. Um. Hackers don't necessarily just

0:32:33.680 --> 0:32:36.800
<v Speaker 1>sit at a keyboard and type in strings of letters

0:32:36.800 --> 0:32:39.160
<v Speaker 1>and numbers. They also do a lot of social engineering

0:32:39.240 --> 0:32:41.920
<v Speaker 1>where or they can do a lot of social engineering

0:32:41.960 --> 0:32:45.040
<v Speaker 1>where they attempt to gain access to systems, either by

0:32:45.120 --> 0:32:49.200
<v Speaker 1>physically gaining access to a system, which makes it way

0:32:49.200 --> 0:32:53.400
<v Speaker 1>easier than remotely doing it um, or even easier than

0:32:53.400 --> 0:32:55.960
<v Speaker 1>that manipulating someone who does have access to a system,

0:32:56.000 --> 0:32:58.200
<v Speaker 1>and then you get it that way. Um. And it's

0:32:58.240 --> 0:33:03.320
<v Speaker 1>surprisingly easy to do if employees have not been educated

0:33:03.520 --> 0:33:06.600
<v Speaker 1>on how to spot that and avoid it. Yeah, properly

0:33:06.640 --> 0:33:09.600
<v Speaker 1>training your your your employees at your place of work

0:33:09.720 --> 0:33:12.440
<v Speaker 1>is really important when it comes to social engineering. And

0:33:12.920 --> 0:33:16.720
<v Speaker 1>it is incredibly easy to do social engineering, especially when

0:33:16.760 --> 0:33:20.200
<v Speaker 1>you're a female, I would imagine. So it turns out

0:33:20.240 --> 0:33:23.960
<v Speaker 1>also if you are dressed as the stereotypical I T

0:33:24.120 --> 0:33:28.480
<v Speaker 1>guy and you are there to quote unquote upgrade someone's machine,

0:33:29.240 --> 0:33:32.040
<v Speaker 1>really easy to get access to that machine. People are

0:33:32.440 --> 0:33:38.040
<v Speaker 1>so eager. Yeah, and obviously, like social engineering, completely depends

0:33:38.120 --> 0:33:43.640
<v Speaker 1>upon identifying and then exploiting a person's vulnerability and typically

0:33:43.680 --> 0:33:47.840
<v Speaker 1>speaking like greed lust, those are two big ones that

0:33:48.400 --> 0:33:51.680
<v Speaker 1>are exploitable, and that the people who are really good

0:33:51.680 --> 0:33:54.320
<v Speaker 1>at social engineering know that, and they're very good at

0:33:54.320 --> 0:33:58.720
<v Speaker 1>that leveraging that. Just as knowing what sort of vulnerabilities

0:33:58.760 --> 0:34:02.600
<v Speaker 1>typically show up within code, within within programs, you need

0:34:02.640 --> 0:34:06.520
<v Speaker 1>to know what vulnerabilities show up in people. UM And

0:34:06.760 --> 0:34:08.399
<v Speaker 1>I also I had a little thing on here about

0:34:08.480 --> 0:34:11.120
<v Speaker 1>botan net masters. Really what in this I was thinking

0:34:11.120 --> 0:34:13.120
<v Speaker 1>about the people who are using malware to get that

0:34:13.160 --> 0:34:15.839
<v Speaker 1>back door access to machines, to get UH, to get

0:34:15.840 --> 0:34:20.640
<v Speaker 1>that administrative control over a wide array. Sometimes we call

0:34:20.680 --> 0:34:22.560
<v Speaker 1>it a boton net. Sometimes we call it a zombie

0:34:22.640 --> 0:34:26.799
<v Speaker 1>army of of user computers, and then utilizing that to

0:34:26.880 --> 0:34:32.120
<v Speaker 1>do stuff like UH distributed denial of service attacks or

0:34:32.200 --> 0:34:36.600
<v Speaker 1>de DOS attacks, where you are UH directing an army

0:34:36.880 --> 0:34:42.279
<v Speaker 1>essentially to coordinate an attack against an identified target. Sometimes

0:34:42.320 --> 0:34:45.480
<v Speaker 1>this is done just to cause problems. I mean, obviously,

0:34:45.520 --> 0:34:50.320
<v Speaker 1>if you've ever had issues logging into like a gaming network,

0:34:50.760 --> 0:34:53.319
<v Speaker 1>Xbox Live has had this happen, PlayStation has had this

0:34:53.400 --> 0:34:57.719
<v Speaker 1>happen where people who are disenchanted with the service for

0:34:57.760 --> 0:35:00.440
<v Speaker 1>one reason or another, or they just want to do

0:35:00.480 --> 0:35:04.719
<v Speaker 1>it for the lulls. Uh, specifically around holiday times. That's

0:35:04.760 --> 0:35:07.879
<v Speaker 1>a big that's a big target time to attack something

0:35:07.920 --> 0:35:10.880
<v Speaker 1>like Xbox Live. They'll direct a ton of traffic to

0:35:11.120 --> 0:35:14.720
<v Speaker 1>break down servers, so servers can't respond to legitimate traffic

0:35:14.719 --> 0:35:18.200
<v Speaker 1>because they're too busy responding to a bunch of fake traffic. Essentially,

0:35:18.920 --> 0:35:22.360
<v Speaker 1>I'm oversimplifying, but this is a basic detos attack. It is.

0:35:22.400 --> 0:35:24.359
<v Speaker 1>It's such a mean thing to do to those little

0:35:24.400 --> 0:35:27.360
<v Speaker 1>kids during Christmas times, turn off their xboxes so that

0:35:27.400 --> 0:35:29.440
<v Speaker 1>they can't log in and they can't play their games,

0:35:29.480 --> 0:35:32.799
<v Speaker 1>so they just go on Yeah, yeah, I think, break

0:35:32.920 --> 0:35:35.440
<v Speaker 1>my heart. Gosh, it's it's a jerk move. It's a

0:35:35.520 --> 0:35:39.239
<v Speaker 1>jerk move. Don't do it. I love the definition or

0:35:39.280 --> 0:35:43.439
<v Speaker 1>I love the term zombie for bot nuts, because that's

0:35:43.440 --> 0:35:45.799
<v Speaker 1>exactly what it is. Where you have a you have

0:35:45.880 --> 0:35:48.640
<v Speaker 1>a zero, a patient zero, and that would be the

0:35:48.680 --> 0:35:52.600
<v Speaker 1>first computer. They end up biting a few more computers,

0:35:52.680 --> 0:35:55.000
<v Speaker 1>and those ones end up getting infected with the same

0:35:55.080 --> 0:35:58.640
<v Speaker 1>exact infection that patient zero had, and then those ones

0:35:58.840 --> 0:36:01.520
<v Speaker 1>end up biting ten each so you end up with

0:36:01.560 --> 0:36:04.520
<v Speaker 1>thousands upon thousands of these computers that each have the

0:36:04.600 --> 0:36:08.360
<v Speaker 1>same exact infection, and they all end up perpetrating the

0:36:08.480 --> 0:36:13.000
<v Speaker 1>same exact vulnerability on whatever their target might be. Yeah,

0:36:13.120 --> 0:36:16.719
<v Speaker 1>and then ultimately you end up with a situation where

0:36:16.800 --> 0:36:19.000
<v Speaker 1>Nagan is standing there with a baseball bat and you

0:36:19.000 --> 0:36:23.279
<v Speaker 1>don't know whose head he's gonna cave in. I might

0:36:23.280 --> 0:36:26.960
<v Speaker 1>have taken that metaphor a little too far. But one

0:36:26.960 --> 0:36:30.120
<v Speaker 1>of the things that Boughton net controllers might do, and

0:36:30.120 --> 0:36:32.560
<v Speaker 1>in fact, this has happened on multiple occasions. It's similar

0:36:32.600 --> 0:36:36.160
<v Speaker 1>to ransomware is they'll send a message to an identified

0:36:36.160 --> 0:36:40.560
<v Speaker 1>target and say, hey, we we got your number. We're

0:36:40.600 --> 0:36:42.920
<v Speaker 1>gonna come after you unless you pay us a certain

0:36:42.960 --> 0:36:46.799
<v Speaker 1>amount of money. Um, we will unleash the dogs of

