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Speaker 1: Quick housekeeping note a literal one. Matt and I were

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Speaker 1: so into the thunderstorms that we're happening while we were

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Speaker 1: recording that, as we mentioned on air, we left us

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Speaker 1: doors and some windows open. Uh. So that is why

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Speaker 1: you're hearing some fuzz for the first few minutes on

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Speaker 1: my end. Oh no, it's on my end too, And

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Speaker 1: just to be clear, I was the one who suggested

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Speaker 1: it, and and I am sorry everybody. As we use the

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Speaker 1: software called isotope, which gets rid of you know, background

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Speaker 1: noise and stuff. Uh I wasn't thinking, so sorry, So

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Speaker 1: please welcome our special guests is there for the first

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Speaker 1: twelve minutes, the rain from UFOs to psychic powers and

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Speaker 1: government conspiracies. History is riddled with unexplained events. You can

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Speaker 1: turn back now or learn the stuff they don't want

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Speaker 1: you to know. A production of I Heart Brading. Hello,

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Speaker 1: welcome back to the show. My name is Matt. Noel

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Speaker 1: is on an adventure, but he'll be back very soon.

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Speaker 1: They called me Ben. We are joined as always with

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Speaker 1: our super producer Paul Mission controlled deconds. Most importantly, you

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Speaker 1: are you, You are here, and that makes this the

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Speaker 1: stuff they don't want you to know. Uh, Matt it is.

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Speaker 1: Let's let's paint a little bit of a audio picture here.

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Speaker 1: It is a wonderful, wonderfully stormy dark afternoon here and

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Speaker 1: our fair metropolis of Atlanta. Uh you and I have

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Speaker 1: survived a tornado to come come to record today. Oh yeah, man,

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Speaker 1: we we fought through that tornado. I had my shield,

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Speaker 1: I had. It was a bastard sword. It was a

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Speaker 1: little a little large to wheel from one hand. But

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Speaker 1: we fought through it. Now, but we really are. We

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Speaker 1: were under a tornado warning as of just a little

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Speaker 1: while ago, and it is still storming like mad out

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Speaker 1: here and before warned. You may hear the sounds of

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Speaker 1: said storm in this recording as well as my dog

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Speaker 1: Penny as she hyperventilates below my chair. Yes, and uh yeah,

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Speaker 1: We've both got little parts of our recorded areas open

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Speaker 1: so that you can you can get the full ambiance

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Speaker 1: of what happened. And you know that is it is true, Matt.

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Speaker 1: When I say we survived the storm. It's kind of

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Speaker 1: like how when people are in the same room as

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Speaker 1: a celebrity, they say they met them, you know what

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Speaker 1: I mean. So we could say we were in the

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Speaker 1: same sort of room as a tornado but luckily, to

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Speaker 1: our knowledge, there hasn't been a ton of serious destruction yet.

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Speaker 1: We'll see what happens at the end of this episode,

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Speaker 1: because just like us in Atlanta today, you might be

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Speaker 1: surprised by how many people and how many places in

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Speaker 1: the world are very close to destruction utter destruction, and

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Speaker 1: it's something that is existential. It's dreadful, and we don't

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Speaker 1: talk about it all the time because it is scary

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Speaker 1: stuff and it should be. In an earlier episode, though, Matt,

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Speaker 1: we talked about a guy named a Q Khan who

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Speaker 1: is one of the most influential individuals in the recent

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Speaker 1: history of nuclear warfare. He Uh. He is the guy

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Speaker 1: who was terrified that India would be able to take

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Speaker 1: over his adoptive country of Pakistan when they gained nuclear ability.

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Speaker 1: So he began a one man Mission UH to give

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Speaker 1: Pakistan the bomb, and then somewhere along the way he

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Speaker 1: experienced mission creep and started selling nuclear tech to the

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Speaker 1: highest bidder. He cast a shadow that's going be with

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Speaker 1: us long after many of the folks listening to this

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Speaker 1: recording today have passed away. It's just true. And when

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Speaker 1: we talked about that, we talked about what we called

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Speaker 1: an often invisible war that countries wage on one another

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Speaker 1: to prevent other countries from getting nuclear weapons. And the

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Speaker 1: long story short is it's it's very much a do

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Speaker 1: as I say, not as I do kind of deal.

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Speaker 1: It's very much um some rules for these some rules

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Speaker 1: for me. I'm loving this thunder U. Nations that have

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Speaker 1: nuclear weapons in general do not want other countries to

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Speaker 1: have them, even if they're quote unquote friends. I guarantee

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Speaker 1: you they will do anything within their power to prevent

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Speaker 1: other countries from having this world ending ability. And so

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Speaker 1: if you're a country that unfortunately does not have a nuke,

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Speaker 1: you're gonna feel threatened by these nuclear capable adversaries. And

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Speaker 1: if you're a sational actor, which we always assumed, then

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Speaker 1: you are going to You're going to conspire to get

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Speaker 1: some kind of safety. Whether that's working in secret to

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Speaker 1: meet your own bomb, or whether that is buddying up

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Speaker 1: as much as you can with an ally that already

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Speaker 1: has nuclear capability. You've got to do something. And today's

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Speaker 1: story is about a little known example of the lengths

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Speaker 1: countries go to in this invisible war. Uh So we

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Speaker 1: hope that you have had a chance to check out

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Speaker 1: our earlier episode on a Q Cohn uh, and it's

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Speaker 1: you know, it's pretty good. The main criticism we get

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Speaker 1: is there's a lack of Matt Frederick, which I you know,

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Speaker 1: I agree with on that one. Have you seen the

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Speaker 1: hate mail? I have not, But as a listener of

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Speaker 1: that episode, I did not feel a lack of Matt Frederick.

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Speaker 1: It was really good and the back and forth was

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Speaker 1: was perfect to kept me engaged. So hey, I loved

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Speaker 1: that episode. We cut out all the parts were like,

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Speaker 1: where's man? But don't believe you for a second. It

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Speaker 1: was perfect. Well. Anyhow, to to establish the roots of

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Speaker 1: this conspiracy, today's conspiracy, we have to start, uh, really

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Speaker 1: like at the end of World War two is usually

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Speaker 1: when these stories start. So here are the facts. Yes,

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Speaker 1: we will be describing to you this cat and mouse

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Speaker 1: game a little bit further of the struggle to attain

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Speaker 1: a nuclear force. And here's the deal. There the the

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Speaker 1: desire of countries that already have nuclear capability to prevent

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Speaker 1: those who don't have it from gaining it. There's it

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Speaker 1: is so high. There's so much incentive behind that that

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Speaker 1: often these countries, whether it's the United States, whether it's Israel,

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Speaker 1: name your country with nuclear capability, they will often play

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Speaker 1: on the edges of the law, if not break the

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Speaker 1: own law of their land in order to to stop

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Speaker 1: it from happening. It's it's often an argument of national

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Speaker 1: security for whichever country you're talking about, and a play

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Speaker 1: for the quote greater good. Yeah. When we think in

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Speaker 1: terms of analogies, it's like, imagine that your neighbor owns

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Speaker 1: a gun. Their neighbor owns a couple of guns, and

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Speaker 1: you think, well, I get along okay with my neighbor.

