1 00:00:15,370 --> 00:00:24,210 Speaker 1: Pushkin. Japan is one of the safest countries in the world, 2 00:00:24,810 --> 00:00:28,770 Speaker 1: which only made it more shocking. During morning rush hour 3 00:00:28,850 --> 00:00:33,490 Speaker 1: on the twentieth of March nineteen five men stepped onto 4 00:00:33,530 --> 00:00:37,330 Speaker 1: five different trains on the Tokyo Metro. Each of them 5 00:00:37,450 --> 00:00:40,570 Speaker 1: had the same mission to drop a couple of plastic 6 00:00:40,610 --> 00:00:43,930 Speaker 1: bags wrapped in newspaper on the floor, to puncture those 7 00:00:43,930 --> 00:00:47,890 Speaker 1: bags with a specially sharpened umbrella, and then to get 8 00:00:47,930 --> 00:00:52,970 Speaker 1: off the train and make a getaway. Each bag contained 9 00:00:53,010 --> 00:00:57,050 Speaker 1: almost a pint of liquid surin, a chemical developed by 10 00:00:57,130 --> 00:01:00,850 Speaker 1: Nazi scientists in the nineteen forties. Suren vapor can be 11 00:01:00,890 --> 00:01:05,130 Speaker 1: breathed in or absorbed to the skin. Even in small doses. 12 00:01:05,370 --> 00:01:08,650 Speaker 1: It blocks the body's ability to control its muscles. A 13 00:01:08,770 --> 00:01:13,610 Speaker 1: simple of suren exposure and nausea and drooling, followed by vomiting, 14 00:01:14,050 --> 00:01:17,770 Speaker 1: twitching and self soiling as the bladder and bowels opened, 15 00:01:18,290 --> 00:01:23,730 Speaker 1: followed by death from asphyxiation. Those who survive can suffer 16 00:01:23,890 --> 00:01:28,170 Speaker 1: permanent nerve damage. It's not a chemical you want to 17 00:01:28,210 --> 00:01:32,330 Speaker 1: have drifting through a busy subway carriage, but since saren 18 00:01:32,450 --> 00:01:37,810 Speaker 1: evaporates very quickly, that's what happened. The result was carnage. 19 00:01:38,450 --> 00:01:42,650 Speaker 1: Twelve people died almost immediately and thousands were injured, with 20 00:01:42,810 --> 00:01:46,970 Speaker 1: two later dying of those injuries. The attack was the 21 00:01:47,010 --> 00:01:50,970 Speaker 1: work of a cult named Home Shinrikyo, which had just 22 00:01:51,130 --> 00:01:55,250 Speaker 1: a few thousand members. A small number of unhinged extremists 23 00:01:55,290 --> 00:02:00,370 Speaker 1: had caused dreadful harm. Still, it could have been worse. 24 00:02:01,490 --> 00:02:09,090 Speaker 1: The Tokyo Metro attack killed fourteen people, COVID killed many millions, imagine, 25 00:02:09,090 --> 00:02:13,370 Speaker 1: and the Ohm Shinrikyo cult had released not nerve gas, 26 00:02:13,410 --> 00:02:17,730 Speaker 1: but a killer coronavirus that might infect the entire world. 27 00:02:19,370 --> 00:02:47,610 Speaker 1: I'm Tim Harford, and you're listening to Cautionary Tales. This 28 00:02:47,690 --> 00:02:51,410 Speaker 1: is another of our occasional cautionary conversations in which we 29 00:02:51,450 --> 00:02:54,170 Speaker 1: explore a mistake at anything with a mishap to a 30 00:02:54,250 --> 00:02:57,690 Speaker 1: catastrophe and try to learn the lessons with the help 31 00:02:57,730 --> 00:03:02,130 Speaker 1: of an expert guest. This time I'm joined by Michael Spector. 32 00:03:02,770 --> 00:03:06,050 Speaker 1: Michael is an award winning staff writer at The New Yorker, 33 00:03:06,410 --> 00:03:09,690 Speaker 1: where his subjects have ranged widely, everything for p Diddy 34 00:03:09,810 --> 00:03:14,450 Speaker 1: to Doctor Oz, but often focusing on science and public health. 35 00:03:15,130 --> 00:03:20,090 Speaker 1: And his new audiobook is Higher Animals, Vaccines, Synthetic Biology, 36 00:03:20,370 --> 00:03:23,770 Speaker 1: and The Future of Life. It's published by Pushkin Industries, 37 00:03:23,770 --> 00:03:29,450 Speaker 1: which full disclosure also produces cautionary tales. Michael, welcome, thank you. 38 00:03:29,530 --> 00:03:32,050 Speaker 1: I'm happy to be here. I'm very happy that you 39 00:03:32,090 --> 00:03:36,050 Speaker 1: are here. And let's circle back to the Saren attack later, 40 00:03:36,250 --> 00:03:39,610 Speaker 1: because I first wanted to discuss something which first sight 41 00:03:39,690 --> 00:03:42,610 Speaker 1: it seems a world away. It's a city council meeting 42 00:03:42,650 --> 00:03:46,810 Speaker 1: in Cambridge, Massachusetts in nineteen seventy six, which really caught 43 00:03:46,850 --> 00:03:49,610 Speaker 1: my attention. In your book, tell us about that. It 44 00:03:49,690 --> 00:03:52,730 Speaker 1: was an unusual city council meeting, probably the most unusual 45 00:03:52,770 --> 00:03:55,130 Speaker 1: of its kind to that point in the history of 46 00:03:55,170 --> 00:03:58,770 Speaker 1: the United States. It was a meeting about whether Harvard 47 00:03:58,890 --> 00:04:03,170 Speaker 1: University would have the right to build a biological laboratory 48 00:04:03,210 --> 00:04:07,010 Speaker 1: to work with recombinant DNA, which had just recently been 49 00:04:07,290 --> 00:04:12,370 Speaker 1: discovered and become in. DNA means you can basically mix 50 00:04:12,650 --> 00:04:15,890 Speaker 1: the genes of two species, and that is something that 51 00:04:16,010 --> 00:04:17,810 Speaker 1: every lab in the world does right now. But at 52 00:04:17,850 --> 00:04:21,810 Speaker 1: the time it sort of invoked every type of fear 53 00:04:22,490 --> 00:04:26,410 Speaker 1: of creating monsters in destroying the world that you could 54 00:04:26,450 --> 00:04:29,130 Speaker 1: possibly imagine. The or that has been written about over 55 00:04:29,170 --> 00:04:33,970 Speaker 1: the last three hundred years and the mayor of Cambridge 56 00:04:34,530 --> 00:04:39,010 Speaker 1: was a very cantankerous and somewhat intelligent man who understood politics. 57 00:04:40,050 --> 00:04:43,290 Speaker 1: His constituency was working class Cambridge, and he was going 58 00:04:43,330 --> 00:04:47,690 Speaker 1: to go after the elites at Harvard for ignoring what 59 00:04:47,730 --> 00:04:51,970 Speaker 1: he thought were the risks. And this city council meeting 60 00:04:52,210 --> 00:04:55,130 Speaker 1: was an epical event in the history of molecular biology 61 00:04:55,210 --> 00:05:00,090 Speaker 1: because it sort of pitted the future against citizens who 62 00:05:00,130 --> 00:05:03,330 Speaker 1: had not really asked questions in the past, and it 63 00:05:03,370 --> 00:05:06,210 Speaker 1: really set the tone for almost every kind of meeting 64 00:05:06,210 --> 00:05:09,730 Speaker 1: that came afterwards. Yes, I may have a Lucci. He 65 00:05:09,810 --> 00:05:12,610 Speaker 1: was very politically savvy, and you had some wonderful tape 66 00:05:12,610 --> 00:05:15,090 Speaker 1: in your audio booklet. I mean, let's listen to a 67 00:05:15,090 --> 00:05:17,850 Speaker 1: small extract of his remarks at this meeting. When I 68 00:05:17,930 --> 00:05:19,650 Speaker 1: was a little boy, I used to fish in the 69 00:05:19,770 --> 00:05:22,450 Speaker 1: Child River, and I woke up one more and I've 70 00:05:22,490 --> 00:05:26,050 Speaker 1: found millions of fair dead in the Child River. And 71 00:05:26,170 --> 00:05:29,690 Speaker 1: you tonight tell me the shot dump chemicals into the 72 00:05:29,730 --> 00:05:35,050 Speaker 1: sewer system of game, and the sewer system all that 73 00:05:35,170 --> 00:05:40,450 Speaker 1: flows into the Child Was he right to be so 74 00:05:40,770 --> 00:05:43,970 Speaker 1: worried the image of millions of dead fish? Were those 75 00:05:43,970 --> 00:05:47,210 Speaker 1: concerns overblown at the