1 00:00:00,240 --> 00:00:04,680 Speaker 1: From UFOs to psychic powers and government conspiracies. History is 2 00:00:04,760 --> 00:00:09,080 Speaker 1: riddled with unexplained events. You can turn back now or 3 00:00:09,200 --> 00:00:12,079 Speaker 1: learn the stuff they don't want you to know. A 4 00:00:12,200 --> 00:00:25,239 Speaker 1: production of My Heart Radio. Hello, and welcome back to 5 00:00:25,280 --> 00:00:27,480 Speaker 1: the show. My name is Matt, my name is Noel. 6 00:00:27,720 --> 00:00:30,080 Speaker 1: They called me Ben, and we're joined as always with 7 00:00:30,160 --> 00:00:34,279 Speaker 1: our super producer Paul Michian. Controlled deconds. Most importantly, you 8 00:00:34,360 --> 00:00:37,120 Speaker 1: are you, You are here, and that makes this the 9 00:00:37,240 --> 00:00:40,760 Speaker 1: stuff they don't want you to know. Well, good news 10 00:00:41,240 --> 00:00:44,279 Speaker 1: as we start the show today, there is currently not 11 00:00:44,560 --> 00:00:48,200 Speaker 1: a nuclear war, believe it or not, folks. Yeah, right, 12 00:00:48,520 --> 00:00:51,040 Speaker 1: this is actually a thing that we check on right 13 00:00:51,040 --> 00:00:54,960 Speaker 1: before we record these days. Uh. And Matt, no, you 14 00:00:54,960 --> 00:00:57,840 Speaker 1: can verify because right before we rolled I I had 15 00:00:57,880 --> 00:01:01,640 Speaker 1: almost forgotten. I said, oh wait one second, let's check. Yeah, 16 00:01:01,640 --> 00:01:09,280 Speaker 1: I have a Google notification set for armageddon, uh, nuclear holocaust, apocalypse, uh, nukes, 17 00:01:09,400 --> 00:01:13,000 Speaker 1: duck and cover, you know, the Big five, just to 18 00:01:13,040 --> 00:01:15,840 Speaker 1: make sure at all times that things are hunky dorry, 19 00:01:15,840 --> 00:01:17,959 Speaker 1: which of course they're not. But we're at least not 20 00:01:18,080 --> 00:01:21,480 Speaker 1: there yet, you know, a little bit like a modern 21 00:01:21,600 --> 00:01:25,160 Speaker 1: Cold War era with that level of fear kind of 22 00:01:25,200 --> 00:01:28,240 Speaker 1: returning doesn't it. Yeah, rest assured though you would get 23 00:01:28,280 --> 00:01:31,040 Speaker 1: a notification on your phone of some kind of national 24 00:01:31,080 --> 00:01:36,480 Speaker 1: alert moments before you're vaporized. So just like just like 25 00:01:36,480 --> 00:01:39,800 Speaker 1: what happen in Hawaii, right, can you imagine getting that 26 00:01:39,880 --> 00:01:41,960 Speaker 1: while you're on the can? And what do you do 27 00:01:42,000 --> 00:01:44,280 Speaker 1: at that point? I guess like why herds own it? 28 00:01:44,319 --> 00:01:47,119 Speaker 1: You just enjoy it? Just scroll on Reddit in the 29 00:01:47,240 --> 00:01:52,520 Speaker 1: end from the toilet. Sure, there we go. And then 30 00:01:52,560 --> 00:01:54,680 Speaker 1: at that point you hope the bomb hits because you 31 00:01:54,680 --> 00:01:57,760 Speaker 1: don't want that stay it on. In an earlier Listener 32 00:01:57,760 --> 00:02:01,320 Speaker 1: Male segment, we ran into something interesting. We looked a 33 00:02:01,320 --> 00:02:04,680 Speaker 1: bit into the dangers of nuclear war, the struggle for disarmament. 34 00:02:04,960 --> 00:02:08,079 Speaker 1: We've also explored the nuclear black market r I P 35 00:02:08,400 --> 00:02:10,960 Speaker 1: to a Q Khan. We looked at the concept of 36 00:02:11,040 --> 00:02:14,840 Speaker 1: mutually assured destruction or MAD and we even back in 37 00:02:14,880 --> 00:02:18,440 Speaker 1: the day, looked at an ancient non man made nuclear 38 00:02:18,440 --> 00:02:23,200 Speaker 1: reactor over there in Gabon. But we didn't ask this question. 39 00:02:23,240 --> 00:02:25,959 Speaker 1: We've never asked this question yet, how many nukes are 40 00:02:26,080 --> 00:02:30,360 Speaker 1: actually out there? This this sounds like a little bit 41 00:02:30,400 --> 00:02:34,520 Speaker 1: of a policy podcast, but there really is some stuff 42 00:02:34,520 --> 00:02:37,120 Speaker 1: they don't want you to know. So here are the facts. 43 00:02:37,600 --> 00:02:41,120 Speaker 1: The world as we know it fundamentally changed. On July six, 44 00:02:41,720 --> 00:02:46,520 Speaker 1: nineteen was something called the Trinity nuclear test out in 45 00:02:46,880 --> 00:02:50,480 Speaker 1: the Alma Gordo Test Range in New Mexico. They used 46 00:02:50,520 --> 00:02:54,400 Speaker 1: plutonium to create a nineteen kiloton blast. This was the 47 00:02:54,440 --> 00:02:59,840 Speaker 1: first ever official nuclear bomb. There's a fantastic graphic novel 48 00:03:00,000 --> 00:03:04,519 Speaker 1: about this that Matt you introduced us to UH, called Trinity. 49 00:03:04,560 --> 00:03:07,160 Speaker 1: It's wonderful. Is very much worth your time if you 50 00:03:07,200 --> 00:03:10,520 Speaker 1: want to, if you want a fact based exploration of 51 00:03:10,560 --> 00:03:15,480 Speaker 1: both the science, the subterfuge and UH and the problems 52 00:03:15,760 --> 00:03:19,839 Speaker 1: with nuclear weapons. That's not a hot take, but we've 53 00:03:19,840 --> 00:03:21,960 Speaker 1: got quotes that can give you a little bit of 54 00:03:22,000 --> 00:03:26,200 Speaker 1: a of a sense of just what it was like 55 00:03:26,320 --> 00:03:28,920 Speaker 1: to be there at that moment in history. Maybe we 56 00:03:28,960 --> 00:03:32,160 Speaker 1: start with a T. F. Farrell. Yes, this is a 57 00:03:32,200 --> 00:03:36,400 Speaker 1: Brigadier general on the staff of the Manhattan Projects Military Command. 58 00:03:36,840 --> 00:03:40,480 Speaker 1: And here's the quote. No man made phenomenon of such 59 00:03:40,520 --> 00:03:45,160 Speaker 1: tremendous power had ever occurred before the lighting effects beggar 60 00:03:45,360 --> 00:03:48,800 Speaker 1: description beggared. That's a great word. We'll talk about it. 61 00:03:48,840 --> 00:03:52,960 Speaker 1: After the whole country was lighted by a searing light 62 00:03:53,120 --> 00:03:56,240 Speaker 1: with the intensity many times that of the midday sun. 63 00:03:57,240 --> 00:04:01,680 Speaker 1: So beggard beggar to belief is how I've heard that 64 00:04:01,840 --> 00:04:05,360 Speaker 1: used before, And I guess it just means unable to 65 00:04:05,440 --> 00:04:13,160 Speaker 1: come up with or unable to fathom, unable to fully describe. Yeah, 66 00:04:13,320 --> 00:04:15,920 Speaker 1: like you have to be confused with buggard, which it 67 00:04:15,960 --> 00:04:21,240 Speaker 1: just means, you know, yeah, beggar just in this in 68 00:04:21,279 --> 00:04:24,200 Speaker 1: this case means that, like you said that, it was 69 00:04:24,400 --> 00:04:30,560 Speaker 1: almost impossible to articulate the full experience. Einstein warned about this, 70 00:04:30,720 --> 00:04:35,800 Speaker 1: even wrote letters to political leaders. It caused Oppenheimer, who 71 00:04:35,920 --> 00:04:38,599 Speaker 1: was running point on the science part and the occult part, 72 00:04:39,160 --> 00:04:43,599 Speaker 1: to contemplate religion, where he famously said the line from 73 00:04:43,640 --> 00:04:46,760 Speaker 1: I believe the Bahagavadgita. Now I have become death, the 74 00:04:46,839 --> 00:04:51,280 Speaker 1: destroy of worlds. Not long after Uncle Sam dropped the 75 00:04:51,360 --> 00:04:55,919 Speaker 1: first two nukes ever used in wartime in Japan, wreaking 76 00:04:56,600 --> 00:05:00,800 Speaker 1: immense chaos in Nagasaki and Hiroshima, stuff that reverberates in 77 00:05:00,839 --> 00:05:03,440 Speaker 1: the modern day. And you mentioned like a good sort 78 00:05:03,440 --> 00:05:08,240 Speaker 1: of more documentary style, uh, nonfiction graphic novel and Trinity, right? 79 00:05:08,320 --> 00:05:10,600 Speaker 1: Is that what it's called? Just Trinity. I can't wait 80 00:05:10,600 --> 00:05:15,119 Speaker 1: to check that one out. There's a absurdly stylized sci 81 00:05:15,160 --> 00:05:18,039 Speaker 1: fi ified version of a similar story called The Manhattan 82 00:05:18,080 --> 00:05:20,040 Speaker 1: Projects that I believe you've been read as well. Ben. 83 00:05:20,120 --> 00:05:23,360 Speaker 1: That's quite good. Yes, yeah, yeah, those are Those are 84 00:05:23,360 --> 00:05:25,760 Speaker 1: both hits, and they're they're important. You know. I would 85 00:05:25,839 --> 00:05:29,880 Speaker 1: love for those graphic novels to be read in schools 86 00:05:29,880 --> 00:05:32,600 Speaker 1: and classrooms because I think it's an excellent way to 87 00:05:32,720 --> 00:05:36,240 Speaker 1: learn um. But you know, people are back to banning books. 88 00:05:36,320 --> 00:05:38,880 Speaker 1: So get your copy of Mouse while you can. Uh. 89 00:05:39,120 --> 00:05:44,320 Speaker 1: Other countries, Yeah right, other countries saw this. They wanted 90 00:05:44,320 --> 00:05:48,320 Speaker 1: in the game, and they got in. Today's official nuclear 91 00:05:48,360 --> 00:05:54,719 Speaker 1: powers are nine countries. We got China, India, Israel, Pakistan, France, 92 00:05:54,760 --> 00:05:57,560 Speaker 1: the UK, North Korea, Russia, and of course the good 93 00:05:57,560 --> 00:06:00,400 Speaker 1: old US of A. We should put an asterix by Israel. 94 00:06:00,920 --> 00:06:03,480 Speaker 1: We'll tell you what we mean by that in a second. Uh. 95 00:06:03,640 --> 00:06:06,880 Speaker 1: Like we mentioned in our earlier segment, the two big 96 00:06:06,920 --> 00:06:10,280 Speaker 1: dogs of the Cold War are the countries that had 97 00:06:10,400 --> 00:06:15,040 Speaker 1: and continue to have the largest nuclear stockpiles. There are 98 00:06:15,080 --> 00:06:18,839 Speaker 1: other countries that have pursued nuclear weapons. Iraq had a 99 00:06:18,880 --> 00:06:23,359 Speaker 1: secret program, Iran is such a is continually accused of 100 00:06:23,400 --> 00:06:26,719 Speaker 1: pursuing nuclear weapons. And then there were other countries that 101 00:06:26,800 --> 00:06:30,679 Speaker 1: actually got to a nuclear state, like Libya and later 102 00:06:30,920 --> 00:06:34,640 Speaker 1: d nuclearized UM for a few years there as we 103 00:06:35,040 --> 00:06:38,239 Speaker 1: as we found out earlier, Ukraine was technically a nuclear 104 00:06:38,279 --> 00:06:41,400 Speaker 1: power UM. But the thing is, when you ask how 105 00:06:41,440 --> 00:06:47,040 Speaker 1: many nukes are actually out there, the question gets tricky 106 00:06:47,160 --> 00:06:51,800 Speaker 1: because nuclear weapons need systems to get them to, you know, 107 00:06:51,960 --> 00:06:55,599 Speaker 1: their desired target, and those systems as well as those 108 00:06:55,640 --> 00:06:59,440 Speaker 1: weapons are not always created equally. Fellow in North Korean, 109 00:07:00,960 --> 00:07:03,840 Speaker 1: I don't know what you would call us Boffin's observers. 110 00:07:04,360 --> 00:07:07,599 Speaker 1: I don't want to call us enthusiasts. You probably caught 111 00:07:07,600 --> 00:07:11,360 Speaker 1: the news that DPRK and South Korea were in a 112 00:07:12,040 --> 00:07:18,560 Speaker 1: bit of a ball swinging Paul swinging missile testing interchange. 