Speaker 1: Masters in Business is brought to you by the American
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Speaker 1: for over ninety years. Learn more at a d R
Speaker 1: dot org. This is Masters in Business with Barry Ridholts
Speaker 1: on Bloomberg Radio. Hey, welcome to Masters in Business. We
Speaker 1: have a special extra podcast this week. I went to
Speaker 1: one of the m t A, the Market Technicians Association's
Speaker 1: conferences earlier this spring, where I got to sit down
Speaker 1: with a legend of technical analysis. Alan Shaw is really
Speaker 1: everybody's favorite UH technician. There are so many people whose
Speaker 1: entire careers trace back to Alan Shaw. He was the
Speaker 1: founder of the m t A. He was somebody who
Speaker 1: just helped get so many balls rolling in the world
Speaker 1: of training and in the world of technical analysis. Many
Speaker 1: many people owe a debt of gratitude for their expertise
Speaker 1: and their careers to him. A super nice guy. I
Speaker 1: think he's eighty four eighty two, sharp as attack, very witty.
Speaker 1: This was in a in a conference event. It was
Speaker 1: the two of us sitting in front of a few
Speaker 1: hundred people, so it's not the usual format when you
Speaker 1: get a guy like that and he wants to just
Speaker 1: tell a story, telling an anecdote, and meander, Hey, it's
Speaker 1: not up to me to interrupt him and keep him
Speaker 1: on a broadcast schedule. All I did was just kind
Speaker 1: of poke and privade and trying to keep him going.
Speaker 1: And it was really only about forty five minutes or
Speaker 1: so of conversation. If you are at all interested in
Speaker 1: technical analysis or market history, or if you just like
Speaker 1: the thoughts of the guy who called the greatest bonds
Speaker 1: market rally and in history, dead on a very outlier
Speaker 1: contrarian call, and who continued to get it right. It
Speaker 1: wasn't just one lucky call. He was pretty dead on
Speaker 1: and stayed then on for a long time. Then I
Speaker 1: think you're gonna enjoy this conversation, So our special extra
Speaker 1: holiday weekend podcast, my mt A Events Conversation with Alan Shaw.
Speaker 1: Let me start with a really interesting question. I've I've
Speaker 1: spoken to a number of technicians, and many of them
Speaker 1: have noted that they began on the fundamental side before
Speaker 1: switching to technicals. Tell us about how that transition, that
Speaker 1: evolution took place with your self. I'm gonna make a
Speaker 1: very long story as short as I can. We got
Speaker 1: four hours. First of all, it's a real, real pleasure
Speaker 1: to be here with you all, and thank you for
Speaker 1: showing your interests in all this. The first thing I
Speaker 1: had to do is flunk out of college. Um My
Speaker 1: father when he read the note that I was no
Speaker 1: longer wanted back. This was a school in central Pennsylvania
Speaker 1: called Susquehanna University, he said, Sonny said, you'll never be
Speaker 1: You don't know what success is unless you fail every
Speaker 1: now and again. I don't know. Forget that and uh.
Speaker 1: He came home from work the next day with a
Speaker 1: help wanted to add from the Wall Street Journal, and
Speaker 1: I answered the ad. I went into the city to
Speaker 1: the Newall Street Journal's headquarters here and they they hired
Speaker 1: me as a glorified salesman. The Wall Street Journal was
Speaker 1: then expanding its business, uh from being you know, with
Speaker 1: just a Wall Street type paper to being a you know,
Speaker 1: a daily uh and reporting on the real news and
Speaker 1: this and that. And I would go around to brokerage
Speaker 1: firms and asked to speak to the manager of the
Speaker 1: office or whatever and try to sell subscriptions. One day
Speaker 1: I found myself in Washington, d C. Wall Street Journal
Speaker 1: has just opened their brand new plant there on fourteenth Street.
Speaker 1: And I walked into an office of a broker's firm
Speaker 1: called Harris Upham, and I had to speak to the manager,
Speaker 1: Edwin Bastaball his name was, And he said, young man,
Speaker 1: you're a pretty damn good salesman. We can use people
Speaker 1: like you in our business. I'm going to give you
Speaker 1: my card and make may get you an appointment up
Speaker 1: at our main office and one twenty Broadway in New York,
Speaker 1: and I'd like you to follow through so lo and behold.
Speaker 1: I went to one twenty Broadway, a few blocks away
Speaker 1: from here one day in nineteen fifty eight, and UH
Speaker 1: asked to see the fellow who's in hot in charge
Speaker 1: of trainees, and I was escorted in to see a
Speaker 1: gentleman by the name of Henry You Harris Jr. Who
Speaker 1: was the son of the senior partner. Henry was a
Speaker 1: partner himself. UM, wonderful guy. And he said, well, you
Speaker 1: don't have a college degree. UM, I don't hold that
Speaker 1: against you. I said, Oh, don't worry about Henry. I'm
Speaker 1: going to school at night now. And I was that
Speaker 1: actually going out to Adelifi trying to get caught up.
Speaker 1: That's that's a hello test to do night school, and
Speaker 1: he said, let me check it. I got home that
Speaker 1: day there was a call waiting for me from Henry
Speaker 1: that there was an opening in the research department, and
Speaker 1: I said, I'll take it, and I did. I went
Speaker 1: to work. They showed me this little death the desk,
Speaker 1: about this wide one column of draws on the right
Speaker 1: hand side. And I was really in a clerical role
Speaker 1: helping out some of the senior people there. But I
Speaker 1: was introduced to a gentleman name of Ralph, Ralph Rottenham
Speaker 1: who was at that time the president of New York
Speaker 1: Society Security Analysts. Right. Ralph was my mentor. I mean,
Speaker 1: he was the greatest walking living historian. He could tell
Speaker 1: you what happened to the market after the battleship, mean
Speaker 1: was sunk when a moment's notice uh edible guy uh
Speaker 1: and uh Harri stuptam was set up in a way
Speaker 1: that uh, I have to tell you about my first paycheck.
Speaker 1: Um this this is a real that's a real joke.
Speaker 1: I mean I saw people getting these yellow pieces of
Speaker 1: paper every two week and I wasn't getting one yet.