time? Yes, They were overblown at 76 00:05:47,210 --> 00:05:51,130 Speaker 1: the time, but they weren't completely ridiculous. And what's really 77 00:05:51,210 --> 00:05:53,970 Speaker 1: interesting if you go back and listen to that conversation 78 00:05:54,010 --> 00:05:58,850 Speaker 1: in those debates, it's not overblown now. Those questions were 79 00:05:58,970 --> 00:06:03,370 Speaker 1: crazy at the time. He was asking whether entirely new 80 00:06:03,490 --> 00:06:06,130 Speaker 1: species could be created in that lab, and that was 81 00:06:06,410 --> 00:06:10,290 Speaker 1: something that could never have happened. It's not crazy question now. 82 00:06:10,890 --> 00:06:17,290 Speaker 1: So those inflammatory debates were kind of necessary. And I 83 00:06:17,290 --> 00:06:20,370 Speaker 1: think it's worth pointing out that Cambridge, Massachusetts is now 84 00:06:20,850 --> 00:06:26,730 Speaker 1: the absolute center of biotechnological innovation in the world. There 85 00:06:26,770 --> 00:06:30,010 Speaker 1: are dozens, if not hundreds of labs there that use 86 00:06:30,090 --> 00:06:33,810 Speaker 1: that kind of recombinant DNA technology with the blessing of 87 00:06:33,850 --> 00:06:36,650 Speaker 1: the city council and with the participation of members of 88 00:06:36,650 --> 00:06:40,210 Speaker 1: the city council, so we've come a long way. As 89 00:06:40,210 --> 00:06:43,570 Speaker 1: we said, was nineteen seventy six. What was the kind 90 00:06:43,610 --> 00:06:46,050 Speaker 1: of background, Why did the stakes seem so high and 91 00:06:46,170 --> 00:06:49,730 Speaker 1: why was people so worried? Because a guy named Paul Berg, 92 00:06:49,810 --> 00:06:53,770 Speaker 1: who was a professor at Stanford, had recently figured out 93 00:06:53,770 --> 00:06:57,610 Speaker 1: a way to take a virus called SV eleven, which 94 00:06:57,690 --> 00:07:01,490 Speaker 1: caused cancer and hamsters, and inserted into a very common 95 00:07:01,490 --> 00:07:07,850 Speaker 1: Bacterium e coli, and that was the first time that 96 00:07:08,130 --> 00:07:12,210 Speaker 1: humans had ever been able to mix species of any kind. 97 00:07:13,050 --> 00:07:16,330 Speaker 1: And while it showed a great deal of promise, it 98 00:07:16,410 --> 00:07:20,170 Speaker 1: was a very scary step because it also meant maybe 99 00:07:20,290 --> 00:07:23,610 Speaker 1: some things would be created that we couldn't control. So 100 00:07:23,690 --> 00:07:27,090 Speaker 1: that was the background. I mean, immediately, when you say that, 101 00:07:27,170 --> 00:07:31,170 Speaker 1: I think if I undercook my sausage, I could catch 102 00:07:31,170 --> 00:07:34,210 Speaker 1: cancer for me. No, that's what it sounds like. Well 103 00:07:34,250 --> 00:07:36,330 Speaker 1: I know it sounds like that, but first of all, 104 00:07:36,730 --> 00:07:38,930 Speaker 1: this is something that happened in a lab in the 105 00:07:39,010 --> 00:07:43,730 Speaker 1: cancer virus is not one that's common or that infects humans. 106 00:07:44,210 --> 00:07:48,690 Speaker 1: It's just that we didn't know at the time whether 107 00:07:48,890 --> 00:07:51,370 Speaker 1: or not it was going to be possible for that 108 00:07:51,410 --> 00:07:54,570 Speaker 1: to mutate into something that somebody could sneeze and catch. 109 00:07:54,610 --> 00:07:56,690 Speaker 1: I mean, we had no idea. It had never been 110 00:07:56,690 --> 00:08:02,410 Speaker 1: done before. And even Paul Berg was quite upfront about saying, 111 00:08:02,450 --> 00:08:06,130 Speaker 1: there are tremendous dangers to this. He could see the promise, 112 00:08:06,210 --> 00:08:09,490 Speaker 1: all biologists and many other people could, but the dangers 113 00:08:09,490 --> 00:08:15,210 Speaker 1: were evident too, and they were evident and also unknown. 114 00:08:15,730 --> 00:08:18,210 Speaker 1: We didn't know what might happen. Yeah, we've got a 115 00:08:18,250 --> 00:08:20,450 Speaker 1: little bit more tape from the council meeting. If you 116 00:08:20,530 --> 00:08:22,490 Speaker 1: listen to some of the questions that have come in, 117 00:08:22,610 --> 00:08:25,730 Speaker 1: you can really get a sense that the fears are palpable. 118 00:08:26,090 --> 00:08:28,570 Speaker 1: For the benefit of all of members of the City Council, 119 00:08:28,650 --> 00:08:32,810 Speaker 1: I would like to inject his statement of questions not 120 00:08:32,890 --> 00:08:36,050 Speaker 1: to be answered at this time, but for the benefit 121 00:08:36,090 --> 00:08:38,410 Speaker 1: of members of this City Council who may want to 122 00:08:38,450 --> 00:08:43,810 Speaker 1: ask these questions. We're recombinant, DNA experienced, be safer if 123 00:08:43,850 --> 00:08:48,810 Speaker 1: they were done in a maximum security lab. Question is 124 00:08:48,810 --> 00:08:51,610 Speaker 1: a truth that in the history of science, mistakes have 125 00:08:51,690 --> 00:08:57,050 Speaker 1: been made, nor to happen. Question to scientists ever exercise 126 00:08:57,530 --> 00:09:04,250 Speaker 1: or judgment? Question do they ever have accidents? Question? Classic politician, 127 00:09:04,330 --> 00:09:08,650 Speaker 1: isn't he? He's a classic politician? And they were inflammatory questions, 128 00:09:08,770 --> 00:09:12,890 Speaker 1: but you can't deny that they even now have some 129 00:09:12,930 --> 00:09:16,490 Speaker 1: application in real life. And I mean there were other 130 00:09:16,530 --> 00:09:19,170 Speaker 1: things going on at the time, So I think Ford 131 00:09:19,530 --> 00:09:23,130 Speaker 1: Motor Company had had put out this car the pinto, 132 00:09:23,410 --> 00:09:26,210 Speaker 1: which they knew was unsafe, and they had just decided 133 00:09:26,610 --> 00:09:30,170 Speaker 1: it was cheaper to deal with the legal claims from 134 00:09:30,210 --> 00:09:33,170 Speaker 1: these exploding fuel tanks than it was to redesign or 135 00:09:33,210 --> 00:09:35,730 Speaker 1: withdraw the car. And this had come out, and so 136 00:09:36,170 --> 00:09:40,650 Speaker 1: there was this real palpable sense of mistrust of corporations 137 00:09:41,050 --> 00:09:44,450 Speaker 1: and overshadowing all of this for the previous thirty years 138 00:09:44,450 --> 00:09:47,730 Speaker 1: had been the atomic bomb and the sense that scientists 139 00:09:47,850 --> 00:09:52,490 Speaker 1: could potentially create something uncontrollable. There's a moment in that 140 00:09:52,490 --> 00:09:57,130 Speaker 1: book where David Baltimore, who's a Nobel Prize winning biologists, 141 00:09:57,130 --> 00:10:00,730 Speaker 1: said the reason people were so afraid was it wasn't 142 00:10:00,770 --> 00:10:04,010 Speaker 1: so far from World War Two and they were worried 143 00:10:04,050 --> 00:10:07,970 Speaker 1: whether there was an atomic bomb in biology. And at 144 00:10:07,970 --> 00:10:12,890 Speaker 1: the time that seemed a crazy fear. Again it's not now, 145 00:10:13,530 --> 00:10:18,290 Speaker 1: but these things seemed palpable at a time when we 146 00:10:18,290 --> 00:10:21,250 Speaker 1: were learning so much about how corporations allied to us. 147 00:10:21,890 --> 00:10:24,050 Speaker 1: That was the year. It was two years after Richard 148 00:10:24,130 --> 00:10:27,370 Speaker 1: Nixon had resigned, the first president ever to resign in 149 00:10:27,410 --> 00:10:31,050 Speaker 1: the United States in disgrace. There's been a lot going 150 00:10:31,130 --> 00:10:35,570 Speaker 1: on previously. A few years previously, one of the Great 151 00:10:35,690 --> 00:10:39,730 Speaker 1: Lakes caught fire because of all the pollution that had 152 00:10:39,730 --> 00:10:42,530 Speaker 1: been admitted into it. So there was a sense that 153 00:10:42,730 --> 00:10:45,290 Speaker 1: you couldn't really trust the institutions you used to believe 154 00:10:45,330 --> 00:10:48,570 Speaker 1: in anymore. And when scientists started to come along and 155 00:10:48,610 --> 00:10:51,330 Speaker 1: say hey, we've created a new form of life that 156 00:10:51,410 --> 00:10:54,170 Speaker 1: could do all sorts of cool things. It didn't go 157 00:10:54,210 --> 00:10:58,330 Speaker 1: down so well, yeah, Well, as Mavolucci's questions, do scientists 158 00:10:58,370 --> 00:11:01,290 Speaker 1: have exercised poor judgments? Do they ever have accidents? I 159 00:11:01,330 --> 00:11:05,210 Speaker 1: mean yeah, yeah, and Tween Mile Island came along shortly afterwards, 160 00:11:05,290 --> 00:11:08,410 Speaker 1: so yeah, there are accidents. So puts us in a 161 00:11:08,450 --> 00:11:12,250 Speaker 1: strange position then, because we're saying, well, from the point 162 00:11:12,290 --> 00:11:15,610 Speaker 1: of view of nineteen seventy six, people were highly strong. 163 00:11:15,890 --> 00:11:19,250 Speaker 1: You understand why they were mistrustful. But actually the pears 164 00:11:19,250 --> 00:11:23,170 Speaker 1: were overblown. There was nothing really to worry about. But now, 165 00:11:23,290 --> 00:11:26,210 Speaker 1: I mean, as I alluded to in the introduction, if 166 00:11:26,250 --> 00:11:30,130 Speaker 1: you manufactured a virus, you could kill tens of millions 167 00:11:30,170 --> 00:11:32,010 Speaker 1: of people. You could kill more people than you could 168 00:11:32,090 --> 00:11:34,170 Speaker 1: kill at least with a single hydrogen bomb, even the 169 00:11:34,210 --> 00:11:36,330 Speaker 1: largest hydrogen bomb. So it turns out there walls an 170 00:11:36,370 --> 00:11:40,610 Speaker 1: atomic bomb in biology. Oh, absolutely more than an atomic bomb. 171 00:11:40,610 --> 00:11:43,450 Speaker 1: Because there's one thing about biology that there isn't even 172 00:11:43,530 --> 00:11:49,130 Speaker 1: with nuclear weapons. It's exponential. It's digital. Biology has become 173 00:11:49,250 --> 00:11:53,730 Speaker 1: a sort of part of information technology. We developed a 174 00:11:53,810 --> 00:11:57,610 Speaker 1: COVID vaccine really rapidly, because scientists were able to download 175 00:11:57,650 --> 00:12:02,330 Speaker 1: it from the internet make DNA in certain into cells. 176 00:12:03,370 --> 00:12:06,810 Speaker 1: That's great, that's wonderful, but it also means, you know, 177 00:12:07,090 --> 00:12:09,490 Speaker 1: there used to be very few people who do this 178 00:12:09,530 --> 00:12:12,770 Speaker 1: sort of thing. There are thousands now. And if they 179 00:12:12,770 --> 00:12:15,450 Speaker 1: wanted to do it badly, if they wanted to harm people, 180 00:12:15,490 --> 00:12:17,410 Speaker 1: if they wanted to make a virus, it is in 181 00:12:17,530 --> 00:12:21,490 Speaker 1: no way inconceivable that they could. At this meeting, the 182 00:12:21,570 --> 00:12:26,890 Speaker 1: Council imposes a two year moratorium on experiments with recombinant DNA. 183 00:12:26,970 --> 00:12:29,970 Speaker 1: And looking at this, it felt like quite an old story. 184 00:12:30,410 --> 00:12:33,250 Speaker 1: There was a previous episode of Cautionary Tales called How 185 00:12:33,330 --> 00:12:38,130 Speaker 1: to End a Pandemic where we were discussing early smallpox inoculations. 186 00:12:38,650 --> 00:12:41,810 Speaker 1: Funny enough, also in Massachusetts, in the Boston area, and 187 00:12:41,970 --> 00:12:45,730 Speaker 1: in seventeen twenty one, as Sabdel Boylstone the doctor, he 188 00:12:45,770 --> 00:12:50,010 Speaker 1: was going around innoculating Bostonians against smallpox. He'd got this 189 00:12:50,090 --> 00:12:55,170 Speaker 1: idea from Africa and enslaveman called Onnissimus, and he faced 190 00:12:55,250 --> 00:12:58,170 Speaker 1: huge resistance, partly that seemed to be racism, like this 191 00:12:58,210 --> 00:13:01,610 Speaker 1: idea has come from Africa, it's come from enslave people. 192 00:13:01,650 --> 00:13:05,970 Speaker 1: It's it's not a white idea, it's not a domestic idea. 193 00:13:06,090 --> 00:13:10,290 Speaker 1: But also, I mean, you can die from being auld inoculated. 194 00:13:10,330 --> 00:13:13,650 Speaker 1: People do have a dose of smallpox, they can infect 195 00:13:13,690 --> 00:13:16,850 Speaker 1: other people. And in the end the resistance went as 196 00:13:16,850 --> 00:13:20,810 Speaker 1: far as people throwing hand grenades to Boilster's window where 197 00:13:20,850 --> 00:13:22,850 Speaker 1: his wife and his children were sitting. And in the 198 00:13:22,930 --> 00:13:26,250 Speaker 1: end he started visiting people at midnight and in disguise 199 00:13:26,410 --> 00:13:30,690 Speaker 1: because there was just yeah, he was physically under threat 200 00:13:31,010 --> 00:13:33,650 Speaker 1: for what he was doing. Yeah, I address some of 201 00:13:33,690 --> 00:13:36,250 Speaker 1: that in the first chapter of this book, but I think, 202 00:13:37,570 --> 00:13:40,010 Speaker 1: especially at that time, you have to remember that a 203 00:13:40,090 --> 00:13:45,170 Speaker 1: small pox inoculation was to some degree dangerous in a 204 00:13:45,210 --> 00:13:47,370 Speaker 1: way that it isn't or wouldn't be today if we 205 00:13:47,450 --> 00:13:50,450 Speaker 1: got them again. People don't look at the risks and 206 00:13:50,770 --> 00:13:54,930 Speaker 1: rewards of these things. They just get excited about the rewards, 207 00:13:54,930 --> 00:13:57,730 Speaker 1: are upset about the risks, And the fact is the 208 00:13:57,930 --> 00:14:01,410 Speaker 1: risks of getting small parks and dying of small parks 209 00:14:01,490 --> 00:14:05,130 Speaker 1: were much greater than the risks of being harmed by 210 00:14:05,130 --> 00:14:08,650 Speaker 1: the vaccine. But you know, every number has a numerator 211 00:14:08,730 --> 00:14:11,570 Speaker 1: and a nominator, and we only usually look at one 212 00:14:11,770 --> 00:14:15,050 Speaker 1: or the other, and so yeah, it's true that those 213 00:14:15,090 --> 00:14:19,770 Speaker 1: things can cause harm. You can't ever say something's going 214 00:14:19,810 --> 00:14:23,210 Speaker 1: to be one hundred percent in biology, Yeah, but you 215 00:14:23,250 --> 00:14:26,210 Speaker 1: have to figure out is it better than the alternative, 216 00:14:26,370 --> 00:14:33,370 Speaker 1: and often it's pretty clear the answer. Cautionary tales will 217 00:14:33,410 --> 00:14:50,570 Speaker 1: be back after the break, Michael. Let's try and look 218 00:14:50,610 --> 00:14:53,130 Speaker 1: at the rewards as well as the risks. I mean, 219 00:14:53,210 --> 00:14:56,210 Speaker 1: I've framed our whole discussion in terms of risks, partly 220 00:14:56,210 --> 00:14:59,290 Speaker 1: because you talk about them very eloquently in higher animals, 221 00:14:59,370 --> 00:15:02,210 Speaker 1: partly because this is cautionary tales. Wouldn't be cautionary tales 222 00:15:02,210 --> 00:15:05,690 Speaker 1: if we weren't talking about something going wrong. But let's 223 00:15:05,690 --> 00:15:07,890 Speaker 1: talk about the upside. So where are we now with 224 00:15:08,050 --> 00:15:11,890 Speaker 1: synthetic biology. What can we do and what should we 225 00:15:11,930 --> 00:15:14,690 Speaker 1: be thankful for? Well, I mean, first of all, the 226 00:15:14,730 --> 00:15:17,610 Speaker 1: first thing we should remember is we just made a 227 00:15:17,690 --> 00:15:23,090 Speaker 1: vaccine that has been administered billions of times, and that's 228 00:15:23,090 --> 00:15:27,850 Speaker 1: a synthetic biological product that saved millions of lives. But 229 00:15:28,010 --> 00:15:31,770 Speaker 1: beyond that, there are people growing things that they used 230 00:15:31,770 --> 00:15:35,770 Speaker 1: to make in plants with chemicals. They're growing all sorts 231 00:15:35,810 --> 00:15:39,450 Speaker 1: of medicines. There's going to be an opportunity to try 232 00:15:39,490 --> 00:15:45,810 Speaker 1: and make vaccines. For other illnesses, not COVID but HIV influenza. 