1 00:00:04,240 --> 00:00:07,240 Speaker 1: Welcome to Tech Stuff, a production of I Heart Radios, 2 00:00:07,320 --> 00:00:13,800 Speaker 1: How Stuff Works. Hey there, and welcome to Tech Stuff. 3 00:00:13,840 --> 00:00:17,000 Speaker 1: I'm your host, Jonathan Strickland. I'm an executive producer with 4 00:00:17,000 --> 00:00:18,800 Speaker 1: How Stuff Works and I heart Radio and a love 5 00:00:18,760 --> 00:00:22,680 Speaker 1: of all things tech. And we are continuing our series 6 00:00:22,840 --> 00:00:25,479 Speaker 1: on Boeing, and before we get into it, I just 7 00:00:25,480 --> 00:00:27,960 Speaker 1: want to tell you guys, technically, I probably could have 8 00:00:28,000 --> 00:00:31,960 Speaker 1: done maybe two or three or four more episodes about 9 00:00:32,000 --> 00:00:34,600 Speaker 1: Boeing because the company has done a lot of stuff. 10 00:00:34,840 --> 00:00:37,520 Speaker 1: There's been a lot of controversy around some of those things, 11 00:00:38,320 --> 00:00:42,760 Speaker 1: and all of those elements are pretty deep and could 12 00:00:43,400 --> 00:00:46,479 Speaker 1: they could all justify an episode all by themselves. But 13 00:00:46,720 --> 00:00:50,520 Speaker 1: rather than turn this into the Boeing Podcast, I thought 14 00:00:50,600 --> 00:00:54,160 Speaker 1: I would kind of some up things in this third part. 15 00:00:54,160 --> 00:00:56,160 Speaker 1: I'm gonna have to skip over a lot of stuff, 16 00:00:56,760 --> 00:00:59,080 Speaker 1: and if you guys are really interested, I could always 17 00:00:59,120 --> 00:01:01,760 Speaker 1: go back and do a couple of episodes that really 18 00:01:01,760 --> 00:01:05,400 Speaker 1: focus on some of the individual stories on a more 19 00:01:06,120 --> 00:01:10,640 Speaker 1: granular level. But rather than have this series go on indefinitely, 20 00:01:10,959 --> 00:01:16,920 Speaker 1: We're just going to press about seventy years of history 21 00:01:17,120 --> 00:01:22,640 Speaker 1: together into one episode. So, considering the first two episodes 22 00:01:22,640 --> 00:01:26,120 Speaker 1: were thirty years, we're gonna be taking some liberties. But 23 00:01:26,560 --> 00:01:29,399 Speaker 1: in our last episode, we looked at a very busy 24 00:01:29,440 --> 00:01:32,400 Speaker 1: time for Boeing because the company had become a major 25 00:01:32,440 --> 00:01:34,840 Speaker 1: part of the war effort for the United States during 26 00:01:34,840 --> 00:01:37,800 Speaker 1: World War Two, and we also looked at how Boeing 27 00:01:37,840 --> 00:01:42,240 Speaker 1: continued to develop both military and civilian aircraft after the 28 00:01:42,240 --> 00:01:45,560 Speaker 1: war was over, and we finished with a discussion about 29 00:01:45,560 --> 00:01:48,680 Speaker 1: the development of the seven oh seven, which was Boeing's 30 00:01:48,840 --> 00:01:53,280 Speaker 1: first mass produced commercial jet, so passenger jet like the 31 00:01:53,360 --> 00:01:57,120 Speaker 1: kind we have today now. As I mentioned in that episode, 32 00:01:57,440 --> 00:02:00,280 Speaker 1: the development process for the seven oh seven represented an 33 00:02:00,400 --> 00:02:04,480 Speaker 1: enormous investment, a huge risk for Boeing. It took up 34 00:02:04,640 --> 00:02:08,079 Speaker 1: nearly all the profits Boeing had made since World War 35 00:02:08,120 --> 00:02:11,920 Speaker 1: Two had ended. And making the matter more fraught was 36 00:02:11,960 --> 00:02:16,480 Speaker 1: that the havaland comment the British made commercial jet that 37 00:02:16,600 --> 00:02:20,600 Speaker 1: had inspired Boeing president William Allen to take this big 38 00:02:20,720 --> 00:02:23,040 Speaker 1: risk in the first place, well, it ended up having 39 00:02:23,120 --> 00:02:27,240 Speaker 1: some catastrophic problems of its own, and by the time 40 00:02:27,280 --> 00:02:31,519 Speaker 1: those problems became evident, Boeing had already committed to building 41 00:02:31,520 --> 00:02:34,840 Speaker 1: a commercial jet, so within the first year of operation 42 00:02:34,960 --> 00:02:40,200 Speaker 1: that would be the comment started to have some issues. Now, 43 00:02:40,200 --> 00:02:43,760 Speaker 1: the first accident only caused a couple of minor injuries, 44 00:02:44,200 --> 00:02:47,400 Speaker 1: and in that incident, the Commet the airplane failed to 45 00:02:47,440 --> 00:02:50,400 Speaker 1: become airborne at the end of a runway, so it 46 00:02:50,520 --> 00:02:53,120 Speaker 1: ran the whole length of the runway, could not take 47 00:02:53,200 --> 00:02:56,800 Speaker 1: off and it ended up crossing into really rough ground. 48 00:02:57,440 --> 00:03:00,200 Speaker 1: But people got bumped up, but that was the worst 49 00:03:00,200 --> 00:03:03,600 Speaker 1: of it. However, a similar accident in nineteen fifty three 50 00:03:03,639 --> 00:03:07,320 Speaker 1: was much more serious. Again, a Comet failed to take 51 00:03:07,360 --> 00:03:10,480 Speaker 1: off from a runway, this time in Pakistan, and it 52 00:03:10,560 --> 00:03:14,160 Speaker 1: collided with an embankment at the end of the runway. 53 00:03:14,200 --> 00:03:17,320 Speaker 1: All five members of the crew died and six passengers 54 00:03:17,360 --> 00:03:20,200 Speaker 1: did as well. It was the first commercial jet accident 55 00:03:20,280 --> 00:03:24,720 Speaker 1: that had fatalities UH and obviously this was a huge deal. 56 00:03:25,480 --> 00:03:29,600 Speaker 1: Then in nineteen fifty four, on two separate occasions, Commet 57 00:03:29,639 --> 00:03:34,160 Speaker 1: aircraft broke apart in midflight. The Commet fleet was grounded. 58 00:03:34,160 --> 00:03:37,840 Speaker 1: As a result, the aircraft lost its certificate of airworthiness 59 00:03:38,440 --> 00:03:41,200 Speaker 1: and a full inquiry was made and an investigation to 60 00:03:41,200 --> 00:03:44,480 Speaker 1: find out what exactly was happening. The investigation actually found 61 00:03:44,480 --> 00:03:49,360 Speaker 1: that the aircraft's frame was suffering fatigue and that led 62 00:03:49,400 --> 00:03:52,920 Speaker 1: to structural failures, particularly around the windows. It was that 63 00:03:53,040 --> 00:03:56,760 Speaker 1: the the pressurized cabins. You know that air pressure inside 64 00:03:56,800 --> 00:03:59,960 Speaker 1: the plane is much greater than the air pressure outside 65 00:04:00,560 --> 00:04:04,480 Speaker 1: in high altitudes, and so you have this force pushing 66 00:04:04,600 --> 00:04:08,520 Speaker 1: outward on the interior of the plane, and that push, 67 00:04:08,880 --> 00:04:12,160 Speaker 1: particularly at the windows, was what was causing fatigue on 68 00:04:12,200 --> 00:04:17,239 Speaker 1: the airframe. And thus you had structural failures in flight 69 00:04:17,320 --> 00:04:19,520 Speaker 1: with a couple of these comet flights, and that caused 70 00:04:19,520 --> 00:04:23,560 Speaker 1: in flight accidents, essentially the planes which just completely break 71 00:04:23,560 --> 00:04:28,120 Speaker 1: apart with all people aboard lost as a result. Now 72 00:04:28,160 --> 00:04:29,760 Speaker 1: all of this was going on, as I said, as 73 00:04:29,760 --> 00:04:33,200 Speaker 1: Boeing had already committed to creating its own commercial jet aircraft. 74 00:04:33,440 --> 00:04:36,000 Speaker 1: So one of the big challenges Boeing faced was creating 75 00:04:36,000 --> 00:04:39,560 Speaker 1: an aircraft that was demonstrably safe to travel in. And 76 00:04:39,600 --> 00:04:42,360 Speaker 1: then a second challenge was to convince the general public 77 00:04:42,680 --> 00:04:46,839 Speaker 1: that this was the case. And travelers were understandably concerned 78 00:04:46,839 --> 00:04:50,560 Speaker 1: after the high profile accidents involving the world's first commercial jets. 79 00:04:51,160 --> 00:04:55,159 Speaker 1: So Boeing produced a film titled This is Such a 80 00:04:55,240 --> 00:05:01,040 Speaker 1: Charming Name, Operation Guillotine. It was a a film that 81 00:05:01,120 --> 00:05:04,760 Speaker 1: was trying to counteract this public reservation of flying aboard 82 00:05:04,760 --> 00:05:07,800 Speaker 1: a commercial jet. And in the film, Boeing had test 83 00:05:07,800 --> 00:05:13,880 Speaker 1: footage where they had aircraft chambers that were pressurized. This 84 00:05:13,920 --> 00:05:16,720 Speaker 1: was inside a controlled environment, so this wasn't like flying 85 00:05:16,960 --> 00:05:20,360 Speaker 1: in the you know, over the United States or something. 86 00:05:21,160 --> 00:05:25,680 Speaker 1: And in the first demonstration they showed a pressurized airplane 87 00:05:25,720 --> 00:05:30,400 Speaker 1: fuselage like a regular propeller airplane type fuselage, and the 88 00:05:30,400 --> 00:05:34,200 Speaker 1: fuselage gets pierced by two metal blades. So this is 89 00:05:34,240 --> 00:05:37,240 Speaker 1: like a scenario where a propeller failure has happened and 90 00:05:37,320 --> 00:05:40,240 Speaker 1: part of a propeller breaks off and breaks into the 91 00:05:40,240 --> 00:05:44,240 Speaker 1: fuselage of a plane and that caused rapid depressurization and 92 00:05:44,279 --> 00:05:48,120 Speaker 1: the fuselage broke apart in that test. But then Bowing 93 00:05:48,160 --> 00:05:51,400 Speaker 1: showed a similar test with the fuselage of their seven 94 00:05:51,480 --> 00:05:55,400 Speaker 1: oh seven and they had five blades pierced this structure, 95 00:05:55,440 --> 00:05:58,640 Speaker 1: not just two. But in their test footage they show 96 00:05:58,720 --> 00:06:01,880 Speaker 1: that the Bowing fusel lodge can hold together even with 97 00:06:01,960 --> 00:06:06,440 Speaker 1: this this breach, and some air was escaping obviously because 98 00:06:06,760 --> 00:06:10,159 Speaker 1: there was, you know, now a hole in the plane. 