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Speaker 1: Masters in Business is brought to you by the American

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Speaker 1: Arbitration Association. Business disputes are inevitable, resolve faster with the

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Speaker 1: American Arbitration Association, the global leader in alternative dispute resolution

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Speaker 1: for over ninety years. Learn more at a d R

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Speaker 1: dot org. This is Masters in Business with Barry Ridholts

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Speaker 1: on Bloomberg Radio. Hey, welcome to Masters in Business. We

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Speaker 1: have a special extra podcast this week. I went to

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Speaker 1: one of the m t A, the Market Technicians Association's

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Speaker 1: conferences earlier this spring, where I got to sit down

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Speaker 1: with a legend of technical analysis. Alan Shaw is really

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Speaker 1: everybody's favorite UH technician. There are so many people whose

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Speaker 1: entire careers trace back to Alan Shaw. He was the

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Speaker 1: founder of the m t A. He was somebody who

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Speaker 1: just helped get so many balls rolling in the world

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Speaker 1: of training and in the world of technical analysis. Many

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Speaker 1: many people owe a debt of gratitude for their expertise

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Speaker 1: and their careers to him. A super nice guy. I

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Speaker 1: think he's eighty four eighty two, sharp as attack, very witty.

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Speaker 1: This was in a in a conference event. It was

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Speaker 1: the two of us sitting in front of a few

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Speaker 1: hundred people, so it's not the usual format when you

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Speaker 1: get a guy like that and he wants to just

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Speaker 1: tell a story, telling an anecdote, and meander, Hey, it's

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Speaker 1: not up to me to interrupt him and keep him

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Speaker 1: on a broadcast schedule. All I did was just kind

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Speaker 1: of poke and privade and trying to keep him going.

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Speaker 1: And it was really only about forty five minutes or

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Speaker 1: so of conversation. If you are at all interested in

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Speaker 1: technical analysis or market history, or if you just like

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Speaker 1: the thoughts of the guy who called the greatest bonds

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Speaker 1: market rally and in history, dead on a very outlier

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Speaker 1: contrarian call, and who continued to get it right. It

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Speaker 1: wasn't just one lucky call. He was pretty dead on

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Speaker 1: and stayed then on for a long time. Then I

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Speaker 1: think you're gonna enjoy this conversation, So our special extra

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Speaker 1: holiday weekend podcast, my mt A Events Conversation with Alan Shaw.

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Speaker 1: Let me start with a really interesting question. I've I've

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Speaker 1: spoken to a number of technicians, and many of them

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Speaker 1: have noted that they began on the fundamental side before

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Speaker 1: switching to technicals. Tell us about how that transition, that

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Speaker 1: evolution took place with your self. I'm gonna make a

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Speaker 1: very long story as short as I can. We got

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Speaker 1: four hours. First of all, it's a real, real pleasure

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Speaker 1: to be here with you all, and thank you for

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Speaker 1: showing your interests in all this. The first thing I

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Speaker 1: had to do is flunk out of college. Um My

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Speaker 1: father when he read the note that I was no

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Speaker 1: longer wanted back. This was a school in central Pennsylvania

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Speaker 1: called Susquehanna University, he said, Sonny said, you'll never be

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Speaker 1: You don't know what success is unless you fail every

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Speaker 1: now and again. I don't know. Forget that and uh.

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Speaker 1: He came home from work the next day with a

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Speaker 1: help wanted to add from the Wall Street Journal, and

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Speaker 1: I answered the ad. I went into the city to

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Speaker 1: the Newall Street Journal's headquarters here and they they hired

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Speaker 1: me as a glorified salesman. The Wall Street Journal was

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Speaker 1: then expanding its business, uh from being you know, with

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Speaker 1: just a Wall Street type paper to being a you know,

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Speaker 1: a daily uh and reporting on the real news and

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Speaker 1: this and that. And I would go around to brokerage

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Speaker 1: firms and asked to speak to the manager of the

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Speaker 1: office or whatever and try to sell subscriptions. One day

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Speaker 1: I found myself in Washington, d C. Wall Street Journal

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Speaker 1: has just opened their brand new plant there on fourteenth Street.

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Speaker 1: And I walked into an office of a broker's firm

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Speaker 1: called Harris Upham, and I had to speak to the manager,

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Speaker 1: Edwin Bastaball his name was, And he said, young man,

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Speaker 1: you're a pretty damn good salesman. We can use people

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Speaker 1: like you in our business. I'm going to give you

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Speaker 1: my card and make may get you an appointment up

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Speaker 1: at our main office and one twenty Broadway in New York,

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Speaker 1: and I'd like you to follow through so lo and behold.

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Speaker 1: I went to one twenty Broadway, a few blocks away

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Speaker 1: from here one day in nineteen fifty eight, and UH

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Speaker 1: asked to see the fellow who's in hot in charge

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Speaker 1: of trainees, and I was escorted in to see a

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Speaker 1: gentleman by the name of Henry You Harris Jr. Who

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Speaker 1: was the son of the senior partner. Henry was a

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Speaker 1: partner himself. UM, wonderful guy. And he said, well, you

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Speaker 1: don't have a college degree. UM, I don't hold that

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Speaker 1: against you. I said, Oh, don't worry about Henry. I'm

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Speaker 1: going to school at night now. And I was that

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Speaker 1: actually going out to Adelifi trying to get caught up.

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Speaker 1: That's that's a hello test to do night school, and

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Speaker 1: he said, let me check it. I got home that

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Speaker 1: day there was a call waiting for me from Henry

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Speaker 1: that there was an opening in the research department, and

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Speaker 1: I said, I'll take it, and I did. I went

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Speaker 1: to work. They showed me this little death the desk,

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Speaker 1: about this wide one column of draws on the right

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Speaker 1: hand side. And I was really in a clerical role

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Speaker 1: helping out some of the senior people there. But I

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Speaker 1: was introduced to a gentleman name of Ralph, Ralph Rottenham

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Speaker 1: who was at that time the president of New York

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Speaker 1: Society Security Analysts. Right. Ralph was my mentor. I mean,

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Speaker 1: he was the greatest walking living historian. He could tell

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Speaker 1: you what happened to the market after the battleship, mean

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Speaker 1: was sunk when a moment's notice uh edible guy uh

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Speaker 1: and uh Harri stuptam was set up in a way

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Speaker 1: that uh, I have to tell you about my first paycheck.

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Speaker 1: Um this this is a real that's a real joke.

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Speaker 1: I mean I saw people getting these yellow pieces of

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Speaker 1: paper every two week and I wasn't getting one yet.

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Speaker 1: And uh. Long Behold. They got me to the accounting

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Speaker 1: department and I got one those yellow pieces of paper

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Speaker 1: and I figured out my salary was fifty eight dollars

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Speaker 1: a week as my starting Sorry, I still have that

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Speaker 1: check pretax. Uh it's funny pre tax. Yeah, uh, it

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Speaker 1: was funny. So Harri Stupple had a research department that

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Speaker 1: was like oh others, mainly with people specializing in the

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Speaker 1: steel industry, aluminium industry, you know, specialized analysts. But there

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Speaker 1: was one one slot missing. They didn't have a consumer

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Speaker 1: consumer undurable analyst like foods, tobacco, soft drinks. And I

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Speaker 1: I was. I was Ralph Frodden's assistant now to see,

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Speaker 1: I was doing his relative strength work. This was my

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Speaker 1: first come puter. Still have it to this day, that

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Speaker 1: old wooden slide rule. The only thing missing is a

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Speaker 1: little slide that goes on and that fell off many

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Speaker 1: years ago somewhere. Uh. And I asked Ralph, I said,

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Speaker 1: you know, can I have a hand at this? I said,

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Speaker 1: I I madeed in accounting, even though I didn't go

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Speaker 1: back and go back for my second year, but I

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Speaker 1: love the course and I know what five phone life

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Speaker 1: will mean. Um, could could you give me a could

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Speaker 1: you could I possibly have a chance of following the

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Speaker 1: food in the treat he said, And he said, well, okay,

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Speaker 1: you sure about that? And I said, yes, I'm sure

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Speaker 1: about it, and so he he let me off on

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Speaker 1: my own. I did research, but upon research, upon research,

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Speaker 1: upon research, and the end result was the published publishing

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Speaker 1: of my very first research report in September nine until

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Speaker 1: the Harris up them heading at the top investment opportunities

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Speaker 1: of the food industry, and we tried our best to

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Speaker 1: put forth why these stocks we should be looked upon

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Speaker 1: as growth stocks and not widow and often income stocks

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Speaker 1: because there was an item coming into the industry called

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Speaker 1: convenience foods. As a matter of fact, I had a

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Speaker 1: whole paragraph about a guy named Clarence Bird's Eye. There

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Speaker 1: was actually a guy named Bird's Eye, you know, who

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Speaker 1: invented the frozen food. And the profit margins on each

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Speaker 1: products were exhorbernant. It was amazing, and most of it

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Speaker 1: was a little going down to the bottom line, and

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Speaker 1: I highlighted all of that in this report. Just scats

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Speaker 1: and scats of companies recommended because there are so many

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Speaker 1: of them, from general Foods to Hershey Chocolate to Bury biscuit.

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Speaker 1: I mean names that are no longer around, some of

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Speaker 1: them now. Little did I know at the time that

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Speaker 1: my report was being published during a stock market cycle

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Speaker 1: which was heavily favoring consuming no durable stocks. Within the

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Speaker 1: next year, every stock in this report, if it didn't double,

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Speaker 1: it tripled. I was an instant here with the research

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Speaker 1: to problem. This was so funny. I mean, really, I

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Speaker 1: still was only making seventy dollars a week. But no, nevertheless,

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Speaker 1: Uh but Ralph, ralphacka poor Ralph Rottenham communed with a

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Speaker 1: fellow by the name of Jim Morgan from Princeton every day.