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Speaker 1: We're not celebrating each other's birthdays or whatever, but we

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Speaker 1: say hi if we both happen to get the mail

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Speaker 1: at the same time. Still, I would kind of like

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Speaker 1: a gun too. And and in the US, where guns

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Speaker 1: are pretty easy to get, that's a very simple series

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Speaker 1: of steps. But imagine if you were in a situation

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Speaker 1: where your neighbor said, no, I don't know, bro, I've

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Speaker 1: got a gun, so we're pretty much fine, and I

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Speaker 1: should you know, if there's a problem, just come to me, man.

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Speaker 1: Don't do something crazy like try to buy a gun

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Speaker 1: because I might have to show up to your house. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: and especially don't make a gun like if you're going

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Speaker 1: to construct a gun from some steel and other parts.

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Speaker 1: You've got maybe some black powder, you've got Uh, we're

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Speaker 1: gonna have a real problem. Oh and spoiler alert, Matt

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Speaker 1: making guns at home comes up in an episode down

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Speaker 1: the line that we're going to delve into later today

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Speaker 1: for us. But in a few days everyone listening because

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Speaker 1: of the magic timey wymy stuff about podcasting. You're absolutely right, dude.

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Speaker 1: There is a pattern of play, and it's a pattern

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Speaker 1: that a lot of people pay attention to because some

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Speaker 1: countries that were on the path toward creating nuclear weapons,

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Speaker 1: although they might never say they're creating nuclear weapons, they

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Speaker 1: later made international agreements to stop pursuing nuclear tech at all,

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Speaker 1: and in return they were obliterated. Libya is a great

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Speaker 1: example of this, uh well, a horrific example of what happens.

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Speaker 1: And of course, as we said previously, the main Western

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Speaker 1: reason for the Libyan intervention was not human rights related

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Speaker 1: at all. France wanted to maintain control of the regional currency.

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Speaker 1: It is a conspiracy, not a conspiracy theory. Do check

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Speaker 1: it out if you are thinking, I wonder if I

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Speaker 1: could be more depressed today. I was recently visiting with

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Speaker 1: some in laws. One of whom let's he was in

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Speaker 1: various intelligence fields, one of them dealt directly with Libya,

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Speaker 1: where he had a need to know on a lot

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Speaker 1: of stuff occurring there. And we had a whole discussion

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Speaker 1: about Libya, and what you just said been very much

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Speaker 1: holds up from personal experience somebody I spoke with, Yeah,

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Speaker 1: it's better to know the truth even when it's ugly.

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Speaker 1: Do not mistake this as a defense of Mumar Gadaffi.

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Speaker 1: It most certainly is not. Just feel like, when we

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Speaker 1: talk about the billions of dollars spent and the millions

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Speaker 1: of lives are reparably affected, we should be honest about

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Speaker 1: why it happened. So with the nukes, Let's say you're

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Speaker 1: the ruler of North Korea, right, you're the Ayatolla of Iran. Uh,

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Speaker 1: any number of countries that have been considered antagonistic to

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Speaker 1: the Western order of the world or the way the

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Speaker 1: Western world wants everything to work. Uh. If you see

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Speaker 1: what happened in Libya, it's pretty easy to connect the dots.

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Speaker 1: Watching that, and you're the leader of North Korea, you're thinking,

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Speaker 1: I will absolutely never give up nuclear weapons. I know

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Speaker 1: the score. I saw what happened you cannot trust these people,

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Speaker 1: which is reasonable whether or not you agree, the logic

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Speaker 1: is there. And then if you say the Ayatollah or

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Speaker 1: if you are in a leadership position in Iran, then

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Speaker 1: you might think, and very validly think, this is what

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Speaker 1: will happen to us if we don't get across that

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Speaker 1: nuclear finished line. So they're regional hotspots around the world. UH.

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Speaker 1: Leaders are playing some variation of this game all the time.

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Speaker 1: And you know, like we said earlier, there are a

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Speaker 1: lot of countries Europe at Western Europe's a great example.

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Speaker 1: There are a lot of countries that have been up

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Speaker 1: to now satisfy to UH, to posse, up to vultron,

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Speaker 1: up with existing nuclear powers under agreements like NATO and

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Speaker 1: stuff like that. UH, and they're agreeing not to pursue

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Speaker 1: their own nuclear warheads. In exchange, they're saying, you, this

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Speaker 1: country i'm agreeing with will step in, and you will

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Speaker 1: you will save me if something, You'll have my back

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Speaker 1: at least if something goes sideways. But we can't assume

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Speaker 1: this is a sustainable situation. Very few things are no.

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Speaker 1: So you know, when when we're talking about the places

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Speaker 1: in the world where these kinds of conflicts are occurring.

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Speaker 1: We really look at the Middle East, it's by far

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Speaker 1: the region that has let's say that is in the

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Speaker 1: most danger of experiencing some kind of nuclear warfare, actual

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Speaker 1: hot war with a nuke, and a lot of it

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Speaker 1: just has to do with the number of countries in

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Speaker 1: the region that want to have nuclear weapons versus the

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Speaker 1: number that don't. There's only one country in the Middle

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Speaker 1: East currently that officially has nuclear capability, although it's it's

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Speaker 1: official unofficial, but that's Israel. And we've talked about it before,

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Speaker 1: how it's kind of a it's a weird situation to

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Speaker 1: talk about nuclearly capable Israel because it's a bit of

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Speaker 1: a weird situation. Yeah, you know what, let's modify our

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Speaker 1: analogy a little. Let's go back to your neighbor, who's

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Speaker 1: begetting really weird for a while. Okay, so your neighbor

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Speaker 1: has a garage. Everybody knows they have a garage. Your neighbor,

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Speaker 1: it looks like a big garage. Uh, your neighbor may

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Speaker 1: have a car, but they get super sketchy whenever you

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Speaker 1: bring it up. They say, I maybe I have a car,

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Speaker 1: Maybe I don't. I've never seen a cargo in or

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Speaker 1: out of the garage. They've never actually seen it. Tell

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Speaker 1: you what, though, man, you don't keep an eye on

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Speaker 1: those trash cans. You might have to find out. I

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Speaker 1: want to find out if I have a car, do you?

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Speaker 1: You don't. You don't have a car, right, you're not

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Speaker 1: even thinking about getting a car, right, you shouldn't. The

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Speaker 1: bus works fine, buddy, Right, we can agree because we,

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Speaker 1: you know, do not have a car. It's really shrouding

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Speaker 1: Jer's car over here. But if you ever need one,

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Speaker 1: we can find a way. Anyway, it would be better

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Speaker 1: for you and I to agree that you and none

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Speaker 1: of our other neighbors need a car. Let's just end

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Speaker 1: it there. So like, that's that's a really weird in

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Speaker 1: this analogy. On an individual level, this sounds really intense

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Speaker 1: and weird. Right, But car is not the same thing

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Speaker 1: as a nuclear weapon. And Israel's position is itself by design, uh,

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Speaker 1: someone like conspiratorial. They have never the government is never

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Speaker 1: officially confirmed or denied that it has nukes. It absolutely does,

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Speaker 1: but they they have a policy that's somewhat euphemistically called

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Speaker 1: deliberate ambiguity. So they'll issue statements that are incredibly like

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Speaker 1: weirdly worded like the closest the official government has come

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Speaker 1: to admitting this is saying stuff like Israel will not

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Speaker 1: be the first country to introduce nuclear weapons to the

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Speaker 1: Middle East, and that statement hinges on the word introduce, introduced,

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Speaker 1: I think means use so this uh so you can

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Speaker 1: see how it's weird. And also, you know, compounded by

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Speaker 1: the act that over the years, various leaders of this

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Speaker 1: country have essentially said, yeah, we have nuclear weapons. But

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Speaker 1: that's just them speaking in elusive political tones. The other

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Speaker 1: piece of the puzzle here, if we're gonna pepe A Sylvia,

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Speaker 1: this a bit is that Israel has also refused to

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Speaker 1: sign the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

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Speaker 1: Meaning they're saying, look, we're not saying we do or

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Speaker 1: we don't have them, but it's it wouldn't be good

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Speaker 1: for our national security if we signed you guys agreement. So,

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Speaker 1: I mean, there's a car in the garage. I'm just saying,

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Speaker 1: I feel like I'm not in a good spot where

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Speaker 1: I would sign something saying that I'm not gonna have

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Speaker 1: as many cars as I mean, who's to say I

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Speaker 1: may not want or need a car at some point.

