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Speaker 1: Get in touch with technology with tech Stuff from how

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Speaker 1: stuff works dot com. Hey there, everybuddy, Welcome to tech Stuff.

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Speaker 1: I'm Jonathan Strickland. I'm your host and the executive producer

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Speaker 1: of this show there at how Stuff Works, and I

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Speaker 1: heeart radio and a love of all things tech, and

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Speaker 1: we are doing another classic episode of tech Stuff hacking

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Speaker 1: for dollars. I got to talk with Shannon Morse of

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Speaker 1: Hack five and we talked all about how hackers make

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Speaker 1: money and both in in legal and nefarious ways. And

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Speaker 1: this is going to be the last of our classic

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Speaker 1: episodes covering my vacation time, I will be back in

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Speaker 1: the studio recording brand new episodes. So I thank you

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Speaker 1: very much for your patience. I hope you guys have

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Speaker 1: enjoyed this look back on some past episodes of tech Stuff.

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Speaker 1: Let's join past Jonathan and Shannon right now. Hi, how

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Speaker 1: are you Jonathan, I'm doing great. How are you? I'm awesome. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: thank you so much for having me on. This is

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Speaker 1: a great show and I love listening to it, so

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Speaker 1: I'm super happy to be on. Yeah, excellent. Now, this

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Speaker 1: is of course the second time we've had you on,

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Speaker 1: so I will work very hard to to increase that number.

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Speaker 1: I want to at least get us up to double

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Speaker 1: digits with that. But I got Shannon on the show

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Speaker 1: specifically to talk about an area that she talks about

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Speaker 1: a lot, the realm of hacking, and specifically I wanted

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Speaker 1: to do kind of an episode about how do hacker,

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Speaker 1: how do you make money? How do you make a

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Speaker 1: career out of hacking? And uh and really to frame

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Speaker 1: this conversation, I think one of the most important things

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Speaker 1: to do is to sort of define your terms. And

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Speaker 1: as it turns out, the term hacker is is actually

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Speaker 1: a very broad term that can apply to a lot

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Speaker 1: of different things, and not all of them are that

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Speaker 1: nefarious evil infiltrate a system and steal all the corporate

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Speaker 1: secrets kind of approach to hacking that Hollywood often presents

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Speaker 1: right right exactly. I actually asked this question to a

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Speaker 1: lot of people, especially when I first meet them. Since

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Speaker 1: I'm so closely affiliated with a lot of the info

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Speaker 1: set community, I want to surround myself with positive people.

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Speaker 1: So you'll notice with the hacker definition, you can either

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Speaker 1: get a very negative vibe from somebody or a very

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Speaker 1: positive vibe. Oftentimes, with the negative vibe, you'll get somebody

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Speaker 1: who says, oh, that's the person who stole my credit

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Speaker 1: card data when I went to a restaurant the other day.

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Speaker 1: But on the positive side, you'll get somebody that says, oh,

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Speaker 1: they're the kind of people that will like break something

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Speaker 1: apart and then put it back together in a way

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Speaker 1: that it wasn't supposed to be put back together to

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Speaker 1: make it do something cool. And that's a hack in

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Speaker 1: in mainstream. Uh So that's the way I see it.

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Speaker 1: I see hackers as being people who um reverse engineer

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Speaker 1: different software, different hardware. It could just be a bicycle,

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Speaker 1: for example, and put it back together in a way

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Speaker 1: to make it harder, better, faster, and stronger. Nice the

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Speaker 1: old daft punk approach, of course, Yeah, I agree entirely. Uh.

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Speaker 1: The the original term hacker was really all about people

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Speaker 1: who have almost an insatiable curiosity to learn how stuff works.

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Speaker 1: Oddly enough, I share that quality, having worked at how

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Speaker 1: stuff works for a decade. Uh. But yeah, to understand

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Speaker 1: how it works and then to make stuff do things

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Speaker 1: it wasn't necessarily intended to do. Not for nefarious purposes necessarily,

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Speaker 1: although that could clearly be an application, but just for

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Speaker 1: curiosity's sake. Can can I take these elements that are

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Speaker 1: meant to do this one thing and do something completely

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Speaker 1: transformative with it, whether it is hardware or software. And

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Speaker 1: we've seen some really cool stuff come out of that.

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Speaker 1: I mean, I would argue that a lot of the

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Speaker 1: things you see in the cosplay world and the steampunk world,

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Speaker 1: those are all taking elements of hacking. Maker Fair is

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Speaker 1: really just a hacker's paradise when you get down to it,

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Speaker 1: especially for hardware hacks. Absolutely, I'm kind of sad I'm

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Speaker 1: gonna miss Make Her Fair this year. I haven't been

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Speaker 1: to one yet. I've been to a small one here

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Speaker 1: in Atlanta, very very modest maker Fair. Everyone there was

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Speaker 1: great and passionate and intelligent, but it was, you know,

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Speaker 1: a much smaller scale than something you would see in

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Speaker 1: the Bay Area. But but that's the kind of thing

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Speaker 1: that hacker means to me. Now that being said, in

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Speaker 1: this episode, we're really going to be focusing on on

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Speaker 1: sort of the computer oriented, really the software side of hacking.

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Speaker 1: Uh And a large part of it's going to be

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Speaker 1: on the the the bad guy, the naughty bits as

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Speaker 1: I call it in our notes about hacking, simply to

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Speaker 1: talk about what are the ways that hackers cause or

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Speaker 1: the malicious hackers cause problems? How do they expect to

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Speaker 1: profit from that? And also that, well, we'll look at

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Speaker 1: ways that hackers who don't follow that path, who are

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Speaker 1: looking to help people, not hurt people, how do they

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Speaker 1: make a living? Because it's one of those things where

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Speaker 1: you kind of take it for granted when you see

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Speaker 1: the Hollywood depiction of a hacker, the person sitting down.

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Speaker 1: Usually they're sitting at a keyboard and for some reason

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Speaker 1: they're monitor only is monochromatic green. Yes, that's so true. Well,

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Speaker 1: they're using the old Apple to E terminals. Terminals are

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Speaker 1: actually written and green oftentimes, but you can change the

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Speaker 1: colors to rainbow colors if you choose. That is a hack,

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Speaker 1: it's a real life hack. Yeah, yeah, And usually you

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Speaker 1: see them sitting down and then they cause some sort

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Speaker 1: of mischief, sometimes bordering on sabotage. But then you when

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Speaker 1: you think about it outside the context of that scene,

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Speaker 1: you think, how did they expect to profit from this?

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Speaker 1: So that's kind of what we're looking at. Yeah, Because

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Speaker 1: it's always important to me to reiterate to that there

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Speaker 1: are always going to be two sides of a coin.

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Speaker 1: To everything in life. Of course, there are going to

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Speaker 1: be bad guys in the realm in the world who

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Speaker 1: do nefarious hacks, but there's also a lot of good

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Speaker 1: guys too, And personally, for me, the reason why I'm

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Speaker 1: so interested in researching this is because it has made

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Speaker 1: me a much more privacy and security guard person. I've

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Speaker 1: gotten a lot better at my own protections online, and

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Speaker 1: I feel like if somebody else can understand what a

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Speaker 1: hacker does on the bad side as well as the

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Speaker 1: good side, they can better protect themselves too, And that's

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Speaker 1: what I've always tried to teach people. Yeah, I think

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Speaker 1: all you have to really do is attend one def

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Speaker 1: con and really have that driven home. I have not

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Speaker 1: yet gone to a def con, mostly because I don't

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Speaker 1: know that I could part with my smartphone for that

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Speaker 1: long and I certainly wouldn't take it with me. Bring

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Speaker 1: a burner phone, you'll be fine. Yeah, that that's me Jonathan,

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Speaker 1: the guy who carries the burner. Uh. It makes sense,

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Speaker 1: I mean, when you're doing something like that. So, for

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Speaker 1: those who don't know, def Con is a large hacker

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Speaker 1: based conference largely looking at the realm of information security

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Speaker 1: UM and often they will you'll have entire presentations dedicated

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Speaker 1: to showing off vulnerabilities and security, again not necessarily so

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Speaker 1: that people can take advantage of them, but rather to

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Speaker 1: raise awareness and to kind of force the hands of

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Speaker 1: the parties that are responsible for that software to take

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Speaker 1: action and fix a problem. Right Like, that was what

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Speaker 1: we saw with the hack about remotely taking control of

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Speaker 1: a person's vehicle. Uh specifically Jeep was really having that issue.

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Speaker 1: Those one of those things where the researchers were saying, look,

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Speaker 1: we're bringing this to light, not so that we can

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Speaker 1: create an era where people are terrified of their vehicles

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Speaker 1: that someone's going to take remote control of their car,

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Speaker 1: but rather to really drive home the fact that the

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Speaker 1: information security is now it's important everywhere. It's not just

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Speaker 1: your phone, it's not just your computer. As the Internet

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Speaker 1: of Things continues to blossom, it's everything. Yes, I agree,

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Speaker 1: And in that sense, those researchers were trying to use

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Speaker 1: something the old school term is called responsible disclosure, where

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Speaker 1: they explain some kind of vulnerability that they found to

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Speaker 1: the company in hopes that the company will fix this

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Speaker 1: problem before it becomes mainstream and before it gets out

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Speaker 1: into the wild. In the case of Jeep. I believe,

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Speaker 1: if my memory serves me right, that Jeep did not

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Speaker 1: necessarily release a patch for this vulnerability. So then the

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Speaker 1: researchers decided to go out publicly about the information that

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Speaker 1: they found, and then Jeep decided to fix it once

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Speaker 1: everybody else knew about it, right, And then sometimes that's

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Speaker 1: what it takes. And then and I've had the same

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Speaker 1: discussion offline with a mutual friend of ours, Brian Brushwood.

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Speaker 1: Brian is a stage magician. He has a show called

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Speaker 1: Scam School. It's all about social engineering. One of the

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Speaker 1: things I have talked about with Brian is that his show,

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Speaker 1: he often shows how to do certain types of scams

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Speaker 1: or tricks, but they're mostly in the bar bet world, right, Like,

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Speaker 1: not stuff that you would do to ruin someone's life,

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Speaker 1: but something that you know you might want to you

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Speaker 1: might win a free beer that way. Totally use some

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Speaker 1: of those myself. Yeah, And he showed off. He had

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Speaker 1: an episode where he showed off this guy who had

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Speaker 1: was demonstrating a well known vulnerableity of a popular bike

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Speaker 1: lock that has been off the market for a couple

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Speaker 1: of years because of this vulnerability. But that particular vulnerability

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Speaker 1: meant that you could use a regular plastic pen, remove

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Speaker 1: the pen part of the pen, use the casing, and

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Speaker 1: jam them into the lock and pop the lock open hole. Right.

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Speaker 1: And so people were complaining in the comments. They were saying,

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Speaker 1: you're you're, you're publicizing this vulnerability. And I said, guess what,

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Speaker 1: the bad guys already know about this vulnerability. What they're

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Speaker 1: doing is publicizing it to a public that might be

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Speaker 1: still vulnerable to it so that they don't fall victim.

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Speaker 1: And that, to me is a very important part of

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Speaker 1: hackers across the board. They they serve a very important

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Speaker 1: purpose to alert folks to potential dangers before it gets

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Speaker 1: too late. Yeah. Absolutely, And and you're those hackers are

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Speaker 1: the people that are generally working to make a better

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Speaker 1: world for consumers, a better about a private and secure

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Speaker 1: world for consumers. But then, of course, on the other hand,

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Speaker 1: are the batties. Yeah, let's talk about some of them.

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Speaker 1: So I kind of gave some weird little titles for

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Speaker 1: this when I was typing it up, because in the

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Speaker 1: middle of a week, I get bored. Shannon has to

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Speaker 1: be honest, And so when I was making an outline

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Speaker 1: kind of for us to work from, I started coming

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Speaker 1: up with goofy subtitles. So this whole section is titled

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Speaker 1: the Naughty Bits in our Notes, and the first one

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Speaker 1: is malware moo law as in people who make money

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Speaker 1: through the development or distribution of malware. And malware, as

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Speaker 1: I've said on this show many times in order to

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Speaker 1: define it, it's really software that is intended to do

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Speaker 1: something that is ultimately harmful to the person who runs

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Speaker 1: that software on their machine. It covers a wide array

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Speaker 1: of different sub categories, like, uh, you know, this is

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Speaker 1: the sort of term that we normally would have in

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Speaker 1: the old days just called a computer virus, But computer

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Speaker 1: virus is a very specific thing, and malware covers more

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Speaker 1: stuff than just viruses, also worms and all sorts of stuff. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: there's there's malware for Java and Flash. If you still

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Speaker 1: have Flash installed, I highly recommend that you uninstall it

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Speaker 1: if you don't need it. There's malware for browsers. There's

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Speaker 1: malware for advertisements online for sponsors that you'll see like

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Speaker 1: on on different websites. That was a very recent problem

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Speaker 1: that a lot of news publications had with yeah, big

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Speaker 1: name news publicly. Yeah, so that was a big one.

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Speaker 1: But you'll see maw'd all over the place, and luckily

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Speaker 1: we do have anti malware software that we can use

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Speaker 1: to protect our computers from it, and we can also

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Speaker 1: block certain ports on the routers that can hopefully protect

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Speaker 1: you from Mauer. But there's also a lot of cases

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Speaker 1: where maware is distributed and built so quickly that a

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Speaker 1: lot of those anti Mauer software are not updated quick enough.