99 00:06:10,200 --> 00:06:12,800 Speaker 1: It's not like you can just not have air leak 100 00:06:12,839 --> 00:06:15,680 Speaker 1: out if you have a differential in pressure on one 101 00:06:15,720 --> 00:06:18,400 Speaker 1: side and versus the other, but it did show that 102 00:06:18,440 --> 00:06:21,000 Speaker 1: the Bowing design was far more resilient to damage that 103 00:06:21,120 --> 00:06:24,119 Speaker 1: was going to hold together even in a catastrophic event 104 00:06:24,240 --> 00:06:28,040 Speaker 1: like that than the traditional aircraft, which is an interesting 105 00:06:28,080 --> 00:06:31,919 Speaker 1: way to build passenger confidence, to be sure, but it 106 00:06:32,040 --> 00:06:34,320 Speaker 1: was one of the things they tried. The seven oh 107 00:06:34,320 --> 00:06:36,799 Speaker 1: seven was meant to be a mid to low range 108 00:06:36,880 --> 00:06:39,680 Speaker 1: commercial jet, and I mentioned in the previous episode that 109 00:06:39,760 --> 00:06:43,360 Speaker 1: PanAm had put in an order for twenty seven oh seven's, 110 00:06:43,360 --> 00:06:45,839 Speaker 1: but PanAm also hedged its bets. It wasn't going all 111 00:06:45,920 --> 00:06:48,599 Speaker 1: in on Boeing. It also put in an order for 112 00:06:48,680 --> 00:06:53,440 Speaker 1: twenty five d C eights from boeing competitor Douglas. Boeing 113 00:06:53,520 --> 00:06:57,520 Speaker 1: was able to manufacture the seven oh seven faster than 114 00:06:57,560 --> 00:07:00,520 Speaker 1: Douglas could build the d C eights, and Bowing would 115 00:07:00,520 --> 00:07:03,960 Speaker 1: also customize the aircraft itself. They would have different load 116 00:07:04,040 --> 00:07:06,279 Speaker 1: outs and different variants of the seven oh seven, And 117 00:07:06,279 --> 00:07:09,880 Speaker 1: because of those customizations, there's not really one set of 118 00:07:09,920 --> 00:07:12,000 Speaker 1: measurements I can give you for a seven oh seven. 119 00:07:12,120 --> 00:07:15,240 Speaker 1: The same is true for all the different seven hundred 120 00:07:15,320 --> 00:07:19,240 Speaker 1: series aircraft that Boeing would produce. There are different variations 121 00:07:19,240 --> 00:07:21,640 Speaker 1: of those and they all have different stats. But here's 122 00:07:21,640 --> 00:07:24,800 Speaker 1: how the first seven oh seven stacked up. It was 123 00:07:24,840 --> 00:07:27,840 Speaker 1: a hundred forty five ft one inch long, that's about 124 00:07:27,880 --> 00:07:30,960 Speaker 1: forty four point two meters, and had a wingspan of 125 00:07:31,000 --> 00:07:34,080 Speaker 1: a hundred thirty feet ten inches or thirty nine point 126 00:07:34,200 --> 00:07:37,559 Speaker 1: nine ms. The fuselage, so you know, like the body 127 00:07:37,600 --> 00:07:40,240 Speaker 1: of the aircraft had a width of twelve feet four 128 00:07:40,280 --> 00:07:42,880 Speaker 1: inches or three point eight meters. And while it was 129 00:07:42,920 --> 00:07:45,760 Speaker 1: meant as a mid range aircraft, its first commercial flight 130 00:07:45,840 --> 00:07:49,200 Speaker 1: was actually between New York City and Paris, France, though 131 00:07:49,240 --> 00:07:52,240 Speaker 1: it did stop once in Newfoundland to refuel. The seven 132 00:07:52,280 --> 00:07:55,400 Speaker 1: oh seven could travel faster and hold more passengers than 133 00:07:55,440 --> 00:07:58,840 Speaker 1: the Comet could, and there were several variations of it. 134 00:07:58,880 --> 00:08:01,720 Speaker 1: There was the seven O seven one, the seven O 135 00:08:01,840 --> 00:08:04,800 Speaker 1: seven one twenty B, the seven oh seven to twenty, 136 00:08:05,200 --> 00:08:07,600 Speaker 1: the seven oh seven three twenty, the seven oh seven 137 00:08:07,720 --> 00:08:10,440 Speaker 1: four twenty, and then there was the seven twenty and 138 00:08:10,480 --> 00:08:13,720 Speaker 1: the seven twenty B variants. So those two seven twenties 139 00:08:13,760 --> 00:08:15,800 Speaker 1: you might wonder what's up with those because they didn't 140 00:08:15,840 --> 00:08:18,200 Speaker 1: follow that seven oh seven pattern. These were meant to 141 00:08:18,200 --> 00:08:22,840 Speaker 1: be short to medium range jets, and they were also 142 00:08:22,880 --> 00:08:25,640 Speaker 1: meant to service airports that had shorter runways that couldn't 143 00:08:25,640 --> 00:08:28,040 Speaker 1: accommodate the larger versions of the seven O seven, so 144 00:08:28,040 --> 00:08:33,040 Speaker 1: these were slightly smaller versions of those those commercial jets. Now, 145 00:08:33,080 --> 00:08:36,520 Speaker 1: differences between some of these variants could sometimes be tricky 146 00:08:36,559 --> 00:08:40,320 Speaker 1: to spot. Some of them were essentially the same design 147 00:08:40,720 --> 00:08:44,120 Speaker 1: but had different engines, so unless you were really really 148 00:08:44,160 --> 00:08:47,000 Speaker 1: observant and had an up close and personal look at 149 00:08:47,000 --> 00:08:50,160 Speaker 1: the interior of some of the workings of the jets, 150 00:08:50,160 --> 00:08:52,840 Speaker 1: you wouldn't be able to necessarily tell on site the 151 00:08:52,880 --> 00:08:56,440 Speaker 1: difference without seeing a designation. Now, Boeing would manufacture more 152 00:08:56,480 --> 00:08:59,959 Speaker 1: than one thousand of the seven oh seven aircraft across 153 00:09:00,040 --> 00:09:02,400 Speaker 1: US all families over the decades, and the seven oh 154 00:09:02,480 --> 00:09:05,960 Speaker 1: seven would be in continuous production from nineteen fifty four 155 00:09:06,280 --> 00:09:10,680 Speaker 1: to nineteen seventy seven. It helped establish commercial jet travel 156 00:09:10,720 --> 00:09:13,880 Speaker 1: across the world, not just for Boeing but for all companies, 157 00:09:14,120 --> 00:09:17,360 Speaker 1: and before long more people were traveling by air than 158 00:09:17,400 --> 00:09:21,000 Speaker 1: by sea, which was a first because while air travel 159 00:09:21,040 --> 00:09:24,520 Speaker 1: had been established for several decades, it was incredibly expensive 160 00:09:24,640 --> 00:09:29,320 Speaker 1: and it was very slow if you're using a propeller aircraft, uh, 161 00:09:29,360 --> 00:09:32,320 Speaker 1: and it there was this perception of real danger, so 162 00:09:32,360 --> 00:09:35,520 Speaker 1: a lot of people preferred to travel by boat rather 163 00:09:35,559 --> 00:09:38,560 Speaker 1: than by airplane, but jets were a different story. It 164 00:09:38,640 --> 00:09:41,400 Speaker 1: also established something else. The seven O seven had exit 165 00:09:41,440 --> 00:09:44,920 Speaker 1: doors on the front left and rear left side of 166 00:09:44,960 --> 00:09:47,440 Speaker 1: the plane, so the four and the aft of the plane. 167 00:09:48,400 --> 00:09:51,800 Speaker 1: This would become a standardized configuration for Boeing's commercial jets 168 00:09:51,880 --> 00:09:54,360 Speaker 1: and ultimately would mean that other manufacturers would have to 169 00:09:54,840 --> 00:09:58,720 Speaker 1: follow suit because airports would accommodate this particular configuration with 170 00:09:58,760 --> 00:10:01,840 Speaker 1: the design of their jetway. So if you've flown into 171 00:10:02,280 --> 00:10:05,199 Speaker 1: a major airport and you notice that all the jets 172 00:10:05,200 --> 00:10:07,400 Speaker 1: are pulling up to their jet ways the same way, 173 00:10:07,800 --> 00:10:11,280 Speaker 1: it's because the Boeing kind of established this, and then 174 00:10:11,400 --> 00:10:14,560 Speaker 1: it sort of became the standard. While Boeing was hard 175 00:10:14,600 --> 00:10:17,240 Speaker 1: at work on the seven oh seven, the company's aircraft 176 00:10:17,320 --> 00:10:21,360 Speaker 1: also made history in another way. On September one, nineteen 177 00:10:21,400 --> 00:10:25,600 Speaker 1: fifty three, a Boeing B forty seven Strato jet refueled 178 00:10:25,800 --> 00:10:30,000 Speaker 1: another B forty seven in midflight. It was the first 179 00:10:30,040 --> 00:10:33,320 Speaker 1: time a jet was being used as a tanker. The 180 00:10:33,440 --> 00:10:37,400 Speaker 1: arrangement relied upon what is called a probe and drogue 181 00:10:37,400 --> 00:10:42,760 Speaker 1: refueling system, so there are two main aerial refueling methods, 182 00:10:42,800 --> 00:10:45,280 Speaker 1: and by that I mean two main methods of refueling 183 00:10:45,280 --> 00:10:48,840 Speaker 1: a plane in air, not a way of refueling a mermaid. 184 00:10:49,520 --> 00:10:52,800 Speaker 1: One is to use a rigid boom extension that connects 185 00:10:52,840 --> 00:10:56,240 Speaker 1: two aircraft together in midflight for the purposes of fuel transfer. 186 00:10:56,320 --> 00:10:59,080 Speaker 1: It allows for a very high speed fuel transfer because 187 00:10:59,080 --> 00:11:03,120 Speaker 1: you're using a rigid boom. Um when you use something 188 00:11:03,160 --> 00:11:06,840 Speaker 1: that has flexibility to it, it actually slows down the 189 00:11:06,880 --> 00:11:10,720 Speaker 1: transfer of fuel a little bit. However, that system requires 190 00:11:10,720 --> 00:11:13,480 Speaker 1: both aircraft to fly pretty close to each other, and 191 00:11:13,559 --> 00:11:16,600 Speaker 1: if something should go wrong, the boom, because it's solid, 192 00:11:16,920 --> 00:11:20,000 Speaker 1: could cause serious damage to one or both aircraft, so 193 00:11:20,040 --> 00:11:24,840 Speaker 1: it's riskier. The probe and drogue method is slightly more safe. 194 00:11:25,080 --> 00:11:28,880 Speaker 1: The aircraft in need of refueling flies ahead of the 195 00:11:28,920 --> 00:11:34,400 Speaker 1: tanker aircraft, and the refueling plane extends a hose that 196 00:11:34,520 --> 00:11:37,240 Speaker 1: is otherwise retracted so that it would be flush against 197 00:11:37,240 --> 00:11:40,160 Speaker 1: the aircraft. So it starts to let this hose out, 198 00:11:40,240 --> 00:11:44,040 Speaker 1: and the hose trails behind the aircraft, and at the 199 00:11:44,120 --> 00:11:47,160 Speaker 1: end of this hose is a basket, and the trailing 200 00:11:47,240 --> 00:11:49,320 Speaker 1: aircraft the one that has all the fuel aboard it 201 00:11:49,440 --> 00:11:53,600 Speaker 1: that's going to refuel The first plane has the probe. 202 00:11:53,880 --> 00:11:57,840 Speaker 1: It's kind of like a uh, you know, a fuel 203 00:11:57,840 --> 00:12:01,600 Speaker 1: pump that you would use at a gas station. The 204 00:12:01,600 --> 00:12:03,960 Speaker 1: the pump part where you plug that, you know, you 205 00:12:04,000 --> 00:12:08,000 Speaker 1: slot that into your gas tank. That's kind of what 206 00:12:08,120 --> 00:12:11,960 Speaker 1: the probe is. The pilot guides this probe into the 207 00:12:12,040 --> 00:12:15,560 Speaker 1: basket and that connects the probe to the hose and 208 00:12:15,640 --> 00:12:19,400 Speaker 1: refueling can begin. Afterward, the tanker pilot can retract the 209 00:12:19,440 --> 00:12:22,840 Speaker 1: probe from the drobe. The basket um and the pilot 210 00:12:22,920 --> 00:12:26,240 Speaker 1: of the newly refueled plane retracts the drogue, winds it 211 00:12:26,320 --> 00:12:29,680 Speaker 1: back up, and then you've got a newly refueled plane 212 00:12:29,800 --> 00:12:32,000 Speaker 1: in flight and never had the land to refuel. And 213 00:12:32,040 --> 00:12:35,280 Speaker 1: I'm just gonna say this, I find the fact that 214 00:12:35,400 --> 00:12:39,360 Speaker 1: pilots can fly so steady as to allow for in 215 00:12:39,480 --> 00:12:43,480 Speaker 1: flight refueling to be absolutely mind blowing. I'm amazed at 216 00:12:43,520 --> 00:12:46,880 Speaker 1: that level of precision and skill, and also the ingenuity 217 00:12:46,920 --> 00:12:49,600 Speaker 1: required to create the refueling system in the first place. 