1 00:00:03,520 --> 00:00:06,800 Speaker 1: From the heart of where innovation, money and power COLLI 2 00:00:07,640 --> 00:00:12,119 Speaker 1: in Silicon Valley and beyond. This is Bloomberg Technology with 3 00:00:12,200 --> 00:00:28,080 Speaker 1: Emily Jay. I'm Emily Chang in San Francisco, and this 4 00:00:28,160 --> 00:00:31,040 Speaker 1: is Bloomberg Technology. Coming up in the next hour. Putin 5 00:00:31,240 --> 00:00:34,680 Speaker 1: retaliates as sanctions for Russia's invasion. Mount will bring you 6 00:00:34,720 --> 00:00:37,600 Speaker 1: the latest development in the assault on Ukraine from the 7 00:00:37,640 --> 00:00:41,640 Speaker 1: ground and keep to the White House to cyberspace plus 8 00:00:41,760 --> 00:00:45,680 Speaker 1: Meta and Twitter disrupt a Russian disinformation campaign. We'll talk 9 00:00:45,720 --> 00:00:48,159 Speaker 1: to a top meta security official about what more can 10 00:00:48,200 --> 00:00:52,919 Speaker 1: be done to fight Russian propaganda on social media. And 11 00:00:53,000 --> 00:00:54,880 Speaker 1: we will talk about the role of crypto in the 12 00:00:54,960 --> 00:00:58,960 Speaker 1: Ukrainian war, with several cryptocurrency surging after Russian sanctions, but 13 00:00:59,040 --> 00:01:02,280 Speaker 1: could crypto also be a tool to allow Russian billionaires 14 00:01:02,320 --> 00:01:05,480 Speaker 1: to circumvent them. We'll discuss We'll get to all of 15 00:01:05,480 --> 00:01:07,679 Speaker 1: that in a moment. But first, stocks are raising almost 16 00:01:07,760 --> 00:01:11,400 Speaker 1: all of their losses, Bitcoin rallying as investors weigh the 17 00:01:11,480 --> 00:01:14,839 Speaker 1: risk of mounting sanctions on Russia. Meantime, Russia canceled trading 18 00:01:14,840 --> 00:01:19,120 Speaker 1: in Moscow, but chairs of Russian companies cratered elsewhere, joining us. 19 00:01:19,120 --> 00:01:20,920 Speaker 1: Now our ed Ludlow, who has been looking at market 20 00:01:20,920 --> 00:01:23,840 Speaker 1: reaction across the globe. Yeah, it's been an incredible day 21 00:01:23,880 --> 00:01:26,679 Speaker 1: in financial markets. Yes, we ended off session lows in 22 00:01:26,760 --> 00:01:29,319 Speaker 1: terms of the equity story. Look at the spif just 23 00:01:29,360 --> 00:01:32,600 Speaker 1: a quarter of percentage point, but investors clearly trying to 24 00:01:32,640 --> 00:01:36,240 Speaker 1: work out their exposure position themselves. This is February, last 25 00:01:36,319 --> 00:01:39,200 Speaker 1: day of the month, and it's the second consecutive monthly 26 00:01:39,240 --> 00:01:42,000 Speaker 1: declined for U S secuities, the worst street going back 27 00:01:42,040 --> 00:01:44,960 Speaker 1: to October. A big part of that story, of course, 28 00:01:45,040 --> 00:01:47,680 Speaker 1: is yields. You see a big drive, a big advance 29 00:01:47,880 --> 00:01:50,720 Speaker 1: in the bond market. US tenure yield, the benchmark in 30 00:01:50,760 --> 00:01:54,520 Speaker 1: the US market off by fourteen basis points one eight 31 00:01:54,560 --> 00:01:58,560 Speaker 1: two percent. So clearly investors taking the assessment. Semi conductors 32 00:01:58,560 --> 00:02:00,320 Speaker 1: have been such a big part of that. Say ancients 33 00:02:00,360 --> 00:02:03,320 Speaker 1: package well, the socks off by seven tenths of one percent, 34 00:02:03,320 --> 00:02:05,560 Speaker 1: but it had been down more than two percent. So 35 00:02:05,640 --> 00:02:08,800 Speaker 1: also investors working out the explosion of their bitcoin is 36 00:02:08,840 --> 00:02:12,440 Speaker 1: really interesting. Trades seven, it's Monday. You and I back 37 00:02:12,480 --> 00:02:14,520 Speaker 1: here in the studio over the weekend, I was not 38 00:02:14,560 --> 00:02:17,560 Speaker 1: looking at cryptocurrency markets. If you see that big jump, 39 00:02:17,600 --> 00:02:21,160 Speaker 1: the biggest since July for bitcoins. The consideration here is 40 00:02:21,200 --> 00:02:25,000 Speaker 1: that whichever side the sanctions you sit on, crypto adoption 41 00:02:25,080 --> 00:02:27,960 Speaker 1: crypto use may become more prevalent in the wake of those, 42 00:02:28,160 --> 00:02:31,240 Speaker 1: particularly financial sanctions. To work out those that might be 43 00:02:31,280 --> 00:02:34,440 Speaker 1: strung by certain currencies. Also kind of covering me ins 44 00:02:34,480 --> 00:02:36,280 Speaker 1: my Bloombog tunuel. Yes, there's a lot of red on 45 00:02:36,280 --> 00:02:38,280 Speaker 1: the screen at the moment, but there are also sectors 46 00:02:38,480 --> 00:02:41,239 Speaker 1: that are in winners. This is the out performance of 47 00:02:41,280 --> 00:02:43,760 Speaker 1: the defense sector on the SMP five relative to the 48 00:02:43,800 --> 00:02:46,720 Speaker 1: broader index. You can see money has been going into 49 00:02:46,720 --> 00:02:48,280 Speaker 1: the defense stocks. You know all about some of these 50 00:02:48,360 --> 00:02:52,440 Speaker 1: NATO countries that are upping their defense spending unprecedentedly so 51 00:02:52,720 --> 00:02:54,880 Speaker 1: in the wake of what we're seeing out of Ukraine. 52 00:02:54,880 --> 00:02:58,200 Speaker 1: And finally there's the specific story of Russia and sanctions. 53 00:02:58,200 --> 00:03:00,600 Speaker 1: A lot of it around commodities. You look at oil 54 00:03:00,680 --> 00:03:04,440 Speaker 1: holding it around a barrel below a hundred, and we 55 00:03:04,560 --> 00:03:07,720 Speaker 1: held pretty steady there as sanctions become more and more 56 00:03:07,840 --> 00:03:10,480 Speaker 1: encroaching on the energy markets. But also the Bloomberg Commodity 57 00:03:10,520 --> 00:03:14,000 Speaker 1: Index shows how broad basedis is soft and hard commodities 58 00:03:14,080 --> 00:03:17,760 Speaker 1: jumping by the most insects. And finally, the van K 59 00:03:17,880 --> 00:03:19,519 Speaker 1: e t F. This is a U S listed e 60 00:03:19,600 --> 00:03:23,239 Speaker 1: t F which trucks which tracks Russian equities with the 61 00:03:23,320 --> 00:03:26,920 Speaker 1: Russian markets closed until further notice. This was an issue 62 00:03:26,960 --> 00:03:30,120 Speaker 1: of price discovery using that e t F truck tracking 63 00:03:30,320 --> 00:03:35,720 Speaker 1: Russian assets down the biggest drop Emily in history. All right, 64 00:03:36,120 --> 00:03:39,600 Speaker 1: thank you. Lots of moving parts there. As sweeping sanctions 65 00:03:39,600 --> 00:03:42,960 Speaker 1: shake Russia's financial system and ripple worldwide, the Bank of 66 00:03:43,040 --> 00:03:46,440 Speaker 1: Russia is taking desperate measures to seal the nation's economy, 67 00:03:46,480 --> 00:03:48,040 Speaker 1: and the question is what more can the West do? 68 00:03:48,360 --> 00:03:52,240 Speaker 1: Bloombergh Jordan's Fabian has more Jordans as far as we know. 69 00:03:52,280 --> 00:03:55,360 Speaker 1: How much further is the US willing to go, especially 70 00:03:55,400 --> 00:03:59,600 Speaker 1: when it comes to swift or otherwise. Right now they're 71 00:03:59,600 --> 00:04:02,600 Speaker 1: saying U S oficials are saying that nothing is off 72 00:04:02,600 --> 00:04:05,360 Speaker 1: the table, But one area they've been very hesitant to 73 00:04:05,360 --> 00:04:07,960 Speaker 1: touch is the energy sector, which is of course the 74 00:04:08,040 --> 00:04:11,600 Speaker 1: lifeblood of Rush's economy. There they're saying this morning that 75 00:04:11,680 --> 00:04:14,520 Speaker 1: there's going to be certain carve outs or exemptions for 76 00:04:14,640 --> 00:04:18,080 Speaker 1: energy related trades when they do announce the specifics of 77 00:04:18,080 --> 00:04:21,920 Speaker 1: this swift band. That being said, the sanctions package thus 78 00:04:21,960 --> 00:04:25,680 Speaker 1: far hasn't convinced Vladimir Putin to withdraw from Ukraine. So 79 00:04:25,720 --> 00:04:28,480 Speaker 1: the question is, if this latest round of central bank 80 00:04:28,680 --> 00:04:31,839 Speaker 1: penalties doesn't do the trick, then what does How far 81 00:04:32,240 --> 00:04:34,600 Speaker 1: is the U S willing to go? And obviously, Jordan, 82 00:04:34,600 --> 00:04:36,760 Speaker 1: you're covering the White House forest talk to us about 83 00:04:36,839 --> 00:04:40,800 Speaker 1: how the Ukraine situation is changing President Biden's plan for 84 00:04:40,839 --> 00:04:44,599 Speaker 1: the state of the Union coming up tomorrow. When the 85 00:04:44,600 --> 00:04:47,119 Speaker 1: White House was initially conceiving the speech, they were thinking 86 00:04:47,160 --> 00:04:50,640 Speaker 1: of it as a broad reset, uh, domestically on the 87 00:04:50,640 --> 00:04:54,720 Speaker 1: President Biden's domestic agenda, which has been stalled since late 88 00:04:54,800 --> 00:04:57,880 Speaker 1: last year, and also on the COVID situation. Uh, those 89 00:04:57,920 --> 00:05:01,120 Speaker 1: two things are still gonna be prominent factor in this speech. 