1 00:00:08,119 --> 00:00:08,440 Speaker 1: Y'all. 2 00:00:08,480 --> 00:00:13,320 Speaker 2: Tonight's Zone seven is important to me. It's an important topic. 3 00:00:13,640 --> 00:00:17,119 Speaker 2: We are going to talk about the assassination attempt on 4 00:00:17,280 --> 00:00:22,640 Speaker 2: former President Donald Trump. This is not a political conversation. 5 00:00:23,160 --> 00:00:26,160 Speaker 2: I don't care who was at that podium, no matter 6 00:00:26,520 --> 00:00:29,840 Speaker 2: who it could have ever been. They should have been 7 00:00:30,040 --> 00:00:35,120 Speaker 2: safe and free from harm while exercising their first amendment. 8 00:00:35,640 --> 00:00:38,199 Speaker 1: That is not up for debate for me. 9 00:00:39,000 --> 00:00:43,920 Speaker 2: This type of action can't happen. It shouldn't happen. We're 10 00:00:43,920 --> 00:00:47,080 Speaker 2: going to take an inside look at what might have 11 00:00:47,159 --> 00:00:50,360 Speaker 2: gone wrong, what might have been some of the failures, 12 00:00:50,760 --> 00:00:54,440 Speaker 2: and how they can be corrected going forward. There can't 13 00:00:54,520 --> 00:00:57,960 Speaker 2: be a shooting of a former president of the United 14 00:00:58,040 --> 00:01:03,240 Speaker 2: States without failures. There just can't failure to act or 15 00:01:03,320 --> 00:01:07,880 Speaker 2: react appropriately and timely. Failure to use all the security 16 00:01:07,880 --> 00:01:11,119 Speaker 2: equipment at your disposal, for example, drones. 17 00:01:11,520 --> 00:01:14,360 Speaker 1: Where were the drones? What about communication? 18 00:01:14,959 --> 00:01:18,560 Speaker 2: I can guarantee you that was a factor. We need 19 00:01:18,600 --> 00:01:23,119 Speaker 2: an expert, but not just any expert. We need a 20 00:01:23,280 --> 00:01:26,240 Speaker 2: former Secret Service agent. 21 00:01:26,480 --> 00:01:27,680 Speaker 1: That's the bottom line. 22 00:01:27,959 --> 00:01:30,840 Speaker 2: The only person that could break this down, the only 23 00:01:30,880 --> 00:01:35,039 Speaker 2: person that could talk legitimately about this situation, has got 24 00:01:35,080 --> 00:01:38,479 Speaker 2: to be somebody that's been there, y'all. My longtime friend 25 00:01:38,720 --> 00:01:42,119 Speaker 2: and a man that I have admired for years. Jim 26 00:01:42,200 --> 00:01:45,240 Speaker 2: Rathman is with us now. I want y'all to know 27 00:01:45,280 --> 00:01:48,360 Speaker 2: who he is and a little about his background. He 28 00:01:48,440 --> 00:01:52,840 Speaker 2: graduated from the Federal Law Enforcement and United States Secret 29 00:01:52,920 --> 00:01:59,000 Speaker 2: Service academies. He protected President Barack Obama around the world 30 00:01:59,280 --> 00:02:03,440 Speaker 2: and his family. He protected Vice President Joe Biden. He 31 00:02:03,560 --> 00:02:08,480 Speaker 2: protected the Republican Vice president candidate Mitt Romney, vice President 32 00:02:08,600 --> 00:02:14,880 Speaker 2: candidate Paul Ryan, and numerous presidents, prime ministers and kings 33 00:02:14,919 --> 00:02:18,840 Speaker 2: from around the world. Jim, I cannot thank you enough 34 00:02:18,880 --> 00:02:22,040 Speaker 2: for being here so that we can just talk calmly 35 00:02:22,320 --> 00:02:26,040 Speaker 2: and legitimately about what occurred and what we can do 36 00:02:26,200 --> 00:02:29,440 Speaker 2: about it. Jim, welcome to Zone seven. 37 00:02:29,960 --> 00:02:32,160 Speaker 3: Thank you so much for having me at pleasure to 38 00:02:32,200 --> 00:02:35,720 Speaker 3: be here. I know the topic of choice we wish 39 00:02:36,040 --> 00:02:39,120 Speaker 3: did not happen, but gives me an opportunity to connect 40 00:02:39,160 --> 00:02:41,200 Speaker 3: with you and your audience and we can take a 41 00:02:41,240 --> 00:02:43,799 Speaker 3: deep dive into this assassination attempt. 42 00:02:44,040 --> 00:02:46,120 Speaker 2: Well, let's do it, because I don't think there's anything 43 00:02:46,160 --> 00:02:50,440 Speaker 2: more important right now. Because my phone has been going crazy, 44 00:02:50,520 --> 00:02:51,920 Speaker 2: I bet yours has meilted. 45 00:02:53,560 --> 00:02:56,240 Speaker 3: It pretty much has since Saturday, no doubt about it. 46 00:02:56,280 --> 00:02:59,600 Speaker 2: And you know, you've got information, you've got an understanding 47 00:03:00,120 --> 00:03:03,160 Speaker 2: that the rest of us just don't have. So I'm 48 00:03:03,160 --> 00:03:05,600 Speaker 2: going to let you start where you think it's appropriate 49 00:03:05,680 --> 00:03:06,079 Speaker 2: to start. 50 00:03:06,320 --> 00:03:08,360 Speaker 3: Yeah, I think you start from the very beginning. I 51 00:03:08,360 --> 00:03:11,880 Speaker 3: think it's important for everybody to know kind of the 52 00:03:12,400 --> 00:03:14,560 Speaker 3: work that it takes to go into working one of 53 00:03:14,600 --> 00:03:17,000 Speaker 3: these events. And you know, you got to keep in mind, 54 00:03:17,720 --> 00:03:20,240 Speaker 3: the last time there was a shooting of a president 55 00:03:20,480 --> 00:03:25,280 Speaker 3: or a presidential elect or a candidate was actually President 56 00:03:25,360 --> 00:03:28,120 Speaker 3: Ronald Reagan back in nineteen eighty one, So it's been 57 00:03:28,200 --> 00:03:31,040 Speaker 3: a very long time, you know, since something like this 58 00:03:31,040 --> 00:03:33,960 Speaker 3: has happened, and the Secret Service will train for every 59 00:03:34,080 --> 00:03:37,320 Speaker 3: single day, but nobody expected it to actually happen, right, 60 00:03:37,360 --> 00:03:40,800 Speaker 3: You're always training for something that you would never happen. Unfortunately, 61 00:03:40,800 --> 00:03:44,360 Speaker 3: this past Saturday it happened to kind of take a 62 00:03:44,400 --> 00:03:47,920 Speaker 3: deep dive into what it takes. You know, there's a 63 00:03:47,960 --> 00:03:50,880 Speaker 3: lot of personnel that go to a site like that, 64 00:03:51,000 --> 00:03:53,200 Speaker 3: and typically you start with a site survey that could 65 00:03:53,200 --> 00:03:58,600 Speaker 3: be an aerial photo, could be walking the entire venue site, 66 00:03:58,880 --> 00:04:01,200 Speaker 3: but you know what you're looking for or are some 67 00:04:01,280 --> 00:04:03,600 Speaker 3: of the first things you want to eliminate, which is 68 00:04:03,880 --> 00:04:06,480 Speaker 3: line of sight. The line of sight is what's most 69 00:04:06,560 --> 00:04:11,680 Speaker 3: dangerous because if you don't cover that, and you know, rooftops, windows, alleyways, 70 00:04:11,760 --> 00:04:16,120 Speaker 3: just with anyone that can get a site of your protectee, 71 00:04:16,240 --> 00:04:18,840 Speaker 3: and the protectee being in this would be former President 72 00:04:18,880 --> 00:04:22,200 Speaker 3: Donald Trump. You want to be able to eliminate that. 73 00:04:22,880 --> 00:04:26,040 Speaker 3: So what do you do, right, You use every tool 74 00:04:26,080 --> 00:04:28,960 Speaker 3: in every asset you have available to you to secure that. 75 00:04:29,480 --> 00:04:33,479 Speaker 3: So it could be drone footage, helicopters, you marking out 76 00:04:33,480 --> 00:04:35,840 Speaker 3: how much distance it is from one building to the 77 00:04:35,960 --> 00:04:39,000 Speaker 3: state itself. But you want to take away that line 78 00:04:39,040 --> 00:04:42,720 Speaker 3: of sight, So securing the rooftop, securing the windows, and 79 00:04:42,760 --> 00:04:46,320 Speaker 3: then from there, you know, you start placing personnel that 80 00:04:46,400 --> 00:04:49,440 Speaker 3: has now been secured. You know, we use kanine, explosive dogs, 81 00:04:49,520 --> 00:04:52,279 Speaker 3: there's all kinds of things that are used in order 82 00:04:52,320 --> 00:04:56,400 Speaker 3: to secure that entire site. Once we establish that and 83 00:04:56,440 --> 00:05:00,280 Speaker 3: we start putting personnel on the ground as well. You 84 00:05:00,320 --> 00:05:03,479 Speaker 3: also have your local law enforcement that helps out, and 85 00:05:03,520 --> 00:05:07,000 Speaker 3: it's not always just that city. Like if you take 86 00:05:07,080 --> 00:05:11,880 Speaker 3: this incident itself, you have Butler Police Department. Butler Police 87 00:05:11,880 --> 00:05:15,479 Speaker 3: Department is within a county. You have other municipalities that 88 00:05:15,520 --> 00:05:19,120 Speaker 3: are there. You have this Pennsylvania State Police, you have 89 00:05:19,200 --> 00:05:23,680 Speaker 3: the neighboring counties. So you have this hodgepodge of law 90 00:05:23,800 --> 00:05:28,920 Speaker 3: enforcement professionals local state that are assisting the federal government. 91 00:05:30,000 --> 00:05:32,440 Speaker 3: So we will place them. Usually the local guys will 92 00:05:32,480 --> 00:05:36,080 Speaker 3: block off roadways, right. We want to prevent anybody from 93 00:05:36,120 --> 00:05:38,200 Speaker 3: being able to drive down a street and be able 94 00:05:38,240 --> 00:05:41,320 Speaker 3: to get a line of site shot, so we block 95 00:05:41,400 --> 00:05:47,000 Speaker 3: off those roadways, and essentially you create perimeter rings. Your 96 00:05:47,320 --> 00:05:50,520 Speaker 3: internal perimeter ring is going to be all SECT service. 