218 00:12:49,840 --> 00:12:54,560 Speaker 1: Human beings can be pretty astounding sometimes, And of course 219 00:12:54,600 --> 00:12:57,880 Speaker 1: I say that as a human being. I'm not some 220 00:12:57,920 --> 00:13:02,000 Speaker 1: sort of transdimensional alien make observations or anything. So let's 221 00:13:02,120 --> 00:13:05,360 Speaker 1: get back to Boeing and stop asking silly questions human 222 00:13:05,760 --> 00:13:10,559 Speaker 1: by nint. Boeing had made some huge accomplishments. The Dash 223 00:13:10,640 --> 00:13:13,760 Speaker 1: E D had already had its first flight at that point, 224 00:13:13,920 --> 00:13:17,360 Speaker 1: and Boeing was producing the k C one five strato 225 00:13:17,440 --> 00:13:21,200 Speaker 1: tanker aircraft, which was based off this DASH eight design, 226 00:13:21,679 --> 00:13:23,600 Speaker 1: and it was also at this point working on that 227 00:13:23,679 --> 00:13:26,720 Speaker 1: seven oh seven commercial jet, which again was also based 228 00:13:26,720 --> 00:13:28,080 Speaker 1: off the Dash A D. So you can think of 229 00:13:28,120 --> 00:13:31,360 Speaker 1: the DASH E D as the parent to both the 230 00:13:31,520 --> 00:13:34,520 Speaker 1: k C one thirty five strato tanker and the seven 231 00:13:34,600 --> 00:13:38,560 Speaker 1: oh seven. And those two aircraft were not identical. They 232 00:13:38,559 --> 00:13:40,280 Speaker 1: were actually very different from each other, but they were 233 00:13:40,280 --> 00:13:44,640 Speaker 1: both based off that same ancestor. Now Boeing was still 234 00:13:44,640 --> 00:13:47,760 Speaker 1: building military aircraft like the B forty seven, and it 235 00:13:47,800 --> 00:13:49,720 Speaker 1: had begun production on the B fifty two A, so 236 00:13:49,760 --> 00:13:52,720 Speaker 1: things were going pretty well for the company in nineteen 237 00:13:52,760 --> 00:13:57,040 Speaker 1: fifty six. On September, William Boeing, who was the founder 238 00:13:57,040 --> 00:13:59,439 Speaker 1: of the company but had you know, sold off all 239 00:13:59,480 --> 00:14:02,840 Speaker 1: of his entry in years before, passed away. He had 240 00:14:02,880 --> 00:14:06,280 Speaker 1: a heart attack aboard his yacht. I can only hope 241 00:14:06,320 --> 00:14:08,720 Speaker 1: that I go the same way. But it was three 242 00:14:08,800 --> 00:14:11,320 Speaker 1: days before his seventy five birthday, and I'd prefer to 243 00:14:11,400 --> 00:14:13,440 Speaker 1: last a little longer than that. But other than that, 244 00:14:13,559 --> 00:14:18,120 Speaker 1: I think, um passing away on board your luxury yacht, 245 00:14:18,320 --> 00:14:20,920 Speaker 1: that's a pretty baller way to go if you've gotta 246 00:14:20,960 --> 00:14:25,040 Speaker 1: if you gotta choose, I think on May fift nifty eight, 247 00:14:25,200 --> 00:14:27,800 Speaker 1: the US Air Force put in an order for three 248 00:14:27,880 --> 00:14:30,840 Speaker 1: of the new seven oh seven's, specifically the seven oh 249 00:14:30,880 --> 00:14:34,080 Speaker 1: seven one twenties, because you remember they're all those variations, 250 00:14:34,120 --> 00:14:38,240 Speaker 1: and these planes would receive a new designation, which would 251 00:14:38,240 --> 00:14:41,960 Speaker 1: be VC one thirty seven A. They were meant for 252 00:14:42,040 --> 00:14:45,240 Speaker 1: something very special. They'd be used for transportation for the 253 00:14:45,280 --> 00:14:48,760 Speaker 1: president and for other high ranking government officials. And when 254 00:14:48,800 --> 00:14:51,680 Speaker 1: the president steps aboard one of those planes, that plane 255 00:14:51,960 --> 00:14:54,800 Speaker 1: then becomes known as air Force one for as long 256 00:14:54,800 --> 00:14:56,920 Speaker 1: as the president is on it. And that's fun bit 257 00:14:56,960 --> 00:14:59,640 Speaker 1: of trivia. Air Force one does not refer to a 258 00:14:59,720 --> 00:15:03,720 Speaker 1: single goal plane. It's the designation that we give whatever 259 00:15:03,800 --> 00:15:06,760 Speaker 1: plane happens to be carrying the president at any given time. 260 00:15:07,240 --> 00:15:11,640 Speaker 1: So there's no one air Force one. It's whatever plane 261 00:15:11,840 --> 00:15:14,600 Speaker 1: the president happens to be on that is air Force one. 262 00:15:15,400 --> 00:15:17,520 Speaker 1: These planes were not the first to be used for 263 00:15:17,560 --> 00:15:20,800 Speaker 1: presidential transportation. I mean they were customized specifically for that, 264 00:15:20,840 --> 00:15:22,880 Speaker 1: but they weren't even the first for that. They were 265 00:15:22,880 --> 00:15:25,480 Speaker 1: the first from Boeing Um. They were also not the 266 00:15:25,520 --> 00:15:27,520 Speaker 1: first planes to be called air Force one when the 267 00:15:27,560 --> 00:15:30,560 Speaker 1: president was aboard, but it was the first time Boeing 268 00:15:30,560 --> 00:15:34,600 Speaker 1: would be the company providing planes for that purpose, and 269 00:15:34,640 --> 00:15:38,880 Speaker 1: they would continue to do so. Boeing has frequently provided 270 00:15:39,000 --> 00:15:42,480 Speaker 1: well sold planes to the United States government for use 271 00:15:42,640 --> 00:15:48,240 Speaker 1: as presidential transportation. On October t n eight, Boeing landed 272 00:15:48,280 --> 00:15:52,920 Speaker 1: a contract to assemble an intercontinental ballistic missile or ICBM, 273 00:15:53,600 --> 00:15:57,120 Speaker 1: called the minute Man. This was named after the members 274 00:15:57,200 --> 00:16:00,600 Speaker 1: of the American militia who were participated in the militia 275 00:16:00,680 --> 00:16:03,160 Speaker 1: leading up to the Revolutionary War. They were so called 276 00:16:03,480 --> 00:16:05,680 Speaker 1: the minutemen because they had to be ready to deploy 277 00:16:05,760 --> 00:16:08,600 Speaker 1: within a minute of getting a message. The i c 278 00:16:08,720 --> 00:16:11,560 Speaker 1: b M would rely upon solid rocket fuel, which would 279 00:16:11,600 --> 00:16:15,120 Speaker 1: also allow those missiles to stand ready for use indefinitely, 280 00:16:15,400 --> 00:16:18,000 Speaker 1: as opposed to the liquid fueled rockets of that time, 281 00:16:18,400 --> 00:16:21,200 Speaker 1: which had to be fueled pretty much immediately before use 282 00:16:21,520 --> 00:16:25,000 Speaker 1: and thus required more time to actually deploy. Now, it 283 00:16:25,000 --> 00:16:28,480 Speaker 1: would come about that they would find workarounds for that 284 00:16:28,560 --> 00:16:31,040 Speaker 1: limitation for liquid fuel, but at the time that was 285 00:16:31,080 --> 00:16:34,520 Speaker 1: not really you know, those rear options. Now, while the 286 00:16:34,560 --> 00:16:37,960 Speaker 1: Minutemen I c b M had been proposed earlier, the 287 00:16:38,040 --> 00:16:43,600 Speaker 1: US military originally dismissed those proposals, and the idea was 288 00:16:43,640 --> 00:16:47,560 Speaker 1: that they had already started development on other missiles, so 289 00:16:47,840 --> 00:16:49,920 Speaker 1: they thought, well, it doesn't make sense for US to 290 00:16:49,960 --> 00:16:53,720 Speaker 1: devote even more resources to building different types of missiles. 291 00:16:53,720 --> 00:16:56,560 Speaker 1: Were already building missiles. But then there was a report 292 00:16:57,080 --> 00:17:00,200 Speaker 1: which was later found to be inaccurate that suggests said 293 00:17:00,200 --> 00:17:02,800 Speaker 1: that the Soviet Union was actually far ahead of the 294 00:17:02,880 --> 00:17:06,800 Speaker 1: United States and missile production and deployment, and that pretty 295 00:17:06,840 --> 00:17:09,159 Speaker 1: much scared the dickens of the U. S. Government, and 296 00:17:09,280 --> 00:17:11,639 Speaker 1: soon the minute Man was given the fast track for 297 00:17:11,720 --> 00:17:16,160 Speaker 1: production and Boeing was in business. In nine Boeing began 298 00:17:16,200 --> 00:17:19,080 Speaker 1: development on what would have been a predecessor to the 299 00:17:19,119 --> 00:17:21,440 Speaker 1: Space Shuttle. I think I referred to this a little 300 00:17:21,440 --> 00:17:24,359 Speaker 1: bit in the Space Race episodes I did a year ago. 301 00:17:25,119 --> 00:17:28,200 Speaker 1: It was called the X twenty and was later known 302 00:17:28,240 --> 00:17:33,480 Speaker 1: as the Dina sore d Y in a dash s 303 00:17:33,520 --> 00:17:36,439 Speaker 1: O A R. It was a space plane meant to 304 00:17:36,440 --> 00:17:38,280 Speaker 1: be able to return to Earth as a sort of 305 00:17:38,480 --> 00:17:41,639 Speaker 1: plane or glider like the Space Shuttle. So this was 306 00:17:41,680 --> 00:17:44,840 Speaker 1: different from the Gemini or Giminy if you prefer, and 307 00:17:44,880 --> 00:17:48,840 Speaker 1: Apollo designs. Those were ballistic spacecraft, which meant they would 308 00:17:49,000 --> 00:17:53,080 Speaker 1: hurtle to Earth like you know, uh, just a cannonball, 309 00:17:53,600 --> 00:17:56,520 Speaker 1: and then deploy a parachute to slow them down, as 310 00:17:56,560 --> 00:17:59,440 Speaker 1: well as angle themselves properly so that you know, their 311 00:17:59,600 --> 00:18:02,520 Speaker 1: heat field was at the right angle, and then eventually 312 00:18:02,560 --> 00:18:05,120 Speaker 1: they would land in the water. From nineteen fifty nine 313 00:18:05,119 --> 00:18:07,439 Speaker 1: to the early nineteen sixties, Boeing would work on the 314 00:18:07,560 --> 00:18:12,639 Speaker 1: dinosaur design, and hundreds of millions of dollars were dedicated 315 00:18:12,680 --> 00:18:15,560 Speaker 1: to this development from the U. S government, But ultimately 316 00:18:16,000 --> 00:18:18,760 Speaker 1: the US government decided that the ballistic approach, which was 317 00:18:18,880 --> 00:18:23,080 Speaker 1: much less expensive and technically less complicated, would get priority, 318 00:18:23,480 --> 00:18:27,000 Speaker 1: so the project was canned in nineteen sixty three. It's 319 00:18:27,000 --> 00:18:29,840 Speaker 1: a shame too, because it was actually a pretty cool design. 