90 00:05:01,160 --> 00:05:06,000 Speaker 1: But there's going to be much about the situation Ukraine, 91 00:05:06,279 --> 00:05:08,719 Speaker 1: and they're gonna try and cast it in a way 92 00:05:08,839 --> 00:05:11,440 Speaker 1: that it makes a part of the President Biden's effort 93 00:05:11,520 --> 00:05:15,560 Speaker 1: to promote democracy both in the United States and abroad well. 94 00:05:15,560 --> 00:05:18,160 Speaker 1: And there's also this question is about how these sanctions 95 00:05:18,200 --> 00:05:21,640 Speaker 1: against Russia impact economies around the world and impact the 96 00:05:21,720 --> 00:05:25,479 Speaker 1: US economy, which is already hurting from inflation. How is 97 00:05:25,520 --> 00:05:29,839 Speaker 1: the President thinking about that? As I mentioned that the 98 00:05:29,960 --> 00:05:32,960 Speaker 1: energy sector is a huge factor here. Inflation has been 99 00:05:32,960 --> 00:05:36,719 Speaker 1: a tremendous bugaboo for Biden politically. It's it's really helped 100 00:05:36,920 --> 00:05:39,520 Speaker 1: drag down his approval ratings. And thus far we've seen 101 00:05:39,560 --> 00:05:42,760 Speaker 1: a real reluctance by the US government to go after 102 00:05:43,320 --> 00:05:46,960 Speaker 1: Russia's oil and gas sector because they fear rising oil 103 00:05:47,000 --> 00:05:50,280 Speaker 1: prices beyond how far they've already risen. So Uh, it's 104 00:05:50,279 --> 00:05:51,840 Speaker 1: gonna be a big test for them in the coming 105 00:05:51,839 --> 00:05:55,520 Speaker 1: weeks and days. Uh to see again, if Russia is 106 00:05:55,680 --> 00:05:59,080 Speaker 1: not pulling out, not picking any concessions on the Ukraine front, 107 00:05:59,120 --> 00:06:01,560 Speaker 1: how are they going? Are they're willing to go and 108 00:06:01,640 --> 00:06:05,400 Speaker 1: you know, ban exports of Russian oil for example. Uh, 109 00:06:05,560 --> 00:06:08,520 Speaker 1: that's something we'll be watching in the next few weeks, alright, 110 00:06:08,520 --> 00:06:11,560 Speaker 1: Our White House reporter Jordan Fabian Jordan, thank you for 111 00:06:11,720 --> 00:06:22,960 Speaker 1: that update. The war in Ukraine and the moments leading 112 00:06:23,000 --> 00:06:25,360 Speaker 1: up to it have been muddied by disinformation online, with 113 00:06:25,440 --> 00:06:30,280 Speaker 1: Russian actors pushing state narratives via platforms like Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, 114 00:06:30,480 --> 00:06:32,760 Speaker 1: Twitter and more. Joining us to break down the role 115 00:06:32,800 --> 00:06:36,560 Speaker 1: of social media in this ongoing war. Bloomberg Sarah Fryar, Sarah, 116 00:06:36,600 --> 00:06:38,840 Speaker 1: thank you so much for joining us. Talk to us 117 00:06:38,839 --> 00:06:42,960 Speaker 1: about how this fight against Russian disinformation is different than 118 00:06:43,000 --> 00:06:46,720 Speaker 1: what we've seen in years past, for example, disinformation surrounding 119 00:06:46,920 --> 00:06:51,039 Speaker 1: the US election. I think it's different because in this 120 00:06:51,080 --> 00:06:55,839 Speaker 1: case you have a very clear instance of a state 121 00:06:55,880 --> 00:06:59,480 Speaker 1: actor with the goal the gold known and you can 122 00:06:59,520 --> 00:07:03,120 Speaker 1: just look for those specific talking points across social media 123 00:07:03,600 --> 00:07:06,400 Speaker 1: and in those chiels right, we've seen, We've seen Twitter, 124 00:07:06,480 --> 00:07:12,080 Speaker 1: We've seen UM Facebook, Twitter labeling Russian state media of 125 00:07:12,240 --> 00:07:16,160 Speaker 1: Facebook is removing it from from circulation in the EU. 126 00:07:16,480 --> 00:07:21,480 Speaker 1: UM YouTube has restricted any sort of advertising on that 127 00:07:21,960 --> 00:07:24,640 Speaker 1: content in certain places. So I think I think that 128 00:07:24,880 --> 00:07:29,280 Speaker 1: the side is a little clear because the U S 129 00:07:29,280 --> 00:07:32,640 Speaker 1: based company UM your US based companies, and they are 130 00:07:32,680 --> 00:07:36,320 Speaker 1: getting pressure from governments in the EU, UM and in 131 00:07:36,360 --> 00:07:39,560 Speaker 1: the US, So I think that it's a little less 132 00:07:39,600 --> 00:07:43,000 Speaker 1: murky what they have to do here talks us about 133 00:07:43,000 --> 00:07:47,440 Speaker 1: how widespread this particular campaign is. I mean, they say 134 00:07:47,480 --> 00:07:51,480 Speaker 1: they've suspended forty accounts in forty eight hours, but could 135 00:07:51,480 --> 00:07:54,960 Speaker 1: it be much bigger than that? You're referring to uh 136 00:07:56,000 --> 00:08:00,520 Speaker 1: operation that meta found on Facebook and Instagram. I mean, 137 00:08:00,560 --> 00:08:02,600 Speaker 1: this is this is the typical kind of thing that 138 00:08:02,600 --> 00:08:07,000 Speaker 1: they've been looking for for years, ever since the presidential 139 00:08:07,000 --> 00:08:11,480 Speaker 1: election that involved Russian state interference and spreading and misinformation. 140 00:08:11,840 --> 00:08:14,000 Speaker 1: This is what they've trained their systems on now, so 141 00:08:14,080 --> 00:08:16,360 Speaker 1: they're they're a lot more aware of what to look at. 142 00:08:17,200 --> 00:08:20,360 Speaker 1: Are they catching everything? Probably not um, but this is 143 00:08:20,400 --> 00:08:26,560 Speaker 1: at least um invocative of of how how they're proactively 144 00:08:26,640 --> 00:08:30,000 Speaker 1: looking for such things now. It's it's not like these 145 00:08:30,000 --> 00:08:34,360 Speaker 1: companies that are being blindsided anymore. They are being asked um. 146 00:08:34,480 --> 00:08:39,360 Speaker 1: And not just not just these companies, but information disinformation 147 00:08:39,400 --> 00:08:42,720 Speaker 1: researchers the world over have been looking for this kind 148 00:08:42,720 --> 00:08:45,559 Speaker 1: of content and flagging it. So I think that there 149 00:08:45,600 --> 00:08:47,959 Speaker 1: are a lot more resources, a lot more eyeballs, and 150 00:08:48,080 --> 00:08:51,200 Speaker 1: the more eyeballs to the problem, that easier it is disolved, 151 00:08:52,040 --> 00:08:56,200 Speaker 1: all right, Bloomberg Stari Fire, thank you for that update. Meantime, 152 00:08:56,320 --> 00:08:59,760 Speaker 1: as we just discussed medicine, it's disrupted a Russian disinformation 153 00:09:00,000 --> 00:09:04,640 Speaker 1: operation targeting Ukraine, blocking efforts by a hacking group attempting 154 00:09:04,720 --> 00:09:07,599 Speaker 1: to compromise the accounts of prominent Ukrainians. I want to 155 00:09:07,640 --> 00:09:09,800 Speaker 1: get the latest on this from MET has had a 156 00:09:09,840 --> 00:09:12,920 Speaker 1: security policy Napaniel Gleicher himself Da Daniel talk to us 157 00:09:12,920 --> 00:09:16,559 Speaker 1: about the significance of what you have disrupted so far, 158 00:09:16,720 --> 00:09:20,200 Speaker 1: and what else, what more work there is to do here? Sure, 159 00:09:20,280 --> 00:09:23,480 Speaker 1: so we've identified and removed these two separate campaigns. One 160 00:09:23,559 --> 00:09:26,720 Speaker 1: is an influence operation where these actors were using fake 161 00:09:26,720 --> 00:09:30,120 Speaker 1: accounts across a whole number of social media networks Instagram 162 00:09:30,160 --> 00:09:33,600 Speaker 1: and Facebook, but also on Twitter, on YouTube, on Okay 163 00:09:33,679 --> 00:09:36,520 Speaker 1: and v k which are Russian social media networks, and 164 00:09:36,640 --> 00:09:40,079 Speaker 1: their own websites to try to push messages suggesting that 165 00:09:40,160 --> 00:09:43,920 Speaker 1: the Ukrainian government is sailing or failed, to undermine trust 166 00:09:43,960 --> 00:09:47,120 Speaker 1: in the Ukrainian government and boost trust in the Russian government. 