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Speaker 1: Jim Morgan was ahead of a firm called Morgan, Rogers

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Speaker 1: and Roberts, which was headquartered at one forty Broadway More

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Speaker 1: and Rogers and robertson those days were the purveyors a

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Speaker 1: point and figure data, point and figure numbers to make

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Speaker 1: point and figure charts. And they had a chap on

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Speaker 1: their step by the name of Alexander H. Wheeland, who

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Speaker 1: had just published a booklet called Study Helps and Pointing

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Speaker 1: Figure Technique. Ralph had received a copy from Jim Morgan

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Speaker 1: this one morning on the train, and I'm bringing him

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Speaker 1: in his daily data, you know, he did overboard over

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Speaker 1: Soul that was always giving him his numbers, trying to

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Speaker 1: do all this work too. And he said, Allen, I

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Speaker 1: got this this morning. You might fin might find that interesting.

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Speaker 1: I said, oh my god, Ralph, I mean, well, there's

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Speaker 1: tit tattoo stuff, you know. He said, well, read it

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Speaker 1: to see what you think. Well. I found this book fascinating,

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Speaker 1: absolutely fascinating, so fascinating that I traveled over to one

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Speaker 1: forty Broadway, which obviously was next door to one twenty

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Speaker 1: Broadway where I was, and I introduced myself to Jim Morgan.

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Speaker 1: I told him I wasn't making much money at this point,

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Speaker 1: but was it possible that he could give me some

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Speaker 1: copies of point and figure charts like General Foods, Stokely,

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Speaker 1: Van Camp, National Dairy Products, all the names of those days.

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Speaker 1: He said, I'd be happy to And I said, well,

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Speaker 1: could you also supply me with the price change service

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Speaker 1: that I need to keep these charts up to date

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Speaker 1: every day? And he said, well, I'll have to talk

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Speaker 1: to your boss about that, because that does cost money.

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Speaker 1: But I didn't wear Ralph to know that I was

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Speaker 1: keeping these charts. You know, this is the voodoo stuff

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Speaker 1: because supposedly so. I started in plodding away making one

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Speaker 1: point reversal charts of all the stocks that were in

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Speaker 1: my report. And finally in the first half of nineteen

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Speaker 1: and the last half from nineteen sixty one, a year

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Speaker 1: or so after the publication of the report, I started

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Speaker 1: to see patterns emerge in these stocks on the charts.

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Speaker 1: Now in Alexander Willem's book, on page twelve he had

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Speaker 1: a page of pattern identification, and he had a calm

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Speaker 1: called tops and a calm call bottoms. And I started

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Speaker 1: to look at my patterns. I said, my god, this

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Speaker 1: is this is making a top and and and I

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Speaker 1: said to myself, how can this be? Well, my earnings

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Speaker 1: estimates are coming through, stocks are doing you know, those

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Speaker 1: stocks are all up because there was a key right there.

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Speaker 1: I can't go down unless you're going up. Um. And

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Speaker 1: I walked into Ralph's office and I said, Ralph, I

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Speaker 1: haven't missioned. I pulled out the charts to behind my back.

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Speaker 1: I've been keeping these in my desk drawer. That's my

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Speaker 1: knuckles onn saw um. And to look at these patterns

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Speaker 1: this book, you see the stock is topping out. He said, well, allan.

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Speaker 1: He said, maybe you're about to learn something which I

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Speaker 1: hope you'll never forget. You're gonna learn how to operate

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Speaker 1: a company from its stock. Well I was so taken back.

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Speaker 1: What are you talking about, Ralph? Are you telling me

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Speaker 1: that the stock might go up? And even though the

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Speaker 1: company's earnings, don't you know to separate the company from

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Speaker 1: its stock? And then the key phrase came out, barometer

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Speaker 1: and at a thermometer. Never forgot all these things, uh,

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Speaker 1: marcus a discounting function, uh, and all the stuff I

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Speaker 1: learned from him. So I said, well, do you have

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Speaker 1: an objection if I put out a lighten up all

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Speaker 1: wires to the branch offices since there are so many

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Speaker 1: much profits in here. See that's what that was our terminology,

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Speaker 1: not sell right, lighten up. So I sent out what

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Speaker 1: we called those days, an all wire message to all

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Speaker 1: the fifty two branches plus Geneva of Harris Upham uh

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Speaker 1: with a with a with a of course, this this

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Speaker 1: was the basis of it original report. These stocks have

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Speaker 1: all gone up there starting to look a little suspicious

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Speaker 1: on the ape. We have no objection if your clients

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Speaker 1: want to lighten up. Well, ladies and gentlemen. This was

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Speaker 1: in late in nineteen sixty two. We had this incredible

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Speaker 1: bear market, as you all remember, which finished with the

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Speaker 1: Southern climax of the Kennedy confronting the steel industry for

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Speaker 1: raising prices in May of that year. My stocks collapsed,

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Speaker 1: Every one of them collapsed. Now, how did I know

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Speaker 1: that forty five times earnings was expensive? For general Foods?

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Speaker 1: Had never sold it before? You say, I had no

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Speaker 1: historical evidence to go back and say, we'll see what

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Speaker 1: happened in int or whatever. You know, So I didn't

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Speaker 1: know until afterwards. And you know what, of course, sixty

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Speaker 1: two was called a pe adjustment. Can you imagine going

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Speaker 1: to a client, a broker, You've just been wiped out, Barry,

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Speaker 1: It's just a pe justice, don't worry about it. They'll

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Speaker 1: come back. So at that point was the key for me.

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Speaker 1: Let me ask you a question about clients. I heard

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Speaker 1: a rumor. I'm gonna read this to make sure I

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Speaker 1: don't get it wrong. Back in the sixties and seventies,

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Speaker 1: you would do technical analysis knowing that clients might not

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Speaker 1: be enamored of it, and so you would have to

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Speaker 1: go out after you made your technical decision and find

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Speaker 1: fundamental reasons to put like ornaments on a Christmas tree

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Speaker 1: in order to sell the call to the client. True

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Speaker 1: or false? Well, that's not entirely true, is it partly true?

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Speaker 1: Is it a little bit true? It's a little bit

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Speaker 1: true in this way. Uh. I began to run for

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Speaker 1: the private clients side a master list. It started harris

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Speaker 1: up them. We would recommend stocks based mostly on their

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Speaker 1: technical potentials. And I would indeed at least get a

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Speaker 1: yellow sheet in front of me to make sure I

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Speaker 1: had had earrings. Um. And you know I wasn't going

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Speaker 1: into the tube fundamentally, and I could get that from

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Speaker 1: a little in a brief paragraph that was on top

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Speaker 1: of the S and P l um, So I feel

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Speaker 1: better about it. Um. So there's truth from that point

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Speaker 1: of view. Because we'd follow up the recommendation until the

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Speaker 1: day we got out of it, and we would keep

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Speaker 1: a track. We actually had a long In fact, the

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Speaker 1: publication that went out with a record of the transactions

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Speaker 1: was longer than the actual recommend recommendations themselves and in size.

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Speaker 1: So yes, at that point we would do that just

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Speaker 1: to check out. So so Ralph famously said, fundamentals tell

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Speaker 1: you what to buy technicals tell you when very very

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Speaker 1: well done, very well done. Okay, so let's move on

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Speaker 1: from that. Um, you said something earlier. I want to revisit.

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Speaker 1: How could these stocks be making tops when the fundamental

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Speaker 1: news is right online and earnings are coming in for

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Speaker 1: all these companies. It doesn't make any sense. So how

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Speaker 1: did you make the transition from that to, oh, the

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Speaker 1: market's a future discounting that news? Well, I remember the

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Speaker 1: story about the stockholder who raised his hand at the

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Speaker 1: annual meeting and he and he asked the president. He said, Sarah,

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Speaker 1: how's the business. The president said to him, we couldn't

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Speaker 1: be better. So the guy ran on the phone called

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Speaker 1: its broker and sold all the stock and the broker said,

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Speaker 1: what are you happening? Said, the president just told me

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Speaker 1: the business couldn't be better. So you see that. That's

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Speaker 1: the same thing you say, is is he really tie

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Speaker 1: it together? It's the same thing. I mean. Stocks can

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Speaker 1: top out when the business couldn't be better, like they

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Speaker 1: will bottom that out when the business couldn't be worse. Uh. Fear, greed, greed, fear,

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Speaker 1: you know all that stuff. It all plays into that psychology,

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Speaker 1: which is what about what we study now? We call

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Speaker 1: behavioral finance. I love it. It's all part of reading

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Speaker 1: a chart to a great degree. So let me give

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Speaker 1: you another quote from Tom Dorsey. The core advantage is

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Speaker 1: that point and figure chart is strictly tied to the

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Speaker 1: irrefutable law of supply and demn It takes volatility totally

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Speaker 1: out of the question. The equation unquotes how does someone

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Speaker 1: know when to use point and figure charts versus traditional chart?

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Speaker 1: That's very good, Barry, only because of my experience. I

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Speaker 1: would tell you as I did in the other interviews,

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Speaker 1: if you want to be a point and figure advocate,

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Speaker 1: start with the one point reversal. Learn how to make

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Speaker 1: the one point reversal. That's like looking at a short

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Speaker 1: term to intermediate term trend as it unfolds. If the

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Speaker 1: twenty dollar stock becomes a fifty or sixty dollar stock,

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Speaker 1: you now I mean being invited to condense it into

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Speaker 1: a three point reversal. You see, point figure is so versatile.

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Speaker 1: If you start with the one point reversal and then

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Speaker 1: make a three point reversal, a pattern that was this

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Speaker 1: wide perhaps can become this wide for the same time period.

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Speaker 1: And then point and figure also allows you to condense

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Speaker 1: the vertical. Let's say you get a really high priced stock,

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Speaker 1: make it a ten unit shart or a five unit chart.

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Speaker 1: It's gotta go up and down five points before you

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Speaker 1: put in that X. And you can see you can

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Speaker 1: reduce your horizontal and your vertical, which we would do

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Speaker 1: particularly in the high flying days in the sixties and

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Speaker 1: fifty fifty with Avon and all those kinds of names.

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Speaker 1: Um oh, let me share some of these stories with

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Speaker 1: you get a kick out of it. We've built a

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Speaker 1: very strong relationship with Morgan Guarantee Trust um Trust department.