320 00:18:30,240 --> 00:18:32,879 Speaker 1: I'll talk about a bit more after the break, but 321 00:18:33,000 --> 00:18:44,720 Speaker 1: first let's go and thank our sponsor. The dinosaur looked 322 00:18:44,760 --> 00:18:48,399 Speaker 1: pretty darn cool in a chunky way. It measured thirty 323 00:18:48,440 --> 00:18:50,880 Speaker 1: five and a half feet or ten point eight meters 324 00:18:50,880 --> 00:18:54,720 Speaker 1: long and had a delta wingspan of nearly twenty one ft. 325 00:18:54,960 --> 00:18:58,159 Speaker 1: Boeing had built a mocked up model of it and 326 00:18:58,280 --> 00:19:01,040 Speaker 1: was working on building out a prototo hype when the 327 00:19:01,119 --> 00:19:05,000 Speaker 1: project got jumped. The official decision was that the spacecraft 328 00:19:05,040 --> 00:19:08,560 Speaker 1: would have no military applications, so it would be useless 329 00:19:08,560 --> 00:19:11,760 Speaker 1: as a military vehicle. You couldn't use it for you know, wartime. 330 00:19:11,760 --> 00:19:14,760 Speaker 1: You couldn't use it for reconnaissance, so there was no 331 00:19:14,840 --> 00:19:17,399 Speaker 1: practical use of it in that sense. And it was 332 00:19:17,480 --> 00:19:20,000 Speaker 1: considered to be too expensive to be of any practical 333 00:19:20,119 --> 00:19:23,159 Speaker 1: use as a research and science vehicle, So there was 334 00:19:23,200 --> 00:19:26,800 Speaker 1: no practical scientific application. And so the dinosaur went the 335 00:19:26,800 --> 00:19:29,919 Speaker 1: way of the dinosaurs. And yes, I was waiting to 336 00:19:29,960 --> 00:19:32,199 Speaker 1: make that joke for ages. I couldn't wait for the 337 00:19:32,320 --> 00:19:35,440 Speaker 1: break to be over. In the spring of nineteen sixty, 338 00:19:35,480 --> 00:19:40,119 Speaker 1: Boeing acquired the Vital Aircraft Corporation and it formed a 339 00:19:40,160 --> 00:19:43,840 Speaker 1: new division within Boeing. Vital was a play on the 340 00:19:43,880 --> 00:19:46,920 Speaker 1: phrase vertical takeoff and landing, so it's this part of 341 00:19:46,960 --> 00:19:50,600 Speaker 1: Boeing's company that develops v t o L aircraft like 342 00:19:50,720 --> 00:19:55,480 Speaker 1: helicopters and related vehicles. Um they actually would be involved 343 00:19:55,480 --> 00:19:58,199 Speaker 1: in developing lots of helicopters. They don't talk about a 344 00:19:58,200 --> 00:19:59,840 Speaker 1: lot of them in this episode. That's one of the 345 00:19:59,840 --> 00:20:01,800 Speaker 1: thing things that I'm having to skip over quite a bit. 346 00:20:02,160 --> 00:20:05,400 Speaker 1: But they had a hand in designing several helicopters, both 347 00:20:05,400 --> 00:20:08,800 Speaker 1: for the military and for civilian use. In late nineteen 348 00:20:08,880 --> 00:20:11,359 Speaker 1: sixty one, Bowing would land a contract to produce the 349 00:20:11,440 --> 00:20:14,480 Speaker 1: first stage booster for the Saturn five, which would be 350 00:20:14,560 --> 00:20:17,439 Speaker 1: used in the Apollo program. That's pretty darn cool, And 351 00:20:17,480 --> 00:20:20,760 Speaker 1: the following year Boeing would test its first hydrofoil vehicle, 352 00:20:20,960 --> 00:20:25,560 Speaker 1: the high Point. So what's a hydrofoil. Well, as the 353 00:20:25,640 --> 00:20:28,240 Speaker 1: name suggests, it has to do with water, you know, 354 00:20:28,359 --> 00:20:32,960 Speaker 1: hydro water, and a foil is a surface that uh 355 00:20:33,160 --> 00:20:36,359 Speaker 1: provides lift. So a hydrofoil is a surface that, when 356 00:20:36,400 --> 00:20:39,359 Speaker 1: it moves in water, acts as a lifting surface. So 357 00:20:39,359 --> 00:20:42,399 Speaker 1: it's sort of like the wings on an airplane, except, 358 00:20:42,440 --> 00:20:45,440 Speaker 1: of course, an airplane moves through the air, hydrofoil moves 359 00:20:45,440 --> 00:20:47,840 Speaker 1: through the water, and of course water and air both 360 00:20:47,880 --> 00:20:50,840 Speaker 1: obey fluid dynamics. So if you've ever seen a boat 361 00:20:51,000 --> 00:20:54,879 Speaker 1: that travels really fast and it's on top of skis 362 00:20:54,920 --> 00:20:58,439 Speaker 1: that are on these long struts, that's a hydrofoil, and 363 00:20:58,480 --> 00:21:00,840 Speaker 1: Bowing would go on to produce hydro of foil vehicles 364 00:21:00,840 --> 00:21:03,439 Speaker 1: for the Navy as well as for other uses. And 365 00:21:03,520 --> 00:21:06,399 Speaker 1: hydrofoil boats can travel pretty darn fast, and it's largely 366 00:21:06,400 --> 00:21:09,960 Speaker 1: because they have decreased drag. There's reduced surface area making 367 00:21:10,000 --> 00:21:13,040 Speaker 1: contact with the water, so they can go much faster 368 00:21:13,280 --> 00:21:15,800 Speaker 1: than boats that have their full surface or you know, 369 00:21:15,880 --> 00:21:18,919 Speaker 1: the full lower surface in contact with the water. In 370 00:21:19,000 --> 00:21:23,160 Speaker 1: nineteen sixty two, Boeing began producing seven twenty seven aircraft. 371 00:21:23,440 --> 00:21:24,840 Speaker 1: So I guess now it's a good time to just 372 00:21:24,880 --> 00:21:27,760 Speaker 1: do a full run down on the seven hundred family 373 00:21:27,800 --> 00:21:30,800 Speaker 1: of commercial jets and get a general timeline for each 374 00:21:30,800 --> 00:21:33,440 Speaker 1: and describe how they are different. I'd like to get 375 00:21:33,440 --> 00:21:36,320 Speaker 1: them all all the way collectively, though obviously obviously we're 376 00:21:36,359 --> 00:21:38,040 Speaker 1: gonna have to come back for the seven thirty seven 377 00:21:38,080 --> 00:21:41,400 Speaker 1: Max designed to close out this episode. But yeah, let's 378 00:21:41,480 --> 00:21:43,280 Speaker 1: let's do all the seven hundreds, because if I just 379 00:21:43,359 --> 00:21:45,480 Speaker 1: keep on going through the timeline, it's just gonna get 380 00:21:45,480 --> 00:21:48,400 Speaker 1: tedious anyway. So it all started with the seven oh 381 00:21:48,400 --> 00:21:51,280 Speaker 1: seven that got things moving, and then next was the 382 00:21:51,400 --> 00:21:53,560 Speaker 1: seven twenty that was the variation on the seven oh 383 00:21:53,640 --> 00:21:56,240 Speaker 1: seven that was designed for the shorter flights and smaller airports, 384 00:21:56,720 --> 00:21:59,120 Speaker 1: and then after that came the seven twenty seven. Now, 385 00:21:59,119 --> 00:22:01,320 Speaker 1: depending on the lay out, it could hold between a 386 00:22:01,359 --> 00:22:05,840 Speaker 1: hundred forty nine to eighty nine passengers max. And it 387 00:22:05,920 --> 00:22:09,240 Speaker 1: had three engines. It had an engine under each wing, 388 00:22:09,800 --> 00:22:12,040 Speaker 1: and then the third engine was located at the tail 389 00:22:12,240 --> 00:22:14,919 Speaker 1: of the aircraft. It was built into the tail of 390 00:22:14,960 --> 00:22:18,480 Speaker 1: the fuselage, and it was also intended for short to 391 00:22:18,600 --> 00:22:23,560 Speaker 1: medium routes. The original seven thirty seven would follow in 392 00:22:23,600 --> 00:22:26,920 Speaker 1: the late nineteen sixties, and the original seven thirty seven 393 00:22:26,960 --> 00:22:29,600 Speaker 1: had twin engines, was also meant for short to medium 394 00:22:29,680 --> 00:22:34,000 Speaker 1: length trips, and Boeing has updated this particular line many 395 00:22:34,040 --> 00:22:36,800 Speaker 1: many times. There are several variations of the seven thirty 396 00:22:36,840 --> 00:22:40,720 Speaker 1: seven seven thirty seven seven thirty seven Classic, seven thirty 397 00:22:40,760 --> 00:22:45,120 Speaker 1: seven NG, seven thirty seven Crystal seven thirty seven Low Calorie. 398 00:22:45,280 --> 00:22:47,359 Speaker 1: I might be making some of these up, though, but 399 00:22:47,400 --> 00:22:49,159 Speaker 1: there really is a seven thirty seven n G that 400 00:22:49,200 --> 00:22:53,120 Speaker 1: stands for next Generation, just like Star Trek and uh 401 00:22:53,520 --> 00:22:56,040 Speaker 1: that one was a little bit more narrow than the 402 00:22:56,040 --> 00:22:58,720 Speaker 1: original seven thirty seven. And of course there's the seven 403 00:22:58,760 --> 00:23:01,840 Speaker 1: thirty seven MAX that here about in the News Currently, 404 00:23:02,280 --> 00:23:06,200 Speaker 1: there are several variants of these jets, even within these families, 405 00:23:06,560 --> 00:23:09,840 Speaker 1: and each variant has slightly different stats and passenger layouts, 406 00:23:10,000 --> 00:23:12,960 Speaker 1: and the variety means it's really hard to talk about 407 00:23:13,000 --> 00:23:16,359 Speaker 1: seven thirty seven's as a collective because there's so much 408 00:23:16,480 --> 00:23:20,040 Speaker 1: variation between them. There are versions that had a maximum 409 00:23:20,080 --> 00:23:23,080 Speaker 1: capacity of eighty five passengers and there are versions that 410 00:23:23,119 --> 00:23:26,920 Speaker 1: could carry up to two fifteen passengers. That's a pretty 411 00:23:27,000 --> 00:23:30,159 Speaker 1: big difference there. Seven seven would go on to be 412 00:23:30,280 --> 00:23:34,520 Speaker 1: Boeing's biggest commercial success. It is the highest selling commercial 413 00:23:34,600 --> 00:23:37,800 Speaker 1: jet liner model of all time, though again there are 414 00:23:37,800 --> 00:23:41,720 Speaker 1: a ton of variations, and that consideration has taken all 415 00:23:41,760 --> 00:23:43,879 Speaker 1: of them and putting them in a big collective group. 416 00:23:44,560 --> 00:23:48,239 Speaker 1: They've been in continuous production since their introduction in the 417 00:23:48,320 --> 00:23:53,959 Speaker 1: nineteen sixties, so a very big working horse for Boeing. 418 00:23:54,520 --> 00:23:58,080 Speaker 1: The Bowing seven forty seven was the very first aircraft 419 00:23:58,119 --> 00:24:01,639 Speaker 1: to receive the descriptor of eumbo jet, and it is 420 00:24:01,840 --> 00:24:05,200 Speaker 1: a beast of an aircraft. Now. I have never flown 421 00:24:05,440 --> 00:24:08,280 Speaker 1: on a seven forty seven, but I have toured a 422 00:24:08,400 --> 00:24:11,560 Speaker 1: grounded seven forty seven. They have one at Delta's Air 423 00:24:11,680 --> 00:24:15,199 Speaker 1: Museum in Atlanta, Georgia, and the seven forty seven is 424 00:24:15,240 --> 00:24:18,119 Speaker 1: a wide body airplane. If you were to look at 425 00:24:18,119 --> 00:24:20,480 Speaker 1: one in profile, you notice that at the front end 426 00:24:20,520 --> 00:24:23,280 Speaker 1: of the airplane has a hump on the top of it, 427 00:24:23,520 --> 00:24:26,119 Speaker 1: and that's because the forward section of the plane has 428 00:24:26,160 --> 00:24:30,240 Speaker 1: a second floor. It's a double decker. UH. Passenger cabin, 429 00:24:30,400 --> 00:24:32,760 Speaker 1: so you actually have a staircase inside the cabin that 430 00:24:32,840 --> 00:24:36,240 Speaker 1: leads up to the second floor. Uh. They can get 431 00:24:36,280 --> 00:24:39,280 Speaker 1: real swanky up there. The at least the model that 432 00:24:39,320 --> 00:24:42,480 Speaker 1: I went on, they had the the first class set 433 00:24:42,520 --> 00:24:46,160 Speaker 1: up in the upper deck and it was pretty nifty. 