Speaker 1: Soon after the attacks of nine eleven, the families of
Speaker 1: those killed demanded answers, Politicians began pointing fingers, and the
Speaker 1: American public was wondering if this could ever happen again.
Speaker 1: Note for the record that se of what we knew
Speaker 1: about found out about Asama bin Laden after nine eleven.
Speaker 1: We knew in. N of the facts that we knew
Speaker 1: about Asama bin Laden we knew in but the full
Speaker 1: story wasn't delivered until after nine eleven. It was held
Speaker 1: in classified, compartmentalized sections. This is nine eleven, two decades later.
Speaker 1: I'm Steve Gregory in Los Angeles. Within a year of
Speaker 1: the attacks, Congress drafted legislation to create the National Commission
Speaker 1: on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, commonly referred to
Speaker 1: as the nine eleven Commission. On November twenty seventh, two
Speaker 1: thousand to, President George W. Bush signed the legislation, which
Speaker 1: mandated a full and complete accounting of the attacks of
Speaker 1: September eleven, two thousand one, and recommendations as to how
Speaker 1: to prevent such attacks in the future. With a budget
Speaker 1: of fifteen million dollars and eighty people on staff, the
Speaker 1: Commission would research, compile, and report on eight points of interest,
Speaker 1: including al Qaeda and the organization of the nine eleven attack,
Speaker 1: Intelligence collection, analysis, and management. International counter terrorism policy including
Speaker 1: states that harbor or harbored terrorists, terrorists financing border security
Speaker 1: and foreign visitors, law enforcement and intelligence collection inside the
Speaker 1: United States, Commercial aviation and transportation security, including the investigation
Speaker 1: into the four hijackings, and the immediate response to the
Speaker 1: attacks at the national, state, and local levels, including issues
Speaker 1: of continuity of government. On July twenty, two, thousand four,
Speaker 1: the nine eleven Commission issued its final report to Congress.
Speaker 1: The following month, the chair and vice chair of the
Speaker 1: Commission would sit before the Armed Services Committee to discuss
Speaker 1: the report and take questions. One such exchange happened between
Speaker 1: Democratic Congresswoman Nita Lowey and Committee Chair Thomas Kane. In
Speaker 1: your report, you say, quote, it must take into consideration
Speaker 1: the full array of possible enemy tactics, such as the
Speaker 1: use of insires. Did the Commission intend for airport workers,
Speaker 1: cabin cleaners, maintenance crews, caterers who are currently permitted to
Speaker 1: bypass metal detectors? Should they be given antiquated badges or
Speaker 1: should everyone have to go through medical excuse me? Metal detectives,
Speaker 1: and I've been repeatedly told by T s A it's
Speaker 1: too inconvenient and costly to screen all airport workers, despite
Speaker 1: the fact that a hundred percent of workers have physically
Speaker 1: screened at airports like Heathrow, almost a hundred percent at
Speaker 1: Child de Gall This doesn't make sense to me. If
Speaker 1: you could can continue to weigh in on that issue,
Speaker 1: because I'm sure you agree that everyone should be going
Speaker 1: through medical detectives metal detectives, and as a New Yorker,
Speaker 1: it disturbs me that currently we are so worried about
Speaker 1: security in the New York area, yet thousands of people
Speaker 1: are going through every day with antiquated badges. And if
Speaker 1: we're going to carry out your recommendations, I would like
Speaker 1: to hear your recommendations as to an adjustment. And since
Speaker 1: my time is running out, if you can comment on
Speaker 1: airport security, in particular the fact that thousands of people
Speaker 1: are currently going through the metal detectors, uh that thousands
Speaker 1: of people are not going through the metal detectors with
Speaker 1: their badges, thank you very much. Well, everybody should go
Speaker 1: through metal detectives, I believe without we have to wait
Speaker 1: for structural change, or do you think we can implement
Speaker 1: that now, ow can it be implemented by executive order?
Speaker 1: We can't seem to move the f A A or
Speaker 1: T s A and business keeps talking about an inconvenience.