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Speaker 1: They they like every other institution in the city, alot

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Speaker 1: to the gazill with Avon products. I know, I forget

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Speaker 1: the day I walked from one to one from sixth Avenue,

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Speaker 1: which was one our officers there, over to their office

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Speaker 1: on fifty seven Street with the Avon Products chart in

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Speaker 1: my black pocket and I walked into the head of

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Speaker 1: the investment manager and I covered up the name of

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Speaker 1: the stock. Yea, I said, look at the stock. Uh,

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Speaker 1: would you be a buyer here or a seller here?

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Speaker 1: And of course I asked you if you're it's gonna

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Speaker 1: be a seller as assumes as you own it. Um,

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Speaker 1: you can't sell something you don't own. But just give

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Speaker 1: me an answer one or the other. Would you be

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Speaker 1: a buyer or a seller? He said, I don't think

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Speaker 1: I'd be a buyer, not in a stock that's how

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Speaker 1: to run like this. I said, how about a seller?

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Speaker 1: He said, well, there's not enough evidence of that. And

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Speaker 1: I said, well, look carefully at how all these rallies

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Speaker 1: I had the one point shot. See how all these

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Speaker 1: rallies are failing to get higher. A rally that fails

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Speaker 1: to break out is selling into strength, like a decline

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Speaker 1: that fails to break down is buying into weakness. That's

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Speaker 1: where the point and figure shigns through and giving you

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Speaker 1: the feeling of supply and demand distribution, virtuals accumulation. And

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Speaker 1: uh So he looked at this and I said, you

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Speaker 1: know what, I said, entertain me and sell half of

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Speaker 1: your million chats and see what happens. And he did.

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Speaker 1: And that was the That was the end of Avon products.

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Speaker 1: We just couldn't see it going up anymore. It wasn't

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Speaker 1: that we could possibly see major risk yet, but it

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Speaker 1: just didn't show any reward potential. So that's a great story.

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Speaker 1: I used to do this a lot. I mean I'll

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Speaker 1: tell you the time I went to a major mutual

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Speaker 1: fund in Boston. I'm gonna mentioned the name, and uh,

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Speaker 1: I don't. I didn't. I didn't see many people here.

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Speaker 1: It's not it's not yours, David. Uh and uh. All

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Speaker 1: the managers were sitting around table, and I would go

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Speaker 1: in with the charts without beings on them. And uh.

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Speaker 1: Just one time I sat there and I had the

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Speaker 1: guts to put these charts up on the wall. They

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Speaker 1: were in the technology field in the sixties, late sixties,

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Speaker 1: early seventies, whatever, and uh, and I'd say, just simply,

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Speaker 1: would you own these stocks? No hand went up and

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Speaker 1: as East would put if they were forming frowns. She

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Speaker 1: liked to buy smiles. These were falling frowns. And one

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Speaker 1: guy got so pissed upset at me. He came up

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Speaker 1: and he took me to the doors, let me to

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Speaker 1: the elevator, and he said, get out of here. I

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Speaker 1: never want to see you again. And the salesman sat there,

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Speaker 1: but will then, what am I gonna do? My analyst

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Speaker 1: is being thrown out of here. And the salesman came

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Speaker 1: to me. I said, Dave, we're gonna be right, We're

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Speaker 1: gonna be right. Look at this. They threw me out.

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Speaker 1: They're overweighted in these stocks and there's no way they're

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Speaker 1: not going up anymore. And we were right. I never

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Speaker 1: if forget that meaning. So you mentioned earlier. You mentioned

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Speaker 1: earlier behavioral pyschology and behavioral finance. What does this say

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Speaker 1: about portfolio manager's ability to be objective if he doesn't

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Speaker 1: want to sell his stock, but if he's looking at

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Speaker 1: a chart without the name on it, he has a

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Speaker 1: very different read of it. Well, I don't know, it's it.

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Speaker 1: Sometimes you can be over informed, right, maybe just the

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Speaker 1: reality of the chot picture. If you've got the understanding

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Speaker 1: and you gain the feel, and let's face it, you

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Speaker 1: won't know this experienced people. Do you feel the supply

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Speaker 1: and demand when you keep your charts to your studies,

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Speaker 1: whether it's by the computer or by hand. I have

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Speaker 1: staff that kept up our three four hundred as it was,

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Speaker 1: pointing figure charts every day. But I would slip in

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Speaker 1: and and take two or three books myself as many

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Speaker 1: mornings as I could, because the thing I love to

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Speaker 1: do is actually see what is really going on and

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Speaker 1: update these charts. Letting someone else do it wasn't really

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Speaker 1: benefiting me at all. Do you do you think technology

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Speaker 1: has had a negative impact, that you lose something when

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Speaker 1: you're no longer doing it by hands. Very there's probably

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Speaker 1: a lot to be said for that. I mean, you know,

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Speaker 1: I I'm a I'm a peculiar person in the sense

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Speaker 1: that I came in with a doubt four hundred five

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Speaker 1: d ninety eight and left when it was uh in

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Speaker 1: the well over ten thousand. I lived through the greatest

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Speaker 1: and participated in the greatest bull market and history if

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Speaker 1: you think about it, um, So a lot of my

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Speaker 1: leanings are not going to be akin to now. We're

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Speaker 1: in an entirely different cycle. Obviously, I personally think you're

404
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Speaker 1: in another major bully move now, um that hasn't shown

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Speaker 1: any signs of correcting. And we got to do this

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Speaker 1: conversation before. If you're studying the market today, throw out

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Speaker 1: your linear charts. You need geometric charts, you need semi

408
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Speaker 1: log graphs. That last night, I was getting ready to

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Speaker 1: go out to dinner with Ralph and and the TV

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Speaker 1: on this woman it could have been a guide and

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Speaker 1: as a matter of the person was complaining that the

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Speaker 1: market was down forty somebod points and it was crashing.

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Speaker 1: How disappointing after being up two hundred down forty and

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Speaker 1: I said, my god, one it was five hundred forty

415
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Speaker 1: points was crashing, But not when it's twenty thousand. That's amazing.

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Speaker 1: There's no grasp of reality, if you will, where are

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Speaker 1: we in the whole thing? That's why I love log shots.

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Speaker 1: I mean, and you just stepped back and and take

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Speaker 1: a look. Really fun, Let's let's let's talk about um

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Speaker 1: the number one you mentioned five hundred. Let's look about

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Speaker 1: a hundred and a thousand you reference, and I'm assuming

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Speaker 1: this is in the sixty eight two period. The Dow

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Speaker 1: tried to get over a thousand repeatedly, I think you

424
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Speaker 1: said seventeen times and failed. And you went back in

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Speaker 1: the history books and you looked at a hundred and

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Speaker 1: lo and behold something similar. Very that was that? That

427
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Speaker 1: that that? Thank you to bring that up, because, as

428
00:24:43,000 --> 00:24:45,359
Speaker 1: I said, that was my last piece of research that

429
00:24:45,400 --> 00:24:47,440
Speaker 1: I published, and it was a joy to do. I

430
00:24:47,480 --> 00:24:50,800
Speaker 1: love going back looking at historic pictures. And that's exactly.

431
00:24:51,080 --> 00:24:52,960
Speaker 1: My god. I had the books, all the stuff there

432
00:24:53,080 --> 00:24:57,200
Speaker 1: in the room, but the study fell apart. I retired

433
00:24:57,200 --> 00:25:00,720
Speaker 1: in two thousand four. Study a part really in the

434
00:25:00,720 --> 00:25:03,480
Speaker 1: bear mark at two thousand seven eight, more so in

435
00:25:03,520 --> 00:25:06,480
Speaker 1: the recovery, because we're not supposed to be through ten

436
00:25:07,000 --> 00:25:10,159
Speaker 1: yet in a material way. But the final the final

437
00:25:10,400 --> 00:25:13,840
Speaker 1: sentence did say that the next major secular uptrend won't

438
00:25:13,840 --> 00:25:17,520
Speaker 1: become really visible in two thousand eighteen, will become visible

439
00:25:17,520 --> 00:25:21,320
Speaker 1: in that pots on track. But what happened in the

440
00:25:21,640 --> 00:25:25,320
Speaker 1: jiggles in between didn't seem too to work out correctly.

441
00:25:25,440 --> 00:25:28,720
Speaker 1: So so there's no significance about base ten numbers ten

442
00:25:29,000 --> 00:25:32,679
Speaker 1: hundred of thousand. Well that was all psychological anyway, you know,

443
00:25:33,400 --> 00:25:36,399
Speaker 1: But it was a fun exercise, Okay, it gave me

444
00:25:36,440 --> 00:25:40,320
Speaker 1: something to talk about. So everything you use, all of

445
00:25:40,359 --> 00:25:44,240
Speaker 1: your indicators, all your strategies, all of that is publicly

446
00:25:44,280 --> 00:25:48,840
Speaker 1: available to anybody who wants, right, anybody wants to do

447
00:25:48,960 --> 00:25:53,920
Speaker 1: the work. What made your approach to technico analysis stands out?

448
00:25:54,520 --> 00:25:56,400
Speaker 1: And how much of it was art and how much

449
00:25:56,400 --> 00:25:58,560
Speaker 1: of it was sorry, very good, Please put the first

450
00:25:58,600 --> 00:26:01,679
Speaker 1: page up first. I know, really do this myself, but

451
00:26:01,720 --> 00:26:03,480
Speaker 1: I'm not a member of the union. Don't let me

452
00:26:03,520 --> 00:26:06,000
Speaker 1: do it now. The first page, the very first page,

453
00:26:06,040 --> 00:26:11,080
Speaker 1: the title, the title, the cover, No, not that this

454
00:26:11,119 --> 00:26:14,520
Speaker 1: one our technical bull case for bonds written in what

455
00:26:14,640 --> 00:26:20,840
Speaker 1: year May. Based on our technical analysis, we believe that

456
00:26:20,880 --> 00:26:24,960
Speaker 1: a structural bullmarket is underway for bonds. We believe the shorter,

457
00:26:25,080 --> 00:26:27,080
Speaker 1: immediate and long term in the cave is allowing the

458
00:26:27,119 --> 00:26:29,760
Speaker 1: best bond bet to be made and possibly the entire

459
00:26:29,840 --> 00:26:35,040
Speaker 1: investment career of the reader. Where's the heads there? Okay,

460
00:26:35,320 --> 00:26:38,960
Speaker 1: tell me that there's Oh, we're always hedging. We strongly

461
00:26:39,040 --> 00:26:42,520
Speaker 1: suggest that balance institutional and private investor portfolios contain a

462
00:26:42,600 --> 00:26:46,840
Speaker 1: larger than here to four prudent bond position. We believe

463
00:26:46,880 --> 00:26:49,920
Speaker 1: that representation is blah blah blah. This strenths is being published.