167 00:09:47,760 --> 00:09:50,680 Speaker 1: And then separately, this hacking campaign. This is a group 168 00:09:50,760 --> 00:09:53,439 Speaker 1: known as Ghostwriter, which is a well known threat actor 169 00:09:53,559 --> 00:09:57,400 Speaker 1: that operates across Eastern Europe. They have now begun targeting 170 00:09:57,480 --> 00:10:01,840 Speaker 1: individuals in Ukraine, including at least one journalists and prominent 171 00:10:01,920 --> 00:10:04,560 Speaker 1: military officials and government linked officials. And what they're doing 172 00:10:04,760 --> 00:10:07,800 Speaker 1: is they're hacking in and taking over their personal emails 173 00:10:07,920 --> 00:10:10,559 Speaker 1: and their devices, and then they're using that to take 174 00:10:10,600 --> 00:10:12,520 Speaker 1: over all their social media accounts and try to use 175 00:10:12,520 --> 00:10:16,679 Speaker 1: those accounts to post false narratives or deceptive narratives. The 176 00:10:16,760 --> 00:10:19,080 Speaker 1: good news is our teams have found and taken action 177 00:10:19,200 --> 00:10:21,880 Speaker 1: on both of these operations. We've shared that information with 178 00:10:21,920 --> 00:10:24,800 Speaker 1: our partners in industry, and so far it doesn't look 179 00:10:24,840 --> 00:10:27,520 Speaker 1: like they were having a lot of success. So, for example, 180 00:10:27,640 --> 00:10:32,120 Speaker 1: that influence operation, they only had about five thousand followers 181 00:10:32,240 --> 00:10:35,520 Speaker 1: or even a bit less on Facebook and Instagram when 182 00:10:35,559 --> 00:10:39,079 Speaker 1: they were removed. So to my next point, forty accounts 183 00:10:39,120 --> 00:10:42,360 Speaker 1: in forty eight hours, how significant is that really, given 184 00:10:42,480 --> 00:10:46,800 Speaker 1: that metas platforms, Facebook, Instagram, what's top are massive? Is 185 00:10:46,880 --> 00:10:49,880 Speaker 1: this just scratching the surface, you know, in terms of 186 00:10:49,960 --> 00:10:53,559 Speaker 1: how far these disinformation campaigns are running. Well, this is 187 00:10:53,600 --> 00:10:56,320 Speaker 1: only one piece of the work that we're doing in Ukraine, 188 00:10:56,320 --> 00:10:57,839 Speaker 1: and I wouldn't want people to think that this is 189 00:10:57,880 --> 00:11:00,280 Speaker 1: the only thing that's happening. We've stood up a full 190 00:11:00,760 --> 00:11:04,520 Speaker 1: special operations center and lets us bring in investigators and 191 00:11:04,559 --> 00:11:06,960 Speaker 1: product experts from across the company so that we can 192 00:11:07,040 --> 00:11:10,120 Speaker 1: tackle these challenges. We've rolled out a whole number of 193 00:11:10,240 --> 00:11:13,760 Speaker 1: new products changes to help keep people stay safe on 194 00:11:13,880 --> 00:11:17,400 Speaker 1: the platform. But influence operations like this, it's not the 195 00:11:17,559 --> 00:11:19,760 Speaker 1: size that you need to pay attention to. This is 196 00:11:19,800 --> 00:11:22,920 Speaker 1: an indication and it's the first indication we've seen that 197 00:11:23,040 --> 00:11:26,160 Speaker 1: there is that there are covert influence operations from Russia 198 00:11:26,480 --> 00:11:29,000 Speaker 1: targeting public debate in Ukraine. There's been a lot of 199 00:11:29,160 --> 00:11:32,040 Speaker 1: speculation that that's happening, and of course there's been a 200 00:11:32,080 --> 00:11:35,240 Speaker 1: lot of focus on overt influence operations from Russian state 201 00:11:35,400 --> 00:11:37,679 Speaker 1: media and from other corners, but this is the first 202 00:11:37,720 --> 00:11:41,120 Speaker 1: time we've seen this evidence. It's a good reminder that 203 00:11:41,240 --> 00:11:44,080 Speaker 1: the threat actors that teams around the world are focused 204 00:11:44,120 --> 00:11:48,360 Speaker 1: on our targeting this crisis, this invasion, and it's critical 205 00:11:48,440 --> 00:11:50,480 Speaker 1: that we all remain vigilant to take action on these 206 00:11:50,880 --> 00:11:53,800 Speaker 1: networks when they when they appear well and look, Russian 207 00:11:53,840 --> 00:11:56,959 Speaker 1: disinformation campaigns are nothing new. As you and I have 208 00:11:57,040 --> 00:11:59,320 Speaker 1: talked about in the past. Why did it take an 209 00:11:59,360 --> 00:12:02,960 Speaker 1: invasion to get this kind of action from META on Ukraine? 210 00:12:02,960 --> 00:12:05,959 Speaker 1: I mean, couldn't you have done this sooner? So we've 211 00:12:06,080 --> 00:12:09,360 Speaker 1: enforced on a number of operations targeting Ukraine over the years. 212 00:12:09,440 --> 00:12:12,520 Speaker 1: And actually an interesting point this network in particular, which 213 00:12:12,559 --> 00:12:15,240 Speaker 1: is which is in particular stood up and begin engaging 214 00:12:15,640 --> 00:12:19,760 Speaker 1: as tensions in Ukraine developed, UH is linked to a 215 00:12:19,800 --> 00:12:22,840 Speaker 1: network we removed last year in that we removed from 216 00:12:22,840 --> 00:12:26,240 Speaker 1: the platform we know these threat actors keep trying, but 217 00:12:26,440 --> 00:12:29,920 Speaker 1: one of the indicators of success is that network removed. 218 00:12:30,000 --> 00:12:33,200 Speaker 1: Last year it had about two and fifty thousand followers 219 00:12:33,400 --> 00:12:36,079 Speaker 1: on Facebook and Instagram. This network, when they've tried to 220 00:12:36,120 --> 00:12:39,079 Speaker 1: come back, had less than five thousand. And that's the 221 00:12:39,200 --> 00:12:42,760 Speaker 1: goal here. These threat actors will keep trying, but over time, 222 00:12:42,960 --> 00:12:46,599 Speaker 1: working with partners across society and improving our systems, we 223 00:12:46,679 --> 00:12:48,880 Speaker 1: can make it harder for them, We can contain them, 224 00:12:48,960 --> 00:12:50,520 Speaker 1: and we can ensure that even if they do get 225 00:12:50,559 --> 00:12:53,000 Speaker 1: on the platforms, they just don't reach that many people 226 00:12:53,040 --> 00:12:56,040 Speaker 1: before they get taken down. Look, your head of policy, 227 00:12:56,240 --> 00:13:00,480 Speaker 1: Nick Klag, just announced you will be suspending Ussian state 228 00:13:00,559 --> 00:13:03,640 Speaker 1: run media Art and spot Nik in Europe. There are 229 00:13:03,760 --> 00:13:06,480 Speaker 1: calls for you to do that globally. When you look 230 00:13:06,520 --> 00:13:09,600 Speaker 1: at the bigger picture, what more do you think Meta 231 00:13:09,880 --> 00:13:13,920 Speaker 1: and its platforms, it's massive platforms can do to crack 232 00:13:14,000 --> 00:13:18,480 Speaker 1: down on this kind of disinformation. So we've already taken 233 00:13:18,520 --> 00:13:21,760 Speaker 1: a number of steps on Russian state media. We have 234 00:13:22,520 --> 00:13:25,760 Speaker 1: removed their ability to run ads and demonetize them around 235 00:13:25,800 --> 00:13:29,040 Speaker 1: the world. As Nick mentioned, in response to requests from 236 00:13:29,040 --> 00:13:31,839 Speaker 1: the Ukrainian government and the EU government, we blocked them 237 00:13:32,000 --> 00:13:34,880 Speaker 1: a number of specific Russian state media entities from broadcasting 238 00:13:34,960 --> 00:13:38,280 Speaker 1: into the EU and into Ukraine. We're taking a whole 239 00:13:38,360 --> 00:13:41,600 Speaker 1: range of other steps to essentially de amplify their ability 240 00:13:41,679 --> 00:13:44,760 Speaker 1: to share information on our platforms. And also, we have 241 00:13:44,880 --> 00:13:48,880 Speaker 1: third party fact checkers that are continuing to review content 242 00:13:49,000 --> 00:13:52,000 Speaker 1: posted by Russian state media entities and other entities around 243 00:13:52,000 --> 00:13:54,720 Speaker 1: the world. When they identify something is false or misleading, 244 00:13:54,960 --> 00:13:56,959 Speaker 1: we label that to make sure people can see that, 245 00:13:57,320 --> 00:13:59,439 Speaker 1: and we down rank it so it doesn't appear in 246 00:13:59,480 --> 00:14:03,400 Speaker 1: people's needs and people are less likely to encounter the information. Meantime, 247 00:14:03,440 --> 00:14:06,400 Speaker 1: you've got the Russian government asking you to take stuff down. 248 00:14:06,559 --> 00:14:10,640 Speaker 1: How are you handling those requests? Looking at the other 249 00:14:10,679 --> 00:14:13,599 Speaker 1: side of the coin, We're going to be consistent with 250 00:14:13,640 --> 00:14:16,800 Speaker 1: our policies. The Russian government has asked us to remove 251 00:14:17,120 --> 00:14:21,120 Speaker 1: fact checks from Russian state media publications where the third 252 00:14:21,120 --> 00:14:23,520 Speaker 1: party fact checkers I mentioned have determined that they were 253 00:14:23,800 --> 00:14:26,400 Speaker 1: making statements that were false or misleading. We refused to 254 00:14:26,480 --> 00:14:29,480 Speaker 1: do that. Those fact checks are still available. Our third 255 00:14:29,520 --> 00:14:32,800 Speaker 1: party fact checkers are still fact checking content from around 256 00:14:32,840 --> 00:14:36,080 Speaker 1: the world, including from Russian state media, and actually, in 257 00:14:36,160 --> 00:14:39,280 Speaker 1: the meantime, we've identified and labeled a number of additional 258 00:14:39,400 --> 00:14:43,440 Speaker 1: Russian state media entities. So we're continuing to push. In fact, 259 00:14:43,560 --> 00:14:46,560 Speaker 1: we'll be likely identifying and labeling more as time passes. 