Speaker 1: How can we get that done? Now? Well, you could
Speaker 1: probably an answer that, knowing probably more about government than
Speaker 1: I do, But I don't know what the how you
Speaker 1: can do these kind of things by executive order, or
Speaker 1: whether you can or whether you have to have something
Speaker 1: through the United States Congress that I just don't have
Speaker 1: the expertise to answer that. But it should be done,
Speaker 1: There's no There's no question about it. I believe that
Speaker 1: if we're going to create less terrorists change minds in
Speaker 1: the Arab world, we've got to change. We can't just
Speaker 1: be viewed as a military power. We've got to get
Speaker 1: back to some of the things we used to do
Speaker 1: in the Cold War to try to win that cold
Speaker 1: Cold War and change minds. And that involved not only
Speaker 1: education expenses, but cultural exchanges, ways in which with student exchanges,
Speaker 1: ways in which show we allowed these people to get
Speaker 1: to know us and that we had a better understanding
Speaker 1: of them. I mean, we've got to get into those
Speaker 1: with some people call soft areas we we we've got
Speaker 1: to let these people know who we are, and we've
Speaker 1: got to understand in a much better way who they are.
Speaker 1: And I'm not talking about the small percentage you want
Speaker 1: to kill us. I'm talking about the much lodge of
Speaker 1: a centage now who don't really like us at all
Speaker 1: because of what they know of us right now. But
Speaker 1: if we were able to send a different message, might
Speaker 1: like us a bit better. After the release of the report,
Speaker 1: the ten commissioners held a press conference. Here's a portion
Speaker 1: of that conference with opening statements by Chairman Thomas Kine.
Speaker 1: Today we present this report and these recommendations to the
Speaker 1: President of the United States, to the United States Congress,
Speaker 1: and the American people. This report represents the unanimous conclusion
Speaker 1: of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States.
Speaker 1: On September eleven, two thousand and one, nineteen men armed
Speaker 1: with knives, box cutters, mace, and pepper spray penetrated the
Speaker 1: defenses of the most powerful nation in the world. They
Speaker 1: inflicted unbearable trump on our people. At the same time,
Speaker 1: they turned the international order upside down. Now, we recognize
Speaker 1: as commissioners that we have the benefit of hindsight and
Speaker 1: since the plotters were flexible and resourceful, we cannot know
Speaker 1: whether any single step or series of steps would have
Speaker 1: defeated them. What we can say with a good deal
Speaker 1: of confidence is that none of the measures adopted by
Speaker 1: the United States government before eleven disturbed or even delayed
Speaker 1: the progress of the al Qaeda plot. There were several
Speaker 1: unexploited opportunities. Our government did not watch list future hijackers
Speaker 1: Osmi and Minhof before they arrived in the United States
Speaker 1: or take adequate steps to find them once they were here.
Speaker 1: Our government did not link the arrest of zachairas Massawi
Speaker 1: described as interested in flight training for the purpose of
Speaker 1: using airplane as a terrorist act to the heightened indications
Speaker 1: of attack. Our government did not discover false statements and
Speaker 1: visa applications, or recognized passports that were manipulated in a
Speaker 1: fraudulent manner. Our government did not expand no Fly List
Speaker 1: to include names from terrorist watchless or require airline passages
Speaker 1: to be more thoroughly screened. These examples make up part
Speaker 1: of a broader national security picture where the government failed
Speaker 1: to protect the American people. The United States government was
Speaker 1: simply not active enough in batting the terrorist threat before eleven,
Speaker 1: diplomacy and foreign policy failed to extract Unladen from his
Speaker 1: Afghan sanctuary. Our military forces and covert action capabilities did
Speaker 1: not have the options on the table to defeat al
Speaker 1: Qaeda or kill or capture either Ben Laden or his
Speaker 1: top lieutenants. Our intelligence and law enforcement agencies did not
Speaker 1: manage or share information or effectively follow leaves to keep
Speaker 1: pace with a very nimble enemy. Our border, immigration, and
Speaker 1: aviation security agencies were not integrated into the counter terrorism effort,
Speaker 1: and much of a response on a day of nine
Speaker 1: eleven was improvised and ineffective, even as extraordinary individual acts
Speaker 1: of heroism saved countless lives. Our failures took place over
Speaker 1: many years and administrations. There's no single individual who is
Speaker 1: responsible for our failures. Yet individuals and institutions cannot be
Speaker 1: absolved of responsibility. Any person in a senior position within
Speaker 1: our government during this time bears some element of responsibility
Speaker 1: for our government's actions. Having said that, it is not
Speaker 1: our purse to assign blame. As we said at the outset,
Speaker 1: we look back so that we can look forward. Our
Speaker 1: goal is to prevent future attacks. Every expert with whom
Speaker 1: we spoke toldness, an attack of even greater magnitude is
Speaker 1: now possible and even probable. We do not have the
Speaker 1: luxury of time. We must prepare and we must act.