Speaker 1: And uh. Long Behold. They got me to the accounting
Speaker 1: department and I got one those yellow pieces of paper
Speaker 1: and I figured out my salary was fifty eight dollars
Speaker 1: a week as my starting Sorry, I still have that
Speaker 1: check pretax. Uh it's funny pre tax. Yeah, uh, it
Speaker 1: was funny. So Harri Stupple had a research department that
Speaker 1: was like oh others, mainly with people specializing in the
Speaker 1: steel industry, aluminium industry, you know, specialized analysts. But there
Speaker 1: was one one slot missing. They didn't have a consumer
Speaker 1: consumer undurable analyst like foods, tobacco, soft drinks. And I
Speaker 1: I was. I was Ralph Frodden's assistant now to see,
Speaker 1: I was doing his relative strength work. This was my
Speaker 1: first come puter. Still have it to this day, that
Speaker 1: old wooden slide rule. The only thing missing is a
Speaker 1: little slide that goes on and that fell off many
Speaker 1: years ago somewhere. Uh. And I asked Ralph, I said,
Speaker 1: you know, can I have a hand at this? I said,
Speaker 1: I I madeed in accounting, even though I didn't go
Speaker 1: back and go back for my second year, but I
Speaker 1: love the course and I know what five phone life
Speaker 1: will mean. Um, could could you give me a could
Speaker 1: you could I possibly have a chance of following the
Speaker 1: food in the treat he said, And he said, well, okay,
Speaker 1: you sure about that? And I said, yes, I'm sure
Speaker 1: about it, and so he he let me off on
Speaker 1: my own. I did research, but upon research, upon research,
Speaker 1: upon research, and the end result was the published publishing
Speaker 1: of my very first research report in September nine until
Speaker 1: the Harris up them heading at the top investment opportunities
Speaker 1: of the food industry, and we tried our best to
Speaker 1: put forth why these stocks we should be looked upon
Speaker 1: as growth stocks and not widow and often income stocks
Speaker 1: because there was an item coming into the industry called
Speaker 1: convenience foods. As a matter of fact, I had a
Speaker 1: whole paragraph about a guy named Clarence Bird's Eye. There
Speaker 1: was actually a guy named Bird's Eye, you know, who
Speaker 1: invented the frozen food. And the profit margins on each
Speaker 1: products were exhorbernant. It was amazing, and most of it
Speaker 1: was a little going down to the bottom line, and
Speaker 1: I highlighted all of that in this report. Just scats
Speaker 1: and scats of companies recommended because there are so many
Speaker 1: of them, from general Foods to Hershey Chocolate to Bury biscuit.
Speaker 1: I mean names that are no longer around, some of
Speaker 1: them now. Little did I know at the time that
Speaker 1: my report was being published during a stock market cycle
Speaker 1: which was heavily favoring consuming no durable stocks. Within the
Speaker 1: next year, every stock in this report, if it didn't double,
Speaker 1: it tripled. I was an instant here with the research
Speaker 1: to problem. This was so funny. I mean, really, I
Speaker 1: still was only making seventy dollars a week. But no, nevertheless,
Speaker 1: Uh but Ralph, ralphacka poor Ralph Rottenham communed with a
Speaker 1: fellow by the name of Jim Morgan from Princeton every day.
Speaker 1: Jim Morgan was ahead of a firm called Morgan, Rogers
Speaker 1: and Roberts, which was headquartered at one forty Broadway More
Speaker 1: and Rogers and robertson those days were the purveyors a
Speaker 1: point and figure data, point and figure numbers to make
Speaker 1: point and figure charts. And they had a chap on
Speaker 1: their step by the name of Alexander H. Wheeland, who
Speaker 1: had just published a booklet called Study Helps and Pointing
Speaker 1: Figure Technique. Ralph had received a copy from Jim Morgan
Speaker 1: this one morning on the train, and I'm bringing him
Speaker 1: in his daily data, you know, he did overboard over
Speaker 1: Soul that was always giving him his numbers, trying to
Speaker 1: do all this work too. And he said, Allen, I
Speaker 1: got this this morning. You might fin might find that interesting.
Speaker 1: I said, oh my god, Ralph, I mean, well, there's
Speaker 1: tit tattoo stuff, you know. He said, well, read it
Speaker 1: to see what you think. Well. I found this book fascinating,
Speaker 1: absolutely fascinating, so fascinating that I traveled over to one
Speaker 1: forty Broadway, which obviously was next door to one twenty
Speaker 1: Broadway where I was, and I introduced myself to Jim Morgan.
Speaker 1: I told him I wasn't making much money at this point,
Speaker 1: but was it possible that he could give me some
Speaker 1: copies of point and figure charts like General Foods, Stokely,
Speaker 1: Van Camp, National Dairy Products, all the names of those days.
Speaker 1: He said, I'd be happy to And I said, well,
Speaker 1: could you also supply me with the price change service
Speaker 1: that I need to keep these charts up to date
Speaker 1: every day? And he said, well, I'll have to talk
Speaker 1: to your boss about that, because that does cost money.
Speaker 1: But I didn't wear Ralph to know that I was
Speaker 1: keeping these charts. You know, this is the voodoo stuff
Speaker 1: because supposedly so. I started in plodding away making one
Speaker 1: point reversal charts of all the stocks that were in
Speaker 1: my report. And finally in the first half of nineteen
Speaker 1: and the last half from nineteen sixty one, a year
Speaker 1: or so after the publication of the report, I started
Speaker 1: to see patterns emerge in these stocks on the charts.
Speaker 1: Now in Alexander Willem's book, on page twelve he had
Speaker 1: a page of pattern identification, and he had a calm
Speaker 1: called tops and a calm call bottoms. And I started
Speaker 1: to look at my patterns. I said, my god, this
Speaker 1: is this is making a top and and and I
Speaker 1: said to myself, how can this be? Well, my earnings
Speaker 1: estimates are coming through, stocks are doing you know, those
Speaker 1: stocks are all up because there was a key right there.
Speaker 1: I can't go down unless you're going up. Um. And
Speaker 1: I walked into Ralph's office and I said, Ralph, I
Speaker 1: haven't missioned. I pulled out the charts to behind my back.
Speaker 1: I've been keeping these in my desk drawer. That's my
Speaker 1: knuckles onn saw um. And to look at these patterns
Speaker 1: this book, you see the stock is topping out. He said, well, allan.
Speaker 1: He said, maybe you're about to learn something which I
Speaker 1: hope you'll never forget. You're gonna learn how to operate
Speaker 1: a company from its stock. Well I was so taken back.
Speaker 1: What are you talking about, Ralph? Are you telling me
Speaker 1: that the stock might go up? And even though the
Speaker 1: company's earnings, don't you know to separate the company from
Speaker 1: its stock? And then the key phrase came out, barometer
Speaker 1: and at a thermometer. Never forgot all these things, uh,
Speaker 1: marcus a discounting function, uh, and all the stuff I
Speaker 1: learned from him. So I said, well, do you have
Speaker 1: an objection if I put out a lighten up all
Speaker 1: wires to the branch offices since there are so many
Speaker 1: much profits in here. See that's what that was our terminology,
Speaker 1: not sell right, lighten up. So I sent out what
Speaker 1: we called those days, an all wire message to all
Speaker 1: the fifty two branches plus Geneva of Harris Upham uh
Speaker 1: with a with a with a of course, this this
Speaker 1: was the basis of it original report. These stocks have
Speaker 1: all gone up there starting to look a little suspicious
Speaker 1: on the ape. We have no objection if your clients
Speaker 1: want to lighten up. Well, ladies and gentlemen. This was
Speaker 1: in late in nineteen sixty two. We had this incredible
Speaker 1: bear market, as you all remember, which finished with the
Speaker 1: Southern climax of the Kennedy confronting the steel industry for
Speaker 1: raising prices in May of that year. My stocks collapsed,
Speaker 1: Every one of them collapsed. Now, how did I know
Speaker 1: that forty five times earnings was expensive? For general Foods?