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Speaker 1: We have this garage I think we're just gonna We're

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Speaker 1: just gonna stay for a while and you know, maybe

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Speaker 1: we'll take action later. That kind of what's happening, because

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Speaker 1: it really is, it's kind of silly. And look, I

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Speaker 1: can't confirm this personally, but it is kind of just

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Speaker 1: an open secret slash just everybody is aware that Israel

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Speaker 1: does have nuclear capability. It's more of a question of

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Speaker 1: how powerful are the individual warheads. How many of those

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Speaker 1: warheads do they actually have, how many are deployable like

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Speaker 1: readily deployable, how many are just sitting somewhere in a

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Speaker 1: garage hand or and or just large military facility. Um,

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Speaker 1: I don't know. It's it's a it's a weird situation.

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Speaker 1: It is, and it's something that's understandable because secrecy for

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Speaker 1: two reasons. First, secrecy is key to a lot of

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Speaker 1: operations like this because it also allows for plausible deniability.

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Speaker 1: But then secondly, there may be a bit of a

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Speaker 1: long term in a way, a long term greater good

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Speaker 1: argument because as we'll see, for or that country in

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Speaker 1: that part of the world, to go official with this,

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Speaker 1: I could very likely set off or exacerbate the nuclear

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Speaker 1: arms race because being able to lie to yourself and say, oh,

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Speaker 1: it's not the official. That's a very easy and somewhat

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Speaker 1: stable position to take. But I love that you use

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Speaker 1: the word silly, Matt. This is one of the silliest

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Speaker 1: open secrets in the region, if not the world. Sure okay, sure,

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Speaker 1: you have a garage and don't have a car, fine, whatever,

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Speaker 1: just don't drive into my house. And the reason they're

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Speaker 1: doing this is because we think about it. Remember that

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Speaker 1: game Jenga. Do you ever play Jenga? Yeah, dude, there's

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Speaker 1: a great version of it. It's like the human size Jenga. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: stacks up your head or right at your head. I've

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Speaker 1: never I've never played that one, but I've I've seen it.

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Speaker 1: I think we're on a work trip or something and hella,

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Speaker 1: bougie bowling alley that had one. That's all I remember.

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Speaker 1: That's true. Maybe we could go back and give it

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Speaker 1: a try one day and then just be super cool

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Speaker 1: people and say this is like an analogy for nuclear

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Speaker 1: weapons in the Middle East because we're great at parties.

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Speaker 1: Just put up a little sign next to it. Yes, yes,

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Speaker 1: and now it's performance art. We need a grant for this,

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Speaker 1: So yeah, it's it's a good comparison, because the situation

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Speaker 1: with nukes in the Middle East, well, the situation in

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Speaker 1: the Middle East in general is like a carefully stacked,

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Speaker 1: very precarious tower of radioactive Jenga pieces, because some countries,

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Speaker 1: did you know, to one level or another, they act

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Speaker 1: close to chasey nukes, only to have for an intervention

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Speaker 1: arrived in a very brutal way because a Rock, for instance,

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Speaker 1: was um it was definitely trying to get nuclear capability

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Speaker 1: and may have done so if it weren't for the

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Speaker 1: US invasion. Other countries have done something a little trickier.

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Speaker 1: They play specific conditions on their position in the nuclear game,

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Speaker 1: and these may change um in the very near near future. Actually, yeah,

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Speaker 1: a couple of countries to talk about here. Turkey has

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Speaker 1: signaled it might be looking into getting some nuclear weapons,

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Speaker 1: and it's specifically in response to some actions that are

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Speaker 1: being put forth by the Biden administration. You know, hopefully

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Speaker 1: that doesn't actually occur, but Turkeys at least saying it's possible.

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Speaker 1: In Saudi Arabia just over and over and over has

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Speaker 1: done the same signaling that it will it will bring

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Speaker 1: itself up to match any capability of any other group

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Speaker 1: in the in the Middle Eastern country or actor in

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Speaker 1: the Middle East that has nuclear capability. So it's like

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Speaker 1: we will see you and call uh, well, well we

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Speaker 1: will call your whatever you're playing. That is interesting. I

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Speaker 1: didn't even think about Saudi Arabia. And when we're discussing

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Speaker 1: how Israel is the only nuclear capable actor is I

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Speaker 1: genuinely don't know, but I always assumed Saudi Arabia was,

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Speaker 1: or at least was close to it. But it's just

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Speaker 1: a lack or maybe it's just a hole in my knowledge. Yeah. There,

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Speaker 1: they signed the Non Proliferation Treaty and they've they've been

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Speaker 1: accused of working on nuclear programs. Their their official position

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Speaker 1: is that, uh, they right now have plans to create

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Speaker 1: a domestic nuclear energy industry. But again, if you have

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Speaker 1: if you have the enter, if you have the setup

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Speaker 1: to you know, be a nuclear energy capable country, then

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Speaker 1: you have the set up to become a nuclear weapons

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Speaker 1: capable country. And their specific trigger is a rod. It's like,

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Speaker 1: I think we've said this before in a very oversimplified way.

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Speaker 1: The best way to imagine international affairs are the way

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Speaker 1: these countries interact with each other across the world is

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Speaker 1: let's say a hundred nineties something. People show up to

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Speaker 1: a house party and they learned that you know, uh,

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Speaker 1: there's enough beer for maybe fifty people, there's enough like

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Speaker 1: pizza for uh for sixty people. But somewhere in this

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Speaker 1: house there's all this stuff you need to build a gun,

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Speaker 1: and tensions are running high over the pizza and beer,

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Speaker 1: and Saudi Arabia is basically one corner hanging out with

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Speaker 1: its buddies, keeping an eye on that Iran guy they

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Speaker 1: don't like. And they say, well, like, look, if this

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Speaker 1: guy gets let's stock Holm guns party favors, if this

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Speaker 1: guy grabs some party favors that I am, I'm you, guys,

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Speaker 1: can't stop me. I'm gonna get all of the party

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Speaker 1: favors because I hate that guy. Yeah, oh yeah, I

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Speaker 1: don't like that. Also, I'm gonna go so far as

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Speaker 1: to dig a little hole in the basement level, make

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Speaker 1: a second sub basement, and then start making party favors

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Speaker 1: down there. And you'll never know because I'm telling you

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Speaker 1: I dislike that dude. So that's that's I mean, that's

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Speaker 1: what's happening. This this in an overly simple way. Again,

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Speaker 1: but the important part here is that we are in

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Speaker 1: a system with any number of opportunities for to go

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Speaker 1: horribly horribly wrong very quickly, and one one change in

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Speaker 1: domestic policy in one country can have massive ripple effects

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Speaker 1: across this region, and stuff that happens in the Middle

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Speaker 1: East can have massive ripple effects across the world. No

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Speaker 1: matter no matter how you personally feel, no matter how

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Speaker 1: your government feels. Uh, everybody knows, based on clear examples

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Speaker 1: of previous proven conspiracies, that Israel will not hesitate to

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Speaker 1: do anything it can't by hook or by crook to

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Speaker 1: prevent other countries in the region from gaining the same capabilities.