434 00:24:47,200 --> 00:24:50,760 Speaker 1: So when this seven forty seven debuted in nineteen seventy, 435 00:24:50,800 --> 00:24:53,280 Speaker 1: it was known as the commercial jet with the largest 436 00:24:53,359 --> 00:24:56,359 Speaker 1: capacity for passengers, and it would actually hold on to 437 00:24:56,520 --> 00:25:01,160 Speaker 1: that title for nearly forty years. There's also several variations 438 00:25:01,160 --> 00:25:04,560 Speaker 1: of the seven forty seven, and the seven eight is 439 00:25:04,640 --> 00:25:09,480 Speaker 1: still in production today. The seven fifty seven is kind 440 00:25:09,480 --> 00:25:12,280 Speaker 1: of a study in contrast to the seven forty seven. 441 00:25:12,480 --> 00:25:15,520 Speaker 1: It first went into production in n one and it's 442 00:25:15,520 --> 00:25:18,720 Speaker 1: a narrow body plane, has a single aisle down the 443 00:25:18,720 --> 00:25:23,719 Speaker 1: passenger cabin. It's got two engines and Boeing generally intended 444 00:25:23,760 --> 00:25:26,920 Speaker 1: it to take the place of the older seven twenty 445 00:25:27,000 --> 00:25:29,879 Speaker 1: seven's for those short to medium flight routes. It can 446 00:25:29,960 --> 00:25:32,720 Speaker 1: hold nearly three hundred passengers in at least some of 447 00:25:32,720 --> 00:25:36,200 Speaker 1: the configurations for the seven fifty seven, and it makes 448 00:25:36,240 --> 00:25:40,480 Speaker 1: it Boeing's largest single aisle passenger jet. This one, however, 449 00:25:40,680 --> 00:25:43,760 Speaker 1: is no longer in production. Then you have the seven 450 00:25:43,840 --> 00:25:46,879 Speaker 1: sixty seven that's a mid to long range aircraft. It 451 00:25:46,920 --> 00:25:50,080 Speaker 1: has a wide body and has two jet engines, and 452 00:25:50,119 --> 00:25:51,879 Speaker 1: there are lots of variations of this one to that 453 00:25:51,920 --> 00:25:54,600 Speaker 1: allow for a maximum passenger capacity of up to three 454 00:25:54,640 --> 00:25:58,560 Speaker 1: hundred seventy five passengers, depending upon the variation. Obviously, not 455 00:25:58,640 --> 00:26:01,679 Speaker 1: all buildouts can hold that many. In fact, some of 456 00:26:01,680 --> 00:26:05,040 Speaker 1: them top out at closer to passengers, which is less 457 00:26:05,040 --> 00:26:09,680 Speaker 1: than half of that other maximum. Like the seven fifty seven. 458 00:26:09,760 --> 00:26:12,520 Speaker 1: The seven sixty seven went into production in one and 459 00:26:12,560 --> 00:26:15,720 Speaker 1: it shares many design components with the seven fifty seven, 460 00:26:16,160 --> 00:26:19,840 Speaker 1: and it's so similar in operation that the f a 461 00:26:19,920 --> 00:26:22,960 Speaker 1: A said that pilots who had the proper type of 462 00:26:23,080 --> 00:26:26,600 Speaker 1: rating to fly a seven fifty seven could also fly 463 00:26:26,720 --> 00:26:29,320 Speaker 1: a seven sixty seven because the differences, at least in 464 00:26:29,400 --> 00:26:33,600 Speaker 1: operation were so few and far between they were practically 465 00:26:33,640 --> 00:26:39,760 Speaker 1: the same aircraft by operation, even though by actual specs 466 00:26:39,840 --> 00:26:42,240 Speaker 1: like by width and length and all that, they were 467 00:26:42,320 --> 00:26:45,120 Speaker 1: very different. The seventy seven sixty seven was much wider 468 00:26:45,160 --> 00:26:48,320 Speaker 1: than the seven fifty seven. Boeing still makes the seven 469 00:26:48,359 --> 00:26:51,280 Speaker 1: sixty seven aircraft today, but most of those are not 470 00:26:51,480 --> 00:26:54,119 Speaker 1: being used as passenger jets are being used for other stuff. 471 00:26:54,600 --> 00:26:56,960 Speaker 1: Then we have the Triple seven, the seven seventy seven. 472 00:26:57,520 --> 00:26:59,960 Speaker 1: It's a wide body, long range aircraft, the first one 473 00:27:00,000 --> 00:27:03,760 Speaker 1: to production in It is the largest twin jet commercial 474 00:27:03,800 --> 00:27:06,960 Speaker 1: aircraft in the world, and some variations of the seven 475 00:27:07,000 --> 00:27:10,680 Speaker 1: seventy seven can hold nearly four hundred passengers. It's also 476 00:27:10,840 --> 00:27:14,679 Speaker 1: the first Boeing commercial aircraft to have computer mediated controls, 477 00:27:15,000 --> 00:27:17,639 Speaker 1: which is going to become part of our story towards 478 00:27:17,640 --> 00:27:20,160 Speaker 1: the end of this episode two for the seven thirty 479 00:27:20,200 --> 00:27:23,480 Speaker 1: seven Max. The seven seventy seven became a big success 480 00:27:23,520 --> 00:27:26,080 Speaker 1: for Boeing, and airlines ordered enough of them to make 481 00:27:26,160 --> 00:27:29,720 Speaker 1: the seven seventy seven the best selling wide body commercial 482 00:27:29,800 --> 00:27:32,399 Speaker 1: jet of all time. It beat out the record that 483 00:27:32,440 --> 00:27:35,040 Speaker 1: was previously held by the seven forty seven, and as 484 00:27:35,080 --> 00:27:38,359 Speaker 1: I record this, Boeing is working on the latest generation 485 00:27:38,560 --> 00:27:41,520 Speaker 1: of the Triple seven family of aircraft with the seven 486 00:27:41,640 --> 00:27:45,359 Speaker 1: seventy seven X, which would start flying the skies in 487 00:27:45,400 --> 00:27:48,800 Speaker 1: twenty twenty. One of those is the seven seventy seven 488 00:27:48,960 --> 00:27:52,240 Speaker 1: nine and it's a huge, huge plane. It can hold 489 00:27:52,320 --> 00:27:56,480 Speaker 1: up to four fourteen passengers. Big plane. And now we're 490 00:27:56,560 --> 00:27:59,639 Speaker 1: up to seven eighty seven a k a. The Dreamliner. 491 00:27:59,680 --> 00:28:01,679 Speaker 1: It's an the wide body jet, though it's in the 492 00:28:01,720 --> 00:28:03,679 Speaker 1: mid size range, so it's not as big as the 493 00:28:03,760 --> 00:28:06,560 Speaker 1: seven seventy sevens, and it went into production in two 494 00:28:06,600 --> 00:28:09,840 Speaker 1: thousand nine. It's meant to replace the seven sixty seven. 495 00:28:10,160 --> 00:28:12,240 Speaker 1: So Boeing's goal was to create a commercial jet that 496 00:28:12,280 --> 00:28:14,520 Speaker 1: could fill the same role as the seven sixty seven, 497 00:28:14,520 --> 00:28:17,639 Speaker 1: but have much better fuel efficiency. And they did this 498 00:28:17,720 --> 00:28:21,000 Speaker 1: with lots of different changes in design, including using mostly 499 00:28:21,040 --> 00:28:24,040 Speaker 1: composite materials for the aircraft, which helped cut down on 500 00:28:24,119 --> 00:28:26,800 Speaker 1: the aircraft's weight, which therefore cuts down on the amount 501 00:28:26,800 --> 00:28:29,080 Speaker 1: of fuel it needs to stay in the air. It 502 00:28:29,080 --> 00:28:32,160 Speaker 1: can hold up to three five passengers, depending again upon 503 00:28:32,200 --> 00:28:36,280 Speaker 1: the layout, and it also can travel on long distance routes. 504 00:28:36,720 --> 00:28:38,640 Speaker 1: Oh and then there is one other one I should 505 00:28:38,640 --> 00:28:41,240 Speaker 1: mention the seven seventeen. So why would I leave that 506 00:28:41,280 --> 00:28:43,360 Speaker 1: one last? Why would I work up from seven oh 507 00:28:43,400 --> 00:28:45,200 Speaker 1: seven all the way up to seven eighty seven, then 508 00:28:45,200 --> 00:28:48,040 Speaker 1: go back to seven seventeen. Well, it's because Bowing didn't 509 00:28:48,080 --> 00:28:51,920 Speaker 1: actually design the seven seventeen, the Boeing seven seventeen, at 510 00:28:51,960 --> 00:28:55,040 Speaker 1: least the commercial jet version of the seven seventeen. There 511 00:28:55,160 --> 00:28:58,840 Speaker 1: was a Boeing military aircraft that had a seven seventeen 512 00:28:58,880 --> 00:29:00,959 Speaker 1: designation back in the nineteen fifties, but that's not what 513 00:29:01,000 --> 00:29:05,080 Speaker 1: we're talking about here anyway. It wasn't a Bowing aircraft. Originally. 514 00:29:05,120 --> 00:29:08,320 Speaker 1: It used to have the name MD and it was 515 00:29:08,360 --> 00:29:12,520 Speaker 1: designed by Boeing's competitor McDonald Douglas in the mid nineties. 516 00:29:12,880 --> 00:29:15,400 Speaker 1: But before the plane could go into production, something else 517 00:29:15,400 --> 00:29:17,840 Speaker 1: would happen. And I'll get back to that in a 518 00:29:17,920 --> 00:29:20,960 Speaker 1: little bit, all right. So that's the family of Boeing 519 00:29:20,960 --> 00:29:23,920 Speaker 1: commercial jets, and honestly, each of those could merit their 520 00:29:23,960 --> 00:29:27,920 Speaker 1: own episode. There are lots of stories about each of them. 521 00:29:27,960 --> 00:29:33,360 Speaker 1: There are stories about the different crazy configurations the airlines 522 00:29:33,360 --> 00:29:36,680 Speaker 1: would have for those aircraft, their stories about accidents with 523 00:29:36,720 --> 00:29:40,280 Speaker 1: those aircraft. Um, the seven forty seven has had a 524 00:29:40,320 --> 00:29:43,280 Speaker 1: lot of accidents, not not to say that the seven 525 00:29:43,600 --> 00:29:46,240 Speaker 1: seven itself was at fault. There were plenty of accidents 526 00:29:46,280 --> 00:29:50,560 Speaker 1: that were judged to be human error, not mechanical error. 527 00:29:51,040 --> 00:29:54,040 Speaker 1: But there's you know, there's just so much to talk about, 528 00:29:54,080 --> 00:29:56,800 Speaker 1: and again we've got it in this series at some point, 529 00:29:56,880 --> 00:30:02,200 Speaker 1: so I'm just gonna calling all double here. Also, it's 530 00:30:02,200 --> 00:30:05,280 Speaker 1: good to remember a few general notes about these planes. First, 531 00:30:05,320 --> 00:30:09,200 Speaker 1: the number designation doesn't indicate size. This took me a 532 00:30:09,240 --> 00:30:11,000 Speaker 1: long time to figure out. When I was a kid, 533 00:30:11,200 --> 00:30:16,160 Speaker 1: I just assumed that every number bigger was meant there's 534 00:30:16,200 --> 00:30:17,600 Speaker 1: gonna be a bigger plane. So when I heard I 535 00:30:17,640 --> 00:30:19,640 Speaker 1: was gonna fly on the seven sixties seven, I thought, Wow, 536 00:30:19,680 --> 00:30:22,960 Speaker 1: it's gonna be even bigger than the seven seven, And 537 00:30:23,000 --> 00:30:28,440 Speaker 1: I was wrong. Still getting over that. Also, another is 538 00:30:28,480 --> 00:30:31,040 Speaker 1: that the variations within a single family in the seven 539 00:30:31,280 --> 00:30:36,080 Speaker 1: series can be significant. It's not just about the seat layout. 