464
00:26:49,920 --> 00:26:53,440
Speaker 1: Billity is a thought provoking document even the world's smartest

465
00:26:53,480 --> 00:26:57,000
Speaker 1: man couldn't project with empirical climate collect there's the references

466
00:26:57,040 --> 00:27:01,520
Speaker 1: we make. Technical analysis helps uncovered friends that leave the

467
00:27:01,600 --> 00:27:06,399
Speaker 1: curious mind to explore the explanation. That's the spirit of

468
00:27:06,440 --> 00:27:10,000
Speaker 1: the report. Now, in order to get our point across,

469
00:27:10,480 --> 00:27:13,359
Speaker 1: I'm going to show you the best proprietary indicator for

470
00:27:13,560 --> 00:27:15,320
Speaker 1: a few pages that you get to the rubber band.

471
00:27:16,720 --> 00:27:22,720
Speaker 1: Um find a picture of There it is Alan's hands

472
00:27:22,760 --> 00:27:26,359
Speaker 1: under the xerox machine. I had so much fun with this.

473
00:27:26,520 --> 00:27:29,239
Speaker 1: I would go out I'll never forgetting Winston Salem. A

474
00:27:29,240 --> 00:27:32,119
Speaker 1: crowd of people like this, you know, private clients or

475
00:27:32,160 --> 00:27:34,320
Speaker 1: a big group, and I have the band's a whole

476
00:27:34,320 --> 00:27:36,600
Speaker 1: pocket full of them. And I started to stretch it,

477
00:27:36,640 --> 00:27:38,560
Speaker 1: and the guy in the first road acurse would be

478
00:27:38,600 --> 00:27:41,160
Speaker 1: moving back, not knowing what was going to happen. All

479
00:27:41,200 --> 00:27:44,439
Speaker 1: I was trying to point out here you see this

480
00:27:44,600 --> 00:27:48,560
Speaker 1: is interest rates. Uh no, no, this is the bond price.

481
00:27:48,600 --> 00:27:53,000
Speaker 1: I'm very sorry. These are not rates. Now they are rates?

482
00:27:53,680 --> 00:27:57,680
Speaker 1: Are I said, Look, if rates could go from eight

483
00:27:57,720 --> 00:28:02,200
Speaker 1: percent to four and four years, why couldn't they snapped

484
00:28:02,240 --> 00:28:04,800
Speaker 1: back just as quick? That was the purpose of the

485
00:28:04,880 --> 00:28:08,240
Speaker 1: rubber band thesis. And you know that's exactly what happened.

486
00:28:08,720 --> 00:28:11,560
Speaker 1: Without a forecast, No was something. Get the mind open,

487
00:28:11,600 --> 00:28:15,320
Speaker 1: it might happen. You know it could happen. And what

488
00:28:15,400 --> 00:28:17,440
Speaker 1: else do you all see? Come on, all you folks,

489
00:28:17,480 --> 00:28:20,720
Speaker 1: look at this chart. It's wonderful. You see for the

490
00:28:20,800 --> 00:28:23,480
Speaker 1: first time in the forty some odd years of interest

491
00:28:23,560 --> 00:28:28,960
Speaker 1: rates um the first higher bottom. That was the clue

492
00:28:28,960 --> 00:28:31,879
Speaker 1: to us. It was really the top in the price

493
00:28:32,320 --> 00:28:35,600
Speaker 1: that caught our attention because we did not catch the

494
00:28:35,680 --> 00:28:40,320
Speaker 1: high end rates, but we certainly caught the reversal and

495
00:28:40,400 --> 00:28:43,880
Speaker 1: stayed with it for some years. And right now we

496
00:28:43,920 --> 00:28:48,440
Speaker 1: believe that rates a reversing again in a different direction.

497
00:28:49,240 --> 00:28:51,160
Speaker 1: And as we used to say back in these days,

498
00:28:52,360 --> 00:28:56,440
Speaker 1: interest rates are like a short sale. I gotta took

499
00:28:56,480 --> 00:29:00,640
Speaker 1: out a discussion not here today, somewhere else maybe about

500
00:29:00,680 --> 00:29:03,880
Speaker 1: the interest rates. Remember they can't go lower than zero?

501
00:29:04,080 --> 00:29:09,040
Speaker 1: Oh yes they did. I know, I know we negative rates, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes,

502
00:29:09,120 --> 00:29:13,120
Speaker 1: But you're not talking about something where it's four and

503
00:29:13,160 --> 00:29:17,200
Speaker 1: it's got you know, hundred basis points to go before

504
00:29:17,360 --> 00:29:21,120
Speaker 1: it might hit zero. And this was not overly difficult

505
00:29:21,880 --> 00:29:24,720
Speaker 1: for an open mind to accept that there was something happening.

506
00:29:24,720 --> 00:29:26,960
Speaker 1: But the rubber band just kind of added a little

507
00:29:27,000 --> 00:29:31,000
Speaker 1: fun to the whole thing. So are you seeing the

508
00:29:31,040 --> 00:29:33,880
Speaker 1: bond bull market that began in the eighties. Are you

509
00:29:34,040 --> 00:29:36,880
Speaker 1: ready to say it's over? Or you looking that it's

510
00:29:36,960 --> 00:29:41,480
Speaker 1: coming to an end? Um? Well, I think I'd say.

511
00:29:41,640 --> 00:29:47,840
Speaker 1: I'd say that the the the decline and interest rates, um,

512
00:29:47,880 --> 00:29:51,760
Speaker 1: it would be over. So therefore the bull marketing bonds

513
00:29:51,960 --> 00:29:55,280
Speaker 1: would be over. Yes, I guess that's the guess. That's

514
00:29:55,320 --> 00:30:01,800
Speaker 1: the position that we take the evidence that's unfolding. If

515
00:30:01,840 --> 00:30:04,600
Speaker 1: you're having a business dispute, the process can be slow

516
00:30:04,640 --> 00:30:07,600
Speaker 1: and drawn out, especially if you rely on litigation. In

517
00:30:07,640 --> 00:30:10,240
Speaker 1: the courts, you can wait for years before your case

518
00:30:10,320 --> 00:30:13,360
Speaker 1: is resolved, and the longer your case proceeds, the more

519
00:30:13,440 --> 00:30:17,600
Speaker 1: your case can cost. Not with the American Arbitration Association.

520
00:30:17,960 --> 00:30:22,080
Speaker 1: Arbitration or mediation with the American Arbitration Association is faster.

521
00:30:22,360 --> 00:30:26,040
Speaker 1: In fact, nearly fifty of our cases settled prior to hearings.

522
00:30:26,760 --> 00:30:31,920
Speaker 1: Ad R dot org resolve faster. So the bullmarket and

523
00:30:31,960 --> 00:30:34,880
Speaker 1: bonds is over? Can we say a bear marketing bonds

524
00:30:35,160 --> 00:30:37,240
Speaker 1: has begun? Or is it too soon to say that? Oh?

525
00:30:37,320 --> 00:30:41,080
Speaker 1: It's very too soon? Yea and release? What was it

526
00:30:41,120 --> 00:30:43,360
Speaker 1: that you pointed out that the tops were shop and

527
00:30:43,400 --> 00:30:47,680
Speaker 1: the bottoms were curved? So you retired officially in two

528
00:30:47,720 --> 00:30:52,600
Speaker 1: thousand and four, and then the market peaks in oh seven.

529
00:30:53,400 --> 00:30:56,160
Speaker 1: Over the next eighteen months we see a fifty seven

530
00:30:56,160 --> 00:31:01,120
Speaker 1: percent drop in the SMP. Were you watching not thinking? Man?

531
00:31:01,280 --> 00:31:03,240
Speaker 1: I could be making a killing now if I was

532
00:31:03,280 --> 00:31:06,160
Speaker 1: still working. What were you thinking when you were watched?

533
00:31:06,920 --> 00:31:10,120
Speaker 1: I'll tell you this, and this is again a little

534
00:31:10,640 --> 00:31:14,680
Speaker 1: confessions of the soul. I'm not in the booth. But anyway,

535
00:31:16,760 --> 00:31:19,240
Speaker 1: I was on bended knees a lot of my colleagues

536
00:31:20,080 --> 00:31:22,600
Speaker 1: to sell their City Group stock at fifty five dollars,

537
00:31:22,600 --> 00:31:26,320
Speaker 1: which the price it was the day I retired. I'm

538
00:31:26,360 --> 00:31:28,720
Speaker 1: just backing up a little bit to the deeps that

539
00:31:28,840 --> 00:31:32,320
Speaker 1: you've got. Uh, this stock, to me was forming an

540
00:31:32,320 --> 00:31:36,080
Speaker 1: incredible reversal. Did I see it going to two? Of

541
00:31:36,120 --> 00:31:39,680
Speaker 1: course not? Which it did, of course not. But I

542
00:31:39,720 --> 00:31:42,840
Speaker 1: sold all my holdings, which were rather large thanks to

543
00:31:42,880 --> 00:31:47,800
Speaker 1: Sandy and his profit sharing plans. And uh, I wasn't

544
00:31:47,840 --> 00:31:50,360
Speaker 1: there going down to two. I was out, But I

545
00:31:50,400 --> 00:31:52,800
Speaker 1: saw some of my colleagues with even more time at

546
00:31:52,800 --> 00:31:55,280
Speaker 1: the firm than me, wiped out. It was. It was

547
00:31:55,520 --> 00:31:58,520
Speaker 1: a horrible feeling to see because they just, you know,

548
00:31:58,640 --> 00:32:02,280
Speaker 1: the dividend that cause was the yield, you know, the

549
00:32:02,320 --> 00:32:06,680
Speaker 1: dividends as good as the next director's meeting. Come on. Uh. Anyway,

550
00:32:06,880 --> 00:32:11,120
Speaker 1: that was so, that was so sorrowful to see. So

551
00:32:11,520 --> 00:32:16,920
Speaker 1: what's your question? So, so, as as a retiree watching

552
00:32:17,720 --> 00:32:21,000
Speaker 1: a major negative trend unfold, were you looking at it?