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Speaker 1: This is not the government and the lawmakers of this

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Speaker 1: country purposely just being like jerks for the sake of it.

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Speaker 1: They consider they considered nuclear armed countries in the Middle

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Speaker 1: East other than them, an existential threat. So how far

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Speaker 1: would they go? I'll tell you after a word from

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Speaker 1: our sponsor, and we're back and prepare yourselves because we're

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Speaker 1: going outside of the box in an operation that's titled

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Speaker 1: the same way. Yeah. So this is it's a bit

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Speaker 1: of storytelling here. It's it's kind of exciting. So here

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Speaker 1: we go. So on September six seven, imagine you're hanging

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Speaker 1: out somewhere in Syria. Let's say it's just after midnight

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Speaker 1: local time. The Israeli Air Force is thinking about Syria's

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Speaker 1: growing possibility for nuclear ability. That was kind of weird.

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Speaker 1: It's like the same word twice, but not really because

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Speaker 1: you added a thing to the beginning. Sorry, um, But

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Speaker 1: Israel is thinking about doing something, like physically doing something

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Speaker 1: about this, and the way they're imagining going about it

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Speaker 1: is going to get around some of the negotiations that

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Speaker 1: are happening on an international level to prevent things from

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Speaker 1: happening like this, to um prevent attacks from happening, to

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Speaker 1: prevent countries from developing nuclear capabilities. There's all kinds of discussion, dialogue,

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Speaker 1: there's red tape from all of the associations that all

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Speaker 1: of these countries have in the things like NATO. As

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Speaker 1: you've mentioned, there have been oh what do they what

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Speaker 1: do they call these things? These things that prevent you

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Speaker 1: from doing something? Oh? Laws, there are laws that are

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Speaker 1: preventing this kind of action from occurring. But it doesn't matter.

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Speaker 1: Israel says we're going to do something, and we have

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Speaker 1: to do something, so they launch an air strike on this, uh,

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Speaker 1: this one small little area in Syria. It was a

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Speaker 1: suspected nuclear reactor in this place called the al Kibar

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Speaker 1: site all Kidbar k I b a r um and

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Speaker 1: this thing, this area, it was called the cube. Okay,

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Speaker 1: and it's really Can we call out the Heretts article

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00:25:33,320 --> 00:25:35,440
Speaker 1: already just at the top of this or we can

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Speaker 1: do that later. There is an article you can read

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Speaker 1: if you want to get some of the storytelling of

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Speaker 1: this and see the cube. It's called no Longer a Secret.

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Speaker 1: They just type that in I will give you the

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Speaker 1: whole thing type in no longer a secret on Herrett's

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Speaker 1: Seeing the cube made a difference for me. Yeah. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: So to fill in a bit of the picture here,

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Speaker 1: it's in the middle of nowhere. In the middle of nowhere,

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Speaker 1: there's rubble around it. It looks kind of abandoned. It's

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Speaker 1: a weird place for a factory to be, and officially

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Speaker 1: it's a factory. Uh. There doesn't seem to be a

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Speaker 1: ton of traffic to or from the place. And where's

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Speaker 1: all the infrastructure for you know, sending electricity or power

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Speaker 1: generation and stuff like that. Marry Tom waits, what's the

404
00:26:25,760 --> 00:26:30,639
Speaker 1: building in there? And this air strike? What we're gonna

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Speaker 1: do is We're going to examine how the Israeli government

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Speaker 1: came to its conclusions and why they also felt that

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00:26:45,040 --> 00:26:49,240
Speaker 1: hot escalation was necessary, and why why they also felt

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00:26:49,280 --> 00:26:53,560
Speaker 1: it was necessary to hide this from the public and

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Speaker 1: never admit it for the better part of a decade.

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Speaker 1: This is a little bit of levity here, fellow conspiracy realist.

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Speaker 1: It's something I don't know if we if we mentioned

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00:27:04,600 --> 00:27:09,640
Speaker 1: often enough, But this conspiracy started like many government conspiracies,

413
00:27:09,960 --> 00:27:12,800
Speaker 1: and be surprised how many of them start this way.

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Speaker 1: It all began because someone somewhere screwed up. Yeah, it's

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Speaker 1: not like some crazy Monty Burns master plan. It almost

416
00:27:23,560 --> 00:27:27,760
Speaker 1: never is. Soon made a mistake, and then other people

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Speaker 1: scrambled to fix that or address it, and then try.

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Speaker 1: While trying to fix it, things just like more and

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Speaker 1: more wrong. It's like if you're moving, but like you,

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Speaker 1: if you're one of those people who um when you

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Speaker 1: get groceries, you try to carry as many possible from

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Speaker 1: the car, right you want to like maximize your load

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Speaker 1: or whatever, and then you like one, I don't know

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Speaker 1: what what do people eat, Matt, Mandarin oranges? Okay, so

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Speaker 1: one one like mandarin orange falls out of the bag,

426
00:27:57,800 --> 00:28:00,119
Speaker 1: you got both of your handsfully like dang it, and

427
00:28:00,200 --> 00:28:02,639
Speaker 1: trying to like wiggle your way down to pick up

428
00:28:02,680 --> 00:28:05,840
Speaker 1: that orange to fix that mistake, and all sorts of

429
00:28:05,840 --> 00:28:08,639
Speaker 1: other stuff starts falling out of the bag, and the

430
00:28:08,720 --> 00:28:11,800
Speaker 1: next thing you know, you know, you're you're You've got

431
00:28:12,160 --> 00:28:14,600
Speaker 1: like half of your junk out there on your on

432
00:28:14,680 --> 00:28:17,720
Speaker 1: your driveway, and your neighbor drops Viven's like, just to

433
00:28:17,760 --> 00:28:20,000
Speaker 1: be clear, I never said whether or not I have

434
00:28:20,080 --> 00:28:23,000
Speaker 1: a car, And You're like, now is not the time, Neil,

435
00:28:23,720 --> 00:28:27,840
Speaker 1: or whatever, And Neil's like, why did you put your

436
00:28:27,960 --> 00:28:30,160
Speaker 1: junk on the driveway? I thought we were just talking

437
00:28:30,160 --> 00:28:36,000
Speaker 1: about groceries. Yes, well, Neil is asking the real questions

438
00:28:36,400 --> 00:28:40,840
Speaker 1: in this in this scenario. So it's true, though, you know,

439
00:28:40,960 --> 00:28:43,600
Speaker 1: like a lot of times, it might surprise people, I

440
00:28:43,680 --> 00:28:48,160
Speaker 1: think because in the world of fiction, conspiracies are often

441
00:28:48,320 --> 00:28:52,720
Speaker 1: presented as the as escalations on the part of a

442
00:28:52,840 --> 00:28:57,240
Speaker 1: very powerful, very competent group, and that is not always

443
00:28:57,280 --> 00:28:59,760
Speaker 1: the case. The people at the top are human beings

444
00:28:59,800 --> 00:29:03,040
Speaker 1: too for the most parts. So sometimes there's a mastermind.