113 00:07:19,400 --> 00:07:22,920 Speaker 1: North Korea just demonstrated its newest i CBM, the WAA 114 00:07:23,040 --> 00:07:30,680 Speaker 1: Song seventeen. South Korea also almost instantly responded with missile 115 00:07:30,760 --> 00:07:34,560 Speaker 1: test of their own. So what we're seeing is people 116 00:07:36,000 --> 00:07:38,960 Speaker 1: signaling to the world we don't just have the nukes, 117 00:07:39,400 --> 00:07:42,160 Speaker 1: we have the way to get them to you in 118 00:07:42,200 --> 00:07:47,480 Speaker 1: a matter of minutes. So it's it's scary times, scary time. Yeah, 119 00:07:47,560 --> 00:07:51,840 Speaker 1: and we'll hit on Russia's newest form of deployment probably 120 00:07:51,880 --> 00:07:54,400 Speaker 1: towards the end of this because in my mind, that's 121 00:07:54,400 --> 00:07:57,680 Speaker 1: the scariest thing about this entire story. Absolutely. I mean 122 00:07:57,680 --> 00:07:59,440 Speaker 1: it also seems to me to be a bit of 123 00:07:59,480 --> 00:08:02,440 Speaker 1: an issue of strategy, right, I mean, certainly there's maybe 124 00:08:02,480 --> 00:08:05,520 Speaker 1: someone that knows, you know, at least in the countries 125 00:08:05,560 --> 00:08:09,320 Speaker 1: that have agreements, you know, in terms of like how 126 00:08:09,360 --> 00:08:12,080 Speaker 1: many nukes they have to kind of know, But it 127 00:08:12,120 --> 00:08:14,360 Speaker 1: doesn't seem like it would make sense to be super 128 00:08:14,360 --> 00:08:23,200 Speaker 1: public knowledge. But somebody knows, right how many? Uh well, Uh, 129 00:08:23,280 --> 00:08:25,440 Speaker 1: it'd be nice, it'd be nice if there was someone 130 00:08:25,480 --> 00:08:29,640 Speaker 1: at the will, right. Uh. Luckily, one of the big 131 00:08:29,680 --> 00:08:33,240 Speaker 1: reasons that you are listening to this podcast today and 132 00:08:33,280 --> 00:08:36,440 Speaker 1: then everybody in the audience with us today is alive 133 00:08:36,840 --> 00:08:40,679 Speaker 1: is due to uh, I hate to say it, paperwork, 134 00:08:41,280 --> 00:08:45,520 Speaker 1: very fancy paperwork. Treaties. Bureaucracy has kind of kept the 135 00:08:45,600 --> 00:08:48,720 Speaker 1: human race going for a minute. Uh. These there's so 136 00:08:48,760 --> 00:08:52,480 Speaker 1: many treaties about how nuclear weapons can be tested, how 137 00:08:52,600 --> 00:08:55,559 Speaker 1: nuclear energy can be used, how it can be deployed, 138 00:08:55,720 --> 00:08:58,679 Speaker 1: and there are a lot of treaties aimed at what 139 00:08:58,720 --> 00:09:03,280 Speaker 1: we call d nuclearization, getting people to step back from 140 00:09:03,320 --> 00:09:07,440 Speaker 1: having the world's most dangerous toy uh. The ultimate goal 141 00:09:07,679 --> 00:09:11,440 Speaker 1: is a world without any nuclear weapons at all. That 142 00:09:11,600 --> 00:09:15,720 Speaker 1: is a pipe drink. I'm just gonna say it's not 143 00:09:15,840 --> 00:09:18,880 Speaker 1: it's not gonna happen. And I called it a fat chance, 144 00:09:19,000 --> 00:09:23,280 Speaker 1: but it's not even that. So the earliest example is 145 00:09:23,360 --> 00:09:26,760 Speaker 1: something called the Antarctic Treaty of nineteen fifty nine. So 146 00:09:26,800 --> 00:09:29,440 Speaker 1: this was specific to that part of the world. It 147 00:09:29,520 --> 00:09:33,040 Speaker 1: was just twelve countries said we're going to protect the 148 00:09:33,160 --> 00:09:39,480 Speaker 1: peaceful status of Antarctica. That's why nobody. No country can 149 00:09:39,640 --> 00:09:44,040 Speaker 1: own Antarctica. You can occupy it, you can research there, 150 00:09:44,080 --> 00:09:47,120 Speaker 1: you can send people there. Um, but they're they're kind 151 00:09:47,120 --> 00:09:50,199 Speaker 1: of treating it the way they're supposed to be treating space. 152 00:09:51,200 --> 00:09:54,560 Speaker 1: But it's kind of like a continent that's so far 153 00:09:55,040 --> 00:09:58,240 Speaker 1: removed from most of the nuclear powers, Like, we're gonna 154 00:09:58,240 --> 00:10:02,120 Speaker 1: protect that place in case anybody decides they want to 155 00:10:02,160 --> 00:10:05,120 Speaker 1: drop nukes on land and test them somewhere, don't do 156 00:10:05,160 --> 00:10:09,640 Speaker 1: it on the only well mostly almost fully unoccupied continent. 157 00:10:10,040 --> 00:10:13,559 Speaker 1: M Oh yeah, yeah. And check out Operation High Jump. 158 00:10:13,760 --> 00:10:16,280 Speaker 1: That's something we might want to revisit. That's still such 159 00:10:16,320 --> 00:10:19,400 Speaker 1: an interesting story. But maybe we talked a little bit 160 00:10:19,440 --> 00:10:25,640 Speaker 1: about the most famous Nuclear Treaty in history MPT Treaty 161 00:10:25,640 --> 00:10:29,800 Speaker 1: on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons UH entered force. 162 00:10:31,960 --> 00:10:36,080 Speaker 1: Proponents will tell you overall it's been quite successful. It 163 00:10:36,160 --> 00:10:40,520 Speaker 1: was extended indefinitely in so it's still in effect, and 164 00:10:40,800 --> 00:10:45,400 Speaker 1: a hundred and ninety one countries nuclear and non nuclear 165 00:10:45,640 --> 00:10:49,400 Speaker 1: have signed on. So like, if you're talking about how 166 00:10:49,640 --> 00:10:52,480 Speaker 1: widely this applies, it's probably better just to list the 167 00:10:52,480 --> 00:10:57,240 Speaker 1: countries who didn't side on, and that would be India, Israel, 168 00:10:57,640 --> 00:11:03,080 Speaker 1: North Korea, Pakistan and South Sudan. UM. And this agreement 169 00:11:03,320 --> 00:11:08,680 Speaker 1: has several main components. Non proliferation, which means not making 170 00:11:08,800 --> 00:11:11,920 Speaker 1: any more nuclear weapons. Where where does the term proliferation 171 00:11:12,040 --> 00:11:16,360 Speaker 1: come from that automatically associates it with nukes? Or does 172 00:11:16,360 --> 00:11:20,720 Speaker 1: it proliferation just mean not to to continue doing a thing? Yeah, 173 00:11:20,800 --> 00:11:25,920 Speaker 1: proliferation is just rapid reproduction or rapid increase. UH. And 174 00:11:26,200 --> 00:11:33,320 Speaker 1: you know these are these agreements are made to apply 175 00:11:33,520 --> 00:11:37,240 Speaker 1: across multiple languages, so sometimes the words they have to 176 00:11:37,360 --> 00:11:41,120 Speaker 1: use are very very specific. That's why you'll hear that's 177 00:11:41,120 --> 00:11:44,680 Speaker 1: what That's why you'll hear sometimes uh L, SAD or 178 00:11:44,800 --> 00:11:46,959 Speaker 1: s A T g r E kind of words like 179 00:11:47,640 --> 00:11:51,760 Speaker 1: accusing someone of being belicoas. These bellicost actions are blah 180 00:11:51,800 --> 00:11:54,560 Speaker 1: blah blah. When's the last time you were hanging out 181 00:11:54,600 --> 00:11:57,760 Speaker 1: somewhere and you call it a person bellicost it's I 182 00:11:57,800 --> 00:12:01,240 Speaker 1: think it's a translation thing. Yeah, bellicos just means like 183 00:12:01,320 --> 00:12:05,160 Speaker 1: aggressive kind of right, or yeah, bellicoast means you're being 184 00:12:05,200 --> 00:12:10,120 Speaker 1: a jerk, like you dick. Yeah, Bellicost is like why 185 00:12:10,160 --> 00:12:13,079 Speaker 1: are you bucking at me? You know, it's like come 186 00:12:13,120 --> 00:12:15,800 Speaker 1: at me, bro energy. But in this context, it is 187 00:12:15,840 --> 00:12:18,480 Speaker 1: very like you said, ben, very clearly defined as a 188 00:12:18,520 --> 00:12:22,000 Speaker 1: pledge not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive 189 00:12:22,000 --> 00:12:25,720 Speaker 1: devices to any recipient or in any way assist, encourage, 190 00:12:25,800 --> 00:12:30,239 Speaker 1: or induce any non nuclear weapons state in the manufacture 191 00:12:30,320 --> 00:12:33,800 Speaker 1: acquisition of nukes. So essentially it's like where the club, 192 00:12:34,320 --> 00:12:36,360 Speaker 1: we're the only ones that get the toys. If you 193 00:12:36,440 --> 00:12:39,679 Speaker 1: give any toys to you know, little Johnny or a 194 00:12:39,679 --> 00:12:43,400 Speaker 1: little Susie or whatever, then you're out. You Then you're 195 00:12:43,480 --> 00:12:45,600 Speaker 1: like out in the cold. Guys. I have to do 196 00:12:45,600 --> 00:12:47,480 Speaker 1: the so fast. I'm so sorry to all the magic 197 00:12:47,520 --> 00:12:50,160 Speaker 1: the gathering listeners out there. You know the word proliferate 198 00:12:50,559 --> 00:12:54,240 Speaker 1: because there's a there's an action in magine the gathering 199 00:12:54,280 --> 00:12:57,920 Speaker 1: where if you proliferate, you add one more, You add 200 00:12:57,960 --> 00:13:01,080 Speaker 1: an additional counter to any perman on the battlefield. It 201 00:13:01,160 --> 00:13:03,680 Speaker 1: has a counter currently on it. It's a great one. 202 00:13:04,000 --> 00:13:07,360 Speaker 1: It's a scaling that's it's like a biological charm. Really, 203 00:13:07,360 --> 00:13:10,120 Speaker 1: I mean it's hard. It's the idea of like um 204 00:13:10,280 --> 00:13:13,400 Speaker 1: self replicating almost right, So like that makes sense. It's 205 00:13:13,400 --> 00:13:16,600 Speaker 1: a scalable action where it adds one to like all 206 00:13:16,640 --> 00:13:20,440 Speaker 1: of the things. Right, Yeah, question is yeah, just so 207 00:13:20,480 --> 00:13:22,960 Speaker 1: I understand because this will be important for me later 208 00:13:23,000 --> 00:13:27,720 Speaker 1: this weekend. Does proliferate what does that give a counter 209 00:13:27,880 --> 00:13:32,240 Speaker 1: to every permanent or just one? You as whoever is 210 00:13:32,280 --> 00:13:36,440 Speaker 1: causing the proliferation gets to decide, like I think, oh god, 211 00:13:36,440 --> 00:13:39,079 Speaker 1: that may be wrong. I think you get to decide, 212 00:13:39,320 --> 00:13:41,800 Speaker 1: but I may I may be incorrect there. It may 213 00:13:41,840 --> 00:13:46,320 Speaker 1: just happen, maybe just something that happens while we're While 214 00:13:46,320 --> 00:13:48,960 Speaker 1: we're on magic, let's give a big shout out to 215 00:13:49,240 --> 00:13:55,960 Speaker 1: Kelsey who sent us a delightful the delightful care package 216 00:13:56,000 --> 00:14:02,520 Speaker 1: from Hawaii including also some magic some MTG conspiracy packs, 217 00:14:02,720 --> 00:14:11,560 Speaker 1: which was thank you, and I actually actually texted I 218 00:14:11,600 --> 00:14:13,440 Speaker 1: texted man. It was like, hey, can you send a 219 00:14:13,440 --> 00:14:16,600 Speaker 1: picture of that card and the texting galsy so thank 220 00:14:16,640 --> 00:14:19,120 Speaker 1: you man. We're so glad World War three didn't happen 221 00:14:19,200 --> 00:14:23,240 Speaker 1: before that package got here. Uh. So, as we're recording 222 00:14:23,280 --> 00:14:27,200 Speaker 1: trying to get this episode out before the bombs drop, 223 00:14:27,320 --> 00:14:29,760 Speaker 1: let's talk a little bit more about the MPT because 224 00:14:29,760 --> 00:14:32,200 Speaker 1: you you nailed one of the big problems with