0:36:46.880 --> 0:36:51.000
<v Speaker 1>war on your servers and you will be unable to

0:36:51.080 --> 0:36:54.120
<v Speaker 1>do business. And there have been cases where businesses have

0:36:54.360 --> 0:36:56.880
<v Speaker 1>folded to this kind of pressure, where they have in

0:36:56.920 --> 0:37:00.799
<v Speaker 1>fact paid to do this because the hospital ended up

0:37:00.800 --> 0:37:04.640
<v Speaker 1>doing that. Yes, yes it was. Yeah, I've seen a

0:37:04.680 --> 0:37:12.680
<v Speaker 1>few cases of particularly malicious and odious acts against things

0:37:12.719 --> 0:37:15.640
<v Speaker 1>like hospitals. There was one year when I was participating

0:37:16.480 --> 0:37:20.360
<v Speaker 1>in a charity for children's hospitals and the charity was

0:37:20.640 --> 0:37:25.520
<v Speaker 1>targeted in the middle of the event and for about

0:37:25.600 --> 0:37:30.040
<v Speaker 1>three hours they were offline trying to deal with that. Um, yeah,

0:37:30.239 --> 0:37:32.520
<v Speaker 1>it's and in that case, it wasn't a it wasn't

0:37:32.520 --> 0:37:35.160
<v Speaker 1>an attack in an effort to get money. I don't

0:37:35.200 --> 0:37:37.560
<v Speaker 1>think I think it was just someone being truly an

0:37:37.600 --> 0:37:41.280
<v Speaker 1>awful human being. But we have seen cases of people

0:37:41.280 --> 0:37:43.879
<v Speaker 1>trying to do this in order to extort money. So

0:37:44.080 --> 0:37:49.000
<v Speaker 1>you're probably noticing some trends here extortion, stealing, uh, you know,

0:37:49.040 --> 0:37:53.319
<v Speaker 1>holding things for ransom, this idea of making sure that

0:37:53.320 --> 0:37:57.400
<v Speaker 1>that people are spending money for out of fear or

0:37:57.440 --> 0:38:00.120
<v Speaker 1>out of a need to get back and and have

0:38:00.320 --> 0:38:05.120
<v Speaker 1>access to something that belongs to them. These are all terrible,

0:38:05.200 --> 0:38:09.520
<v Speaker 1>terrible motivations to make money, and as such, as such

0:38:09.600 --> 0:38:12.080
<v Speaker 1>terrible motivations, you might think, well, wait a minute, how

0:38:12.120 --> 0:38:14.319
<v Speaker 1>are they actually like, how are they getting paid? How

0:38:14.400 --> 0:38:19.120
<v Speaker 1>is this money transfer happening? Because you would think anything

0:38:19.239 --> 0:38:23.879
<v Speaker 1>that would be traceable would end up being somewhat problematic.

0:38:23.920 --> 0:38:25.960
<v Speaker 1>You've got a trail that leads back to you as

0:38:26.000 --> 0:38:29.880
<v Speaker 1>a person, then pretty soon law enforcement's going to get involved,

0:38:30.120 --> 0:38:33.640
<v Speaker 1>or at least the I R S. So so how

0:38:33.880 --> 0:38:38.400
<v Speaker 1>Shannon do hackers? How do they get the money? So

0:38:38.480 --> 0:38:41.120
<v Speaker 1>there's probably some ways that I don't even know about yet,

0:38:41.480 --> 0:38:44.000
<v Speaker 1>but the ones that I can think of would be

0:38:44.520 --> 0:38:47.439
<v Speaker 1>treating of high value data. So that's a pretty big

0:38:47.440 --> 0:38:50.400
<v Speaker 1>one where uh saya hacker collects a whole bunch of

0:38:50.520 --> 0:38:53.720
<v Speaker 1>really really high value data like your SO security number,

0:38:53.880 --> 0:38:57.960
<v Speaker 1>your credit card accounts, your banking account, tons of information,

0:38:58.400 --> 0:39:00.520
<v Speaker 1>and they decided to go on to a deep forum

0:39:00.640 --> 0:39:03.839
<v Speaker 1>sell it, and then or trade it for something else

0:39:03.840 --> 0:39:07.319
<v Speaker 1>of high value, for example, a gift card. They could

0:39:07.400 --> 0:39:09.760
<v Speaker 1>ask for people to give them a ton of gift

0:39:09.760 --> 0:39:12.000
<v Speaker 1>cards that are like, you know, twenty five or fifty

0:39:12.040 --> 0:39:15.799
<v Speaker 1>dollars each, and then use those gift cards at a

0:39:15.880 --> 0:39:19.600
<v Speaker 1>retailer who is easily vulnerable to some kind of gift

0:39:19.640 --> 0:39:22.200
<v Speaker 1>card scam, and in that sense they would be able

0:39:22.239 --> 0:39:24.439
<v Speaker 1>to make some kind of money back through those gift

0:39:24.480 --> 0:39:27.600
<v Speaker 1>cards and that trade of that high value UH data

0:39:27.680 --> 0:39:31.800
<v Speaker 1>that they stole from whoever it might be, whatever company.

0:39:31.840 --> 0:39:34.960
<v Speaker 1>Another way would be bitcoins. Now that's probably the most

0:39:34.960 --> 0:39:38.000
<v Speaker 1>obvious one, of course, because bitcoins are very very hard

0:39:38.040 --> 0:39:41.600
<v Speaker 1>to track. Yes, they are traceable in some circumstances, depending

0:39:41.600 --> 0:39:44.160
<v Speaker 1>on what kind of wallet you use, but in a

0:39:44.200 --> 0:39:48.200
<v Speaker 1>lot of circumstances, the bitcoins will trade wallets so many

0:39:48.239 --> 0:39:50.919
<v Speaker 1>times that it will be somewhat impossible to find out

0:39:50.920 --> 0:39:53.799
<v Speaker 1>where it actually came from, where it actually started. Yeah,

0:39:53.800 --> 0:39:57.080
<v Speaker 1>it's kind of interesting because every single bitcoin contains with

0:39:57.160 --> 0:39:59.600
<v Speaker 1>it a record of every transaction. But that does not

0:39:59.760 --> 0:40:04.120
<v Speaker 1>mean that the parties involved are actually identifiable. It really

0:40:04.320 --> 0:40:07.320
<v Speaker 1>is um. It's it's actually data that's used in order

0:40:07.360 --> 0:40:10.319
<v Speaker 1>to allow for the mining of further bitcoins. It's a

0:40:10.360 --> 0:40:13.680
<v Speaker 1>really fascinating process. But but one of the things that

0:40:13.719 --> 0:40:16.720
<v Speaker 1>attracts people to bitcoins is this idea of being able

0:40:16.760 --> 0:40:22.280
<v Speaker 1>to spend them anonymously and be able to purchase things, uh,

0:40:22.560 --> 0:40:26.160
<v Speaker 1>whether legal or illegal, without it being traced back to

0:40:26.200 --> 0:40:29.000
<v Speaker 1>that person. You often will hear about things like, you know,

0:40:29.080 --> 0:40:32.480
<v Speaker 1>the old Silk Road, where you could purchase all sources

0:40:32.520 --> 0:40:37.200
<v Speaker 1>of stuff, including illegal drugs or other materials, sometimes weapons,

0:40:37.680 --> 0:40:39.759
<v Speaker 1>that kind of stuff, um, and you could do it

0:40:39.800 --> 0:40:43.160
<v Speaker 1>through bitcoins, and people felt a high level of confidence

0:40:43.200 --> 0:40:47.440
<v Speaker 1>because it was not a state backed currency. It was

0:40:47.560 --> 0:40:52.480
<v Speaker 1>this independent cryptocurrency that allowed them that that freedom and

0:40:52.600 --> 0:40:56.799
<v Speaker 1>had real value because people want the bitcoins. If no

0:40:56.840 --> 0:41:00.560
<v Speaker 1>one wanted the bitcoins, they wouldn't be worth anything, right,

0:41:00.680 --> 0:41:04.120
<v Speaker 1>and bitcoins have actually been pretty steady last time I checked,

0:41:04.200 --> 0:41:09.080
<v Speaker 1>so their value has been pretty decent in late days,

0:41:09.200 --> 0:41:12.840
<v Speaker 1>in recent days, So so I completely understand why hacker

0:41:12.880 --> 0:41:16.760
<v Speaker 1>would want to be paid in bitcoins. It makes sense. Yeah. Yeah,

0:41:16.880 --> 0:41:19.840
<v Speaker 1>there's also the old, the old deal of putting the

0:41:19.880 --> 0:41:22.640
<v Speaker 1>money into the the washing machine, right, that's how money

0:41:22.680 --> 0:41:26.280
<v Speaker 1>laundering work, right, Yes, money laundering. So that was something

0:41:26.280 --> 0:41:28.040
<v Speaker 1>that I learned about way back in the day when

0:41:28.080 --> 0:41:30.399
<v Speaker 1>I worked at a bank of all places, which also

0:41:30.440 --> 0:41:33.600
<v Speaker 1>got me really interested in security before I started podcasting.