445
00:29:03,560 --> 00:29:06,120
Speaker 1: Sometimes not, well, there are a ton of people who

446
00:29:06,160 --> 00:29:09,640
Speaker 1: want to be masterminds, you know what I mean. But

447
00:29:09,840 --> 00:29:14,160
Speaker 1: there are very few actual effective ones, and they're not

448
00:29:14,240 --> 00:29:18,480
Speaker 1: all good either, by the way, Like you could argue,

449
00:29:19,520 --> 00:29:22,960
Speaker 1: you know, you could argue various despots and dictators are

450
00:29:23,200 --> 00:29:27,040
Speaker 1: quote unquote good at their jobs, but being good at

451
00:29:27,080 --> 00:29:31,880
Speaker 1: their jobs is not necessarily good for other people. Uh okay, alright, well,

452
00:29:31,960 --> 00:29:35,400
Speaker 1: let's let's move on. Alright, Yeah, you're right. Let's let's

453
00:29:35,400 --> 00:29:38,800
Speaker 1: talk about this cube. It's a big, wait for cubical

454
00:29:39,000 --> 00:29:42,120
Speaker 1: building that was at the time it was still under

455
00:29:42,160 --> 00:29:46,120
Speaker 1: construction in the middle of the desert. It's it has

456
00:29:46,160 --> 00:29:50,960
Speaker 1: an area of more than seventeen thousand, two hundred square feet,

457
00:29:51,040 --> 00:29:55,080
Speaker 1: so it's really really big. It's close to sixties six

458
00:29:55,120 --> 00:30:00,920
Speaker 1: ft high. Here's how this got to this point. The

459
00:30:01,040 --> 00:30:05,600
Speaker 1: Israeli Defense Establishment had been paying attention to this mysterious

460
00:30:05,680 --> 00:30:08,800
Speaker 1: factory looking structure since at least the end of two

461
00:30:08,840 --> 00:30:12,720
Speaker 1: thousand six. If you think the nickname the Cube is

462
00:30:12,880 --> 00:30:16,360
Speaker 1: sort of uncreative, well that that falls on that they

463
00:30:16,400 --> 00:30:19,720
Speaker 1: coined the term. That's fine. They're the you know, they're

464
00:30:19,760 --> 00:30:23,720
Speaker 1: the defense Establishment, not the nickname squad. So hey, I

465
00:30:23,800 --> 00:30:25,960
Speaker 1: kind of dig it because it reminds me of that

466
00:30:26,400 --> 00:30:29,640
Speaker 1: the film series The Cube. I was thinking of that too.

467
00:30:29,880 --> 00:30:32,440
Speaker 1: What is the point of that, what's like the ultimate

468
00:30:33,640 --> 00:30:36,680
Speaker 1: What was the motivation for sticking those folks in the cube?

469
00:30:37,400 --> 00:30:42,920
Speaker 1: Mostly psychological torture of an audience. I think of an

470
00:30:42,960 --> 00:30:47,720
Speaker 1: audience forced to watch it. Oh boy, no, the so

471
00:30:47,880 --> 00:30:52,239
Speaker 1: for anyone who's unaware. So the It's just cube I

472
00:30:52,280 --> 00:30:55,080
Speaker 1: think the first one came out in the late nineties,

473
00:30:55,280 --> 00:30:57,800
Speaker 1: and the ideas that these people wake up and they

474
00:30:57,920 --> 00:31:01,440
Speaker 1: don't know one another from Adam or a Canna paint,

475
00:31:01,600 --> 00:31:06,040
Speaker 1: and they have to progress through these series of cubes

476
00:31:06,200 --> 00:31:09,960
Speaker 1: that are rigged with traps, not all of them, but

477
00:31:10,120 --> 00:31:15,160
Speaker 1: some of them are rigged with traps to the lethal traps,

478
00:31:15,720 --> 00:31:19,080
Speaker 1: and I think at some point it goes to several films.

479
00:31:19,080 --> 00:31:21,120
Speaker 1: Don't spoil it, Yeah, don't spoil it. I would just

480
00:31:21,160 --> 00:31:24,959
Speaker 1: say from an indie filmmaker's perspective, it is a brilliant

481
00:31:25,240 --> 00:31:28,520
Speaker 1: concept because you have one set, you just change that

482
00:31:28,640 --> 00:31:30,880
Speaker 1: set a little bit and ope you're in a new cube.

483
00:31:31,080 --> 00:31:33,640
Speaker 1: Oh is it look the same even though we're switching

484
00:31:33,680 --> 00:31:35,720
Speaker 1: from one cube to the next part of the cube,

485
00:31:36,280 --> 00:31:40,400
Speaker 1: same room, same set. Wow, this is perfect and it's

486
00:31:40,400 --> 00:31:43,240
Speaker 1: supposed to be that way too for the story. That's

487
00:31:43,240 --> 00:31:47,160
Speaker 1: what they're tough. All right, that's a really good point. Um, yeah,

488
00:31:47,280 --> 00:31:49,960
Speaker 1: don't uh. Probably a lot of us in the crowd

489
00:31:50,000 --> 00:31:54,600
Speaker 1: remember it today. I without going back, I'm I don't

490
00:31:54,600 --> 00:31:58,880
Speaker 1: remember the entirety of why those people ended up there,

491
00:31:58,920 --> 00:32:00,880
Speaker 1: but I think they get to it one of the films.

492
00:32:02,200 --> 00:32:04,800
Speaker 1: They get to it. Okay, I'll have to check it

493
00:32:04,840 --> 00:32:06,480
Speaker 1: out too, but let us know what you all think

494
00:32:06,520 --> 00:32:09,960
Speaker 1: about the cube. So it's the end of two thousand

495
00:32:09,960 --> 00:32:12,640
Speaker 1: and six. The months are going by, we're getting into

496
00:32:12,680 --> 00:32:17,800
Speaker 1: two thousand seven. The Israeli government grows increasingly suspicious and

497
00:32:17,880 --> 00:32:21,920
Speaker 1: later certain that the cube is not just some weird

498
00:32:22,560 --> 00:32:25,840
Speaker 1: industrial flex in the middle of the desert, that it

499
00:32:26,160 --> 00:32:33,680
Speaker 1: is actually President Bashar al Assad's secret flagship passion project.