553
00:32:21,680 --> 00:32:25,440
Speaker 1: Aside from the obvious My former colleagues hopefully they followed

554
00:32:25,480 --> 00:32:27,880
Speaker 1: my advice and sold, But were you looking at it

555
00:32:27,960 --> 00:32:31,000
Speaker 1: as there is a huge trade to be made here

556
00:32:31,160 --> 00:32:34,560
Speaker 1: or how did you see I I although thought my

557
00:32:34,640 --> 00:32:38,080
Speaker 1: best my last best call was on gold in the

558
00:32:38,120 --> 00:32:42,440
Speaker 1: early eighties, um, and my my favorite stock was Newmont Mining,

559
00:32:43,480 --> 00:32:45,719
Speaker 1: and I used to push the heck out of it,

560
00:32:45,720 --> 00:32:48,200
Speaker 1: particularly to our private client. And I got the Investment

561
00:32:48,200 --> 00:32:51,880
Speaker 1: Policy Committee to actually allocate part of the you know,

562
00:32:52,240 --> 00:32:55,960
Speaker 1: the portfolio strategist to to the metal itself and and

563
00:32:56,040 --> 00:33:00,840
Speaker 1: the stocks themselves. And that was a tremendous Gold had

564
00:33:00,840 --> 00:33:03,640
Speaker 1: and Newmont had and some of the others. And I

565
00:33:03,680 --> 00:33:09,080
Speaker 1: walked away from all that four just before I tied,

566
00:33:09,120 --> 00:33:11,960
Speaker 1: I retired, and those were the last point in figure

567
00:33:11,960 --> 00:33:14,160
Speaker 1: shots I still have at home. That was my gold

568
00:33:14,240 --> 00:33:17,760
Speaker 1: chairs two thousand four or two thou four. And I,

569
00:33:17,880 --> 00:33:23,560
Speaker 1: frankly in the ensuing fifteen ensuing ten years, don't even

570
00:33:23,560 --> 00:33:26,600
Speaker 1: turn on the Cartoon Network anymore. I mean, you know,

571
00:33:27,480 --> 00:33:30,320
Speaker 1: that's why I used to cost the NBC. I did.

572
00:33:30,400 --> 00:33:35,520
Speaker 1: I used to Cartoon Network. Can entertainment go watch these

573
00:33:35,600 --> 00:33:39,520
Speaker 1: characters try to explain what's happening. So so, prior to

574
00:33:39,560 --> 00:33:43,200
Speaker 1: the financial crisis, hedge funds had been doing really well,

575
00:33:43,400 --> 00:33:46,320
Speaker 1: capturing a lot of assets and doing well for clients.

576
00:33:46,920 --> 00:33:50,200
Speaker 1: For the past decade, hedge funds can't seem to get

577
00:33:50,240 --> 00:33:53,880
Speaker 1: out of their own way. What do you attribute that to? Uh,

578
00:33:54,880 --> 00:33:58,280
Speaker 1: the door has to be opened bigger, meaning there's too

579
00:33:58,360 --> 00:34:00,520
Speaker 1: many trades trying to get through the same or so

580
00:34:00,560 --> 00:34:03,200
Speaker 1: they're all doing it's they're all crowded trade. I think so,

581
00:34:04,600 --> 00:34:08,239
Speaker 1: I think so, I mean and and and I don't know, frankly,

582
00:34:08,239 --> 00:34:10,520
Speaker 1: if I was practicing today really like we used to,

583
00:34:11,920 --> 00:34:15,240
Speaker 1: I have no idea even if there are price change

584
00:34:15,280 --> 00:34:18,880
Speaker 1: services available, like our point in figure service was to

585
00:34:19,000 --> 00:34:21,080
Speaker 1: keep charts like that up to date. So I'm so,

586
00:34:21,239 --> 00:34:24,280
Speaker 1: I'm so out of it. They're at out of business.

587
00:34:24,280 --> 00:34:30,320
Speaker 1: And I was talking briefly before too, uh president about

588
00:34:30,320 --> 00:34:33,040
Speaker 1: how they took over the R. W. Mansfield Company and

589
00:34:33,880 --> 00:34:36,920
Speaker 1: keeping that service alive, which is gratifying. That was one

590
00:34:36,960 --> 00:34:39,520
Speaker 1: of my favorite I'd had that to the house of

591
00:34:39,600 --> 00:34:43,040
Speaker 1: the weekends and spent two hours every Sunday pouring through

592
00:34:43,040 --> 00:34:45,759
Speaker 1: the Mansfield sorts. It was really that simple. I mean,

593
00:34:45,760 --> 00:34:49,799
Speaker 1: you didn't have to have complicated al Graham's or whatever

594
00:34:49,800 --> 00:34:54,400
Speaker 1: they're called. And uh wise over two squad and x

595
00:34:54,560 --> 00:34:58,120
Speaker 1: y Z s um in a in a parentheses. Um God,

596
00:34:58,160 --> 00:35:00,439
Speaker 1: I could never get through the Financial Analysts hand book

597
00:35:01,040 --> 00:35:04,320
Speaker 1: were so difficult because I never took statistics of source.

598
00:35:04,320 --> 00:35:06,759
Speaker 1: That's one of the reasons. But I don't do know

599
00:35:06,840 --> 00:35:10,200
Speaker 1: the difference between many are and good blog. What about

600
00:35:10,239 --> 00:35:15,799
Speaker 1: technology today? What what is the impact of massive computing

601
00:35:15,800 --> 00:35:19,680
Speaker 1: power on on charted Well, I don't know the answer.

602
00:35:20,920 --> 00:35:24,839
Speaker 1: I honestly don't know the answer. All I can all

603
00:35:24,880 --> 00:35:27,000
Speaker 1: I can say is my one of my first trips

604
00:35:27,040 --> 00:35:31,279
Speaker 1: to Tokyo. We're incidentally technical analysis really got its birth,

605
00:35:31,320 --> 00:35:35,320
Speaker 1: as you all know, back a few centuries ago in Japan.

606
00:35:36,040 --> 00:35:40,920
Speaker 1: Um I was taken to the Tokyo Stock Exchange and

607
00:35:41,920 --> 00:35:45,640
Speaker 1: showed I was I showed show the road room where

608
00:35:45,680 --> 00:35:49,200
Speaker 1: computers were trading with computers, and all I could see

609
00:35:49,200 --> 00:35:52,200
Speaker 1: with these lights flashing, lights flashing, lights flashing, there were

610
00:35:52,239 --> 00:35:55,760
Speaker 1: no people, nobody, just the computer is going back and forth,

611
00:35:55,840 --> 00:35:58,799
Speaker 1: matching and selling and buy and selling, and and I'm

612
00:35:58,800 --> 00:36:01,360
Speaker 1: sure that there was something I can stick chop makers somewhere,

613
00:36:01,960 --> 00:36:04,000
Speaker 1: you know, trying to take this information and put it

614
00:36:04,000 --> 00:36:06,279
Speaker 1: on the pencil on a piece of paper that these

615
00:36:06,280 --> 00:36:10,160
Speaker 1: computers were doing. I don't I don't know the answer

616
00:36:10,200 --> 00:36:12,000
Speaker 1: to the question, because see if you can just take

617
00:36:12,200 --> 00:36:15,680
Speaker 1: some other step further. We're not running those computers. They're

618
00:36:15,719 --> 00:36:20,360
Speaker 1: running themselves. We're not the brains behind whatever trades they're making.

619
00:36:20,440 --> 00:36:23,200
Speaker 1: So they are they are? They just playing their own emotions.

620
00:36:23,800 --> 00:36:27,720
Speaker 1: Do the computers have emotions? Do they overheat an example,

621
00:36:27,800 --> 00:36:31,080
Speaker 1: or they run out of power? Do they go through climaxes?

622
00:36:31,080 --> 00:36:33,960
Speaker 1: Selling climaxes, buying climaxes? I mean, I don't know, you

623
00:36:34,000 --> 00:36:37,839
Speaker 1: know all that to answer your question. So, so now

624
00:36:37,880 --> 00:36:42,120
Speaker 1: that you're retired, you you mentioned some media. When you're

625
00:36:42,160 --> 00:36:46,719
Speaker 1: looking at the industry today, be at Wall Street or

626
00:36:46,800 --> 00:36:50,840
Speaker 1: technicals or just trading in general, what what makes you crazy?

627
00:36:50,880 --> 00:36:54,200
Speaker 1: What do you look at? And just do that with Oh,

628
00:36:54,200 --> 00:36:56,320
Speaker 1: that's a good question. Because I came up before to

629
00:36:57,000 --> 00:37:01,720
Speaker 1: the likely reporting I heard last night. I do that too.

630
00:37:02,239 --> 00:37:04,359
Speaker 1: The fact that you know you're talking about a twenty

631
00:37:05,440 --> 00:37:09,800
Speaker 1: level and you're worried about forty um that and because

632
00:37:09,840 --> 00:37:11,959
Speaker 1: because you know, the average person on the street who's

633
00:37:12,000 --> 00:37:14,879
Speaker 1: listening to you doesn't put it in that perspective. They

634
00:37:14,880 --> 00:37:17,160
Speaker 1: hear the forty points and they don't think of it

635
00:37:17,160 --> 00:37:21,600
Speaker 1: on a twenty thou base. I have just one thing

636
00:37:21,640 --> 00:37:26,560
Speaker 1: I still may have here in this incredible pile of stuff. Incidentally, Hank,

637
00:37:27,320 --> 00:37:29,839
Speaker 1: I've brought along something that you wrote, The twenty one

638
00:37:30,000 --> 00:37:34,479
Speaker 1: Century Technician by Hank Prudent, and that's an incredible piece

639
00:37:34,520 --> 00:37:37,160
Speaker 1: of artwork on there that was chosen for this piece.