0:41:34.040 --> 0:41:37.160
<v Speaker 1>But money laundering, it's very easy for somebody to go online,

0:41:37.360 --> 0:41:40.439
<v Speaker 1>be able to sell this high value data, get some

0:41:40.680 --> 0:41:44.759
<v Speaker 1>bitcoins or it might be some other form of currency,

0:41:45.160 --> 0:41:48.920
<v Speaker 1>and then be able to resell that money or be

0:41:48.960 --> 0:41:51.759
<v Speaker 1>able to trade a product to get real money, real

0:41:51.800 --> 0:41:54.759
<v Speaker 1>cash at one point or another. But basically it's it's

0:41:54.880 --> 0:41:59.879
<v Speaker 1>um exchanging the hands that hold that money so many

0:42:00.000 --> 0:42:03.239
<v Speaker 1>times that again it's very hard to trace. Yeah, and

0:42:03.280 --> 0:42:06.560
<v Speaker 1>it's it's hard to determine that the original source of

0:42:06.600 --> 0:42:11.560
<v Speaker 1>that money was anything remotely illegal. And then depending on again,

0:42:11.600 --> 0:42:14.120
<v Speaker 1>if you're if you're a state sponsored hacker, you're probably

0:42:14.160 --> 0:42:17.880
<v Speaker 1>just drawing a salary or doing contract work, so you're

0:42:17.920 --> 0:42:23.000
<v Speaker 1>actually getting paid. You get a pay check. Yeah. Yeah,

0:42:24.160 --> 0:42:27.360
<v Speaker 1>so you've got money withdrawn from your paycheck to handle

0:42:27.480 --> 0:42:31.080
<v Speaker 1>to support the government while you are subverting other governments.

0:42:31.360 --> 0:42:33.839
<v Speaker 1>And then it looks completely legitimate. So that's a really

0:42:33.840 --> 0:42:38.400
<v Speaker 1>easy way for somebody to do something that might be very,

0:42:38.520 --> 0:42:42.680
<v Speaker 1>very bad. Yeah, because they are, They do have to

0:42:42.760 --> 0:42:44.720
<v Speaker 1>pay the I R S, they do get a tax

0:42:44.760 --> 0:42:47.200
<v Speaker 1>refund every year, they do have an employer, so it

0:42:47.239 --> 0:42:51.080
<v Speaker 1>looks completely normal for them to be receiving a paycheck

0:42:51.160 --> 0:42:54.880
<v Speaker 1>for whatever work this might be. Yeah, we've got a

0:42:54.920 --> 0:42:57.880
<v Speaker 1>little bit more to say about how hackers make money,

0:42:57.920 --> 0:43:00.840
<v Speaker 1>but first let's take another quick break to thank our sponsor.

0:43:08.480 --> 0:43:13.680
<v Speaker 1>So the nice thing is there aren't just quote unquote

0:43:13.719 --> 0:43:16.680
<v Speaker 1>bad guys out there doing all this kind of of

0:43:16.719 --> 0:43:21.520
<v Speaker 1>work with computers, with a hacking, with discovering vulnerabilities. There

0:43:21.520 --> 0:43:24.240
<v Speaker 1>are plenty of people, as as you mentioned earlier, Shannon,

0:43:24.280 --> 0:43:27.680
<v Speaker 1>who are doing this in order to help others, either

0:43:27.840 --> 0:43:32.160
<v Speaker 1>to make systems more secure or to inform people of

0:43:32.239 --> 0:43:35.000
<v Speaker 1>how these kind of attacks happen so that they can

0:43:35.040 --> 0:43:38.280
<v Speaker 1>be better prepared to defend themselves. So let's talk about

0:43:38.320 --> 0:43:41.120
<v Speaker 1>some of them. Um, of course, if you have black

0:43:41.120 --> 0:43:44.600
<v Speaker 1>hat hackers, right, you got the bad guys, you gotta have,

0:43:44.960 --> 0:43:49.799
<v Speaker 1>you gotta the white hack hackers. These are the These

0:43:49.800 --> 0:43:55.840
<v Speaker 1>are the the noble bounty hunter characters of those westerns,

0:43:55.880 --> 0:43:59.640
<v Speaker 1>the ones who you know they've seen things but deep

0:43:59.680 --> 0:44:03.160
<v Speaker 1>down and they have a heart of gold. Well, not

0:44:03.200 --> 0:44:06.000
<v Speaker 1>all of them, but a lot of a lot of

0:44:06.000 --> 0:44:10.280
<v Speaker 1>my friends are considered white hat hackers. They're the people

0:44:10.320 --> 0:44:15.040
<v Speaker 1>who either they work for a company that specializes insecurity.

0:44:15.200 --> 0:44:17.880
<v Speaker 1>So a lot of my friends work for these companies

0:44:17.880 --> 0:44:21.879
<v Speaker 1>who will be contracted with big brands, go into their

0:44:21.920 --> 0:44:24.880
<v Speaker 1>networks and then find out what the vulnerabilities are and

0:44:24.960 --> 0:44:27.160
<v Speaker 1>fix them, or they will give them a report and

0:44:27.160 --> 0:44:29.200
<v Speaker 1>tell them how to fix that fix it in the future.

0:44:29.760 --> 0:44:31.879
<v Speaker 1>They make a lot of money. A lot of them

0:44:31.920 --> 0:44:36.600
<v Speaker 1>don't like it because they have specific amounts of vulnerabilities

0:44:36.719 --> 0:44:39.160
<v Speaker 1>or specific time frame set that they have to get

0:44:39.200 --> 0:44:41.839
<v Speaker 1>this work done, and a lot of times hacking takes

0:44:41.880 --> 0:44:45.960
<v Speaker 1>a lot of time. It takes a lot of information reconnaissance.

0:44:46.440 --> 0:44:49.640
<v Speaker 1>So a lot of my friends don't necessarily appreciate having

0:44:49.640 --> 0:44:52.680
<v Speaker 1>to be under these time constraints with these big brands. Well,

0:44:52.719 --> 0:44:55.759
<v Speaker 1>particularly since you figure the bad guys aren't under any

0:44:55.800 --> 0:44:59.560
<v Speaker 1>particular time constraints exactly, So the bad guys have tons

0:44:59.560 --> 0:45:02.479
<v Speaker 1>of time to find these vulnerabilities, while the white hacks

0:45:02.480 --> 0:45:04.879
<v Speaker 1>are under the stress of these time constraints to get

0:45:04.880 --> 0:45:06.800
<v Speaker 1>the work done so that they make their bosses happy.

0:45:07.480 --> 0:45:10.000
<v Speaker 1>In this sense, a lot of my a lot of

0:45:10.000 --> 0:45:12.640
<v Speaker 1>people that I know, have created their own security companies

0:45:12.680 --> 0:45:16.640
<v Speaker 1>because of this fault in the generic nature of having

0:45:16.920 --> 0:45:19.680
<v Speaker 1>these security companies. So they said, you know, I'm tired

0:45:19.719 --> 0:45:22.680
<v Speaker 1>of having to deal with these constraints that my boss

0:45:22.719 --> 0:45:25.640
<v Speaker 1>has given me. Just gonna open my own security company,

0:45:25.640 --> 0:45:27.360
<v Speaker 1>and we're going to do it even better because we

0:45:27.360 --> 0:45:30.200
<v Speaker 1>won't give ourselves those time constraints. Will give us ourselves

0:45:30.200 --> 0:45:33.719
<v Speaker 1>several months to find all the vulnerabilities that we absolutely

0:45:33.760 --> 0:45:36.279
<v Speaker 1>can and then we'll write a report and we'll fix it.