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Speaker 1: So in that case, we need to do the best

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Speaker 1: that we can to protect ourselves and keep Mauer from

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Speaker 1: getting out from the deep web. Yeah, you know, it

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Speaker 1: used to be, uh that you really all you needed

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Speaker 1: to worry about was just don't go to the more

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Speaker 1: seedy elements of the web, and you were generally all right, right, Yeah,

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Speaker 1: It's kind of like avoiding a bad neighborhood. Like, obviously,

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Speaker 1: if you don't want to get robbed, there's certain neighborhoods

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Speaker 1: that you should probably shouldn't walk around in by yourself

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Speaker 1: at night, right, And this is kind of similar in

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Speaker 1: that case where you avoid the deep web unless you

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Speaker 1: really want to be on somebody's like hit list or

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Speaker 1: something like that. Yeah. Yeah, if you're if you suddenly

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Speaker 1: think that you want to come across as a big shot. Look,

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Speaker 1: if you're not a big shot. Don't do that. It's

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Speaker 1: kind of like, kind of like walking up to someone

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Speaker 1: who works in a carnival and claiming that you're with

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Speaker 1: it and for it. If you don't know what that means,

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Speaker 1: you do not say that. Okay, I think I just

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Speaker 1: gave terrible advice to an entire population of listeners. Don't don't.

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Speaker 1: Don't talk to Carney's unless you are one. Alright, so, uh,

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Speaker 1: and I love you Carney's, I love you all. So.

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Speaker 1: The the thing that we're getting across, though, is that

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Speaker 1: today that's not as big a guarantee as it used

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Speaker 1: to be. Right like ten years ago, you'd say, look,

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Speaker 1: just be careful. Don't download unusual files. Don't don't run

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Speaker 1: a file that's linked in your email without checking it

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Speaker 1: out first. Don't don't, you know, be careful opening up

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Speaker 1: emails from things that you don't recognize. Be careful with

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Speaker 1: PDF files. Be careful with stuff, especially unsolicited stuff that

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Speaker 1: has come to you, because that raises the chances that's

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Speaker 1: something hinky is going on. It doesn't necessarily mean it's

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Speaker 1: definitely a problem, but it's potentially a problem, and it's

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Speaker 1: better to be safe than sorry. Make sure you have

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Speaker 1: good and uh anti virus software on your computer, make

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Speaker 1: sure you have a nice strong firewall, all of these

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Speaker 1: kind of things. Those used to be pretty good at

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Speaker 1: keeping of the malware away from you if you were

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Speaker 1: being a fairly responsible ned is in these days, they

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Speaker 1: definitely help these days. These days, the attacks are sometimes

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Speaker 1: getting like in the case of the advertise eismans on

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Speaker 1: news sites. These are attacks that are going through avenues

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Speaker 1: that you want at one point would have considered perfectly safe.

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Speaker 1: Not that it's happening all the time, but the fact

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Speaker 1: that it can happen tells you that it requires an

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Speaker 1: extra level of vigilance beyond what we used to say

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Speaker 1: was was sufficient. Yeah. Absolutely, A data collection for a

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Speaker 1: lot of this matare is extremely Uh. It's high sensitive

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Speaker 1: in the fact that a user's data can get so

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Speaker 1: much money on the on the deep web, so much

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Speaker 1: money really, particularly a collection of user data. That's where

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Speaker 1: the big money is, right. I did an episode once

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Speaker 1: where we tried to break down how much is your

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Speaker 1: personal information worth? Yeah, it really depends. It depends upon

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Speaker 1: what information you're talking about, Like how extensive is that

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Speaker 1: profile on a person? But yeah, it's not much in

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Speaker 1: the grand scheme of things like, to you, it's worth

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Speaker 1: a lot right you a person, Shannon, you as a person,

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Speaker 1: that information is worth a lot of money to you

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Speaker 1: because it's who you are. To someone else, it's worth

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Speaker 1: pennies on the dollar, really, depending upon depending upon the

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Speaker 1: amount of information. But the smellware often is giving hackers

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Speaker 1: access to massive amounts of info about a huge number

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Speaker 1: of people, and in numbers there is more value, and

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Speaker 1: that's where they will sell that. Sometimes they sell it

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Speaker 1: to companies that are just interested in getting information so

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Speaker 1: that they can do targeted advertising. So it might be

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Speaker 1: that the ultimate use of your information isn't as bad

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Speaker 1: as it could be. It just means you're going to

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Speaker 1: get some ads, but still not fun to think about

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Speaker 1: and to think that you know, now these companies have

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Speaker 1: access to information about you that you probably would rather

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Speaker 1: they not have, particularly in targeted advertising. The famous story

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Speaker 1: about target when they started sending ads to a young

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Speaker 1: lady that were related to pregnancy, and then her dad

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Speaker 1: got really really ticked off about it. But it turned

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Speaker 1: out that little girl was pregnant, yeah, and that it

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Speaker 1: was it was because the algorithms had picked up through

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Speaker 1: her search habits that she was pregnant based upon the

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Speaker 1: search terms she was putting in, and so they proactively

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Speaker 1: sent her some coupons for pregnancy related items. The dad

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Speaker 1: got very upset. Then the dad ended up apologizing to Targets,

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Speaker 1: saying that he was unaware at the time of the

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Speaker 1: full situation. Well, in that case, it was search algorithms.

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Speaker 1: It wasn't a hacker who had gained access to stuff

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Speaker 1: and then sold it. But there are other cases where

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Speaker 1: that does happen, where you know, just a database of info,

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Speaker 1: and a lot of times they will release this malware

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Speaker 1: in something that's called an exploit kit. So generally, these

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Speaker 1: exploit kits are like a batch of similar malware that

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Speaker 1: will work across several different platforms. So that whether that's

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Speaker 1: several different types of software like job and flash, or

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Speaker 1: several different browsers. It could be several different operating systems too,

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Speaker 1: So you might see an exploit kit that works on

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Speaker 1: Lenox four but also works on Windows XP up through

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Speaker 1: eight or something like that. Right, And what's crazy is

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Speaker 1: that when you start looking at I mean, this is

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Speaker 1: one of the things that hackers do, right, They'll look

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Speaker 1: at operating systems and what the market penetration is for

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Speaker 1: those systems because that that's that shows you where your

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Speaker 1: target rich environment is. Right, So if you have Windows seven,

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Speaker 1: guess what you are prime target for for malware because

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Speaker 1: that is by far the largest um that that has

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Speaker 1: the greatest market share of any operating system right now,

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Speaker 1: Windows XP still it's number three, number three, and it

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Speaker 1: has not been supported by Window formed by Microsoft for

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Speaker 1: two years. This, by the way, bad thing. If you

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Speaker 1: want to be really secure with your your computer information,

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Speaker 1: you don't want to be using and operate system that

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Speaker 1: no longer gets support from the company that made it,

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Speaker 1: because because that means no vulnerabilities will be patched. From

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Speaker 1: that moment forward, you're pretty much on your own. You

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Speaker 1: have gone into the dark forest, and you forgot to

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Speaker 1: bring your flashlight. It's pretty dangerous. UM. One of the

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Speaker 1: things that you kind of uh that that I think

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Speaker 1: it leads in from what you were saying before with

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Speaker 1: these exploit kits. One of the most terrifying aspects of

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Speaker 1: this type of malware and and the fact that that

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Speaker 1: people can use it for nefarious purposes and monetary gain,

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Speaker 1: is that you also have a population of people who

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Speaker 1: don't even understand how the malware works. They don't even

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Speaker 1: Script kitties is what I'm getting at. Script kitties, that's

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Speaker 1: the term we use for people who are, uh, they're

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Speaker 1: benefiting from the the work that hackers have done. Hackers

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Speaker 1: are the ones who are actually putting together the software.

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Speaker 1: They're the ones who have identified the vulnerability and then

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Speaker 1: exploited it in some way. Script kitties are the ones

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Speaker 1: who essentially they're given a set of skeleton keys, and

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Speaker 1: they didn't make the skeleton keys, they're just using them. Um.

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Speaker 1: And it's scary because you don't need a level of expertise.

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Speaker 1: You might think, oh, well, I'm kind of safe from

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Speaker 1: hackers because how many people are actually hackers? How many

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Speaker 1: people really know how this system works. Well, you don't

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Speaker 1: have to really know how the system works. If you

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Speaker 1: have a tool that exploits a vulnerability. Oh absolutely. Although

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Speaker 1: I really hate the word script kittie, I will put

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Speaker 1: it out there because I feel like if you're interested

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Speaker 1: in information security, and if you're interested in becoming a

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Speaker 1: good hacker, then you do start somewhere. And everybody is

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Speaker 1: going to start with the easy tools that are out

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Speaker 1: there and that are available for free. For example, one

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Speaker 1: thing that I learned how to use a couple of

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Speaker 1: years back was this tool called wire shark. It easily

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Speaker 1: lets you see everything that's happening on your wireless network,

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Speaker 1: or you can use it for um, any computers that

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Speaker 1: are on your on your network, like behind your router,

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Speaker 1: so you can see everything that's going on and you

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Speaker 1: don't necessarily have to learn or understand what's going on

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Speaker 1: behind it to be able to read what's on your

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Speaker 1: screen happening right in front of you. I think it's

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Speaker 1: really important though, for people who might be called script

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Speaker 1: kitties to look at as being beneficial and that they

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Speaker 1: can grow from that process. They can start from being

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Speaker 1: a beginner and say, okay, well I need to understand

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Speaker 1: the theory. Now I can move on from being a

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Speaker 1: script kittie quote unquote to becoming somebody who is an

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Speaker 1: expert in some kind of information security out there. Yeah.

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Speaker 1: I when I think of the term script kitty, in

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Speaker 1: my mind, it's a very it's a subset of the

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Speaker 1: people that typically get labeled as such. That subset being

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Speaker 1: people who have little to no interest in actually learning

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Speaker 1: how to hack or program. Uh, people who want a

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Speaker 1: very very fast track way to gain either a reputation

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Speaker 1: by being the person who took down a system by

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Speaker 1: whatever means, or by making a whole lot of money

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Speaker 1: really fast for relatively little effort. Those are the ones

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Speaker 1: I specifically think of when I think of script kitty.

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Speaker 1: But you are absolutely right, you have to start somewhere

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Speaker 1: if you're interested in that is. I'm kind of defensive

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Speaker 1: with that because I I was called a script katie

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Speaker 1: when I first started up started off learning about hacking

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Speaker 1: and information security. People would be like, oh, she's just

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Speaker 1: a script katty, and I'd be like, well, I actually

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Speaker 1: want to understand the theory. I want to learn how

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Speaker 1: to program. I want to learn how to code. I'm

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Speaker 1: no longer called that because I have learned how to

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Speaker 1: write certain kinds of code. I have learned how to program.

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Speaker 1: I can make my r do we know, do whatever

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Speaker 1: I want. So at this point in my stage, I've

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Speaker 1: surpassed that moment of being a nube and I've gone

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Speaker 1: on to learning things and being able to understand specific

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Speaker 1: tests and get them to do what I want them

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Speaker 1: to do without finding tutorials online. Yea, so now I

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Speaker 1: make my own tutorials. Seeing Now that's nice because when

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Speaker 1: I started at how stuff works. They call me that

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Speaker 1: weird bald guy, and today they still do. So some

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Speaker 1: labels just stick, is what I'm saying. So yeah, so,

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Speaker 1: so that kind of covers the malware approach. People can

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Speaker 1: make money through malware, either by selling your information UM,

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Speaker 1: they might do so by another method, which kind of

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Speaker 1: leads into this idea of ransomware. So this would be

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Speaker 1: malware specific type of malware that UM locks down your

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Speaker 1: machine in some way so that you can no longer

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Speaker 1: access it, and then you essentially get a message saying, hey,

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Speaker 1: if you want if you want your data back, if

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Speaker 1: you want access to your data, if you want to

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Speaker 1: be able to do all this stuff, and you want

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Speaker 1: our hands out of your business, then you've got to

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Speaker 1: pay us some moolah, some money. Shannon and I will

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Speaker 1: have more to say about how hackers make all the

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Speaker 1: dollar dollar bills y'all in just a moment, but first

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Speaker 1: let's take a quick break. Yeah. So, basically what happens

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Speaker 1: with ransomware is, uh, it is just like you said,

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Speaker 1: a type of aware that gets distributed in one way,

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Speaker 1: shape or form onto somebody's computer and it ends up

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Speaker 1: encrypting their data. It could be a whole hard drive.

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Speaker 1: It could be a folder of data. It's some kind

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Speaker 1: of important data that they have sitting on their computer. Uh.

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Speaker 1: And in many cases, a thief the hacker will ask

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Speaker 1: them in an email or maybe an encrypted text document

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Speaker 1: that's now surreptitiously on their computer out of nowhere, to

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Speaker 1: send them a certain amount of bitcoins, and they tell

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Speaker 1: them how to set up a bitcoin wallets so that

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Speaker 1: they can send the bitcoins to them for them to

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Speaker 1: get a pass code to unlock their encrypted data. Now,

431
00:23:39,200 --> 00:23:42,040
Speaker 1: the weird part is they already own this data is

432
00:23:42,040 --> 00:23:44,120
Speaker 1: on their own hard drive. It could be anything from

433
00:23:44,119 --> 00:23:46,959
Speaker 1: like kids photos, it could be tax documents. But in

434
00:23:47,000 --> 00:23:48,960
Speaker 1: any case, it's going to be some kind of important

435
00:23:49,000 --> 00:23:52,040
Speaker 1: information that people don't want to lose because it might

436
00:23:52,080 --> 00:23:55,280
Speaker 1: be years and years of information that's just on that computer.

437
00:23:55,880 --> 00:23:58,159
Speaker 1: So of course people are going to send them bitcoins.