97 00:05:51,480 --> 00:05:54,680 Speaker 3: Your second level could be things like magnetometers, right, so 98 00:05:54,720 --> 00:05:57,919 Speaker 3: you have a mixture of service plus local law enforcement, 99 00:05:58,440 --> 00:06:01,200 Speaker 3: and then your exterior perimeter just pushed out even farther 100 00:06:01,240 --> 00:06:04,560 Speaker 3: as your local But unfortunately, what happened there was some failures. 101 00:06:04,760 --> 00:06:06,960 Speaker 2: And I want to tell you you know, I had 102 00:06:06,960 --> 00:06:11,480 Speaker 2: an opportunity to start really seeing the Secret Service up close. 103 00:06:11,920 --> 00:06:12,800 Speaker 1: In high school. 104 00:06:13,600 --> 00:06:17,680 Speaker 2: I watched them work every single day because I went 105 00:06:17,720 --> 00:06:22,039 Speaker 2: to high school with Amy Carter, so it was fascinating 106 00:06:22,080 --> 00:06:25,680 Speaker 2: to me to watch them sweep the stadium, sweep the gymnasium, 107 00:06:25,760 --> 00:06:28,839 Speaker 2: make sure that everything in the cafeteria was okay. Before 108 00:06:28,880 --> 00:06:32,880 Speaker 2: she walked in and it just became almost habit for 109 00:06:33,000 --> 00:06:35,720 Speaker 2: us to see them and know what they were doing 110 00:06:35,760 --> 00:06:38,479 Speaker 2: and what they were about. And they had to be 111 00:06:38,680 --> 00:06:42,400 Speaker 2: right every single day. Every day. They could not make 112 00:06:42,440 --> 00:06:44,440 Speaker 2: a mistake. They had to know where she was, what 113 00:06:44,600 --> 00:06:47,920 Speaker 2: she was doing, who was near her. And then later 114 00:06:47,960 --> 00:06:50,520 Speaker 2: in my career, I was in charge of the crisis 115 00:06:50,560 --> 00:06:53,960 Speaker 2: response team for the Olympics and the Secret Service was 116 00:06:54,520 --> 00:06:58,640 Speaker 2: powerful that evening because Chelsea Clinton had just left the park, 117 00:06:59,279 --> 00:07:02,200 Speaker 2: so they were really interested what had happened. And then 118 00:07:03,160 --> 00:07:05,440 Speaker 2: during nine to eleven I was sent to the Pentagon, 119 00:07:06,520 --> 00:07:09,479 Speaker 2: and obviously, you know, being in Washington, d C. Got 120 00:07:09,520 --> 00:07:12,480 Speaker 2: to see what the Secret Service were doing there. And 121 00:07:12,520 --> 00:07:15,800 Speaker 2: then now in my current position, I'm that outer perimeter 122 00:07:15,920 --> 00:07:18,520 Speaker 2: you talk about. I get to shut down an intersection 123 00:07:18,760 --> 00:07:24,160 Speaker 2: when the president's coming through. So to your point, they 124 00:07:24,160 --> 00:07:27,920 Speaker 2: have to be perfect every time. And when you're talking 125 00:07:27,960 --> 00:07:31,160 Speaker 2: about local law enforcement, one thing, Jim, that you know, 126 00:07:31,320 --> 00:07:35,920 Speaker 2: always was such a just frustration for me is I 127 00:07:35,960 --> 00:07:41,040 Speaker 2: don't have a radio that can communicate with the federal agencies. 128 00:07:41,920 --> 00:07:44,400 Speaker 2: So you have to either be standing next to somebody 129 00:07:45,200 --> 00:07:47,440 Speaker 2: in the federal government, or you have to have a 130 00:07:47,480 --> 00:07:51,040 Speaker 2: way that they have one of your radios, so they're 131 00:07:51,080 --> 00:07:52,560 Speaker 2: working two radios at a time. 132 00:07:52,920 --> 00:07:55,560 Speaker 3: You're not wrong with that. I can definitely see where 133 00:07:55,640 --> 00:07:59,320 Speaker 3: the confusion would come in the past, especially with communication. However, 134 00:07:59,400 --> 00:08:01,920 Speaker 3: what I'm going to pivot to on that Prior to 135 00:08:01,960 --> 00:08:04,720 Speaker 3: n TO eleven, that was one of the biggest problems 136 00:08:04,720 --> 00:08:08,520 Speaker 3: with a lot of the responding units to Manhattan right 137 00:08:08,560 --> 00:08:10,840 Speaker 3: when the World Trade Centers were attacked, is that they 138 00:08:10,840 --> 00:08:15,120 Speaker 3: could not you know, laterally communicate with one another. So 139 00:08:15,520 --> 00:08:18,600 Speaker 3: after that, the FCC made some changes so that way 140 00:08:18,800 --> 00:08:21,680 Speaker 3: you can have multi agencies being able to communicate. So 141 00:08:22,080 --> 00:08:25,120 Speaker 3: typically the way that it would work we create special 142 00:08:25,160 --> 00:08:28,160 Speaker 3: event channels. We can give access to some of those 143 00:08:28,240 --> 00:08:31,760 Speaker 3: law enforcement personnel there. Usually it's the commanders on the ground, 144 00:08:31,840 --> 00:08:35,160 Speaker 3: whether it's a captain, whether it's SWAT commanders, team leaders, 145 00:08:35,240 --> 00:08:38,120 Speaker 3: things such as that that would be able to communicate. 146 00:08:38,480 --> 00:08:41,680 Speaker 3: But Secret Service, you know, will also have there's always 147 00:08:41,720 --> 00:08:45,680 Speaker 3: a command center somewhere on that site where we're able 148 00:08:45,720 --> 00:08:48,280 Speaker 3: to monitor all the radio channels. So if there were 149 00:08:48,320 --> 00:08:51,160 Speaker 3: somebody there on the local law enforcement channel, and you know, 150 00:08:51,880 --> 00:08:54,280 Speaker 3: in this particular case, Spotler PD, they would have their 151 00:08:54,320 --> 00:08:57,480 Speaker 3: own channels that they communicate on. We probably have some 152 00:08:57,520 --> 00:09:00,520 Speaker 3: sort of special events channel we would have access to 153 00:09:00,520 --> 00:09:03,680 Speaker 3: that we can monitor everything that's being set so we 154 00:09:03,679 --> 00:09:07,520 Speaker 3: can immediately report that out to to see your service 155 00:09:07,600 --> 00:09:10,640 Speaker 3: agents that have to hear pieces in to the regional 156 00:09:10,640 --> 00:09:13,079 Speaker 3: aid or to the agent in charge, and that way 157 00:09:13,120 --> 00:09:15,800 Speaker 3: everybody's kind of always in the know of what is 158 00:09:15,840 --> 00:09:19,120 Speaker 3: going on. Again, one of the strange things that happened 159 00:09:19,160 --> 00:09:21,280 Speaker 3: here is that this went on for so long and 160 00:09:21,280 --> 00:09:24,800 Speaker 3: it seemed like there really wasn't a response. Still trying 161 00:09:24,840 --> 00:09:27,880 Speaker 3: to put my finger onto that and understand how that 162 00:09:27,880 --> 00:09:30,400 Speaker 3: could have happened, But we don't know that could there 163 00:09:30,440 --> 00:09:33,319 Speaker 3: could have been some logistical challenges. Just like you said, 164 00:09:33,400 --> 00:09:36,160 Speaker 3: it's not like they have access to all the Secret 165 00:09:36,240 --> 00:09:38,800 Speaker 3: Service channels, so I don't know if they were limited 166 00:09:38,840 --> 00:09:40,520 Speaker 3: in their scope understood. 167 00:09:41,240 --> 00:09:43,520 Speaker 2: So, you know, when I was a little girl, they 168 00:09:43,760 --> 00:09:46,840 Speaker 2: would talk about like when you know, the President would 169 00:09:46,880 --> 00:09:50,760 Speaker 2: come through town and I would hear things like one 170 00:09:50,800 --> 00:09:53,160 Speaker 2: thing I heard was if the President was going to 171 00:09:53,200 --> 00:09:56,480 Speaker 2: be in a parade, that the manhole covers, y'all would 172 00:09:56,480 --> 00:10:00,400 Speaker 2: come in and weld them shut, y'all. Would you know 173 00:10:00,520 --> 00:10:04,640 Speaker 2: have even agents in scuba gear, like in the water 174 00:10:05,160 --> 00:10:08,680 Speaker 2: in the mall in DC you know, so if anything 175 00:10:08,720 --> 00:10:12,360 Speaker 2: were to happen, y'all are just everywhere. So I even 176 00:10:12,440 --> 00:10:16,600 Speaker 2: believe that some of y'all were in civilian clothes in 177 00:10:16,640 --> 00:10:18,800 Speaker 2: that crowd, maybe even behind him. 178 00:10:19,640 --> 00:10:21,960 Speaker 1: And again, when you're looking at. 179 00:10:21,840 --> 00:10:25,520 Speaker 2: The totality of what has got to go into protecting 180 00:10:25,760 --> 00:10:30,240 Speaker 2: any leader, even from another country, that you know, you've 181 00:10:30,240 --> 00:10:33,400 Speaker 2: got to look at every window, every door, every manhole cover, 182 00:10:33,880 --> 00:10:36,319 Speaker 2: every barn, every car. 183 00:10:36,160 --> 00:10:38,000 Speaker 1: That all of a sudden is part somewhere that wasn't 184 00:10:38,040 --> 00:10:38,720 Speaker 1: there yesterday. 185 00:10:39,400 --> 00:10:42,880 Speaker 2: So talk a little bit about how y'all spot issues 186 00:10:43,000 --> 00:10:45,600 Speaker 2: and identify issues and then what you do about them. 187 00:10:46,040 --> 00:10:48,760 Speaker 3: It's a lot of work that goes into these events. 188 00:10:49,000 --> 00:10:53,040 Speaker 3: We travel in uniform, secret service personnel. You have your 189 00:10:53,360 --> 00:10:58,000 Speaker 3: specialty units that could be anything from your presidential counter 190 00:10:58,040 --> 00:11:02,480 Speaker 3: assault teams, k and dogs. We have everything, and so 191 00:11:02,520 --> 00:11:05,160 Speaker 3: what we try to do is make the venue as 192 00:11:05,160 --> 00:11:08,320 Speaker 3: secure as possible. So, yes, we have people there many 193 00:11:08,400 --> 00:11:13,240 Speaker 3: days in advance, sweeping hospitals. You know, will always designate 194 00:11:13,240 --> 00:11:15,520 Speaker 3: a few hospitals for the president, not just one, but 195 00:11:15,600 --> 00:11:18,520 Speaker 3: multiple because you never know where we are. There's multiple routes. 