Speaker 1: The al Qaida network and its affiliates are sophisticated, patient, disciplined,
Speaker 1: and lethal. Osama bin Laden built an infrastructure and organization
Speaker 1: that was able to attract, train, and use recruits against
Speaker 1: even more ambitious targets. He rallied New Zealots with each
Speaker 1: demonstration of Alakaida's capability. His message and his hate filled
Speaker 1: ideology have instructed and inspired untol recruits and imitators. He
Speaker 1: in al Qaeda despise America and its policies. They exploit
Speaker 1: political grievances and hopelessnesses within the Arab and Islamic world.
Speaker 1: They indoctrinate to disaffect it and pervert one of the
Speaker 1: great world's great religions, and they seek creative methods to
Speaker 1: kill Americans in limitless numbers, including if they can do
Speaker 1: it with the use of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.
Speaker 1: Put simply, the United States is faced with one of
Speaker 1: the greatest security challenges in our long history. Because al
Speaker 1: Qaeda represents an ideology, not a finite group of people.
Speaker 1: We should not expect the danger to receive greatly as
Speaker 1: years to come. No matter whom we kill a capture,
Speaker 1: including Osama bin Laden himself, there will be still those
Speaker 1: who plot against us. And Laden has inspired affiliates and imitates.
Speaker 1: The societies they prey on are vulnerable. The terrorist ideology
Speaker 1: is potent, and the means for a conflicting harm are
Speaker 1: readily available. We cannot let our God down. Congressman Hamilton's
Speaker 1: I begin with the recommendations. This commission, of course does
Speaker 1: not have all of the answers, but we have thought
Speaker 1: about to do a global strategy and how to do
Speaker 1: it a different way of organizing our government. But based
Speaker 1: on our third review of the government's performance and our
Speaker 1: examination of the enemy, we recommend the following elements for
Speaker 1: a counter terrorism strategy. The strategy must be balanced. It
Speaker 1: must integrate all the elements of national power, diplomacy, intelligence,
Speaker 1: covert action, law enforcement, economic policy, foreign aid, homeland defense,
Speaker 1: and military strength. There is no silver bullet or decisive
Speaker 1: blow that can defeat Islamic terrorism. It will take unity
Speaker 1: of effort and sustained an effective use of every tool
Speaker 1: at our disposal. We need to play offense to kill
Speaker 1: or to capture the terrorists, deny them sanctuaries, and disrupt
Speaker 1: their ability to move money and people around the globe.
Speaker 1: We need to ensure that the key countries like Afghanistan
Speaker 1: and Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are stable, capable, and resolute
Speaker 1: in opposing terrorism. We need to sustain a coalition of
Speaker 1: nations that cooperates bilaterally and multilaterally with US in the
Speaker 1: counter terrorism mission. We need a better dialogue between the
Speaker 1: West and the Islamic world. We also highlight the need
Speaker 1: to restrict and roll back the proliferation of the world's
Speaker 1: most dangerous weapons. We need to put forth an agenda
Speaker 1: of opportunity, economic, educational, political, so that young people in
Speaker 1: the Arab and Islamic world have peaceful and productive avenues
Speaker 1: for expression and hope. We need to join the battle
Speaker 1: of ideas within the Islamic world, communicating hope instead of despair,
Speaker 1: progress in place of persecution, life instead of death. This
Speaker 1: message should be matched by policies that encourage and support
Speaker 1: the majority of Muslims who share these goals. At home,
Speaker 1: we need to set clear priorities for the protection of
Speaker 1: our infrastructure and the security of our transportation resources. Should
Speaker 1: be allocated based upon those priorities, and standards of preparedness
Speaker 1: should be set. The private sector and local governments should
Speaker 1: play an important part in this process. We need secure
Speaker 1: borders with heightened and uniform standards of identification for those
Speaker 1: entering and exiting the country, and an immigration system able
Speaker 1: to be efficient allowing good people in while keeping the
Speaker 1: terrorists out. If God forbid there is another attack, we
Speaker 1: must be ready to respond. We must educate the public,
Speaker 1: train and equip our first responders, and anticipate countless scenarios.