233 00:15:45,890 --> 00:15:49,690 Speaker 1: We have terrible influenza vaccines that we administer every year. 234 00:15:50,130 --> 00:15:54,650 Speaker 1: Now people are seriously attempting to develop a single shot 235 00:15:54,690 --> 00:15:57,810 Speaker 1: that would be universal, and that would I mean, influenza 236 00:15:57,930 --> 00:16:01,050 Speaker 1: is a really serious disease and people always say, oh 237 00:16:01,050 --> 00:16:03,730 Speaker 1: I got the flu, Usually they didn't, they had a cold. 238 00:16:04,250 --> 00:16:07,210 Speaker 1: That would be something. But beyond that, people are using 239 00:16:07,410 --> 00:16:14,410 Speaker 1: synthetic biology to replace plastics, to engineer dyes, to make 240 00:16:14,770 --> 00:16:18,530 Speaker 1: types of energy that would not be you know, carbon 241 00:16:19,330 --> 00:16:25,010 Speaker 1: based and not cause terrible pollution. It has unlimited potential 242 00:16:25,130 --> 00:16:28,570 Speaker 1: because it's the potential of biology. And if we can 243 00:16:28,650 --> 00:16:33,050 Speaker 1: rewrite the rules of biology, Yeah, there are risks, but 244 00:16:33,090 --> 00:16:36,570 Speaker 1: we can also do some tremendous things, and we're starting 245 00:16:36,610 --> 00:16:39,730 Speaker 1: to see that. It's early days, yeah, and that's very 246 00:16:39,770 --> 00:16:43,090 Speaker 1: clear in the later chapters of Higher Animals. So it 247 00:16:43,170 --> 00:16:48,330 Speaker 1: is enormously exciting. However, as Caution Retales, let's talk about 248 00:16:48,370 --> 00:16:53,290 Speaker 1: this risk, which you cover in some detail in the book. Fundamentally, 249 00:16:53,610 --> 00:16:59,450 Speaker 1: smallpox was eradicated by better and better vaccinations, and that's 250 00:17:00,130 --> 00:17:03,370 Speaker 1: that subject we've discussed in Caution Tales as well. Just 251 00:17:03,450 --> 00:17:06,850 Speaker 1: a few samples of smallpox in a couple of very 252 00:17:06,930 --> 00:17:10,530 Speaker 1: high security laboratories in case we need to study it. 253 00:17:11,130 --> 00:17:16,770 Speaker 1: And as you explain, in higher animals, sure there were 254 00:17:16,810 --> 00:17:19,690 Speaker 1: just a few samples of smallpox remaining in highly secure labs. 255 00:17:19,730 --> 00:17:24,170 Speaker 1: But you can make smallpox, and people people have made 256 00:17:24,210 --> 00:17:27,090 Speaker 1: small pox. In fact, I think they haven't. They made 257 00:17:27,170 --> 00:17:31,730 Speaker 1: horse horse parks, they made a very similar parks. Yeah, 258 00:17:31,770 --> 00:17:33,930 Speaker 1: they demonstrated that they could have made small pox if 259 00:17:33,930 --> 00:17:37,330 Speaker 1: they wanted to, and that potential exists because it's the 260 00:17:37,370 --> 00:17:41,250 Speaker 1: formula for the formula. Maybe that's the wrong word, the 261 00:17:41,330 --> 00:17:44,170 Speaker 1: recipe for smallpox. It's it's no right, it's it's not 262 00:17:44,210 --> 00:17:46,810 Speaker 1: a secret. Yeah, I mean one of the problems that 263 00:17:46,850 --> 00:17:50,730 Speaker 1: we have to address is not only is the genetic sequence, 264 00:17:50,890 --> 00:17:54,610 Speaker 1: the sort of code, the letters of small pox all known, 265 00:17:55,050 --> 00:17:57,770 Speaker 1: they're all printed, and so, by the way, are the 266 00:17:57,930 --> 00:18:03,770 Speaker 1: recipes to make every virus you could possibly name, influenza, 267 00:18:03,850 --> 00:18:08,370 Speaker 1: every type of deadly influenza, COVID, SARS, you name it. 268 00:18:08,370 --> 00:18:12,090 Speaker 1: It's on the end that seems bad. Well, I mean 269 00:18:12,170 --> 00:18:14,570 Speaker 1: it used to be. It has always been in academics 270 00:18:14,570 --> 00:18:18,450 Speaker 1: and particularly that the incentive is to keep your information 271 00:18:18,450 --> 00:18:21,370 Speaker 1: close and then publish it. So that everyone knows you 272 00:18:21,450 --> 00:18:24,690 Speaker 1: have it, and the idea was publishing a sequence would 273 00:18:24,770 --> 00:18:28,010 Speaker 1: let other scientists do research with it and check your work. 274 00:18:28,770 --> 00:18:32,530 Speaker 1: The problem is we don't have the kind of regulations 275 00:18:32,610 --> 00:18:35,530 Speaker 1: we need to have. You know, at least with nuclear weapons, 276 00:18:36,690 --> 00:18:40,170 Speaker 1: there are regulations, there are treaties, they could be violated, 277 00:18:40,450 --> 00:18:45,850 Speaker 1: they certainly are violated. But biology is different because we 278 00:18:45,930 --> 00:18:50,610 Speaker 1: actually encourage the thing that we should be preventing, and 279 00:18:50,890 --> 00:18:54,650 Speaker 1: it's something that you can do for I don't know, 280 00:18:54,810 --> 00:18:58,250 Speaker 1: ten twenty thousand dollars in a couple smart graduate students. 281 00:18:58,530 --> 00:19:01,610 Speaker 1: You don't need a nation state to develop a virus. 282 00:19:01,890 --> 00:19:05,970 Speaker 1: So let's talk about scientists who have pushed back against 283 00:19:06,010 --> 00:19:09,570 Speaker 1: publication and those who who've gone a long way. So fas, 284 00:19:09,610 --> 00:19:11,970 Speaker 1: let's talk about the horsepox guy. So what was the 285 00:19:12,130 --> 00:19:14,930 Speaker 1: what was the reaction of the scientific community to someone 286 00:19:15,010 --> 00:19:17,290 Speaker 1: just saying, hey, I can make this virus, I have 287 00:19:17,370 --> 00:19:20,090 Speaker 1: made this virus, I've kind of proof of concept that 288 00:19:20,130 --> 00:19:22,370 Speaker 1: I could have made smallpox. Who did that and how 289 00:19:22,370 --> 00:19:24,850 Speaker 1: do people respond to that scientist? It was a guy 290 00:19:24,930 --> 00:19:29,570 Speaker 1: named David Evans and his team in Canada. There's serious virologists, 291 00:19:29,650 --> 00:19:33,770 Speaker 1: and their position was, we want you to understand that 292 00:19:33,850 --> 00:19:37,290 Speaker 1: this can be done, and there was also some sense 293 00:19:37,450 --> 00:19:41,690 Speaker 1: that it would help make a better smallpox vaccine, though 294 00:19:41,770 --> 00:19:46,090 Speaker 1: most scientists I've talked to think that's absolutely not the case. 295 00:19:46,970 --> 00:19:51,170 Speaker 1: It was pretty universally condemned because what it basically showed 296 00:19:51,290 --> 00:19:53,490 Speaker 1: is that you can go make I mean, there's no 297 00:19:53,530 --> 00:19:55,610 Speaker 1: reason to have horsepox out there. I mean, we don't 298 00:19:55,650 --> 00:19:58,170 Speaker 1: need a virus. We don't need a vaccine. It was 299 00:19:58,250 --> 00:20:00,850 Speaker 1: extinct in the world. People weren't getting up in the 300 00:20:00,850 --> 00:20:03,890 Speaker 1: morning and saying, I hope I don't get horsepox, And 301 00:20:03,970 --> 00:20:07,050 Speaker 1: there was no need to bring a deadly virus that's 302 00:20:07,410 --> 00:20:11,490 Speaker 1: closely related to small back to life. It is just 303 00:20:11,810 --> 00:20:18,970 Speaker 1: highly irresponsible. Yeah, but so people criticized him, But I mean, 304 00:20:19,170 --> 00:20:20,970 Speaker 1: he didn't he didn't lose his job, he didn't go 305 00:20:20,970 --> 00:20:24,410 Speaker 1: to prison. He didn't he didn't violate any any laws. 306 00:20:24,450 --> 00:20:27,290 Speaker 1: There's no law I could if I and I'm not 307 00:20:27,490 --> 00:20:30,090 Speaker 1: the smart but if I was, I could buy the 308 00:20:30,330 --> 00:20:34,530 Speaker 1: DNA online. It's not that expensive. I could get sequencing machines. 