438
00:23:58,560 --> 00:24:00,919
Speaker 1: And I think last night Act to Bitcoin was a

439
00:24:00,960 --> 00:24:03,000
Speaker 1: few hundred bucks, so it ends up being quite a

440
00:24:03,000 --> 00:24:04,680
Speaker 1: bit of money that they have to send to get

441
00:24:04,680 --> 00:24:08,000
Speaker 1: their information unlocked. Yeah, and this is this is the

442
00:24:08,000 --> 00:24:12,040
Speaker 1: type of malware. When we were talking about the advertising

443
00:24:12,119 --> 00:24:15,679
Speaker 1: that was targeting people through massive news sites. If I'm

444
00:24:15,720 --> 00:24:19,159
Speaker 1: not mistaken. It was specifically ransomware. It was the kind

445
00:24:19,160 --> 00:24:23,240
Speaker 1: of stuff that was encrypting users. Uh yeah, yeah, so

446
00:24:23,280 --> 00:24:26,679
Speaker 1: it wasn't just malware. It was ransomware that was infecting computers.

447
00:24:26,720 --> 00:24:28,640
Speaker 1: Because malware can do other stuff too, right, it can

448
00:24:28,800 --> 00:24:34,160
Speaker 1: It can create something like a backdoor access. So yeah,

449
00:24:34,359 --> 00:24:36,880
Speaker 1: hackers can take control of your machine or just monitor

450
00:24:36,920 --> 00:24:38,879
Speaker 1: what you're doing. Even if they don't want to take control.

451
00:24:39,240 --> 00:24:41,360
Speaker 1: They can put in key loggers so they can see

452
00:24:41,359 --> 00:24:44,200
Speaker 1: what all your passwords are. Um, so you might want

453
00:24:44,200 --> 00:24:47,480
Speaker 1: to think about using things like a really good password manager.

454
00:24:48,040 --> 00:24:51,399
Speaker 1: UM that's what I use and and I love mine.

455
00:24:52,000 --> 00:24:55,600
Speaker 1: Uh yeah, so the things where you don't have to

456
00:24:55,600 --> 00:24:57,360
Speaker 1: type the password and so you don't have to worry

457
00:24:57,359 --> 00:24:59,399
Speaker 1: about key loggers picking up on that kind of stuff.

458
00:25:01,000 --> 00:25:03,240
Speaker 1: But we'll talk more about that in just a second.

459
00:25:03,359 --> 00:25:05,440
Speaker 1: So one of the other ones I wanted to talk about,

460
00:25:05,480 --> 00:25:07,959
Speaker 1: This one is kind of a gray area because, uh,

461
00:25:08,119 --> 00:25:12,399
Speaker 1: this is this. I titled this section spies like us um,

462
00:25:12,400 --> 00:25:16,480
Speaker 1: and by this I meant state sponsored hackers. People who

463
00:25:16,560 --> 00:25:21,960
Speaker 1: are hacking on behalf of a specific state or nation

464
00:25:22,080 --> 00:25:25,840
Speaker 1: or government. Um. Sometimes they may be doing so not

465
00:25:26,040 --> 00:25:29,760
Speaker 1: with the Uh why should I say like, not with

466
00:25:29,840 --> 00:25:33,760
Speaker 1: the express permission of the nation. It may turn out

467
00:25:33,800 --> 00:25:36,040
Speaker 1: that the state says, hey, we didn't tell them to

468
00:25:36,080 --> 00:25:38,280
Speaker 1: do this. They're just doing it because they love us

469
00:25:38,359 --> 00:25:41,560
Speaker 1: so much and they hate and they hate you guys,

470
00:25:42,119 --> 00:25:44,960
Speaker 1: and that's why they're doing it. Um. Whether that's true

471
00:25:45,040 --> 00:25:48,119
Speaker 1: or not depends upon the situation. I would I would

472
00:25:48,280 --> 00:25:51,399
Speaker 1: think that if I were running a government and I

473
00:25:51,440 --> 00:25:55,480
Speaker 1: had employed a bunch of hackers to infiltrate or sabotage

474
00:25:55,960 --> 00:25:59,680
Speaker 1: another nations systems, I also would like some plausible deniability

475
00:25:59,680 --> 00:26:03,040
Speaker 1: in their Hey, I didn't tell him to do it.

476
00:26:03,119 --> 00:26:05,640
Speaker 1: I just said, man, it's It's kind of like there's

477
00:26:05,720 --> 00:26:09,840
Speaker 1: there's a story that a king of England once yelled out,

478
00:26:09,880 --> 00:26:12,640
Speaker 1: who will rid me of this meddlesome priest? And then

479
00:26:12,640 --> 00:26:15,119
Speaker 1: a couple of nights went often ridded him of his

480
00:26:15,480 --> 00:26:18,520
Speaker 1: that meddlesome priest, and it turned out that he was

481
00:26:18,760 --> 00:26:22,840
Speaker 1: he was just mad and just talking out loud. And

482
00:26:22,880 --> 00:26:25,360
Speaker 1: then one of his dearest friends ended up being murdered

483
00:26:25,400 --> 00:26:27,640
Speaker 1: by a couple of nights because they heard the guy

484
00:26:27,720 --> 00:26:29,359
Speaker 1: talking and said, hey, we should get rid of them.

485
00:26:29,359 --> 00:26:32,280
Speaker 1: We'll get rewarded. Um. That's why the states argue, I

486
00:26:32,280 --> 00:26:34,440
Speaker 1: don't know that that's always the case. Also, by the way,

487
00:26:34,560 --> 00:26:37,119
Speaker 1: for you listeners out there who recognize who I'm talking about,

488
00:26:37,160 --> 00:26:39,439
Speaker 1: send me an email and prove it, because I'm a

489
00:26:39,480 --> 00:26:43,199
Speaker 1: medievalist and I love that stuff. Um. But yeah, this

490
00:26:43,280 --> 00:26:45,439
Speaker 1: is something that we see. You know, you often will

491
00:26:45,440 --> 00:26:47,760
Speaker 1: hear stories about Chinese hackers or Russian hackers. There was

492
00:26:47,800 --> 00:26:52,679
Speaker 1: a story, UH several years ago about how UH information

493
00:26:52,720 --> 00:26:57,200
Speaker 1: security experts were noticing some artifacts in our power grid

494
00:26:57,280 --> 00:27:02,080
Speaker 1: system that were indicative of UH people who had infiltrated

495
00:27:02,119 --> 00:27:04,359
Speaker 1: that system and planted some stuff in there so that

496
00:27:04,400 --> 00:27:07,440
Speaker 1: they could monitor things or perhaps even jump back into

497
00:27:07,440 --> 00:27:10,560
Speaker 1: the power grid system should UH push come to shove

498
00:27:10,600 --> 00:27:13,439
Speaker 1: in some sort of political situation. They had traced it

499
00:27:13,480 --> 00:27:16,439
Speaker 1: back to either China or Russia. It's pretty tricky to

500
00:27:16,600 --> 00:27:20,399
Speaker 1: actually figure out where attacks ultimately originate from, because if

501
00:27:20,400 --> 00:27:23,680
Speaker 1: you're really good, you can cover your tracks pretty well. Um.

502
00:27:23,920 --> 00:27:26,359
Speaker 1: But the United States has done it too. You might

503
00:27:26,400 --> 00:27:29,080
Speaker 1: have heard about Stuck's Net. That was the that was

504
00:27:29,119 --> 00:27:32,879
Speaker 1: the computer virus that was designed to um to to

505
00:27:33,119 --> 00:27:37,000
Speaker 1: spin a centrifuge in a nuclear facility at a speed

506
00:27:37,160 --> 00:27:40,280
Speaker 1: greater than what it was supposed to spin at, and

507
00:27:40,440 --> 00:27:42,720
Speaker 1: originally I think the hope was that it would cause

508
00:27:42,760 --> 00:27:47,480
Speaker 1: a catastrophic failure and perhaps perhaps even destroy the facility.

509
00:27:47,800 --> 00:27:50,320
Speaker 1: As it turned out, it caused a failure, but not

510
00:27:50,440 --> 00:27:54,440
Speaker 1: at that level. But that those are examples of something

511
00:27:54,440 --> 00:27:59,480
Speaker 1: that's technically legal within the country because it's it's endorsed

512
00:27:59,600 --> 00:28:04,800
Speaker 1: or at least permitted by a government, but you don't

513
00:28:04,840 --> 00:28:08,160
Speaker 1: want it out there because it seems pretty darn shady

514
00:28:08,240 --> 00:28:13,200
Speaker 1: to anybody else. Yeah. Yeah, So state sponsored hacks are

515
00:28:13,560 --> 00:28:18,040
Speaker 1: more worrisome to me because they oftentimes have much larger targets.

516
00:28:18,640 --> 00:28:22,800
Speaker 1: For example, they might target a large government facility, like

517
00:28:23,080 --> 00:28:26,280
Speaker 1: I don't know, the Pentagon, So I worried about those

518
00:28:26,359 --> 00:28:30,240
Speaker 1: because those kind of servers have a lot of information

519
00:28:30,280 --> 00:28:33,119
Speaker 1: on the citizens of any sort of country. Uh So,

520
00:28:33,160 --> 00:28:35,920
Speaker 1: anytime you see these in the news, it's it's always like, oh, well,

521
00:28:36,000 --> 00:28:39,720
Speaker 1: this this hack was done by Chinese state sponsored hackers,

522
00:28:39,840 --> 00:28:44,200
Speaker 1: or Russian state sponsored hackers, or American state sponsored hackers,

523
00:28:44,200 --> 00:28:47,520
Speaker 1: and these are Korea. North Korea would be another big one. Yeah. Yeah,

524
00:28:47,560 --> 00:28:50,800
Speaker 1: So so they are either it might be a tinam

525
00:28:50,800 --> 00:28:54,400
Speaker 1: of hackers that are kind of comprised together in a

526
00:28:54,640 --> 00:28:58,560
Speaker 1: illegitimate company who are hired by a government or like

527
00:28:58,640 --> 00:29:02,920
Speaker 1: you say, where they may not necessarily have any affiliation

528
00:29:03,120 --> 00:29:07,160
Speaker 1: quote unquote with the government, but the government ends them

529
00:29:07,160 --> 00:29:10,320
Speaker 1: paying them in some way, shape or form for their

530
00:29:10,400 --> 00:29:13,640
Speaker 1: infiltration because it ends up helping the government in some

531
00:29:13,680 --> 00:29:17,320
Speaker 1: way or another. And so it's it's a very sticky

532
00:29:17,360 --> 00:29:20,240
Speaker 1: scenario when you start dealing with these state sponsored hackers,

533
00:29:20,280 --> 00:29:24,160
Speaker 1: because it's it's hard to understand, Um, how are we

534
00:29:24,200 --> 00:29:27,360
Speaker 1: going to, you know, penalize them? Who do we penalize

535
00:29:27,360 --> 00:29:30,080
Speaker 1: Do we penalize government or the hackers themselves? Are both?

536
00:29:30,320 --> 00:29:33,200
Speaker 1: Like who was actually involved? It might end up being

537
00:29:33,320 --> 00:29:36,320
Speaker 1: how do we address the underlying situation that led to

538
00:29:36,400 --> 00:29:40,680
Speaker 1: the employment of hackers in the first place? Um, which

539
00:29:40,800 --> 00:29:45,720
Speaker 1: can get pretty pretty delicate. Another great example or him

540
00:29:45,760 --> 00:29:48,600
Speaker 1: not too long ago, or at least one that may

541
00:29:48,720 --> 00:29:51,160
Speaker 1: or may not have been involved in may or may

542
00:29:51,200 --> 00:29:53,600
Speaker 1: not have involved a state sponsored hacker I'm still somewhat

543
00:29:54,600 --> 00:29:58,120
Speaker 1: skeptical of that would be the Sony hack. Oh yeah,

544
00:29:58,320 --> 00:30:01,520
Speaker 1: because the Sony hack, the Wes government essentially was pointing

545
00:30:01,520 --> 00:30:04,240
Speaker 1: fingers to North Korea, saying the hackers must have come

546
00:30:04,280 --> 00:30:07,200
Speaker 1: from North Korea. Look at this IP address, which we

547
00:30:07,240 --> 00:30:09,840
Speaker 1: don't even need to go into detail right now, except

548
00:30:09,840 --> 00:30:12,520
Speaker 1: to say that an IP address does not proof make

549
00:30:12,800 --> 00:30:16,200
Speaker 1: But at any rate, they're they're pointing over at North

550
00:30:16,280 --> 00:30:18,760
Speaker 1: Korea saying, we think the attacks came from there. The

551
00:30:19,000 --> 00:30:22,080
Speaker 1: attack appears to be politically motivated North Korea for its part,

552
00:30:22,120 --> 00:30:24,720
Speaker 1: the government, which, by the way, North Korea not shy

553
00:30:24,840 --> 00:30:27,920
Speaker 1: about taking credit for stuff. But they said, no, no,

554
00:30:28,040 --> 00:30:30,240
Speaker 1: we didn't. We we didn't ask for this, but we're

555
00:30:30,280 --> 00:30:34,800
Speaker 1: totally cool with it happening. Um, So you know, it's

556
00:30:34,800 --> 00:30:37,000
Speaker 1: one of those. It's also very muddy because obviously when

557
00:30:37,040 --> 00:30:39,600
Speaker 1: you're talking about things like espionage or sabotage or any

558
00:30:39,640 --> 00:30:43,400
Speaker 1: of those things, Uh, you don't. You don't come out

559
00:30:43,440 --> 00:30:45,600
Speaker 1: and talk more about it, you don't. That ends up

560
00:30:45,640 --> 00:30:48,360
Speaker 1: being closed away. Um. In fact, I should, I should

561
00:30:48,360 --> 00:30:50,240
Speaker 1: really throw that over to the stuff they don't want

562
00:30:50,280 --> 00:30:52,240
Speaker 1: you to know guys and have them do an episode

563
00:30:52,280 --> 00:30:54,960
Speaker 1: on it, because I would be a lot of fun. Uh.