196 00:11:18,559 --> 00:11:21,080 Speaker 3: The routes are traveled many many, many times. You just 197 00:11:21,120 --> 00:11:22,840 Speaker 3: don't know which one we're going to choose, because we 198 00:11:22,880 --> 00:11:26,560 Speaker 3: literally have a through and Z of route planning. You know, 199 00:11:26,679 --> 00:11:28,800 Speaker 3: you have your magnetometers that are brought in. We have 200 00:11:28,960 --> 00:11:30,840 Speaker 3: X ray machines that are brought in as well, So 201 00:11:30,920 --> 00:11:34,360 Speaker 3: not only are we skinning everyone's body as they come 202 00:11:34,400 --> 00:11:38,080 Speaker 3: through with that magnetometer, but we're also checking all the 203 00:11:38,120 --> 00:11:41,160 Speaker 3: back or making sure that nothing is getting in and 204 00:11:41,200 --> 00:11:44,480 Speaker 3: you have a clean site. There's a lot of personnel 205 00:11:44,480 --> 00:11:46,640 Speaker 3: and a lot of work, a lot of movement that 206 00:11:46,760 --> 00:11:48,840 Speaker 3: goes into that to try to make it as secure 207 00:11:48,840 --> 00:11:51,840 Speaker 3: as possible. And in addition to that, when you're doing 208 00:11:51,840 --> 00:11:55,800 Speaker 3: your site survey, you're creating your security rings and you're 209 00:11:55,840 --> 00:11:58,959 Speaker 3: also blocking off areas that people can't get access to 210 00:11:59,040 --> 00:12:01,120 Speaker 3: when you're following them to where they want, so that 211 00:12:01,160 --> 00:12:04,880 Speaker 3: way you can do your job effectively. You're constantly scanning 212 00:12:04,920 --> 00:12:08,040 Speaker 3: for threats, and you know, until you know that everybody 213 00:12:08,080 --> 00:12:11,000 Speaker 3: is clean and there's no threats and you can bring 214 00:12:11,080 --> 00:12:14,280 Speaker 3: out your protectee. In this case, I'm a President Trump 215 00:12:14,360 --> 00:12:16,360 Speaker 3: to bring them on stage and be able to speak. 216 00:12:16,640 --> 00:12:19,200 Speaker 3: You shouldn't have any threats towards him. He should be 217 00:12:19,200 --> 00:12:22,480 Speaker 3: able to do the event. Everybody they're supposed to be 218 00:12:22,480 --> 00:12:24,240 Speaker 3: able to enjoy the event, and then we get them 219 00:12:24,240 --> 00:12:27,200 Speaker 3: out of there and get them off to the next site. 220 00:12:30,600 --> 00:12:33,760 Speaker 2: You talked a little bit about the standard. So you've 221 00:12:33,800 --> 00:12:36,760 Speaker 2: got the inner perimeter, which is the Secret Service, the 222 00:12:36,880 --> 00:12:40,000 Speaker 2: outer perimeter, which is a mixture Secret Service and local 223 00:12:40,080 --> 00:12:43,959 Speaker 2: law enforcement, that third perimeter, which is mostly the local 224 00:12:44,120 --> 00:12:48,400 Speaker 2: law enforcement. It almost looked like the shot that neutralized 225 00:12:48,440 --> 00:12:52,320 Speaker 2: that thread was a second and a half. Once they 226 00:12:52,559 --> 00:12:57,319 Speaker 2: engaged with that threat, it was almost an instant. 227 00:12:57,520 --> 00:12:59,440 Speaker 1: So were you watching it live? 228 00:13:00,040 --> 00:13:02,319 Speaker 3: I wasn't watching live. I saw it come across that 229 00:13:02,440 --> 00:13:04,600 Speaker 3: there was a security incident and big that I used 230 00:13:04,600 --> 00:13:06,160 Speaker 3: to do this job with. The first thing I did 231 00:13:06,200 --> 00:13:08,880 Speaker 3: was turn on the news and start watching. And as 232 00:13:08,920 --> 00:13:11,400 Speaker 3: I was watching what happened and realizing when it happened, 233 00:13:12,040 --> 00:13:14,960 Speaker 3: of course, my heart immediately goes into my stomach, and 234 00:13:15,000 --> 00:13:17,440 Speaker 3: now it's a matter of what happened, how this happened. 235 00:13:17,480 --> 00:13:20,880 Speaker 3: I actually have friends that are there, you know, in 236 00:13:20,960 --> 00:13:24,600 Speaker 3: the Secret Service, still active. So in fact, the famous 237 00:13:24,640 --> 00:13:28,800 Speaker 3: sniper picture that they're showing around the globe right now 238 00:13:28,960 --> 00:13:32,760 Speaker 3: on the rooftop, I actually worked with him, So you know, 239 00:13:33,320 --> 00:13:36,080 Speaker 3: you know these people personally, so you kind of have 240 00:13:36,120 --> 00:13:39,600 Speaker 3: a mixture you're making hoping nobody's hurt. Unfortunately, there were 241 00:13:40,080 --> 00:13:43,480 Speaker 3: innocent people and bystanders that were killed and seriously wounded. 242 00:13:43,960 --> 00:13:47,360 Speaker 3: Former President Trump was wounded. So watching this, you know, 243 00:13:47,920 --> 00:13:52,079 Speaker 3: it took me off guard. But then I start looking for, well. 244 00:13:51,880 --> 00:13:55,800 Speaker 2: What happened and just walk us through how your mind 245 00:13:55,880 --> 00:13:58,480 Speaker 2: was working as you were watching, you know, the small 246 00:13:58,679 --> 00:14:00,719 Speaker 2: video clips that they were showing to all of us, 247 00:14:01,120 --> 00:14:04,680 Speaker 2: and what were some of the things that you noticed that. 248 00:14:04,000 --> 00:14:06,200 Speaker 1: That's a failure that needs to be corrected. 249 00:14:06,600 --> 00:14:08,280 Speaker 3: Well, the first thing that what they were showing a 250 00:14:08,280 --> 00:14:10,760 Speaker 3: lot was the stage. This is before we knew about 251 00:14:11,040 --> 00:14:12,880 Speaker 3: when we knew the shooter came from the building, but 252 00:14:12,960 --> 00:14:14,959 Speaker 3: they weren't showing the videos that they didn't come out 253 00:14:14,960 --> 00:14:19,800 Speaker 3: to a little bit later with the with the Bisanders 254 00:14:19,800 --> 00:14:22,240 Speaker 3: and said buysanders that were passing all that information. But 255 00:14:22,280 --> 00:14:24,240 Speaker 3: when I watched it, they were watching what happened on 256 00:14:24,240 --> 00:14:27,440 Speaker 3: the stage. You can immediately identify the gunshots, so you 257 00:14:27,480 --> 00:14:30,440 Speaker 3: knew that there was a shooting taking place. Former President 258 00:14:30,440 --> 00:14:33,680 Speaker 3: Trump did what, you know, we do take them through 259 00:14:33,720 --> 00:14:36,360 Speaker 3: some protocols, right, and so for him it was to 260 00:14:36,440 --> 00:14:38,440 Speaker 3: be able to get down on the ground because that's 261 00:14:38,440 --> 00:14:41,240 Speaker 3: going to be the safest place for him. Their security 262 00:14:41,280 --> 00:14:43,840 Speaker 3: measures in and around the stage that can help protect that. 263 00:14:44,600 --> 00:14:47,800 Speaker 3: What I initially noticed was that the Secret Service agents did, 264 00:14:48,400 --> 00:14:51,880 Speaker 3: in my opinion, a remarkable job on getting to him 265 00:14:52,000 --> 00:14:53,520 Speaker 3: and creating that human shield. 266 00:14:53,680 --> 00:14:54,080 Speaker 1: Amen. 267 00:14:54,400 --> 00:14:57,760 Speaker 3: That was almost instantaneous. I don't think they could have 268 00:14:57,840 --> 00:14:59,600 Speaker 3: executed that any better. 269 00:15:00,080 --> 00:15:00,600 Speaker 1: I don't either. 270 00:15:00,880 --> 00:15:03,160 Speaker 3: You know, they got on top of him, they traded 271 00:15:03,160 --> 00:15:05,400 Speaker 3: that human shield. That what you're trying to do is 272 00:15:05,440 --> 00:15:08,640 Speaker 3: elimonee the sniper for being able to see the target 273 00:15:09,040 --> 00:15:11,360 Speaker 3: and be able to put another round on its target, 274 00:15:11,360 --> 00:15:14,960 Speaker 3: which would be former President Trump. So you're stopping that. 275 00:15:15,320 --> 00:15:18,360 Speaker 3: In addition, which most people don't know, you know, and 276 00:15:19,320 --> 00:15:22,560 Speaker 3: in combat you can get you know, once those shots 277 00:15:22,600 --> 00:15:26,080 Speaker 3: are fired, right, you get that physiological change, you get 278 00:15:26,120 --> 00:15:29,320 Speaker 3: that fight or flight, and so you could get shot 279 00:15:29,640 --> 00:15:32,400 Speaker 3: and not even know that you were shot. And that's 280 00:15:32,440 --> 00:15:34,600 Speaker 3: why when you see the first round that goes through 281 00:15:34,680 --> 00:15:36,600 Speaker 3: and then the second one, it takes him a little 282 00:15:36,600 --> 00:15:38,560 Speaker 3: bit the registral like, wait a minute, that just hit me, 283 00:15:39,120 --> 00:15:42,200 Speaker 3: and then he goes to the ground, right, So when 284 00:15:42,240 --> 00:15:44,800 Speaker 3: they're on the ground, they're probably checking him, right, they're 285 00:15:44,840 --> 00:15:48,440 Speaker 3: physically touching him to sea, do you have any bullet 286 00:15:48,440 --> 00:15:51,400 Speaker 3: holes anywhere else other than what we see clearly that's 287 00:15:51,440 --> 00:15:53,880 Speaker 3: on his side of his face and his ear. So 288 00:15:53,960 --> 00:15:56,800 