Speaker 1: Had never sold it before? You say, I had no
Speaker 1: historical evidence to go back and say, we'll see what
Speaker 1: happened in int or whatever. You know, So I didn't
Speaker 1: know until afterwards. And you know what, of course, sixty
Speaker 1: two was called a pe adjustment. Can you imagine going
Speaker 1: to a client, a broker, You've just been wiped out, Barry,
Speaker 1: It's just a pe justice, don't worry about it. They'll
Speaker 1: come back. So at that point was the key for me.
Speaker 1: Let me ask you a question about clients. I heard
Speaker 1: a rumor. I'm gonna read this to make sure I
Speaker 1: don't get it wrong. Back in the sixties and seventies,
Speaker 1: you would do technical analysis knowing that clients might not
Speaker 1: be enamored of it, and so you would have to
Speaker 1: go out after you made your technical decision and find
Speaker 1: fundamental reasons to put like ornaments on a Christmas tree
Speaker 1: in order to sell the call to the client. True
Speaker 1: or false? Well, that's not entirely true, is it partly true?
Speaker 1: Is it a little bit true? It's a little bit
Speaker 1: true in this way. Uh. I began to run for
Speaker 1: the private clients side a master list. It started harris
Speaker 1: up them. We would recommend stocks based mostly on their
Speaker 1: technical potentials. And I would indeed at least get a
Speaker 1: yellow sheet in front of me to make sure I
Speaker 1: had had earrings. Um. And you know I wasn't going
Speaker 1: into the tube fundamentally, and I could get that from
Speaker 1: a little in a brief paragraph that was on top
Speaker 1: of the S and P l um, So I feel
Speaker 1: better about it. Um. So there's truth from that point
Speaker 1: of view. Because we'd follow up the recommendation until the
Speaker 1: day we got out of it, and we would keep
Speaker 1: a track. We actually had a long In fact, the
Speaker 1: publication that went out with a record of the transactions
Speaker 1: was longer than the actual recommend recommendations themselves and in size.
Speaker 1: So yes, at that point we would do that just
Speaker 1: to check out. So so Ralph famously said, fundamentals tell
Speaker 1: you what to buy technicals tell you when very very
Speaker 1: well done, very well done. Okay, so let's move on
Speaker 1: from that. Um, you said something earlier. I want to revisit.
Speaker 1: How could these stocks be making tops when the fundamental
Speaker 1: news is right online and earnings are coming in for
Speaker 1: all these companies. It doesn't make any sense. So how
Speaker 1: did you make the transition from that to, oh, the
Speaker 1: market's a future discounting that news? Well, I remember the
Speaker 1: story about the stockholder who raised his hand at the
Speaker 1: annual meeting and he and he asked the president. He said, Sarah,
Speaker 1: how's the business. The president said to him, we couldn't
Speaker 1: be better. So the guy ran on the phone called
Speaker 1: its broker and sold all the stock and the broker said,
Speaker 1: what are you happening? Said, the president just told me
Speaker 1: the business couldn't be better. So you see that. That's
Speaker 1: the same thing you say, is is he really tie
Speaker 1: it together? It's the same thing. I mean. Stocks can
Speaker 1: top out when the business couldn't be better, like they
Speaker 1: will bottom that out when the business couldn't be worse. Uh. Fear, greed, greed, fear,
Speaker 1: you know all that stuff. It all plays into that psychology,
Speaker 1: which is what about what we study now? We call
Speaker 1: behavioral finance. I love it. It's all part of reading
Speaker 1: a chart to a great degree. So let me give
Speaker 1: you another quote from Tom Dorsey. The core advantage is
Speaker 1: that point and figure chart is strictly tied to the
Speaker 1: irrefutable law of supply and demn It takes volatility totally
Speaker 1: out of the question. The equation unquotes how does someone
Speaker 1: know when to use point and figure charts versus traditional chart?
Speaker 1: That's very good, Barry, only because of my experience. I
Speaker 1: would tell you as I did in the other interviews,
Speaker 1: if you want to be a point and figure advocate,
Speaker 1: start with the one point reversal. Learn how to make
Speaker 1: the one point reversal. That's like looking at a short
Speaker 1: term to intermediate term trend as it unfolds. If the
Speaker 1: twenty dollar stock becomes a fifty or sixty dollar stock,
Speaker 1: you now I mean being invited to condense it into
Speaker 1: a three point reversal. You see, point figure is so versatile.
Speaker 1: If you start with the one point reversal and then
Speaker 1: make a three point reversal, a pattern that was this
Speaker 1: wide perhaps can become this wide for the same time period.
Speaker 1: And then point and figure also allows you to condense
Speaker 1: the vertical. Let's say you get a really high priced stock,
Speaker 1: make it a ten unit shart or a five unit chart.
Speaker 1: It's gotta go up and down five points before you
Speaker 1: put in that X. And you can see you can
Speaker 1: reduce your horizontal and your vertical, which we would do
Speaker 1: particularly in the high flying days in the sixties and
Speaker 1: fifty fifty with Avon and all those kinds of names.
Speaker 1: Um oh, let me share some of these stories with
Speaker 1: you get a kick out of it. We've built a
Speaker 1: very strong relationship with Morgan Guarantee Trust um Trust department.
Speaker 1: They they like every other institution in the city, alot
Speaker 1: to the gazill with Avon products. I know, I forget
Speaker 1: the day I walked from one to one from sixth Avenue,
Speaker 1: which was one our officers there, over to their office
Speaker 1: on fifty seven Street with the Avon Products chart in
Speaker 1: my black pocket and I walked into the head of
Speaker 1: the investment manager and I covered up the name of
Speaker 1: the stock. Yea, I said, look at the stock. Uh,
Speaker 1: would you be a buyer here or a seller here?
Speaker 1: And of course I asked you if you're it's gonna
Speaker 1: be a seller as assumes as you own it. Um,
Speaker 1: you can't sell something you don't own. But just give
Speaker 1: me an answer one or the other. Would you be
Speaker 1: a buyer or a seller? He said, I don't think
Speaker 1: I'd be a buyer, not in a stock that's how
Speaker 1: to run like this. I said, how about a seller?
Speaker 1: He said, well, there's not enough evidence of that. And
Speaker 1: I said, well, look carefully at how all these rallies
Speaker 1: I had the one point shot. See how all these
Speaker 1: rallies are failing to get higher. A rally that fails
Speaker 1: to break out is selling into strength, like a decline
Speaker 1: that fails to break down is buying into weakness. That's
Speaker 1: where the point and figure shigns through and giving you
Speaker 1: the feeling of supply and demand distribution, virtuals accumulation. And
Speaker 1: uh So he looked at this and I said, you
Speaker 1: know what, I said, entertain me and sell half of
Speaker 1: your million chats and see what happens. And he did.