it. 225 00:14:32,280 --> 00:14:38,640 Speaker 1: Nol so, non nuclear states on their end, they're promising 226 00:14:39,000 --> 00:14:43,720 Speaker 1: not to get nuclear weapons, not to control nuclear weapons 227 00:14:44,040 --> 00:14:47,800 Speaker 1: or any nuclear explosive device, and not to ask people, 228 00:14:48,040 --> 00:14:51,160 Speaker 1: not to ask the haves for help. In that regard, 229 00:14:51,720 --> 00:14:54,280 Speaker 1: I like to call they're they're called the nuclear weapons 230 00:14:54,280 --> 00:14:56,960 Speaker 1: states or in WS, but I like to call them 231 00:14:57,000 --> 00:15:00,960 Speaker 1: the nukey boys. Uh. The nukey boys have this agreement 232 00:15:01,040 --> 00:15:05,239 Speaker 1: that they're not going to use they're big guns against 233 00:15:05,280 --> 00:15:08,920 Speaker 1: any non nuclear party. It's not necessarily a country. But 234 00:15:09,000 --> 00:15:14,560 Speaker 1: also like terrorists accept in response to a preceding nuclear 235 00:15:14,560 --> 00:15:19,120 Speaker 1: attack or an attack that takes place in concert with 236 00:15:19,320 --> 00:15:22,760 Speaker 1: a nuclear weapon state with another nuki boy, this isn't 237 00:15:22,760 --> 00:15:25,600 Speaker 1: hard in effects. This is kind of like a gentleman's agreement, 238 00:15:25,680 --> 00:15:28,520 Speaker 1: and it can change over time. So that's a really 239 00:15:28,600 --> 00:15:32,960 Speaker 1: dangerous one. That's like, for example, the language is confusing, right, 240 00:15:33,080 --> 00:15:37,240 Speaker 1: But for example, that means like, um, the US won't 241 00:15:38,120 --> 00:15:43,600 Speaker 1: deploy nuclear weapons in you know, Nicaragua, right, because Nicaragua 242 00:15:44,240 --> 00:15:49,400 Speaker 1: is not a nuclear weapon state. But if there is 243 00:15:50,360 --> 00:15:54,000 Speaker 1: a conventional attack on the US that is for some 244 00:15:54,080 --> 00:15:58,400 Speaker 1: reason sponsored by France, that's another nuki boy, And so 245 00:15:58,520 --> 00:16:01,760 Speaker 1: the US could say, hey, for ants, what's up, let's 246 00:16:01,800 --> 00:16:04,640 Speaker 1: have some grown folk talk. Do you think Tolkien was 247 00:16:04,720 --> 00:16:08,320 Speaker 1: thinking about nukes when he when he envisioned the Rings 248 00:16:08,360 --> 00:16:11,280 Speaker 1: of Power? I feel like that's true, because it's like 249 00:16:11,520 --> 00:16:14,240 Speaker 1: everyone gets one, All the different races get a piece, 250 00:16:14,360 --> 00:16:15,680 Speaker 1: you know, and it makes them sort of on an 251 00:16:15,720 --> 00:16:18,720 Speaker 1: even playing feel. But then the big bad guy forges 252 00:16:18,840 --> 00:16:21,840 Speaker 1: the really scary one that will counteract all the other ones. 253 00:16:21,920 --> 00:16:24,240 Speaker 1: He doesn't played by the rules, you know, Like that's 254 00:16:24,280 --> 00:16:26,400 Speaker 1: sort of the deal, you know what I should say though, 255 00:16:26,560 --> 00:16:31,480 Speaker 1: because I'm thinking back, Noll, I think it makes sense 256 00:16:31,640 --> 00:16:39,000 Speaker 1: as an analogy. But I'm pretty sure Tolkien started writing um, 257 00:16:39,000 --> 00:16:44,360 Speaker 1: writing Lord, but yeah, before the Manhattan Project. But he 258 00:16:44,400 --> 00:16:47,840 Speaker 1: couldn't have made a more perfect comparison. That's absolutely true. 259 00:16:48,720 --> 00:16:53,280 Speaker 1: So so then there's let's talk about the other thing, disarmament. 260 00:16:53,400 --> 00:16:55,360 Speaker 1: This is the big one. It's meant to stop the 261 00:16:55,440 --> 00:16:58,240 Speaker 1: nuclear arms race. It's been a clearer path towards a 262 00:16:58,360 --> 00:17:02,640 Speaker 1: nuke free world. Not gonna happened, definitely, not anytime soon. Uh. 263 00:17:02,680 --> 00:17:06,320 Speaker 1: And it's a subject of great debate. But to be fair, 264 00:17:06,800 --> 00:17:10,520 Speaker 1: both Russia and the US have actually stepped down a 265 00:17:10,520 --> 00:17:13,719 Speaker 1: lot of their total stockpile over the course of the 266 00:17:13,720 --> 00:17:17,560 Speaker 1: Cold War. Uh. That's good news, but it's maybe not 267 00:17:18,160 --> 00:17:21,760 Speaker 1: as fantastic news as we think because the well you'll 268 00:17:21,760 --> 00:17:25,000 Speaker 1: see in a second, the amount of deployed weapons has increased. 269 00:17:25,240 --> 00:17:28,200 Speaker 1: So you've got less guns in the garage, but you're 270 00:17:28,240 --> 00:17:31,639 Speaker 1: carrying more every time you walk outside. That's that's what 271 00:17:31,640 --> 00:17:34,680 Speaker 1: we're deployed doesn't mean launched at you. It just means 272 00:17:34,720 --> 00:17:41,159 Speaker 1: out and ready, right yep. Yet it's like Little Caesar's 273 00:17:41,680 --> 00:17:45,399 Speaker 1: has a hundred pizzas in the store, but thirty or 274 00:17:45,440 --> 00:17:49,600 Speaker 1: hot and ready. I should probably be breakfast before we recorded. Anyway. 275 00:17:49,880 --> 00:17:53,959 Speaker 1: There's the third one. This is the other. There's this 276 00:17:54,040 --> 00:17:56,240 Speaker 1: is the other one. This is the sticky one. So 277 00:17:56,400 --> 00:18:00,160 Speaker 1: the peaceful use of nuclear energy, this says, okay, every 278 00:18:00,160 --> 00:18:04,720 Speaker 1: body has the right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful 279 00:18:04,800 --> 00:18:10,120 Speaker 1: purposes and as long as they're not using this nuclear 280 00:18:10,200 --> 00:18:14,600 Speaker 1: tech to make nuclear weapons. Jolly good, we're all copacetic. 281 00:18:14,760 --> 00:18:17,200 Speaker 1: As a matter of fact, the new key boys can 282 00:18:17,280 --> 00:18:21,240 Speaker 1: help you build things like light water reactors. There's a 283 00:18:21,240 --> 00:18:24,160 Speaker 1: problem with this because we've talked about before this dual 284 00:18:24,280 --> 00:18:27,440 Speaker 1: use technology. The same stuff you would use to build 285 00:18:27,480 --> 00:18:30,879 Speaker 1: a peaceful nuclear power plant is the same stuff you 286 00:18:30,880 --> 00:18:34,280 Speaker 1: would use to build a very dangerous weapon of mass destruction. 287 00:18:34,800 --> 00:18:38,320 Speaker 1: So like you have to use your enrichment, right, is 288 00:18:38,440 --> 00:18:44,439 Speaker 1: about levels of enrichment. It's about the cycle of enrichment. Uh. 289 00:18:45,080 --> 00:18:47,360 Speaker 1: For instance, you have to have uranium to power light 290 00:18:47,359 --> 00:18:49,440 Speaker 1: water reactor, which means you have to be able to 291 00:18:49,480 --> 00:18:51,879 Speaker 1: buy the stuff, which means someone has to sell it 292 00:18:51,920 --> 00:18:56,840 Speaker 1: to you. Uh. There's a whole regime of international monitoring. 293 00:18:57,240 --> 00:19:02,479 Speaker 1: But we'll see mixed results. So anyway, at first glance, 294 00:19:02,600 --> 00:19:06,720 Speaker 1: those are a few loopholes, imperfections, maybe purposeful imperfections in 295 00:19:06,760 --> 00:19:09,680 Speaker 1: these agreements. And that leads us to the most troubling 296 00:19:09,760 --> 00:19:12,600 Speaker 1: question about nuclear weapons. How many are out there? In 297 00:19:12,640 --> 00:19:15,120 Speaker 1: a very real way, this is the stuff they don't 298 00:19:15,119 --> 00:19:18,120 Speaker 1: want you to know. To pause for worth from our sponsor, 299 00:19:18,720 --> 00:19:21,120 Speaker 1: check to see if the nukes have dropped and hopefully 300 00:19:21,160 --> 00:19:31,359 Speaker 1: we'll be back. Here's where it gets crazy. Can I 301 00:19:31,400 --> 00:19:33,720 Speaker 1: get out from here to my desk? Now? All right? 302 00:19:33,760 --> 00:19:36,760 Speaker 1: We did? We just did? Did the nuclear drill? Uh? 303 00:19:37,359 --> 00:19:40,639 Speaker 1: Some of some of our fellow nineties eighties babies and 304 00:19:40,680 --> 00:19:42,960 Speaker 1: older may remember that one. It was great fun. I 305 00:19:43,000 --> 00:19:46,120 Speaker 1: guess those desks were more sturdy back then. But when 306 00:19:46,119 --> 00:19:48,320 Speaker 1: we ask how many nukes are out there? The problem 307 00:19:48,400 --> 00:19:53,000 Speaker 1: is we can guess, and experts can make some very 308 00:19:53,080 --> 00:19:56,960 Speaker 1: smart guesses, but we can't know. There's not a way too. 309 00:19:57,960 --> 00:20:01,120 Speaker 1: There might be intelligence agents sees that know, but they're 310 00:20:01,160 --> 00:20:03,479 Speaker 1: not going to tell you because then they would have 311 00:20:03,560 --> 00:20:07,800 Speaker 1: to implicitly reveal that they have access to something. So 312 00:20:08,040 --> 00:20:10,919 Speaker 1: we don't know. The public won't. So it's not a 313 00:20:11,040 --> 00:20:14,240 Speaker 1: condition of these treaties to disclose this. It's more of 314 00:20:14,280 --> 00:20:17,760 Speaker 1: a general overarching agreement to like, not make more than 315 00:20:17,800 --> 00:20:19,239 Speaker 1: you have, but you don't have to give us an 316 00:20:19,240 --> 00:20:23,280 Speaker 1: inventory of what you've got. Uh. Due to another tree, 317 00:20:23,400 --> 00:20:27,560 Speaker 1: A couple like the US, depending on the administration, will 318 00:20:27,760 --> 00:20:31,960 Speaker 1: sporadically disclose. Russia has disclosed at different times, but it's 319 00:20:32,000 --> 00:20:36,240 Speaker 1: it's sticky. We'll see why. Yeah, and again you're you're 320 00:20:36,280 --> 00:20:40,440 Speaker 1: strategically disclosing a number of weapons, you know, I mean, 321 00:20:41,560 --> 00:20:46,600 Speaker 1: come on, and that was back in and then when 322 00:20:46,600 --> 00:20:51,199 Speaker 1: the NPT was like put into in perpetuity mode. So 323 00:20:51,240 --> 00:20:53,960 Speaker 1: it's just I don't know whatever it. I don't think 324 00:20:54,000 --> 00:20:56,880 Speaker 1: anybody is saying exactly how many nukes they've got, even 325 00:20:56,880 --> 00:20:58,600 Speaker 1: with the numbers were about to give you, because this 326 00:20:58,640 --> 00:21:03,359 Speaker 1: is our this is the humanity's best guess. Yeah, that's it. 327 00:21:03,520 --> 00:21:07,120 Speaker 1: It's humanity's collective best guess. It's a game show thing. 328 00:21:07,760 --> 00:21:11,400 Speaker 1: So if you want to answer the question and get 329 00:21:11,400 --> 00:21:14,879 Speaker 1: into the kind of the secrecy and the cover up 330 00:21:14,920 --> 00:21:19,200 Speaker 1: and sort of the conspiracy regarding nuclear weapons, it really 331 00:21:19,200 --> 00:21:23,160 Speaker 1: depends on how you frame what you're asking. It may 332 00:21:23,960 --> 00:21:27,720 Speaker 1: amuse some of us, may scare some of us to 333 00:21:27,880 --> 00:21:32,200 Speaker 1: understand that the new game is way way sloppier than 334 00:21:32,240 --> 00:21:36,880 Speaker 1: the evening news may make it appear. Humanity has repeatedly 335 00:21:37,520 --> 00:21:40,040 Speaker 1: come close to fumbling the ball in the like the 336 00:21:40,080 --> 00:21:44,439 Speaker 1: most dangerous game. Yes, first off, right, we all know 337 00:21:44,560 --> 00:21:49,880 Speaker 1: nuclear weapons or potential world enders, but humanity has managed 338 00:21:49,920 --> 00:21:54,280 Speaker 1: to lose a few, not not as some like maca 339 00:21:54,359 --> 00:21:59,399 Speaker 1: Velli in for d chess move, but just because people 340 00:21:59,440 --> 00:22:02,560 Speaker 1: are great losing stuff all the time, where your keys? 341 00:22:02,560 --> 00:22:04,639 Speaker 1: Do you know where your keys are? Right now? That 342 00:22:04,760 --> 00:22:08,879 Speaker 1: happened like six times. With nuclear weapons, they're called broken arrows. 