Speaker 1: We recommend significant changes in the organization of government. We
Speaker 1: know that the quality of the people is more important
Speaker 1: than the quality of the wiring diagrams. Good people can
Speaker 1: overcome bad structures. They should not have to day and night.
Speaker 1: Dedicated public servants are waging the struggle to combat terrorists
Speaker 1: and protect the homeland. We need to ensure that our
Speaker 1: government maximizes their efforts through information sharing, coordinated effort, and
Speaker 1: clear authority. A critical theme that emerged throughout our inquiry
Speaker 1: was the difficulty of answering the question who is in charge?
Speaker 1: Who ensures that agencies pool resources, avoid duplication, and plan jointly.
Speaker 1: Who oversees the massive integration and unity of effort necessary
Speaker 1: to keep America safe. Too often the answer is no one.
Speaker 1: Thus we are recommending a National counter Terrorism Center. We
Speaker 1: need effective unity of effort on counter terrorism. We should
Speaker 1: create a National counter Terrorism Center to unify all counter
Speaker 1: terrorism intelligence and operations across the foreign and the domestic
Speaker 1: divide in one organization. Right now, these efforts are too
Speaker 1: diffuse across the government. They need to be unified. We
Speaker 1: recommend a National Intelligence Director. We need unity of effort
Speaker 1: in the intelligence community. We need a much stronger head
Speaker 1: of the intelligence community and an intelligence community that organizes
Speaker 1: itself to do joint work in national mission centers. We
Speaker 1: need reforms of the kind the military had two decades ago.
Speaker 1: We need a Goldwater Nichols reform for the intelligence community.
Speaker 1: The intelligence community needs a shift in mindset and organization
Speaker 1: so that intelligence agencies operate under the principle of joint
Speaker 1: command with information sharing as the norm. We need to
Speaker 1: reform in the United States Congress. We need unity of
Speaker 1: effort in the Congress. Right now, authority and responsibility are
Speaker 1: too diffuse. The Intelligence Committees do not have enough power
Speaker 1: to perform effectively their oversight work oversight for homeland security
Speaker 1: is splintered among too many committees. We need much stronger
Speaker 1: committees performing oversight of intelligence, and we need a single
Speaker 1: committee in each chamber providing oversight of the Department of
Speaker 1: Homeland Security. We need reform in the FBI. We need
Speaker 1: us stronger national security workforce within the FBI. We do
Speaker 1: not support the creation of a new domestic intelligence agency.
Speaker 1: What the f FBI needs is a specialized and integrated
Speaker 1: national security workforce consisting of agents, analysts, linguists, and surveillance specialists.
Speaker 1: These specialists need to be recruited, trained, rewarded, and retained
Speaker 1: to ensure the development of an institutional culture with deep
Speaker 1: expertise and intelligence and national security. We need changes in
Speaker 1: information sharing. We need unity of effort in that task.
Speaker 1: United States government has access to vast amounts of information,
Speaker 1: but it has a weak process, a weak system of
Speaker 1: processing and using that information. Need to share must replace
Speaker 1: need to know, and we need a better process for
Speaker 1: transitions between one administration and another for national security officials
Speaker 1: so that this nation does not lower its guard every
Speaker 1: four or eight years. These and other recommendations are spelled
Speaker 1: out in great detail in our report. We've made a
Speaker 1: limited number of recommendations, focusing on the areas we believe
Speaker 1: most critical. We are acutely sensitive to the need to
Speaker 1: vigorously protect our liberties as we secure and guard our security.