540 00:30:36,360 --> 00:30:40,320 Speaker 1: It's also about the aircraft's dimensions, which engines it has, 541 00:30:40,360 --> 00:30:44,360 Speaker 1: and other design elements. And these differences, at least according 542 00:30:44,400 --> 00:30:47,200 Speaker 1: to Boeing, aren't so great as to necessitate a totally 543 00:30:47,280 --> 00:30:50,880 Speaker 1: new designation. You wouldn't call it a different type of plane, 544 00:30:51,200 --> 00:30:53,800 Speaker 1: but it does mean that not all seven forty seven's 545 00:30:53,800 --> 00:30:55,960 Speaker 1: are alike. For example, and there are a lot of 546 00:30:56,000 --> 00:30:58,680 Speaker 1: these Boeing aircraft out there in the wild. Boeing delivered 547 00:30:58,800 --> 00:31:03,400 Speaker 1: more than nine thousand seven thirty seven aircraft alone. That's 548 00:31:03,400 --> 00:31:05,800 Speaker 1: if you lump all the versions of the seven thirty 549 00:31:05,880 --> 00:31:08,560 Speaker 1: seven together. If you do that, then it's delivered more 550 00:31:08,600 --> 00:31:12,000 Speaker 1: than nine thousand of them to customers. That's nearly half 551 00:31:12,080 --> 00:31:14,720 Speaker 1: of all the commercial aircraft that Boeing has delivered since 552 00:31:14,720 --> 00:31:17,960 Speaker 1: it started producing the seven family. So it's pretty impressive 553 00:31:18,000 --> 00:31:21,480 Speaker 1: that the seven thirty seven takes up almost of all 554 00:31:21,520 --> 00:31:24,040 Speaker 1: the planes Boeing has ever sold, at least in the 555 00:31:24,040 --> 00:31:27,720 Speaker 1: commercial jet world. Okay, so back to the timeline and 556 00:31:27,880 --> 00:31:30,600 Speaker 1: bowing in the nineteen sixties. Gotta finish this episode out 557 00:31:30,600 --> 00:31:34,960 Speaker 1: before the number seven ceases to mean anything to me anymore. 558 00:31:36,320 --> 00:31:38,800 Speaker 1: Boeing would continue to play a crucial role in the 559 00:31:38,840 --> 00:31:41,920 Speaker 1: space race, landing the contract with NASA to build the 560 00:31:42,000 --> 00:31:46,080 Speaker 1: Lunar Orbiter spacecraft. Now, these were unmanned spacecraft that would 561 00:31:46,120 --> 00:31:48,600 Speaker 1: fly around the Moon and map out sites of the 562 00:31:48,640 --> 00:31:51,560 Speaker 1: Moon that could potentially be used by the Apollo program 563 00:31:51,600 --> 00:31:54,720 Speaker 1: for landing sites. Boeing would work with other companies to 564 00:31:54,720 --> 00:31:57,960 Speaker 1: produce the spacecraft, and the mission was a success. And 565 00:31:58,040 --> 00:32:00,720 Speaker 1: was very important for the planning of the Apollo missions. 566 00:32:01,200 --> 00:32:04,560 Speaker 1: In nineteen sixty six, Boeing celebrated its fiftieth anniversary, and 567 00:32:04,600 --> 00:32:06,920 Speaker 1: it did so by flying a replica of the old 568 00:32:07,040 --> 00:32:10,640 Speaker 1: B and W biplane that had started it all so 569 00:32:10,680 --> 00:32:14,600 Speaker 1: many years before. On a less celebratory note, Boeing would 570 00:32:14,640 --> 00:32:18,000 Speaker 1: also land a contract and design a short Range Attack 571 00:32:18,160 --> 00:32:22,560 Speaker 1: missile or SRAM s RAM. This was a nuclear air 572 00:32:22,640 --> 00:32:25,760 Speaker 1: to surface missile, so this was meant to be fired 573 00:32:25,840 --> 00:32:30,560 Speaker 1: by bombers that would penetrate enemy airspace, presumably after the 574 00:32:30,640 --> 00:32:33,520 Speaker 1: surface to air missile capabilities of the enemy had been 575 00:32:33,560 --> 00:32:37,280 Speaker 1: knocked out and by enemy everyone was essentially thinking the 576 00:32:37,360 --> 00:32:40,040 Speaker 1: Soviet Union. This was still in the Cold War, so 577 00:32:40,160 --> 00:32:43,040 Speaker 1: Boeing would first produce the missiles in nineteen seventy two 578 00:32:43,080 --> 00:32:46,320 Speaker 1: and would continue to do so, upgrading the line, making 579 00:32:46,400 --> 00:32:51,440 Speaker 1: changes to it, but continuate producing these missiles until which 580 00:32:51,480 --> 00:32:55,280 Speaker 1: was when the program was discontinued. In nineteen sixty nine, 581 00:32:55,520 --> 00:32:59,280 Speaker 1: Boeing began production on the Lunar Rover vehicle, that's the 582 00:32:59,320 --> 00:33:01,760 Speaker 1: moon car that astronauts would us to make some wicked 583 00:33:01,800 --> 00:33:05,320 Speaker 1: donuts on the Moon. I'm told they also used to 584 00:33:05,320 --> 00:33:08,800 Speaker 1: do science and stuff up there too. Not everything went 585 00:33:08,880 --> 00:33:11,960 Speaker 1: without a hitch, however, Boeing had landed a contract to 586 00:33:12,000 --> 00:33:16,640 Speaker 1: develop a supersonic transport or s ST vehicle. This would 587 00:33:16,680 --> 00:33:19,760 Speaker 1: be a passenger aircraft capable of breaking the sound barrier. 588 00:33:20,600 --> 00:33:24,120 Speaker 1: In the nineteen sixties, Boeing landed a contract to develop 589 00:33:24,280 --> 00:33:26,320 Speaker 1: such an aircraft, and it would have been the first 590 00:33:26,360 --> 00:33:28,600 Speaker 1: of a new family of aircraft in Boeing. It had 591 00:33:28,640 --> 00:33:32,600 Speaker 1: the designation to seven oh seven, but the government scrapped 592 00:33:32,600 --> 00:33:36,080 Speaker 1: the project in nineteen seventy one and Boeing canceled the 593 00:33:36,120 --> 00:33:39,920 Speaker 1: development on the project. So what happened, Well, if you 594 00:33:40,000 --> 00:33:42,600 Speaker 1: listen to my episode about the Concorde, you know that 595 00:33:42,680 --> 00:33:46,760 Speaker 1: supersonic travel is challenging, not just from a technical standpoint, 596 00:33:47,040 --> 00:33:50,480 Speaker 1: but also an economical one. The expense of developing and 597 00:33:50,520 --> 00:33:54,720 Speaker 1: building the aircraft, of training crews and pilots of how 598 00:33:54,800 --> 00:33:58,680 Speaker 1: to fly them, and maintenance crews about how to maintain them, 599 00:33:59,120 --> 00:34:02,040 Speaker 1: also just paying to fuel the darned things. All that 600 00:34:02,320 --> 00:34:04,600 Speaker 1: ends up being a considerable amount of money. On top 601 00:34:04,640 --> 00:34:07,080 Speaker 1: of that, breaking the sound barrier means you produce more 602 00:34:07,080 --> 00:34:09,520 Speaker 1: sonic booms than I do after a dinner at Taco Bell. 603 00:34:10,040 --> 00:34:13,319 Speaker 1: So while Boeing was tackling the challenge with zeal The 604 00:34:13,400 --> 00:34:16,120 Speaker 1: general opinion in the industry was that it wasn't a 605 00:34:16,120 --> 00:34:19,080 Speaker 1: good idea to pursue, and the general public was concerned 606 00:34:19,120 --> 00:34:22,160 Speaker 1: about the environmental impact that such aircraft would have. So 607 00:34:22,239 --> 00:34:25,600 Speaker 1: at uh, it never got off the ground. Now, when 608 00:34:25,600 --> 00:34:28,640 Speaker 1: we come back, I'll quickly rush through the timeline and 609 00:34:28,680 --> 00:34:31,160 Speaker 1: then we'll talk about the seven thirty seven Max. But 610 00:34:31,280 --> 00:34:41,400 Speaker 1: first let's take a quick break. So while the SST 611 00:34:41,600 --> 00:34:44,680 Speaker 1: program went belly up, Boeing was continuing to not just 612 00:34:44,760 --> 00:34:49,000 Speaker 1: work on space, military and commercial air vehicles, but also 613 00:34:49,160 --> 00:34:54,040 Speaker 1: to diversify. That involved creating alternate uses for Boeing owned land, 614 00:34:54,120 --> 00:34:57,120 Speaker 1: like turning some of it into farmland, for example, And 615 00:34:57,320 --> 00:34:59,160 Speaker 1: this way they could put the land to work rather 616 00:34:59,200 --> 00:35:01,840 Speaker 1: than just you know, have it be land. And it 617 00:35:01,880 --> 00:35:05,680 Speaker 1: also involved Boeing bidding for contracts to develop rapid rail 618 00:35:05,760 --> 00:35:09,320 Speaker 1: transit technology. So at this point, Bowing is building components 619 00:35:09,320 --> 00:35:14,360 Speaker 1: for spacecraft, for military aircraft, including helicopters, for commercial aircraft, 620 00:35:14,400 --> 00:35:18,279 Speaker 1: for hydrofoil vehicles, and rail transit systems. Oh And by 621 00:35:18,280 --> 00:35:21,120 Speaker 1: the late nineteen seventies it was also building wind turbines 622 00:35:21,160 --> 00:35:23,479 Speaker 1: for electricity production. So it was really getting into lots 623 00:35:23,480 --> 00:35:26,440 Speaker 1: of stuff. One of the spacecraft Bowing created was the 624 00:35:26,440 --> 00:35:29,600 Speaker 1: Mariner ten, which was a satellite that did flybys of 625 00:35:29,719 --> 00:35:32,879 Speaker 1: Venus and Mercury sending information back to us on Earth, 626 00:35:32,880 --> 00:35:36,040 Speaker 1: which is pretty darn cool. And Boeing would contribute components 627 00:35:36,080 --> 00:35:39,520 Speaker 1: to the Space Telescope Hubble as well. Would also continue 628 00:35:39,560 --> 00:35:42,560 Speaker 1: designing and building missiles for the military, like the a 629 00:35:42,800 --> 00:35:45,800 Speaker 1: l C m or air launched Cruise missile, which was 630 00:35:45,880 --> 00:35:48,560 Speaker 1: designed to fire from a Bowing B fifty two, originally 631 00:35:49,280 --> 00:35:51,600 Speaker 1: getting up to the nineteen eighties. Now Boeing would work 632 00:35:51,600 --> 00:35:54,160 Speaker 1: on components for the boosters used by the Space Shuttle. 633 00:35:54,800 --> 00:35:57,719 Speaker 1: It would also design and build major sections of the 634 00:35:57,719 --> 00:36:02,400 Speaker 1: International Space Station, would was an incredibly lucrative contract. A 635 00:36:02,440 --> 00:36:06,440 Speaker 1: division called Boeing Computer Services would produce software to be 636 00:36:06,560 --> 00:36:09,719 Speaker 1: used on the International Space Station. The company produced the 637 00:36:09,840 --> 00:36:14,000 Speaker 1: Chinook military helicopter as well at this time, and Boeing 638 00:36:14,160 --> 00:36:17,000 Speaker 1: was one of the companies working on the osprey, which 639 00:36:17,040 --> 00:36:20,200 Speaker 1: is a vertical takeoff and landing aircraft that has a 640 00:36:20,239 --> 00:36:23,200 Speaker 1: tilt rotor assembly. You've probably seen pictures of these, if 641 00:36:23,239 --> 00:36:25,880 Speaker 1: not one in person. It kind of looks like a 642 00:36:25,920 --> 00:36:28,719 Speaker 1: helicopter and kind of looks like a propeller plane. And 643 00:36:28,760 --> 00:36:32,520 Speaker 1: those tilt rotors actually can can angle to serve either 644 00:36:32,680 --> 00:36:35,920 Speaker 1: as a helicopter or an airplane. So you can have 645 00:36:36,000 --> 00:36:39,399 Speaker 1: it tilted so that they the propellers are facing up 646 00:36:39,800 --> 00:36:42,120 Speaker 1: and then do a vertical takeoff, and then you can 647 00:36:42,400 --> 00:36:46,839 Speaker 1: start to transition and tilt them in a more horizontal 648 00:36:47,680 --> 00:36:50,600 Speaker 1: wing position, and then with the propellers being ninety degrees 649 00:36:50,680 --> 00:36:53,279 Speaker 1: from that and turn it into essentially an airplane. I 650 00:36:53,320 --> 00:36:55,000 Speaker 1: have to do a full episode about the osprey at 651 00:36:55,040 --> 00:36:58,360 Speaker 1: some point because it's really an odd type of aircraft. 