0:45:36.640 --> 0:45:39.400
<v Speaker 1>And uh, those are the ones that I would definitely

0:45:39.440 --> 0:45:42.800
<v Speaker 1>work with if I had to hire a security company. Yeah,

0:45:42.840 --> 0:45:45.000
<v Speaker 1>because they're the ones who are going to use the

0:45:45.040 --> 0:45:48.799
<v Speaker 1>exact same kind of methodologies that bad guys are going

0:45:48.880 --> 0:45:52.280
<v Speaker 1>to use. And if if you want to really be secure,

0:45:52.719 --> 0:45:55.960
<v Speaker 1>you want the people to throw everything they can at

0:45:56.000 --> 0:45:58.560
<v Speaker 1>your system. So that you can find out are you

0:45:58.600 --> 0:46:00.960
<v Speaker 1>actually secure? If you're what do you need to do

0:46:01.000 --> 0:46:03.560
<v Speaker 1>to address it? Um? If you want to see a

0:46:03.600 --> 0:46:08.000
<v Speaker 1>movie that that does a very fantasy version of this

0:46:08.160 --> 0:46:12.200
<v Speaker 1>very idea, there's a film that I always think back to,

0:46:12.440 --> 0:46:17.080
<v Speaker 1>Sneakers had Robert Redford and Dan Ackroyd, who plays a

0:46:17.160 --> 0:46:21.800
<v Speaker 1>character named mother. Ben Kingsley is in it Um. A

0:46:21.920 --> 0:46:25.520
<v Speaker 1>ton of folks. River Phoenix was in it Um, and

0:46:25.600 --> 0:46:29.160
<v Speaker 1>it's a It's a movie about a group of kind

0:46:29.200 --> 0:46:33.200
<v Speaker 1>of almost like outcasts who have grouped together to form

0:46:33.280 --> 0:46:35.880
<v Speaker 1>a company that they specifically do this. They try to

0:46:35.960 --> 0:46:40.480
<v Speaker 1>infiltrate a company in order to test its security, not

0:46:40.880 --> 0:46:44.960
<v Speaker 1>to exploit it, but rather to tell the company, hey,

0:46:45.440 --> 0:46:47.600
<v Speaker 1>here's how we got in, here's how someone else could

0:46:47.640 --> 0:46:50.120
<v Speaker 1>get in, So you need to plug this vulnerability, that

0:46:50.200 --> 0:46:52.479
<v Speaker 1>kind of thing um. And then of course they get

0:46:52.560 --> 0:46:55.360
<v Speaker 1>involved in all sorts of shenanigans. And in case you

0:46:55.400 --> 0:46:58.399
<v Speaker 1>are interested in the methodology, I actually find it very

0:46:58.520 --> 0:47:02.279
<v Speaker 1>very interesting how they get their work done, because of

0:47:02.320 --> 0:47:05.680
<v Speaker 1>course they have to go through the tennis match of

0:47:05.719 --> 0:47:08.800
<v Speaker 1>back and forth with a brand name company, whatever it

0:47:08.880 --> 0:47:11.439
<v Speaker 1>might be, So they'll have to get a purchase order,

0:47:11.560 --> 0:47:14.440
<v Speaker 1>they'll do a little bit of negotiation for an amount

0:47:14.480 --> 0:47:16.600
<v Speaker 1>that they'll do the work for, and then they'll go

0:47:16.680 --> 0:47:20.080
<v Speaker 1>in and they'll gather information on the network and they'll

0:47:20.160 --> 0:47:22.560
<v Speaker 1>capture traffic, and they'll try to find any kind of

0:47:22.600 --> 0:47:26.359
<v Speaker 1>vulnerabilities that are on that network, even with the people too.

0:47:26.920 --> 0:47:29.720
<v Speaker 1>For example, they could use social engineering to get into

0:47:30.040 --> 0:47:34.120
<v Speaker 1>the server rack uh physically, or they could get into

0:47:34.320 --> 0:47:37.440
<v Speaker 1>a network that doesn't necessarily have a very good password

0:47:37.480 --> 0:47:41.279
<v Speaker 1>on it. Uh. They could email clients that work there

0:47:41.320 --> 0:47:44.640
<v Speaker 1>that are employed at the brand name company with I

0:47:44.680 --> 0:47:48.279
<v Speaker 1>don't know malware written PDFs for example, and they could

0:47:48.360 --> 0:47:50.920
<v Speaker 1>use wireless attacks. They could do war driving from the

0:47:50.960 --> 0:47:53.560
<v Speaker 1>parking lot if they wanted to. And then what they'll

0:47:53.600 --> 0:47:56.719
<v Speaker 1>do is write a very very long report so that

0:47:56.800 --> 0:48:00.120
<v Speaker 1>the brand name company can see exactly what happened is

0:48:00.160 --> 0:48:02.040
<v Speaker 1>on their network and exactly what they were able to

0:48:02.080 --> 0:48:05.640
<v Speaker 1>do from from whatever back door they were able to

0:48:05.640 --> 0:48:09.520
<v Speaker 1>get into. It's really interesting how how well they're able

0:48:09.600 --> 0:48:13.719
<v Speaker 1>to put everything together in in turn hopefully save this

0:48:13.800 --> 0:48:17.600
<v Speaker 1>company in the long run thousands and thousands of dollars. Yeah, yeah,

0:48:17.640 --> 0:48:20.279
<v Speaker 1>I mean this is the whole Security has always been

0:48:20.320 --> 0:48:22.959
<v Speaker 1>a tick talk approach, right, You've got the tick, which

0:48:23.000 --> 0:48:26.600
<v Speaker 1>is where someone has identified a way of exploiting a system,

0:48:26.640 --> 0:48:28.839
<v Speaker 1>and then the talk is where you find a way

0:48:28.880 --> 0:48:32.719
<v Speaker 1>to correct that that vulnerability. The tick is the next

0:48:32.719 --> 0:48:35.800
<v Speaker 1>time someone's found a vulnerability. Uh, you're always going to

0:48:35.880 --> 0:48:41.000
<v Speaker 1>have that, right unless someone somehow designs the absolute perfect system,

0:48:41.280 --> 0:48:44.000
<v Speaker 1>which as far as we know, is an impossibility. Yeah,

0:48:44.040 --> 0:48:47.800
<v Speaker 1>that's impossible. Yeah, because for one thing, if people are involved,

0:48:47.880 --> 0:48:50.840
<v Speaker 1>there's no such thing as a perfect system. It's always

0:48:50.840 --> 0:48:53.160
<v Speaker 1>a battle. And I love my video games, so I

0:48:53.200 --> 0:48:57.839
<v Speaker 1>love a battle. But also it also drives other other

0:48:57.920 --> 0:49:01.560
<v Speaker 1>industries though, because we'll see things like the artificial intelligence

0:49:01.600 --> 0:49:05.760
<v Speaker 1>industry improve as a result of this security battle between

0:49:05.800 --> 0:49:09.319
<v Speaker 1>hackers and uh, the infosec experts who are trying to

0:49:09.360 --> 0:49:13.000
<v Speaker 1>make sure that their protecting systems. And as a result,

0:49:13.080 --> 0:49:15.560
<v Speaker 1>we're we're getting information that can be used in other areas,

0:49:16.160 --> 0:49:19.799
<v Speaker 1>which is phenomenal. Like I remember, here's a simple one.