309 00:20:34,810 --> 00:20:36,890 Speaker 1: I could get all the stuff I need. I could 310 00:20:36,970 --> 00:20:40,450 Speaker 1: make whatever virus you tell me to make. It's not 311 00:20:40,690 --> 00:20:45,010 Speaker 1: against the law, it's not against the rules, and that 312 00:20:45,130 --> 00:20:48,010 Speaker 1: has to change. Yeah, So, how many people do you 313 00:20:48,050 --> 00:20:53,410 Speaker 1: think exist in the world who could make a dangerous virus? 314 00:20:53,410 --> 00:20:56,890 Speaker 1: I mean, are we talking millions? Are we talking hundreds, 315 00:20:57,010 --> 00:20:59,090 Speaker 1: five or six? I mean, I don't really have a 316 00:20:59,090 --> 00:21:02,250 Speaker 1: sense of the number of people who who do have 317 00:21:02,290 --> 00:21:05,450 Speaker 1: access to the technology and the skill. It's a growing number. 318 00:21:05,570 --> 00:21:09,450 Speaker 1: Kevin as Felt, who teaches at MIT and who I 319 00:21:09,610 --> 00:21:13,290 Speaker 1: teach a course with, I should say he does a 320 00:21:13,290 --> 00:21:17,290 Speaker 1: lot of this kind of research. He believes there's five 321 00:21:17,370 --> 00:21:19,690 Speaker 1: or ten thousand people who could do this now, but 322 00:21:19,850 --> 00:21:21,890 Speaker 1: in a few years. You know, we're sort of in 323 00:21:21,930 --> 00:21:25,730 Speaker 1: the era of biology. It used to be like if 324 00:21:25,730 --> 00:21:28,250 Speaker 1: you look at early days and computers, there was a 325 00:21:28,290 --> 00:21:31,250 Speaker 1: mainframe computer that would take up a whole building, and 326 00:21:31,490 --> 00:21:34,850 Speaker 1: now the computers in our watches are more powerful than 327 00:21:34,890 --> 00:21:39,290 Speaker 1: that mainframe. That's what's happening with biology. So as that happens, 328 00:21:39,650 --> 00:21:43,210 Speaker 1: people are getting access to more powerful programs to make 329 00:21:43,450 --> 00:21:46,650 Speaker 1: things like viruses, it's going to be great. You know, 330 00:21:46,730 --> 00:21:48,730 Speaker 1: it's going to be graduate students, then it's going to 331 00:21:48,810 --> 00:21:51,730 Speaker 1: be undergraduates, and then your eighth grade is going to 332 00:21:51,850 --> 00:21:54,570 Speaker 1: come home and say, Mommy, look what I made. And 333 00:21:54,930 --> 00:21:56,690 Speaker 1: they can make a lot of cool things, and I 334 00:21:56,690 --> 00:21:59,850 Speaker 1: think it's great, but there has to be some guardrails. 335 00:22:00,410 --> 00:22:03,050 Speaker 1: You also in the book discuss kind of the polo 336 00:22:03,050 --> 00:22:09,010 Speaker 1: opposite of Evans making horsebox. There were scientists who discus 337 00:22:09,170 --> 00:22:12,170 Speaker 1: was something very dangerous and said, we're going to give 338 00:22:12,170 --> 00:22:14,050 Speaker 1: you the broad outlines, but we're not actually going to 339 00:22:14,130 --> 00:22:16,370 Speaker 1: tell you what we did or how we did it. 340 00:22:16,490 --> 00:22:18,330 Speaker 1: And so tell us about that, and tell us about 341 00:22:18,330 --> 00:22:20,850 Speaker 1: what we actually they received. There's a guy named Robert 342 00:22:20,890 --> 00:22:24,890 Speaker 1: Arnon in California. He was a bacheline expert. He actually 343 00:22:24,930 --> 00:22:29,610 Speaker 1: died last year. But there were seven known baculism toxins 344 00:22:29,730 --> 00:22:32,410 Speaker 1: and they're deadly, but we also have antidotes for all 345 00:22:32,450 --> 00:22:35,730 Speaker 1: of them. He found an eighth, so this is an 346 00:22:35,810 --> 00:22:40,410 Speaker 1: incredibly poisonous substance for which there was no antidote. Deadly 347 00:22:40,810 --> 00:22:43,810 Speaker 1: and there was no antidote at the time. And he said, 348 00:22:44,770 --> 00:22:47,010 Speaker 1: I found this stuff. I'll tell you about it, but 349 00:22:47,090 --> 00:22:49,690 Speaker 1: I'm not going to do what we would always do, 350 00:22:49,730 --> 00:22:53,490 Speaker 1: which has published the information so that my competitors and 351 00:22:53,530 --> 00:22:56,010 Speaker 1: colleagues can go out and repeat it and make sure 352 00:22:56,130 --> 00:22:59,810 Speaker 1: it really is deadly. He said, it's just it's too 353 00:22:59,890 --> 00:23:03,930 Speaker 1: dangerous to do that, and he was roundly denounced for 354 00:23:04,010 --> 00:23:06,170 Speaker 1: doing that. People said they didn't trust him, they didn't 355 00:23:06,170 --> 00:23:08,890 Speaker 1: believe him. He was a very senior scientist and well respected, 356 00:23:09,290 --> 00:23:12,490 Speaker 1: but he wasn't playing by the rules that were established, 357 00:23:12,850 --> 00:23:14,930 Speaker 1: and so he tried to do the right thing. And 358 00:23:14,970 --> 00:23:16,850 Speaker 1: in fact, he stuck to his guns and did the 359 00:23:16,930 --> 00:23:21,010 Speaker 1: right thing, and he was condemned for it. It's interesting, 360 00:23:21,370 --> 00:23:22,690 Speaker 1: I'm trying to get my head around this. So the 361 00:23:22,730 --> 00:23:26,450 Speaker 1: horsebox guy was condemned for going too far right, the 362 00:23:26,570 --> 00:23:31,410 Speaker 1: eighth botulism toxin guy was condemned for not publishing what 363 00:23:31,530 --> 00:23:34,090 Speaker 1: he found. So the scientists seem they need to make 364 00:23:34,170 --> 00:23:36,690 Speaker 1: up their mind. What am I misunderstanding about this situation. 365 00:23:36,970 --> 00:23:39,410 Speaker 1: You're not misunderstanding anything. I think in the case of 366 00:23:39,450 --> 00:23:43,050 Speaker 1: the horsebox guy, what he did was within the legitimate 367 00:23:43,170 --> 00:23:47,250 Speaker 1: rules of biology. That was how things worked. It's just 368 00:23:47,370 --> 00:23:51,090 Speaker 1: that people understood it shouldn't work that way. Arnon did 369 00:23:51,130 --> 00:23:53,450 Speaker 1: something different. He said, I'm not going to do this 370 00:23:53,570 --> 00:23:57,210 Speaker 1: normal published stuff because it's wrong and it would be 371 00:23:57,290 --> 00:24:00,690 Speaker 1: dangerous at least until we have a universal antidote the 372 00:24:00,690 --> 00:24:04,970 Speaker 1: way we do to other toxins. And he was denounced 373 00:24:05,010 --> 00:24:08,690 Speaker 1: and condemned for not adhering to the normal rules of 374 00:24:08,730 --> 00:24:12,050 Speaker 1: biolog So what this says to me is we need 375 00:24:12,130 --> 00:24:16,210 Speaker 1: to change the normal rules of biology. Yeah, so let's 376 00:24:16,250 --> 00:24:19,770 Speaker 1: talk about that. I'm thinking again about the souring gas attack, 377 00:24:20,890 --> 00:24:23,250 Speaker 1: which is a reminder that there are groups out there 378 00:24:23,250 --> 00:24:27,970 Speaker 1: who would be very happy to unleash apocalyptic harm if 379 00:24:27,970 --> 00:24:31,890 Speaker 1: they could. We can all think of various extremist groups, 380 00:24:32,010 --> 00:24:34,650 Speaker 1: terrorist groups, whatever you want to call them, who would 381 00:24:34,650 --> 00:24:38,170 Speaker 1: be willing to do that, and perhaps also some state 382 00:24:38,210 --> 00:24:42,330 Speaker 1: actors who would be happy to support that kind of thing. 