260 00:14:46,680 --> 00:14:49,400 Speaker 1: That our investigators continue to work. And what can you 261 00:14:49,520 --> 00:14:53,880 Speaker 1: tell us about cooperation between Meta and Twitter and TikTok 262 00:14:54,040 --> 00:14:56,680 Speaker 1: and YouTube on these efforts. I know that that's that 263 00:14:56,800 --> 00:14:59,400 Speaker 1: kind of coordination is something that's been happening for a 264 00:14:59,480 --> 00:15:04,040 Speaker 1: few years now. Yeah, coordination across industry is absolutely critical 265 00:15:04,360 --> 00:15:07,080 Speaker 1: because threat actors like the ones we're talking about don't 266 00:15:07,160 --> 00:15:11,040 Speaker 1: just target one social media platform. I mentioned that the 267 00:15:11,120 --> 00:15:14,280 Speaker 1: Influence operations we took down targeted a number of social 268 00:15:14,320 --> 00:15:19,080 Speaker 1: media platforms, similarly that that hacking group Ghostwriter. They begin 269 00:15:19,400 --> 00:15:22,480 Speaker 1: by compromising personal email and then using that to get 270 00:15:22,520 --> 00:15:25,760 Speaker 1: to a whole bunch of different social media accounts. Whenever 271 00:15:25,800 --> 00:15:27,760 Speaker 1: we find an operation like this, we share information with 272 00:15:27,840 --> 00:15:30,000 Speaker 1: our partners so that they can investigate and they can 273 00:15:30,080 --> 00:15:33,680 Speaker 1: take action themselves on violations on their platform, and then 274 00:15:33,720 --> 00:15:35,520 Speaker 1: they share information back with us so that we can 275 00:15:35,560 --> 00:15:38,240 Speaker 1: do the same thing. One of the biggest changes from 276 00:15:39,360 --> 00:15:44,120 Speaker 1: even from is that today there are determined expert teams 277 00:15:44,640 --> 00:15:48,240 Speaker 1: at social media platforms around the world, in government and 278 00:15:48,360 --> 00:15:51,120 Speaker 1: in civil society, that are working to defend against these 279 00:15:51,120 --> 00:15:53,480 Speaker 1: types of threats and are sharing information with each other 280 00:15:53,720 --> 00:15:55,320 Speaker 1: so we can all counter them as a whole of 281 00:15:55,360 --> 00:16:00,280 Speaker 1: society response. Alright, met ahead of security policy, Nathaniel, I sure, 282 00:16:00,400 --> 00:16:03,160 Speaker 1: thank you so much as always for joining us to 283 00:16:03,200 --> 00:16:06,520 Speaker 1: talk about the work you're doing. Meantime, TikTok users can 284 00:16:06,560 --> 00:16:09,600 Speaker 1: now upload videos up to ten minutes long. This after 285 00:16:09,680 --> 00:16:12,760 Speaker 1: months of testing. TikTok has been expanding its video length 286 00:16:12,800 --> 00:16:15,880 Speaker 1: ever since its creation, going from an initial fifteen seconds 287 00:16:15,960 --> 00:16:19,320 Speaker 1: to sixty seconds and then, most recently three minutes. TikTok 288 00:16:19,360 --> 00:16:22,680 Speaker 1: says it hopes this will unleash even more creative possibilities 289 00:16:22,720 --> 00:16:26,600 Speaker 1: for creators around the world. Longer videos could allow more context. However, 290 00:16:26,680 --> 00:16:29,960 Speaker 1: critics say this also opens the door for more misinformation 291 00:16:30,080 --> 00:16:33,480 Speaker 1: and disinformation, especially in the midst of the ongoing crisis 292 00:16:33,960 --> 00:16:39,040 Speaker 1: in Ukraine. Coming up, tens of thousands of Ukrainians fleeing 293 00:16:39,080 --> 00:16:41,800 Speaker 1: their war torn country now able to access homes on 294 00:16:41,920 --> 00:16:45,560 Speaker 1: Airbnb for free or on that pledge from CEO Brian Chesky. 295 00:16:45,880 --> 00:17:08,119 Speaker 1: Next this Spoomberg AIRBNBC O Brian Chesky says the home 296 00:17:08,160 --> 00:17:11,040 Speaker 1: sharing service will offer free short term housing for up 297 00:17:11,080 --> 00:17:14,320 Speaker 1: to one thousand Ukrainian refugees now being forced to flee 298 00:17:14,520 --> 00:17:16,920 Speaker 1: their country. This is something the company has done in 299 00:17:16,960 --> 00:17:20,040 Speaker 1: the past during other international conflicts. For more, I'm joined 300 00:17:20,080 --> 00:17:22,920 Speaker 1: by Bloomberg Michael Tobin. Bloomberg Michael, what do we know 301 00:17:23,640 --> 00:17:26,840 Speaker 1: about Airbnb's efforts this time and how does it compare 302 00:17:27,200 --> 00:17:31,440 Speaker 1: to what they've done in years past. So Airbnb is 303 00:17:31,760 --> 00:17:34,720 Speaker 1: stepped up and offered to provide short term housing to 304 00:17:34,960 --> 00:17:38,159 Speaker 1: up to a hundred thousands UM Ukrainian refugees that are 305 00:17:38,200 --> 00:17:41,399 Speaker 1: coming from the country. UM, the size and scope of 306 00:17:41,560 --> 00:17:44,280 Speaker 1: what we're seeing out of Ukraine is pretty large, and 307 00:17:44,520 --> 00:17:46,760 Speaker 1: people are estimating that it's only going to get larger 308 00:17:46,800 --> 00:17:50,520 Speaker 1: as the conflict progresses. UM. In the past, Airbnb has 309 00:17:50,560 --> 00:17:53,640 Speaker 1: really helped us step up and provide housing to refugees 310 00:17:53,680 --> 00:17:56,199 Speaker 1: from Afghanistan. They were able to provide housing to more 311 00:17:56,240 --> 00:17:59,200 Speaker 1: than twenty one refugees and have also stepped up in 312 00:17:59,240 --> 00:18:02,439 Speaker 1: the past to provide housing UM too refucues from Syria 313 00:18:02,680 --> 00:18:06,600 Speaker 1: and Venezuela. How is this operation being funded? I mean, 314 00:18:06,720 --> 00:18:10,520 Speaker 1: is this purely thanks to the generosity of Airbnb hosts? 315 00:18:11,800 --> 00:18:13,600 Speaker 1: That's part of it. I mean, ultimately, at the end 316 00:18:13,640 --> 00:18:15,000 Speaker 1: of the day, people are going to have to open 317 00:18:15,080 --> 00:18:17,880 Speaker 1: up their homes, right, and they're also getting some support 318 00:18:18,000 --> 00:18:20,639 Speaker 1: from donors as well as their refugee fund. But I 319 00:18:20,720 --> 00:18:22,080 Speaker 1: mean a lot of the work is gonna have to 320 00:18:22,160 --> 00:18:26,240 Speaker 1: come from the hosts themselves. So talk to us that 321 00:18:26,320 --> 00:18:30,480 Speaker 1: about how airbnb dot org fits into the broader company 322 00:18:30,680 --> 00:18:35,280 Speaker 1: efforts and the longer term goals here. I think that 323 00:18:35,400 --> 00:18:38,879 Speaker 1: they are continuing to place an emphasis on kind of 324 00:18:39,000 --> 00:18:43,399 Speaker 1: this social outreach and humanitarian work. And I mean I 325 00:18:43,520 --> 00:18:45,960 Speaker 1: think the speed that they've been able to put this together, 326 00:18:46,160 --> 00:18:47,879 Speaker 1: I mean, this crisis has been going on for a 327 00:18:47,960 --> 00:18:50,080 Speaker 1: few days. It's clearly you know, at the top of 328 00:18:50,119 --> 00:18:52,360 Speaker 1: their mind whenever something happens, they're looking for a way 329 00:18:52,400 --> 00:18:55,520 Speaker 1: that they can help out. We know that other companies 330 00:18:55,640 --> 00:18:58,840 Speaker 1: like Uber are pulling employees out of Ukraine. Uber is 331 00:18:58,840 --> 00:19:01,600 Speaker 1: also suspended its service is in Ukraine. What kind of 332 00:19:01,640 --> 00:19:06,600 Speaker 1: operations does Airbnb have in Ukraine and Russia to be fair, 333 00:19:06,760 --> 00:19:11,880 Speaker 1: and how are they handling this? In total? UM there's 334 00:19:11,920 --> 00:19:17,160 Speaker 1: about seventeen thousand short term listings in Ukraine, and that's 335 00:19:17,520 --> 00:19:20,280 Speaker 1: data from air DNA, which is a market research company. 336 00:19:20,760 --> 00:19:24,160 Speaker 1: UM from what I've seen, there is a good deal 337 00:19:24,600 --> 00:19:29,480 Speaker 1: of UM I guess market share that Airbnb has within 338 00:19:29,640 --> 00:19:34,560 Speaker 1: that community. UM. I spoke to a few hosts who 339 00:19:34,560 --> 00:19:37,000 Speaker 1: are in the city of Mariopool, which is down on 340 00:19:37,080 --> 00:19:39,560 Speaker 1: the c of asof so it connects, you know, to 341 00:19:39,760 --> 00:19:42,520 Speaker 1: the Black Sea. UM and they said that business was 342 00:19:42,680 --> 00:19:46,560 Speaker 1: going as normal up until the week before the invasion. UM. 343 00:19:47,359 --> 00:19:51,199 Speaker 1: So it sounds like some of those are still in operation. 344 00:19:51,359 --> 00:19:53,520 Speaker 1: The company said that they're going to continue to support 345 00:19:53,560 --> 00:19:56,000 Speaker 1: hosts and guests, but we haven't heard anything direct from them. 346 00:19:56,600 --> 00:20:02,840 Speaker 1: And what about in Russia in particular, Yeah, so in 347 00:20:02,960 --> 00:20:05,920 Speaker 1: Russia there are more there's about nine than the active 348 00:20:05,960 --> 00:20:09,320 Speaker 1: rental units UM and I haven't checked to see what 349 00:20:09,520 --> 00:20:12,520 Speaker 1: share Airbnb has, but it's a much larger market and 350 00:20:12,600 --> 00:20:14,720 Speaker 1: to be fair, also a much larger country than Ukraine. 351 00:20:16,720 --> 00:20:19,399 Speaker 1: All Right, Bloomberg's Michael Tolben, We're going to continue to 352 00:20:19,440 --> 00:20:23,480 Speaker 1: follow Airbnb's efforts. Here see how many Ukrainian refugees take 353 00:20:23,520 --> 00:20:28,480 Speaker 1: Airbnb up on this offer, this generous offer. Michael, thank 354 00:20:28,560 --> 00:20:31,920 Speaker 1: you for that report. Meantime, Bloomberg has learned that i 355 00:20:32,160 --> 00:20:35,000 Speaker 1: Fit Health and Fitness saw its valuation fall by about 356 00:20:35,040 --> 00:20:39,000 Speaker 1: six after raising new capital. The Peloton rival now valued 357 00:20:39,359 --> 00:20:42,120 Speaker 1: below three billion dollars. Just last week, i FIT announced 358 00:20:42,119 --> 00:20:45,760 Speaker 1: the restructuring and layoffs. I FITS brand include Nordic Track 359 00:20:46,119 --> 00:20:58,120 Speaker 1: and pro Form Welcome back to Bloomberg Technology and Emily 360 00:20:58,200 --> 00:21:01,879 Speaker 1: Chang in San Francisco, starling space actors. Space based internet 361 00:21:01,960 --> 00:21:06,120 Speaker 1: services active in Ukraine and helping the country citizens stay connected. 