Speaker 1: And that was the That was the end of Avon products.
Speaker 1: We just couldn't see it going up anymore. It wasn't
Speaker 1: that we could possibly see major risk yet, but it
Speaker 1: just didn't show any reward potential. So that's a great story.
Speaker 1: I used to do this a lot. I mean I'll
Speaker 1: tell you the time I went to a major mutual
Speaker 1: fund in Boston. I'm gonna mentioned the name, and uh,
Speaker 1: I don't. I didn't. I didn't see many people here.
Speaker 1: It's not it's not yours, David. Uh and uh. All
Speaker 1: the managers were sitting around table, and I would go
Speaker 1: in with the charts without beings on them. And uh.
Speaker 1: Just one time I sat there and I had the
Speaker 1: guts to put these charts up on the wall. They
Speaker 1: were in the technology field in the sixties, late sixties,
Speaker 1: early seventies, whatever, and uh, and I'd say, just simply,
Speaker 1: would you own these stocks? No hand went up and
Speaker 1: as East would put if they were forming frowns. She
Speaker 1: liked to buy smiles. These were falling frowns. And one
Speaker 1: guy got so pissed upset at me. He came up
Speaker 1: and he took me to the doors, let me to
Speaker 1: the elevator, and he said, get out of here. I
Speaker 1: never want to see you again. And the salesman sat there,
Speaker 1: but will then, what am I gonna do? My analyst
Speaker 1: is being thrown out of here. And the salesman came
Speaker 1: to me. I said, Dave, we're gonna be right, We're
Speaker 1: gonna be right. Look at this. They threw me out.
Speaker 1: They're overweighted in these stocks and there's no way they're
Speaker 1: not going up anymore. And we were right. I never
Speaker 1: if forget that meaning. So you mentioned earlier. You mentioned
Speaker 1: earlier behavioral pyschology and behavioral finance. What does this say
Speaker 1: about portfolio manager's ability to be objective if he doesn't
Speaker 1: want to sell his stock, but if he's looking at
Speaker 1: a chart without the name on it, he has a
Speaker 1: very different read of it. Well, I don't know, it's it.
Speaker 1: Sometimes you can be over informed, right, maybe just the
Speaker 1: reality of the chot picture. If you've got the understanding
Speaker 1: and you gain the feel, and let's face it, you
Speaker 1: won't know this experienced people. Do you feel the supply
Speaker 1: and demand when you keep your charts to your studies,
Speaker 1: whether it's by the computer or by hand. I have
Speaker 1: staff that kept up our three four hundred as it was,
Speaker 1: pointing figure charts every day. But I would slip in
Speaker 1: and and take two or three books myself as many
Speaker 1: mornings as I could, because the thing I love to
Speaker 1: do is actually see what is really going on and
Speaker 1: update these charts. Letting someone else do it wasn't really
Speaker 1: benefiting me at all. Do you do you think technology
Speaker 1: has had a negative impact, that you lose something when
Speaker 1: you're no longer doing it by hands. Very there's probably
Speaker 1: a lot to be said for that. I mean, you know,
Speaker 1: I I'm a I'm a peculiar person in the sense
Speaker 1: that I came in with a doubt four hundred five
Speaker 1: d ninety eight and left when it was uh in
Speaker 1: the well over ten thousand. I lived through the greatest
Speaker 1: and participated in the greatest bull market and history if
Speaker 1: you think about it, um, So a lot of my
Speaker 1: leanings are not going to be akin to now. We're
Speaker 1: in an entirely different cycle. Obviously, I personally think you're
Speaker 1: in another major bully move now, um that hasn't shown
Speaker 1: any signs of correcting. And we got to do this
Speaker 1: conversation before. If you're studying the market today, throw out
Speaker 1: your linear charts. You need geometric charts, you need semi
Speaker 1: log graphs. That last night, I was getting ready to
Speaker 1: go out to dinner with Ralph and and the TV
Speaker 1: on this woman it could have been a guide and
Speaker 1: as a matter of the person was complaining that the
Speaker 1: market was down forty somebod points and it was crashing.
Speaker 1: How disappointing after being up two hundred down forty and
Speaker 1: I said, my god, one it was five hundred forty
Speaker 1: points was crashing, But not when it's twenty thousand. That's amazing.
Speaker 1: There's no grasp of reality, if you will, where are
Speaker 1: we in the whole thing? That's why I love log shots.
Speaker 1: I mean, and you just stepped back and and take
Speaker 1: a look. Really fun, Let's let's let's talk about um
Speaker 1: the number one you mentioned five hundred. Let's look about
Speaker 1: a hundred and a thousand you reference, and I'm assuming
Speaker 1: this is in the sixty eight two period. The Dow
Speaker 1: tried to get over a thousand repeatedly, I think you
Speaker 1: said seventeen times and failed. And you went back in
Speaker 1: the history books and you looked at a hundred and
Speaker 1: lo and behold something similar. Very that was that? That
Speaker 1: that that? Thank you to bring that up, because, as
Speaker 1: I said, that was my last piece of research that
Speaker 1: I published, and it was a joy to do. I
Speaker 1: love going back looking at historic pictures. And that's exactly.
Speaker 1: My god. I had the books, all the stuff there
Speaker 1: in the room, but the study fell apart. I retired
Speaker 1: in two thousand four. Study a part really in the
Speaker 1: bear mark at two thousand seven eight, more so in
Speaker 1: the recovery, because we're not supposed to be through ten
Speaker 1: yet in a material way. But the final the final
Speaker 1: sentence did say that the next major secular uptrend won't
Speaker 1: become really visible in two thousand eighteen, will become visible
Speaker 1: in that pots on track. But what happened in the
Speaker 1: jiggles in between didn't seem too to work out correctly.
Speaker 1: So so there's no significance about base ten numbers ten
Speaker 1: hundred of thousand. Well that was all psychological anyway, you know,
Speaker 1: But it was a fun exercise, Okay, it gave me
Speaker 1: something to talk about. So everything you use, all of
Speaker 1: your indicators, all your strategies, all of that is publicly
Speaker 1: available to anybody who wants, right, anybody wants to do
Speaker 1: the work. What made your approach to technico analysis stands out?
Speaker 1: And how much of it was art and how much
Speaker 1: of it was sorry, very good, Please put the first
Speaker 1: page up first. I know, really do this myself, but
Speaker 1: I'm not a member of the union. Don't let me
Speaker 1: do it now. The first page, the very first page,
Speaker 1: the title, the title, the cover, No, not that this
Speaker 1: one our technical bull case for bonds written in what
Speaker 1: year May. Based on our technical analysis, we believe that
Speaker 1: a structural bullmarket is underway for bonds. We believe the shorter,
Speaker 1: immediate and long term in the cave is allowing the
Speaker 1: best bond bet to be made and possibly the entire
Speaker 1: investment career of the reader. Where's the heads there? Okay,
Speaker 1: tell me that there's Oh, we're always hedging. We strongly
Speaker 1: suggest that balance institutional and private investor portfolios contain a
Speaker 1: larger than here to four prudent bond position. We believe
Speaker 1: that representation is blah blah blah. This strenths is being published.