564
00:30:55,040 --> 00:30:59,680
Speaker 1: And then we've got got the the traditional at least,

565
00:30:59,680 --> 00:31:02,200
Speaker 1: I would argue the traditional concept of a hacker from

566
00:31:02,200 --> 00:31:06,120
Speaker 1: the Hollywood perspective. The black hats, the ones that are

567
00:31:06,160 --> 00:31:08,280
Speaker 1: wearing the hoodies and they're sitting at a keyboard and

568
00:31:08,280 --> 00:31:13,000
Speaker 1: they're typing really fast on a green and black screen over. Yes,

569
00:31:13,120 --> 00:31:18,720
Speaker 1: they've got got some junk food snail and they have

570
00:31:18,760 --> 00:31:21,320
Speaker 1: a ton of different windows popping up on their computer

571
00:31:21,400 --> 00:31:24,240
Speaker 1: really really fast. You can't make out anything that's happening.

572
00:31:24,440 --> 00:31:27,800
Speaker 1: It's entirely not true. That's not how it works. It's

573
00:31:27,840 --> 00:31:32,200
Speaker 1: actually a somewhat slow process to get um basically, to

574
00:31:32,280 --> 00:31:35,600
Speaker 1: get reconnaissance and to get into any kind of network. Uh.

575
00:31:35,640 --> 00:31:38,400
Speaker 1: The only things I've done, of course, are completely legal.

576
00:31:38,880 --> 00:31:42,160
Speaker 1: I've had an authorization by everybody who I have tested

577
00:31:42,240 --> 00:31:47,560
Speaker 1: my my abilities on. Right. Yeah, so black hats, that's

578
00:31:47,560 --> 00:31:51,760
Speaker 1: that's another awkward definition because it's not one that I

579
00:31:51,880 --> 00:31:54,240
Speaker 1: like to use all the time because black hat hacker

580
00:31:54,360 --> 00:31:58,200
Speaker 1: means that there's it makes hackers have more of a

581
00:31:58,280 --> 00:32:01,320
Speaker 1: negative appeal to a lot of people. So I always

582
00:32:01,360 --> 00:32:04,160
Speaker 1: just call them black hat thiefs. Yeah. No, that's a

583
00:32:04,160 --> 00:32:07,120
Speaker 1: great way of putting it, because, uh, typically you'll see

584
00:32:07,160 --> 00:32:10,440
Speaker 1: things like um uh, the idea of infiltrating a system

585
00:32:10,480 --> 00:32:12,880
Speaker 1: in order to steal information, perhaps to sell it to

586
00:32:12,920 --> 00:32:16,080
Speaker 1: someone else, or to hold it against the party that

587
00:32:16,120 --> 00:32:19,280
Speaker 1: you've stolen it from. Um, you know, so it might

588
00:32:19,280 --> 00:32:24,720
Speaker 1: be extortion as opposed to uh to stealing and selling. Uh. Also,

589
00:32:24,800 --> 00:32:27,080
Speaker 1: we should go ahead and point out something else that

590
00:32:27,120 --> 00:32:30,280
Speaker 1: I'll talk about in a future episode, but I've mentioned

591
00:32:30,280 --> 00:32:33,640
Speaker 1: it in previous ones too. Um. Hackers don't necessarily just

592
00:32:33,680 --> 00:32:36,800
Speaker 1: sit at a keyboard and type in strings of letters

593
00:32:36,800 --> 00:32:39,160
Speaker 1: and numbers. They also do a lot of social engineering

594
00:32:39,240 --> 00:32:41,920
Speaker 1: where or they can do a lot of social engineering

595
00:32:41,960 --> 00:32:45,040
Speaker 1: where they attempt to gain access to systems, either by

596
00:32:45,120 --> 00:32:49,200
Speaker 1: physically gaining access to a system, which makes it way

597
00:32:49,200 --> 00:32:53,400
Speaker 1: easier than remotely doing it um, or even easier than

598
00:32:53,400 --> 00:32:55,960
Speaker 1: that manipulating someone who does have access to a system,

599
00:32:56,000 --> 00:32:58,200
Speaker 1: and then you get it that way. Um. And it's

600
00:32:58,240 --> 00:33:03,320
Speaker 1: surprisingly easy to do if employees have not been educated

601
00:33:03,520 --> 00:33:06,600
Speaker 1: on how to spot that and avoid it. Yeah, properly

602
00:33:06,640 --> 00:33:09,600
Speaker 1: training your your your employees at your place of work

603
00:33:09,720 --> 00:33:12,440
Speaker 1: is really important when it comes to social engineering. And

604
00:33:12,920 --> 00:33:16,720
Speaker 1: it is incredibly easy to do social engineering, especially when

605
00:33:16,760 --> 00:33:20,200
Speaker 1: you're a female, I would imagine. So it turns out

606
00:33:20,240 --> 00:33:23,960
Speaker 1: also if you are dressed as the stereotypical I T

607
00:33:24,120 --> 00:33:28,480
Speaker 1: guy and you are there to quote unquote upgrade someone's machine,

608
00:33:29,240 --> 00:33:32,040
Speaker 1: really easy to get access to that machine. People are

609
00:33:32,440 --> 00:33:38,040
Speaker 1: so eager. Yeah, and obviously, like social engineering, completely depends

610
00:33:38,120 --> 00:33:43,640
Speaker 1: upon identifying and then exploiting a person's vulnerability and typically

611
00:33:43,680 --> 00:33:47,840
Speaker 1: speaking like greed lust, those are two big ones that

612
00:33:48,400 --> 00:33:51,680
Speaker 1: are exploitable, and that the people who are really good

613
00:33:51,680 --> 00:33:54,320
Speaker 1: at social engineering know that, and they're very good at

614
00:33:54,320 --> 00:33:58,720
Speaker 1: that leveraging that. Just as knowing what sort of vulnerabilities

615
00:33:58,760 --> 00:34:02,600
Speaker 1: typically show up within code, within within programs, you need

616
00:34:02,640 --> 00:34:06,520
Speaker 1: to know what vulnerabilities show up in people. UM And

617
00:34:06,760 --> 00:34:08,399
Speaker 1: I also I had a little thing on here about

618
00:34:08,480 --> 00:34:11,120
Speaker 1: botan net masters. Really what in this I was thinking

619
00:34:11,120 --> 00:34:13,120
Speaker 1: about the people who are using malware to get that

620
00:34:13,160 --> 00:34:15,839
Speaker 1: back door access to machines, to get UH, to get

621
00:34:15,840 --> 00:34:20,640
Speaker 1: that administrative control over a wide array. Sometimes we call

622
00:34:20,680 --> 00:34:22,560
Speaker 1: it a boton net. Sometimes we call it a zombie

623
00:34:22,640 --> 00:34:26,799
Speaker 1: army of of user computers, and then utilizing that to

624
00:34:26,880 --> 00:34:32,120
Speaker 1: do stuff like UH distributed denial of service attacks or

625
00:34:32,200 --> 00:34:36,600
Speaker 1: de DOS attacks, where you are UH directing an army

626
00:34:36,880 --> 00:34:42,279
Speaker 1: essentially to coordinate an attack against an identified target. Sometimes

627
00:34:42,320 --> 00:34:45,480
Speaker 1: this is done just to cause problems. I mean, obviously,

628
00:34:45,520 --> 00:34:50,320
Speaker 1: if you've ever had issues logging into like a gaming network,

629
00:34:50,760 --> 00:34:53,319
Speaker 1: Xbox Live has had this happen, PlayStation has had this

630
00:34:53,400 --> 00:34:57,719
Speaker 1: happen where people who are disenchanted with the service for

631
00:34:57,760 --> 00:35:00,440
Speaker 1: one reason or another, or they just want to do

632
00:35:00,480 --> 00:35:04,719
Speaker 1: it for the lulls. Uh, specifically around holiday times. That's

633
00:35:04,760 --> 00:35:07,879
Speaker 1: a big that's a big target time to attack something

634
00:35:07,920 --> 00:35:10,880
Speaker 1: like Xbox Live. They'll direct a ton of traffic to

635
00:35:11,120 --> 00:35:14,720
Speaker 1: break down servers, so servers can't respond to legitimate traffic

636
00:35:14,719 --> 00:35:18,200
Speaker 1: because they're too busy responding to a bunch of fake traffic. Essentially,

637
00:35:18,920 --> 00:35:22,360
Speaker 1: I'm oversimplifying, but this is a basic detos attack. It is.

638
00:35:22,400 --> 00:35:24,359
Speaker 1: It's such a mean thing to do to those little

639
00:35:24,400 --> 00:35:27,360
Speaker 1: kids during Christmas times, turn off their xboxes so that

640
00:35:27,400 --> 00:35:29,440
Speaker 1: they can't log in and they can't play their games,

641
00:35:29,480 --> 00:35:32,799
Speaker 1: so they just go on Yeah, yeah, I think, break

642
00:35:32,920 --> 00:35:35,440
Speaker 1: my heart. Gosh, it's it's a jerk move. It's a

643
00:35:35,520 --> 00:35:39,239
Speaker 1: jerk move. Don't do it. I love the definition or

644
00:35:39,280 --> 00:35:43,439
Speaker 1: I love the term zombie for bot nuts, because that's

645
00:35:43,440 --> 00:35:45,799
Speaker 1: exactly what it is. Where you have a you have

646
00:35:45,880 --> 00:35:48,640
Speaker 1: a zero, a patient zero, and that would be the

647
00:35:48,680 --> 00:35:52,600
Speaker 1: first computer. They end up biting a few more computers,

648
00:35:52,680 --> 00:35:55,000
Speaker 1: and those ones end up getting infected with the same

649
00:35:55,080 --> 00:35:58,640
Speaker 1: exact infection that patient zero had, and then those ones

650
00:35:58,840 --> 00:36:01,520
Speaker 1: end up biting ten each so you end up with

651
00:36:01,560 --> 00:36:04,520
Speaker 1: thousands upon thousands of these computers that each have the

652
00:36:04,600 --> 00:36:08,360
Speaker 1: same exact infection, and they all end up perpetrating the

653
00:36:08,480 --> 00:36:13,000
Speaker 1: same exact vulnerability on whatever their target might be. Yeah,

654
00:36:13,120 --> 00:36:16,719
Speaker 1: and then ultimately you end up with a situation where

655
00:36:16,800 --> 00:36:19,000
Speaker 1: Nagan is standing there with a baseball bat and you

656
00:36:19,000 --> 00:36:23,279
Speaker 1: don't know whose head he's gonna cave in. I might

657
00:36:23,280 --> 00:36:26,960
Speaker 1: have taken that metaphor a little too far. But one

658
00:36:26,960 --> 00:36:30,120
Speaker 1: of the things that Boughton net controllers might do, and

659
00:36:30,120 --> 00:36:32,560
Speaker 1: in fact, this has happened on multiple occasions. It's similar

660
00:36:32,600 --> 00:36:36,160
Speaker 1: to ransomware is they'll send a message to an identified

661
00:36:36,160 --> 00:36:40,560
Speaker 1: target and say, hey, we we got your number. We're

662
00:36:40,600 --> 00:36:42,920
Speaker 1: gonna come after you unless you pay us a certain

663
00:36:42,960 --> 00:36:46,799
Speaker 1: amount of money. Um, we will unleash the dogs of

664
00:36:46,880 --> 00:36:51,000
Speaker 1: war on your servers and you will be unable to

665
00:36:51,080 --> 00:36:54,120
Speaker 1: do business. And there have been cases where businesses have

666
00:36:54,360 --> 00:36:56,880
Speaker 1: folded to this kind of pressure, where they have in

667
00:36:56,920 --> 00:37:00,799
Speaker 1: fact paid to do this because the hospital ended up

668
00:37:00,800 --> 00:37:04,640
Speaker 1: doing that. Yes, yes it was. Yeah, I've seen a

669
00:37:04,680 --> 00:37:12,680
Speaker 1: few cases of particularly malicious and odious acts against things

670
00:37:12,719 --> 00:37:15,640
Speaker 1: like hospitals. There was one year when I was participating

671
00:37:16,480 --> 00:37:20,360
Speaker 1: in a charity for children's hospitals and the charity was

672
00:37:20,640 --> 00:37:25,520
Speaker 1: targeted in the middle of the event and for about

673
00:37:25,600 --> 00:37:30,040
Speaker 1: three hours they were offline trying to deal with that. Um, yeah,

674
00:37:30,239 --> 00:37:32,520
Speaker 1: it's and in that case, it wasn't a it wasn't

675
00:37:32,520 --> 00:37:35,160
Speaker 1: an attack in an effort to get money. I don't

676
00:37:35,200 --> 00:37:37,560
Speaker 1: think I think it was just someone being truly an

677
00:37:37,600 --> 00:37:41,280
Speaker 1: awful human being. But we have seen cases of people

678
00:37:41,280 --> 00:37:43,879
Speaker 1: trying to do this in order to extort money. So

679
00:37:44,080 --> 00:37:49,000
Speaker 1: you're probably noticing some trends here extortion, stealing, uh, you know,

680
00:37:49,040 --> 00:37:53,319
Speaker 1: holding things for ransom, this idea of making sure that

681
00:37:53,320 --> 00:37:57,400
Speaker 1: that people are spending money for out of fear or

682
00:37:57,440 --> 00:38:00,120
Speaker 1: out of a need to get back and and have

683
00:38:00,320 --> 00:38:05,120
Speaker 1: access to something that belongs to them. These are all terrible,

684
00:38:05,200 --> 00:38:09,520
Speaker 1: terrible motivations to make money, and as such, as such

685
00:38:09,600 --> 00:38:12,080
Speaker 1: terrible motivations, you might think, well, wait a minute, how

686
00:38:12,120 --> 00:38:14,319
Speaker 1: are they actually like, how are they getting paid? How

687
00:38:14,400 --> 00:38:19,120
Speaker 1: is this money transfer happening? Because you would think anything

688
00:38:19,239 --> 00:38:23,879
Speaker 1: that would be traceable would end up being somewhat problematic.