652 00:36:58,360 --> 00:37:01,040 Speaker 1: But it's also incredibly expensive and there was a lot 653 00:37:01,080 --> 00:37:04,400 Speaker 1: of controversy around it as well. But they're still ospray 654 00:37:04,520 --> 00:37:07,319 Speaker 1: aircraft in service today. That's more than thirty years after 655 00:37:07,320 --> 00:37:09,840 Speaker 1: Bowing first started working on them. Set it's impressive. In 656 00:37:09,840 --> 00:37:13,520 Speaker 1: the late nineteen eighties, Boeing built an unmanned aerial vehicle 657 00:37:13,640 --> 00:37:17,879 Speaker 1: called the Condor. This is a bigin has a wingspan 658 00:37:17,960 --> 00:37:21,680 Speaker 1: measuring two hundred five feet or sixty two meters, and 659 00:37:21,719 --> 00:37:26,000 Speaker 1: it has propellers for propulsion. It's not a jet drone, 660 00:37:26,360 --> 00:37:29,480 Speaker 1: it's it's a propeller drone. It looks kind of like 661 00:37:29,680 --> 00:37:34,840 Speaker 1: a very wide, like almost an unrealistically wide propeller plane. 662 00:37:35,440 --> 00:37:39,200 Speaker 1: It has an effective ceiling altitude of around seventy thousand 663 00:37:39,239 --> 00:37:42,319 Speaker 1: feet or twenty one thousand meters, and it can fly 664 00:37:42,480 --> 00:37:46,560 Speaker 1: completely under computer control from takeoff to landing. Only two 665 00:37:46,640 --> 00:37:49,080 Speaker 1: of them were ever built, and they were really meant 666 00:37:49,120 --> 00:37:52,960 Speaker 1: for Boeing to kind of research effective strategies for unmanned 667 00:37:53,000 --> 00:37:57,239 Speaker 1: aerial vehicles. In general, they weren't intended necessarily to be 668 00:37:57,320 --> 00:38:00,239 Speaker 1: production vehicles, and in fact, the military said there were 669 00:38:00,400 --> 00:38:03,400 Speaker 1: very few practical applications because they would be far too 670 00:38:03,480 --> 00:38:07,359 Speaker 1: vulnerable by to enemy attack if you were to try 671 00:38:07,360 --> 00:38:11,239 Speaker 1: and use them as reconnaissance vehicles. For example, Boeing was 672 00:38:11,280 --> 00:38:13,879 Speaker 1: involved in the design and production of the B two 673 00:38:13,960 --> 00:38:17,040 Speaker 1: stealth bomber, which was a top secret vehicle at the time. 674 00:38:17,080 --> 00:38:19,920 Speaker 1: I've talked about stealth technology and other episodes, so I'm 675 00:38:19,920 --> 00:38:22,200 Speaker 1: not going to go into detail here. It largely involves 676 00:38:22,239 --> 00:38:26,440 Speaker 1: creating surfaces with odd angles so the incoming radar waves 677 00:38:26,480 --> 00:38:29,719 Speaker 1: don't reflect back to the radar stations. But it gets 678 00:38:29,760 --> 00:38:31,640 Speaker 1: a little more compleated than that. But I've talked about 679 00:38:31,680 --> 00:38:35,239 Speaker 1: in previous episodes, Boeing and McDonald Douglas would get the 680 00:38:35,280 --> 00:38:37,680 Speaker 1: nod from NASA to lead R and D efforts into 681 00:38:37,719 --> 00:38:41,560 Speaker 1: the design of supersonic passenger aircraft, again, this time with 682 00:38:41,600 --> 00:38:44,520 Speaker 1: an eye to mitigate the challenges I mentioned earlier. This 683 00:38:44,560 --> 00:38:48,640 Speaker 1: is called the High Speed Civil Transport Project. And occasionally 684 00:38:48,680 --> 00:38:52,440 Speaker 1: you'll hear about various studies and ways to try and 685 00:38:52,480 --> 00:38:55,880 Speaker 1: do things like reduce or eliminate the sonic boom as 686 00:38:55,960 --> 00:38:58,160 Speaker 1: much as possible, which is tricky to do. It's hard 687 00:38:58,160 --> 00:39:02,440 Speaker 1: to fool physics. You ken in decrease its effect, it's 688 00:39:02,480 --> 00:39:05,759 Speaker 1: hard to get rid of it because air, you know, 689 00:39:05,880 --> 00:39:10,400 Speaker 1: nature still abhors a vacuum, so do I hate vacuuming. 690 00:39:10,840 --> 00:39:15,360 Speaker 1: In December nine, Boeing merged with Rockwell Aerospace, and Rockwell 691 00:39:15,400 --> 00:39:19,680 Speaker 1: became Boeing North American and it operated as a subsidiary company. 692 00:39:19,719 --> 00:39:23,880 Speaker 1: Also in August, Boeing would merge with its old competitor 693 00:39:24,320 --> 00:39:28,000 Speaker 1: McDonald Douglas. Harry Stone Cipher, who had been the CEO 694 00:39:28,040 --> 00:39:30,799 Speaker 1: of McDonald Douglas, would then come over to be the 695 00:39:30,920 --> 00:39:34,840 Speaker 1: Boeing president and the Boeing CEO and Chairman, Phil Condent 696 00:39:34,920 --> 00:39:38,359 Speaker 1: would remain at his role at the top. On September seven, 697 00:39:39,880 --> 00:39:42,680 Speaker 1: the f twenty two Raptor, which was based off an 698 00:39:42,680 --> 00:39:46,160 Speaker 1: experimental aircraft from a couple of years earlier, would make 699 00:39:46,239 --> 00:39:49,400 Speaker 1: its first flight. This is a high speed, stealth tactical 700 00:39:49,440 --> 00:39:51,840 Speaker 1: fighter and on that first flight it climbed to an 701 00:39:51,840 --> 00:39:54,560 Speaker 1: altitude of fifteen thousand feet in less than three minutes. 702 00:39:55,000 --> 00:39:58,560 Speaker 1: Boeing was responsible for several parts of this aircraft, but 703 00:39:58,680 --> 00:40:01,120 Speaker 1: it was working in a partner a ship with other companies, 704 00:40:01,160 --> 00:40:06,480 Speaker 1: including Lockheed, on this particular project. In Boeing would change 705 00:40:06,520 --> 00:40:09,600 Speaker 1: the name of the McDonald Douglas m d N that 706 00:40:09,640 --> 00:40:12,279 Speaker 1: I mentioned earlier, and when was the plane that had 707 00:40:12,320 --> 00:40:14,759 Speaker 1: not yet gone into production when Boeing had merged with 708 00:40:14,840 --> 00:40:18,239 Speaker 1: McDonald Douglas, and the new name was the seven seventeen, 709 00:40:18,560 --> 00:40:21,480 Speaker 1: So now it's the Boeing seven seventeen. In ninety nine, 710 00:40:21,560 --> 00:40:25,000 Speaker 1: Bowing landed a one point six billion dollar contract to 711 00:40:25,040 --> 00:40:27,920 Speaker 1: serve as the lead systems integrator for the National Missile 712 00:40:28,000 --> 00:40:31,680 Speaker 1: Defense Program. And there's a ton of other odds and 713 00:40:31,760 --> 00:40:35,440 Speaker 1: ends we could cover, like the Joint helmet mounted Queuing 714 00:40:35,560 --> 00:40:40,520 Speaker 1: system or the Joint Direct Attack Munition or j DAM platform, 715 00:40:40,680 --> 00:40:44,640 Speaker 1: or the rock and Roll satellites that Bowing produced for 716 00:40:44,880 --> 00:40:49,400 Speaker 1: XM satellite radio or the space launch complex at Cape Canaveral, 717 00:40:49,480 --> 00:40:53,080 Speaker 1: not to mention the various missiles and bombs and aircraft 718 00:40:53,120 --> 00:40:55,040 Speaker 1: that Boeing has worked on since two thousand for the 719 00:40:55,120 --> 00:40:58,839 Speaker 1: United States and other countries. But I'm running out of time, 720 00:40:59,200 --> 00:41:01,840 Speaker 1: and we still need to talk about the seven thirty 721 00:41:01,840 --> 00:41:06,200 Speaker 1: seven Max. Boeing announced this particular generation of its seven 722 00:41:06,239 --> 00:41:10,120 Speaker 1: thirty seven back in two thousand eleven, and they're very 723 00:41:10,160 --> 00:41:13,759 Speaker 1: similar in many ways in capacity to early generations of 724 00:41:13,800 --> 00:41:16,920 Speaker 1: the seven thirty seven, but in other ways they're very different. 725 00:41:17,239 --> 00:41:21,200 Speaker 1: The seven thirty seven Max aircraft received certification in two 726 00:41:21,200 --> 00:41:25,000 Speaker 1: thousand seventeen, staying the aircraft was suitable to enter into service. 727 00:41:25,239 --> 00:41:28,320 Speaker 1: But in October two thousand eighteen, a seven thirty seven 728 00:41:28,400 --> 00:41:33,440 Speaker 1: Max eight operated by Lion air Jet UH crashed into 729 00:41:33,640 --> 00:41:36,600 Speaker 1: the Java Sea off the coast of Indonesia less than 730 00:41:36,600 --> 00:41:39,440 Speaker 1: twenty minutes after it had taken off, with all aboard lost. 731 00:41:40,040 --> 00:41:42,319 Speaker 1: The cause appeared to be a problem with the flight 732 00:41:42,360 --> 00:41:45,640 Speaker 1: control system. More on that in a moment. On March tenth, 733 00:41:45,800 --> 00:41:49,919 Speaker 1: two thousand nineteen, and Ethiopian Airlines flight also a seven 734 00:41:50,000 --> 00:41:53,880 Speaker 1: thirty seven Max eight crashed less than ten minutes after 735 00:41:53,920 --> 00:41:56,480 Speaker 1: it had taken off from Addis Ababa. There were no 736 00:41:56,560 --> 00:42:01,360 Speaker 1: survivors in that crash either. Investigations are ongoing as of 737 00:42:01,360 --> 00:42:03,839 Speaker 1: the recording of this podcast, but in any case, the 738 00:42:03,880 --> 00:42:07,960 Speaker 1: global fleet of seven thirty seven Max aircraft is currently 739 00:42:08,000 --> 00:42:11,120 Speaker 1: grounded and may continue to be so for the rest 740 00:42:11,120 --> 00:42:14,080 Speaker 1: of twenty nineteen, and Boeing has stated that it may 741 00:42:14,120 --> 00:42:17,279 Speaker 1: soon need to slow or even halt production on the aircraft. 742 00:42:17,360 --> 00:42:21,800 Speaker 1: So what actually happened, Well, it's premature to say everything, 743 00:42:21,800 --> 00:42:25,080 Speaker 1: but we have some ideas now. Boeing has maintained that 744 00:42:25,080 --> 00:42:29,040 Speaker 1: the aircraft were designed properly and they were operating properly, 745 00:42:29,160 --> 00:42:32,440 Speaker 1: but that cruise were not following the correct procedures as 746 00:42:32,480 --> 00:42:35,839 Speaker 1: indicated by the flight manual. Pilots have stated that they 747 00:42:35,880 --> 00:42:39,000 Speaker 1: were not adequately informed of a new type of software 748 00:42:39,040 --> 00:42:42,080 Speaker 1: that was incorporated into the flight control system that may 749 00:42:42,080 --> 00:42:46,440 Speaker 1: have played a part in these accidents. So what's going on? Well, first, 750 00:42:46,440 --> 00:42:49,200 Speaker 1: it's helpful to know that the seven thirty seven Max 751 00:42:49,520 --> 00:42:53,120 Speaker 1: is different from earlier seven thirty seven aircraft in its construction. 