640
00:37:37,600 --> 00:37:41,600
Speaker 1: You remember that, Hank, when you wrote that, um, and

641
00:37:41,640 --> 00:37:44,640
Speaker 1: that was the future of technical analysis and the academics

642
00:37:44,719 --> 00:37:48,480
Speaker 1: ie of Golden State University looks pretty chaotic on it,

643
00:37:49,600 --> 00:37:51,600
Speaker 1: that thing about what you were talking to me about there.

644
00:37:53,040 --> 00:37:58,879
Speaker 1: But once a month, um, this young lady up here

645
00:37:58,920 --> 00:38:04,160
Speaker 1: puts out this piece of research. Uh, look at this,

646
00:38:05,320 --> 00:38:08,440
Speaker 1: Look at this. Oh my god. I give her so

647
00:38:08,560 --> 00:38:12,160
Speaker 1: much credit because I wouldn't even be able to get

648
00:38:12,280 --> 00:38:16,800
Speaker 1: past the first ten pages, not sixty. Um. I'm probably

649
00:38:16,840 --> 00:38:20,000
Speaker 1: listed on here as a consultant emeritus or is it

650
00:38:20,080 --> 00:38:24,799
Speaker 1: emeritus emeritus. I don't know. I always feel like I

651
00:38:24,800 --> 00:38:27,000
Speaker 1: have a problem with my right arm one. It's a

652
00:38:27,040 --> 00:38:32,919
Speaker 1: little little mme ritis. But you know, to follow all

653
00:38:32,960 --> 00:38:36,480
Speaker 1: that's going on and gets to can be concise and

654
00:38:37,080 --> 00:38:39,800
Speaker 1: it means something. I think it's really really today the

655
00:38:40,120 --> 00:38:45,239
Speaker 1: challenge of the technical analysts. But Ralph's right, Ralph, do

656
00:38:45,280 --> 00:38:48,799
Speaker 1: you know I would not in my discussions with a

657
00:38:48,840 --> 00:38:56,080
Speaker 1: client I'd never talked about the shampoo. Okay, I never

658
00:38:56,160 --> 00:38:59,879
Speaker 1: mentioned the term heads and shoulders, head and shoulders, top

659
00:39:00,160 --> 00:39:04,640
Speaker 1: or bottom. I would told a top a distribution part

660
00:39:04,719 --> 00:39:08,520
Speaker 1: of pattern, or an accumulation bottom or a reversal pattern.

661
00:39:08,880 --> 00:39:11,600
Speaker 1: I'd never give them the opportunity to come back and

662
00:39:11,719 --> 00:39:14,600
Speaker 1: laugh at me. You know, you're the guy with all

663
00:39:14,600 --> 00:39:20,160
Speaker 1: those wedges, triangles, shampoo products, um gaps, still aware of

664
00:39:20,200 --> 00:39:22,520
Speaker 1: water gap, you know, all that kind of stuff. You

665
00:39:22,760 --> 00:39:25,839
Speaker 1: never have to bring that up, just you know, bring

666
00:39:25,920 --> 00:39:29,359
Speaker 1: up the reason that those patterns were forming as you're

667
00:39:29,400 --> 00:39:35,799
Speaker 1: excused distribution, accumulations, supply demand. And I mean I used

668
00:39:35,800 --> 00:39:37,920
Speaker 1: to show the point in figure talking to some people,

669
00:39:37,960 --> 00:39:41,279
Speaker 1: and I never believed in myself, but I had. I

670
00:39:41,320 --> 00:39:44,080
Speaker 1: had a report out on bowling when the twenty dollars stopped.

671
00:39:44,120 --> 00:39:48,880
Speaker 1: You know, I had price target for bowing, and I

672
00:39:48,960 --> 00:39:51,359
Speaker 1: told the clients I honestly, I said, I don't believe it,

673
00:39:52,040 --> 00:39:55,040
Speaker 1: but I'm showing it to you. The method is allowing

674
00:39:55,080 --> 00:40:00,160
Speaker 1: me to you express this possibility. And I was long.

675
00:40:00,160 --> 00:40:05,080
Speaker 1: I went to a bull market that was I'll never

676
00:40:05,239 --> 00:40:10,000
Speaker 1: forget it times. So I know we only have about

677
00:40:10,000 --> 00:40:12,359
Speaker 1: ten minutes and there's a handful of questions I want

678
00:40:12,360 --> 00:40:16,040
Speaker 1: to get to. You mentioned some of your early mentors,

679
00:40:16,080 --> 00:40:19,520
Speaker 1: that people mentored you in the business problem. Who were

680
00:40:19,560 --> 00:40:24,239
Speaker 1: the investors that you that influenced you, that you were

681
00:40:24,280 --> 00:40:29,040
Speaker 1: impressed with, that you followed in the early days. Well,

682
00:40:29,080 --> 00:40:31,799
Speaker 1: that's a good question. I went back and of course

683
00:40:31,880 --> 00:40:34,839
Speaker 1: read all the major history books. I'm sorry Buddy has

684
00:40:34,880 --> 00:40:38,760
Speaker 1: about Jesse Livermore and and I went back and studied

685
00:40:38,880 --> 00:40:43,480
Speaker 1: entirelyly Harold Gottli series which was published in the nineteen twenties.

686
00:40:44,520 --> 00:40:50,960
Speaker 1: UM and I was. I was also uh Shabaka books

687
00:40:51,280 --> 00:40:55,000
Speaker 1: that he was Tony Tabelle's uncle, you know, uh point

688
00:40:55,000 --> 00:40:59,360
Speaker 1: and figure work and stuff back in the thirties. UM

689
00:40:59,400 --> 00:41:01,759
Speaker 1: and my idols on Wall Street. To put let's put

690
00:41:01,760 --> 00:41:04,560
Speaker 1: it this way, instead of investors ken Ward at Hayden

691
00:41:04,640 --> 00:41:09,200
Speaker 1: Stone pointing figure shots, Edmund W. Tabell at Walston was

692
00:41:09,320 --> 00:41:13,200
Speaker 1: son Tony pointing figure charts. I never knew what Bob

693
00:41:13,200 --> 00:41:16,840
Speaker 1: Farrell practiced over at Mery Lynch. I only saw his

694
00:41:16,880 --> 00:41:18,920
Speaker 1: written work. I never I never knew what went into it.

695
00:41:19,000 --> 00:41:21,160
Speaker 1: I don't know whether he kept pointing figure shots. But

696
00:41:21,840 --> 00:41:25,680
Speaker 1: the three reel point you figure shot people were were

697
00:41:25,680 --> 00:41:31,680
Speaker 1: Walston W. Harris Upham and and and and Hayden Stone

698
00:41:32,480 --> 00:41:37,560
Speaker 1: and Ralph You never what happened to ken Woods charts.

699
00:41:38,320 --> 00:41:43,520
Speaker 1: Oh that's right, Yeah, that's correct. Yeah, he was. He

700
00:41:43,600 --> 00:41:45,880
Speaker 1: was a fascinating fellow. I got to know him, not

701
00:41:45,960 --> 00:41:48,440
Speaker 1: for too many years. Unfortunately I got the nomen. He

702
00:41:48,480 --> 00:41:52,239
Speaker 1: was in his late seventies and he expired mazines. But

703
00:41:52,640 --> 00:41:56,040
Speaker 1: and then ed to Bell Tony's father, Um, and then

704
00:41:56,040 --> 00:41:59,320
Speaker 1: they actually computerized their pointing figure work and Ken Tower

705
00:41:59,360 --> 00:42:01,879
Speaker 1: of course who's year there was one of Tony's right

706
00:42:01,920 --> 00:42:04,920
Speaker 1: hand man and helped with all that process. Tony was

707
00:42:04,920 --> 00:42:09,279
Speaker 1: our second president. Incidentally, let let me ask you a

708
00:42:09,000 --> 00:42:12,080
Speaker 1: m a little bit of a trick question. You you've

709
00:42:12,080 --> 00:42:15,960
Speaker 1: told us about a couple of outstanding calls. Tell us

710
00:42:15,960 --> 00:42:18,920
Speaker 1: about a call that went wrong, a call that failed,

711
00:42:19,320 --> 00:42:25,800
Speaker 1: and what you might have learned from that. I assume once,

712
00:42:26,480 --> 00:42:33,680
Speaker 1: at least once, not once, I had a curl a

713
00:42:33,840 --> 00:42:38,640
Speaker 1: call that failed that I could not learn from. Really, yes,

714
00:42:38,880 --> 00:42:44,080
Speaker 1: you'll have to explain. I will. I recommended selling short televine.

715
00:42:45,200 --> 00:42:50,440
Speaker 1: The stock was and I was feeling fairly certain at

716
00:42:50,440 --> 00:42:52,960
Speaker 1: the stock was from the process of our pretty big

717
00:42:53,000 --> 00:42:56,120
Speaker 1: top well at least so it could sell off to eat.

718
00:43:00,200 --> 00:43:03,440
Speaker 1: I recommended it, send out a wire, put it out

719
00:43:03,480 --> 00:43:06,279
Speaker 1: there short sale, and that's kind of an interesting thing.

720
00:43:06,320 --> 00:43:08,560
Speaker 1: I had to check with my back office. Do we

721
00:43:08,600 --> 00:43:10,640
Speaker 1: have shares to loan? I mean, there's no sense of

722
00:43:10,640 --> 00:43:12,759
Speaker 1: doing something you can't do business. And you know, if

723
00:43:12,760 --> 00:43:14,520
Speaker 1: we couldn't get to find the shares for the guy

724
00:43:14,520 --> 00:43:17,280
Speaker 1: who wanted to sell it short, don't don't, don't bother

725
00:43:17,360 --> 00:43:21,399
Speaker 1: with it. Well, two days after that recommendation went out,

726
00:43:21,520 --> 00:43:26,759
Speaker 1: Mr Singleton announced a buy back, another thing I had

727
00:43:26,760 --> 00:43:29,799
Speaker 1: a control over, but at ten points higher than way

728
00:43:29,800 --> 00:43:34,640
Speaker 1: I recommended the shorts. Now I couldn't do anything about that.

729
00:43:35,719 --> 00:43:38,360
Speaker 1: I was really wrong on that one, but it was

730
00:43:38,400 --> 00:43:40,040
Speaker 1: out of my control. You know. He came out and

731
00:43:40,040 --> 00:43:42,560
Speaker 1: annouked the buyeback. Now did he know about this recommendation?