Speaker 1: Billity is a thought provoking document even the world's smartest
Speaker 1: man couldn't project with empirical climate collect there's the references
Speaker 1: we make. Technical analysis helps uncovered friends that leave the
Speaker 1: curious mind to explore the explanation. That's the spirit of
Speaker 1: the report. Now, in order to get our point across,
Speaker 1: I'm going to show you the best proprietary indicator for
Speaker 1: a few pages that you get to the rubber band.
Speaker 1: Um find a picture of There it is Alan's hands
Speaker 1: under the xerox machine. I had so much fun with this.
Speaker 1: I would go out I'll never forgetting Winston Salem. A
Speaker 1: crowd of people like this, you know, private clients or
Speaker 1: a big group, and I have the band's a whole
Speaker 1: pocket full of them. And I started to stretch it,
Speaker 1: and the guy in the first road acurse would be
Speaker 1: moving back, not knowing what was going to happen. All
Speaker 1: I was trying to point out here you see this
Speaker 1: is interest rates. Uh no, no, this is the bond price.
Speaker 1: I'm very sorry. These are not rates. Now they are rates?
Speaker 1: Are I said, Look, if rates could go from eight
Speaker 1: percent to four and four years, why couldn't they snapped
Speaker 1: back just as quick? That was the purpose of the
Speaker 1: rubber band thesis. And you know that's exactly what happened.
Speaker 1: Without a forecast, No was something. Get the mind open,
Speaker 1: it might happen. You know it could happen. And what
Speaker 1: else do you all see? Come on, all you folks,
Speaker 1: look at this chart. It's wonderful. You see for the
Speaker 1: first time in the forty some odd years of interest
Speaker 1: rates um the first higher bottom. That was the clue
Speaker 1: to us. It was really the top in the price
Speaker 1: that caught our attention because we did not catch the
Speaker 1: high end rates, but we certainly caught the reversal and
Speaker 1: stayed with it for some years. And right now we
Speaker 1: believe that rates a reversing again in a different direction.
Speaker 1: And as we used to say back in these days,
Speaker 1: interest rates are like a short sale. I gotta took
Speaker 1: out a discussion not here today, somewhere else maybe about
Speaker 1: the interest rates. Remember they can't go lower than zero?
Speaker 1: Oh yes they did. I know, I know we negative rates, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes,
Speaker 1: But you're not talking about something where it's four and
Speaker 1: it's got you know, hundred basis points to go before
Speaker 1: it might hit zero. And this was not overly difficult
Speaker 1: for an open mind to accept that there was something happening.
Speaker 1: But the rubber band just kind of added a little
Speaker 1: fun to the whole thing. So are you seeing the
Speaker 1: bond bull market that began in the eighties. Are you
Speaker 1: ready to say it's over? Or you looking that it's
Speaker 1: coming to an end? Um? Well, I think I'd say.
Speaker 1: I'd say that the the the decline and interest rates, um,
Speaker 1: it would be over. So therefore the bull marketing bonds
Speaker 1: would be over. Yes, I guess that's the guess. That's
Speaker 1: the position that we take the evidence that's unfolding. If
Speaker 1: you're having a business dispute, the process can be slow
Speaker 1: and drawn out, especially if you rely on litigation. In
Speaker 1: the courts, you can wait for years before your case
Speaker 1: is resolved, and the longer your case proceeds, the more
Speaker 1: your case can cost. Not with the American Arbitration Association.
Speaker 1: Arbitration or mediation with the American Arbitration Association is faster.
Speaker 1: In fact, nearly fifty of our cases settled prior to hearings.
Speaker 1: Ad R dot org resolve faster. So the bullmarket and
Speaker 1: bonds is over? Can we say a bear marketing bonds
Speaker 1: has begun? Or is it too soon to say that? Oh?
Speaker 1: It's very too soon? Yea and release? What was it
Speaker 1: that you pointed out that the tops were shop and
Speaker 1: the bottoms were curved? So you retired officially in two
Speaker 1: thousand and four, and then the market peaks in oh seven.
Speaker 1: Over the next eighteen months we see a fifty seven
Speaker 1: percent drop in the SMP. Were you watching not thinking? Man?
Speaker 1: I could be making a killing now if I was
Speaker 1: still working. What were you thinking when you were watched?
Speaker 1: I'll tell you this, and this is again a little
Speaker 1: confessions of the soul. I'm not in the booth. But anyway,
Speaker 1: I was on bended knees a lot of my colleagues
Speaker 1: to sell their City Group stock at fifty five dollars,
Speaker 1: which the price it was the day I retired. I'm
Speaker 1: just backing up a little bit to the deeps that
Speaker 1: you've got. Uh, this stock, to me was forming an
Speaker 1: incredible reversal. Did I see it going to two? Of
Speaker 1: course not? Which it did, of course not. But I
Speaker 1: sold all my holdings, which were rather large thanks to
Speaker 1: Sandy and his profit sharing plans. And uh, I wasn't
Speaker 1: there going down to two. I was out, But I
Speaker 1: saw some of my colleagues with even more time at
Speaker 1: the firm than me, wiped out. It was. It was
Speaker 1: a horrible feeling to see because they just, you know,
Speaker 1: the dividend that cause was the yield, you know, the
Speaker 1: dividends as good as the next director's meeting. Come on. Uh. Anyway,
Speaker 1: that was so, that was so sorrowful to see. So
Speaker 1: what's your question? So, so, as as a retiree watching
Speaker 1: a major negative trend unfold, were you looking at it?
Speaker 1: Aside from the obvious My former colleagues hopefully they followed
Speaker 1: my advice and sold, But were you looking at it
Speaker 1: as there is a huge trade to be made here
Speaker 1: or how did you see I I although thought my
Speaker 1: best my last best call was on gold in the
Speaker 1: early eighties, um, and my my favorite stock was Newmont Mining,
Speaker 1: and I used to push the heck out of it,
Speaker 1: particularly to our private client. And I got the Investment
Speaker 1: Policy Committee to actually allocate part of the you know,
Speaker 1: the portfolio strategist to to the metal itself and and
Speaker 1: the stocks themselves. And that was a tremendous Gold had
Speaker 1: and Newmont had and some of the others. And I
Speaker 1: walked away from all that four just before I tied,
Speaker 1: I retired, and those were the last point in figure
Speaker 1: shots I still have at home. That was my gold
Speaker 1: chairs two thousand four or two thou four. And I,
Speaker 1: frankly in the ensuing fifteen ensuing ten years, don't even
Speaker 1: turn on the Cartoon Network anymore. I mean, you know,
Speaker 1: that's why I used to cost the NBC. I did.