0:49:19.800 --> 0:49:22.520
<v Speaker 1>It's it's as far as security goes. This is as

0:49:22.560 --> 0:49:25.319
<v Speaker 1>low level as it gets. But the capture system, so

0:49:25.360 --> 0:49:29.359
<v Speaker 1>when cap when capture was implemented, even the people who

0:49:29.400 --> 0:49:32.240
<v Speaker 1>were writing capture at the time, we're not really thinking

0:49:32.280 --> 0:49:35.640
<v Speaker 1>of it as being some sort of full proof security

0:49:35.640 --> 0:49:38.960
<v Speaker 1>system to make sure that bots don't get into a system. Right,

0:49:39.320 --> 0:49:43.520
<v Speaker 1>they weren't thinking, oh, now only human beings can get access.

0:49:43.520 --> 0:49:45.360
<v Speaker 1>And if you don't know what a capture is, anytime

0:49:45.400 --> 0:49:47.200
<v Speaker 1>you get your filling out a thing and you get

0:49:47.239 --> 0:49:50.959
<v Speaker 1>a little picture of something and it says, uh, tell

0:49:51.120 --> 0:49:53.040
<v Speaker 1>you know, write down the word or numbers that are

0:49:53.040 --> 0:49:56.080
<v Speaker 1>in this picture, or even to a point of identify

0:49:56.160 --> 0:49:59.480
<v Speaker 1>the pictures in this sequence that have this particular feature,

0:49:59.520 --> 0:50:01.400
<v Speaker 1>like deify all the pictures that have a lake in

0:50:01.440 --> 0:50:04.120
<v Speaker 1>it or something like that. That's a simply that's simply

0:50:04.120 --> 0:50:07.440
<v Speaker 1>a version of capture. Um. The people who made it,

0:50:07.440 --> 0:50:09.799
<v Speaker 1>they actually said, our goal was really to help push

0:50:09.880 --> 0:50:14.040
<v Speaker 1>artificial intelligence because we created a system where programmers or

0:50:14.120 --> 0:50:18.400
<v Speaker 1>hackers had to start coming up with uh, computer programs

0:50:18.400 --> 0:50:22.720
<v Speaker 1>that could identify the same things that we humans can identify.

0:50:22.880 --> 0:50:25.920
<v Speaker 1>And in turn, that means now we've got software that

0:50:25.960 --> 0:50:28.960
<v Speaker 1>pushes forward artificial intelligence. Now, granted, that also means you

0:50:29.000 --> 0:50:32.160
<v Speaker 1>have to improve the system you had designed to keep

0:50:32.200 --> 0:50:34.399
<v Speaker 1>bots out in the first place. So again it goes

0:50:34.400 --> 0:50:37.960
<v Speaker 1>to that TikTok. But there's an added benefit beyond someone

0:50:38.200 --> 0:50:42.560
<v Speaker 1>being able to to automatically access systems and build you know,

0:50:42.719 --> 0:50:45.600
<v Speaker 1>dozens and dozens of fake profiles on Facebook or whatever

0:50:45.640 --> 0:50:49.239
<v Speaker 1>it might be, whatever that might be. Yeah, yeah, and

0:50:49.280 --> 0:50:51.520
<v Speaker 1>then keep in mind, like like we've been saying here,

0:50:51.560 --> 0:50:54.760
<v Speaker 1>I mean, any any systems security is only as strong

0:50:54.800 --> 0:50:58.799
<v Speaker 1>as its weakest link. That we cat is pretty much

0:50:58.840 --> 0:51:01.560
<v Speaker 1>always people. That's the big one, right. But I mean,

0:51:01.600 --> 0:51:05.000
<v Speaker 1>I've I've read stories about hacker gaining access to a

0:51:05.040 --> 0:51:08.880
<v Speaker 1>system because there was an overall security system that was

0:51:08.960 --> 0:51:12.400
<v Speaker 1>really robust for the main company, but then they had

0:51:12.440 --> 0:51:15.719
<v Speaker 1>a little branch office and the branch office didn't have

0:51:15.800 --> 0:51:18.799
<v Speaker 1>that crazy amount of security but was still on the

0:51:18.840 --> 0:51:21.960
<v Speaker 1>same network. I think I read about that story too,

0:51:22.360 --> 0:51:24.239
<v Speaker 1>So I mean, these are these are things like if

0:51:24.280 --> 0:51:29.240
<v Speaker 1>you identify a potential point of weakness that's now suddenly

0:51:29.280 --> 0:51:32.080
<v Speaker 1>the you know, it's it's like a bank vault. If

0:51:32.120 --> 0:51:34.680
<v Speaker 1>the bank vault has an enormous door with huge locks

0:51:34.760 --> 0:51:36.920
<v Speaker 1>on it that you have to get through. Oh, but

0:51:36.960 --> 0:51:39.719
<v Speaker 1>it also has a backdoor just for convenience sake, you're

0:51:39.719 --> 0:51:43.520
<v Speaker 1>gonna aim for the back door. So but there are

0:51:43.520 --> 0:51:47.320
<v Speaker 1>other ways that that hackers can can make a legitimate

0:51:47.360 --> 0:51:50.839
<v Speaker 1>living that don't even involve testing security systems. It might

0:51:50.880 --> 0:51:55.560
<v Speaker 1>involve education. Yeah, absolutely so education is I guess what

0:51:55.600 --> 0:51:58.120
<v Speaker 1>you would say, I fall into that kind of comory.

0:51:58.480 --> 0:52:01.040
<v Speaker 1>And while I I don't necessarily like to call myself

0:52:01.080 --> 0:52:03.520
<v Speaker 1>a hacker because I know so many experts in the

0:52:03.560 --> 0:52:06.239
<v Speaker 1>field who are much more knowledgeable than I am. I'm

0:52:06.680 --> 0:52:11.520
<v Speaker 1>quite a intermediate, I would say, but I love to teach,

0:52:11.719 --> 0:52:14.560
<v Speaker 1>and I love to give tutorials online, so I give

0:52:14.600 --> 0:52:17.560
<v Speaker 1>tutorials on YouTube. But I also know a lot of

0:52:17.560 --> 0:52:21.600
<v Speaker 1>people who have either written books about hacking UH, and

0:52:21.680 --> 0:52:25.359
<v Speaker 1>they could do either specifics about penetration testing or they

0:52:25.360 --> 0:52:28.640
<v Speaker 1>get to make it a very very wide based book

0:52:28.680 --> 0:52:30.960
<v Speaker 1>where they explain everything that you would have to do

0:52:31.000 --> 0:52:33.920
<v Speaker 1>as a penetration tester. And a penetration tester is basically

0:52:33.920 --> 0:52:36.239
<v Speaker 1>one of those guys that would go into a company

0:52:36.280 --> 0:52:39.000
<v Speaker 1>and UH find all the vulnerabilities and report on it.

0:52:39.800 --> 0:52:44.719
<v Speaker 1>You would also have companies that administer certifications, so a

0:52:44.840 --> 0:52:47.760
<v Speaker 1>lot of I'm sure a lot of your your UM

0:52:47.800 --> 0:52:51.000
<v Speaker 1>listeners probably know that you have to get certifications to

0:52:51.040 --> 0:52:54.239
<v Speaker 1>get a lot of UH to get into a lot

0:52:54.280 --> 0:52:57.799
<v Speaker 1>of the fields with computer security and even just you know,

0:52:57.880 --> 0:53:01.279
<v Speaker 1>computer networking too. Sure a lot of searts for those

0:53:01.320 --> 0:53:03.800
<v Speaker 1>and they're very, very expensive. So a lot of companies

0:53:03.880 --> 0:53:07.799
<v Speaker 1>just administer their certifications or they will have you take

0:53:07.880 --> 0:53:10.359
<v Speaker 1>classes for a period of time until you actually take

0:53:10.360 --> 0:53:13.200
<v Speaker 1>the test and get certified. But that ends up being

0:53:13.200 --> 0:53:14.960
<v Speaker 1>a really good thing to put on your resume for

0:53:15.000 --> 0:53:18.040
<v Speaker 1>a lot of companies whenever you do intend to get

0:53:18.040 --> 0:53:22.680
<v Speaker 1>a job in network security. And then lastly, we have

0:53:22.800 --> 0:53:26.400
<v Speaker 1>the publishers. So that's the YouTubers, the that's the people

0:53:26.440 --> 0:53:30.560
<v Speaker 1>that make podcast That's the people that um might be

0:53:31.080 --> 0:53:35.040
<v Speaker 1>creating other forms of entertainment that not only educate but

0:53:35.239 --> 0:53:38.319
<v Speaker 1>also entertain their users and their listeners so that they

0:53:38.440 --> 0:53:42.960
<v Speaker 1>get excited about being a part of information security. Uh.