343 00:22:09,160 --> 00:22:11,400 Speaker 1: No one knows where they are. There's one that's actually 344 00:22:12,080 --> 00:22:14,760 Speaker 1: uh off the coast of Savannah here in our home, 345 00:22:14,800 --> 00:22:18,280 Speaker 1: stated Georgia. You guys heard about that one, right, Remember 346 00:22:18,320 --> 00:22:23,560 Speaker 1: that nineties movie with John Travolta and maybe Christians later. 347 00:22:23,800 --> 00:22:28,119 Speaker 1: I think it's called broken Arrow. Yes, it was about Yeah, 348 00:22:28,640 --> 00:22:35,800 Speaker 1: there was no yes, don't let him take your girlfriend 349 00:22:35,880 --> 00:22:37,720 Speaker 1: out on a date while you're out of town because 350 00:22:37,760 --> 00:22:44,040 Speaker 1: she will overdose on Heroin's gonna happen. And uh, then 351 00:22:44,119 --> 00:22:50,679 Speaker 1: Battlefield Earth, so there was there was that checkered career 352 00:22:50,720 --> 00:22:54,760 Speaker 1: that man has had fast and they yeah. Uh. But 353 00:22:55,040 --> 00:22:57,320 Speaker 1: like you said, Matt, you nailed the other problem with 354 00:22:57,359 --> 00:23:01,440 Speaker 1: the question. Their countries don't pays tell the truth about 355 00:23:01,520 --> 00:23:06,240 Speaker 1: their nukes like Emily Dickinson style. They're very nuanced at 356 00:23:06,240 --> 00:23:09,480 Speaker 1: times about the truths they do tell. And then third, 357 00:23:09,760 --> 00:23:13,919 Speaker 1: different nuclear weapons sometimes get excluded and or included in 358 00:23:13,960 --> 00:23:17,280 Speaker 1: the official tally. It's like going to I get to 359 00:23:17,320 --> 00:23:20,160 Speaker 1: stop with the food examples, It's like going to a 360 00:23:20,240 --> 00:23:24,360 Speaker 1: car dealership and saying, how many cars do you have 361 00:23:25,680 --> 00:23:28,679 Speaker 1: or better yet, it's like saying, how many vehicles do 362 00:23:28,720 --> 00:23:31,159 Speaker 1: you have at this dealership and they say, well, we 363 00:23:31,240 --> 00:23:35,879 Speaker 1: have thirty five trucks from and you know that there 364 00:23:35,880 --> 00:23:39,800 Speaker 1: are Sedans there there in the lot. And you're like, no, no, no, dude, 365 00:23:39,840 --> 00:23:43,320 Speaker 1: how many vehicles And they're like, well, we have a 366 00:23:43,320 --> 00:23:46,919 Speaker 1: pretty hefty collection of Sedan's. You're like, okay, so that 367 00:23:46,960 --> 00:23:51,399 Speaker 1: plus the trucks, and they're like, well, it's time for 368 00:23:51,520 --> 00:23:53,959 Speaker 1: us to close shop for the day if you're not 369 00:23:54,000 --> 00:23:57,840 Speaker 1: going to buy anything. So nuclear weaponry is not the same, 370 00:23:57,920 --> 00:24:01,400 Speaker 1: and that's actually a fairly okay analogy. The two big 371 00:24:01,400 --> 00:24:06,080 Speaker 1: determining factors are the yield, the amount of damage that 372 00:24:06,160 --> 00:24:09,560 Speaker 1: can be done by a successful detonation, and the distance 373 00:24:09,600 --> 00:24:12,760 Speaker 1: how far this thing can go. Is it launching on 374 00:24:12,880 --> 00:24:17,000 Speaker 1: like a more conventional missile system, or is it on 375 00:24:17,080 --> 00:24:21,199 Speaker 1: an I, C, B N and pretty much able to 376 00:24:21,240 --> 00:24:24,159 Speaker 1: hit anywhere in the world. So we've really got to 377 00:24:24,240 --> 00:24:29,240 Speaker 1: just quickly talk about the the actual nuclear explosion or 378 00:24:29,280 --> 00:24:32,680 Speaker 1: the atomic explosion or the thermonuclear explosion that can occur 379 00:24:32,800 --> 00:24:35,880 Speaker 1: within a nuclear weapon, and then the delivery system, because 380 00:24:35,880 --> 00:24:38,399 Speaker 1: that's really what we're talking about here. If you go 381 00:24:38,440 --> 00:24:41,879 Speaker 1: back and you look at the first two nuclear weapons 382 00:24:41,880 --> 00:24:44,359 Speaker 1: that where ever used, the atomic bombs dropped on Japan 383 00:24:44,440 --> 00:24:47,720 Speaker 1: by the United States. You're talking about uranium two thirty 384 00:24:47,760 --> 00:24:50,760 Speaker 1: five that we've discussed before. That's the that's why the 385 00:24:50,800 --> 00:24:54,040 Speaker 1: center fugures are so important. You spin up uranium until 386 00:24:54,080 --> 00:24:56,680 Speaker 1: it gets to what they what would be called uranium 387 00:24:56,680 --> 00:25:00,600 Speaker 1: two thirty five, and you actually shoot your ranium into 388 00:25:00,680 --> 00:25:04,159 Speaker 1: itself to make a nuclear explosion. But that occurs just 389 00:25:04,320 --> 00:25:08,800 Speaker 1: inside the bomb itself. How do you actually get that 390 00:25:08,920 --> 00:25:13,040 Speaker 1: bomb to the place that you want to drop it? Uh, 391 00:25:13,320 --> 00:25:17,080 Speaker 1: that's what we're talking about right here. Yeah. Yeah, So 392 00:25:17,840 --> 00:25:21,359 Speaker 1: the two big flavors that get brought up the most 393 00:25:21,560 --> 00:25:26,800 Speaker 1: are tactical nuclear weapons and strategic nuclear weapons. And you 394 00:25:26,920 --> 00:25:30,160 Speaker 1: nail the definition, matt. Uh. Let's talk about the tactical 395 00:25:30,200 --> 00:25:35,760 Speaker 1: ones first. They're sometimes called t nws tactical nuclear weapons. 396 00:25:36,640 --> 00:25:39,600 Speaker 1: They're gonna be they can be launched from land, are 397 00:25:39,720 --> 00:25:41,800 Speaker 1: cy If they're launched from the air, we're talking range 398 00:25:41,800 --> 00:25:44,520 Speaker 1: of about three miles and if they're launched from air, 399 00:25:44,680 --> 00:25:48,880 Speaker 1: c think about it like four hundred miles or uh 400 00:25:48,880 --> 00:25:54,160 Speaker 1: five kilometers for land and six hundred kilometers for air 401 00:25:54,240 --> 00:25:59,080 Speaker 1: and c So these are easier to build first off 402 00:25:59,160 --> 00:26:03,240 Speaker 1: because they have to do less work, right, But they're 403 00:26:03,280 --> 00:26:07,880 Speaker 1: also the least regulated category of nuclear weapons. That's that's 404 00:26:07,920 --> 00:26:10,680 Speaker 1: one of the UH, that's one of the big problems. 405 00:26:11,280 --> 00:26:15,200 Speaker 1: And then long range stuff, like the strategic stuff, is 406 00:26:15,240 --> 00:26:21,560 Speaker 1: meant to target bigger things cities, military installations, points of infrastructure. 407 00:26:22,160 --> 00:26:24,480 Speaker 1: It makes a big, big difference because again, when you 408 00:26:24,560 --> 00:26:27,000 Speaker 1: hear someone estivating the number of nukes out there, you 409 00:26:27,040 --> 00:26:29,960 Speaker 1: have to be very careful. Are they are they separating 410 00:26:30,040 --> 00:26:34,879 Speaker 1: these two groups. Are they talking about weapons that are deployed, 411 00:26:35,040 --> 00:26:37,480 Speaker 1: hot and fresh, ready to go. Are they talking about 412 00:26:37,520 --> 00:26:42,119 Speaker 1: stuff that's in storage or has been mothballed? And well, 413 00:26:42,119 --> 00:26:44,520 Speaker 1: we'll see. Those are just some of the problems. But 414 00:26:44,680 --> 00:26:48,520 Speaker 1: here's the number. Here's the official number. According to some 415 00:26:48,560 --> 00:26:52,000 Speaker 1: of the best guesses out there, the world currently has 416 00:26:52,080 --> 00:26:57,520 Speaker 1: somewhere between twelve thousand, seven hundred nuclear warheads to just 417 00:26:57,680 --> 00:27:03,040 Speaker 1: north of thirteen thousand and eight all in. That's that's 418 00:27:03,119 --> 00:27:07,160 Speaker 1: the guess UH, and that is as of two So 419 00:27:07,200 --> 00:27:11,040 Speaker 1: that's as of this year. So the Arms Control Association 420 00:27:11,320 --> 00:27:14,160 Speaker 1: UM just a couple of months back in January twenty two, 421 00:27:14,560 --> 00:27:18,040 Speaker 1: released a list citing US and Russia as the big boys. 422 00:27:18,720 --> 00:27:23,560 Speaker 1: US has, according to their estimates, five thousand, five hundred 423 00:27:23,600 --> 00:27:27,399 Speaker 1: and fifty warheads, while Russia has six thousand, two hundred 424 00:27:27,520 --> 00:27:35,040 Speaker 1: fifty seven, which is of the unofficial overall global tally. UM. 425 00:27:35,080 --> 00:27:38,560 Speaker 1: But as we talked about in the previous episode or 426 00:27:38,560 --> 00:27:41,760 Speaker 1: in our previous discussion of this, at some point recently, UM, 427 00:27:41,800 --> 00:27:44,600 Speaker 1: just having them doesn't mean they're ready to go. Your 428 00:27:44,680 --> 00:27:47,960 Speaker 1: little Caesar's analogy holds true. Ben, You've got a freezer 429 00:27:48,000 --> 00:27:52,920 Speaker 1: full of these, you know, frozen rectangular nuclear pizza pies. Uh. 430 00:27:52,960 --> 00:27:55,520 Speaker 1: And then you've got the ones that are like already hot, 431 00:27:55,720 --> 00:27:58,240 Speaker 1: ready in the box, ready to ship out, you know, 432 00:27:58,320 --> 00:28:00,720 Speaker 1: and feed the masses or you know, blow them up. Um. 433 00:28:01,119 --> 00:28:05,879 Speaker 1: Same deal. So the US currently has deployed as in 434 00:28:06,200 --> 00:28:11,159 Speaker 1: hot and ready seven and Russia has fourteen hundred and 435 00:28:11,160 --> 00:28:16,440 Speaker 1: fifty six UH strategic warheads on several hundred bombers UM 436 00:28:16,520 --> 00:28:21,520 Speaker 1: and held within missiles UM and are modernizing their nuclear 437 00:28:21,560 --> 00:28:25,520 Speaker 1: delivery systems. And both are are trying their damned as 438 00:28:25,600 --> 00:28:30,439 Speaker 1: to modernize their nuclear delivery systems. But again, another thing 439 00:28:30,480 --> 00:28:34,280 Speaker 1: that we talked about recently is we don't know what 440 00:28:34,440 --> 00:28:38,080 Speaker 1: state of repair some of these devices are, and especially 441 00:28:38,080 --> 00:28:40,560 Speaker 1: when it comes to Russia, because they're known for being 442 00:28:41,040 --> 00:28:44,360 Speaker 1: you know, technologically savvy, but also that a lot has 443 00:28:44,400 --> 00:28:47,080 Speaker 1: to do with sometimes they're not exactly known for being 444 00:28:47,120 --> 00:28:51,120 Speaker 1: like precision engineers. They're definitely a little fast and loose 445 00:28:51,120 --> 00:28:53,800 Speaker 1: with how quickly they push out tech. Uh, and sometimes 446 00:28:53,840 --> 00:28:58,160 Speaker 1: that can lead to you