362 00:21:06,200 --> 00:21:09,720 Speaker 1: This according to a tweet from ukas City lamask the world, 363 00:21:09,800 --> 00:21:12,320 Speaker 1: which is man also promised more hardware is on the 364 00:21:12,359 --> 00:21:15,879 Speaker 1: way to help Ukraine in response to a plea from 365 00:21:15,920 --> 00:21:19,439 Speaker 1: the country's Vice Prime Minister, Mikhailo Federer of joining us 366 00:21:19,480 --> 00:21:21,879 Speaker 1: now with the latest on that are at Ludlow and 367 00:21:22,040 --> 00:21:25,920 Speaker 1: talk to us about what Starlink is doing in Ukraine. Yeah, 368 00:21:25,960 --> 00:21:28,680 Speaker 1: it's interesting they've moved so quickly. So Elon Musk tweeted 369 00:21:28,760 --> 00:21:31,600 Speaker 1: that two pm on Saturday, we actually just in the 370 00:21:31,680 --> 00:21:35,000 Speaker 1: last couple of hours had an image through from Ukraine 371 00:21:35,040 --> 00:21:38,480 Speaker 1: from that same minister and those Starlink ground terminals or 372 00:21:38,520 --> 00:21:40,400 Speaker 1: sets have arrived. You see them there in the back 373 00:21:40,440 --> 00:21:42,359 Speaker 1: of that truck. We don't know how many you are 374 00:21:42,440 --> 00:21:45,639 Speaker 1: in there, but that's incredibly fast. Bearing in mind that 375 00:21:45,720 --> 00:21:48,720 Speaker 1: the Starlink service wasn't active in the Ukraine and wasn't 376 00:21:48,800 --> 00:21:52,159 Speaker 1: juiced be active there until three. So there have been reports, 377 00:21:52,160 --> 00:21:55,520 Speaker 1: for example from vias At that their internet service has 378 00:21:55,520 --> 00:21:58,440 Speaker 1: been disrupted by a suspected cyber hack. This goes some 379 00:21:58,640 --> 00:22:01,840 Speaker 1: way to helping the country of Ukraine and staying connected. 380 00:22:03,440 --> 00:22:07,880 Speaker 1: Why is starlink so useful for what's going on there? Yeah, 381 00:22:08,080 --> 00:22:10,320 Speaker 1: it's the simplicity of it. So inside each of those 382 00:22:10,400 --> 00:22:13,760 Speaker 1: boxes there's the receiver unit and a dish, and you literally, 383 00:22:13,800 --> 00:22:16,040 Speaker 1: as Elon Musk has put in the past, stand outside, 384 00:22:16,280 --> 00:22:18,680 Speaker 1: point your dish in the sky and hope that there's 385 00:22:18,680 --> 00:22:21,760 Speaker 1: a Starling satellite overhead. But we've already seen some tweets 386 00:22:21,760 --> 00:22:24,200 Speaker 1: from the ground showing that they're getting good connectivity a 387 00:22:24,280 --> 00:22:27,639 Speaker 1: hundred and thirty seven megabits per second to TV some context, 388 00:22:27,720 --> 00:22:30,480 Speaker 1: the average broadband in the US gives you around fifty 389 00:22:30,520 --> 00:22:33,680 Speaker 1: megabits per second. So it's strong WiFi that you're able 390 00:22:33,760 --> 00:22:36,680 Speaker 1: to run video on, you can communicate with and as 391 00:22:36,720 --> 00:22:38,560 Speaker 1: we know, some of the services in that country have 392 00:22:38,720 --> 00:22:42,000 Speaker 1: been disrupted because of energy shortages or outages because of 393 00:22:42,080 --> 00:22:44,720 Speaker 1: Russia's military activity, but also, as I said, some of 394 00:22:44,760 --> 00:22:48,399 Speaker 1: these suspected cyber attacks which have impacted other providers like 395 00:22:48,680 --> 00:22:51,399 Speaker 1: vias that it's simple, it's quick. We just don't know 396 00:22:51,480 --> 00:22:53,640 Speaker 1: how many receivers they've got. We don't know how much 397 00:22:53,680 --> 00:22:57,280 Speaker 1: service starlink is able to provide, and how as far 398 00:22:57,320 --> 00:23:00,280 Speaker 1: as we know to Starlink's system compared to the kind 399 00:23:00,320 --> 00:23:04,399 Speaker 1: of internet you know, and Ukrainian citizen would normally be 400 00:23:04,480 --> 00:23:07,200 Speaker 1: able to access. Yeah, I think part of the problem 401 00:23:07,240 --> 00:23:10,280 Speaker 1: with Elon Musk and Starlink and SpaceX is how they communicate. 402 00:23:10,359 --> 00:23:13,560 Speaker 1: All we're going off is tweets and pictures that have 403 00:23:13,680 --> 00:23:16,880 Speaker 1: been tweeted. For example, each starlink box costs around five 404 00:23:17,760 --> 00:23:21,120 Speaker 1: the services a month. We have no idea how many 405 00:23:21,160 --> 00:23:23,520 Speaker 1: boxes are being provided, We have no idea who's paying 406 00:23:23,600 --> 00:23:25,639 Speaker 1: for this. We have no idea if this is just 407 00:23:25,760 --> 00:23:29,240 Speaker 1: a one off publicity stunt, or if Starling Conula must 408 00:23:29,240 --> 00:23:32,879 Speaker 1: will continue to support Ukraine throughout this conflict. All we 409 00:23:32,960 --> 00:23:34,800 Speaker 1: know is that we've done this, They've done this quickly, 410 00:23:34,840 --> 00:23:37,400 Speaker 1: and if we have a prior example, For example, Starlink 411 00:23:37,440 --> 00:23:42,000 Speaker 1: provided fifty ground sets to Tonga after that tsunami and earthquake. 412 00:23:42,280 --> 00:23:44,040 Speaker 1: That really helps some of the remote parts of the 413 00:23:44,080 --> 00:23:46,520 Speaker 1: country get back online. So it should be helpful in 414 00:23:46,600 --> 00:23:49,639 Speaker 1: this case as well. All Right, Ed Ludlow. We're going 415 00:23:49,680 --> 00:23:52,520 Speaker 1: to continue to follow that story. Thank you. I want 416 00:23:52,560 --> 00:23:54,920 Speaker 1: to stay on this topic of keeping Ukraine's connected to 417 00:23:55,000 --> 00:23:56,840 Speaker 1: the Internet and bring in Wendy Whitmore. She is the 418 00:23:56,880 --> 00:23:59,720 Speaker 1: senior vice president for Unit forty two at Power out 419 00:23:59,800 --> 00:24:03,720 Speaker 1: or Works and a globally recognized cybersecurity leader. What do 420 00:24:03,760 --> 00:24:05,440 Speaker 1: you great to have you back with us. I would 421 00:24:05,480 --> 00:24:07,160 Speaker 1: love it if you could give us a state of play. 422 00:24:07,600 --> 00:24:10,920 Speaker 1: What is happening in cyberspace at this stage of war 423 00:24:11,119 --> 00:24:17,200 Speaker 1: in terms of cyber attacks on Ukraine and on Russian targets. Yes, hi, Emily, 424 00:24:17,320 --> 00:24:20,600 Speaker 1: great to see you again today. Certainly despite the circumstances. 425 00:24:20,720 --> 00:24:24,760 Speaker 1: So we are closely monitoring activity that's occurring in Ukraine 426 00:24:24,880 --> 00:24:28,040 Speaker 1: as well as abroad. In some cases, what we're seeing 427 00:24:28,160 --> 00:24:32,720 Speaker 1: is what we would expect, so activity targeted at critical 428 00:24:32,760 --> 00:24:37,840 Speaker 1: infrastructure and government websites within the Ukraine. We're seeing web defacements, 429 00:24:37,920 --> 00:24:42,360 Speaker 1: We're seeing wiper mallar that's intended to conduct destructive attacks. 430 00:24:42,880 --> 00:24:46,919 Speaker 1: What we're anticipating next will be attacks in a broader sphere, 431 00:24:47,240 --> 00:24:50,280 Speaker 1: so potentially targeted towards Europe and towards the United States 432 00:24:50,640 --> 00:24:54,760 Speaker 1: and specifically focused on financial services as well. As critical infrastructure. 