0:53:42.960 --> 0:53:44.840
<v Speaker 1>And that's what I like to do. I like to

0:53:45.200 --> 0:53:47.600
<v Speaker 1>teach people in a way that makes it exciting. So

0:53:47.640 --> 0:53:49.719
<v Speaker 1>I do a lot of hands on stuff. I I make,

0:53:49.880 --> 0:53:52.120
<v Speaker 1>I make jokes, and I explain things in a very

0:53:52.200 --> 0:53:57.719
<v Speaker 1>natural light and it helps it helps again foster that

0:53:57.800 --> 0:54:02.080
<v Speaker 1>desire to learn how things work right. That does so

0:54:02.160 --> 0:54:04.600
<v Speaker 1>again that that same fascination, like if you were ever

0:54:04.680 --> 0:54:07.480
<v Speaker 1>a kid that took apart a watch or a radio

0:54:07.719 --> 0:54:10.359
<v Speaker 1>or some other piece of equipment, because you really want

0:54:10.400 --> 0:54:13.560
<v Speaker 1>to know what's the magic that makes this thing do

0:54:13.760 --> 0:54:17.759
<v Speaker 1>what it does? Uh, hackers have that, I mean, that's

0:54:17.840 --> 0:54:21.000
<v Speaker 1>the that's that's the defining quality in my mind of

0:54:21.040 --> 0:54:24.520
<v Speaker 1>a hacker is ultimately it's someone who is fascinated with

0:54:24.600 --> 0:54:28.840
<v Speaker 1>the way something works. Uh. We've largely been focusing on software,

0:54:29.120 --> 0:54:32.879
<v Speaker 1>but that is just as legitimate as any hardware hack.

0:54:33.320 --> 0:54:35.759
<v Speaker 1>It's the idea of how does this It might not

0:54:35.840 --> 0:54:37.880
<v Speaker 1>even just be the software, might be a full system,

0:54:37.960 --> 0:54:40.560
<v Speaker 1>like how does the system work? What are all the

0:54:40.600 --> 0:54:44.799
<v Speaker 1>interlocking parts? How do they communicate with each other. I

0:54:44.880 --> 0:54:47.760
<v Speaker 1>just had a random memory from when I was younger

0:54:47.760 --> 0:54:50.760
<v Speaker 1>and in school. I took apart my first iPod because

0:54:50.800 --> 0:54:52.279
<v Speaker 1>I had no clue how it worked, and I was

0:54:52.400 --> 0:54:55.040
<v Speaker 1>very curious about what what the interior of it was.

0:54:55.640 --> 0:54:58.239
<v Speaker 1>So I just I took it apart. I couldn't put

0:54:58.280 --> 0:55:01.600
<v Speaker 1>it back together, So I was not hacker in any sense.

0:55:01.840 --> 0:55:06.080
<v Speaker 1>We um we for for an article I was writing,

0:55:06.120 --> 0:55:13.000
<v Speaker 1>We've got a first edition Launch Day Nintendo three D

0:55:13.280 --> 0:55:16.000
<v Speaker 1>s and it was my job to disassemble it and

0:55:16.040 --> 0:55:19.480
<v Speaker 1>take photos of all the pieces. So first I took

0:55:19.480 --> 0:55:23.680
<v Speaker 1>a picture of it whole and shared it online on

0:55:23.719 --> 0:55:26.680
<v Speaker 1>Twitter and said look what I have, and everyone got

0:55:26.719 --> 0:55:29.319
<v Speaker 1>excited and then by the end of it, I had

0:55:29.360 --> 0:55:32.600
<v Speaker 1>a little had a little black cauldron at my desk

0:55:32.640 --> 0:55:35.400
<v Speaker 1>that was left over from a Halloween thing, and then

0:55:35.440 --> 0:55:37.960
<v Speaker 1>I put all the different pieces because there was no

0:55:38.000 --> 0:55:39.879
<v Speaker 1>way this thing was going back together after I took

0:55:39.880 --> 0:55:43.040
<v Speaker 1>it apart. For one thing, Nintendo is pretty careful about

0:55:43.280 --> 0:55:45.520
<v Speaker 1>sealing stuff in such a way that's not meant to

0:55:45.520 --> 0:55:48.120
<v Speaker 1>come aboard, so um, so you have to have he

0:55:48.200 --> 0:55:50.120
<v Speaker 1>was a little force in some cases in order to

0:55:50.120 --> 0:55:52.319
<v Speaker 1>get to stuff. And then I showed a picture. I'm like,

0:55:52.360 --> 0:55:55.800
<v Speaker 1>I'm like, look what I did to the thing. I

0:55:55.880 --> 0:56:00.600
<v Speaker 1>made the entire Internet cry. Yeah, although ultimately I think

0:56:00.640 --> 0:56:04.160
<v Speaker 1>the three DS most people are like, oh whatever. But

0:56:04.239 --> 0:56:06.200
<v Speaker 1>at the time when it was brand new, people were

0:56:06.239 --> 0:56:09.439
<v Speaker 1>freaking out. And of course there's there's also another role

0:56:09.560 --> 0:56:11.719
<v Speaker 1>for for hackers out there. It may not be a

0:56:11.719 --> 0:56:15.960
<v Speaker 1>steady gig, but we are seeing more and more of

0:56:16.000 --> 0:56:20.080
<v Speaker 1>the Hollywood productions out there actually talk with people in

0:56:20.120 --> 0:56:23.440
<v Speaker 1>the industry so that the depictions that we're getting are

0:56:23.600 --> 0:56:27.760
<v Speaker 1>more accurately reflecting what really happens. Mr Robot is probably

0:56:28.320 --> 0:56:32.000
<v Speaker 1>the example that immediately leaps to my mind, and that

0:56:32.200 --> 0:56:34.960
<v Speaker 1>it's it's a show that tries very hard to take

0:56:35.000 --> 0:56:38.279
<v Speaker 1>a more realistic approach to the world of hacking as

0:56:38.280 --> 0:56:41.839
<v Speaker 1>opposed to um. You type in three passwords, the third

0:56:41.840 --> 0:56:44.799
<v Speaker 1>one gets you in, and then you're navigating through a

0:56:44.920 --> 0:56:48.160
<v Speaker 1>vector graphics three D dungeon and you encounter a skull

0:56:48.200 --> 0:56:51.920
<v Speaker 1>and cross bones. That's not how hacking works. It sounds

0:56:51.920 --> 0:56:55.920
<v Speaker 1>like you were talking about hackers hack the planet. I

0:56:56.040 --> 0:57:01.040
<v Speaker 1>might have been education. Just bring it back. But professors,

0:57:01.080 --> 0:57:03.560
<v Speaker 1>I didn't leave you guys out. I'm sorry. I love

0:57:03.560 --> 0:57:05.839
<v Speaker 1>you guys. You are the reason why I'm here now.

0:57:05.920 --> 0:57:08.239
<v Speaker 1>If I didn't take my computer courses in college with

0:57:08.280 --> 0:57:10.759
<v Speaker 1>my professors, I would not be doing what I'm doing now.

0:57:10.840 --> 0:57:13.560
<v Speaker 1>So professors are like at the top of that education

0:57:13.640 --> 0:57:16.240
<v Speaker 1>list because and you can take a lot of computer

0:57:16.280 --> 0:57:19.120
<v Speaker 1>security courses in college and sometimes in high schools if

0:57:19.160 --> 0:57:23.880
<v Speaker 1>you're lucky. But yeah, technical assistance. So technical assistance are

0:57:23.960 --> 0:57:27.360
<v Speaker 1>people that will come on board with a Hollywood movie

0:57:27.520 --> 0:57:29.960
<v Speaker 1>or a TV show or what have you, and they

0:57:29.960 --> 0:57:34.400
<v Speaker 1>will explain to the network how the hacking actually happens.