500
00:32:35,040 --> 00:32:40,760
Speaker 1: There they are telling their superiors, we believe that this

501
00:32:40,840 --> 00:32:43,400
Speaker 1: is in fact a nuclear reactor. They got it from

502
00:32:43,400 --> 00:32:48,080
Speaker 1: North Korea. Syria is working on the bomb. This is

503
00:32:48,120 --> 00:32:51,520
Speaker 1: important because if that happened and one fell swoop, no

504
00:32:51,600 --> 00:32:55,160
Speaker 1: matter what you think about who should or should not

505
00:32:55,320 --> 00:32:58,560
Speaker 1: have the quote unquote right to nuclear power, no matter

506
00:32:58,560 --> 00:33:02,720
Speaker 1: what would happen in that case, Uh, Syria with this

507
00:33:02,800 --> 00:33:07,800
Speaker 1: program would fundamentally change the playing field. It would remove

508
00:33:07,920 --> 00:33:12,719
Speaker 1: a huge part of Israel's military technological edge, and so

509
00:33:12,840 --> 00:33:16,680
Speaker 1: if you are the Israeli government, you are thinking this

510
00:33:16,760 --> 00:33:22,240
Speaker 1: could open the door too terrible terrible things, and it's

511
00:33:22,280 --> 00:33:24,440
Speaker 1: a door we might not be able to close if

512
00:33:24,440 --> 00:33:28,080
Speaker 1: we don't act now. And this has been brewing for

513
00:33:28,120 --> 00:33:31,160
Speaker 1: a long time, right, they had known this for decades

514
00:33:31,320 --> 00:33:35,000
Speaker 1: or they been keeping an eye on it for decades,

515
00:33:35,080 --> 00:33:39,840
Speaker 1: and we're having a tough time getting accurate info. It

516
00:33:39,880 --> 00:33:44,920
Speaker 1: goes back to I think at least the early early nineties,

517
00:33:44,960 --> 00:33:49,680
Speaker 1: So that's when the the regime there in Syria it

518
00:33:49,800 --> 00:33:53,160
Speaker 1: was known that there was an interest in procuring at

519
00:33:53,320 --> 00:33:57,560
Speaker 1: least not only weapons themselves, by the ability to create weapons,

520
00:33:57,840 --> 00:34:01,120
Speaker 1: especially through research facilities. Kind so kind of have that cover, right,

521
00:34:01,760 --> 00:34:06,920
Speaker 1: we're doing this for energy, um. And that's that's when

522
00:34:06,920 --> 00:34:12,960
Speaker 1: the Western world, well the United States, Israel, probably UH,

523
00:34:13,040 --> 00:34:15,719
Speaker 1: England and a couple other powers, the UK, they were

524
00:34:16,680 --> 00:34:21,040
Speaker 1: just really paying attention to Syria in particular, and Israel

525
00:34:21,160 --> 00:34:25,520
Speaker 1: really then started paying attention again because of just proximity

526
00:34:25,640 --> 00:34:29,240
Speaker 1: and because how much it would shift the playing field

527
00:34:29,840 --> 00:34:33,040
Speaker 1: if if it were to occur um. But this was

528
00:34:33,080 --> 00:34:37,040
Speaker 1: only after there was a serious intelligence gap in Libya.

529
00:34:37,360 --> 00:34:40,799
Speaker 1: That's when that's when Israel is like, oh, if we

530
00:34:41,080 --> 00:34:44,840
Speaker 1: didn't know this specific thing about Libya, maybe we don't

531
00:34:45,080 --> 00:34:48,839
Speaker 1: know some specifics about Syria, and we're missing some info here.

532
00:34:48,840 --> 00:34:51,680
Speaker 1: And what could they be doing in that garage if

533
00:34:51,719 --> 00:34:55,040
Speaker 1: there's no way for us to peek in exactly? Yeah,

534
00:34:55,320 --> 00:35:00,439
Speaker 1: So there's there's something really interesting that comes from uh.

535
00:35:00,480 --> 00:35:03,280
Speaker 1: The guy who was the head of the intelligence division

536
00:35:03,920 --> 00:35:08,120
Speaker 1: at Massad in two thousand three, and his name's am

537
00:35:08,160 --> 00:35:15,879
Speaker 1: Non Suffrin, and you can hear his surprise, frustration and

538
00:35:16,239 --> 00:35:19,879
Speaker 1: no small amount of fury when he talks about how

539
00:35:19,960 --> 00:35:24,600
Speaker 1: he how he figured this out. He says, on December nineteenth,

540
00:35:24,680 --> 00:35:27,799
Speaker 1: two thousand three, a Saturday morning, I turned on the

541
00:35:27,880 --> 00:35:31,120
Speaker 1: radio and heard on a news broadcast that the Americans

542
00:35:31,200 --> 00:35:36,040
Speaker 1: and the British have persuaded Libya to dismantle its nuclear program.

543
00:35:36,080 --> 00:35:39,080
Speaker 1: The next morning, I assembled by people and I said,

544
00:35:39,120 --> 00:35:42,200
Speaker 1: we had to experience two total failures here. We had

545
00:35:42,280 --> 00:35:46,360
Speaker 1: absolutely no idea that such a program, meaning in Libya

546
00:35:46,560 --> 00:35:50,400
Speaker 1: even existed. In second, we didn't know that the negotiations

547
00:35:50,400 --> 00:35:52,960
Speaker 1: to dismantle it have been going on for eight months.

548
00:35:53,280 --> 00:35:56,480
Speaker 1: We started to back analyze the Libyan program and try

549
00:35:56,520 --> 00:35:59,839
Speaker 1: to figure out where else in the region, similar pro

550
00:36:00,040 --> 00:36:05,280
Speaker 1: Grahams could be hiding. So imagine that your entire job

551
00:36:05,520 --> 00:36:08,520
Speaker 1: is to know as much as possible about stuff like this,

552
00:36:09,200 --> 00:36:14,439
Speaker 1: and you hear it, you know, on like MPR, what

553
00:36:14,719 --> 00:36:19,600
Speaker 1: I'm sorry, Uh wow, I'm not hungry anymore. Let's get

554
00:36:19,600 --> 00:36:23,120
Speaker 1: to work exactly. You know, That's that's the thing that

555
00:36:23,160 --> 00:36:27,320
Speaker 1: gets me, because it's like hearing that kind of stuff

556
00:36:27,360 --> 00:36:31,319
Speaker 1: for an industry professional through the news and having to

557
00:36:31,360 --> 00:36:35,000
Speaker 1: be the first time you've heard this is is a

558
00:36:35,080 --> 00:36:38,360
Speaker 1: recipe for a heart attack. That's not only is that

559
00:36:38,440 --> 00:36:41,560
Speaker 1: highly unusual, but it means that you need you have

560
00:36:41,800 --> 00:36:46,080
Speaker 1: hundreds of things you need to have done by yesterday.

561
00:36:46,120 --> 00:36:49,120
Speaker 1: And we're gonna take a pause for a word from

562
00:36:49,120 --> 00:36:53,160
Speaker 1: our sponsor or turn to explore a little bit more

563
00:36:53,360 --> 00:36:56,960
Speaker 1: about what Suffering did once he realized he had been

564
00:36:57,000 --> 00:37:08,520
Speaker 1: like scooped by CNN. It's crazy and we are back,

565
00:37:08,960 --> 00:37:14,680
Speaker 1: So Ben, what's uh, Let's jump back to Massad. Let's

566
00:37:14,680 --> 00:37:18,360
Speaker 1: see what they're doing. Yeah, so about a month of

567
00:37:18,400 --> 00:37:24,360
Speaker 1: invest month's worth of investigations in Sue Suffrin and the

568
00:37:24,400 --> 00:37:31,640
Speaker 1: research teams over at MASSAD say, okay, Libya surprised us

569
00:37:31,680 --> 00:37:35,799
Speaker 1: in a way that we did not care for and

570
00:37:35,880 --> 00:37:39,279
Speaker 1: it looks like the problem is much closer to home

571
00:37:39,400 --> 00:37:44,360
Speaker 1: than we imagine. Syria at some point has entered the

572
00:37:44,440 --> 00:37:48,320
Speaker 1: race to build the bomb. They're not at drawing board stage.