know, disastrous results like with 447 00:28:58,360 --> 00:29:02,880 Speaker 1: US you know what was that the based dog? Oh yeah, yeah, 448 00:29:03,040 --> 00:29:07,120 Speaker 1: or with a Challenger space program in the US. What 449 00:29:07,160 --> 00:29:11,320 Speaker 1: I'm trying to say is every country is like pushing 450 00:29:11,360 --> 00:29:13,960 Speaker 1: the edge of technology as far as it can possibly 451 00:29:14,000 --> 00:29:17,520 Speaker 1: go to the point where it breaks. Right. Um. It's 452 00:29:17,560 --> 00:29:21,080 Speaker 1: just I don't want to push back too hard on that, No, 453 00:29:21,240 --> 00:29:23,360 Speaker 1: I because I agree with you. It's just I think 454 00:29:23,440 --> 00:29:25,240 Speaker 1: the US is probably in the same boat when it 455 00:29:25,280 --> 00:29:27,760 Speaker 1: comes to a lot of the older nukes that we 456 00:29:27,840 --> 00:29:30,240 Speaker 1: had around, since you know, they think probably I'm not 457 00:29:30,280 --> 00:29:35,160 Speaker 1: meaning to unfairly malign Russia's technical sal They're very technologically savvy, 458 00:29:35,200 --> 00:29:38,200 Speaker 1: we know, in terms of their ability to you know, 459 00:29:38,320 --> 00:29:42,080 Speaker 1: do um you know wage information wars and do you 460 00:29:42,120 --> 00:29:45,160 Speaker 1: know a very high level hacking attacks. I just have 461 00:29:45,200 --> 00:29:47,680 Speaker 1: a feeling, you know, there is sort of like like 462 00:29:47,720 --> 00:29:50,800 Speaker 1: you know, if I mentioned even like synthesizers and certain 463 00:29:50,920 --> 00:29:58,320 Speaker 1: Russian uh technology is cutting edge but also notoriously cantankerous 464 00:29:58,520 --> 00:30:01,360 Speaker 1: in terms of like being able to air or you know, 465 00:30:01,680 --> 00:30:05,560 Speaker 1: going on the fritz periodically. Sure, sorry you guys, I 466 00:30:05,560 --> 00:30:07,600 Speaker 1: didn't mean to interrupt it. Just the only thing is, like, 467 00:30:08,280 --> 00:30:11,240 Speaker 1: how many nukes do you actually need to start a 468 00:30:11,280 --> 00:30:14,160 Speaker 1: full on nuclear war? And just the one, you know, 469 00:30:14,720 --> 00:30:17,840 Speaker 1: the one that does, the one that goes boom. Yeah, 470 00:30:17,840 --> 00:30:20,520 Speaker 1: that's the tricky part. It's a great question, Matt, just 471 00:30:20,680 --> 00:30:25,760 Speaker 1: the one really. Uh So, the there's also something we 472 00:30:25,760 --> 00:30:29,560 Speaker 1: should talk about here, which is there's a difference in policy, 473 00:30:29,920 --> 00:30:32,520 Speaker 1: or you can even say a difference in philosophy. And 474 00:30:33,120 --> 00:30:35,400 Speaker 1: it all comes from a rational standpoint, if you know, 475 00:30:35,480 --> 00:30:39,520 Speaker 1: the perspective of the actors involved. But these differences often 476 00:30:39,600 --> 00:30:43,800 Speaker 1: lead to ambiguity, and this ambiguity is a huge monkey 477 00:30:43,800 --> 00:30:46,680 Speaker 1: wrench when we're trying to suss out nuclear weapon counts. 478 00:30:46,720 --> 00:30:50,000 Speaker 1: I mean, here's the deal. Let's say let's say we're playing, uh, 479 00:30:50,120 --> 00:30:54,080 Speaker 1: you know, we're all playing, you know, and one of 480 00:30:54,160 --> 00:30:55,960 Speaker 1: us knows that we have a couple of like kick 481 00:30:56,000 --> 00:30:59,520 Speaker 1: ass draw fours, we have three in our hand, but 482 00:30:59,640 --> 00:31:01,840 Speaker 1: we know the other people in the game they are 483 00:31:01,840 --> 00:31:06,440 Speaker 1: playing with us also may have some draw force, you know, 484 00:31:06,560 --> 00:31:09,320 Speaker 1: the good kind that go for any color, right the 485 00:31:09,840 --> 00:31:13,640 Speaker 1: and uh we if possible, we want to save our 486 00:31:13,760 --> 00:31:17,120 Speaker 1: supercard for the best moment and wanted to be a surprise. 487 00:31:17,760 --> 00:31:20,840 Speaker 1: Like the inventor of unos son Zoo once said, keep 488 00:31:20,920 --> 00:31:26,600 Speaker 1: them guessing, right, and don't fact check that. So it's 489 00:31:26,600 --> 00:31:29,280 Speaker 1: but it's the same with military capability. It's kind of 490 00:31:29,320 --> 00:31:32,200 Speaker 1: like a game of you know. That's why the DPRK 491 00:31:32,400 --> 00:31:35,720 Speaker 1: or North Korea doesn't disclose how many nuclear weapons it has. 492 00:31:36,400 --> 00:31:41,480 Speaker 1: Analysts have to guess instead based on how much fissile 493 00:31:41,640 --> 00:31:45,040 Speaker 1: material they think that government has created. The actual size 494 00:31:45,080 --> 00:31:50,040 Speaker 1: of their stockpile. People have no idea. Maybe forty, maybe fifty, 495 00:31:50,160 --> 00:31:55,680 Speaker 1: who knows. Uh. And then Israel has for many years 496 00:31:55,680 --> 00:32:00,880 Speaker 1: been the been the cheerful keeper of the world's worst 497 00:32:01,120 --> 00:32:06,600 Speaker 1: open secret in in nuclear technology. They've never officially acknowledged 498 00:32:06,680 --> 00:32:10,680 Speaker 1: that they have a nuclear weapons program, but everybody knows, 499 00:32:11,320 --> 00:32:14,960 Speaker 1: and they're fine with everybody knowing. They just don't talk 500 00:32:15,040 --> 00:32:20,880 Speaker 1: about it, which is a pretty um It's a pretty 501 00:32:20,920 --> 00:32:25,040 Speaker 1: interesting stance, this nuclear ambiguity, and it's something that a 502 00:32:25,080 --> 00:32:27,680 Speaker 1: lot of other countries seem to have accepted been it's 503 00:32:27,680 --> 00:32:29,920 Speaker 1: so weird. I was, We've talked about that for so long, 504 00:32:30,080 --> 00:32:34,680 Speaker 1: like the just best kept open secret Israel has here 505 00:32:35,000 --> 00:32:39,480 Speaker 1: And you posted a an article from Scientific American, but 506 00:32:39,520 --> 00:32:41,280 Speaker 1: I think it's from Life Science. It was kind a 507 00:32:41,320 --> 00:32:43,040 Speaker 1: little weird in some of those articles where it's like 508 00:32:43,360 --> 00:32:47,520 Speaker 1: cross posted. But there are just there are experts who 509 00:32:47,560 --> 00:32:51,280 Speaker 1: just say it now, yeah, Israel definitely has nukes. They 510 00:32:51,320 --> 00:32:54,240 Speaker 1: just don't talk about it. They don't acknowledge it. And 511 00:32:54,560 --> 00:32:57,000 Speaker 1: I remember before when we were researching this stuff, it 512 00:32:57,040 --> 00:32:59,440 Speaker 1: was kind of like it was felt more hush hush 513 00:32:59,600 --> 00:33:02,400 Speaker 1: to me. Now it's just like, yeah, and Israel's got 514 00:33:02,520 --> 00:33:06,719 Speaker 1: nukes whatever. Yeah. I think a lot of academics and 515 00:33:06,720 --> 00:33:12,000 Speaker 1: other politicians have been more open about it because politicians 516 00:33:12,200 --> 00:33:15,440 Speaker 1: in Israel itself were more open about it. You know, 517 00:33:15,480 --> 00:33:21,280 Speaker 1: they're not making official statements or necessarily uh propagating a 518 00:33:21,320 --> 00:33:23,680 Speaker 1: lot of documentation about it, but there are plenty of 519 00:33:23,720 --> 00:33:28,960 Speaker 1: interviews where they are very much acknology at least tacitly 520 00:33:29,360 --> 00:33:33,000 Speaker 1: this stuff. And you know, the world at least in 521 00:33:33,080 --> 00:33:35,560 Speaker 1: terms of the public sphere may never have known about 522 00:33:35,600 --> 00:33:40,080 Speaker 1: that program. If it worked for the whistleblower, Mordechai Venu 523 00:33:40,200 --> 00:33:44,240 Speaker 1: nu Uh. He's a former nuclear tech working in Israel. 524 00:33:44,400 --> 00:33:47,680 Speaker 1: He is still alive today. He spent like more than 525 00:33:47,720 --> 00:33:52,600 Speaker 1: a decade in solitary confinement. He definitely he was, He 526 00:33:52,720 --> 00:33:57,440 Speaker 1: definitely met with consequences for going public. Um. But but 527 00:33:57,560 --> 00:33:59,880 Speaker 1: in this case, you know, especially for this show, that 528 00:34:00,040 --> 00:34:04,080 Speaker 1: transparency is important. Even we can understand the logic of ambiguity, 529 00:34:05,080 --> 00:34:06,960 Speaker 1: the one that a lot of people are worried about 530 00:34:07,040 --> 00:34:13,320 Speaker 1: right now, surprisingly is not not just Russia. The nation 531 00:34:13,360 --> 00:34:16,759 Speaker 1: of China is also a black box. Experts have estimated 532 00:34:16,800 --> 00:34:22,000 Speaker 1: the country might have around fifty warheads in total. But 533 00:34:22,160 --> 00:34:25,680 Speaker 1: that's still kind of a guess. Uh, you know, I 534 00:34:25,719 --> 00:34:28,000 Speaker 1: think what we do here is maybe we pause for 535 00:34:28,120 --> 00:34:30,799 Speaker 1: word from our sponsor and then we return with some 536 00:34:30,880 --> 00:34:34,000 Speaker 1: bad news. Is that too soon? No, let's let's get 537 00:34:34,200 --> 00:34:43,480 Speaker 1: let's get the bad news going man, and we returned. 538 00:34:44,160 --> 00:34:46,600 Speaker 1: So there's one thing for sure, it's kind of the 539 00:34:46,640 --> 00:34:50,760 Speaker 1: bad news for a lot of observers. Without knowing exactly 540 00:34:50,800 --> 00:34:54,680 Speaker 1: how many nuclear weapons China has and its stockpile, we 541 00:34:54,760 --> 00:34:56,719 Speaker 1: do know that there are going to be a lot 542 00:34:56,760 --> 00:35:00,279 Speaker 1: more in the near to mid future. Arms can roll 543 00:35:00,360 --> 00:35:03,799 Speaker 1: had a great quote on this quote in the U. 544 00:35:03,920 --> 00:35:06,719 Speaker 1: S Department of Defense estimated that China had an operational 545 00:35:06,840 --> 00:35:10,680 Speaker 1: nuclear warhead stockpile in the low two hundreds, but projected 546 00:35:10,719 --> 00:35:14,439 Speaker 1: that number could double over the next decade. China has 547 00:35:14,480 --> 00:35:18,000 Speaker 1: since accelerated its nuclear development, and the Defense Department estimates 548 00:35:18,040 --> 00:35:21,760 Speaker 1: as of one that China may have up to seven 549 00:35:21,840 --> 00:35:30,880 Speaker 1: hundred deliverable nuclear warheads and a thousand by zoichs. And 550 00:35:31,200 --> 00:35:35,520 Speaker 1: that doesn't necessarily qualify as proliferation because they're not giving 551 00:35:35,560 --> 00:35:39,080 Speaker 1: them to other countries. These are these are homemade toys, 552 00:35:39,800 --> 00:35:43,120 Speaker 1: but it's true. And then the other complicating fact we 553 00:35:43,200 --> 00:35:46,600 Speaker 1: mentioned this just second ago. We might be overestimating the 554 00:35:46,680 --> 00:35:51,880 Speaker 1: nuclear capabilities of some states. Right. People may, for instance, 555 00:35:51,880 --> 00:35:57,480 Speaker 1: student ambiguity overestimate the size of Israel's nuclear stockpile, and 556 00:35:57,560 --> 00:36:02,360 Speaker 1: with Russia, the world maybe overestimating how much of that 557 00:36:02,400 --> 00:36:06,720 Speaker 1: stuff is actually usable because the invasion of Ukraine showed 558 00:36:06,719 --> 00:36:11,680 Speaker 1: that Russia has some serious infrastructure, hardware maintenance problems. So 559 00:36:11,719 --> 00:36:13,880 Speaker 1: they may have a lot of nuclear weapons on paper, 560 00:36:14,000 --> 00:36:16,960 Speaker 1: but we have to ask how many have the infrastructure 561 00:36:17,040 --> 00:36:20,839 Speaker 1: to deploy successfully at range. While that's an important point 562 00:36:20,880 --> 00:36:23,480 Speaker 1: to bring up, it's even more important to say that 563 00:36:23,520 --> 00:36:29,320 Speaker 1: they'll definitely have some that work. You know, they'll they'll 564 00:36:29,360 --> 00:36:33,640 Speaker 1: definitely still have more than the vast majority of countries, 565 00:36:33,680 --> 00:36:36,799 Speaker 1: including the other Nuki boys. I gotta let go of 566 00:36:36,800 --> 00:36:40,600 Speaker 1: the phrase Nuki boys. I think it reminds me Duke 567 00:36:41,560 --> 00:36:47,279 Speaker 1: it beautif were those prank callers remember Duke Nukem the 568 00:36:47,640 --> 00:36:51,040 Speaker 1: video game. I'm also there was like some prank callers 569 00:36:51,600 --> 00:36:54,600 Speaker 1: that they like had albums where they prank called people. 