Speaker 1: I used to Cartoon Network. Can entertainment go watch these
Speaker 1: characters try to explain what's happening. So so, prior to
Speaker 1: the financial crisis, hedge funds had been doing really well,
Speaker 1: capturing a lot of assets and doing well for clients.
Speaker 1: For the past decade, hedge funds can't seem to get
Speaker 1: out of their own way. What do you attribute that to? Uh,
Speaker 1: the door has to be opened bigger, meaning there's too
Speaker 1: many trades trying to get through the same or so
Speaker 1: they're all doing it's they're all crowded trade. I think so,
Speaker 1: I think so, I mean and and and I don't know, frankly,
Speaker 1: if I was practicing today really like we used to,
Speaker 1: I have no idea even if there are price change
Speaker 1: services available, like our point in figure service was to
Speaker 1: keep charts like that up to date. So I'm so,
Speaker 1: I'm so out of it. They're at out of business.
Speaker 1: And I was talking briefly before too, uh president about
Speaker 1: how they took over the R. W. Mansfield Company and
Speaker 1: keeping that service alive, which is gratifying. That was one
Speaker 1: of my favorite I'd had that to the house of
Speaker 1: the weekends and spent two hours every Sunday pouring through
Speaker 1: the Mansfield sorts. It was really that simple. I mean,
Speaker 1: you didn't have to have complicated al Graham's or whatever
Speaker 1: they're called. And uh wise over two squad and x
Speaker 1: y Z s um in a in a parentheses. Um God,
Speaker 1: I could never get through the Financial Analysts hand book
Speaker 1: were so difficult because I never took statistics of source.
Speaker 1: That's one of the reasons. But I don't do know
Speaker 1: the difference between many are and good blog. What about
Speaker 1: technology today? What what is the impact of massive computing
Speaker 1: power on on charted Well, I don't know the answer.
Speaker 1: I honestly don't know the answer. All I can all
Speaker 1: I can say is my one of my first trips
Speaker 1: to Tokyo. We're incidentally technical analysis really got its birth,
Speaker 1: as you all know, back a few centuries ago in Japan.
Speaker 1: Um I was taken to the Tokyo Stock Exchange and
Speaker 1: showed I was I showed show the road room where
Speaker 1: computers were trading with computers, and all I could see
Speaker 1: with these lights flashing, lights flashing, lights flashing, there were
Speaker 1: no people, nobody, just the computer is going back and forth,
Speaker 1: matching and selling and buy and selling, and and I'm
Speaker 1: sure that there was something I can stick chop makers somewhere,
Speaker 1: you know, trying to take this information and put it
Speaker 1: on the pencil on a piece of paper that these
Speaker 1: computers were doing. I don't I don't know the answer
Speaker 1: to the question, because see if you can just take
Speaker 1: some other step further. We're not running those computers. They're
Speaker 1: running themselves. We're not the brains behind whatever trades they're making.
Speaker 1: So they are they are? They just playing their own emotions.
Speaker 1: Do the computers have emotions? Do they overheat an example,
Speaker 1: or they run out of power? Do they go through climaxes?
Speaker 1: Selling climaxes, buying climaxes? I mean, I don't know, you
Speaker 1: know all that to answer your question. So, so now
Speaker 1: that you're retired, you you mentioned some media. When you're
Speaker 1: looking at the industry today, be at Wall Street or
Speaker 1: technicals or just trading in general, what what makes you crazy?
Speaker 1: What do you look at? And just do that with Oh,
Speaker 1: that's a good question. Because I came up before to
Speaker 1: the likely reporting I heard last night. I do that too.
Speaker 1: The fact that you know you're talking about a twenty
Speaker 1: level and you're worried about forty um that and because
Speaker 1: because you know, the average person on the street who's
Speaker 1: listening to you doesn't put it in that perspective. They
Speaker 1: hear the forty points and they don't think of it
Speaker 1: on a twenty thou base. I have just one thing
Speaker 1: I still may have here in this incredible pile of stuff. Incidentally, Hank,
Speaker 1: I've brought along something that you wrote, The twenty one
Speaker 1: Century Technician by Hank Prudent, and that's an incredible piece
Speaker 1: of artwork on there that was chosen for this piece.
Speaker 1: You remember that, Hank, when you wrote that, um, and
Speaker 1: that was the future of technical analysis and the academics
Speaker 1: ie of Golden State University looks pretty chaotic on it,
Speaker 1: that thing about what you were talking to me about there.
Speaker 1: But once a month, um, this young lady up here
Speaker 1: puts out this piece of research. Uh, look at this,
Speaker 1: Look at this. Oh my god. I give her so
Speaker 1: much credit because I wouldn't even be able to get
Speaker 1: past the first ten pages, not sixty. Um. I'm probably
Speaker 1: listed on here as a consultant emeritus or is it
Speaker 1: emeritus emeritus. I don't know. I always feel like I
Speaker 1: have a problem with my right arm one. It's a
Speaker 1: little little mme ritis. But you know, to follow all
Speaker 1: that's going on and gets to can be concise and
Speaker 1: it means something. I think it's really really today the
Speaker 1: challenge of the technical analysts. But Ralph's right, Ralph, do
Speaker 1: you know I would not in my discussions with a
Speaker 1: client I'd never talked about the shampoo. Okay, I never
Speaker 1: mentioned the term heads and shoulders, head and shoulders, top
Speaker 1: or bottom. I would told a top a distribution part
Speaker 1: of pattern, or an accumulation bottom or a reversal pattern.
Speaker 1: I'd never give them the opportunity to come back and
Speaker 1: laugh at me. You know, you're the guy with all
Speaker 1: those wedges, triangles, shampoo products, um gaps, still aware of
Speaker 1: water gap, you know, all that kind of stuff. You
Speaker 1: never have to bring that up, just you know, bring
Speaker 1: up the reason that those patterns were forming as you're
Speaker 1: excused distribution, accumulations, supply demand. And I mean I used
Speaker 1: to show the point in figure talking to some people,
Speaker 1: and I never believed in myself, but I had. I
Speaker 1: had a report out on bowling when the twenty dollars stopped.
Speaker 1: You know, I had price target for bowing, and I
Speaker 1: told the clients I honestly, I said, I don't believe it,
Speaker 1: but I'm showing it to you. The method is allowing
Speaker 1: me to you express this possibility. And I was long.
Speaker 1: I went to a bull market that was I'll never
Speaker 1: forget it times. So I know we only have about
Speaker 1: ten minutes and there's a handful of questions I want
Speaker 1: to get to. You mentioned some of your early mentors,
Speaker 1: that people mentored you in the business problem. Who were
Speaker 1: the investors that you that influenced you, that you were
Speaker 1: impressed with, that you followed in the early days. Well,
Speaker 1: that's a good question. I went back and of course
Speaker 1: read all the major history books. I'm sorry Buddy has
Speaker 1: about Jesse Livermore and and I went back and studied
Speaker 1: entirelyly Harold Gottli series which was published in the nineteen twenties.