Speaker 3: you're doing it. You're literally patting him down, making sure 289 00:15:56,880 --> 00:15:59,640 Speaker 3: because he could be shot and he wouldn't even know it. 290 00:16:00,080 --> 00:16:03,720 Speaker 3: Perfect example of that Ronald Reagan. President Reagan back in 291 00:16:03,800 --> 00:16:06,640 Speaker 3: nineteen eighty one, he was initially shot, didn't know he 292 00:16:06,680 --> 00:16:09,200 Speaker 3: was even shot until he was in the vehicle. It 293 00:16:09,240 --> 00:16:11,640 Speaker 3: wasn't until the Secret Service agent jumped on top of 294 00:16:11,680 --> 00:16:15,120 Speaker 3: them before it was ever even noted or noticed. So 295 00:16:15,680 --> 00:16:18,040 Speaker 3: that's why we do those kind of things. We'll do 296 00:16:18,120 --> 00:16:20,840 Speaker 3: the same thing in the military and combat. When somebody's shot, 297 00:16:20,960 --> 00:16:22,640 Speaker 3: you want to look for an exit wound. Are there 298 00:16:22,640 --> 00:16:25,400 Speaker 3: any other wounds, so that way you can treat the 299 00:16:25,440 --> 00:16:27,280 Speaker 3: problem immediately. So that would have been one of the 300 00:16:27,320 --> 00:16:31,000 Speaker 3: first thing you they're doing. While that's happening, the radio 301 00:16:31,080 --> 00:16:35,560 Speaker 3: communications are going on and you can hear them talking, Okay, 302 00:16:35,560 --> 00:16:37,200 Speaker 3: we got to get up ready to move on, You 303 00:16:37,680 --> 00:16:41,760 Speaker 3: move right, So they're trying to move in unison when 304 00:16:41,760 --> 00:16:45,120 Speaker 3: it's time to start moving. The reason for that is 305 00:16:45,120 --> 00:16:48,440 Speaker 3: is you don't want former President Trump to stand straight 306 00:16:48,520 --> 00:16:51,320 Speaker 3: up because what does that make him completely. 307 00:16:50,880 --> 00:16:53,480 Speaker 1: Exposed to another shot the sniper? 308 00:16:53,760 --> 00:16:57,400 Speaker 3: Yep, right, so they now know before they stood up, 309 00:16:57,640 --> 00:17:02,680 Speaker 3: it's already communicated from the counter's life team. We eliminated 310 00:17:02,680 --> 00:17:07,399 Speaker 3: that threat. That is no longer a threat. Where I 311 00:17:07,520 --> 00:17:10,960 Speaker 3: got a little bit disturbed in what I saw was 312 00:17:11,119 --> 00:17:13,760 Speaker 3: now they got up. They did the best they could 313 00:17:13,760 --> 00:17:16,480 Speaker 3: to try to keep him shielded, but they were not 314 00:17:16,680 --> 00:17:20,439 Speaker 3: looking for a secondary shooter, and that to me was 315 00:17:20,680 --> 00:17:23,800 Speaker 3: very scary because if there was a second shooter, he 316 00:17:23,920 --> 00:17:27,760 Speaker 3: was completely exposed. And the amount of time it took 317 00:17:27,920 --> 00:17:31,840 Speaker 3: to get him off that stage into that vehicle, it's 318 00:17:31,960 --> 00:17:35,159 Speaker 3: far too long. I don't know where they had the 319 00:17:35,240 --> 00:17:38,520 Speaker 3: vehicle staged out originally, but it couldn't have taken too 320 00:17:38,560 --> 00:17:41,040 Speaker 3: long to get to where they need to go. That's 321 00:17:41,119 --> 00:17:44,879 Speaker 3: that they are so good at what they do. I 322 00:17:44,920 --> 00:17:49,160 Speaker 3: don't know if they just allowed former President Trump to 323 00:17:49,160 --> 00:17:53,280 Speaker 3: to move at his own pace or what. But once 324 00:17:53,320 --> 00:17:57,439 Speaker 3: the shots are fired, you're no longer in charge, mister Trump. 325 00:17:57,520 --> 00:18:01,080 Speaker 3: President Trump, we are. I have got to get you 326 00:18:01,119 --> 00:18:04,160 Speaker 3: off the stage. I don't care if you don't like it, 327 00:18:04,600 --> 00:18:06,359 Speaker 3: but that's how it's going to be. And at that 328 00:18:06,520 --> 00:18:09,320 Speaker 3: point they should have pushed his head down so he 329 00:18:09,359 --> 00:18:14,040 Speaker 3: can stay behind the protection right, and you get him 330 00:18:14,160 --> 00:18:18,080 Speaker 3: immediately into that vehicle, and that vehicle should have Dirk 331 00:18:18,160 --> 00:18:21,600 Speaker 3: flying out of those tires as it is taking off, 332 00:18:22,560 --> 00:18:25,880 Speaker 3: but unfortunately that didn't happen. So that was the first 333 00:18:26,600 --> 00:18:29,040 Speaker 3: mistake that I saw that the Secret Service for making. 334 00:18:29,119 --> 00:18:31,680 Speaker 3: And it's easy for me to sit there and say 335 00:18:31,680 --> 00:18:34,440 Speaker 3: it's a mistake. I believe it to be a mistake. 336 00:18:34,680 --> 00:18:38,080 Speaker 3: It's my opinion, of course, because I don't really know. Again, 337 00:18:38,600 --> 00:18:41,119 Speaker 3: when did that vehicle get back there. They did a 338 00:18:41,160 --> 00:18:44,600 Speaker 3: great job initially, but there was zero looking for a 339 00:18:44,680 --> 00:18:47,719 Speaker 3: second or even a third cipher that could have been 340 00:18:47,760 --> 00:18:48,120 Speaker 3: out there. 341 00:18:48,240 --> 00:18:50,280 Speaker 2: And that's one thing you and I talked about, you 342 00:18:50,280 --> 00:18:55,040 Speaker 2: know earlier, is that you always, whether it's a bomb, 343 00:18:55,600 --> 00:18:59,639 Speaker 2: a shooting, no matter what type of event, at this level, 344 00:19:00,200 --> 00:19:04,240 Speaker 2: you always anticipate the secondary event every time. 345 00:19:04,280 --> 00:19:06,480 Speaker 3: I mean, it has to become second nature. We do 346 00:19:06,560 --> 00:19:09,160 Speaker 3: the same thing in the military, you know, when you're 347 00:19:09,200 --> 00:19:12,520 Speaker 3: overseas and you'd come across an ied in the ground. 348 00:19:13,040 --> 00:19:14,960 Speaker 3: You know, we started learning that a lot of times 349 00:19:14,960 --> 00:19:18,040 Speaker 3: the Taliban would put an ied in the ground that 350 00:19:18,119 --> 00:19:20,639 Speaker 3: was completely fake because they know that we're going to 351 00:19:20,720 --> 00:19:22,960 Speaker 3: now back away from it, and we're going to go 352 00:19:23,080 --> 00:19:25,159 Speaker 3: back a certain distance, and that's where they put the 353 00:19:25,200 --> 00:19:28,960 Speaker 3: real IEDs And a lot of times they'll build daisy 354 00:19:29,040 --> 00:19:32,320 Speaker 3: chain them, which basically means they connect them together so 355 00:19:32,400 --> 00:19:35,320 Speaker 3: they can take out as much as possible. So you 356 00:19:35,440 --> 00:19:39,359 Speaker 3: always have to be thinking of that, what's the next 357 00:19:39,359 --> 00:19:44,000 Speaker 3: move they would make right that counterintelligence, that counter mindset. 358 00:19:44,119 --> 00:19:49,880 Speaker 3: What I would like for your audience to understand. In combat, 359 00:19:50,080 --> 00:19:53,960 Speaker 3: whenever a bullet flies, you go through that fight or flight, 360 00:19:54,040 --> 00:19:56,840 Speaker 3: that physiological change that I talked about, your heart rate's 361 00:19:56,840 --> 00:19:59,200 Speaker 3: going to go up, your breathing is going to go up, 362 00:19:59,440 --> 00:20:02,320 Speaker 3: your blood pressure goes through the roof, and you have 363 00:20:02,400 --> 00:20:05,320 Speaker 3: to be able to calm that down. And it's not easy. 364 00:20:05,440 --> 00:20:08,840 Speaker 3: Not everybody can do it. And you can train as 365 00:20:09,000 --> 00:20:12,600 Speaker 3: much as you want and as hard as you want, 366 00:20:13,040 --> 00:20:17,160 Speaker 3: but you cannot replicate when a bullet is actually fired. 367 00:20:17,240 --> 00:20:20,639 Speaker 3: You just can't replicate that. That's why they train so 368 00:20:21,040 --> 00:20:24,320 Speaker 3: much is because it has to become muscle memory. And 369 00:20:24,359 --> 00:20:28,359 Speaker 3: the agents that jumped on top of former President Trump 370 00:20:28,960 --> 00:20:31,199 Speaker 3: that was in state that they used that muscle memory. 