383 00:24:42,850 --> 00:24:46,890 Speaker 1: So there's clearly a risk of biological terrorism. So what 384 00:24:47,730 --> 00:24:49,850 Speaker 1: rules do you have in mind that might help us 385 00:24:50,330 --> 00:24:52,770 Speaker 1: defend against that. Well, there are things we could do. 386 00:24:53,090 --> 00:24:56,410 Speaker 1: One of them is, let's say we tested the waste 387 00:24:56,490 --> 00:25:01,690 Speaker 1: water with DNA sequencers at every airport or porta ventry 388 00:25:01,730 --> 00:25:05,690 Speaker 1: in Europe in the United States. That's about three hundred places. 389 00:25:05,730 --> 00:25:09,890 Speaker 1: You could instantly see viruses and you would be looking 390 00:25:09,970 --> 00:25:15,250 Speaker 1: for are things that were exponentially growing really fast. You'd 391 00:25:15,290 --> 00:25:19,010 Speaker 1: find very rapidly if someone was releasing something, Would it 392 00:25:19,730 --> 00:25:22,890 Speaker 1: save everyone? Maybe not. That's one thing you can do. 393 00:25:22,930 --> 00:25:26,930 Speaker 1: Another thing is personal protective equipment can be immensely better 394 00:25:26,970 --> 00:25:29,250 Speaker 1: than it is. I mean, we saw in the COVID 395 00:25:29,290 --> 00:25:34,130 Speaker 1: pandemic bad equipment, a lack of knowledge about what work 396 00:25:34,170 --> 00:25:37,850 Speaker 1: and what didn't. We can make really good ppe that 397 00:25:37,970 --> 00:25:42,050 Speaker 1: people would use that would protect them. Other things we 398 00:25:42,090 --> 00:25:46,010 Speaker 1: can do is if I want to order some DNA 399 00:25:46,370 --> 00:25:50,330 Speaker 1: from one of the sort of Amazon like places that 400 00:25:50,570 --> 00:25:53,970 Speaker 1: sell it on the internet, we should have some sort 401 00:25:53,970 --> 00:25:56,090 Speaker 1: of body that says, why do you want that sequence? 402 00:25:56,130 --> 00:26:00,730 Speaker 1: Because it's coding an awful lot like one of these viruses. Now, yeah, 403 00:26:00,770 --> 00:26:02,610 Speaker 1: it's sort of like gun control. You can always get 404 00:26:02,610 --> 00:26:04,850 Speaker 1: around it. You will be able to get around it, 405 00:26:05,290 --> 00:26:06,970 Speaker 1: but we ought to make an effort in There are 406 00:26:07,010 --> 00:26:10,210 Speaker 1: ways to make an effort. Another thing to do is 407 00:26:11,530 --> 00:26:14,450 Speaker 1: when you print DNA. You can now print DNA at 408 00:26:14,490 --> 00:26:17,930 Speaker 1: home or in your lab, but you could put bar 409 00:26:18,050 --> 00:26:22,650 Speaker 1: codes into those printers so that there would be some 410 00:26:22,810 --> 00:26:26,010 Speaker 1: form of regulation. It would make it seem like the 411 00:26:26,210 --> 00:26:30,050 Speaker 1: US currency that has water marks. You couldn't counterfeit it, 412 00:26:30,170 --> 00:26:33,250 Speaker 1: you could account for it. Those things can be done, 413 00:26:34,010 --> 00:26:37,690 Speaker 1: and none of them really are. This is blowing my mind. 414 00:26:37,690 --> 00:26:40,290 Speaker 1: I mean, this is actually more than anything else you said, Michael, 415 00:26:40,810 --> 00:26:43,210 Speaker 1: gives me a sense of just how advanced the technology 416 00:26:43,290 --> 00:26:45,250 Speaker 1: now is that Oh yeah, you can print DNA at 417 00:26:45,290 --> 00:26:47,810 Speaker 1: home and you can water market so you know, you 418 00:26:47,810 --> 00:26:51,330 Speaker 1: know whose printer was being used. There's more that I 419 00:26:51,370 --> 00:26:54,530 Speaker 1: can't even yet go into because it's too speculative. But 420 00:26:54,570 --> 00:26:58,010 Speaker 1: there are things you can do to regulate DNA and 421 00:26:58,130 --> 00:27:02,090 Speaker 1: kill viruses that would be really effective. But I also 422 00:27:02,170 --> 00:27:05,650 Speaker 1: have to say, we just went through a pandemic that 423 00:27:05,890 --> 00:27:08,850 Speaker 1: name your figure across the world, seventeen trillion, you know, 424 00:27:09,250 --> 00:27:13,090 Speaker 1: crazy amount of money. And in the United States we 425 00:27:13,570 --> 00:27:17,530 Speaker 1: can't even get a billion dollars in the next budget 426 00:27:18,410 --> 00:27:22,490 Speaker 1: to do some of these preparations, these pandemic preparations, these 427 00:27:22,530 --> 00:27:26,370 Speaker 1: anti viral preparations. It's just remarkable. That is astonishing. So 428 00:27:26,930 --> 00:27:31,650 Speaker 1: let's talk about what scientists should do differently. You talked 429 00:27:31,650 --> 00:27:35,290 Speaker 1: about your concerns that the norms, the rules of science 430 00:27:35,370 --> 00:27:40,530 Speaker 1: were maybe not fit for these new risks. He also 431 00:27:40,730 --> 00:27:42,450 Speaker 1: in the book you say, look, I'm a journalist. As 432 00:27:42,450 --> 00:27:44,050 Speaker 1: a journalist, if I find something out, I'm going to 433 00:27:44,090 --> 00:27:46,010 Speaker 1: publish it. And scientists are the same. So used to 434 00:27:46,050 --> 00:27:49,290 Speaker 1: sympathize with the urge to be transparent and to get 435 00:27:49,290 --> 00:27:52,130 Speaker 1: everything out there to be discussed and debated. But that's 436 00:27:52,170 --> 00:27:55,490 Speaker 1: not right. Do you think I do sympathize, and I 437 00:27:55,530 --> 00:27:57,970 Speaker 1: think it's a fine line. I mean, I don't want 438 00:27:58,330 --> 00:28:00,890 Speaker 1: biologists to be hemmed in and not be able to 439 00:28:00,930 --> 00:28:04,330 Speaker 1: do their work, but there has to be some sort 440 00:28:04,370 --> 00:28:10,810 Speaker 1: of justification, like we now fund and courage scientists to 441 00:28:10,890 --> 00:28:15,370 Speaker 1: go out and find new deadly viruses, take them to 442 00:28:15,530 --> 00:28:18,930 Speaker 1: labs and work on them and see how deadly they 443 00:28:18,930 --> 00:28:21,090 Speaker 1: are and what can be done. You know, there's an 444 00:28:21,210 --> 00:28:25,170 Speaker 1: endless debate about was the Wuhan virus a lab leak 445 00:28:25,290 --> 00:28:29,730 Speaker 1: or not. Most people in the field that I talked 446 00:28:29,730 --> 00:28:32,650 Speaker 1: to the most think it was not a lab leak, 447 00:28:33,010 --> 00:28:35,370 Speaker 1: but their lab leaks happen. I mean, it wouldn't be 448 00:28:35,410 --> 00:28:37,890 Speaker 1: impossible for it to have been one, and there are 449 00:28:37,930 --> 00:28:41,930 Speaker 1: many examples. So the idea that we're actually encouraging scientists 450 00:28:41,930 --> 00:28:45,850 Speaker 1: to go into bat caves and bring back deadly viruses 451 00:28:45,850 --> 00:28:50,210 Speaker 1: to labs so that the rationale for that used to be, well, 452 00:28:50,250 --> 00:28:53,090 Speaker 1: if you want to make a vaccine, you need to 453 00:28:53,130 --> 00:28:55,970 Speaker 1: know what you're making a vaccine against. So the idea 454 00:28:56,050 --> 00:28:59,490 Speaker 1: that we need