Speaker 1: UM and I was. I was also uh Shabaka books
Speaker 1: that he was Tony Tabelle's uncle, you know, uh point
Speaker 1: and figure work and stuff back in the thirties. UM
Speaker 1: and my idols on Wall Street. To put let's put
Speaker 1: it this way, instead of investors ken Ward at Hayden
Speaker 1: Stone pointing figure shots, Edmund W. Tabell at Walston was
Speaker 1: son Tony pointing figure charts. I never knew what Bob
Speaker 1: Farrell practiced over at Mery Lynch. I only saw his
Speaker 1: written work. I never I never knew what went into it.
Speaker 1: I don't know whether he kept pointing figure shots. But
Speaker 1: the three reel point you figure shot people were were
Speaker 1: Walston W. Harris Upham and and and and Hayden Stone
Speaker 1: and Ralph You never what happened to ken Woods charts.
Speaker 1: Oh that's right, Yeah, that's correct. Yeah, he was. He
Speaker 1: was a fascinating fellow. I got to know him, not
Speaker 1: for too many years. Unfortunately I got the nomen. He
Speaker 1: was in his late seventies and he expired mazines. But
Speaker 1: and then ed to Bell Tony's father, Um, and then
Speaker 1: they actually computerized their pointing figure work and Ken Tower
Speaker 1: of course who's year there was one of Tony's right
Speaker 1: hand man and helped with all that process. Tony was
Speaker 1: our second president. Incidentally, let let me ask you a
Speaker 1: m a little bit of a trick question. You you've
Speaker 1: told us about a couple of outstanding calls. Tell us
Speaker 1: about a call that went wrong, a call that failed,
Speaker 1: and what you might have learned from that. I assume once,
Speaker 1: at least once, not once, I had a curl a
Speaker 1: call that failed that I could not learn from. Really, yes,
Speaker 1: you'll have to explain. I will. I recommended selling short televine.
Speaker 1: The stock was and I was feeling fairly certain at
Speaker 1: the stock was from the process of our pretty big
Speaker 1: top well at least so it could sell off to eat.
Speaker 1: I recommended it, send out a wire, put it out
Speaker 1: there short sale, and that's kind of an interesting thing.
Speaker 1: I had to check with my back office. Do we
Speaker 1: have shares to loan? I mean, there's no sense of
Speaker 1: doing something you can't do business. And you know, if
Speaker 1: we couldn't get to find the shares for the guy
Speaker 1: who wanted to sell it short, don't don't, don't bother
Speaker 1: with it. Well, two days after that recommendation went out,
Speaker 1: Mr Singleton announced a buy back, another thing I had
Speaker 1: a control over, but at ten points higher than way
Speaker 1: I recommended the shorts. Now I couldn't do anything about that.
Speaker 1: I was really wrong on that one, but it was
Speaker 1: out of my control. You know. He came out and
Speaker 1: annouked the buyeback. Now did he know about this recommendation?
Speaker 1: Do you think? Do you think he did? I don't know.
Speaker 1: I mean there's a little Harris up I'm back then,
Speaker 1: you know, somehow probably could have triggered it down to him.
Speaker 1: Things that new topples fast, or that I think I
Speaker 1: mentioned it before. You want you want to get more
Speaker 1: involved in what you're doing, go back and read all
Speaker 1: of Alvin Toffler's books. Start with Future Shock. Start with
Speaker 1: the understanding of the acceleration of the rate of change,
Speaker 1: because that's what the stock markets have been doing for
Speaker 1: years now and probably will continue thanks to the technology. Um,
Speaker 1: but do read these books are incredible. Let's start with
Speaker 1: the Wheel and Fire and all that marvelous book readings.
Speaker 1: Let's talk more about books. What the single by the way,
Speaker 1: the single most ask question I get about any guests
Speaker 1: they have is always what are their favorite books? So
Speaker 1: Toffler's Future Shock, well that was that was from my
Speaker 1: macro perspective. How Charts can help You in the stock
Speaker 1: Market by William Giler, very simple published back in the sixties,
Speaker 1: finn little volume. Oh I guess it might be now
Speaker 1: Technical Analysis of Stock Trends by Edwards and McGee um
Speaker 1: way out of date. But nevertheless, if you want to
Speaker 1: see a chartist to bake a packet, what it looked
Speaker 1: like back in those days, it you know, it's in
Speaker 1: the book. Um. Let's see. I read all of Grandville books.
Speaker 1: I knew Joe, not personally, but enough that he had
Speaker 1: let me know if he was in town or something.
Speaker 1: He was a character, God bless him. He was a showman.
Speaker 1: Let's face it, but but he he put on a
Speaker 1: damn good show. Um, let's see who else was in there. Well,
Speaker 1: all the books you're all familiar with. I'm sure I've
Speaker 1: read Garfield Drew's books on odd lot theory. It's an
Speaker 1: odd lot? Do you ever hear about it anymore? Did
Speaker 1: they trade odd lots anymore? God? You see, there's not
Speaker 1: an example of how we moved along that was followed
Speaker 1: every single day. Um, on the assumption that it was
Speaker 1: the small buyer was always wrong when the odd light
Speaker 1: on cell on by on selling got high, you should
Speaker 1: be buying when it got low. And of course Bob
Speaker 1: Farrell had proprietary work with the size of Merrill Lynches
Speaker 1: buy sell trades every day. He was right on top
Speaker 1: of all that stuff. What what indicators no longer have validity?
Speaker 1: What what indicators have faded from from usefulness? And and
Speaker 1: what does it an analyst do when they're starting to
Speaker 1: suspect one of their favorite tools no longer works very
Speaker 1: That's that's a wonderful question. I'm glad at both of
Speaker 1: these and Ralpher here with me today because in our
Speaker 1: chart room we had a wall as long as that
Speaker 1: wall back there on one side of the room, which
Speaker 1: was all sliding colkboard and had ten square of the
Speaker 1: inch chopped paper pasted together from top to bottom, which
Speaker 1: daily work was posted, so that side there would have
Speaker 1: been about eight or nine years of daily indicators that
Speaker 1: size of the wall. And it was set in such
Speaker 1: a way that we wouldn't walk up to the wall
Speaker 1: to look at it. We would stand twenty feet back
Speaker 1: and stare and see what was going on. And one
Speaker 1: of the things that was driven home to me is
Speaker 1: never listened to people who tell you they embarrassed on
Speaker 1: the market that's overboard, or the bulls on the market
Speaker 1: because it's oversold. You all know how those indicators are calculated.
Speaker 1: You all know the data go into those indicators. So
Speaker 1: think about it. An over bolt market is bullish, an
Speaker 1: oversoul market is bearish. You don't buy because it's oversold.
Speaker 1: You're wait until it comes out of the oversouled condition.