752 00:42:53,520 --> 00:42:58,840 Speaker 1: The engines are different from earlier seven thirty seven aircraft, 753 00:42:59,280 --> 00:43:03,279 Speaker 1: and they are placed further forward and higher up on 754 00:43:03,400 --> 00:43:06,920 Speaker 1: the fuselage. And that changes the balance of the aircraft. 755 00:43:06,920 --> 00:43:09,880 Speaker 1: It actually creates a tendency for the seven thirty seven's 756 00:43:09,960 --> 00:43:13,680 Speaker 1: nose to start pointing upwards, starts to pitch up when 757 00:43:13,760 --> 00:43:16,799 Speaker 1: it's traveling at lower speeds, and this in turn can 758 00:43:16,880 --> 00:43:19,919 Speaker 1: lead to engines stalling out. They don't get enough air 759 00:43:19,920 --> 00:43:22,360 Speaker 1: in them, and then they stall, and then you're in 760 00:43:22,400 --> 00:43:25,680 Speaker 1: a real dangerous situation. And this is where the software 761 00:43:25,719 --> 00:43:30,560 Speaker 1: comes in. The software is called the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation 762 00:43:30,760 --> 00:43:34,040 Speaker 1: System or m CASTS, and the software detects when the 763 00:43:34,080 --> 00:43:37,200 Speaker 1: aircraft's nose is pointed upward at lower speeds. It has 764 00:43:37,520 --> 00:43:41,480 Speaker 1: sensors to detect the angle of attack, and if the 765 00:43:41,480 --> 00:43:44,920 Speaker 1: angle of attack is too great, it sends a command 766 00:43:45,080 --> 00:43:48,760 Speaker 1: to the horizontal stabilizers. They're at the tail of the plane. 767 00:43:49,120 --> 00:43:52,479 Speaker 1: The stabilizers tilt so that the aircraft will level out, 768 00:43:52,960 --> 00:43:56,880 Speaker 1: which supplies the air the engine's need for continuous operation 769 00:43:57,000 --> 00:44:01,080 Speaker 1: without stalling. So that's important. So in the case where 770 00:44:01,120 --> 00:44:04,400 Speaker 1: this aircraft is slowing down and it's just naturally the 771 00:44:04,480 --> 00:44:08,240 Speaker 1: noses creeping up, this computer system is supposed to account 772 00:44:08,280 --> 00:44:12,960 Speaker 1: for that. In the Lion air crash, here's what seems 773 00:44:13,000 --> 00:44:16,719 Speaker 1: to have happened the m casts incorrectly detected that the 774 00:44:16,760 --> 00:44:19,080 Speaker 1: nose of the aircraft was pointed too far upward and 775 00:44:19,080 --> 00:44:21,239 Speaker 1: the engines would be in dature of stalling, so it's 776 00:44:21,239 --> 00:44:25,160 Speaker 1: sent the command to the horizontal stabilizers, which tilted and 777 00:44:25,239 --> 00:44:29,160 Speaker 1: that caused the aircraft's nose to pitch downward, sending the 778 00:44:29,160 --> 00:44:31,520 Speaker 1: aircraft into a dive, and the crew were unable to 779 00:44:31,520 --> 00:44:34,720 Speaker 1: stop this malfunction or correct for it, and the plane crashed. 780 00:44:35,200 --> 00:44:38,319 Speaker 1: The same thing may have happened with the Ethiopian Airlines crash, 781 00:44:38,400 --> 00:44:41,000 Speaker 1: but that investigation is ongoing as of the recording of 782 00:44:41,040 --> 00:44:45,960 Speaker 1: this show. Now, I have seen several aviation industry experts 783 00:44:45,960 --> 00:44:47,680 Speaker 1: say that a big part of the issue is that 784 00:44:47,760 --> 00:44:52,120 Speaker 1: the seven seven Max is different enough from earlier seven 785 00:44:52,200 --> 00:44:54,840 Speaker 1: thirty seven models like the seven thirty seven in g 786 00:44:55,760 --> 00:44:59,720 Speaker 1: that it should necessitate an entirely new, distinct and thorough 787 00:45:00,080 --> 00:45:03,600 Speaker 1: highlot training program, and that a lot of airlines had 788 00:45:03,840 --> 00:45:08,760 Speaker 1: more casual training programs, like the kind you could complete 789 00:45:08,840 --> 00:45:13,759 Speaker 1: in an hour on a tablet, so that could be 790 00:45:13,800 --> 00:45:17,600 Speaker 1: a problem that might require much more extensive training for 791 00:45:17,800 --> 00:45:20,880 Speaker 1: pilots so they can familiarize themselves with the changes in 792 00:45:20,920 --> 00:45:23,560 Speaker 1: the seven thirty seven max before piloting the newer aircraft. 793 00:45:23,880 --> 00:45:27,320 Speaker 1: In addition, newspapers like The New York Times have investigated 794 00:45:27,360 --> 00:45:29,799 Speaker 1: the f a A and have come to the conclusion 795 00:45:29,880 --> 00:45:33,200 Speaker 1: that that agency is not well enough equipped to perform 796 00:45:33,239 --> 00:45:37,560 Speaker 1: adequate testing and certification procedures on aircraft in general, which 797 00:45:37,600 --> 00:45:41,000 Speaker 1: allows the possibility of malfunctions and mistakes to make their 798 00:45:41,040 --> 00:45:45,040 Speaker 1: way through the certification process because there's just not enough 799 00:45:45,800 --> 00:45:50,359 Speaker 1: funding and expertise to detect all of these, and that 800 00:45:50,480 --> 00:45:54,200 Speaker 1: means that you could have potentially tragic consequences. Boeing Bird's 801 00:45:54,239 --> 00:45:57,240 Speaker 1: part began working on a software patch to address problems 802 00:45:57,239 --> 00:46:01,279 Speaker 1: with the m casts pretty much immediately, and this was 803 00:46:01,400 --> 00:46:04,640 Speaker 1: made more difficult, the company said, because it's simulators were 804 00:46:04,680 --> 00:46:07,720 Speaker 1: unable to replicate the problems that the actual production aircraft 805 00:46:07,760 --> 00:46:11,600 Speaker 1: were experiencing. But the updated software, which puts measures into 806 00:46:11,600 --> 00:46:15,040 Speaker 1: place to prevent the m CAST system from activating prematurely, 807 00:46:15,640 --> 00:46:19,200 Speaker 1: has been completed and as I record this episode, it's 808 00:46:19,280 --> 00:46:24,120 Speaker 1: essentially awaiting f a A certification for distribution. So in 809 00:46:24,160 --> 00:46:28,320 Speaker 1: other words, the company says that they found a fix 810 00:46:28,480 --> 00:46:32,000 Speaker 1: for the issue and it just has to make sure 811 00:46:32,040 --> 00:46:36,680 Speaker 1: that the certification um agrees and that they can then 812 00:46:36,800 --> 00:46:39,759 Speaker 1: distribute it to all the aircraft. As I record this, 813 00:46:40,000 --> 00:46:42,560 Speaker 1: the future of the seven seven Max is in doubt. 814 00:46:42,760 --> 00:46:45,920 Speaker 1: There's the possibility that Boeing might have to scrap production 815 00:46:46,120 --> 00:46:49,880 Speaker 1: on that jet entirely. There are hundreds of outstanding orders 816 00:46:49,880 --> 00:46:53,040 Speaker 1: that could be canceled. It's possible that airlines would rather 817 00:46:53,120 --> 00:46:56,040 Speaker 1: look at alternatives than stick with the seven thirty seven Max, 818 00:46:56,160 --> 00:46:59,239 Speaker 1: even with software updates and training programs to help fix 819 00:46:59,280 --> 00:47:03,080 Speaker 1: these previous problem because now the seven thirty seven Max 820 00:47:03,160 --> 00:47:05,879 Speaker 1: has a very negative association with it, and so it's 821 00:47:05,880 --> 00:47:07,960 Speaker 1: hard to get away from that. It's hard to tell 822 00:47:08,000 --> 00:47:12,040 Speaker 1: passengers no, no, everything's fine now if, especially with the 823 00:47:12,080 --> 00:47:16,399 Speaker 1: amount of reporting then has happened on this issue, uh, 824 00:47:16,760 --> 00:47:19,600 Speaker 1: I think it's reasonable to say that a lot of 825 00:47:19,600 --> 00:47:23,080 Speaker 1: people would have reservations about getting on that type of plane, 826 00:47:23,840 --> 00:47:26,000 Speaker 1: even if they were told that things have been worked 827 00:47:26,000 --> 00:47:29,759 Speaker 1: out since the accidents. It's an ugly thing to see 828 00:47:29,800 --> 00:47:32,439 Speaker 1: it happened. I mean, obviously it's a tragedy and it's 829 00:47:32,560 --> 00:47:35,839 Speaker 1: terrible that people lost their lives in this. Uh. It's 830 00:47:35,880 --> 00:47:39,799 Speaker 1: also frustrating to see the blame game going around. I 831 00:47:39,840 --> 00:47:43,960 Speaker 1: don't honestly know ultimately who is to blame. Boeing says 832 00:47:44,040 --> 00:47:48,160 Speaker 1: that they felt the Flying Manual had all the information 833 00:47:48,200 --> 00:47:52,319 Speaker 1: needed to deal with these kind of situations. Pilots say 834 00:47:52,400 --> 00:47:55,399 Speaker 1: they weren't even really told about the m casts UH 835 00:47:55,560 --> 00:47:59,279 Speaker 1: software on the flying control system. I don't know who 836 00:47:59,320 --> 00:48:01,640 Speaker 1: to believe, UH. I just know it is a tragedy 837 00:48:01,960 --> 00:48:04,719 Speaker 1: and that things have to be fixed for people to 838 00:48:04,760 --> 00:48:07,960 Speaker 1: have at least the confidence that these aircraft can go 839 00:48:08,040 --> 00:48:13,800 Speaker 1: back into service safely. And that concludes our little series 840 00:48:13,840 --> 00:48:16,240 Speaker 1: on Boeing. As I said, I skipped over a ton 841 00:48:16,520 --> 00:48:19,200 Speaker 1: of stuff in this episode, and I apologize for that. 842 00:48:19,280 --> 00:48:21,640 Speaker 1: If you had a favorite Bowing story that I didn't 843 00:48:21,640 --> 00:48:23,839 Speaker 1: get to. But if you do have things you would 844 00:48:23,880 --> 00:48:25,799 Speaker 1: like me to talk about, whether it's about Boeing or 845 00:48:25,880 --> 00:48:28,279 Speaker 1: anything else, get in touch with me. You can send 846 00:48:28,280 --> 00:48:30,880 Speaker 1: me an email the addresses tech stuff at how stuff 847 00:48:30,880 --> 00:48:33,319 Speaker 1: works dot com, or you can pop on over to 848 00:48:33,320 --> 00:48:37,360 Speaker 1: our website that's tech stuff podcast dot com. You're gonna 849 00:48:37,360 --> 00:48:39,759 Speaker 1: find an archive of all of our old episodes. You'll 850 00:48:39,800 --> 00:48:42,360 Speaker 1: find links to where we are on social media. You 851 00:48:42,440 --> 00:48:44,879 Speaker 1: also find a link to our online store, where every 852 00:48:44,880 --> 00:48:47,120 Speaker 1: purchase you make goes to help the show. We greatly 853 00:48:47,120 --> 00:48:51,040 Speaker 1: appreciate it, and I'll talk to you again really soon. 854 00:48:55,480 --> 00:48:57,719 Speaker 1: Tech Stuff is a production of I heart Radio's How 855 00:48:57,760 --> 00:49:01,279 Speaker 1: Stuff Works. For more podcasts from heart Radio, visit the 856 00:49:01,280 --> 00:49:04,600 Speaker 1: I heart Radio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen 857 00:49:04,640 --> 00:49:10,239 Speaker 1: to your favorite shows. H