to have deadly viruses everywhere so that 455 00:28:59,530 --> 00:29:03,570 Speaker 1: we can build something that will contain those viruses is 456 00:29:03,930 --> 00:29:07,090 Speaker 1: very old think and it needs to be done away with. 457 00:29:07,690 --> 00:29:12,610 Speaker 1: You talk about gain of function research and dual use research, 458 00:29:12,930 --> 00:29:15,090 Speaker 1: and you say that actually you don't find either of 459 00:29:15,090 --> 00:29:17,850 Speaker 1: those terms to be particularly helpful. So could you explain 460 00:29:17,890 --> 00:29:19,890 Speaker 1: those terms and then explain why you think that they're 461 00:29:19,930 --> 00:29:23,210 Speaker 1: a little bit short for the purposes of this discussion. Well, 462 00:29:23,370 --> 00:29:26,250 Speaker 1: gain of function and dual use are two ways of 463 00:29:26,370 --> 00:29:31,250 Speaker 1: describing enhancing biological microbes to do something other than what 464 00:29:31,330 --> 00:29:34,170 Speaker 1: they do in nature. But the reason I have a 465 00:29:34,170 --> 00:29:37,370 Speaker 1: problem with that is almost everything we do with biology, 466 00:29:37,490 --> 00:29:41,690 Speaker 1: whether it's make an artificial sweetener or make penicillin, or 467 00:29:41,810 --> 00:29:44,570 Speaker 1: make some sort of cancer drug, or anything else. A 468 00:29:44,650 --> 00:29:51,290 Speaker 1: synthetic dye for clothing enhances the original microbes, so you 469 00:29:51,330 --> 00:29:54,450 Speaker 1: know there are more than one use we are going 470 00:29:54,530 --> 00:29:59,130 Speaker 1: to gain function. The question is is it a gain 471 00:29:59,170 --> 00:30:01,970 Speaker 1: of function that could cause harm? So if we are 472 00:30:02,010 --> 00:30:06,970 Speaker 1: going to rethink the norms of science formulate new rules 473 00:30:07,010 --> 00:30:09,890 Speaker 1: about when to be transparent and when not to be 474 00:30:10,530 --> 00:30:13,770 Speaker 1: who does that? Is they have a model for doing 475 00:30:13,770 --> 00:30:16,730 Speaker 1: that successfully in the past. That's a really painful question. 476 00:30:18,450 --> 00:30:20,810 Speaker 1: You could say there's a model if you look at 477 00:30:21,130 --> 00:30:27,730 Speaker 1: nuclear treaties and the attempt to regulate nuclear weapons. But 478 00:30:27,850 --> 00:30:30,770 Speaker 1: I don't think that's really a model. And if you're talking, 479 00:30:30,930 --> 00:30:34,810 Speaker 1: this is sort of more akin to something like climate change, 480 00:30:34,810 --> 00:30:38,850 Speaker 1: a biological function that would affect the whole world. And 481 00:30:38,850 --> 00:30:42,210 Speaker 1: we're not that great at whole world governance as far 482 00:30:42,250 --> 00:30:45,650 Speaker 1: as I can tell. So you could say the who 483 00:30:45,730 --> 00:30:48,290 Speaker 1: could take a crack at at the UN Maybe we 484 00:30:48,410 --> 00:30:50,970 Speaker 1: need a new body, but we need to do something. 485 00:30:51,210 --> 00:30:54,970 Speaker 1: We've alluded several times in our conversation to the possible 486 00:30:55,010 --> 00:31:00,570 Speaker 1: analogy between uclear weapons and bioweapons. Where does that analogy 487 00:31:00,610 --> 00:31:03,010 Speaker 1: help us and where does it lead us astray? Well? 488 00:31:03,490 --> 00:31:05,810 Speaker 1: I think it helps us in the sense that there 489 00:31:05,850 --> 00:31:10,810 Speaker 1: have been international efforts to agree on what's dangerous and 490 00:31:10,850 --> 00:31:14,290 Speaker 1: what isn't dangerous and who should control it. And there 491 00:31:14,290 --> 00:31:17,850 Speaker 1: are people who inspect places where they exist. I think 492 00:31:17,930 --> 00:31:20,450 Speaker 1: that is helpful. It would be nice to have people 493 00:31:21,090 --> 00:31:25,490 Speaker 1: who are unaligned who could go into various labs and 494 00:31:25,570 --> 00:31:30,130 Speaker 1: inspect what's there. Where it doesn't help us is you know, 495 00:31:30,490 --> 00:31:34,210 Speaker 1: I think there are maybe eight or nine countries that 496 00:31:34,370 --> 00:31:38,610 Speaker 1: could theoretically have a nuclear weapon at this point. There 497 00:31:38,650 --> 00:31:43,130 Speaker 1: are many thousands of groups that could have biological weapons 498 00:31:43,170 --> 00:31:49,570 Speaker 1: because biology is information now, so ultimately it has to 499 00:31:49,610 --> 00:31:52,970 Speaker 1: be a more powerful antidote, and it has to be 500 00:31:53,090 --> 00:31:56,530 Speaker 1: a more present discussion than it is right now, and 501 00:31:57,010 --> 00:32:01,250 Speaker 1: even I think, much more powerful a weapon than nuclear weapons. Are. 502 00:32:01,770 --> 00:32:05,650 Speaker 1: You mentioned in the book that moderna had had basically 503 00:32:05,690 --> 00:32:09,730 Speaker 1: made their vaccine before the Chinese even admitted that the 504 00:32:09,810 --> 00:32:12,730 Speaker 1: virus could spread from human to human. It was that quick, 505 00:32:13,010 --> 00:32:15,730 Speaker 1: It was that early. And yet so this is all 506 00:32:15,770 --> 00:32:21,690 Speaker 1: in January twenty twenty. Their vaccine wasn't actually being used 507 00:32:21,730 --> 00:32:25,850 Speaker 1: in the general population until December of twenty twenty. So 508 00:32:25,890 --> 00:32:27,890 Speaker 1: why did it take so long? First of all, I 509 00:32:27,930 --> 00:32:30,690 Speaker 1: should point out the obvious developing a vaccine in any 510 00:32:30,770 --> 00:32:34,050 Speaker 1: years infinitely faster than it's ever been done before. The 511 00:32:34,090 --> 00:32:37,930 Speaker 1: fastest vaccine previously had been months, and that was four years. 512 00:32:38,330 --> 00:32:41,890 Speaker 1: But it took a while because people needed to test it, 513 00:32:41,930 --> 00:32:44,610 Speaker 1: and they had to do big trials, and they had 514 00:32:44,650 --> 00:32:47,970 Speaker 1: to make sure it was safe. This is a new technology, 515 00:32:48,770 --> 00:32:52,570 Speaker 1: and so the idea of putting it into fourteen billion 516 00:32:53,010 --> 00:32:59,090 Speaker 1: arms without any testing is crazy. There are intermediary steps, 517 00:32:59,690 --> 00:33:03,810 Speaker 1: and you know, we can be much much faster than 518 00:33:03,850 --> 00:33:05,970 Speaker 1: we are, and we're going to have to be, Yeah, 519 00:33:05,970 --> 00:33:08,090 Speaker 1: because isn't this an example of what you were saying 520 00:33:08,090 --> 00:33:10,170 Speaker 1: we're thinking about the benefit, thinking about the costs, but 521 00:33:10,290 --> 00:33:12,970 Speaker 1: not really being able to synthesize both of them, because 522 00:33:14,130 --> 00:33:18,610 Speaker 1: I mean, the costs of not injecting fourteen billion people 523 00:33:18,650 --> 00:33:22,610 Speaker 1: with this vaccine really fast were huge. Obviously, there's a 524 00:33:22,730 --> 00:33:26,010 Speaker 1: risk to using a vaccine before it's been properly tested. 525 00:33:26,410 --> 00:33:28,850 Speaker 1: Do you think we got the balance right? And how 526 00:33:28,890 --> 00:33:31,610 Speaker 1: could we do better next time? We probably got the 527 00:33:31,690 --> 00:33:35,850 Speaker 1: balance close to right, I think. Unfortunately, the answer to 528 00:33:36,050 --> 00:33:39,730 Speaker 1: better that I know of are things caught challenge trials. 