573
00:37:48,440 --> 00:37:52,760
Speaker 1: It's not a series of like back room conversations Davos

574
00:37:52,920 --> 00:37:57,719
Speaker 1: or whatever. They're doing this uh, and it caught us

575
00:37:57,880 --> 00:38:04,560
Speaker 1: unaware because reasonably most of our investigations focus on a

576
00:38:04,680 --> 00:38:07,839
Speaker 1: rod instead of our neighbor to the north. And then

577
00:38:08,400 --> 00:38:11,400
Speaker 1: this is where Suffrin talks a little bit more about

578
00:38:11,440 --> 00:38:15,040
Speaker 1: their discovery. He says, the Koreans and the Syrians built

579
00:38:15,040 --> 00:38:18,719
Speaker 1: a camouflage structure on top of the reactor that made

580
00:38:18,719 --> 00:38:22,000
Speaker 1: it look like a factory. From the outside. You don't

581
00:38:22,040 --> 00:38:26,920
Speaker 1: see what's happening inside. It is far from any settlement.

582
00:38:27,280 --> 00:38:30,359
Speaker 1: There is no reason for anyone to be in this

583
00:38:30,480 --> 00:38:35,320
Speaker 1: area except for herdsman. We began to suspect that there,

584
00:38:35,360 --> 00:38:41,040
Speaker 1: in broad daylight, a reactor was hiding, and in January

585
00:38:41,200 --> 00:38:45,440
Speaker 1: two thousand seven, satellite photos revealed that there was a

586
00:38:45,480 --> 00:38:49,799
Speaker 1: pipeline leading directly from the Cube to the Euphrates. This

587
00:38:49,880 --> 00:38:53,480
Speaker 1: is important because if your researcher, you know, you have

588
00:38:53,560 --> 00:38:56,280
Speaker 1: to be very carefully. Don't want to read tea leaves.

589
00:38:56,640 --> 00:38:59,400
Speaker 1: You know what I mean. You want to have real proof.

590
00:38:59,680 --> 00:39:06,520
Speaker 1: So they started to think, okay, middle of nowhere, nobody

591
00:39:06,560 --> 00:39:11,479
Speaker 1: really has any business being here except for shepherds, hurt

592
00:39:11,680 --> 00:39:17,200
Speaker 1: hurting professionals. Uh so this is a cooling system and

593
00:39:17,320 --> 00:39:19,759
Speaker 1: that's one of the big things you need for a reactor.

594
00:39:20,280 --> 00:39:22,600
Speaker 1: So even at that point, they're not saying this definitely

595
00:39:22,560 --> 00:39:26,759
Speaker 1: a reactor. They're saying, ah, quacks like a duck. I

596
00:39:26,800 --> 00:39:29,600
Speaker 1: want to be too conclusive, but there's some there's a

597
00:39:29,640 --> 00:39:34,920
Speaker 1: definite quacking going on. And then massaw it or someone

598
00:39:35,360 --> 00:39:39,799
Speaker 1: excuse me, had a breakthrough. This is this is a

599
00:39:39,800 --> 00:39:43,040
Speaker 1: little dicey. So at this point I'm trying to think

600
00:39:43,040 --> 00:39:46,680
Speaker 1: of the correct way to say this. This is an

601
00:39:46,719 --> 00:39:49,719
Speaker 1: event that occurs in Vienna in early March of two

602
00:39:49,760 --> 00:39:52,840
Speaker 1: thousand seven, and what we know about it is based

603
00:39:52,880 --> 00:39:56,600
Speaker 1: on the work of an American journalist, that's right, journalist

604
00:39:56,680 --> 00:39:59,879
Speaker 1: named David Mkowski, who was writing in the New York

605
00:40:00,360 --> 00:40:04,280
Speaker 1: in two thousand and twelve. A man named Ibraheim Othman,

606
00:40:04,360 --> 00:40:08,000
Speaker 1: who was head of the Syrian Atomic Energy Commission, had

607
00:40:08,080 --> 00:40:11,759
Speaker 1: gone to Austria and he was participating and he's doing

608
00:40:11,800 --> 00:40:16,120
Speaker 1: this to participate in these deliberations of the International Atomic

609
00:40:16,239 --> 00:40:20,960
Speaker 1: Energy Agency, and of course Israel wants to know what's

610
00:40:20,960 --> 00:40:24,080
Speaker 1: going on. So with Selo Massad, agents from the Cachette

611
00:40:24,160 --> 00:40:27,440
Speaker 1: unit broke into the place where he was staying. It

612
00:40:27,520 --> 00:40:30,520
Speaker 1: was an apartment, it's where Offman was staying, and within

613
00:40:30,640 --> 00:40:34,279
Speaker 1: less than an hour they quote vacuumed up the information

614
00:40:34,960 --> 00:40:37,799
Speaker 1: that was on the personal computer that this this man

615
00:40:37,880 --> 00:40:43,440
Speaker 1: was using. He's a Syrian official. And it is so funny,

616
00:40:43,480 --> 00:40:45,879
Speaker 1: like this is this is how it works, right, He

617
00:40:46,000 --> 00:40:48,040
Speaker 1: leaves the apartment for just a little bit, for just

618
00:40:48,120 --> 00:40:50,879
Speaker 1: a brief period of time, however long it was, and

619
00:40:51,719 --> 00:40:55,719
Speaker 1: like special agents from an intelligence agency break into the apartment,

620
00:40:55,960 --> 00:40:58,319
Speaker 1: access to the computer and then get out of there.

621
00:40:58,800 --> 00:41:01,319
Speaker 1: It's just crazy to him, sagined that can happen and

622
00:41:01,400 --> 00:41:06,399
Speaker 1: probably does happen all the time. Can you imagine that's

623
00:41:06,680 --> 00:41:09,480
Speaker 1: very common. Well, this is at least according to the

624
00:41:09,520 --> 00:41:12,920
Speaker 1: reporting from David Mukowski in the New Yorker, that's what

625
00:41:13,000 --> 00:41:17,319
Speaker 1: this is what happened. Because Israel never officially acknowledged that

626
00:41:17,480 --> 00:41:20,080
Speaker 1: this occurred, that their intelligence agency had anything to do

627
00:41:20,120 --> 00:41:23,680
Speaker 1: with it, or even accepted responsibility for anything occurring in

628
00:41:23,719 --> 00:41:28,000
Speaker 1: that apartment, and then we see another series of uh,

629
00:41:28,280 --> 00:41:31,560
Speaker 1: a series of missteps, right, someone screws up and that

630
00:41:31,640 --> 00:41:36,400
Speaker 1: leads to this kind of situation. There. Their hack found

631
00:41:36,680 --> 00:41:43,920
Speaker 1: that Athman's computer usage definitely left something to be desired.