371 00:20:32,160 --> 00:20:34,439 Speaker 3: But as you look amongst the crowd and there were 372 00:20:34,480 --> 00:20:36,399 Speaker 3: other agents they were in that what we refer to 373 00:20:36,480 --> 00:20:39,000 Speaker 3: kind of like that fog, that foggy moment of war 374 00:20:39,040 --> 00:20:42,040 Speaker 3: where you know they're going through those physiological changes, but 375 00:20:42,119 --> 00:20:46,080 Speaker 3: they haven't overcome it yet, and so they start acting 376 00:20:46,119 --> 00:20:49,280 Speaker 3: in manners that they typically don't act in because well, 377 00:20:49,280 --> 00:20:51,280 Speaker 3: you're scared. I mean, there's bullets flying right now, your 378 00:20:51,280 --> 00:20:54,159 Speaker 3: wife is on the line right So it's it's a 379 00:20:54,200 --> 00:20:57,919 Speaker 3: whole different change. Some people can handle it, some people can't. 380 00:20:58,440 --> 00:21:01,919 Speaker 2: I'm Southern, and when I talk my children to drive, 381 00:21:02,520 --> 00:21:05,280 Speaker 2: one of the things that I said over and over 382 00:21:05,440 --> 00:21:06,280 Speaker 2: and over. 383 00:21:06,840 --> 00:21:10,000 Speaker 1: There's always a second deer. There's never one. 384 00:21:10,920 --> 00:21:14,119 Speaker 2: So if you see one across the road, slow down 385 00:21:14,760 --> 00:21:19,359 Speaker 2: because there's there's another one, I promise you. And if 386 00:21:19,840 --> 00:21:23,959 Speaker 2: there isn't, great, but if there is, you're prepared. And 387 00:21:24,000 --> 00:21:27,480 Speaker 2: it's kind of like you're talking about. You can prepare, 388 00:21:27,680 --> 00:21:30,880 Speaker 2: you can train, you can study, you can take tests, 389 00:21:30,960 --> 00:21:35,560 Speaker 2: you can do some hands on drills. It's a game 390 00:21:35,680 --> 00:21:40,320 Speaker 2: changer when you're looking at somebody bleeding, when you're standing 391 00:21:40,359 --> 00:21:43,360 Speaker 2: in front of that person, not knowing whether or not 392 00:21:43,480 --> 00:21:46,880 Speaker 2: there's another bullet come in your way. Because I'm gonna 393 00:21:46,880 --> 00:21:51,879 Speaker 2: tell you something, Jim, the United States Secret Service is 394 00:21:51,960 --> 00:21:56,600 Speaker 2: not like any other agency. When you take that oath 395 00:21:57,240 --> 00:22:00,840 Speaker 2: and you make your mind up whether this is somebody 396 00:22:00,880 --> 00:22:03,919 Speaker 2: that I have voted for, whether this is somebody I 397 00:22:03,960 --> 00:22:08,359 Speaker 2: believe in, even if it's somebody from another country that 398 00:22:08,520 --> 00:22:12,960 Speaker 2: maybe you do not subscribe to their policies in any way, 399 00:22:14,320 --> 00:22:20,040 Speaker 2: you are prepared to put yourself between the danger and 400 00:22:20,119 --> 00:22:20,679 Speaker 2: that person. 401 00:22:21,840 --> 00:22:23,240 Speaker 1: That is a remarkable thing. 402 00:22:23,840 --> 00:22:27,320 Speaker 3: You said it perfectly. You know, we take that oath, 403 00:22:27,359 --> 00:22:30,040 Speaker 3: we know what the job entails. You know you're one 404 00:22:30,040 --> 00:22:33,280 Speaker 3: of the very selected few to be able to stand 405 00:22:33,280 --> 00:22:36,000 Speaker 3: next to the most powerful leaders in the world, and 406 00:22:36,160 --> 00:22:38,840 Speaker 3: you have to take a job very seriously. And my 407 00:22:39,000 --> 00:22:41,800 Speaker 3: experience with being what the ued State Secret Service was 408 00:22:42,320 --> 00:22:44,760 Speaker 3: an amazing experience because of the men and women that 409 00:22:44,800 --> 00:22:47,240 Speaker 3: I got to work with. They're all dedicated. They were all, 410 00:22:47,760 --> 00:22:50,679 Speaker 3: you know, in my opinion, type eight type personality. They 411 00:22:50,720 --> 00:22:53,120 Speaker 3: want to win, they want to succeed. They don't plain 412 00:22:53,200 --> 00:22:56,200 Speaker 3: when it's time to train. They will put themselves through 413 00:22:56,760 --> 00:23:00,200 Speaker 3: the most rigorous training to make sure that they are 414 00:23:00,480 --> 00:23:03,399 Speaker 3: fit for duty because that is their job. And it 415 00:23:03,440 --> 00:23:09,040 Speaker 3: doesn't matter of political views, whether you're a Republican, Democrat, independent, 416 00:23:09,080 --> 00:23:11,399 Speaker 3: and not of it matters. We all take an oath 417 00:23:11,440 --> 00:23:15,359 Speaker 3: to protect the Office of the United States, and that's 418 00:23:15,480 --> 00:23:17,240 Speaker 3: you know, the President United States. That's who we're there 419 00:23:17,280 --> 00:23:20,440 Speaker 3: to protect, and so that oath we take extremely seriously. 420 00:23:21,119 --> 00:23:25,560 Speaker 2: Besides the communication and then the timely issue getting him 421 00:23:25,600 --> 00:23:29,320 Speaker 2: from the stage to his vehicle, what else went through 422 00:23:29,400 --> 00:23:31,040 Speaker 2: your mind as you're watching it. 423 00:23:31,160 --> 00:23:34,600 Speaker 3: I didn't understand how a person can get a shot 424 00:23:34,600 --> 00:23:38,640 Speaker 3: off like that. That to me, I knew immediately there's 425 00:23:39,119 --> 00:23:42,840 Speaker 3: something was either overlooked or not protected. And when they 426 00:23:42,840 --> 00:23:45,320 Speaker 3: first started showing the aerial photos or when they started 427 00:23:45,359 --> 00:23:47,639 Speaker 3: showing you know that there was a shooter on a 428 00:23:47,760 --> 00:23:51,080 Speaker 3: roof by first sen state was wild come. We didn't 429 00:23:51,119 --> 00:23:53,800 Speaker 3: have somebody on that route. So the way it works 430 00:23:53,800 --> 00:23:56,680 Speaker 3: in the Secret Service, they operate in pairs, so there 431 00:23:56,680 --> 00:24:00,200 Speaker 3: were they or you know, so you have your sniper 432 00:24:00,240 --> 00:24:03,440 Speaker 3: and a spotter. You know a lot of times they 433 00:24:03,600 --> 00:24:06,560 Speaker 3: like said they worked together. So they were two teams. 434 00:24:07,240 --> 00:24:09,679 Speaker 3: So there are four personnel and total, two teams on 435 00:24:09,720 --> 00:24:12,880 Speaker 3: two different buildings. There's that one video that you see 436 00:24:12,880 --> 00:24:16,040 Speaker 3: where it looks like the sniper may have fired a shot, 437 00:24:16,119 --> 00:24:18,439 Speaker 3: but actually that's when the first shot rang out, and 438 00:24:18,480 --> 00:24:21,080 Speaker 3: so what you see there is. You know the shot came, 439 00:24:21,119 --> 00:24:23,760 Speaker 3: he saw it, he fledged. Now he's got to get 440 00:24:23,760 --> 00:24:26,560 Speaker 3: back on his site and either deliver the shot or 441 00:24:26,600 --> 00:24:29,840 Speaker 3: it came from a different the different the other sniper team, 442 00:24:30,400 --> 00:24:32,479 Speaker 3: because I didn't see a muscle flash out of that 443 00:24:32,880 --> 00:24:35,239 Speaker 3: out of that sniper rifle. To me, I saw that, 444 00:24:35,280 --> 00:24:37,040 Speaker 3: and I'm Michael. I don't think he fired the shot. 445 00:24:37,640 --> 00:24:41,040 Speaker 3: I think it came from the other team. But more importantly, 446 00:24:41,400 --> 00:24:45,040 Speaker 3: how on earth did somebody get on a rooftop in 447 00:24:45,119 --> 00:24:47,520 Speaker 3: a sniper's nest and take a shot at some former 448 00:24:47,600 --> 00:24:52,120 Speaker 3: president Donald Trump? That should not happen again. My brain 449 00:24:52,160 --> 00:24:54,360 Speaker 3: immediately goes to, what's one of the first things we're 450 00:24:54,359 --> 00:24:56,640 Speaker 3: going to eliminate his line of sight? 451 00:24:57,240 --> 00:25:00,560 Speaker 2: Line of fight, right? You know, that's even one thing 452 00:25:00,600 --> 00:25:04,879 Speaker 2: we practice. Whether you're working a sexual assault case, a 453 00:25:04,920 --> 00:25:08,679 Speaker 2: stalking case, a homicide, you look for those places the 454 00:25:08,720 --> 00:25:14,080 Speaker 2: person could have had a vantage point, some visual owned 455 00:25:14,400 --> 00:25:18,320 Speaker 2: the victim, right bottom line for everybody listening, if you 456 00:25:18,400 --> 00:25:20,760 Speaker 2: can see it, they can see you. Right. 457 00:25:21,200 --> 00:25:23,359 Speaker 1: So if it's a tree or a building or. 458 00:25:24,880 --> 00:25:28,600 Speaker 2: A shed or a vehicle, anything somebody can hide behind, 459 00:25:28,680 --> 00:25:30,560 Speaker 2: if you can see it, you need to take care 460 00:25:30,600 --> 00:25:34,600 Speaker 2: of that. You need to see, like I'll use Moscow, you. 461 00:25:34,560 --> 00:25:37,040 Speaker 1: Know, Idaho. Where could the person. 462 00:25:36,760 --> 00:25:39,800 Speaker 2: That killed those four students have seen inside their house? 463 00:25:40,400 --> 00:25:43,280 Speaker 2: Lots of places that person could have gone and stalked 464 00:25:43,359 --> 00:25:46,280 Speaker 2: them from the outside, and if the light's grown on 465 00:25:46,320 --> 00:25:48,800 Speaker 2: the inside, they could have seen inside the house. So 466 00:25:48,920 --> 00:25:52,159 Speaker 2: that's the kind of thing you're telling us that one 467 00:25:52,240 --> 00:25:56,560 Speaker 2: hundred and fifty yards away, that rooftop absolutely should have 468 00:25:56,640 --> 00:25:57,800 Speaker 2: had somebody on top. 469 00:25:58,040 --> 00:26:02,080 Speaker 3: One hundred thousand percent. You know, I heard it earlier 470 00:26:02,119 --> 00:26:06,199 Speaker 3: today where it came out that the reason the Secret 471 00:26:06,240 --> 00:26:10,640 Speaker 3: Service did not have personnel on that rooftop is because 472 00:26:10,800 --> 00:26:14,360 Speaker 3: it was a pitched roof had had an angle. That's 473 00:26:14,400 --> 00:26:17,080 Speaker 3: not a good enough reason. You know. I've worked details 474 00:26:17,119 --> 00:26:20,600 Speaker 3: before where I was in some very uncomfortable positions myself. 475 00:26:21,280 --> 00:26:24,920 Speaker 3: But those counter sniper teams, they were on a roof 476 00:26:24,960 --> 00:26:28,359 Speaker 3: that had a pitch to it. They were angled, right. 