689
00:38:23,920 --> 00:38:25,960
Speaker 1: You've got a trail that leads back to you as

690
00:38:26,000 --> 00:38:29,880
Speaker 1: a person, then pretty soon law enforcement's going to get involved,

691
00:38:30,120 --> 00:38:33,640
Speaker 1: or at least the I R S. So so how

692
00:38:33,880 --> 00:38:38,400
Speaker 1: Shannon do hackers? How do they get the money? So

693
00:38:38,480 --> 00:38:41,120
Speaker 1: there's probably some ways that I don't even know about yet,

694
00:38:41,480 --> 00:38:44,000
Speaker 1: but the ones that I can think of would be

695
00:38:44,520 --> 00:38:47,439
Speaker 1: treating of high value data. So that's a pretty big

696
00:38:47,440 --> 00:38:50,400
Speaker 1: one where uh saya hacker collects a whole bunch of

697
00:38:50,520 --> 00:38:53,720
Speaker 1: really really high value data like your SO security number,

698
00:38:53,880 --> 00:38:57,960
Speaker 1: your credit card accounts, your banking account, tons of information,

699
00:38:58,400 --> 00:39:00,520
Speaker 1: and they decided to go on to a deep forum

700
00:39:00,640 --> 00:39:03,839
Speaker 1: sell it, and then or trade it for something else

701
00:39:03,840 --> 00:39:07,319
Speaker 1: of high value, for example, a gift card. They could

702
00:39:07,400 --> 00:39:09,760
Speaker 1: ask for people to give them a ton of gift

703
00:39:09,760 --> 00:39:12,000
Speaker 1: cards that are like, you know, twenty five or fifty

704
00:39:12,040 --> 00:39:15,799
Speaker 1: dollars each, and then use those gift cards at a

705
00:39:15,880 --> 00:39:19,600
Speaker 1: retailer who is easily vulnerable to some kind of gift

706
00:39:19,640 --> 00:39:22,200
Speaker 1: card scam, and in that sense they would be able

707
00:39:22,239 --> 00:39:24,439
Speaker 1: to make some kind of money back through those gift

708
00:39:24,480 --> 00:39:27,600
Speaker 1: cards and that trade of that high value UH data

709
00:39:27,680 --> 00:39:31,800
Speaker 1: that they stole from whoever it might be, whatever company.

710
00:39:31,840 --> 00:39:34,960
Speaker 1: Another way would be bitcoins. Now that's probably the most

711
00:39:34,960 --> 00:39:38,000
Speaker 1: obvious one, of course, because bitcoins are very very hard

712
00:39:38,040 --> 00:39:41,600
Speaker 1: to track. Yes, they are traceable in some circumstances, depending

713
00:39:41,600 --> 00:39:44,160
Speaker 1: on what kind of wallet you use, but in a

714
00:39:44,200 --> 00:39:48,200
Speaker 1: lot of circumstances, the bitcoins will trade wallets so many

715
00:39:48,239 --> 00:39:50,919
Speaker 1: times that it will be somewhat impossible to find out

716
00:39:50,920 --> 00:39:53,799
Speaker 1: where it actually came from, where it actually started. Yeah,

717
00:39:53,800 --> 00:39:57,080
Speaker 1: it's kind of interesting because every single bitcoin contains with

718
00:39:57,160 --> 00:39:59,600
Speaker 1: it a record of every transaction. But that does not

719
00:39:59,760 --> 00:40:04,120
Speaker 1: mean that the parties involved are actually identifiable. It really

720
00:40:04,320 --> 00:40:07,320
Speaker 1: is um. It's it's actually data that's used in order

721
00:40:07,360 --> 00:40:10,319
Speaker 1: to allow for the mining of further bitcoins. It's a

722
00:40:10,360 --> 00:40:13,680
Speaker 1: really fascinating process. But but one of the things that

723
00:40:13,719 --> 00:40:16,720
Speaker 1: attracts people to bitcoins is this idea of being able

724
00:40:16,760 --> 00:40:22,280
Speaker 1: to spend them anonymously and be able to purchase things, uh,

725
00:40:22,560 --> 00:40:26,160
Speaker 1: whether legal or illegal, without it being traced back to

726
00:40:26,200 --> 00:40:29,000
Speaker 1: that person. You often will hear about things like, you know,

727
00:40:29,080 --> 00:40:32,480
Speaker 1: the old Silk Road, where you could purchase all sources

728
00:40:32,520 --> 00:40:37,200
Speaker 1: of stuff, including illegal drugs or other materials, sometimes weapons,

729
00:40:37,680 --> 00:40:39,759
Speaker 1: that kind of stuff, um, and you could do it

730
00:40:39,800 --> 00:40:43,160
Speaker 1: through bitcoins, and people felt a high level of confidence

731
00:40:43,200 --> 00:40:47,440
Speaker 1: because it was not a state backed currency. It was

732
00:40:47,560 --> 00:40:52,480
Speaker 1: this independent cryptocurrency that allowed them that that freedom and

733
00:40:52,600 --> 00:40:56,799
Speaker 1: had real value because people want the bitcoins. If no

734
00:40:56,840 --> 00:41:00,560
Speaker 1: one wanted the bitcoins, they wouldn't be worth anything, right,

735
00:41:00,680 --> 00:41:04,120
Speaker 1: and bitcoins have actually been pretty steady last time I checked,

736
00:41:04,200 --> 00:41:09,080
Speaker 1: so their value has been pretty decent in late days,

737
00:41:09,200 --> 00:41:12,840
Speaker 1: in recent days, So so I completely understand why hacker

738
00:41:12,880 --> 00:41:16,760
Speaker 1: would want to be paid in bitcoins. It makes sense. Yeah. Yeah,

739
00:41:16,880 --> 00:41:19,840
Speaker 1: there's also the old, the old deal of putting the

740
00:41:19,880 --> 00:41:22,640
Speaker 1: money into the the washing machine, right, that's how money

741
00:41:22,680 --> 00:41:26,280
Speaker 1: laundering work, right, Yes, money laundering. So that was something

742
00:41:26,280 --> 00:41:28,040
Speaker 1: that I learned about way back in the day when

743
00:41:28,080 --> 00:41:30,399
Speaker 1: I worked at a bank of all places, which also

744
00:41:30,440 --> 00:41:33,600
Speaker 1: got me really interested in security before I started podcasting.

745
00:41:34,040 --> 00:41:37,160
Speaker 1: But money laundering, it's very easy for somebody to go online,

746
00:41:37,360 --> 00:41:40,439
Speaker 1: be able to sell this high value data, get some

747
00:41:40,680 --> 00:41:44,759
Speaker 1: bitcoins or it might be some other form of currency,

748
00:41:45,160 --> 00:41:48,920
Speaker 1: and then be able to resell that money or be

749
00:41:48,960 --> 00:41:51,759
Speaker 1: able to trade a product to get real money, real

750
00:41:51,800 --> 00:41:54,759
Speaker 1: cash at one point or another. But basically it's it's

751
00:41:54,880 --> 00:41:59,879
Speaker 1: um exchanging the hands that hold that money so many

752
00:42:00,000 --> 00:42:03,239
Speaker 1: times that again it's very hard to trace. Yeah, and

753
00:42:03,280 --> 00:42:06,560
Speaker 1: it's it's hard to determine that the original source of

754
00:42:06,600 --> 00:42:11,560
Speaker 1: that money was anything remotely illegal. And then depending on again,

755
00:42:11,600 --> 00:42:14,120
Speaker 1: if you're if you're a state sponsored hacker, you're probably

756
00:42:14,160 --> 00:42:17,880
Speaker 1: just drawing a salary or doing contract work, so you're

757
00:42:17,920 --> 00:42:23,000
Speaker 1: actually getting paid. You get a pay check. Yeah. Yeah,

758
00:42:24,160 --> 00:42:27,360
Speaker 1: so you've got money withdrawn from your paycheck to handle

759
00:42:27,480 --> 00:42:31,080
Speaker 1: to support the government while you are subverting other governments.

760
00:42:31,360 --> 00:42:33,839
Speaker 1: And then it looks completely legitimate. So that's a really

761
00:42:33,840 --> 00:42:38,400
Speaker 1: easy way for somebody to do something that might be very,

762
00:42:38,520 --> 00:42:42,680
Speaker 1: very bad. Yeah, because they are, They do have to

763
00:42:42,760 --> 00:42:44,720
Speaker 1: pay the I R S, they do get a tax

764
00:42:44,760 --> 00:42:47,200
Speaker 1: refund every year, they do have an employer, so it

765
00:42:47,239 --> 00:42:51,080
Speaker 1: looks completely normal for them to be receiving a paycheck

766
00:42:51,160 --> 00:42:54,880
Speaker 1: for whatever work this might be. Yeah, we've got a

767
00:42:54,920 --> 00:42:57,880
Speaker 1: little bit more to say about how hackers make money,

768
00:42:57,920 --> 00:43:00,840
Speaker 1: but first let's take another quick break to thank our sponsor.

769
00:43:08,480 --> 00:43:13,680
Speaker 1: So the nice thing is there aren't just quote unquote

770
00:43:13,719 --> 00:43:16,680
Speaker 1: bad guys out there doing all this kind of of

771
00:43:16,719 --> 00:43:21,520
Speaker 1: work with computers, with a hacking, with discovering vulnerabilities. There

772
00:43:21,520 --> 00:43:24,240
Speaker 1: are plenty of people, as as you mentioned earlier, Shannon,

773
00:43:24,280 --> 00:43:27,680
Speaker 1: who are doing this in order to help others, either

774
00:43:27,840 --> 00:43:32,160
Speaker 1: to make systems more secure or to inform people of

775
00:43:32,239 --> 00:43:35,000
Speaker 1: how these kind of attacks happen so that they can

776
00:43:35,040 --> 00:43:38,280
Speaker 1: be better prepared to defend themselves. So let's talk about

777
00:43:38,320 --> 00:43:41,120
Speaker 1: some of them. Um, of course, if you have black

778
00:43:41,120 --> 00:43:44,600
Speaker 1: hat hackers, right, you got the bad guys, you gotta have,

779
00:43:44,960 --> 00:43:49,799
Speaker 1: you gotta the white hack hackers. These are the These

780
00:43:49,800 --> 00:43:55,840
Speaker 1: are the the noble bounty hunter characters of those westerns,

781
00:43:55,880 --> 00:43:59,640
Speaker 1: the ones who you know they've seen things but deep

782
00:43:59,680 --> 00:44:03,160
Speaker 1: down and they have a heart of gold. Well, not

783
00:44:03,200 --> 00:44:06,000
Speaker 1: all of them, but a lot of a lot of

784
00:44:06,000 --> 00:44:10,280
Speaker 1: my friends are considered white hat hackers. They're the people

785
00:44:10,320 --> 00:44:15,040
Speaker 1: who either they work for a company that specializes insecurity.

786
00:44:15,200 --> 00:44:17,880
Speaker 1: So a lot of my friends work for these companies

787
00:44:17,880 --> 00:44:21,879
Speaker 1: who will be contracted with big brands, go into their

788
00:44:21,920 --> 00:44:24,880
Speaker 1: networks and then find out what the vulnerabilities are and

789
00:44:24,960 --> 00:44:27,160
Speaker 1: fix them, or they will give them a report and

790
00:44:27,160 --> 00:44:29,200
Speaker 1: tell them how to fix that fix it in the future.

791
00:44:29,760 --> 00:44:31,879
Speaker 1: They make a lot of money. A lot of them

792
00:44:31,920 --> 00:44:36,600
Speaker 1: don't like it because they have specific amounts of vulnerabilities

793
00:44:36,719 --> 00:44:39,160
Speaker 1: or specific time frame set that they have to get

794
00:44:39,200 --> 00:44:41,839
Speaker 1: this work done, and a lot of times hacking takes

795
00:44:41,880 --> 00:44:45,960
Speaker 1: a lot of time. It takes a lot of information reconnaissance.

796
00:44:46,440 --> 00:44:49,640
Speaker 1: So a lot of my friends don't necessarily appreciate having

797
00:44:49,640 --> 00:44:52,680
Speaker 1: to be under these time constraints with these big brands. Well,

798
00:44:52,719 --> 00:44:55,759
Speaker 1: particularly since you figure the bad guys aren't under any

799
00:44:55,800 --> 00:44:59,560
Speaker 1: particular time constraints exactly, So the bad guys have tons

800
00:44:59,560 --> 00:45:02,479
Speaker 1: of time to find these vulnerabilities, while the white hacks

801
00:45:02,480 --> 00:45:04,879
Speaker 1: are under the stress of these time constraints to get

802
00:45:04,880 --> 00:45:06,800
Speaker 1: the work done so that they make their bosses happy.