0:57:34.880 --> 0:57:39.640
<v Speaker 1>So I know a few, uh, they will They'll come

0:57:39.680 --> 0:57:41.800
<v Speaker 1>to some of their hacker friends or they will be

0:57:41.840 --> 0:57:45.040
<v Speaker 1>a hacker themselves and they will say okay uh. In

0:57:45.080 --> 0:57:47.600
<v Speaker 1>this season, I know that they want to do X,

0:57:47.720 --> 0:57:50.120
<v Speaker 1>Y and Z on camera, and I need to make

0:57:50.120 --> 0:57:52.920
<v Speaker 1>it look legitimate, so they will come up with the script.

0:57:53.040 --> 0:57:55.080
<v Speaker 1>They will come up with the hack and the actual

0:57:55.240 --> 0:57:59.280
<v Speaker 1>keyboard commands that the actor has to type in on

0:57:59.400 --> 0:58:03.560
<v Speaker 1>camera so that they are actually doing legitimate hacks. So

0:58:03.600 --> 0:58:07.240
<v Speaker 1>that way, they're not only making it look cool for

0:58:07.280 --> 0:58:09.960
<v Speaker 1>a wider audience because an audience is actually going to

0:58:10.000 --> 0:58:12.560
<v Speaker 1>see how a hack works, but they're also getting that

0:58:12.600 --> 0:58:17.320
<v Speaker 1>credibility with the info set community too. So Mr Robot

0:58:17.400 --> 0:58:20.760
<v Speaker 1>is huge with the infoset community because it is legitimate.

0:58:20.840 --> 0:58:23.360
<v Speaker 1>Like I've watched several of those episodes and I've seen

0:58:23.360 --> 0:58:25.400
<v Speaker 1>a lot of the hacks that they do. They've even

0:58:25.480 --> 0:58:27.520
<v Speaker 1>used some of our hack fi products on the show,

0:58:28.000 --> 0:58:31.520
<v Speaker 1>and they're actually using legit hacks. And it is so

0:58:31.640 --> 0:58:33.720
<v Speaker 1>much fun to see it on TV and see them

0:58:33.760 --> 0:58:36.440
<v Speaker 1>get so many good reviews from a wider consumer audience,

0:58:36.480 --> 0:58:39.600
<v Speaker 1>because it makes me feel like many more people are

0:58:39.600 --> 0:58:42.400
<v Speaker 1>getting interested in info sex because they see what's happening

0:58:42.440 --> 0:58:44.520
<v Speaker 1>on camera and they see that this is actually how

0:58:44.560 --> 0:58:46.920
<v Speaker 1>you do it. Yeah, it's nice to see it go

0:58:47.160 --> 0:58:53.400
<v Speaker 1>beyond uh. The the niche that I would argue, info

0:58:53.440 --> 0:58:57.520
<v Speaker 1>sec and hacking has largely inhabited for the past three decades,

0:58:57.640 --> 0:59:00.600
<v Speaker 1>right the people who have been interested. When it's first started,

0:59:00.600 --> 0:59:04.840
<v Speaker 1>it was essentially your hobbyists, and often those hobbyists were

0:59:04.880 --> 0:59:08.960
<v Speaker 1>isolated individuals. Uh. You got to the phone freaking days

0:59:09.000 --> 0:59:12.680
<v Speaker 1>where there was a little bit of a small subculture

0:59:12.720 --> 0:59:15.800
<v Speaker 1>of people who were interested in hacking the telephone system

0:59:15.920 --> 0:59:20.400
<v Speaker 1>using all sorts of stuff, including a whistle from Captain Crunch. Uh.

0:59:20.640 --> 0:59:23.439
<v Speaker 1>You had you had the the early hack days where

0:59:23.440 --> 0:59:26.000
<v Speaker 1>people were just trying to create interesting programs for their

0:59:26.000 --> 0:59:28.520
<v Speaker 1>computers or to see how some of the programs that

0:59:28.560 --> 0:59:31.320
<v Speaker 1>were coming out, how did those work? Um, but it

0:59:31.440 --> 0:59:36.040
<v Speaker 1>was largely a tiny slice of the folks who were

0:59:36.080 --> 0:59:39.400
<v Speaker 1>even aware of personal computers, and and even that group

0:59:39.480 --> 0:59:42.919
<v Speaker 1>was still a tiny slice of the overall population. We're

0:59:42.920 --> 0:59:47.280
<v Speaker 1>seeing that tiny slice grow over time, and largely because

0:59:47.760 --> 0:59:50.280
<v Speaker 1>so many of us are so dependent upon computers these

0:59:50.360 --> 0:59:53.520
<v Speaker 1>days that it benefits us to have an awareness to

0:59:53.560 --> 0:59:57.040
<v Speaker 1>make sure that we remain safe. But also because of

0:59:57.080 --> 1:00:01.200
<v Speaker 1>things like Mr Robot showing how this wre x and

1:00:01.240 --> 1:00:05.080
<v Speaker 1>sparking the imagination of people who perhaps before they saw

1:00:05.120 --> 1:00:07.920
<v Speaker 1>that never thought, Yeah, it's kind of cool. I would

1:00:07.920 --> 1:00:10.560
<v Speaker 1>love to be able to manipulate code in such a

1:00:10.560 --> 1:00:14.000
<v Speaker 1>way that I could do something new or unexpected or

1:00:14.400 --> 1:00:17.640
<v Speaker 1>help people. Uh. And it's really encouraging to see that

1:00:17.720 --> 1:00:21.120
<v Speaker 1>kind of thing happen right now. I kind of wish

1:00:21.120 --> 1:00:23.040
<v Speaker 1>it had happened ten years ago, but I love seeing

1:00:23.040 --> 1:00:25.800
<v Speaker 1>it happen now. Same. I actually feel like there was

1:00:25.840 --> 1:00:28.960
<v Speaker 1>a little bit of negativity in in the aspect that

1:00:29.600 --> 1:00:32.920
<v Speaker 1>we we used to have all these really fancy graphics

1:00:32.960 --> 1:00:35.720
<v Speaker 1>happening on in these Hollywood movies and these TV shows,

1:00:35.880 --> 1:00:39.240
<v Speaker 1>and now they're actually seeing the reality that is hacking,

1:00:39.320 --> 1:00:43.240
<v Speaker 1>and it is not super colorful. It's not super quick,

1:00:43.280 --> 1:00:46.040
<v Speaker 1>fast paced and exciting like it looks like it is

1:00:46.120 --> 1:00:49.800
<v Speaker 1>on those old school shows. So I'm hoping that now

1:00:49.840 --> 1:00:52.840
<v Speaker 1>that they're actually seeing it, people will try it to

1:00:53.480 --> 1:00:56.840
<v Speaker 1>Like if they see um, the main actor on Mr.

1:00:56.920 --> 1:01:00.720
<v Speaker 1>Robot do a specific command line option, they'll go to

1:01:00.760 --> 1:01:02.800
<v Speaker 1>their computer and try it themselves and see that it

1:01:02.880 --> 1:01:04.920
<v Speaker 1>actually does work, and then they'll be like, oh, I

1:01:04.960 --> 1:01:06.840
<v Speaker 1>really want to try some new stuff too, so they'll

1:01:06.840 --> 1:01:08.959
<v Speaker 1>start googling and see what else they can find out.

1:01:09.360 --> 1:01:12.200
<v Speaker 1>That's the kind of inspiration that I wish happened thirty

1:01:12.280 --> 1:01:16.360
<v Speaker 1>years ago, and it didn't, so I want to see

1:01:16.400 --> 1:01:19.560
<v Speaker 1>more of that now, and I'm really happy that, for example,

1:01:19.680 --> 1:01:22.520
<v Speaker 1>Mr Robot has done a great job with it. Yeah,

1:01:22.520 --> 1:01:26.360
<v Speaker 1>it's it's and you not to not to poop all

1:01:26.400 --> 1:01:31.760
<v Speaker 1>over Hollywood because I do loves mo Hollywood's but but

1:01:31.800 --> 1:01:35.320
<v Speaker 1>it is. And to understand where they were coming from,

1:01:35.360 --> 1:01:38.280
<v Speaker 1>they were trying to find a way to create an

1:01:38.280 --> 1:01:45.240
<v Speaker 1>exciting visual depiction of something that doesn't necessarily necessarily lend

1:01:45.320 --> 1:01:49.040
<v Speaker 1>itself to that in order for to create a dramatic effect.