477 00:26:28,800 --> 00:26:32,480 Speaker 3: You also have the angles and the roofs at the 478 00:26:32,480 --> 00:26:36,040 Speaker 3: White House. You have it in it around wherever they travel, 479 00:26:36,200 --> 00:26:39,800 Speaker 3: so it's never a perfect flat roof. So to me, 480 00:26:40,000 --> 00:26:42,360 Speaker 3: that doesn't make any sense at all. And to be honest, 481 00:26:42,400 --> 00:26:45,399 Speaker 3: that pitch in the roof that the suspected sniper was 482 00:26:45,480 --> 00:26:50,080 Speaker 3: on that didn't have very much of an angle to it. Regardless, 483 00:26:50,160 --> 00:26:52,480 Speaker 3: if they didn't want to put anyone on the roof, 484 00:26:52,560 --> 00:26:55,000 Speaker 3: nobody should have been able to get access to the roof. 485 00:26:55,760 --> 00:26:58,840 Speaker 3: So if we take it a step further right, typically 486 00:26:58,880 --> 00:27:01,560 Speaker 3: you would put a counter sniper team on that rooftop. 487 00:27:01,600 --> 00:27:03,080 Speaker 3: You can put an agent on there. But if we 488 00:27:03,080 --> 00:27:06,000 Speaker 3: don't have enough sniper teams, you still have the state 489 00:27:06,040 --> 00:27:09,240 Speaker 3: police sniper teams, you have the counties or their slot 490 00:27:09,840 --> 00:27:13,000 Speaker 3: for the county. There were special response teams, sniper teams 491 00:27:13,440 --> 00:27:15,520 Speaker 3: that you can put up there as well. It's not 492 00:27:15,600 --> 00:27:18,359 Speaker 3: like we couldn't secure that if it was needed. You know, 493 00:27:18,359 --> 00:27:20,400 Speaker 3: they say that, well, that wasn't part of our perimeter. 494 00:27:20,800 --> 00:27:22,840 Speaker 3: How is that not part of the perimeter. We were 495 00:27:22,880 --> 00:27:24,920 Speaker 3: one hundred and fifth less than one hundred and fifty 496 00:27:25,000 --> 00:27:28,160 Speaker 3: yards away from the stage, one of the only buildings 497 00:27:28,200 --> 00:27:31,120 Speaker 3: that has a line of sight. So I don't understand 498 00:27:31,119 --> 00:27:35,159 Speaker 3: how that wasn't secured. And again, if the true reason 499 00:27:35,359 --> 00:27:37,679 Speaker 3: is that we couldn't put somebody out there because of 500 00:27:37,720 --> 00:27:41,040 Speaker 3: the pitched roof, then there should have been no access 501 00:27:41,280 --> 00:27:44,080 Speaker 3: to get onto that roof, which means we would have 502 00:27:44,160 --> 00:27:48,000 Speaker 3: put local law enforcement and they say it was outside 503 00:27:48,000 --> 00:27:50,760 Speaker 3: of the perimeter. Okay, we could have put local law 504 00:27:50,840 --> 00:27:53,600 Speaker 3: enforcement to guard to make sure nobody on the four 505 00:27:53,640 --> 00:27:57,240 Speaker 3: corners basically of the building nobody can get on. You 506 00:27:57,320 --> 00:28:01,160 Speaker 3: have personnel inside. There's no ladders that they climb. There's 507 00:28:01,160 --> 00:28:03,560 Speaker 3: no ladders that you can bring onto that site because 508 00:28:03,560 --> 00:28:05,880 Speaker 3: you wouldn't have access to be able to freely walk 509 00:28:05,960 --> 00:28:06,400 Speaker 3: to it. 510 00:28:11,280 --> 00:28:13,560 Speaker 1: During the site survey. 511 00:28:13,640 --> 00:28:16,840 Speaker 2: Even if you climbed up there and said, hey, Jim, 512 00:28:16,920 --> 00:28:19,600 Speaker 2: can you see me, I'm laying flat, tell me when 513 00:28:19,640 --> 00:28:22,320 Speaker 2: you can see me. Well, if I'm getting all the 514 00:28:22,320 --> 00:28:24,840 Speaker 2: way up there and you don't see me till I 515 00:28:24,880 --> 00:28:26,960 Speaker 2: pop up to take a shot, then that should have 516 00:28:26,960 --> 00:28:27,439 Speaker 2: been dealt with. 517 00:28:27,840 --> 00:28:30,760 Speaker 3: Should have been dealt with, should have had personnel on 518 00:28:30,800 --> 00:28:34,840 Speaker 3: the ground. Again, if you blocked off the roadways as 519 00:28:34,840 --> 00:28:39,920 Speaker 3: they were supposed to be, you funnel your visitors to 520 00:28:40,000 --> 00:28:43,000 Speaker 3: the site into one area where they have to go 521 00:28:43,080 --> 00:28:46,240 Speaker 3: through the magnetometers. It's roped off, it's blocked off. You 522 00:28:46,400 --> 00:28:50,360 Speaker 3: literally have law enforcement there that nobody, and I mean 523 00:28:50,560 --> 00:28:53,760 Speaker 3: nobody is allowed on the other side of this tape 524 00:28:53,920 --> 00:28:56,800 Speaker 3: right to funnel everyone to where they need to be. 525 00:28:57,120 --> 00:29:00,240 Speaker 3: You had you can have secured somebody inside that building, 526 00:29:00,280 --> 00:29:02,520 Speaker 3: which I understand that we're people inside that building now 527 00:29:02,880 --> 00:29:05,640 Speaker 3: on the four corners of it. Nobody at any time 528 00:29:05,640 --> 00:29:08,280 Speaker 3: should be able to access that rooftop. And the fact 529 00:29:08,280 --> 00:29:11,680 Speaker 3: that it was so open, you know, it was reported 530 00:29:11,720 --> 00:29:15,920 Speaker 3: that the suspect was able to was being very suspicious 531 00:29:15,920 --> 00:29:19,920 Speaker 3: around the magnetometers to begin with, how to rangefinder like 532 00:29:19,960 --> 00:29:22,400 Speaker 3: a golf range fighter that you would use and you'd 533 00:29:22,440 --> 00:29:24,720 Speaker 3: put on the flagstick on the hole and figure out 534 00:29:24,720 --> 00:29:28,160 Speaker 3: how far away am I. He had a rangefinder, was 535 00:29:28,200 --> 00:29:32,080 Speaker 3: able to go back to his vehicle, grab a bag 536 00:29:32,520 --> 00:29:35,600 Speaker 3: which and then be able to put this weapon, this 537 00:29:35,960 --> 00:29:40,720 Speaker 3: AR fifteen, into operation. All major red flags, all things 538 00:29:40,720 --> 00:29:43,040 Speaker 3: that should have never have been able to happen. 539 00:29:43,520 --> 00:29:47,000 Speaker 2: Agreed, And you know, I think of things like the 540 00:29:47,080 --> 00:29:49,440 Speaker 2: Mall in Washington to me is one of the most 541 00:29:50,000 --> 00:29:55,360 Speaker 2: gorgeous places anywhere. And when you look at that Washington 542 00:29:55,400 --> 00:29:59,640 Speaker 2: Monument and then that reflecting pool, I mean, it just 543 00:29:59,640 --> 00:30:02,200 Speaker 2: looks like a postcard no matter what photograph you take, 544 00:30:02,320 --> 00:30:04,040 Speaker 2: no matter what time of day and what time. 545 00:30:03,880 --> 00:30:07,280 Speaker 1: Of year, it's perfect. But if you look at that 546 00:30:07,360 --> 00:30:10,920 Speaker 1: reflecting pool, like the security. 547 00:30:10,400 --> 00:30:14,800 Speaker 2: Measure it is, it's genius. The crowd has to separate. 548 00:30:15,280 --> 00:30:17,680 Speaker 2: There's got to be a place where you got to 549 00:30:17,720 --> 00:30:21,480 Speaker 2: go in two different directions. You can't just mob right there. 550 00:30:21,600 --> 00:30:24,640 Speaker 2: You can't do it when you have that type of layout. 551 00:30:25,000 --> 00:30:29,080 Speaker 2: Again it's built in. But when you have an open field, 552 00:30:30,920 --> 00:30:34,040 Speaker 2: oh my god, it just you know, here's the deal, 553 00:30:34,160 --> 00:30:36,240 Speaker 2: here's the deal. And I want to say this as 554 00:30:36,280 --> 00:30:40,840 Speaker 2: clearly as I can. Yes, mistakes were made, and yes 555 00:30:40,920 --> 00:30:42,920 Speaker 2: there's gonna be debriefings. There are going to be things 556 00:30:42,960 --> 00:30:45,720 Speaker 2: now probably put in place where the car is parked 557 00:30:45,760 --> 00:30:48,880 Speaker 2: right in front as it should be, and that's just 558 00:30:48,880 --> 00:30:52,440 Speaker 2: going to be standard. And we always learn, We always, 559 00:30:53,400 --> 00:30:55,680 Speaker 2: you know, worst case scenario, then we make it better. 560 00:30:56,000 --> 00:30:59,200 Speaker 2: We're always learning, right, But what I saw were heroes. 561 00:31:00,120 --> 00:31:03,080 Speaker 2: What I saw were people that maybe there was somebody 562 00:31:03,080 --> 00:31:05,800 Speaker 2: that couldn't reholst for her weapon, but she freaking had 563 00:31:05,800 --> 00:31:09,280 Speaker 2: her weapon out and she was standing there, and she 564 00:31:09,440 --> 00:31:12,400 Speaker 2: was willing to put herself in great danger, not knowing 565 00:31:12,480 --> 00:31:14,960 Speaker 2: exactly what was going to happen, doing a job that 566 00:31:15,040 --> 00:31:19,280 Speaker 2: a lot of people, I would say majority would not do, 567 00:31:19,640 --> 00:31:23,400 Speaker 2: could not do. So nothing but appreciation for everything that 568 00:31:23,480 --> 00:31:27,920 Speaker 2: I saw, and to prove that you know, nobody has 569 00:31:28,000 --> 00:31:31,560 Speaker 2: lost any faith in the Secret Service. Donald Trump went 570 00:31:31,640 --> 00:31:35,240 Speaker 2: right on about his business, and so did Barack Obama, 571 00:31:35,360 --> 00:31:37,880 Speaker 2: and so did Joe Biden and etc. 572 00:31:38,320 --> 00:31:40,840 Speaker 1: Etc and etc. And so have their families. 573 00:31:41,240 --> 00:31:45,480 Speaker 2: So nothing but respect for the men and women of 574 00:31:45,520 --> 00:31:47,360 Speaker 2: the United States Secret Service. So I just want to 575 00:31:47,400 --> 00:31:49,480 Speaker 2: say that before we go any further, because I don't 576 00:31:49,480 --> 00:31:53,080 Speaker 2: want anybody to think we're bashing anybody. We're not. What 577 00:31:53,120 --> 00:31:56,240 Speaker 2: we're trying to do is say, hey, this happened, and 578 00:31:56,320 --> 00:31:58,040 Speaker 2: it absolutely cannot happen again. 