803
00:45:07,480 --> 00:45:10,000
Speaker 1: In this sense, a lot of my a lot of

804
00:45:10,000 --> 00:45:12,640
Speaker 1: people that I know, have created their own security companies

805
00:45:12,680 --> 00:45:16,640
Speaker 1: because of this fault in the generic nature of having

806
00:45:16,920 --> 00:45:19,680
Speaker 1: these security companies. So they said, you know, I'm tired

807
00:45:19,719 --> 00:45:22,680
Speaker 1: of having to deal with these constraints that my boss

808
00:45:22,719 --> 00:45:25,640
Speaker 1: has given me. Just gonna open my own security company,

809
00:45:25,640 --> 00:45:27,360
Speaker 1: and we're going to do it even better because we

810
00:45:27,360 --> 00:45:30,200
Speaker 1: won't give ourselves those time constraints. Will give us ourselves

811
00:45:30,200 --> 00:45:33,719
Speaker 1: several months to find all the vulnerabilities that we absolutely

812
00:45:33,760 --> 00:45:36,279
Speaker 1: can and then we'll write a report and we'll fix it.

813
00:45:36,640 --> 00:45:39,400
Speaker 1: And uh, those are the ones that I would definitely

814
00:45:39,440 --> 00:45:42,800
Speaker 1: work with if I had to hire a security company. Yeah,

815
00:45:42,840 --> 00:45:45,000
Speaker 1: because they're the ones who are going to use the

816
00:45:45,040 --> 00:45:48,799
Speaker 1: exact same kind of methodologies that bad guys are going

817
00:45:48,880 --> 00:45:52,280
Speaker 1: to use. And if if you want to really be secure,

818
00:45:52,719 --> 00:45:55,960
Speaker 1: you want the people to throw everything they can at

819
00:45:56,000 --> 00:45:58,560
Speaker 1: your system. So that you can find out are you

820
00:45:58,600 --> 00:46:00,960
Speaker 1: actually secure? If you're what do you need to do

821
00:46:01,000 --> 00:46:03,560
Speaker 1: to address it? Um? If you want to see a

822
00:46:03,600 --> 00:46:08,000
Speaker 1: movie that that does a very fantasy version of this

823
00:46:08,160 --> 00:46:12,200
Speaker 1: very idea, there's a film that I always think back to,

824
00:46:12,440 --> 00:46:17,080
Speaker 1: Sneakers had Robert Redford and Dan Ackroyd, who plays a

825
00:46:17,160 --> 00:46:21,800
Speaker 1: character named mother. Ben Kingsley is in it Um. A

826
00:46:21,920 --> 00:46:25,520
Speaker 1: ton of folks. River Phoenix was in it Um, and

827
00:46:25,600 --> 00:46:29,160
Speaker 1: it's a It's a movie about a group of kind

828
00:46:29,200 --> 00:46:33,200
Speaker 1: of almost like outcasts who have grouped together to form

829
00:46:33,280 --> 00:46:35,880
Speaker 1: a company that they specifically do this. They try to

830
00:46:35,960 --> 00:46:40,480
Speaker 1: infiltrate a company in order to test its security, not

831
00:46:40,880 --> 00:46:44,960
Speaker 1: to exploit it, but rather to tell the company, hey,

832
00:46:45,440 --> 00:46:47,600
Speaker 1: here's how we got in, here's how someone else could

833
00:46:47,640 --> 00:46:50,120
Speaker 1: get in, So you need to plug this vulnerability, that

834
00:46:50,200 --> 00:46:52,479
Speaker 1: kind of thing um. And then of course they get

835
00:46:52,560 --> 00:46:55,360
Speaker 1: involved in all sorts of shenanigans. And in case you

836
00:46:55,400 --> 00:46:58,399
Speaker 1: are interested in the methodology, I actually find it very

837
00:46:58,520 --> 00:47:02,279
Speaker 1: very interesting how they get their work done, because of

838
00:47:02,320 --> 00:47:05,680
Speaker 1: course they have to go through the tennis match of

839
00:47:05,719 --> 00:47:08,800
Speaker 1: back and forth with a brand name company, whatever it

840
00:47:08,880 --> 00:47:11,439
Speaker 1: might be, So they'll have to get a purchase order,

841
00:47:11,560 --> 00:47:14,440
Speaker 1: they'll do a little bit of negotiation for an amount

842
00:47:14,480 --> 00:47:16,600
Speaker 1: that they'll do the work for, and then they'll go

843
00:47:16,680 --> 00:47:20,080
Speaker 1: in and they'll gather information on the network and they'll

844
00:47:20,160 --> 00:47:22,560
Speaker 1: capture traffic, and they'll try to find any kind of

845
00:47:22,600 --> 00:47:26,359
Speaker 1: vulnerabilities that are on that network, even with the people too.

846
00:47:26,920 --> 00:47:29,720
Speaker 1: For example, they could use social engineering to get into

847
00:47:30,040 --> 00:47:34,120
Speaker 1: the server rack uh physically, or they could get into

848
00:47:34,320 --> 00:47:37,440
Speaker 1: a network that doesn't necessarily have a very good password

849
00:47:37,480 --> 00:47:41,279
Speaker 1: on it. Uh. They could email clients that work there

850
00:47:41,320 --> 00:47:44,640
Speaker 1: that are employed at the brand name company with I

851
00:47:44,680 --> 00:47:48,279
Speaker 1: don't know malware written PDFs for example, and they could

852
00:47:48,360 --> 00:47:50,920
Speaker 1: use wireless attacks. They could do war driving from the

853
00:47:50,960 --> 00:47:53,560
Speaker 1: parking lot if they wanted to. And then what they'll

854
00:47:53,600 --> 00:47:56,719
Speaker 1: do is write a very very long report so that

855
00:47:56,800 --> 00:48:00,120
Speaker 1: the brand name company can see exactly what happened is

856
00:48:00,160 --> 00:48:02,040
Speaker 1: on their network and exactly what they were able to

857
00:48:02,080 --> 00:48:05,640
Speaker 1: do from from whatever back door they were able to

858
00:48:05,640 --> 00:48:09,520
Speaker 1: get into. It's really interesting how how well they're able

859
00:48:09,600 --> 00:48:13,719
Speaker 1: to put everything together in in turn hopefully save this

860
00:48:13,800 --> 00:48:17,600
Speaker 1: company in the long run thousands and thousands of dollars. Yeah, yeah,

861
00:48:17,640 --> 00:48:20,279
Speaker 1: I mean this is the whole Security has always been

862
00:48:20,320 --> 00:48:22,959
Speaker 1: a tick talk approach, right, You've got the tick, which

863
00:48:23,000 --> 00:48:26,600
Speaker 1: is where someone has identified a way of exploiting a system,

864
00:48:26,640 --> 00:48:28,839
Speaker 1: and then the talk is where you find a way

865
00:48:28,880 --> 00:48:32,719
Speaker 1: to correct that that vulnerability. The tick is the next

866
00:48:32,719 --> 00:48:35,800
Speaker 1: time someone's found a vulnerability. Uh, you're always going to

867
00:48:35,880 --> 00:48:41,000
Speaker 1: have that, right unless someone somehow designs the absolute perfect system,

868
00:48:41,280 --> 00:48:44,000
Speaker 1: which as far as we know, is an impossibility. Yeah,

869
00:48:44,040 --> 00:48:47,800
Speaker 1: that's impossible. Yeah, because for one thing, if people are involved,

870
00:48:47,880 --> 00:48:50,840
Speaker 1: there's no such thing as a perfect system. It's always

871
00:48:50,840 --> 00:48:53,160
Speaker 1: a battle. And I love my video games, so I

872
00:48:53,200 --> 00:48:57,839
Speaker 1: love a battle. But also it also drives other other

873
00:48:57,920 --> 00:49:01,560
Speaker 1: industries though, because we'll see things like the artificial intelligence

874
00:49:01,600 --> 00:49:05,760
Speaker 1: industry improve as a result of this security battle between

875
00:49:05,800 --> 00:49:09,319
Speaker 1: hackers and uh, the infosec experts who are trying to

876
00:49:09,360 --> 00:49:13,000
Speaker 1: make sure that their protecting systems. And as a result,

877
00:49:13,080 --> 00:49:15,560
Speaker 1: we're we're getting information that can be used in other areas,

878
00:49:16,160 --> 00:49:19,799
Speaker 1: which is phenomenal. Like I remember, here's a simple one.

879
00:49:19,800 --> 00:49:22,520
Speaker 1: It's it's as far as security goes. This is as

880
00:49:22,560 --> 00:49:25,319
Speaker 1: low level as it gets. But the capture system, so

881
00:49:25,360 --> 00:49:29,359
Speaker 1: when cap when capture was implemented, even the people who

882
00:49:29,400 --> 00:49:32,240
Speaker 1: were writing capture at the time, we're not really thinking

883
00:49:32,280 --> 00:49:35,640
Speaker 1: of it as being some sort of full proof security

884
00:49:35,640 --> 00:49:38,960
Speaker 1: system to make sure that bots don't get into a system. Right,

885
00:49:39,320 --> 00:49:43,520
Speaker 1: they weren't thinking, oh, now only human beings can get access.

886
00:49:43,520 --> 00:49:45,360
Speaker 1: And if you don't know what a capture is, anytime

887
00:49:45,400 --> 00:49:47,200
Speaker 1: you get your filling out a thing and you get

888
00:49:47,239 --> 00:49:50,959
Speaker 1: a little picture of something and it says, uh, tell

889
00:49:51,120 --> 00:49:53,040
Speaker 1: you know, write down the word or numbers that are

890
00:49:53,040 --> 00:49:56,080
Speaker 1: in this picture, or even to a point of identify

891
00:49:56,160 --> 00:49:59,480
Speaker 1: the pictures in this sequence that have this particular feature,

892
00:49:59,520 --> 00:50:01,400
Speaker 1: like deify all the pictures that have a lake in

893
00:50:01,440 --> 00:50:04,120
Speaker 1: it or something like that. That's a simply that's simply

894
00:50:04,120 --> 00:50:07,440
Speaker 1: a version of capture. Um. The people who made it,

895
00:50:07,440 --> 00:50:09,799
Speaker 1: they actually said, our goal was really to help push

896
00:50:09,880 --> 00:50:14,040
Speaker 1: artificial intelligence because we created a system where programmers or

897
00:50:14,120 --> 00:50:18,400
Speaker 1: hackers had to start coming up with uh, computer programs

898
00:50:18,400 --> 00:50:22,720
Speaker 1: that could identify the same things that we humans can identify.

899
00:50:22,880 --> 00:50:25,920
Speaker 1: And in turn, that means now we've got software that

900
00:50:25,960 --> 00:50:28,960
Speaker 1: pushes forward artificial intelligence. Now, granted, that also means you

901
00:50:29,000 --> 00:50:32,160
Speaker 1: have to improve the system you had designed to keep

902
00:50:32,200 --> 00:50:34,399
Speaker 1: bots out in the first place. So again it goes

903
00:50:34,400 --> 00:50:37,960
Speaker 1: to that TikTok. But there's an added benefit beyond someone

904
00:50:38,200 --> 00:50:42,560
Speaker 1: being able to to automatically access systems and build you know,

905
00:50:42,719 --> 00:50:45,600
Speaker 1: dozens and dozens of fake profiles on Facebook or whatever

906
00:50:45,640 --> 00:50:49,239
Speaker 1: it might be, whatever that might be. Yeah, yeah, and

907
00:50:49,280 --> 00:50:51,520
Speaker 1: then keep in mind, like like we've been saying here,

908
00:50:51,560 --> 00:50:54,760
Speaker 1: I mean, any any systems security is only as strong

909
00:50:54,800 --> 00:50:58,799
Speaker 1: as its weakest link. That we cat is pretty much

910
00:50:58,840 --> 00:51:01,560
Speaker 1: always people. That's the big one, right. But I mean,

911
00:51:01,600 --> 00:51:05,000
Speaker 1: I've I've read stories about hacker gaining access to a

912
00:51:05,040 --> 00:51:08,880
Speaker 1: system because there was an overall security system that was

913
00:51:08,960 --> 00:51:12,400
Speaker 1: really robust for the main company, but then they had

914
00:51:12,440 --> 00:51:15,719
Speaker 1: a little branch office and the branch office didn't have

915
00:51:15,800 --> 00:51:18,799
Speaker 1: that crazy amount of security but was still on the

916
00:51:18,840 --> 00:51:21,960
Speaker 1: same network. I think I read about that story too,

917
00:51:22,360 --> 00:51:24,239
Speaker 1: So I mean, these are these are things like if

918
00:51:24,280 --> 00:51:29,240
Speaker 1: you identify a potential point of weakness that's now suddenly

919
00:51:29,280 --> 00:51:32,080
Speaker 1: the you know, it's it's like a bank vault. If

920
00:51:32,120 --> 00:51:34,680
Speaker 1: the bank vault has an enormous door with huge locks

921
00:51:34,760 --> 00:51:36,920
Speaker 1: on it that you have to get through. Oh, but

922
00:51:36,960 --> 00:51:39,719
Speaker 1: it also has a backdoor just for convenience sake, you're

923
00:51:39,719 --> 00:51:43,520
Speaker 1: gonna aim for the back door. So but there are

924
00:51:43,520 --> 00:51:47,320
Speaker 1: other ways that that hackers can can make a legitimate

925
00:51:47,360 --> 00:51:50,839
Speaker 1: living that don't even involve testing security systems. It might

926
00:51:50,880 --> 00:51:55,560
Speaker 1: involve education. Yeah, absolutely so education is I guess what

927
00:51:55,600 --> 00:51:58,120
Speaker 1: you would say, I fall into that kind of comory.