529 00:33:40,410 --> 00:33:43,770 Speaker 1: Challenge trials are you take a virus, like the COVID virus, 530 00:33:43,770 --> 00:33:47,170 Speaker 1: and you take forty people or four hundred people, and 531 00:33:47,330 --> 00:33:50,290 Speaker 1: you give half of them the virus and half of 532 00:33:50,290 --> 00:33:53,370 Speaker 1: them not the virus. They don't know. It's double blind, 533 00:33:53,650 --> 00:33:56,770 Speaker 1: and then you vaccinate everybody and you see what happens. 534 00:33:57,130 --> 00:33:59,250 Speaker 1: Presumably you vaccinate them before you give them the virus. 535 00:33:59,290 --> 00:34:02,050 Speaker 1: But right, right, why is it easeful to actually deliberately 536 00:34:02,090 --> 00:34:04,970 Speaker 1: infect them? Why is that an important step? Well, it's 537 00:34:05,010 --> 00:34:07,810 Speaker 1: a very rapid way of finding out if the vaccine 538 00:34:07,850 --> 00:34:13,650 Speaker 1: works or not, because if two hundred people have the virus, 539 00:34:13,810 --> 00:34:16,050 Speaker 1: and you know they have the virus, and you give 540 00:34:16,050 --> 00:34:20,010 Speaker 1: them a vaccine and seven of them get sick instead 541 00:34:20,050 --> 00:34:22,730 Speaker 1: of one hundred and ninety six, you know that the 542 00:34:22,810 --> 00:34:26,650 Speaker 1: vaccine is effective. If some of them get sick and 543 00:34:26,690 --> 00:34:30,930 Speaker 1: then have terrible side effects, you know that too. The 544 00:34:31,050 --> 00:34:37,050 Speaker 1: problem is it's hard to get medical officials to agree 545 00:34:37,090 --> 00:34:39,770 Speaker 1: to do something like that because the harm could be 546 00:34:39,850 --> 00:34:43,930 Speaker 1: serious and that's just not how it's worked in the past. 547 00:34:44,210 --> 00:34:47,930 Speaker 1: And it's very hard to get people to understand that 548 00:34:47,970 --> 00:34:49,930 Speaker 1: this is a new era and we have to do 549 00:34:50,050 --> 00:34:54,450 Speaker 1: things differently. Yeah, paint us a picture of what we 550 00:34:54,570 --> 00:35:01,170 Speaker 1: might be able to achieve with these new synthetic biology 551 00:35:01,250 --> 00:35:05,290 Speaker 1: technologies in twenty years. If things go well, if we 552 00:35:05,330 --> 00:35:09,010 Speaker 1: get the balance right and we avoid the risks, what's 553 00:35:09,090 --> 00:35:12,330 Speaker 1: sort of benefits might we be enjoying by say twenty 554 00:35:12,730 --> 00:35:19,650 Speaker 1: or twenty fifty. Cancer vaccines are absolutely possible autoimmune diseases, 555 00:35:19,730 --> 00:35:23,490 Speaker 1: diseases that have been very difficult to treat. If you 556 00:35:23,530 --> 00:35:27,650 Speaker 1: can figure out what cells are attacking your body and 557 00:35:27,730 --> 00:35:32,210 Speaker 1: in what way you can make an mRNA or a 558 00:35:32,330 --> 00:35:37,530 Speaker 1: synthetic attack to it, that would probably be very very specific. 559 00:35:37,570 --> 00:35:40,490 Speaker 1: You know, until recently, what we've done with broad spectrum 560 00:35:40,530 --> 00:35:45,530 Speaker 1: antibiotics and with vaccines is you know, take a big, 561 00:35:45,570 --> 00:35:48,490 Speaker 1: wide swing at the body and try and protect you 562 00:35:48,530 --> 00:35:52,170 Speaker 1: as broadly as you can. The side effects of those things, 563 00:35:52,410 --> 00:35:55,290 Speaker 1: particularly in cancer treatments, are evident. What would be great 564 00:35:55,570 --> 00:36:01,770 Speaker 1: is very highly targeted treatments to diseases, and I think 565 00:36:01,890 --> 00:36:03,930 Speaker 1: we'll be looking at that, and I think we'll see 566 00:36:04,530 --> 00:36:07,770 Speaker 1: a lot of treatments for things that in twenty thirty 567 00:36:07,770 --> 00:36:12,610 Speaker 1: forty years that you think are terrible and permanently deadly. 568 00:36:12,730 --> 00:36:17,170 Speaker 1: Right now, just thinking back to that council meeting in 569 00:36:17,370 --> 00:36:21,050 Speaker 1: nineteen seventy six, they voted for a moratorium. They basically said, 570 00:36:21,130 --> 00:36:25,730 Speaker 1: let's just wait for a bit, which is understandable, but 571 00:36:25,850 --> 00:36:27,370 Speaker 1: let's just wait for a bit does seem to be 572 00:36:27,370 --> 00:36:32,010 Speaker 1: a very crude response to a technology which has rewards 573 00:36:32,050 --> 00:36:35,650 Speaker 1: and risks. I think there's a middle ground, and it's 574 00:36:35,650 --> 00:36:38,250 Speaker 1: something we've never done, and I'm not sure we can do. 575 00:36:38,930 --> 00:36:41,570 Speaker 1: I don't know of an example where humans have decided 576 00:36:41,850 --> 00:36:45,890 Speaker 1: not to use a technology that's available to them, but 577 00:36:45,930 --> 00:36:47,970 Speaker 1: we need to start thinking about that. I'm not saying 578 00:36:47,970 --> 00:36:51,050 Speaker 1: we shouldn't use synthetic biology, but there are some things 579 00:36:51,250 --> 00:36:54,330 Speaker 1: we don't want to make. There are some tools we 580 00:36:54,450 --> 00:36:58,650 Speaker 1: should agree ought not to be pursued. And that's a 581 00:36:58,650 --> 00:37:02,090 Speaker 1: conversation that's starting to happen all around the world in 582 00:37:02,210 --> 00:37:06,650 Speaker 1: biological circles. And it hasn't happened before. It hasn't needed 583 00:37:06,690 --> 00:37:10,890 Speaker 1: to happen in the past. You develop up to your technology, 584 00:37:11,290 --> 00:37:14,450 Speaker 1: you did what you did, and then if there was 585 00:37:14,450 --> 00:37:17,530 Speaker 1: a problem, you tried to fix it later. And that 586 00:37:17,730 --> 00:37:22,650 Speaker 1: can't operate like that anymore. Is that then what we need? 587 00:37:22,690 --> 00:37:25,490 Speaker 1: We need those conversations about what we should and shouldn't 588 00:37:25,530 --> 00:37:28,410 Speaker 1: be being pursued, and we're having I mean we're having 589 00:37:28,410 --> 00:37:30,730 Speaker 1: them in the sense that scientists are having them in 590 00:37:30,770 --> 00:37:33,850 Speaker 1: bioethesis are having them. And I know that's not the public, 591 00:37:34,170 --> 00:37:38,370 Speaker 1: but it's it's a start. And I think the COVID 592 00:37:38,690 --> 00:37:42,410 Speaker 1: pandemic at least got people to think about some of 593 00:37:42,410 --> 00:37:45,010 Speaker 1: these issues. Like I now talk about m RNA and 594 00:37:45,050 --> 00:37:47,290 Speaker 1: people know what I'm talking about. You know, four years 595 00:37:47,290 --> 00:37:49,530 Speaker 1: ago I was talking about m RNA and they were like, 596 00:37:49,570 --> 00:37:53,250 Speaker 1: what planet is that from? So there's a level, you know, 597 00:37:53,370 --> 00:37:57,050 Speaker 1: a level of sophistication that exists. Now. People know about 598 00:37:57,130 --> 00:38:00,690 Speaker 1: spike proteins, they know a bit about vaccines, things they 599 00:38:00,770 --> 00:38:05,610 Speaker 1: never knew before. And that's great because this isn't something anymore, 600 00:38:05,730 --> 00:38:08,730 Speaker 1: if it ever was, that scientists can just deliver to 601 00:38:08,810 --> 00:38:13,210 Speaker 1: poll This has to be something that we all decide 602 00:38:13,250 --> 00:38:15,330 Speaker 1: we want and figure out a way to get it. 603 00:38:17,210 --> 00:38:20,250 Speaker 1: Michael's bag to thank you very much. Thank you, it's 604 00:38:20,290 --> 00:38:25,690 Speaker 1: been a great pleasure. Michael's audiobook Higher Animals is available 605 00:38:25,690 --> 00:38:30,690 Speaker 1: now at pushkin dot Fm, Audible, or wherever audiobooks are sold.