579 00:31:58,200 --> 00:32:00,000 Speaker 3: You need sometime cheft that fell in order to learn 580 00:32:00,080 --> 00:32:03,080 Speaker 3: and it's unfortunate that it's a circumstance like this, But 581 00:32:03,120 --> 00:32:05,640 Speaker 3: you know, again, this hasn't happened since nineteen eighty one. 582 00:32:06,080 --> 00:32:09,280 Speaker 3: Technology has changed the amount of information that's out there 583 00:32:09,320 --> 00:32:12,080 Speaker 3: that can be gathered before an event even takes place. 584 00:32:12,640 --> 00:32:15,720 Speaker 3: You know that used to not be accessible back in 585 00:32:15,800 --> 00:32:19,400 Speaker 3: nineteen eighty one. So this is the first incident that's happened, 586 00:32:19,480 --> 00:32:23,520 Speaker 3: hopefully the last that will happen in our lifetime. But 587 00:32:23,800 --> 00:32:28,280 Speaker 3: this will now bring out the greatest minds on security 588 00:32:28,640 --> 00:32:32,800 Speaker 3: to set up ways to prevent something like this from happening. 589 00:32:32,880 --> 00:32:36,880 Speaker 3: Ever again, So as unfortunate as a circumstance was It's 590 00:32:36,920 --> 00:32:39,640 Speaker 3: also a blessing in the fact that now we can 591 00:32:39,760 --> 00:32:41,680 Speaker 3: learn from this and we can tighten it up and 592 00:32:41,720 --> 00:32:45,479 Speaker 3: make it safe for anybody that's getting Secret Service protection, 593 00:32:45,600 --> 00:32:49,080 Speaker 3: regardless of your political views. We need to protect the 594 00:32:49,120 --> 00:32:51,160 Speaker 3: leaders of our world day in and day out. 595 00:32:51,600 --> 00:32:53,800 Speaker 1: You know, Jim, this will make you laugh, But I 596 00:32:53,800 --> 00:32:56,400 Speaker 1: have a sister, Charlane. She lives next door to me. 597 00:32:57,120 --> 00:33:02,840 Speaker 2: We're very close, obviously, but she paid for an exterminator 598 00:33:02,960 --> 00:33:08,720 Speaker 2: to come out outside and spray for mosquitoes. Well, I 599 00:33:08,760 --> 00:33:10,720 Speaker 2: of course just had a laughing attack, because how in 600 00:33:10,760 --> 00:33:15,840 Speaker 2: the world do you try to combat that outside? 601 00:33:16,000 --> 00:33:19,720 Speaker 1: You know, And this to me is the same thing. 602 00:33:20,240 --> 00:33:25,240 Speaker 2: When you're talking about outside, the vulnerability is at a 603 00:33:25,360 --> 00:33:28,720 Speaker 2: level that is just not the case anywhere else obviously. 604 00:33:29,160 --> 00:33:34,560 Speaker 2: But you know, Andrew Jackson, Theodore Roosevelt, Ronald Reagan, Donald Trump, Kennedy, 605 00:33:34,920 --> 00:33:38,200 Speaker 2: they were all shot outside. Well, I don't know how 606 00:33:38,240 --> 00:33:44,760 Speaker 2: you truly ever locked that down. So the vulnerability is there. 607 00:33:45,600 --> 00:33:48,520 Speaker 2: You've got the best in the world. And to prove 608 00:33:48,560 --> 00:33:54,200 Speaker 2: that again, y'all, every leader of every country, every head 609 00:33:54,200 --> 00:33:58,280 Speaker 2: of state, from every single country in the world relies 610 00:33:58,320 --> 00:34:00,800 Speaker 2: on the Secret Service when they come to the United States. 611 00:34:01,280 --> 00:34:06,600 Speaker 2: So there's no question the caliber of protection that they're getting. 612 00:34:06,720 --> 00:34:09,440 Speaker 2: And I want to say that over and over, I. 613 00:34:09,400 --> 00:34:12,480 Speaker 3: Would completely agree with that. It's it's very difficult to do, 614 00:34:12,600 --> 00:34:17,120 Speaker 3: but it happens every single day. There's somebody meeting protection there, 615 00:34:17,120 --> 00:34:20,520 Speaker 3: whether they go to do a venue such as the 616 00:34:20,520 --> 00:34:23,200 Speaker 3: one former President Trump just did, or are they doing 617 00:34:23,280 --> 00:34:27,080 Speaker 3: a big convention. Are they a guest speaker somewhere, are 618 00:34:27,120 --> 00:34:30,399 Speaker 3: they amongst their trivel are they meeting with foreignicarias somewhere else? 619 00:34:31,000 --> 00:34:34,319 Speaker 3: You know, these are all things that happen every single day, 620 00:34:34,640 --> 00:34:37,240 Speaker 3: and they have been flawless for years. 621 00:34:37,600 --> 00:34:40,440 Speaker 2: And it's not just for them. They're protecting the children 622 00:34:40,520 --> 00:34:43,680 Speaker 2: too and wives. I mean, you've got a lot of 623 00:34:43,719 --> 00:34:47,480 Speaker 2: moving parts and a lot of moving people every single 624 00:34:47,600 --> 00:34:51,640 Speaker 2: day going to different events where they're speaking, or they've 625 00:34:51,680 --> 00:34:54,120 Speaker 2: been invited, or it's a family function, or they're going 626 00:34:54,160 --> 00:34:58,240 Speaker 2: to college, whatever it is. What have I not asked you? 627 00:34:58,239 --> 00:35:00,000 Speaker 2: You want to be sure you talk about. 628 00:35:00,080 --> 00:35:04,160 Speaker 3: There's just a lot of unanswered questions at this point, 629 00:35:04,200 --> 00:35:06,920 Speaker 3: and we have to wait for the investigation to happen. 630 00:35:07,040 --> 00:35:09,360 Speaker 3: We know that it's going to take several weeks. You know, 631 00:35:09,440 --> 00:35:12,680 Speaker 3: every day we get little tidbits of information, but we 632 00:35:12,719 --> 00:35:14,720 Speaker 3: don't know the full scope of everything that had happened, 633 00:35:14,760 --> 00:35:17,000 Speaker 3: how it happened, what were the motives of the suspect 634 00:35:17,040 --> 00:35:19,920 Speaker 3: to do this. There's so much that needs to be 635 00:35:21,080 --> 00:35:25,160 Speaker 3: brought to light, you know. And the FBI now has 636 00:35:25,239 --> 00:35:30,400 Speaker 3: this investigation and almost like when they had the marathon 637 00:35:30,480 --> 00:35:33,480 Speaker 3: bombings in Boston. And I learned this recently from one 638 00:35:33,560 --> 00:35:38,319 Speaker 3: of the retired FBI agents that I know. But there 639 00:35:38,320 --> 00:35:40,680 Speaker 3: were a lot of people in that crowd and as 640 00:35:40,719 --> 00:35:44,319 Speaker 3: you knowed being a you know, a forensic, uh you know, 641 00:35:44,560 --> 00:35:48,960 Speaker 3: investigator and crime scene you know, they're all that those 642 00:35:49,000 --> 00:35:52,040 Speaker 3: phones that you see in the crowd all hold a 643 00:35:52,080 --> 00:35:55,560 Speaker 3: piece of evidence. You may have some of those phones 644 00:35:55,600 --> 00:35:59,160 Speaker 3: that can so exactly when that shooter got into place. Uh, 645 00:35:59,480 --> 00:36:01,640 Speaker 3: you know, there will be looking for everything. Was is 646 00:36:01,680 --> 00:36:04,440 Speaker 3: there a co conspira somewhere within the crowd. They're going 647 00:36:04,520 --> 00:36:07,640 Speaker 3: to go through every single piece of evidence and and 648 00:36:07,640 --> 00:36:09,279 Speaker 3: and you know, I know some of the questions have 649 00:36:09,320 --> 00:36:11,680 Speaker 3: come to me since last week, Well, how do they 650 00:36:12,320 --> 00:36:13,920 Speaker 3: how do they go over all that? How do they 651 00:36:14,000 --> 00:36:17,120 Speaker 3: access all that information? And what the FBI was able 652 00:36:17,160 --> 00:36:20,040 Speaker 3: to do back with the Boston marathon bombing. They actually 653 00:36:20,040 --> 00:36:22,840 Speaker 3: created a link like a site for people to be 654 00:36:22,840 --> 00:36:26,160 Speaker 3: able to submit their videos of what they had and 655 00:36:26,200 --> 00:36:27,920 Speaker 3: they were asked to do so, and a lot of 656 00:36:27,960 --> 00:36:30,239 Speaker 3: them did. And so when they submit that information, it 657 00:36:30,320 --> 00:36:32,839 Speaker 3: clearly comes with their you know, their names, and their 658 00:36:32,880 --> 00:36:35,960 Speaker 3: contact information, so they can get to the bottom of 659 00:36:36,040 --> 00:36:38,359 Speaker 3: or if they have secondary questions, they can go back 660 00:36:38,400 --> 00:36:41,279 Speaker 3: and talk to them. And that's essentially the same thing 661 00:36:41,320 --> 00:36:43,720 Speaker 3: that's going on here, because you've got thousands of people, 662 00:36:44,239 --> 00:36:47,080 Speaker 3: thousands of phones, and there's no way they're going to 663 00:36:47,120 --> 00:36:49,320 Speaker 3: sit there and do some penis for everybody's phone. So 664 00:36:49,360 --> 00:36:51,200 Speaker 3: they're going to hope that people are going to voluntarily 665 00:36:51,200 --> 00:36:53,239 Speaker 3: give this and then give them some sort of link 666 00:36:53,360 --> 00:36:56,319 Speaker 3: or access to put that information on there so they 667 00:36:56,320 --> 00:36:59,120 Speaker 3: can come through it and go through their meticulous ways 668 00:36:59,800 --> 00:37:03,840 Speaker 3: of identifying we know whether there's a co conspirator, what 669 00:37:03,920 --> 00:37:05,680 Speaker 3: happened with the shooter, and be able to piece this 670 00:37:05,880 --> 00:37:09,440 Speaker 3: altogether for everybody. So that is something that I know 671 00:37:09,560 --> 00:37:13,000 Speaker 3: is quite challenging, but you know, they're pretty good at 672 00:37:13,040 --> 00:37:15,120 Speaker 3: being able to do that, and I'm sure you're able 673 00:37:15,160 --> 00:37:18,080 Speaker 3: to take a bigger deep dive into how that's collected. 