433 00:24:55,640 --> 00:24:59,240 Speaker 1: So what kind of increasing chatter are you hearing about 434 00:24:59,359 --> 00:25:02,119 Speaker 1: in terms of our attacks on the United States, you know, 435 00:25:02,200 --> 00:25:07,400 Speaker 1: whether it's businesses or other entities. Well, so, I think 436 00:25:07,520 --> 00:25:10,080 Speaker 1: that I made a comment about destructive malware attacks, and 437 00:25:10,240 --> 00:25:13,560 Speaker 1: that's an area that we're certainly focused on. I think 438 00:25:13,640 --> 00:25:16,840 Speaker 1: the cyber world and many of US defenders are certainly 439 00:25:16,920 --> 00:25:20,159 Speaker 1: prepared for those types of attacks because they're not unprecedented 440 00:25:20,440 --> 00:25:23,920 Speaker 1: in the sense we've seen them before. UH, financial services, 441 00:25:24,000 --> 00:25:28,600 Speaker 1: critical infrastructure, energy, water and power supply. Those are all 442 00:25:28,760 --> 00:25:31,440 Speaker 1: areas that we would anticipate that as attacks in the 443 00:25:31,520 --> 00:25:34,960 Speaker 1: kinetic sphere escalate, we think that we will continue to 444 00:25:35,000 --> 00:25:39,000 Speaker 1: see those types of attacks targeted specifically towards UH, those 445 00:25:39,240 --> 00:25:43,240 Speaker 1: entities with the intent of taking services offline, causing disruption, 446 00:25:43,560 --> 00:25:47,240 Speaker 1: potentially in retaliation for the sanctions being levied. So give 447 00:25:47,320 --> 00:25:50,240 Speaker 1: us your take on the threat level, where is it highest, 448 00:25:50,320 --> 00:25:53,600 Speaker 1: What kinds of businesses, hospitals, healthcare systems are they at 449 00:25:53,680 --> 00:25:58,880 Speaker 1: risk potentially? So we're certainly seeing that within the Ukraine itself, 450 00:25:59,119 --> 00:26:02,440 Speaker 1: and you we have that concern that we may see 451 00:26:02,520 --> 00:26:06,040 Speaker 1: that escalate as we move forward within the the next 452 00:26:06,080 --> 00:26:08,560 Speaker 1: stages of this attack. So Uh, you know, many of 453 00:26:08,640 --> 00:26:11,200 Speaker 1: us are familiar with the not petty attacks which occurred 454 00:26:11,680 --> 00:26:15,320 Speaker 1: within Ukraine years ago. While I'm not convinced that we 455 00:26:15,400 --> 00:26:18,200 Speaker 1: are going to see an exact duplication, I think any 456 00:26:18,280 --> 00:26:22,520 Speaker 1: businesses that had their international organizations with entities and ties 457 00:26:22,560 --> 00:26:26,680 Speaker 1: to Ukraine certainly need to be prepared to be segmenting 458 00:26:26,760 --> 00:26:30,720 Speaker 1: their network, be identifying and detecting this type of activity 459 00:26:30,840 --> 00:26:34,680 Speaker 1: in advance, and really be prepared to detect and respond 460 00:26:34,840 --> 00:26:38,800 Speaker 1: quickly to the types of attacks we might see moving forward. Now, 461 00:26:38,960 --> 00:26:42,520 Speaker 1: one of the world's most successful ransomware group was targeted 462 00:26:42,560 --> 00:26:46,080 Speaker 1: for aligning itself with Russia. Do you think we're going 463 00:26:46,119 --> 00:26:50,080 Speaker 1: to see more of this? Well, I think the space 464 00:26:50,200 --> 00:26:53,760 Speaker 1: is incredibly dynamic. You're seeing certainly a lot of emotions 465 00:26:53,800 --> 00:26:56,879 Speaker 1: that are generated rightfully so from what we're seeing going on, 466 00:26:57,480 --> 00:27:00,760 Speaker 1: and so from that perspective, certainly the tax that occurred 467 00:27:00,760 --> 00:27:03,520 Speaker 1: against the Conti ransomware gang that you're referring to, I 468 00:27:03,600 --> 00:27:06,520 Speaker 1: think anytime there's a significant leak of data, we're going 469 00:27:06,600 --> 00:27:08,920 Speaker 1: to make sure that there's information that can be learned 470 00:27:08,960 --> 00:27:11,240 Speaker 1: from it and that we can better secure our defenses 471 00:27:11,280 --> 00:27:14,880 Speaker 1: moving forward based on the information that's learned from that leak, 472 00:27:15,760 --> 00:27:18,879 Speaker 1: and obviously it's no secret that Russia is a stronghold 473 00:27:19,480 --> 00:27:25,440 Speaker 1: for hackers and state sponsored attacks. How can that sort 474 00:27:25,480 --> 00:27:32,040 Speaker 1: of hub stand up to attacks from around the world. Well, 475 00:27:32,119 --> 00:27:34,560 Speaker 1: I think that's going to be interesting to see how 476 00:27:34,640 --> 00:27:38,760 Speaker 1: that plays out. Emily right, We've seen attackers really leverage 477 00:27:38,800 --> 00:27:42,480 Speaker 1: information against one another. We've seen a lot of organizations 478 00:27:42,800 --> 00:27:47,159 Speaker 1: really unified based on this invasion, and one of the 479 00:27:47,240 --> 00:27:50,280 Speaker 1: things that I'm heartened by actually is that I've never 480 00:27:50,359 --> 00:27:55,080 Speaker 1: seen the cybersecurity community come together more from the perspective 481 00:27:55,119 --> 00:27:58,639 Speaker 1: of sharing front intelligence. We have rival organizations who are 482 00:27:58,680 --> 00:28:02,240 Speaker 1: sharing information very appidly. Certainly a lot of information being 483 00:28:02,280 --> 00:28:06,400 Speaker 1: shared between the private and public sectors, and I've never 484 00:28:06,520 --> 00:28:08,680 Speaker 1: seen it at the speed with which we're seeing it. 485 00:28:09,080 --> 00:28:12,160 Speaker 1: So I'm cautiously optimistic that that is going to help 486 00:28:12,240 --> 00:28:14,760 Speaker 1: in this circumstance. So what do you think the next 487 00:28:14,800 --> 00:28:18,800 Speaker 1: stage is, how do you see cyber warriors, whether from Ukraine, 488 00:28:18,880 --> 00:28:24,879 Speaker 1: around the world, or inside Russia itself, upping the annie. Well, 489 00:28:24,920 --> 00:28:27,080 Speaker 1: I think you're going to see a lot of organizations 490 00:28:27,119 --> 00:28:30,359 Speaker 1: really banding together to share that information. Our teams are 491 00:28:30,400 --> 00:28:33,080 Speaker 1: working seven around the clock to make sure that we 492 00:28:33,160 --> 00:28:36,960 Speaker 1: are understanding specifically what's going on on the ground, but 493 00:28:37,080 --> 00:28:39,680 Speaker 1: I think as the kinetic warfare on the ground plays out, 494 00:28:39,960 --> 00:28:43,120 Speaker 1: then many of us anticipated that cyber would have been 495 00:28:43,240 --> 00:28:46,960 Speaker 1: the primary domain used already. We're not seeing that as 496 00:28:47,080 --> 00:28:49,920 Speaker 1: much yet as we expected, so I anticipate that we're 497 00:28:49,960 --> 00:28:52,800 Speaker 1: going to see that more moving forward, depending upon how 498 00:28:52,840 --> 00:28:55,320 Speaker 1: the ground war plays out over the coming days and weeks. 499 00:28:56,520 --> 00:28:58,880 Speaker 1: All right, I wonder what more? Senior Vice president at 500 00:28:58,920 --> 00:29:02,120 Speaker 1: Polo Alto Network, Twindy, thank you for your perspective on this. 501 00:29:03,080 --> 00:29:05,880 Speaker 1: Coming up, the role of crypto in the Ukraine War. 502 00:29:05,920 --> 00:29:08,000 Speaker 1: We're gonna be joined by aval Labs President John Woo 503 00:29:08,080 --> 00:29:11,080 Speaker 1: to talk about the responsibility of platforms at this critical moment, 504 00:29:11,440 --> 00:29:14,600 Speaker 1: the power of crypto for good or bad, and much more. 505 00:29:15,120 --> 00:29:27,080 Speaker 1: Next Scloomberg, time now for our crypto report. With bitcoin 506 00:29:27,160 --> 00:29:31,480 Speaker 1: spiking as sanctions on Russia go into effects, Bitcoin rebounding 507 00:29:31,560 --> 00:29:34,640 Speaker 1: from a weekend sell off, jumping as much as following 508 00:29:34,680 --> 00:29:37,520 Speaker 1: growing speculation that crypto could be used as another means 509 00:29:37,600 --> 00:29:40,680 Speaker 1: of payment in the wake of sanctions against Russia. Joining 510 00:29:40,720 --> 00:29:42,520 Speaker 1: me now to talk about the role of crypto in 511 00:29:42,600 --> 00:29:46,400 Speaker 1: the Ukrainian conflict. AVA Labs President John Woo along with 512 00:29:46,440 --> 00:29:50,800 Speaker 1: Bloomberg Shinnali Bossi, John, thank you so much for joining us. Obviously, 513 00:29:50,840 --> 00:29:54,440 Speaker 1: we saw a lot of volatility over the weekend, bitcoin spiking. 514 00:29:54,520 --> 00:29:57,600 Speaker 1: Now talk to us specifically about what you see driving 515 00:29:58,120 --> 00:30:04,960 Speaker 1: these moves based on what's happening in Ukraine and Russia. Well, ironically, 516 00:30:05,040 --> 00:30:09,160 Speaker 1: I think bitcoin has rallied on this false narrative that, um, 517 00:30:09,440 --> 00:30:13,640 Speaker 1: with sanctions, you know, bitcoin and cryptocurrencies are different avenue 518 00:30:13,920 --> 00:30:17,600 Speaker 1: for Russians to move money around. That's absolutely false and 519 00:30:17,680 --> 00:30:22,000 Speaker 1: it's incorrect. Um. People like to hold onto this old 520 00:30:22,120 --> 00:30:26,200 Speaker 1: narrative that you know, bitcoin is a black box and 521 00:30:26,320 --> 00:30:31,680 Speaker 1: its censorship resistance, but people forget it's a crypto, is transparent, 522 00:30:32,160 --> 00:30:34,280 Speaker 1: so it's not a black box. It's actually like an 523 00:30:34,400 --> 00:30:38,600 Speaker 1: open box, class box where everyone can look inside, see 524 00:30:38,640 --> 00:30:42,400 Speaker 1: all the transactions and then be able to decipher, you know, 525 00:30:42,520 --> 00:30:45,959 Speaker 1: if they're abnormal movements around. So I think there's been 526 00:30:45,960 --> 00:30:50,080 Speaker 1: speculation that caused bitcoin to go up recently, but reality 527 00:30:50,240 --> 00:30:52,440 Speaker 1: is it's it's not a good way to do fraud. 