Speaker 1: You're wait until the oversouled condition alleviates itself. And that's
Speaker 1: the market telling you. The selling pressure, which is what
Speaker 1: costs it to get oversold is easy. I mean, I'll
Speaker 1: never forget in the market went oversold on Thursday before
Speaker 1: Monday in October. It came out of the oversold in November.
Speaker 1: Now one would have been a better time to buy
Speaker 1: the Friday before the Bundey crashed, or in November when
Speaker 1: it was all over and was starting to recover. And
Speaker 1: we could see that just by standing and looking at
Speaker 1: the wall. It was amazing. Well, those the girl days.
Speaker 1: So you so what other books besides um, the classic
Speaker 1: technical analysis books. Toffler is so off the beaten path,
Speaker 1: that's what? What other books along those lines stay with
Speaker 1: you that may not be pure t a but have
Speaker 1: something to teach and an oh, oh good you got
Speaker 1: The Bandess of Crowds helped me along? Yes, uh, popular
Speaker 1: delusions and the Madness of crowds? Is that it right
Speaker 1: by who McKay? Yes, that's a good one. Crowd psychology.
Speaker 1: Do you read Humphrey nils Reminiscence of a stock market Operator?
Speaker 1: He was the creator of contrary Opinion? Um, that kind
Speaker 1: of stuff is is helpful again and everything at Bob
Speaker 1: Prector writes read carefully actor's perspective that I have the
Speaker 1: greatest respect for that young man m his behavioral finance
Speaker 1: that he's coming out with now on the work that
Speaker 1: he's doing. I mean, he's so on and he's such
Speaker 1: a pleasant person past present. The m T a to
Speaker 1: talk with and listen to. And he's a member of Mensie.
Speaker 1: You know, it's extremely intelligent. Any anywhere Bob does pay
Speaker 1: attention to. And also Ned Davis, Ned's a fan. I'm
Speaker 1: a fan of Ned Davis too. Everybody started working for
Speaker 1: Weak Securities in Tennessee. He used to have a little
Speaker 1: hay seed coming out of his mouth. What a powerful
Speaker 1: operation today. All right, so we're down to our last
Speaker 1: two questions. If if if some youngster came to you
Speaker 1: and said I'm thinking about going into research, I want
Speaker 1: to become a technical analyst, what sort of advice would
Speaker 1: you give them? Punch, Oh, Barry, I don't know, hard question.
Speaker 1: M oh I thought you were giving them the advice
Speaker 1: to punch you want to punch on the question. No.
Speaker 1: I was listening to the talk yesterday and I couldn't
Speaker 1: agree more with what Frank and everybody was saying about
Speaker 1: the difference between the buy and the south sides. I mean,
Speaker 1: in my day, remember I said I went to do
Speaker 1: the technical work because nobody had hires upon was doing it,
Speaker 1: and there was technical work coming out of Hayden Stone Walston, Merrill,
Speaker 1: lynch By, W press Prett's, Joseph Fallen Company, and Reynolds
Speaker 1: and Company. They're right above me. For above me, they
Speaker 1: all had somebody doing some sort of chalt reading or
Speaker 1: or a daily you know, tip sheet or whatever you
Speaker 1: want to call it. Um, you don't have that today.
Speaker 1: I mean, do you have many cell sides? Do you
Speaker 1: have left? Even when I told you how I did
Speaker 1: my family tree one day, I sat down and doodled
Speaker 1: and and I mean Colin loewb Robe, Chifs and Hammel, Harris, Upham, Smith, Bonnie,
Speaker 1: I mean, they're all. They're all. I came up with
Speaker 1: so many firms E F W E. Hutton's there all
Speaker 1: and then my firm. I mean, so look at all
Speaker 1: the firm just disappeared. Hutton used to have, of course,
Speaker 1: phil roth Ian Newton, Cinda, a lot of people. There were.
Speaker 1: All those positions were there, so you had an at
Speaker 1: least your way to answer that question, you know, and
Speaker 1: make a decision if you want to. You can always switch,
Speaker 1: I would say, if we're back in those days, get
Speaker 1: a job on the cell side. You can always switch
Speaker 1: to the bye side. Maybe. But and I think that
Speaker 1: these guys hit it on the nose yesterday too. I
Speaker 1: think Frank said it. I forget now about uh maybe
Speaker 1: more opportunity on the bye side than the cell side
Speaker 1: for this, for this, for this discipline. And my last question,
Speaker 1: what is it that you know about technicals and investing
Speaker 1: in trading today that you wish you knew forty five
Speaker 1: years ago when you began. UM, I never took myself seriously.
Speaker 1: I took my work seriously. I was never afraid to
Speaker 1: make a fool out of myself. Robber band thesis was
Speaker 1: a good example of that. I mean, somebody would have
Speaker 1: looked at that and said, what child play? Maybe, But
Speaker 1: I told the story you say that was the main
Speaker 1: point to get that across. Open the mind. Technical analysis
Speaker 1: is a mindset unless you explore gives you the ability
Speaker 1: and the freedom to do so. Um. And then the
Speaker 1: other thing that's great about is that it can you
Speaker 1: can set risk points in a k A stop losses.
Speaker 1: You can do things that will help you understand that
Speaker 1: maybe you made the wrong call and not let the
Speaker 1: loss run and let the profit run. Three major outcomes
Speaker 1: they brought it up yesterday, small losses, large losses, small profits,
Speaker 1: big profits. We're in we're in for the big profits
Speaker 1: and the small losses as possible. Um. But I think
Speaker 1: I said this earlier and I'll say it again. I'm
Speaker 1: very humbled to be here again. But I'm so happy
Speaker 1: that I'm not practicing today, knowing what I went through
Speaker 1: and how easy it was compared to the challenge and
Speaker 1: shore today. I mean, you know, my that was my
Speaker 1: first computer. Then I went to a Monroe calculator. We
Speaker 1: had to pull the handle and the numbers would spin.
Speaker 1: And then I had an Apple and then ms doss
Speaker 1: uh and we went to all through that learned XCEL
Speaker 1: and Lotus and all that stuff you know today. It's
Speaker 1: just so incredible what you've got at your fingertips as
Speaker 1: you can do. But I also have a firm believer
Speaker 1: of the kiss syndrome. You all know that one. Keep
Speaker 1: it simple, stupid, um, try not to get too oldly involved,
Speaker 1: and especially if you're on the cell side, to avoid
Speaker 1: those shampoo ad terms and things like that. When you
Speaker 1: talk to a client, you don't need to tell him
Speaker 1: as I had to show at the top, tell him
Speaker 1: it's the top um. And you don't ope yourself to
Speaker 1: the ridicule or or criticism or that that stuff, the wedges,
Speaker 1: the gaps, dependance, the flags, etcetera, etcetera. It's all what
Speaker 1: it is. Well, thank you, Allen. It's been my privilege
Speaker 1: to be able to sit up here and ask you
Speaker 1: these questions, and I'm sure everybody in the room appreciate
Speaker 1: your your time and your wisdom. Thank you so much.
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