674 00:37:18,480 --> 00:37:20,480 Speaker 2: I can take exactly how we did it during the 675 00:37:20,520 --> 00:37:23,040 Speaker 2: Olympic Park bombing. I mean, it was something else, even 676 00:37:23,080 --> 00:37:26,359 Speaker 2: collecting shoes that we thought might have evidence. So yes, 677 00:37:26,480 --> 00:37:33,920 Speaker 2: that's critical information. The only other thing that I want 678 00:37:33,960 --> 00:37:37,120 Speaker 2: to touch on briefly is I remember during nine to 679 00:37:37,160 --> 00:37:42,239 Speaker 2: eleven they cautioned parents to not just keep watching the 680 00:37:42,320 --> 00:37:47,719 Speaker 2: news on a loop because small children could not distinguish 681 00:37:48,840 --> 00:37:53,880 Speaker 2: that that was a rerun, that they thought multiple planes 682 00:37:53,920 --> 00:37:58,560 Speaker 2: were hitting multiple buildings. So again, just be sure that 683 00:37:58,680 --> 00:38:03,560 Speaker 2: you're having conversations that he was shot one time and 684 00:38:03,640 --> 00:38:04,400 Speaker 2: one time only. 685 00:38:04,480 --> 00:38:06,720 Speaker 1: This is not a second event, or a third event, 686 00:38:06,880 --> 00:38:07,680 Speaker 1: or a fourth event. 687 00:38:08,520 --> 00:38:12,480 Speaker 2: And you know, maybe even limit your own you know 688 00:38:12,560 --> 00:38:15,879 Speaker 2: how much time you're spending watching, you know, for your 689 00:38:15,920 --> 00:38:20,160 Speaker 2: own just mental well being, take a step back when 690 00:38:20,200 --> 00:38:20,560 Speaker 2: you can. 691 00:38:20,880 --> 00:38:22,200 Speaker 1: That's just my two cents. 692 00:38:22,480 --> 00:38:24,600 Speaker 3: I agree with you fully, and I know you had 693 00:38:24,640 --> 00:38:26,279 Speaker 3: asked you just a few minutes ago if there was 694 00:38:26,320 --> 00:38:28,720 Speaker 3: any other points I wanted to bring up, But there is. 695 00:38:28,600 --> 00:38:31,040 Speaker 1: One, okay, and if I may please. 696 00:38:31,080 --> 00:38:34,000 Speaker 3: We now know that there was this person was reported 697 00:38:34,040 --> 00:38:38,880 Speaker 3: approximately thirty minutes prior to former Trump President Trump taking 698 00:38:38,920 --> 00:38:42,200 Speaker 3: the stage, and then as time went on, there was 699 00:38:42,239 --> 00:38:45,719 Speaker 3: this three to four minute time frame where law force 700 00:38:45,760 --> 00:38:49,160 Speaker 3: you being pointed out to the building, the suspect got 701 00:38:49,200 --> 00:38:51,920 Speaker 3: on the roof, was crawling into his position. We know 702 00:38:52,040 --> 00:38:55,239 Speaker 3: that there was an officer because they were interviewed by 703 00:38:55,280 --> 00:38:59,040 Speaker 3: the FBI had made eye contact with the suspects. Suspect 704 00:38:59,040 --> 00:39:02,880 Speaker 3: point his right's lad he got down. But at that point, 705 00:39:03,760 --> 00:39:06,279 Speaker 3: and this is what this is another part where I'm 706 00:39:06,360 --> 00:39:09,040 Speaker 3: very confused. If you know that there is a threat 707 00:39:09,040 --> 00:39:11,640 Speaker 3: out there, a physical threat to where you can lose 708 00:39:11,880 --> 00:39:16,080 Speaker 3: your life, especially to protect ee, you shouldn't have been 709 00:39:16,120 --> 00:39:19,520 Speaker 3: on that stage. And so I don't know where the 710 00:39:19,719 --> 00:39:22,480 Speaker 3: breakdown came, whether it was in communication or if they 711 00:39:22,480 --> 00:39:25,280 Speaker 3: thought they had the threat neutralized, or they didn't believe 712 00:39:25,320 --> 00:39:29,160 Speaker 3: that there really was one. I don't understand that. To me, 713 00:39:29,280 --> 00:39:32,719 Speaker 3: that just brings off a very big question because what 714 00:39:33,000 --> 00:39:35,479 Speaker 3: I would put myself on those shoes if I were 715 00:39:35,640 --> 00:39:38,520 Speaker 3: to be the local law enforcement and I know that 716 00:39:38,560 --> 00:39:41,800 Speaker 3: this person's on the roof and he's armed. You have 717 00:39:41,920 --> 00:39:44,399 Speaker 3: plenty of bystanders that can get a view from where 718 00:39:44,400 --> 00:39:47,919 Speaker 3: they were standing to say he's right there, right, And 719 00:39:48,000 --> 00:39:50,520 Speaker 3: so if climbing on the roof wasn't an option, then 720 00:39:50,520 --> 00:39:53,080 Speaker 3: maybe you should have gotten line of sight from where 721 00:39:53,080 --> 00:39:56,040 Speaker 3: the bystanders were, and at that point, I feel that 722 00:39:56,080 --> 00:40:00,120 Speaker 3: it is your duty and your obligation to distract that 723 00:40:00,680 --> 00:40:05,319 Speaker 3: suspect or that potential shooter from shooting innocent people or 724 00:40:05,360 --> 00:40:09,000 Speaker 3: even the protectee. So even if he fired a few rounds, 725 00:40:09,080 --> 00:40:11,719 Speaker 3: even if they hit the top of the building, at 726 00:40:11,760 --> 00:40:14,360 Speaker 3: least everybody in the area knows what's going on and 727 00:40:14,400 --> 00:40:16,360 Speaker 3: they have a chance to get covered. You got a 728 00:40:16,400 --> 00:40:19,359 Speaker 3: chance to get your protected, you off the stage, you know, 729 00:40:19,840 --> 00:40:22,200 Speaker 3: And so these are all things that have gone through 730 00:40:22,200 --> 00:40:25,000 Speaker 3: my head. Is so why didn't that happen? But more importantly, 731 00:40:25,080 --> 00:40:27,440 Speaker 3: why are we allowing him to be on the stage 732 00:40:27,480 --> 00:40:30,040 Speaker 3: talking when we know the threat's going on. They could 733 00:40:30,040 --> 00:40:32,839 Speaker 3: have gotten him off the stage. It's happened before, it's 734 00:40:32,840 --> 00:40:35,399 Speaker 3: happened with you know where you've had to go through 735 00:40:35,440 --> 00:40:39,280 Speaker 3: those protective levels where you get the president will elect 736 00:40:39,360 --> 00:40:43,200 Speaker 3: or the candidate or the president off the stage into 737 00:40:43,239 --> 00:40:46,520 Speaker 3: a safe location, and then when the threat or the 738 00:40:46,600 --> 00:40:49,560 Speaker 3: issue at hand is taken care of, they come back 739 00:40:49,560 --> 00:40:53,760 Speaker 3: out and finish their speech. But protection has to come first. 740 00:40:53,800 --> 00:40:55,759 Speaker 3: And so those are the little levels of breakdowns that 741 00:40:55,760 --> 00:40:59,040 Speaker 3: I'm really anxious to find out how that was able 742 00:40:59,080 --> 00:41:02,400 Speaker 3: to continue on when protocols on the path. I've always 743 00:41:02,440 --> 00:41:04,680 Speaker 3: been to be removed from that situation. So I just 744 00:41:04,680 --> 00:41:08,320 Speaker 3: would like to know where that breakdown came from. 745 00:41:08,480 --> 00:41:13,360 Speaker 2: The Director of the United States Secret Service resigned July 746 00:41:13,480 --> 00:41:17,560 Speaker 2: twenty third, twenty twenty four. This is the right call. 747 00:41:18,080 --> 00:41:22,920 Speaker 2: If you respect the badge, the job, and your oath 748 00:41:22,920 --> 00:41:28,480 Speaker 2: of office, there is no other alternative but resignation. This was, 749 00:41:28,560 --> 00:41:33,520 Speaker 2: in fact, a colossal failure on many levels. Her resignation 750 00:41:33,960 --> 00:41:38,440 Speaker 2: should happen because you want to protect the morale of 751 00:41:38,480 --> 00:41:44,719 Speaker 2: your office, you must protect your people, and you absolutely, 752 00:41:45,080 --> 00:41:50,680 Speaker 2: without fail must protect dignitaries at home and abroad. 753 00:41:51,239 --> 00:41:51,680 Speaker 1: Period. 754 00:41:53,200 --> 00:41:55,680 Speaker 2: Jim Rathman, I cannot thank you enough for being with 755 00:41:55,800 --> 00:41:59,919 Speaker 2: us tonight to talking so openly and so honestly about 756 00:42:00,200 --> 00:42:04,520 Speaker 2: the assassination attempt on former President Donald Trump. You know, 757 00:42:04,600 --> 00:42:08,759 Speaker 2: I adore you, I respect you, and I just am 758 00:42:08,800 --> 00:42:11,719 Speaker 2: grateful for you being with us tonight and shedding some 759 00:42:11,840 --> 00:42:12,880 Speaker 2: light on this topic. 760 00:42:13,360 --> 00:42:15,480 Speaker 3: I thank you so much for giving me the opportunity 761 00:42:15,480 --> 00:42:17,240 Speaker 3: to come on and chat with you. You know, I always 762 00:42:17,280 --> 00:42:20,319 Speaker 3: love hanging out and chat with you anyway, and you 763 00:42:20,320 --> 00:42:22,360 Speaker 3: know it's a good opportunity for us to partner up 764 00:42:22,400 --> 00:42:24,960 Speaker 3: and do this, and anytime I can ever come back, 765 00:42:25,680 --> 00:42:27,520 Speaker 3: you know how to reach me. Happy to come back 766 00:42:27,560 --> 00:42:28,680 Speaker 3: in the top y'all. 767 00:42:28,719 --> 00:42:30,839 Speaker 2: I'm going to end Zone seven the way that I 768 00:42:30,880 --> 00:42:36,680 Speaker 2: always do with a quote. Assassination is the extreme form 769 00:42:37,120 --> 00:42:43,319 Speaker 2: of censorship, George Bernard Shaw. I'm Cheryl McCollum, and this 770 00:42:43,360 --> 00:42:44,120 Speaker 2: is Zone seven.