928
00:51:58,480 --> 00:52:01,040
Speaker 1: And while I I don't necessarily like to call myself

929
00:52:01,080 --> 00:52:03,520
Speaker 1: a hacker because I know so many experts in the

930
00:52:03,560 --> 00:52:06,239
Speaker 1: field who are much more knowledgeable than I am. I'm

931
00:52:06,680 --> 00:52:11,520
Speaker 1: quite a intermediate, I would say, but I love to teach,

932
00:52:11,719 --> 00:52:14,560
Speaker 1: and I love to give tutorials online, so I give

933
00:52:14,600 --> 00:52:17,560
Speaker 1: tutorials on YouTube. But I also know a lot of

934
00:52:17,560 --> 00:52:21,600
Speaker 1: people who have either written books about hacking UH, and

935
00:52:21,680 --> 00:52:25,359
Speaker 1: they could do either specifics about penetration testing or they

936
00:52:25,360 --> 00:52:28,640
Speaker 1: get to make it a very very wide based book

937
00:52:28,680 --> 00:52:30,960
Speaker 1: where they explain everything that you would have to do

938
00:52:31,000 --> 00:52:33,920
Speaker 1: as a penetration tester. And a penetration tester is basically

939
00:52:33,920 --> 00:52:36,239
Speaker 1: one of those guys that would go into a company

940
00:52:36,280 --> 00:52:39,000
Speaker 1: and UH find all the vulnerabilities and report on it.

941
00:52:39,800 --> 00:52:44,719
Speaker 1: You would also have companies that administer certifications, so a

942
00:52:44,840 --> 00:52:47,760
Speaker 1: lot of I'm sure a lot of your your UM

943
00:52:47,800 --> 00:52:51,000
Speaker 1: listeners probably know that you have to get certifications to

944
00:52:51,040 --> 00:52:54,239
Speaker 1: get a lot of UH to get into a lot

945
00:52:54,280 --> 00:52:57,799
Speaker 1: of the fields with computer security and even just you know,

946
00:52:57,880 --> 00:53:01,279
Speaker 1: computer networking too. Sure a lot of searts for those

947
00:53:01,320 --> 00:53:03,800
Speaker 1: and they're very, very expensive. So a lot of companies

948
00:53:03,880 --> 00:53:07,799
Speaker 1: just administer their certifications or they will have you take

949
00:53:07,880 --> 00:53:10,359
Speaker 1: classes for a period of time until you actually take

950
00:53:10,360 --> 00:53:13,200
Speaker 1: the test and get certified. But that ends up being

951
00:53:13,200 --> 00:53:14,960
Speaker 1: a really good thing to put on your resume for

952
00:53:15,000 --> 00:53:18,040
Speaker 1: a lot of companies whenever you do intend to get

953
00:53:18,040 --> 00:53:22,680
Speaker 1: a job in network security. And then lastly, we have

954
00:53:22,800 --> 00:53:26,400
Speaker 1: the publishers. So that's the YouTubers, the that's the people

955
00:53:26,440 --> 00:53:30,560
Speaker 1: that make podcast That's the people that um might be

956
00:53:31,080 --> 00:53:35,040
Speaker 1: creating other forms of entertainment that not only educate but

957
00:53:35,239 --> 00:53:38,319
Speaker 1: also entertain their users and their listeners so that they

958
00:53:38,440 --> 00:53:42,960
Speaker 1: get excited about being a part of information security. Uh.

959
00:53:42,960 --> 00:53:44,840
Speaker 1: And that's what I like to do. I like to

960
00:53:45,200 --> 00:53:47,600
Speaker 1: teach people in a way that makes it exciting. So

961
00:53:47,640 --> 00:53:49,719
Speaker 1: I do a lot of hands on stuff. I I make,

962
00:53:49,880 --> 00:53:52,120
Speaker 1: I make jokes, and I explain things in a very

963
00:53:52,200 --> 00:53:57,719
Speaker 1: natural light and it helps it helps again foster that

964
00:53:57,800 --> 00:54:02,080
Speaker 1: desire to learn how things work right. That does so

965
00:54:02,160 --> 00:54:04,600
Speaker 1: again that that same fascination, like if you were ever

966
00:54:04,680 --> 00:54:07,480
Speaker 1: a kid that took apart a watch or a radio

967
00:54:07,719 --> 00:54:10,359
Speaker 1: or some other piece of equipment, because you really want

968
00:54:10,400 --> 00:54:13,560
Speaker 1: to know what's the magic that makes this thing do

969
00:54:13,760 --> 00:54:17,759
Speaker 1: what it does? Uh, hackers have that, I mean, that's

970
00:54:17,840 --> 00:54:21,000
Speaker 1: the that's that's the defining quality in my mind of

971
00:54:21,040 --> 00:54:24,520
Speaker 1: a hacker is ultimately it's someone who is fascinated with

972
00:54:24,600 --> 00:54:28,840
Speaker 1: the way something works. Uh. We've largely been focusing on software,

973
00:54:29,120 --> 00:54:32,879
Speaker 1: but that is just as legitimate as any hardware hack.

974
00:54:33,320 --> 00:54:35,759
Speaker 1: It's the idea of how does this It might not

975
00:54:35,840 --> 00:54:37,880
Speaker 1: even just be the software, might be a full system,

976
00:54:37,960 --> 00:54:40,560
Speaker 1: like how does the system work? What are all the

977
00:54:40,600 --> 00:54:44,799
Speaker 1: interlocking parts? How do they communicate with each other. I

978
00:54:44,880 --> 00:54:47,760
Speaker 1: just had a random memory from when I was younger

979
00:54:47,760 --> 00:54:50,760
Speaker 1: and in school. I took apart my first iPod because

980
00:54:50,800 --> 00:54:52,279
Speaker 1: I had no clue how it worked, and I was

981
00:54:52,400 --> 00:54:55,040
Speaker 1: very curious about what what the interior of it was.

982
00:54:55,640 --> 00:54:58,239
Speaker 1: So I just I took it apart. I couldn't put

983
00:54:58,280 --> 00:55:01,600
Speaker 1: it back together, So I was not hacker in any sense.

984
00:55:01,840 --> 00:55:06,080
Speaker 1: We um we for for an article I was writing,

985
00:55:06,120 --> 00:55:13,000
Speaker 1: We've got a first edition Launch Day Nintendo three D

986
00:55:13,280 --> 00:55:16,000
Speaker 1: s and it was my job to disassemble it and

987
00:55:16,040 --> 00:55:19,480
Speaker 1: take photos of all the pieces. So first I took

988
00:55:19,480 --> 00:55:23,680
Speaker 1: a picture of it whole and shared it online on

989
00:55:23,719 --> 00:55:26,680
Speaker 1: Twitter and said look what I have, and everyone got

990
00:55:26,719 --> 00:55:29,319
Speaker 1: excited and then by the end of it, I had

991
00:55:29,360 --> 00:55:32,600
Speaker 1: a little had a little black cauldron at my desk

992
00:55:32,640 --> 00:55:35,400
Speaker 1: that was left over from a Halloween thing, and then

993
00:55:35,440 --> 00:55:37,960
Speaker 1: I put all the different pieces because there was no

994
00:55:38,000 --> 00:55:39,879
Speaker 1: way this thing was going back together after I took

995
00:55:39,880 --> 00:55:43,040
Speaker 1: it apart. For one thing, Nintendo is pretty careful about

996
00:55:43,280 --> 00:55:45,520
Speaker 1: sealing stuff in such a way that's not meant to

997
00:55:45,520 --> 00:55:48,120
Speaker 1: come aboard, so um, so you have to have he

998
00:55:48,200 --> 00:55:50,120
Speaker 1: was a little force in some cases in order to

999
00:55:50,120 --> 00:55:52,319
Speaker 1: get to stuff. And then I showed a picture. I'm like,

1000
00:55:52,360 --> 00:55:55,800
Speaker 1: I'm like, look what I did to the thing. I

1001
00:55:55,880 --> 00:56:00,600
Speaker 1: made the entire Internet cry. Yeah, although ultimately I think

1002
00:56:00,640 --> 00:56:04,160
Speaker 1: the three DS most people are like, oh whatever. But

1003
00:56:04,239 --> 00:56:06,200
Speaker 1: at the time when it was brand new, people were

1004
00:56:06,239 --> 00:56:09,439
Speaker 1: freaking out. And of course there's there's also another role

1005
00:56:09,560 --> 00:56:11,719
Speaker 1: for for hackers out there. It may not be a

1006
00:56:11,719 --> 00:56:15,960
Speaker 1: steady gig, but we are seeing more and more of

1007
00:56:16,000 --> 00:56:20,080
Speaker 1: the Hollywood productions out there actually talk with people in

1008
00:56:20,120 --> 00:56:23,440
Speaker 1: the industry so that the depictions that we're getting are

1009
00:56:23,600 --> 00:56:27,760
Speaker 1: more accurately reflecting what really happens. Mr Robot is probably

1010
00:56:28,320 --> 00:56:32,000
Speaker 1: the example that immediately leaps to my mind, and that

1011
00:56:32,200 --> 00:56:34,960
Speaker 1: it's it's a show that tries very hard to take

1012
00:56:35,000 --> 00:56:38,279
Speaker 1: a more realistic approach to the world of hacking as

1013
00:56:38,280 --> 00:56:41,839
Speaker 1: opposed to um. You type in three passwords, the third

1014
00:56:41,840 --> 00:56:44,799
Speaker 1: one gets you in, and then you're navigating through a

1015
00:56:44,920 --> 00:56:48,160
Speaker 1: vector graphics three D dungeon and you encounter a skull

1016
00:56:48,200 --> 00:56:51,920
Speaker 1: and cross bones. That's not how hacking works. It sounds

1017
00:56:51,920 --> 00:56:55,920
Speaker 1: like you were talking about hackers hack the planet. I

1018
00:56:56,040 --> 00:57:01,040
Speaker 1: might have been education. Just bring it back. But professors,

1019
00:57:01,080 --> 00:57:03,560
Speaker 1: I didn't leave you guys out. I'm sorry. I love

1020
00:57:03,560 --> 00:57:05,839
Speaker 1: you guys. You are the reason why I'm here now.

1021
00:57:05,920 --> 00:57:08,239
Speaker 1: If I didn't take my computer courses in college with

1022
00:57:08,280 --> 00:57:10,759
Speaker 1: my professors, I would not be doing what I'm doing now.

1023
00:57:10,840 --> 00:57:13,560
Speaker 1: So professors are like at the top of that education

1024
00:57:13,640 --> 00:57:16,240
Speaker 1: list because and you can take a lot of computer

1025
00:57:16,280 --> 00:57:19,120
Speaker 1: security courses in college and sometimes in high schools if

1026
00:57:19,160 --> 00:57:23,880
Speaker 1: you're lucky. But yeah, technical assistance. So technical assistance are

1027
00:57:23,960 --> 00:57:27,360
Speaker 1: people that will come on board with a Hollywood movie

1028
00:57:27,520 --> 00:57:29,960
Speaker 1: or a TV show or what have you, and they

1029
00:57:29,960 --> 00:57:34,400
Speaker 1: will explain to the network how the hacking actually happens.

1030
00:57:34,880 --> 00:57:39,640
Speaker 1: So I know a few, uh, they will They'll come

1031
00:57:39,680 --> 00:57:41,800
Speaker 1: to some of their hacker friends or they will be

1032
00:57:41,840 --> 00:57:45,040
Speaker 1: a hacker themselves and they will say okay uh. In

1033
00:57:45,080 --> 00:57:47,600
Speaker 1: this season, I know that they want to do X,

1034
00:57:47,720 --> 00:57:50,120
Speaker 1: Y and Z on camera, and I need to make

1035
00:57:50,120 --> 00:57:52,920
Speaker 1: it look legitimate, so they will come up with the script.

1036
00:57:53,040 --> 00:57:55,080
Speaker 1: They will come up with the hack and the actual

1037
00:57:55,240 --> 00:57:59,280
Speaker 1: keyboard commands that the actor has to type in on

1038
00:57:59,400 --> 00:58:03,560
Speaker 1: camera so that they are actually doing legitimate hacks. So

1039
00:58:03,600 --> 00:58:07,240
Speaker 1: that way, they're not only making it look cool for

1040
00:58:07,280 --> 00:58:09,960
Speaker 1: a wider audience because an audience is actually going to

1041
00:58:10,000 --> 00:58:12,560
Speaker 1: see how a hack works, but they're also getting that

1042
00:58:12,600 --> 00:58:17,320
Speaker 1: credibility with the info set community too. So Mr Robot

1043
00:58:17,400 --> 00:58:20,760
Speaker 1: is huge with the infoset community because it is legitimate.

1044
00:58:20,840 --> 00:58:23,360
Speaker 1: Like I've watched several of those episodes and I've seen

1045
00:58:23,360 --> 00:58:25,400
Speaker 1: a lot of the hacks that they do. They've even

1046
00:58:25,480 --> 00:58:27,520
Speaker 1: used some of our hack fi products on the show,

1047
00:58:28,000 --> 00:58:31,520
Speaker 1: and they're actually using legit hacks. And it is so

1048
00:58:31,640 --> 00:58:33,720
Speaker 1: much fun to see it on TV and see them

1049
00:58:33,760 --> 00:58:36,440
Speaker 1: get so many good reviews from a wider consumer audience,

1050
00:58:36,480 --> 00:58:39,600
Speaker 1: because it makes me feel like many more people are

1051
00:58:39,600 --> 00:58:42,400
Speaker 1: getting interested in info sex because they see what's happening

1052
00:58:42,440 --> 00:58:44,520
Speaker 1: on camera and they see that this is actually how

1053
00:58:44,560 --> 00:58:46,920
Speaker 1: you do it. Yeah, it's nice to see it go

1054
00:58:47,160 --> 00:58:53,400
Speaker 1: beyond uh. The the niche that I would argue, info

1055
00:58:53,440 --> 00:58:57,520
Speaker 1: sec and hacking has largely inhabited for the past three decades,

1056
00:58:57,640 --> 00:59:00,600
Speaker 1: right the people who have been interested. When it's first started,

1057
00:59:00,600 --> 00:59:04,840
Speaker 1: it was essentially your hobbyists, and often those hobbyists were

1058
00:59:04,880 --> 00:59:08,960
Speaker 1: isolated individuals. Uh. You got to the phone freaking days

1059
00:59:09,000 --> 00:59:12,680
Speaker 1: where there was a little bit of a small subculture

1060
00:59:12,720 --> 00:59:15,800
Speaker 1: of people who were interested in hacking the telephone system

1061
00:59:15,920 --> 00:59:20,400
Speaker 1: using all sorts of stuff, including a whistle from Captain Crunch. Uh.