570 00:36:54,640 --> 00:37:00,640 Speaker 1: They were like the Dukie the Jerky Boys. Okay, that 571 00:37:00,719 --> 00:37:02,640 Speaker 1: was in the era of like the first Adam Sandler 572 00:37:02,680 --> 00:37:06,200 Speaker 1: comedy records. It was a golden time for raunchy comedy CDs. 573 00:37:06,280 --> 00:37:09,680 Speaker 1: It really was. Hang on, I have to look, is 574 00:37:09,760 --> 00:37:14,680 Speaker 1: dookie boys a thing? Boys is not a thing? Okay, 575 00:37:14,719 --> 00:37:23,560 Speaker 1: but doky dookie boys is a thing? Yeah? Okay, So 576 00:37:24,120 --> 00:37:27,120 Speaker 1: all right, so we've solved that we'll get the we'll 577 00:37:27,120 --> 00:37:31,800 Speaker 1: get the Jerky Dookey treaty out next week. But this 578 00:37:31,800 --> 00:37:38,239 Speaker 1: this means O do so this uh, this means that 579 00:37:38,600 --> 00:37:41,480 Speaker 1: it's not difficult for us to understand why some nations 580 00:37:41,520 --> 00:37:44,319 Speaker 1: will want to play their mass destruction cards so close 581 00:37:44,360 --> 00:37:46,799 Speaker 1: to the chest. It also means it's almost certain that 582 00:37:46,880 --> 00:37:50,759 Speaker 1: intelligence agencies may have a closer guess, like we talked 583 00:37:50,800 --> 00:37:54,720 Speaker 1: about a more sophisticated picture, but they can't. They can't 584 00:37:54,719 --> 00:37:58,000 Speaker 1: go public with that one. It removes an advantage they 585 00:37:58,040 --> 00:38:02,760 Speaker 1: have right in terms of visibility to it uh opens 586 00:38:02,800 --> 00:38:06,000 Speaker 1: them to the risk of having their collection methods compromise. 587 00:38:06,600 --> 00:38:11,480 Speaker 1: And three, it might just be the unexpected feather that 588 00:38:11,480 --> 00:38:15,200 Speaker 1: that breaks the camel, you know, the rock that sinks 589 00:38:15,200 --> 00:38:21,320 Speaker 1: the boat. Maybe maybe just like when people's parents pretend 590 00:38:21,719 --> 00:38:24,759 Speaker 1: they don't know their kid is smoking weed, it's just 591 00:38:24,960 --> 00:38:29,839 Speaker 1: better to like have a practice sort of blindness about it. 592 00:38:30,040 --> 00:38:36,760 Speaker 1: At least that's see. Just so now we have to 593 00:38:36,800 --> 00:38:39,560 Speaker 1: talk about the future. We've given you some of the 594 00:38:39,600 --> 00:38:42,759 Speaker 1: best guesses on how many nuclear weapons exist. We've talked 595 00:38:42,760 --> 00:38:46,200 Speaker 1: about the problems with that question and how you have 596 00:38:46,280 --> 00:38:50,239 Speaker 1: to you know, the dealership vehicle truck cark thing. But 597 00:38:51,120 --> 00:38:54,960 Speaker 1: now we have to talk about the future. So, despite 598 00:38:55,440 --> 00:38:59,880 Speaker 1: the good faith efforts of people around the planet for decades, 599 00:39:00,360 --> 00:39:05,840 Speaker 1: nuclear relations remain incredibly tense. And that treaty we mentioned itself, 600 00:39:05,880 --> 00:39:09,719 Speaker 1: the MPT, the most famous of its kind, has some 601 00:39:09,800 --> 00:39:14,040 Speaker 1: big flaws. Non nuclear powers see it as the haves 602 00:39:14,640 --> 00:39:19,080 Speaker 1: the Nukie boys keeping the have nots down. They're saying, look, 603 00:39:19,280 --> 00:39:23,680 Speaker 1: you are, you are benefiting from this right You are 604 00:39:23,760 --> 00:39:29,480 Speaker 1: hegemons in many cases your former colonial powers. Why do 605 00:39:29,760 --> 00:39:32,680 Speaker 1: you get to control the world this way? And for 606 00:39:32,719 --> 00:39:37,319 Speaker 1: this reason? Because of this kind of rationale, you can 607 00:39:37,360 --> 00:39:39,879 Speaker 1: see how a lot of non nuclear states may think 608 00:39:40,200 --> 00:39:43,799 Speaker 1: the path to becoming a superpower is to have the 609 00:39:43,880 --> 00:39:48,239 Speaker 1: same guns as the superpowers. And now more than ever, 610 00:39:48,320 --> 00:39:52,600 Speaker 1: it's possible to do so, because that the technology has spread, 611 00:39:52,640 --> 00:39:57,240 Speaker 1: the scientific discoveries have spread. People can enrich rate countries, 612 00:39:57,320 --> 00:40:01,520 Speaker 1: I should say, can enrich uranium while dodging those inspection regimes. 613 00:40:02,480 --> 00:40:06,239 Speaker 1: You can also step out of the MPT. You can 614 00:40:06,400 --> 00:40:10,480 Speaker 1: use that UM. You can use that third platform we 615 00:40:10,480 --> 00:40:14,600 Speaker 1: were talking about assistance with nuclear power, peaceful nuclear research, 616 00:40:15,160 --> 00:40:18,160 Speaker 1: and you can get right to the brink of developing 617 00:40:18,239 --> 00:40:21,000 Speaker 1: nuclear weapons. And then once you get to that line, 618 00:40:21,239 --> 00:40:24,280 Speaker 1: the treaty no longer serves your purposes. You can withdraw, 619 00:40:24,800 --> 00:40:27,960 Speaker 1: just start building some bombs. You can pull a psych 620 00:40:28,600 --> 00:40:30,720 Speaker 1: just like as if you were in the nineteen nineties 621 00:40:30,800 --> 00:40:33,960 Speaker 1: or early two thousand's, and there's nothing much that the 622 00:40:33,960 --> 00:40:39,080 Speaker 1: rest of the treaty signatories can do to wash over me. Ben, 623 00:40:39,800 --> 00:40:44,160 Speaker 1: what's a psych like you're in the early two thousands 624 00:40:46,400 --> 00:40:49,040 Speaker 1: when I just remember it's not it's not only uranium, 625 00:40:49,040 --> 00:40:53,560 Speaker 1: it's plutonium. It's several other facile materials that can be 626 00:40:53,640 --> 00:40:56,320 Speaker 1: spun up and used to make these kinds of weapons, 627 00:40:56,600 --> 00:41:00,560 Speaker 1: and the most powerful ones that have ever been exploded 628 00:41:00,920 --> 00:41:05,600 Speaker 1: used a combination of different uh materials to actually cause 629 00:41:05,680 --> 00:41:10,960 Speaker 1: a fusion reaction. Uh like it. Nuclear energy really does 630 00:41:11,000 --> 00:41:13,759 Speaker 1: scare me in that way, because it seems as though 631 00:41:13,920 --> 00:41:19,359 Speaker 1: the scenario you're describing, Ben is very much possible and 632 00:41:19,480 --> 00:41:23,480 Speaker 1: probably rational. Oh yeah, it's Uh, it's like I'm not 633 00:41:23,560 --> 00:41:26,399 Speaker 1: touching you. I'm not touching you. I'm not touching you, 634 00:41:26,480 --> 00:41:31,799 Speaker 1: and then slap. Uh. But there's there's gonna be a 635 00:41:31,800 --> 00:41:36,120 Speaker 1: big problem down the road, quite likely. I mean not 636 00:41:36,200 --> 00:41:39,400 Speaker 1: many people can successfully predict the future, but if you 637 00:41:39,480 --> 00:41:43,399 Speaker 1: look at the signs, you know there's something in the wind. Nowadays, 638 00:41:44,400 --> 00:41:48,040 Speaker 1: Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Iran have all already laid out 639 00:41:48,280 --> 00:41:52,239 Speaker 1: the terms under which they would leave the treaty and 640 00:41:52,520 --> 00:41:58,400 Speaker 1: pursue nuclear weapons, so they like, it's already something countries 641 00:41:58,440 --> 00:42:02,759 Speaker 1: are planning on. And this is a glasshouse situation. The 642 00:42:02,840 --> 00:42:05,759 Speaker 1: big dogs, the nukie boys get a loophole too. There's 643 00:42:05,760 --> 00:42:10,880 Speaker 1: a great article on Slate from Fred Kaplan which notes 644 00:42:10,920 --> 00:42:16,440 Speaker 1: the problems with um disarmament. It's it's an article six 645 00:42:16,640 --> 00:42:19,719 Speaker 1: of the MPT and it means that countries that have 646 00:42:19,880 --> 00:42:24,359 Speaker 1: nukes have to start stepping down their stockpile. And it's 647 00:42:24,400 --> 00:42:28,879 Speaker 1: like a it's like a show of good faith, right, 648 00:42:29,719 --> 00:42:33,279 Speaker 1: But it doesn't work. It doesn't work because it is 649 00:42:33,760 --> 00:42:37,279 Speaker 1: written back to the language here. It is written in 650 00:42:37,520 --> 00:42:43,040 Speaker 1: a kind of a weasily way, sort of like, um, 651 00:42:43,080 --> 00:42:46,040 Speaker 1: the founding fathers wanted all the people in the US 652 00:42:46,160 --> 00:42:50,759 Speaker 1: to have the right to the pursuit of happiness, you 653 00:42:50,760 --> 00:42:53,040 Speaker 1: know what I mean. We're not saying it's gonna work out, 654 00:42:53,719 --> 00:42:57,919 Speaker 1: but go nuts. We got we we got your back. Yeah. Yeah. 655 00:43:00,080 --> 00:43:04,080 Speaker 1: So here's the So I think it's maybe let's quote 656 00:43:04,080 --> 00:43:07,479 Speaker 1: directly from Kaplan here, because I think we all quite 657 00:43:07,480 --> 00:43:09,920 Speaker 1: like the way he puts quote. It states that the 658 00:43:10,000 --> 00:43:15,280 Speaker 1: five nuclear countries will uh internal quote undertake to pursue 659 00:43:15,280 --> 00:43:20,400 Speaker 1: negotiations and good faith on effective means relating to cessation 660 00:43:20,920 --> 00:43:24,520 Speaker 1: of the nuclear arms race at an early date. Let's 661 00:43:24,520 --> 00:43:27,719 Speaker 1: try this one more time. Um, that's not a cessation 662 00:43:27,960 --> 00:43:32,960 Speaker 1: to the arms race. But the intention literally quote means 663 00:43:33,080 --> 00:43:38,280 Speaker 1: relating to sensation. Uh, you know, you hear about cessation 664 00:43:38,320 --> 00:43:41,200 Speaker 1: in terms of like quitting smokings. I expressed my intention 665 00:43:41,560 --> 00:43:45,319 Speaker 1: to quit smoking and all the things adjacent to that 666 00:43:45,400 --> 00:43:49,080 Speaker 1: except the act itself. Right, right, It's like when you 667 00:43:49,160 --> 00:43:52,319 Speaker 1: quit smoking by bumming off of everybody else all the time. 668 00:43:52,360 --> 00:43:55,719 Speaker 1: That's not actually quitting smoking, but it's an intention by 669 00:43:55,760 --> 