528 00:30:53,400 --> 00:30:56,480 Speaker 1: So that are you saying bitcoin shouldn't be rallying to 529 00:30:56,600 --> 00:31:00,760 Speaker 1: this extent, to the extent that it's rallying the good 530 00:31:00,800 --> 00:31:04,520 Speaker 1: reason why it's rally is because crypto has been able, 531 00:31:04,640 --> 00:31:07,520 Speaker 1: with the speed and efficiency, be able to raise over 532 00:31:07,640 --> 00:31:11,560 Speaker 1: twenty million dollars for Ukrainian families that needed. It does 533 00:31:11,720 --> 00:31:16,120 Speaker 1: highlight the technology in a different sense as well. It's speedy, 534 00:31:16,600 --> 00:31:19,360 Speaker 1: it's scalable, it's also very fast, and it could be 535 00:31:19,440 --> 00:31:22,920 Speaker 1: done for a lot of good causes. That said, you've 536 00:31:22,960 --> 00:31:27,080 Speaker 1: got crypto exchanges under pressure from the public to cut 537 00:31:27,160 --> 00:31:30,800 Speaker 1: off Russian clients. Jesse Powell, CEO of KRACK, and said 538 00:31:31,120 --> 00:31:33,760 Speaker 1: they can't do that unless there's a legal requirement to 539 00:31:33,840 --> 00:31:37,880 Speaker 1: do so. So why shouldn't we imagine that Russian billionaires, 540 00:31:37,920 --> 00:31:43,200 Speaker 1: for example, could use cryptocurrency to circumvent sanctions on Russia. 541 00:31:44,840 --> 00:31:47,080 Speaker 1: So I think Jesse has a good point here. Um 542 00:31:47,440 --> 00:31:49,080 Speaker 1: that would be equivalent if I link it up to 543 00:31:49,160 --> 00:31:52,680 Speaker 1: your previous UM thing on star Link with Elon Muss. 544 00:31:53,080 --> 00:31:55,800 Speaker 1: It could be like, Okay, you're sending bad messages over 545 00:31:55,800 --> 00:31:58,440 Speaker 1: the Internet, so let's cut off internetfort everyone coming out 546 00:31:58,480 --> 00:32:01,840 Speaker 1: of the Ukraine and the Russians own. It's impossible to 547 00:32:01,920 --> 00:32:05,120 Speaker 1: cut off the whole country and know who's a good 548 00:32:05,160 --> 00:32:08,920 Speaker 1: and who's not a good actor. So from Kraken's perspective 549 00:32:09,040 --> 00:32:12,520 Speaker 1: or from other exchanges perspective, it would not be right 550 00:32:12,800 --> 00:32:15,680 Speaker 1: to just cut people off like that, especially when there's 551 00:32:15,760 --> 00:32:18,240 Speaker 1: good coming out of it, with the twenty million rays 552 00:32:18,280 --> 00:32:21,520 Speaker 1: for childerboll causes in Ukraine. You know, John, there's kind 553 00:32:21,520 --> 00:32:24,320 Speaker 1: of two issues to think about here when we're thinking 554 00:32:24,320 --> 00:32:27,760 Speaker 1: about what's happening across the world and crypto. One is 555 00:32:27,840 --> 00:32:30,120 Speaker 1: this idea which I think you're hitting on earlier about 556 00:32:30,240 --> 00:32:34,440 Speaker 1: wealthy Russian individuals who are looking to evade sanctions. And 557 00:32:34,520 --> 00:32:37,960 Speaker 1: then another issue entirely, which is folks who live in 558 00:32:38,120 --> 00:32:41,560 Speaker 1: Ukraine or people who live in Russia, the ordinary person 559 00:32:41,960 --> 00:32:46,120 Speaker 1: who wants to move their money into crypto because they're 560 00:32:46,120 --> 00:32:50,520 Speaker 1: worried about being able to be working with their bank 561 00:32:50,960 --> 00:32:53,880 Speaker 1: or being able to transact in rubles. How much of 562 00:32:53,920 --> 00:32:57,920 Speaker 1: a reality is that And do you see people who 563 00:32:58,000 --> 00:33:01,960 Speaker 1: are in this scenario start move more to crypto because 564 00:33:02,000 --> 00:33:05,680 Speaker 1: they need to. Yeah, A lot of the activity I 565 00:33:05,800 --> 00:33:08,640 Speaker 1: suspect recently in the last couple of days has been 566 00:33:08,760 --> 00:33:12,320 Speaker 1: very retail driven. There have been third party analytic firms 567 00:33:12,400 --> 00:33:16,360 Speaker 1: that have done analysis on this and crypto to ruble 568 00:33:16,520 --> 00:33:21,920 Speaker 1: that exchange about thirty um um thirty I think about 569 00:33:22,040 --> 00:33:24,960 Speaker 1: thirty billion or thirty about thirty billion has been moved 570 00:33:24,960 --> 00:33:28,520 Speaker 1: in the last couple of days. Um, that is most 571 00:33:28,600 --> 00:33:31,000 Speaker 1: likely in the sizes of that that's been moved around 572 00:33:31,120 --> 00:33:33,560 Speaker 1: have most likely been from retail. It's definitely not the 573 00:33:33,640 --> 00:33:37,120 Speaker 1: size of a Russian oligarch or a sovereign doing it. 574 00:33:37,360 --> 00:33:39,920 Speaker 1: So um, if you look at the data, it suggests 575 00:33:39,960 --> 00:33:43,280 Speaker 1: that it is retail people doing the flight to safety 576 00:33:43,600 --> 00:33:47,760 Speaker 1: because the Russian ruble is down. And historically the adoption 577 00:33:47,840 --> 00:33:51,800 Speaker 1: of cryptocurrencies in emerging markets where there is a currency 578 00:33:51,880 --> 00:33:55,920 Speaker 1: that is not doing well has until there was more 579 00:33:55,960 --> 00:33:58,960 Speaker 1: adoption in Latin America and emerging markets in Middle Eastern 580 00:33:59,040 --> 00:34:01,880 Speaker 1: emerging markets because is the worry of inflation and the 581 00:34:02,000 --> 00:34:04,640 Speaker 1: de value currency. So I think in this case it's 582 00:34:04,680 --> 00:34:09,000 Speaker 1: the same thing, uh, individuals worrying about their local currency devalue. 583 00:34:09,360 --> 00:34:11,840 Speaker 1: You know, there's been so much talk about Swift and 584 00:34:11,920 --> 00:34:15,600 Speaker 1: banning Russia from Swift and certain Russian entities from Swift. 585 00:34:15,960 --> 00:34:19,800 Speaker 1: How is the crypto community viewing this? And also you know, 586 00:34:19,880 --> 00:34:23,360 Speaker 1: I wonder John, is there a chance for crypto companies 587 00:34:23,800 --> 00:34:28,360 Speaker 1: to start joining on to the Swift network instead? So 588 00:34:28,520 --> 00:34:31,760 Speaker 1: I think first on the first point, UM, most people 589 00:34:31,880 --> 00:34:36,239 Speaker 1: in the crypto community sympathize with the unfortunate citizens of 590 00:34:36,360 --> 00:34:40,080 Speaker 1: the Ukraine. So in order to you know, cut off 591 00:34:40,360 --> 00:34:43,640 Speaker 1: the way to exchange payment for the oil and gas 592 00:34:44,200 --> 00:34:48,360 Speaker 1: of Russia is I would be I would be surprised 593 00:34:48,400 --> 00:34:51,680 Speaker 1: if any crypto people view that that sanction is too harsh. 594 00:34:52,200 --> 00:34:56,200 Speaker 1: That's the first thing. A second thing is crypto is 595 00:34:56,239 --> 00:35:02,200 Speaker 1: a very decentralized um concept and abstract, so it's hard 596 00:35:02,280 --> 00:35:07,360 Speaker 1: for anyone firm or any protocol to just regulate like that. 597 00:35:07,560 --> 00:35:11,560 Speaker 1: The beauty of it it is decentralized UM. It's transparent, 598 00:35:11,680 --> 00:35:16,000 Speaker 1: but it's decentralized so that anyone can get access to it. 599 00:35:18,200 --> 00:35:22,759 Speaker 1: John At this point, we haven't seen any sanctions impacting 600 00:35:22,920 --> 00:35:27,800 Speaker 1: the movement of cryptocurrency. But given all of this increased attention, 601 00:35:27,920 --> 00:35:30,880 Speaker 1: is that something you're expecting. Are you expecting any additional 602 00:35:30,960 --> 00:35:35,280 Speaker 1: regulation or sanctions that could impact the movement of digital assets? 603 00:35:36,600 --> 00:35:40,480 Speaker 1: If there were, you would really be hurting individuals in 604 00:35:40,760 --> 00:35:44,279 Speaker 1: Ukraine and individuals in Russia. You're not going to be 605 00:35:44,440 --> 00:35:47,760 Speaker 1: hurting the sovereign state. You're not going to be hurting, 606 00:35:48,160 --> 00:35:51,319 Speaker 1: you know, the treasury of Russia, which I think has 607 00:35:51,360 --> 00:35:55,560 Speaker 1: about six billion dollars worth of UM dollars, as well 608 00:35:55,600 --> 00:35:58,320 Speaker 1: as close to that amount in gold. I would worry 609 00:35:58,320 --> 00:36:01,720 Speaker 1: about gold more than I would worry about UM crypto, 610 00:36:01,920 --> 00:36:06,480 Speaker 1: because you really would be cutting the individuals off. All right, 611 00:36:06,560 --> 00:36:10,200 Speaker 1: interesting port John Wu of Ava Labs, thank you for 612 00:36:10,400 --> 00:36:13,120 Speaker 1: bringing us some of that additional context. Along with Bloomberg's 613 00:36:23,280 --> 00:36:25,640 Speaker 1: a story, we continue to watch Uber is speeding up 614 00:36:25,640 --> 00:36:28,280 Speaker 1: the sale of its steak in a taxi joint venture 615 00:36:28,400 --> 00:36:32,520 Speaker 1: with Russian internet search company Yandex. The ride hailing giant 616 00:36:32,560 --> 00:36:36,400 Speaker 1: will also remove Uber executives from the board of Yandex. 617 00:36:36,760 --> 00:36:39,560 Speaker 1: Uber doesn't hold any shares of the publicly traded Yandex entity, 618 00:36:39,600 --> 00:36:41,880 Speaker 1: but does have a stake in the venture that was 619 00:36:41,960 --> 00:36:44,839 Speaker 1: valued at about eight hundred million dollars at the end 620 00:36:44,840 --> 00:36:47,680 Speaker 1: of one but Uber, of course now trying to distance 621 00:36:47,719 --> 00:36:52,360 Speaker 1: itself from that sale. The pressure on tech companies to 622 00:36:52,600 --> 00:36:55,320 Speaker 1: use their outside influence to react to Russia's invasion of 623 00:36:55,440 --> 00:36:58,560 Speaker 1: Ukraine continuing to mount, from social media to streaming to 624 00:36:58,719 --> 00:37:01,640 Speaker 1: ride sharing, tech companies are enforced to take a stand. 