732
00:43:42,600 --> 00:43:45,600
Speaker 1: Do you think? Do you think he did? I don't know.

733
00:43:45,800 --> 00:43:47,680
Speaker 1: I mean there's a little Harris up I'm back then,

734
00:43:47,760 --> 00:43:50,960
Speaker 1: you know, somehow probably could have triggered it down to him.

735
00:43:51,520 --> 00:43:54,360
Speaker 1: Things that new topples fast, or that I think I

736
00:43:54,400 --> 00:43:56,640
Speaker 1: mentioned it before. You want you want to get more

737
00:43:56,680 --> 00:43:58,640
Speaker 1: involved in what you're doing, go back and read all

738
00:43:58,680 --> 00:44:03,080
Speaker 1: of Alvin Toffler's books. Start with Future Shock. Start with

739
00:44:03,080 --> 00:44:05,520
Speaker 1: the understanding of the acceleration of the rate of change,

740
00:44:05,800 --> 00:44:08,080
Speaker 1: because that's what the stock markets have been doing for

741
00:44:08,239 --> 00:44:12,640
Speaker 1: years now and probably will continue thanks to the technology. Um,

742
00:44:12,680 --> 00:44:14,799
Speaker 1: but do read these books are incredible. Let's start with

743
00:44:14,840 --> 00:44:19,640
Speaker 1: the Wheel and Fire and all that marvelous book readings.

744
00:44:19,680 --> 00:44:22,399
Speaker 1: Let's talk more about books. What the single by the way,

745
00:44:22,400 --> 00:44:25,960
Speaker 1: the single most ask question I get about any guests

746
00:44:25,960 --> 00:44:28,839
Speaker 1: they have is always what are their favorite books? So

747
00:44:29,239 --> 00:44:32,080
Speaker 1: Toffler's Future Shock, well that was that was from my

748
00:44:32,520 --> 00:44:35,719
Speaker 1: macro perspective. How Charts can help You in the stock

749
00:44:35,760 --> 00:44:39,640
Speaker 1: Market by William Giler, very simple published back in the sixties,

750
00:44:40,239 --> 00:44:43,359
Speaker 1: finn little volume. Oh I guess it might be now

751
00:44:43,520 --> 00:44:49,120
Speaker 1: Technical Analysis of Stock Trends by Edwards and McGee um

752
00:44:49,440 --> 00:44:51,920
Speaker 1: way out of date. But nevertheless, if you want to

753
00:44:51,920 --> 00:44:53,839
Speaker 1: see a chartist to bake a packet, what it looked

754
00:44:53,880 --> 00:44:55,960
Speaker 1: like back in those days, it you know, it's in

755
00:44:56,000 --> 00:45:00,920
Speaker 1: the book. Um. Let's see. I read all of Grandville books.

756
00:45:02,640 --> 00:45:06,520
Speaker 1: I knew Joe, not personally, but enough that he had

757
00:45:06,760 --> 00:45:08,520
Speaker 1: let me know if he was in town or something.

758
00:45:09,200 --> 00:45:12,280
Speaker 1: He was a character, God bless him. He was a showman.

759
00:45:12,520 --> 00:45:15,080
Speaker 1: Let's face it, but but he he put on a

760
00:45:15,120 --> 00:45:19,839
Speaker 1: damn good show. Um, let's see who else was in there. Well,

761
00:45:19,600 --> 00:45:22,359
Speaker 1: all the books you're all familiar with. I'm sure I've

762
00:45:22,400 --> 00:45:26,560
Speaker 1: read Garfield Drew's books on odd lot theory. It's an

763
00:45:26,560 --> 00:45:29,640
Speaker 1: odd lot? Do you ever hear about it anymore? Did

764
00:45:29,680 --> 00:45:32,800
Speaker 1: they trade odd lots anymore? God? You see, there's not

765
00:45:32,800 --> 00:45:35,960
Speaker 1: an example of how we moved along that was followed

766
00:45:36,040 --> 00:45:40,640
Speaker 1: every single day. Um, on the assumption that it was

767
00:45:40,719 --> 00:45:44,040
Speaker 1: the small buyer was always wrong when the odd light

768
00:45:44,120 --> 00:45:47,480
Speaker 1: on cell on by on selling got high, you should

769
00:45:47,520 --> 00:45:49,760
Speaker 1: be buying when it got low. And of course Bob

770
00:45:49,800 --> 00:45:53,040
Speaker 1: Farrell had proprietary work with the size of Merrill Lynches

771
00:45:53,760 --> 00:45:56,960
Speaker 1: buy sell trades every day. He was right on top

772
00:45:57,000 --> 00:46:01,520
Speaker 1: of all that stuff. What what indicators no longer have validity?

773
00:46:01,680 --> 00:46:06,040
Speaker 1: What what indicators have faded from from usefulness? And and

774
00:46:06,080 --> 00:46:09,239
Speaker 1: what does it an analyst do when they're starting to

775
00:46:09,320 --> 00:46:14,000
Speaker 1: suspect one of their favorite tools no longer works very

776
00:46:14,239 --> 00:46:16,920
Speaker 1: That's that's a wonderful question. I'm glad at both of

777
00:46:16,920 --> 00:46:20,759
Speaker 1: these and Ralpher here with me today because in our

778
00:46:20,840 --> 00:46:23,799
Speaker 1: chart room we had a wall as long as that

779
00:46:23,920 --> 00:46:26,759
Speaker 1: wall back there on one side of the room, which

780
00:46:26,840 --> 00:46:30,279
Speaker 1: was all sliding colkboard and had ten square of the

781
00:46:30,280 --> 00:46:34,000
Speaker 1: inch chopped paper pasted together from top to bottom, which

782
00:46:34,080 --> 00:46:37,640
Speaker 1: daily work was posted, so that side there would have

783
00:46:37,640 --> 00:46:40,600
Speaker 1: been about eight or nine years of daily indicators that

784
00:46:40,760 --> 00:46:43,120
Speaker 1: size of the wall. And it was set in such

785
00:46:43,160 --> 00:46:45,359
Speaker 1: a way that we wouldn't walk up to the wall

786
00:46:45,400 --> 00:46:47,439
Speaker 1: to look at it. We would stand twenty feet back

787
00:46:47,480 --> 00:46:51,799
Speaker 1: and stare and see what was going on. And one

788
00:46:51,840 --> 00:46:55,719
Speaker 1: of the things that was driven home to me is

789
00:46:55,800 --> 00:46:58,040
Speaker 1: never listened to people who tell you they embarrassed on

790
00:46:58,080 --> 00:47:01,520
Speaker 1: the market that's overboard, or the bulls on the market

791
00:47:01,520 --> 00:47:06,279
Speaker 1: because it's oversold. You all know how those indicators are calculated.

792
00:47:07,040 --> 00:47:11,520
Speaker 1: You all know the data go into those indicators. So

793
00:47:11,640 --> 00:47:16,759
Speaker 1: think about it. An over bolt market is bullish, an

794
00:47:16,800 --> 00:47:21,160
Speaker 1: oversoul market is bearish. You don't buy because it's oversold.

795
00:47:21,239 --> 00:47:23,680
Speaker 1: You're wait until it comes out of the oversouled condition.

796
00:47:24,200 --> 00:47:27,399
Speaker 1: You're wait until the oversouled condition alleviates itself. And that's

797
00:47:27,440 --> 00:47:30,640
Speaker 1: the market telling you. The selling pressure, which is what

798
00:47:30,800 --> 00:47:35,200
Speaker 1: costs it to get oversold is easy. I mean, I'll

799
00:47:35,200 --> 00:47:40,880
Speaker 1: never forget in the market went oversold on Thursday before

800
00:47:40,880 --> 00:47:45,919
Speaker 1: Monday in October. It came out of the oversold in November.

801
00:47:46,920 --> 00:47:48,640
Speaker 1: Now one would have been a better time to buy

802
00:47:48,719 --> 00:47:51,879
Speaker 1: the Friday before the Bundey crashed, or in November when

803
00:47:51,880 --> 00:47:55,080
Speaker 1: it was all over and was starting to recover. And

804
00:47:55,160 --> 00:47:57,319
Speaker 1: we could see that just by standing and looking at

805
00:47:57,360 --> 00:48:00,800
Speaker 1: the wall. It was amazing. Well, those the girl days.

806
00:48:01,960 --> 00:48:07,360
Speaker 1: So you so what other books besides um, the classic

807
00:48:07,400 --> 00:48:12,000
Speaker 1: technical analysis books. Toffler is so off the beaten path,

808
00:48:12,719 --> 00:48:15,319
Speaker 1: that's what? What other books along those lines stay with

809
00:48:15,360 --> 00:48:18,520
Speaker 1: you that may not be pure t a but have

810
00:48:18,680 --> 00:48:24,160
Speaker 1: something to teach and an oh, oh good you got

811
00:48:24,640 --> 00:48:28,400
Speaker 1: The Bandess of Crowds helped me along? Yes, uh, popular

812
00:48:28,440 --> 00:48:31,520
Speaker 1: delusions and the Madness of crowds? Is that it right

813
00:48:31,840 --> 00:48:38,479
Speaker 1: by who McKay? Yes, that's a good one. Crowd psychology.

814
00:48:38,840 --> 00:48:43,520
Speaker 1: Do you read Humphrey nils Reminiscence of a stock market Operator?

815
00:48:43,800 --> 00:48:48,560
Speaker 1: He was the creator of contrary Opinion? Um, that kind

816
00:48:48,600 --> 00:48:53,040
Speaker 1: of stuff is is helpful again and everything at Bob

817
00:48:53,040 --> 00:48:58,319
Speaker 1: Prector writes read carefully actor's perspective that I have the

818
00:48:58,320 --> 00:49:02,560
Speaker 1: greatest respect for that young man m his behavioral finance

819
00:49:02,640 --> 00:49:04,319
Speaker 1: that he's coming out with now on the work that

820
00:49:04,400 --> 00:49:07,879
Speaker 1: he's doing. I mean, he's so on and he's such

821
00:49:07,880 --> 00:49:10,960
Speaker 1: a pleasant person past present. The m T a to

822
00:49:11,120 --> 00:49:14,560
Speaker 1: talk with and listen to. And he's a member of Mensie.