00:43:59,239 Speaker 1: not buying cigarettes and just you know, impinging on the 670 00:43:59,320 --> 00:44:02,560 Speaker 1: kindness of your friends. Um, but you're still not doing 671 00:44:02,560 --> 00:44:04,200 Speaker 1: the thing that you're actually you know, that's sort of 672 00:44:04,239 --> 00:44:08,439 Speaker 1: at the heart of of the conversation. Yeah, or like, okay, 673 00:44:08,640 --> 00:44:13,040 Speaker 1: I'm going to stop carrying a cigarette lighter around with me. 674 00:44:13,320 --> 00:44:15,920 Speaker 1: I'll still have smokes, but I'll only carry it, or 675 00:44:16,360 --> 00:44:19,279 Speaker 1: you know, I'll rely on the kindness of strangers. And 676 00:44:19,320 --> 00:44:23,480 Speaker 1: then also like not saying to actually not committing to 677 00:44:23,520 --> 00:44:29,080 Speaker 1: actually hold negotiations, but to undertake to pursue negotiations, which 678 00:44:29,160 --> 00:44:31,319 Speaker 1: is the same thing as saying, you know what, we 679 00:44:31,320 --> 00:44:34,640 Speaker 1: should hang out, or or even worse, it's like saying, 680 00:44:34,840 --> 00:44:39,120 Speaker 1: you know what, one day I should think about asking 681 00:44:39,160 --> 00:44:41,680 Speaker 1: that person to hang out and then we can work 682 00:44:41,680 --> 00:44:45,239 Speaker 1: out the details. You know um at an early date, 683 00:44:46,400 --> 00:44:51,080 Speaker 1: you know, and anyway, so that that's the problem. That's why, 684 00:44:51,120 --> 00:44:54,160 Speaker 1: that's why a lot of non nuclear states have a 685 00:44:55,160 --> 00:44:59,040 Speaker 1: have a valid concern when they say, we don't think 686 00:44:59,360 --> 00:45:02,760 Speaker 1: these countries trees are holding up their into the bargain. 687 00:45:03,160 --> 00:45:07,160 Speaker 1: And the US also has made like bilateral agreements that 688 00:45:07,640 --> 00:45:12,040 Speaker 1: critics say are weakening these treaties. It's just a mess 689 00:45:12,080 --> 00:45:14,440 Speaker 1: of spaghetti, man, It's a whole bag of badgers. So 690 00:45:14,560 --> 00:45:17,320 Speaker 1: that's that's where it leaves us. But there's still there's 691 00:45:17,320 --> 00:45:19,480 Speaker 1: still more out there. There's more that you need to 692 00:45:19,520 --> 00:45:22,399 Speaker 1: know about this. Well you're saying that in a matter 693 00:45:22,440 --> 00:45:23,880 Speaker 1: of minutes. So this is what I just want to 694 00:45:23,920 --> 00:45:26,080 Speaker 1: harp on this for just a little big guys, how 695 00:45:26,120 --> 00:45:28,880 Speaker 1: long it would take, how a nuke would get to 696 00:45:29,040 --> 00:45:32,680 Speaker 1: you or to a place on the world, and where 697 00:45:32,680 --> 00:45:35,320 Speaker 1: it would explode. I want to jump to that article 698 00:45:35,440 --> 00:45:38,120 Speaker 1: how many nuclear weapons exist and who has them? From 699 00:45:38,160 --> 00:45:41,799 Speaker 1: Live Science written by Joe Felon. Oh that's a great name, 700 00:45:41,880 --> 00:45:50,240 Speaker 1: Joe Felon determinism going on that. I think it's pronounced phelan. Alright, fine, 701 00:45:50,640 --> 00:45:54,560 Speaker 1: that'd be cool. It was DJ Joe Fellon, all right, So, um, 702 00:45:54,719 --> 00:45:58,360 Speaker 1: there's there's a person that Joe consulted for this story 703 00:45:58,640 --> 00:46:02,120 Speaker 1: named Matt Corda, who's a senior research associate and project 704 00:46:02,160 --> 00:46:05,600 Speaker 1: manager from the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of 705 00:46:05,640 --> 00:46:08,160 Speaker 1: American Scientists. I just want to read you some of 706 00:46:08,160 --> 00:46:11,360 Speaker 1: what Matt said when it comes to deployment, how nukes 707 00:46:11,400 --> 00:46:14,960 Speaker 1: would actually get to you. UM. He says, the US 708 00:46:15,000 --> 00:46:17,120 Speaker 1: and Russia keep a portion of their nuclear weapons on 709 00:46:17,200 --> 00:46:19,560 Speaker 1: prompt alert, meaning they could be ready to launch in 710 00:46:19,760 --> 00:46:24,720 Speaker 1: quote under fifteen minutes, So launching nukes in under fifteen minutes. 711 00:46:25,200 --> 00:46:28,400 Speaker 1: And there's a twenty paper that was created by the 712 00:46:28,480 --> 00:46:33,040 Speaker 1: Union of Concerned Scientists UH, and they're saying that US 713 00:46:33,080 --> 00:46:37,440 Speaker 1: and Russia have around nine d weapons of such capacity 714 00:46:37,560 --> 00:46:42,200 Speaker 1: ready at any time, so fifteen minute launch and it's out. UH. 715 00:46:42,280 --> 00:46:45,960 Speaker 1: And that includes stuff that's like ballistic missiles inside silos. 716 00:46:46,000 --> 00:46:48,960 Speaker 1: That includes UH missiles that could be launched from the 717 00:46:49,000 --> 00:46:52,560 Speaker 1: air from like a MiG UH fighter jet if it, 718 00:46:52,719 --> 00:46:54,640 Speaker 1: you know, if it was able to deploy at a 719 00:46:54,640 --> 00:46:57,479 Speaker 1: certain range. It also has to do with submarines, and 720 00:46:57,880 --> 00:47:02,000 Speaker 1: I think it's corvette class UH naval ships they can 721 00:47:02,040 --> 00:47:07,399 Speaker 1: also shoot these ballistic style missiles. UH. So that's one thing, right, 722 00:47:07,520 --> 00:47:11,080 Speaker 1: about nine hundred each that exists. But the scariest thing 723 00:47:11,160 --> 00:47:14,200 Speaker 1: to me is the hypersonic missile system that Russia has 724 00:47:14,200 --> 00:47:17,680 Speaker 1: been testing and recently deployed. As of last week when 725 00:47:17,680 --> 00:47:20,799 Speaker 1: we're recording this, Russia claims to have deployed one of 726 00:47:20,800 --> 00:47:25,879 Speaker 1: their hypersonic missiles. These things travel at mock six, which 727 00:47:25,960 --> 00:47:29,080 Speaker 1: is six times the speed of sound like up to right, 728 00:47:29,200 --> 00:47:32,600 Speaker 1: so might be around mack five actually traveling. They allegedly 729 00:47:32,640 --> 00:47:36,640 Speaker 1: have a range of a thousand kilometers or six and 730 00:47:36,719 --> 00:47:40,680 Speaker 1: twenty one miles. Before we were talking about generally ballistic 731 00:47:40,719 --> 00:47:42,920 Speaker 1: missiles being able to travel I think four around four 732 00:47:42,960 --> 00:47:46,920 Speaker 1: hundred miles been. Uh, these things can travel two miles 733 00:47:46,920 --> 00:47:51,279 Speaker 1: more than that. And the scariest thing about them is 734 00:47:51,280 --> 00:47:53,719 Speaker 1: that when they're flying through the air so quickly, they 735 00:47:53,760 --> 00:47:57,160 Speaker 1: generate a plasma. What is it I'm gonna read from this? Uh? 736 00:47:57,160 --> 00:48:00,680 Speaker 1: This is from military dot Com in an article titled 737 00:48:00,680 --> 00:48:04,759 Speaker 1: why Russia's hypersonic missiles can't be seen on radar. When 738 00:48:04,800 --> 00:48:07,440 Speaker 1: these missiles are traveling through the air, it creates a 739 00:48:07,520 --> 00:48:10,000 Speaker 1: plasma shield at the front of it because the air 740 00:48:10,120 --> 00:48:14,120 Speaker 1: gets superheated, and you can't see them on radar. And 741 00:48:14,120 --> 00:48:17,880 Speaker 1: they travel at mock six. So we've got these like. Um, 742 00:48:17,920 --> 00:48:21,719 Speaker 1: if you imagine the AGIS missile interceptor system, which the 743 00:48:21,800 --> 00:48:24,920 Speaker 1: United States uses and several other countries used, we deploy 744 00:48:24,920 --> 00:48:28,600 Speaker 1: it in other places. If this hypersonic missile is traveling 745 00:48:28,600 --> 00:48:34,000 Speaker 1: at you, Uh, there's there's eight to ten seconds that 746 00:48:34,000 --> 00:48:37,600 Speaker 1: that missile interceptor system needs to be able to track 747 00:48:37,640 --> 00:48:39,920 Speaker 1: a thing and then send a missile out and catch 748 00:48:39,960 --> 00:48:43,279 Speaker 1: it and destroy it. In that eight to ten seconds, 749 00:48:43,320 --> 00:48:47,640 Speaker 1: these hypersonic missiles will have traveled twenty kilometers and the 750 00:48:47,719 --> 00:48:51,640 Speaker 1: missile itself that the AGIS system would deploy cannot catch 751 00:48:51,719 --> 00:48:55,880 Speaker 1: up to that hypersonic missile. It can't, so you can't 752 00:48:55,880 --> 00:48:58,520 Speaker 1: stop it. By the way, what happens when a nuclear 753 00:48:58,560 --> 00:49:01,279 Speaker 1: weapon is detonated like over the ocean. I mean, it's 754 00:49:01,280 --> 00:49:04,160 Speaker 1: obviously better than hitting its direct target, but still probably 755 00:49:04,200 --> 00:49:07,920 Speaker 1: not great, right. I mean, we got an episode on 756 00:49:07,960 --> 00:49:11,879 Speaker 1: the Marshall Islands if anybody wants to be depressed. Yeah, yeah. 757 00:49:12,280 --> 00:49:17,719 Speaker 1: The Vela incident is another example. UM. Water water is 758 00:49:17,960 --> 00:49:22,480 Speaker 1: a okay way to buffer stuff, but it still has 759 00:49:22,760 --> 00:49:27,680 Speaker 1: enormous consequences. It's still very nasty business. There's not really 760 00:49:27,680 --> 00:49:29,840 Speaker 1: a good place to drop a nuke, is what we're saying. 761 00:49:30,360 --> 00:49:33,719 Speaker 1: And now that the delivery systems are so good, I 762 00:49:33,760 --> 00:49:38,200 Speaker 1: would only add that hypersonic missiles have the ability to 763 00:49:38,320 --> 00:49:44,040 Speaker 1: change direction once they're launched, which ballistic usually doesn't. So 764 00:49:44,800 --> 00:49:47,120 Speaker 1: yeah they can, yeah, ballistic like launch it and then 765 00:49:47,120 --> 00:49:50,600 Speaker 1: it goes. But these hypersonic missiles, just in my mind, 766 00:49:50,640 --> 00:49:53,759 Speaker 1: are terrifying. I don't know and I cannot confirm if 767 00:49:53,760 --> 00:49:57,160 Speaker 1: there are any nuclear warheads attached to any hypersonic missiles 768 00:49:57,160 --> 00:50:00,239 Speaker 1: that are like currently deployed and ready to use. But 769 00:50:00,760 --> 00:50:04,160 Speaker 1: Russian naval ships can that specific class of buoy on 770 00:50:05,320 --> 00:50:08,759 Speaker 1: class naval ship can carry around twenty five of these 771 00:50:08,840 --> 00:50:13,560 Speaker 1: hypersonic missiles, and their MiG thirty one K fighter jets 772 00:50:14,000 --> 00:50:18,160 Speaker 1: can carry these things. Uh, And you know, to me, 773 00:50:18,320 --> 00:50:22,640 Speaker 1: that's my nightmare. Fuel is a hypersonic nuclear missile that 774 00:50:22,760 --> 00:50:26,279 Speaker 1: nobody can stop. We know what's happening, and then somebody 775 00:50:26,320 --> 00:50:28,799 Speaker 1: on either the U S side, the Israel side, the 776 00:50:28,920 --> 00:50:32,560 Speaker 1: UK somewhere has to decide while that thing is flying 777 00:50:32,600 --> 00:50:36,719 Speaker 1: through the area in only a couple of minutes to counterattack. Right, 778 00:50:37,040 --> 00:50:40,000 Speaker 1: It's like the person who has to make the decision 779 00:50:40,040 --> 00:50:41,959 Speaker 1: do I launch a nuke? I see that one coming. 