1062
00:59:20,640 --> 00:59:23,439
Speaker 1: You had you had the the early hack days where

1063
00:59:23,440 --> 00:59:26,000
Speaker 1: people were just trying to create interesting programs for their

1064
00:59:26,000 --> 00:59:28,520
Speaker 1: computers or to see how some of the programs that

1065
00:59:28,560 --> 00:59:31,320
Speaker 1: were coming out, how did those work? Um, but it

1066
00:59:31,440 --> 00:59:36,040
Speaker 1: was largely a tiny slice of the folks who were

1067
00:59:36,080 --> 00:59:39,400
Speaker 1: even aware of personal computers, and and even that group

1068
00:59:39,480 --> 00:59:42,919
Speaker 1: was still a tiny slice of the overall population. We're

1069
00:59:42,920 --> 00:59:47,280
Speaker 1: seeing that tiny slice grow over time, and largely because

1070
00:59:47,760 --> 00:59:50,280
Speaker 1: so many of us are so dependent upon computers these

1071
00:59:50,360 --> 00:59:53,520
Speaker 1: days that it benefits us to have an awareness to

1072
00:59:53,560 --> 00:59:57,040
Speaker 1: make sure that we remain safe. But also because of

1073
00:59:57,080 --> 01:00:01,200
Speaker 1: things like Mr Robot showing how this wre x and

1074
01:00:01,240 --> 01:00:05,080
Speaker 1: sparking the imagination of people who perhaps before they saw

1075
01:00:05,120 --> 01:00:07,920
Speaker 1: that never thought, Yeah, it's kind of cool. I would

1076
01:00:07,920 --> 01:00:10,560
Speaker 1: love to be able to manipulate code in such a

1077
01:00:10,560 --> 01:00:14,000
Speaker 1: way that I could do something new or unexpected or

1078
01:00:14,400 --> 01:00:17,640
Speaker 1: help people. Uh. And it's really encouraging to see that

1079
01:00:17,720 --> 01:00:21,120
Speaker 1: kind of thing happen right now. I kind of wish

1080
01:00:21,120 --> 01:00:23,040
Speaker 1: it had happened ten years ago, but I love seeing

1081
01:00:23,040 --> 01:00:25,800
Speaker 1: it happen now. Same. I actually feel like there was

1082
01:00:25,840 --> 01:00:28,960
Speaker 1: a little bit of negativity in in the aspect that

1083
01:00:29,600 --> 01:00:32,920
Speaker 1: we we used to have all these really fancy graphics

1084
01:00:32,960 --> 01:00:35,720
Speaker 1: happening on in these Hollywood movies and these TV shows,

1085
01:00:35,880 --> 01:00:39,240
Speaker 1: and now they're actually seeing the reality that is hacking,

1086
01:00:39,320 --> 01:00:43,240
Speaker 1: and it is not super colorful. It's not super quick,

1087
01:00:43,280 --> 01:00:46,040
Speaker 1: fast paced and exciting like it looks like it is

1088
01:00:46,120 --> 01:00:49,800
Speaker 1: on those old school shows. So I'm hoping that now

1089
01:00:49,840 --> 01:00:52,840
Speaker 1: that they're actually seeing it, people will try it to

1090
01:00:53,480 --> 01:00:56,840
Speaker 1: Like if they see um, the main actor on Mr.

1091
01:00:56,920 --> 01:01:00,720
Speaker 1: Robot do a specific command line option, they'll go to

1092
01:01:00,760 --> 01:01:02,800
Speaker 1: their computer and try it themselves and see that it

1093
01:01:02,880 --> 01:01:04,920
Speaker 1: actually does work, and then they'll be like, oh, I

1094
01:01:04,960 --> 01:01:06,840
Speaker 1: really want to try some new stuff too, so they'll

1095
01:01:06,840 --> 01:01:08,959
Speaker 1: start googling and see what else they can find out.

1096
01:01:09,360 --> 01:01:12,200
Speaker 1: That's the kind of inspiration that I wish happened thirty

1097
01:01:12,280 --> 01:01:16,360
Speaker 1: years ago, and it didn't, so I want to see

1098
01:01:16,400 --> 01:01:19,560
Speaker 1: more of that now, and I'm really happy that, for example,

1099
01:01:19,680 --> 01:01:22,520
Speaker 1: Mr Robot has done a great job with it. Yeah,

1100
01:01:22,520 --> 01:01:26,360
Speaker 1: it's it's and you not to not to poop all

1101
01:01:26,400 --> 01:01:31,760
Speaker 1: over Hollywood because I do loves mo Hollywood's but but

1102
01:01:31,800 --> 01:01:35,320
Speaker 1: it is. And to understand where they were coming from,

1103
01:01:35,360 --> 01:01:38,280
Speaker 1: they were trying to find a way to create an

1104
01:01:38,280 --> 01:01:45,240
Speaker 1: exciting visual depiction of something that doesn't necessarily necessarily lend

1105
01:01:45,320 --> 01:01:49,040
Speaker 1: itself to that in order for to create a dramatic effect.

1106
01:01:49,400 --> 01:01:51,760
Speaker 1: So I get it. It's very similar to the way

1107
01:01:51,800 --> 01:01:56,840
Speaker 1: Hollywood portrayed virtual reality back in the nineties, way before

1108
01:01:56,920 --> 01:02:01,080
Speaker 1: virtual reality was ready for public consumption, and it's what

1109
01:02:01,360 --> 01:02:06,720
Speaker 1: largely killed VR for a decade before the various video

1110
01:02:06,720 --> 01:02:09,280
Speaker 1: game systems started to make the very the components cheap

1111
01:02:09,400 --> 01:02:11,680
Speaker 1: enough for people to play in that space again, and

1112
01:02:11,680 --> 01:02:15,560
Speaker 1: now we're on the verge of another VR revolution. The

1113
01:02:15,600 --> 01:02:17,240
Speaker 1: same sort of thing is true of hacking, Like how

1114
01:02:17,240 --> 01:02:21,280
Speaker 1: do you show hacking in a way that gets across

1115
01:02:21,320 --> 01:02:23,760
Speaker 1: what is happening to an audience and makes it interesting?

1116
01:02:23,920 --> 01:02:26,400
Speaker 1: I think largely you have to do that through really

1117
01:02:26,480 --> 01:02:28,840
Speaker 1: good writing of your characters, and once you do that,

1118
01:02:29,480 --> 01:02:32,439
Speaker 1: then everything else follows. I think if if you can

1119
01:02:32,520 --> 01:02:35,680
Speaker 1: show that the characters in a movie or in a

1120
01:02:35,720 --> 01:02:39,280
Speaker 1: TV show are actually real people that have real relationships,

1121
01:02:39,320 --> 01:02:41,520
Speaker 1: they have real jobs and real lives, and they have

1122
01:02:41,600 --> 01:02:46,000
Speaker 1: hobbies outside of just hacking, you can really you can

1123
01:02:46,160 --> 01:02:49,600
Speaker 1: start to relate to that character in a very real

1124
01:02:49,720 --> 01:02:52,120
Speaker 1: sense in the fact that hey, they are humans too,

1125
01:02:52,200 --> 01:02:56,840
Speaker 1: because here's our people too. That was actually a documentary. Nice. Yeah,

1126
01:02:56,880 --> 01:03:00,160
Speaker 1: because again, when when you're when you're thinking about in

1127
01:03:00,200 --> 01:03:03,840
Speaker 1: the abstract, you're really it becomes that us versus them mentality,

1128
01:03:03,880 --> 01:03:07,959
Speaker 1: where by by its very nature, it's dehumanizing. But that's

1129
01:03:08,000 --> 01:03:11,400
Speaker 1: probably a topic for a show that's not about technology,

1130
01:03:11,520 --> 01:03:15,080
Speaker 1: So I will just leave it be. Shannon Morse, thank

1131
01:03:15,160 --> 01:03:19,000
Speaker 1: you so much for joining me today. Please let everyone

1132
01:03:19,040 --> 01:03:23,160
Speaker 1: know where they can find all of your stuff. Jonathan Strickland,

1133
01:03:23,280 --> 01:03:27,800
Speaker 1: thank you. So it was a little it was a little,

1134
01:03:28,160 --> 01:03:31,280
Speaker 1: it was a little laden. Yeah. Yeah, I've been watching

1135
01:03:31,280 --> 01:03:34,240
Speaker 1: Star Trek lately, way way too much Star Trek. So

1136
01:03:34,280 --> 01:03:37,880
Speaker 1: you can find me. Um. The most direct path is

1137
01:03:37,960 --> 01:03:40,600
Speaker 1: on Twitter. I'm at snubs and that's s n U

1138
01:03:40,800 --> 01:03:44,520
Speaker 1: b S. And then my shows specifically our Tech Thing

1139
01:03:44,640 --> 01:03:47,040
Speaker 1: over at t e k thing dot com and Hack

1140
01:03:47,160 --> 01:03:51,760
Speaker 1: five over at h K five dot org. Yeah, so

1141
01:03:51,880 --> 01:03:55,200
Speaker 1: go check those shows out. They are awesome. Shannon and

1142
01:03:55,280 --> 01:03:58,520
Speaker 1: her co hosts are all awesome. I gotta get Corn.

1143
01:03:58,880 --> 01:04:01,160
Speaker 1: I gotta get Darren on this. Yeah, no, you are cooler,

1144
01:04:01,200 --> 01:04:03,560
Speaker 1: but someday I gotta get Darren on the show. Um.

1145
01:04:03,840 --> 01:04:05,760
Speaker 1: I don't think Darren and I have ever I think

1146
01:04:05,760 --> 01:04:09,880
Speaker 1: we may have been on one of Tom Merritt's shows

1147
01:04:10,000 --> 01:04:12,439
Speaker 1: at the same time, but otherwise I don't think we've

1148
01:04:12,440 --> 01:04:15,280
Speaker 1: ever done a show together at any rate. Yeah, I know,

1149
01:04:15,320 --> 01:04:19,280
Speaker 1: it's crazy, right that happen. Let's let's do that. Let's

1150
01:04:19,320 --> 01:04:22,400
Speaker 1: do that. And that wraps up this classic episode of

1151
01:04:22,400 --> 01:04:24,959
Speaker 1: tech Stuff. I hope you guys enjoyed this look back

1152
01:04:25,280 --> 01:04:27,320
Speaker 1: on some of the episodes that I've done over the

1153
01:04:27,320 --> 01:04:29,480
Speaker 1: past couple of years. These are more recent than some

1154
01:04:29,560 --> 01:04:32,880
Speaker 1: of our other classic episodes. We've been running on Fridays,

1155
01:04:32,920 --> 01:04:35,360
Speaker 1: and like I said before, I should be back in

1156
01:04:35,400 --> 01:04:37,840
Speaker 1: the office recording brand new stuff. You're gonna hear a

1157
01:04:37,960 --> 01:04:42,360
Speaker 1: whole arc of episodes about our relationship with media and

1158
01:04:42,400 --> 01:04:45,960
Speaker 1: how media has changed over time, how the business of

1159
01:04:46,040 --> 01:04:49,920
Speaker 1: media has changed, how our consumption of media has changed.

1160
01:04:50,160 --> 01:04:53,960
Speaker 1: It's a huge, huge topic and it spans multiple episodes,

1161
01:04:54,240 --> 01:04:56,640
Speaker 1: so I hope you enjoy that. It's been fascinating for

1162
01:04:56,680 --> 01:04:58,960
Speaker 1: me to jump into that research and kind of break

1163
01:04:59,040 --> 01:05:02,280
Speaker 1: this out, and um, it was actually I didn't know

1164
01:05:02,520 --> 01:05:05,080
Speaker 1: how big a bite I was taking at the time

1165
01:05:05,120 --> 01:05:08,280
Speaker 1: when I started. And uh, I hope you you enjoy

1166
01:05:08,320 --> 01:05:10,640
Speaker 1: it when you start hearing those episodes. If you have

1167
01:05:10,680 --> 01:05:13,000
Speaker 1: any suggestions for future episodes of tech Stuff, send me

1168
01:05:13,040 --> 01:05:16,240
Speaker 1: a message. The email address is tech stuff at how

1169
01:05:16,280 --> 01:05:19,439
Speaker 1: stuff works dot com. Drop on by our website that's

1170
01:05:19,520 --> 01:05:22,480
Speaker 1: tech stuff podcast dot com. There you'll find an archive

1171
01:05:22,560 --> 01:05:25,200
Speaker 1: of all of our episodes. You'll find links to our

1172
01:05:25,240 --> 01:05:27,800
Speaker 1: social media presence, and you'll find a link to our

1173
01:05:27,840 --> 01:05:31,000
Speaker 1: online store, where every purchasing make goes to help the show.

1174
01:05:31,120 --> 01:05:33,640
Speaker 1: And we greatly appreciate it. And I'll talk to you

1175
01:05:33,680 --> 01:05:42,160
Speaker 1: again really soon for more on this and thousands of

1176
01:05:42,200 --> 01:05:54,200
Speaker 1: other topics. Is it how stuff works dot com.