Speaker 1: We endorse many of the actions taken in the week
Speaker 1: in the wake of nine eleven to facilitate government action
Speaker 1: and information shared, but we stress that these measures need
Speaker 1: to be accompanied by commitment to our open society and
Speaker 1: the principle of review safeguards that are built into the
Speaker 1: process and accompanied by vigorous oversight. We must, after all
Speaker 1: is said and done, preserve the liberties that we are
Speaker 1: fighting for. It wasn't long after the release of the
Speaker 1: report that controversy would seep into the narrative. Critics claimed
Speaker 1: the report was rife with inaccuracies, lacked factual basis, and
Speaker 1: claims of conflicts of interest. Some of those claims were
Speaker 1: actually leveled by members of the commission. Other members of
Speaker 1: the Commission claimed the recommendations were being ignored, and even
Speaker 1: went on a nationwide tour to convince people and agencies
Speaker 1: to adopt the recommendations. Chairman Kane and Vice Chairman Hamilton's
Speaker 1: would go on to write a book about their experiences
Speaker 1: and the frustrations over lack of cooperation from intelligence agencies
Speaker 1: and misstatements by the f a A and the Pentagon.
Speaker 1: Both men said the commission was set up to fail.
Speaker 1: Captain Dale die as a retired Marine, a military consultant
Speaker 1: and author, and one of the most sought after technical
Speaker 1: advisors from motion pictures and television. He's also very well
Speaker 1: informed and connected. I asked him if there was even
Speaker 1: a need for the Department of Homeland Security. I don't
Speaker 1: think so. Um. Look, we're one of one of the
Speaker 1: other things about Americans, as well as being blamers, Um,
Speaker 1: we're we're bureaucracy builders. I mean, part part of our
Speaker 1: I don't know, national character, I guess, is to say, well,
Speaker 1: you know what we need here the greatest minds in
Speaker 1: the world. So let's go find them and we'll build
Speaker 1: some sort of bureaucracy and they'll study the question and
Speaker 1: they'll tell us what to do. Um. The problem with that,
Speaker 1: as is a problem with all bureaucracies, is it's become
Speaker 1: self perpetuating. And what happens is they grasp for power. Okay,
Speaker 1: we're the we're the Department of Homeland Security. We will
Speaker 1: rule your lives. This is the way this is going
Speaker 1: to go. And that's that's entirely anti American. UM. I
Speaker 1: didn't see the need for it. I still don't see
Speaker 1: the need for it, frankly. But it is one of
Speaker 1: those self perpetuating bureaucracies, and here we go, so we
Speaker 1: need I think at this point we don't. We might
Speaker 1: have needed an increased level of training and security and
Speaker 1: that sort of thing for the for the normal security
Speaker 1: people and at airlines and major travel hubs and that
Speaker 1: sort of thing. I think I think we should have
Speaker 1: taken a lesson from the Israelites. Frankly, they're very good
Speaker 1: at this, UM. And and if it were me, rather
Speaker 1: than say, okay, let's build a bureaucracy full of eggheads
Speaker 1: and experts who can study this problem, I would have said,
Speaker 1: wait a minute, what are you guys doing over there
Speaker 1: in Israel? You seem to do really well with this
Speaker 1: sort of thing. And I would have either copied or
Speaker 1: mimicked that and let it go. But that's not that's
Speaker 1: not in our American nature. UM. We liked to build
Speaker 1: stuff and then okay, problem solved, And of course it
Speaker 1: never is. It just creates other problems. UM. So UM
Speaker 1: Homeland Security t s AN I don't think so. We
Speaker 1: could have done it better. In the last few years,
Speaker 1: there's been a lot of controversy surrounding our intelligence services,
Speaker 1: lack of trust, failures in communication, failures to work together.
Speaker 1: How is our intelligence infrastructure? Do you think? Look, we
Speaker 1: we needed a central collating an analysis point. We created one.
Speaker 1: But in the process of doing that, I think we
Speaker 1: ignored the old bureaucratic in fighting. Well, I know something
Speaker 1: you don't know, and that gives me a certain edge,
Speaker 1: that gives me a certain power. And that's rife, rife
Speaker 1: throughout the American intelligence community, whether it's civilian intelligence or
Speaker 1: military intelligen there's something like thirteen fourteen or fifteen separate agencies.