625 00:37:01,719 --> 00:37:03,919 Speaker 1: For more on this, I'm joined by Bloomberg Business Weeks, 626 00:37:03,960 --> 00:37:06,919 Speaker 1: Ashley Vans, and of course the host of Hello World 627 00:37:06,960 --> 00:37:09,560 Speaker 1: actually great to have you with us. You spent time 628 00:37:10,160 --> 00:37:15,160 Speaker 1: in Ukraine's third largest city, which is also it's tech hub. 629 00:37:15,600 --> 00:37:18,000 Speaker 1: What is significant about this place in the context of 630 00:37:18,040 --> 00:37:19,680 Speaker 1: the war that's happening now and what do we need 631 00:37:19,719 --> 00:37:22,839 Speaker 1: to know about it? Well, yeah, you know, I went 632 00:37:23,000 --> 00:37:25,600 Speaker 1: to the cities called Denepro. I went there a couple 633 00:37:25,640 --> 00:37:29,480 Speaker 1: of years ago. It's a fascinating place. People might not know, 634 00:37:29,680 --> 00:37:33,719 Speaker 1: but during the heyday of the Soviet Union, Dnepro was 635 00:37:34,160 --> 00:37:39,000 Speaker 1: was the major supplier manufacturing hub of the Soviet Union's 636 00:37:39,080 --> 00:37:41,279 Speaker 1: I C, B M s and then also their most 637 00:37:41,960 --> 00:37:46,719 Speaker 1: sophisticated rocket engines and rockets for for space missions. And 638 00:37:47,239 --> 00:37:52,160 Speaker 1: you know, it has this multi decade um history of 639 00:37:52,280 --> 00:37:56,320 Speaker 1: just incredible engineers and scientists that live there, some of 640 00:37:56,440 --> 00:38:00,239 Speaker 1: the best schools in Ukraine, and and so you it's 641 00:38:00,360 --> 00:38:03,080 Speaker 1: it's uh, it's a fascinating place that really is the 642 00:38:03,200 --> 00:38:08,360 Speaker 1: heart of Ukraine's engineering prowess. Now, you suggested that this 643 00:38:09,080 --> 00:38:12,719 Speaker 1: city could become a target given the depth of engineering 644 00:38:13,200 --> 00:38:15,239 Speaker 1: and science talent. I know you've been calling some of 645 00:38:15,280 --> 00:38:18,160 Speaker 1: your sources. What's happening there now? Is it? Is it 646 00:38:18,640 --> 00:38:21,399 Speaker 1: a target? Yeah? Well, you know, in the first days 647 00:38:21,440 --> 00:38:24,000 Speaker 1: when the attack began. I was immediately looking to see 648 00:38:24,040 --> 00:38:26,080 Speaker 1: what was going on. There's a there's a factory they're 649 00:38:26,120 --> 00:38:28,800 Speaker 1: called Usmash, which is is the factory where all the 650 00:38:29,320 --> 00:38:31,800 Speaker 1: i CBMs and rockets come out of. There was a 651 00:38:31,920 --> 00:38:34,719 Speaker 1: question of would the Russians just try to blow it up, 652 00:38:34,760 --> 00:38:37,040 Speaker 1: would they try to take it over? And and sees 653 00:38:37,680 --> 00:38:40,719 Speaker 1: these assets my friends there. Early on there there was 654 00:38:40,960 --> 00:38:43,759 Speaker 1: a huge explosion that took place on the outskirts of 655 00:38:43,840 --> 00:38:46,120 Speaker 1: the city. People thought it might be the factory. All 656 00:38:46,160 --> 00:38:49,279 Speaker 1: the reports that I've seen so far, it seems to 657 00:38:49,320 --> 00:38:52,640 Speaker 1: be that the factory is safe. The people there are 658 00:38:53,040 --> 00:38:55,879 Speaker 1: under a lot of pressure. I have friends who were 659 00:38:56,600 --> 00:39:00,560 Speaker 1: um in public relations who are now you know, making 660 00:39:00,640 --> 00:39:05,399 Speaker 1: Molotov cocktails and taking up guns, and nobody's really clear 661 00:39:05,520 --> 00:39:10,200 Speaker 1: on what the Russians want with these assets if the city. 662 00:39:10,719 --> 00:39:12,640 Speaker 1: We've been hearing about a number of companies that have 663 00:39:12,680 --> 00:39:16,760 Speaker 1: been pulling their employees out of Ukraine if they can. Meantime, 664 00:39:16,800 --> 00:39:20,640 Speaker 1: we're also seeing pressure for companies to cut ties with Russia. 665 00:39:20,680 --> 00:39:23,120 Speaker 1: As we were just talking about crypto exchanges being asked 666 00:39:23,160 --> 00:39:27,560 Speaker 1: to kick off their Russian clients. Uber distancing itself for 667 00:39:27,680 --> 00:39:31,160 Speaker 1: trying to distance itself from yandex. Netflix just came out 668 00:39:31,200 --> 00:39:34,160 Speaker 1: today and said we're still going to serve Russia. What 669 00:39:34,239 --> 00:39:38,320 Speaker 1: do you make of the choices these big global companies 670 00:39:38,400 --> 00:39:42,399 Speaker 1: are facing about how to use their influence to make 671 00:39:42,480 --> 00:39:47,640 Speaker 1: it hurt in Russia. It's it's interesting because Russia, along 672 00:39:47,719 --> 00:39:49,200 Speaker 1: with the U. S and China, is one of the 673 00:39:49,280 --> 00:39:52,800 Speaker 1: only places that has kind of it's its own Internet 674 00:39:53,000 --> 00:39:56,000 Speaker 1: where you have all the services you could imagine in 675 00:39:56,280 --> 00:39:59,879 Speaker 1: the Russian language. So there's some question of we kick 676 00:40:00,040 --> 00:40:03,880 Speaker 1: off these US and European based services, there are Russian 677 00:40:03,920 --> 00:40:06,160 Speaker 1: replacements for all the stuff. You know, I think on 678 00:40:06,280 --> 00:40:10,160 Speaker 1: the whole US and European companies have had to make 679 00:40:10,239 --> 00:40:15,440 Speaker 1: compromises for many years now to operate in Russia, and obviously, 680 00:40:16,160 --> 00:40:19,440 Speaker 1: you know, the state of affairs now puts into question 681 00:40:19,560 --> 00:40:23,560 Speaker 1: if they're willing to continue to keep making those compromises. 682 00:40:23,840 --> 00:40:26,279 Speaker 1: And and just in the last month, Russia has been 683 00:40:27,040 --> 00:40:29,520 Speaker 1: leaning on the tech companies to make a new set 684 00:40:29,560 --> 00:40:33,720 Speaker 1: of compromises around you know, having people in Russia behind 685 00:40:33,800 --> 00:40:37,040 Speaker 1: these services and some of their data, and so, I mean, 686 00:40:37,200 --> 00:40:39,279 Speaker 1: you know, if every there was a moment for these 687 00:40:39,360 --> 00:40:43,000 Speaker 1: companies to sort of pick sides and stop making compromises. 688 00:40:43,080 --> 00:40:46,080 Speaker 1: It would seem like this is it. If anything, we've 689 00:40:46,160 --> 00:40:49,800 Speaker 1: seen the you know, strength of the Ukrainian people and 690 00:40:50,520 --> 00:40:53,239 Speaker 1: individuals on the ground rallying. You mentioned your friends making 691 00:40:53,680 --> 00:40:58,239 Speaker 1: Molotov cocktails to stand up to this Russian invasion. How 692 00:40:58,320 --> 00:41:00,719 Speaker 1: do you think this sort of deep bench of engineering 693 00:41:00,800 --> 00:41:04,239 Speaker 1: and scientific talent and and companies that have been you know, 694 00:41:04,600 --> 00:41:08,160 Speaker 1: being built in Ukraine for many years now could potentially 695 00:41:08,200 --> 00:41:12,080 Speaker 1: help this effort. Well, you know, it's sad. I've already 696 00:41:12,120 --> 00:41:15,439 Speaker 1: seen I cover aerospace a lot, and there's a number 697 00:41:15,440 --> 00:41:19,960 Speaker 1: of aerospace startups in Internet bro and and their engineers 698 00:41:20,000 --> 00:41:23,520 Speaker 1: have been pulled out of the country already, two places 699 00:41:23,600 --> 00:41:29,720 Speaker 1: like Bulgaria and in some of the surrounding countries for safety. Um, certainly, 700 00:41:29,920 --> 00:41:32,000 Speaker 1: you know, I mean there's a sense of Russians are 701 00:41:32,040 --> 00:41:34,719 Speaker 1: obviously very good at computer science, at hacking, and so 702 00:41:34,840 --> 00:41:37,239 Speaker 1: are the Ukrainians as well, and so I'm sure they 703 00:41:37,280 --> 00:41:40,120 Speaker 1: can they can lean on that bench of talent there 704 00:41:40,800 --> 00:41:42,879 Speaker 1: on the whole. It's it's a little sad to see, 705 00:41:44,000 --> 00:41:46,200 Speaker 1: you know, what's happening to the tech sing because of this. 706 00:41:47,800 --> 00:41:50,040 Speaker 1: Certainly something we're going to continue to watch. Thank you 707 00:41:50,120 --> 00:41:53,200 Speaker 1: for bringing us that side of the story. Bloomberg's actually vanced, 708 00:41:54,040 --> 00:41:56,960 Speaker 1: and that does it for this edition of Bloomberg Technology 709 00:41:57,320 --> 00:41:58,840 Speaker 1: to an In tomorrow, we're gonna be sitting down with 710 00:41:59,040 --> 00:42:02,400 Speaker 1: Zoom CFO Kelly Steckelberg offer the company's latest earnings report, 711 00:42:02,719 --> 00:42:04,320 Speaker 1: talked to you about the latest on the war, and 712 00:42:04,480 --> 00:42:05,960 Speaker 1: much more. This is Bloomberg