1:01:49.400 --> 1:01:51.760
<v Speaker 1>So I get it. It's very similar to the way

1:01:51.800 --> 1:01:56.840
<v Speaker 1>Hollywood portrayed virtual reality back in the nineties, way before

1:01:56.920 --> 1:02:01.080
<v Speaker 1>virtual reality was ready for public consumption, and it's what

1:02:01.360 --> 1:02:06.720
<v Speaker 1>largely killed VR for a decade before the various video

1:02:06.720 --> 1:02:09.280
<v Speaker 1>game systems started to make the very the components cheap

1:02:09.400 --> 1:02:11.680
<v Speaker 1>enough for people to play in that space again, and

1:02:11.680 --> 1:02:15.560
<v Speaker 1>now we're on the verge of another VR revolution. The

1:02:15.600 --> 1:02:17.240
<v Speaker 1>same sort of thing is true of hacking, Like how

1:02:17.240 --> 1:02:21.280
<v Speaker 1>do you show hacking in a way that gets across

1:02:21.320 --> 1:02:23.760
<v Speaker 1>what is happening to an audience and makes it interesting?

1:02:23.920 --> 1:02:26.400
<v Speaker 1>I think largely you have to do that through really

1:02:26.480 --> 1:02:28.840
<v Speaker 1>good writing of your characters, and once you do that,

1:02:29.480 --> 1:02:32.439
<v Speaker 1>then everything else follows. I think if if you can

1:02:32.520 --> 1:02:35.680
<v Speaker 1>show that the characters in a movie or in a

1:02:35.720 --> 1:02:39.280
<v Speaker 1>TV show are actually real people that have real relationships,

1:02:39.320 --> 1:02:41.520
<v Speaker 1>they have real jobs and real lives, and they have

1:02:41.600 --> 1:02:46.000
<v Speaker 1>hobbies outside of just hacking, you can really you can

1:02:46.160 --> 1:02:49.600
<v Speaker 1>start to relate to that character in a very real

1:02:49.720 --> 1:02:52.120
<v Speaker 1>sense in the fact that hey, they are humans too,

1:02:52.200 --> 1:02:56.840
<v Speaker 1>because here's our people too. That was actually a documentary. Nice. Yeah,

1:02:56.880 --> 1:03:00.160
<v Speaker 1>because again, when when you're when you're thinking about in

1:03:00.200 --> 1:03:03.840
<v Speaker 1>the abstract, you're really it becomes that us versus them mentality,

1:03:03.880 --> 1:03:07.959
<v Speaker 1>where by by its very nature, it's dehumanizing. But that's

1:03:08.000 --> 1:03:11.400
<v Speaker 1>probably a topic for a show that's not about technology,

1:03:11.520 --> 1:03:15.080
<v Speaker 1>So I will just leave it be. Shannon Morse, thank

1:03:15.160 --> 1:03:19.000
<v Speaker 1>you so much for joining me today. Please let everyone

1:03:19.040 --> 1:03:23.160
<v Speaker 1>know where they can find all of your stuff. Jonathan Strickland,

1:03:23.280 --> 1:03:27.800
<v Speaker 1>thank you. So it was a little it was a little,

1:03:28.160 --> 1:03:31.280
<v Speaker 1>it was a little laden. Yeah. Yeah, I've been watching

1:03:31.280 --> 1:03:34.240
<v Speaker 1>Star Trek lately, way way too much Star Trek. So

1:03:34.280 --> 1:03:37.880
<v Speaker 1>you can find me. Um. The most direct path is

1:03:37.960 --> 1:03:40.600
<v Speaker 1>on Twitter. I'm at snubs and that's s n U

1:03:40.800 --> 1:03:44.520
<v Speaker 1>b S. And then my shows specifically our Tech Thing

1:03:44.640 --> 1:03:47.040
<v Speaker 1>over at t e k thing dot com and Hack

1:03:47.160 --> 1:03:51.760
<v Speaker 1>five over at h K five dot org. Yeah, so

1:03:51.880 --> 1:03:55.200
<v Speaker 1>go check those shows out. They are awesome. Shannon and

1:03:55.280 --> 1:03:58.520
<v Speaker 1>her co hosts are all awesome. I gotta get Corn.

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<v Speaker 1>I gotta get Darren on this. Yeah, no, you are cooler,

1:04:01.200 --> 1:04:03.560
<v Speaker 1>but someday I gotta get Darren on the show. Um.

1:04:03.840 --> 1:04:05.760
<v Speaker 1>I don't think Darren and I have ever I think

1:04:05.760 --> 1:04:09.880
<v Speaker 1>we may have been on one of Tom Merritt's shows

1:04:10.000 --> 1:04:12.439
<v Speaker 1>at the same time, but otherwise I don't think we've

1:04:12.440 --> 1:04:15.280
<v Speaker 1>ever done a show together at any rate. Yeah, I know,

1:04:15.320 --> 1:04:19.280
<v Speaker 1>it's crazy, right that happen. Let's let's do that. Let's

1:04:19.320 --> 1:04:22.400
<v Speaker 1>do that. And that wraps up this classic episode of

1:04:22.400 --> 1:04:24.959
<v Speaker 1>tech Stuff. I hope you guys enjoyed this look back

1:04:25.280 --> 1:04:27.320
<v Speaker 1>on some of the episodes that I've done over the

1:04:27.320 --> 1:04:29.480
<v Speaker 1>past couple of years. These are more recent than some

1:04:29.560 --> 1:04:32.880
<v Speaker 1>of our other classic episodes. We've been running on Fridays,

1:04:32.920 --> 1:04:35.360
<v Speaker 1>and like I said before, I should be back in

1:04:35.400 --> 1:04:37.840
<v Speaker 1>the office recording brand new stuff. You're gonna hear a

1:04:37.960 --> 1:04:42.360
<v Speaker 1>whole arc of episodes about our relationship with media and

1:04:42.400 --> 1:04:45.960
<v Speaker 1>how media has changed over time, how the business of

1:04:46.040 --> 1:04:49.920
<v Speaker 1>media has changed, how our consumption of media has changed.

1:04:50.160 --> 1:04:53.960
<v Speaker 1>It's a huge, huge topic and it spans multiple episodes,

1:04:54.240 --> 1:04:56.640
<v Speaker 1>so I hope you enjoy that. It's been fascinating for

1:04:56.680 --> 1:04:58.960
<v Speaker 1>me to jump into that research and kind of break

1:04:59.040 --> 1:05:02.280
<v Speaker 1>this out, and um, it was actually I didn't know

1:05:02.520 --> 1:05:05.080
<v Speaker 1>how big a bite I was taking at the time

1:05:05.120 --> 1:05:08.280
<v Speaker 1>when I started. And uh, I hope you you enjoy

1:05:08.320 --> 1:05:10.640
<v Speaker 1>it when you start hearing those episodes. If you have

1:05:10.680 --> 1:05:13.000
<v Speaker 1>any suggestions for future episodes of tech Stuff, send me

1:05:13.040 --> 1:05:16.240
<v Speaker 1>a message. The email address is tech stuff at how

1:05:16.280 --> 1:05:19.439
<v Speaker 1>stuff works dot com. Drop on by our website that's

1:05:19.520 --> 1:05:22.480
<v Speaker 1>tech stuff podcast dot com. There you'll find an archive

1:05:22.560 --> 1:05:25.200
<v Speaker 1>of all of our episodes. You'll find links to our

1:05:25.240 --> 1:05:27.800
<v Speaker 1>social media presence, and you'll find a link to our

1:05:27.840 --> 1:05:31.000
<v Speaker 1>online store, where every purchasing make goes to help the show.

1:05:31.120 --> 1:05:33.640
<v Speaker 1>And we greatly appreciate it. And I'll talk to you

1:05:33.680 --> 1:05:42.160
<v Speaker 1>again really soon for more on this and thousands of

1:05:42.200 --> 1:05:54.200
<v Speaker 1>other topics. Is it how stuff works dot com.