780 00:50:42,000 --> 00:50:44,759 Speaker 1: I can't stop it. Do I launch nukes? That is 781 00:50:44,840 --> 00:50:49,360 Speaker 1: terrifying to me. Yeah, especially considering China is superactive in 782 00:50:49,480 --> 00:50:53,040 Speaker 1: research on this. They've got a hypersonic live vehicle. They 783 00:50:53,080 --> 00:50:58,560 Speaker 1: also created something called the Starry Sky to UH just 784 00:50:58,640 --> 00:51:01,839 Speaker 1: to go ahead and make sure further ruin entertainment. It's 785 00:51:01,880 --> 00:51:06,399 Speaker 1: called the translates like the Sein Kong to it in. 786 00:51:07,640 --> 00:51:11,360 Speaker 1: This was a nuclear capable hypersonic vehicle and it was 787 00:51:11,440 --> 00:51:18,000 Speaker 1: successfully tested. UH. US is also messed with this obviously. UH. India, France, Germany, 788 00:51:18,040 --> 00:51:23,160 Speaker 1: Australia and Japan are also developing hypersonic weapons. UH. And 789 00:51:24,280 --> 00:51:26,440 Speaker 1: you know it would be naive for US to assume 790 00:51:26,480 --> 00:51:30,560 Speaker 1: that none of those would be nuclear capable, and hypersonic 791 00:51:30,640 --> 00:51:33,359 Speaker 1: missiles like you mentioned that as of just a few 792 00:51:33,440 --> 00:51:37,359 Speaker 1: days ago, have been used in combat. Russia deployed them 793 00:51:37,840 --> 00:51:42,560 Speaker 1: there are I was seeing a suggestions that the reason 794 00:51:43,320 --> 00:51:46,799 Speaker 1: Russia deployed these weapons they were not nuclear, they were 795 00:51:46,840 --> 00:51:52,239 Speaker 1: just hypersonic. But I'm seeing the people saying that they 796 00:51:52,320 --> 00:51:55,200 Speaker 1: launched them because they ran out of their other stuff, 797 00:51:55,840 --> 00:52:00,520 Speaker 1: that the stockpile was low. But we need more information 798 00:52:00,520 --> 00:52:03,920 Speaker 1: on that. In the meantime, stay safe, everyone, we can 799 00:52:03,960 --> 00:52:06,360 Speaker 1: make a kind of good guess about how many nuclear 800 00:52:06,400 --> 00:52:09,399 Speaker 1: weapons are out there. And for a little while there 801 00:52:09,480 --> 00:52:13,279 Speaker 1: was a healcy on optimistic era wherein we could try 802 00:52:13,280 --> 00:52:17,279 Speaker 1: to predict paths toward partial disarmament. But now it looks 803 00:52:17,320 --> 00:52:20,240 Speaker 1: like at least some countries are going to actively create 804 00:52:20,360 --> 00:52:24,120 Speaker 1: more nukes and definitely create more ways to get them 805 00:52:24,120 --> 00:52:26,879 Speaker 1: to you in a matter of minutes. So how many 806 00:52:26,920 --> 00:52:30,120 Speaker 1: exactly are on the way that for now is the 807 00:52:30,160 --> 00:52:33,040 Speaker 1: stuff they don't want you to know. But I don't 808 00:52:33,040 --> 00:52:36,000 Speaker 1: know how to end these episodes, you know, when we're like, well, 809 00:52:36,120 --> 00:52:40,080 Speaker 1: here's the future, no one knows, no one's in charge, 810 00:52:40,840 --> 00:52:43,799 Speaker 1: and if things launch, there's not much you can do. 811 00:52:44,360 --> 00:52:47,160 Speaker 1: It's like what like you know, like a nuclear a 812 00:52:47,239 --> 00:52:50,480 Speaker 1: nuclear bunker, a nuclear shelter. I'm sure a lot of 813 00:52:51,239 --> 00:52:53,759 Speaker 1: are like preppers in the audience have thought of this, 814 00:52:53,840 --> 00:52:56,719 Speaker 1: but I don't know if most people have. If you 815 00:52:56,760 --> 00:52:59,640 Speaker 1: have a nuclear bunker, you have to always be close 816 00:52:59,680 --> 00:53:02,640 Speaker 1: to it for it to be useful, right, especially with 817 00:53:02,719 --> 00:53:06,600 Speaker 1: hypersonic stuff. You hear hypersonic missiles are launching and you 818 00:53:06,680 --> 00:53:08,920 Speaker 1: go to book a flight to Montana or wherever your 819 00:53:08,920 --> 00:53:12,080 Speaker 1: bunker is. It's too late, right, yeah. I mean by 820 00:53:12,280 --> 00:53:15,920 Speaker 1: then you've already gotten the ding ding on your phone 821 00:53:16,239 --> 00:53:19,880 Speaker 1: and you're on the toilet, and you know, it's like, okay, well, 822 00:53:19,920 --> 00:53:22,200 Speaker 1: I guess this is me now. And then next thing 823 00:53:22,239 --> 00:53:24,360 Speaker 1: you know, you're like pomp paid, you know, but on 824 00:53:24,400 --> 00:53:28,640 Speaker 1: the toilet. It's gonna be my last my last stage 825 00:53:28,800 --> 00:53:32,600 Speaker 1: in uh angry Best Fiends. It's gonna be my last 826 00:53:32,640 --> 00:53:35,000 Speaker 1: Best Fiends game. And I'm sorry not to get in 827 00:53:35,200 --> 00:53:37,879 Speaker 1: on a super bummer no, but it's like we've seen 828 00:53:38,000 --> 00:53:41,840 Speaker 1: dramatizations of what it would look like if a nuke 829 00:53:42,000 --> 00:53:45,800 Speaker 1: hit everything from Terminator two. When you see Sarah Connor 830 00:53:46,120 --> 00:53:50,120 Speaker 1: shaking the playground, you know, um chain length fence and 831 00:53:50,120 --> 00:53:54,080 Speaker 1: then getting vaporized into a screaming skeleton. You know that 832 00:53:54,160 --> 00:53:57,239 Speaker 1: then it turns to dust and blows away. If you've 833 00:53:57,239 --> 00:54:02,560 Speaker 1: seen the very depress saying yeah beautiful um anime, Barefoot 834 00:54:02,640 --> 00:54:06,080 Speaker 1: gin Um or the Grade of the Fireflies, you see 835 00:54:06,080 --> 00:54:09,480 Speaker 1: some of the consequences of more like radiation poisoning um. 836 00:54:09,600 --> 00:54:13,120 Speaker 1: Barefoot gin in particular has some really gnarly eviscerating kind 837 00:54:13,120 --> 00:54:15,279 Speaker 1: of like images of what would happen, What would really 838 00:54:15,320 --> 00:54:18,239 Speaker 1: happen though, would you just get kind of vaporized. If 839 00:54:18,239 --> 00:54:20,120 Speaker 1: it was a direct hit, you would write. If it 840 00:54:20,160 --> 00:54:22,120 Speaker 1: was a direct hit, you would just get turned to 841 00:54:22,440 --> 00:54:25,680 Speaker 1: ash and blow away. Yeah, I feel like ground zero. 842 00:54:25,920 --> 00:54:30,360 Speaker 1: It would depend on the yield. Um. But without sounding 843 00:54:31,280 --> 00:54:37,040 Speaker 1: two morbid, I think many people, when they look into 844 00:54:37,200 --> 00:54:41,680 Speaker 1: the reality of what happens in the aftermath, many people 845 00:54:41,760 --> 00:54:44,720 Speaker 1: might make the choice to just go for a quick 846 00:54:44,760 --> 00:54:49,560 Speaker 1: death rather than try to navigate fallout and radiation and 847 00:54:50,600 --> 00:54:54,680 Speaker 1: chaos and collapse of government. Um, but you know what, 848 00:54:54,920 --> 00:54:58,359 Speaker 1: there we go, We got there. No thank you. Now 849 00:54:58,400 --> 00:55:01,160 Speaker 1: we have a question to ask our fellow conspiracy realist. 850 00:55:01,520 --> 00:55:04,880 Speaker 1: What would you do in in the event of an 851 00:55:04,920 --> 00:55:08,800 Speaker 1: imminent nuclear attack? Depending on how much time you had, 852 00:55:09,160 --> 00:55:11,440 Speaker 1: how would you prepare? Are you one of the people 853 00:55:11,520 --> 00:55:14,120 Speaker 1: who if you learned about it while it was occurring, 854 00:55:14,480 --> 00:55:17,799 Speaker 1: like literally an alert on your phone, would you want 855 00:55:17,800 --> 00:55:21,799 Speaker 1: to survive knowing that that survival could quite possibly lead 856 00:55:21,840 --> 00:55:26,160 Speaker 1: to a terrifying existence? Let us know or you know, also, 857 00:55:26,360 --> 00:55:29,120 Speaker 1: just send memes. Who can't use a good meme in 858 00:55:29,160 --> 00:55:32,000 Speaker 1: these trying times, So we love to recommend our Facebook 859 00:55:32,040 --> 00:55:33,879 Speaker 1: group Here's where it gets Crazy, where you can check 860 00:55:33,880 --> 00:55:37,520 Speaker 1: out some good memes. We've got a conspiracy stuff YouTube channel, 861 00:55:37,680 --> 00:55:40,279 Speaker 1: Big Things on the way there. Check it out. We're 862 00:55:40,320 --> 00:55:45,399 Speaker 1: also on the Instagram's the twitters. We're not on e chirp, 863 00:55:46,080 --> 00:55:48,879 Speaker 1: but a lot of are. A lot of folks reached 864 00:55:48,920 --> 00:55:50,680 Speaker 1: out to us to tell us we're not missing much, 865 00:55:51,120 --> 00:55:54,080 Speaker 1: which I found comforting. Oh and if you hate social 866 00:55:54,120 --> 00:55:57,560 Speaker 1: media because you checked out our big Data episode and 867 00:55:57,600 --> 00:56:00,680 Speaker 1: you're like, I'm not sipping those meats anymore, there's good news. 868 00:56:00,760 --> 00:56:04,560 Speaker 1: You can also contact us our telephone line, that's right. 869 00:56:04,560 --> 00:56:07,120 Speaker 1: Give us a call. Our number is one eight three 870 00:56:07,239 --> 00:56:11,200 Speaker 1: three S T d W y t K. When you 871 00:56:11,239 --> 00:56:14,000 Speaker 1: call in, let us know how you pre ordered our book, 872 00:56:14,239 --> 00:56:16,359 Speaker 1: which is coming out in October, but you can pre 873 00:56:16,480 --> 00:56:20,120 Speaker 1: order right now. Tell us which method you use to 874 00:56:20,280 --> 00:56:23,480 Speaker 1: pre order our book. We want to know. We're curious. Um. 875 00:56:24,280 --> 00:56:26,640 Speaker 1: When you call in, please give yourself a cool nickname, 876 00:56:26,840 --> 00:56:29,480 Speaker 1: and you've got three minutes say whatever you'd like. At 877 00:56:29,520 --> 00:56:32,799 Speaker 1: some point, please give us permission or not to use 878 00:56:32,840 --> 00:56:34,880 Speaker 1: your voice end message on the air, in one of 879 00:56:34,920 --> 00:56:38,120 Speaker 1: our listener mail episodes, or wherever we're gonna use it 880 00:56:38,440 --> 00:56:45,480 Speaker 1: worldwide in perpetuity. We got your voice. If you if 881 00:56:45,480 --> 00:56:47,600 Speaker 1: you don't want to do any of that stuff. Let 882 00:56:47,640 --> 00:56:51,240 Speaker 1: us know if you've got maybe an old nuclear missile 883 00:56:51,280 --> 00:56:53,640 Speaker 1: silo or another form of bunker that the three of 884 00:56:53,719 --> 00:56:56,160 Speaker 1: us can come, you know, and visit, maybe hang out 885 00:56:56,160 --> 00:56:58,480 Speaker 1: with you when the world starts d I don't know. 886 00:56:59,120 --> 00:57:04,160 Speaker 1: We'd love to know about your bunker situations as good 887 00:57:04,160 --> 00:57:07,240 Speaker 1: as your WiFi. You got that good bunker WiFi? Yeah, 888 00:57:07,680 --> 00:57:10,160 Speaker 1: use it uh to to to send us a good 889 00:57:10,160 --> 00:57:33,840 Speaker 1: old fashioned email. We are conspiracy at iHeart radio dot com. 890 00:57:33,960 --> 00:57:36,040 Speaker 1: Stuff they don't want you to know is a production 891 00:57:36,080 --> 00:57:39,200 Speaker 1: of I heart Radio. For more podcasts from my heart Radio, 892 00:57:39,360 --> 00:57:42,360 Speaker 1: visit the iHeart Radio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you 893 00:57:42,400 --> 00:57:43,560 Speaker 1: listen to your favorite shows.