823
00:49:14,560 --> 00:49:19,040
Speaker 1: You know, it's extremely intelligent. Any anywhere Bob does pay

824
00:49:19,080 --> 00:49:24,719
Speaker 1: attention to. And also Ned Davis, Ned's a fan. I'm

825
00:49:24,719 --> 00:49:27,279
Speaker 1: a fan of Ned Davis too. Everybody started working for

826
00:49:27,600 --> 00:49:30,760
Speaker 1: Weak Securities in Tennessee. He used to have a little

827
00:49:31,840 --> 00:49:35,800
Speaker 1: hay seed coming out of his mouth. What a powerful

828
00:49:35,840 --> 00:49:39,560
Speaker 1: operation today. All right, so we're down to our last

829
00:49:39,600 --> 00:49:43,839
Speaker 1: two questions. If if if some youngster came to you

830
00:49:43,880 --> 00:49:47,520
Speaker 1: and said I'm thinking about going into research, I want

831
00:49:47,520 --> 00:49:50,719
Speaker 1: to become a technical analyst, what sort of advice would

832
00:49:50,719 --> 00:49:55,960
Speaker 1: you give them? Punch, Oh, Barry, I don't know, hard question.

833
00:49:56,480 --> 00:49:59,480
Speaker 1: M oh I thought you were giving them the advice

834
00:49:59,520 --> 00:50:01,200
Speaker 1: to punch you want to punch on the question. No.

835
00:50:01,440 --> 00:50:04,680
Speaker 1: I was listening to the talk yesterday and I couldn't

836
00:50:04,719 --> 00:50:07,200
Speaker 1: agree more with what Frank and everybody was saying about

837
00:50:07,200 --> 00:50:09,680
Speaker 1: the difference between the buy and the south sides. I mean,

838
00:50:10,560 --> 00:50:13,920
Speaker 1: in my day, remember I said I went to do

839
00:50:13,960 --> 00:50:16,680
Speaker 1: the technical work because nobody had hires upon was doing it,

840
00:50:17,239 --> 00:50:20,760
Speaker 1: and there was technical work coming out of Hayden Stone Walston, Merrill,

841
00:50:20,840 --> 00:50:24,480
Speaker 1: lynch By, W press Prett's, Joseph Fallen Company, and Reynolds

842
00:50:24,520 --> 00:50:27,160
Speaker 1: and Company. They're right above me. For above me, they

843
00:50:27,200 --> 00:50:30,160
Speaker 1: all had somebody doing some sort of chalt reading or

844
00:50:30,080 --> 00:50:32,319
Speaker 1: or a daily you know, tip sheet or whatever you

845
00:50:32,320 --> 00:50:36,160
Speaker 1: want to call it. Um, you don't have that today.

846
00:50:36,480 --> 00:50:38,000
Speaker 1: I mean, do you have many cell sides? Do you

847
00:50:38,040 --> 00:50:41,000
Speaker 1: have left? Even when I told you how I did

848
00:50:41,040 --> 00:50:43,320
Speaker 1: my family tree one day, I sat down and doodled

849
00:50:43,360 --> 00:50:48,560
Speaker 1: and and I mean Colin loewb Robe, Chifs and Hammel, Harris, Upham, Smith, Bonnie,

850
00:50:49,480 --> 00:50:51,800
Speaker 1: I mean, they're all. They're all. I came up with

851
00:50:51,840 --> 00:50:54,879
Speaker 1: so many firms E F W E. Hutton's there all

852
00:50:55,000 --> 00:50:57,799
Speaker 1: and then my firm. I mean, so look at all

853
00:50:57,800 --> 00:51:00,600
Speaker 1: the firm just disappeared. Hutton used to have, of course,

854
00:51:00,719 --> 00:51:05,640
Speaker 1: phil roth Ian Newton, Cinda, a lot of people. There were.

855
00:51:05,680 --> 00:51:09,319
Speaker 1: All those positions were there, so you had an at

856
00:51:09,400 --> 00:51:11,560
Speaker 1: least your way to answer that question, you know, and

857
00:51:12,000 --> 00:51:14,720
Speaker 1: make a decision if you want to. You can always switch,

858
00:51:14,840 --> 00:51:17,719
Speaker 1: I would say, if we're back in those days, get

859
00:51:17,719 --> 00:51:20,000
Speaker 1: a job on the cell side. You can always switch

860
00:51:20,040 --> 00:51:23,239
Speaker 1: to the bye side. Maybe. But and I think that

861
00:51:23,360 --> 00:51:26,239
Speaker 1: these guys hit it on the nose yesterday too. I

862
00:51:26,239 --> 00:51:31,120
Speaker 1: think Frank said it. I forget now about uh maybe

863
00:51:31,120 --> 00:51:33,520
Speaker 1: more opportunity on the bye side than the cell side

864
00:51:34,160 --> 00:51:38,480
Speaker 1: for this, for this, for this discipline. And my last question,

865
00:51:38,840 --> 00:51:42,560
Speaker 1: what is it that you know about technicals and investing

866
00:51:42,560 --> 00:51:46,399
Speaker 1: in trading today that you wish you knew forty five

867
00:51:46,480 --> 00:51:51,040
Speaker 1: years ago when you began. UM, I never took myself seriously.

868
00:51:51,440 --> 00:51:55,000
Speaker 1: I took my work seriously. I was never afraid to

869
00:51:55,360 --> 00:51:58,440
Speaker 1: make a fool out of myself. Robber band thesis was

870
00:51:58,440 --> 00:52:01,040
Speaker 1: a good example of that. I mean, somebody would have

871
00:52:01,040 --> 00:52:03,200
Speaker 1: looked at that and said, what child play? Maybe, But

872
00:52:03,239 --> 00:52:05,000
Speaker 1: I told the story you say that was the main

873
00:52:05,320 --> 00:52:09,640
Speaker 1: point to get that across. Open the mind. Technical analysis

874
00:52:09,680 --> 00:52:13,760
Speaker 1: is a mindset unless you explore gives you the ability

875
00:52:13,760 --> 00:52:17,200
Speaker 1: and the freedom to do so. Um. And then the

876
00:52:17,239 --> 00:52:19,120
Speaker 1: other thing that's great about is that it can you

877
00:52:19,160 --> 00:52:23,360
Speaker 1: can set risk points in a k A stop losses.

878
00:52:23,960 --> 00:52:25,759
Speaker 1: You can do things that will help you understand that

879
00:52:25,800 --> 00:52:28,840
Speaker 1: maybe you made the wrong call and not let the

880
00:52:28,880 --> 00:52:32,800
Speaker 1: loss run and let the profit run. Three major outcomes

881
00:52:32,840 --> 00:52:36,880
Speaker 1: they brought it up yesterday, small losses, large losses, small profits,

882
00:52:36,880 --> 00:52:40,400
Speaker 1: big profits. We're in we're in for the big profits

883
00:52:40,400 --> 00:52:47,399
Speaker 1: and the small losses as possible. Um. But I think

884
00:52:47,440 --> 00:52:50,040
Speaker 1: I said this earlier and I'll say it again. I'm

885
00:52:50,120 --> 00:52:55,160
Speaker 1: very humbled to be here again. But I'm so happy

886
00:52:55,239 --> 00:52:58,879
Speaker 1: that I'm not practicing today, knowing what I went through

887
00:52:59,080 --> 00:53:02,880
Speaker 1: and how easy it was compared to the challenge and

888
00:53:03,000 --> 00:53:06,920
Speaker 1: shore today. I mean, you know, my that was my

889
00:53:06,960 --> 00:53:09,799
Speaker 1: first computer. Then I went to a Monroe calculator. We

890
00:53:09,840 --> 00:53:12,080
Speaker 1: had to pull the handle and the numbers would spin.

891
00:53:13,200 --> 00:53:16,120
Speaker 1: And then I had an Apple and then ms doss

892
00:53:17,200 --> 00:53:20,600
Speaker 1: uh and we went to all through that learned XCEL

893
00:53:20,840 --> 00:53:25,440
Speaker 1: and Lotus and all that stuff you know today. It's

894
00:53:25,480 --> 00:53:30,399
Speaker 1: just so incredible what you've got at your fingertips as

895
00:53:30,440 --> 00:53:33,920
Speaker 1: you can do. But I also have a firm believer

896
00:53:34,000 --> 00:53:37,359
Speaker 1: of the kiss syndrome. You all know that one. Keep

897
00:53:37,360 --> 00:53:41,640
Speaker 1: it simple, stupid, um, try not to get too oldly involved,

898
00:53:41,680 --> 00:53:44,680
Speaker 1: and especially if you're on the cell side, to avoid

899
00:53:44,719 --> 00:53:47,600
Speaker 1: those shampoo ad terms and things like that. When you

900
00:53:47,640 --> 00:53:50,239
Speaker 1: talk to a client, you don't need to tell him

901
00:53:50,239 --> 00:53:52,239
Speaker 1: as I had to show at the top, tell him

902
00:53:52,239 --> 00:53:56,279
Speaker 1: it's the top um. And you don't ope yourself to

903
00:53:56,440 --> 00:54:01,120
Speaker 1: the ridicule or or criticism or that that stuff, the wedges,

904
00:54:01,200 --> 00:54:05,000
Speaker 1: the gaps, dependance, the flags, etcetera, etcetera. It's all what

905
00:54:05,080 --> 00:54:09,240
Speaker 1: it is. Well, thank you, Allen. It's been my privilege

906
00:54:09,280 --> 00:54:11,160
Speaker 1: to be able to sit up here and ask you

907
00:54:11,200 --> 00:54:14,040
Speaker 1: these questions, and I'm sure everybody in the room appreciate

908
00:54:14,160 --> 00:54:16,480
Speaker 1: your your time and your wisdom. Thank you so much.

909
00:54:30,080 --> 00:54:32,280
Speaker 1: Masters in Business is brought to you by the American

910
00:54:32,360 --> 00:54:37,120
Speaker 1: Arbitration Association. Business disputes are inevitable, resolve faster with the

911
00:54:37,120 --> 00:54:42,200
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912
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913
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Speaker 1: dot org.