Speaker 1: I think we finally understood that that the material, the
Speaker 1: product that is produced out of those intelligence agencies needs
Speaker 1: to come under one umbrella. But look, intelligence gathering is
Speaker 1: a dirty business. Even with all of the electronic gizmos
Speaker 1: and satellites and surveillance techniques that we have, it's still
Speaker 1: a dirty business. It's still about secrets. It's still about
Speaker 1: I know something you don't know, and and because I
Speaker 1: know that, and now I have access to power and
Speaker 1: so on, and and that is the sort of thing
Speaker 1: that that defeats a lot of our our intelligence efforts.
Speaker 1: And you know, it's so simple. In many cases, it's
Speaker 1: a matter of picking up a phone and saying, hey,
Speaker 1: I got some stuff, what do you got? But we
Speaker 1: don't want to do that because that's giving away. Um.
Speaker 1: We're so clandestinely oriented about this sort of thing that
Speaker 1: in many cases we defeat ourselves. The information that we've
Speaker 1: gathered through extraordinary effort never gets shared because we're afraid
Speaker 1: of it being compromised. Well, look, a little compromise is
Speaker 1: better than no information at all. Are we safer today
Speaker 1: than we were twenty years ago? You know, I was
Speaker 1: afraid you were going to ask me that, Steve. And
Speaker 1: I don't know the answer, my friend, I really don't. Um,
Speaker 1: I think so, UM, I hope so. I hope we've
Speaker 1: learned some things through this agony that we've been over
Speaker 1: in uh in, in this century. I really do. UM.
Speaker 1: I think it's important for us to understand that America
Speaker 1: is vulnerable and can be vulnerable. And the more we
Speaker 1: screw up internationally, the more we allow China to do
Speaker 1: what China is trying to do become the world power
Speaker 1: that the United States once was. The more we do that, UM,
Speaker 1: I'm afraid our safety, which has improved certainly since nine eleven,
Speaker 1: the safety of the individual on the street, living in
Speaker 1: l A or living in kia Kuk or wherever it is.
Speaker 1: I think I think they are indeed safer right now.
Speaker 1: But if we continue to chase these sort of overseas involvements, Uh,
Speaker 1: we're gonna sack pfies a great deal of that safety.
Speaker 1: We're inviting higher, we're inviting spite. And the more we
Speaker 1: do that, the more the people who are threatening our
Speaker 1: safety are going to attempt to get to us. Look,
Speaker 1: it's a great coup to be able to kick the
Speaker 1: great Satan in the butt. America is a powerful country,
Speaker 1: and anybody who can take a shot and that shot lands,
Speaker 1: that's a great deal of prestige for those people. Um,
Speaker 1: and we are vulnerable. But I think in direct answer,
Speaker 1: we're a bit safer for mr and mrs on the
Speaker 1: street than we were before nine eleven. Once again, Thomas Caine,
Speaker 1: the chairman of the nine eleven Commission, his final words
Speaker 1: on the day the Commission's report was released. We have
Speaker 1: struck blows against the terrorists nine eleven. We have we believe,
Speaker 1: prevented attacks on the homeland. We do believe we are
Speaker 1: safer today than we were in nine eleven, but we
Speaker 1: are not safe. Thank you all. We do believe that
Speaker 1: in this volume, our recommendations will make the American table safe.
Speaker 1: So maybe the answer isn't with government officials, experts and politicians.
Speaker 1: Maybe the answer hits a little closer to home. Do
Speaker 1: you feel safer today than yesterday, than twenty years ago?
Speaker 1: I'm Steve Gregory in Los Angeles, nine eleven, Two decades
Speaker 1: Later is produced by Steve Gregory and Jacob Gonzalez and
Speaker 1: is a production of the k FI News department for
Speaker 1: I Heart Media Los Angeles and the iHeart podcast Network.
Speaker 1: The views expressed are strictly those of the guests and
Speaker 1: not necessarily the hosts or employees of I Heart Media.