632
00:41:43,360 --> 00:41:48,040
Speaker 1: He had thirty five photographs at least from inside this

633
00:41:48,120 --> 00:41:52,320
Speaker 1: building in the Syrian desert, and in the pictures everything

634
00:41:52,440 --> 00:41:57,960
Speaker 1: the more uh paranoid folks in Massad and intelligence were saying,

635
00:41:58,360 --> 00:42:03,680
Speaker 1: is confirmed. There's a visible photograph of this reactor, their

636
00:42:03,800 --> 00:42:09,320
Speaker 1: fusion cylinders and their bars, and there are clearly non

637
00:42:09,520 --> 00:42:14,000
Speaker 1: Syrian people working who are later identified as experts from

638
00:42:14,440 --> 00:42:18,480
Speaker 1: North Korea, from the Korean Peninsula. And so they say, okay, well,

639
00:42:19,160 --> 00:42:23,120
Speaker 1: game on. We were right in the worst way. Can

640
00:42:23,160 --> 00:42:26,200
Speaker 1: we just say point out here, even in two thousand seven,

641
00:42:26,480 --> 00:42:30,680
Speaker 1: it was possible to doctor some images, and it was

642
00:42:30,719 --> 00:42:34,440
Speaker 1: possible to plant images onto a machine, especially if you

643
00:42:34,480 --> 00:42:38,040
Speaker 1: are an elite intelligence agency that has broken into someone's apartment.

644
00:42:38,400 --> 00:42:43,239
Speaker 1: You could ostensibly place images or any files onto a

645
00:42:43,320 --> 00:42:46,960
Speaker 1: machine's hard drives or you know, even virtually onto some

646
00:42:47,080 --> 00:42:50,399
Speaker 1: accessible virtual drive. It's possible. We just have to put

647
00:42:50,400 --> 00:42:53,640
Speaker 1: that out there. Doesn't mean that that's what happened. Yeah,

648
00:42:53,719 --> 00:42:58,480
Speaker 1: that's a really good observation, you know, because the technology

649
00:42:58,640 --> 00:43:02,040
Speaker 1: available might surprise a lot of people. So there's two

650
00:43:02,040 --> 00:43:07,839
Speaker 1: thousands seven, But consider that stooks Net, which disabled a

651
00:43:07,840 --> 00:43:12,080
Speaker 1: lot of Iranian nuclear research. It's an Israeli US system

652
00:43:12,760 --> 00:43:15,680
Speaker 1: that was first uncovered in two thousand and ten, but

653
00:43:16,040 --> 00:43:18,640
Speaker 1: people have been working on it since two thousand and five.

654
00:43:19,280 --> 00:43:22,600
Speaker 1: So things are a little bit further along behind the curtain,

655
00:43:22,640 --> 00:43:25,800
Speaker 1: and they might appear to the public it is possible.

656
00:43:26,760 --> 00:43:30,160
Speaker 1: That's a very important point. But to the non intelligence

657
00:43:30,280 --> 00:43:32,879
Speaker 1: not calling them dumb, I'm saying they don't work in intelligence.

658
00:43:32,920 --> 00:43:37,040
Speaker 1: To the non intelligence UH members and leaders of the

659
00:43:37,160 --> 00:43:42,279
Speaker 1: Israeli government, this is a smoking gun. And so o

660
00:43:42,520 --> 00:43:46,480
Speaker 1: mayor makes the decision. Who may makes the decision to

661
00:43:46,719 --> 00:43:52,800
Speaker 1: share this information with the US. And he was hoping,

662
00:43:53,239 --> 00:43:57,640
Speaker 1: apparently that he could show these documents, these photographs to

663
00:43:57,920 --> 00:44:01,360
Speaker 1: the George W. Bush administration, which was the administration in

664
00:44:01,400 --> 00:44:04,840
Speaker 1: power at the time, and that they would say, holy smokes,

665
00:44:05,360 --> 00:44:08,239
Speaker 1: you know, hold my hold my beer. We're gonna go

666
00:44:08,320 --> 00:44:11,240
Speaker 1: destroy this on our own. We cannot have this happen.

667
00:44:12,960 --> 00:44:18,120
Speaker 1: But instead what they found was that after they met

668
00:44:18,280 --> 00:44:23,279
Speaker 1: with President Bush, with W. Bush, with Vice President Dick

669
00:44:23,360 --> 00:44:27,360
Speaker 1: Cheney with the top people, the CIA, the NSC, the

670
00:44:27,440 --> 00:44:32,640
Speaker 1: National Security Council. The US wasn't super on board with this,

671
00:44:32,920 --> 00:44:37,880
Speaker 1: the kind of pro war hawks where had one idea.

672
00:44:38,040 --> 00:44:41,120
Speaker 1: Their idea was let's do it now, let's bomb it,

673
00:44:41,719 --> 00:44:45,120
Speaker 1: let no stones stand on another, Let's do it publicly

674
00:44:45,440 --> 00:44:48,760
Speaker 1: so we can set an example. And then other folks

675
00:44:48,800 --> 00:44:52,000
Speaker 1: were saying, well, I don't know, there's enough proof for us,

676
00:44:52,400 --> 00:44:56,480
Speaker 1: And then reportedly the President at the time himself said,

677
00:44:56,800 --> 00:45:00,399
Speaker 1: you know, I'm not persuaded. Uh, we need a lot

678
00:45:00,440 --> 00:45:05,160
Speaker 1: more than this to justify taking unilateral action on a

679
00:45:05,200 --> 00:45:08,640
Speaker 1: sovereign state, because that's what we would be doing. We

680
00:45:08,680 --> 00:45:11,400
Speaker 1: can tell the rest of the world whatever we want,

681
00:45:12,080 --> 00:45:14,480
Speaker 1: but the fact of the matter is we would just

682
00:45:14,600 --> 00:45:18,719
Speaker 1: be deciding to fly over there and bomb something. And

683
00:45:18,800 --> 00:45:22,600
Speaker 1: that's usually you know, there are channels for that, right,

684
00:45:22,640 --> 00:45:26,440
Speaker 1: their international mechanisms and other steps. But this is the

685
00:45:26,480 --> 00:45:30,080
Speaker 1: ticking time bomb argument. It is the ticking time bomb argument.

686
00:45:30,160 --> 00:45:32,319
Speaker 1: And we have to keep in mind that the Bush

687
00:45:32,360 --> 00:45:36,680
Speaker 1: administration and American intelligence agencies had learned a lot of

688
00:45:36,840 --> 00:45:39,080
Speaker 1: well maybe they hadn't learned a lot of hard lessons.

689
00:45:39,239 --> 00:45:42,360
Speaker 1: They'd gone through a lot of trials and tribulations because

690
00:45:42,400 --> 00:45:44,560
Speaker 1: of actions they had taken in the Middle East over

691
00:45:44,600 --> 00:45:48,120
Speaker 1: the past, you know, four or five years prior to that,

692
00:45:48,719 --> 00:45:52,480
Speaker 1: just in you know, the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan

693
00:45:52,680 --> 00:45:55,000
Speaker 1: and some of the other actions that were taken right

694
00:45:55,239 --> 00:45:58,160
Speaker 1: like for instance, I mean the big badger in the

695
00:45:58,200 --> 00:46:01,640
Speaker 1: bag here is the false reports of w m d

696
00:46:01,880 --> 00:46:05,720
Speaker 1: s or you know, according to some listeners, some people,

697
00:46:05,719 --> 00:46:08,880
Speaker 1: some of you have written in that fully believe, especially

698
00:46:08,920 --> 00:46:11,080
Speaker 1: some of you who are deployed, believe that w m

699
00:46:11,160 --> 00:46:13,799
Speaker 1: d s were found and they were just hidden from

700
00:46:13,800 --> 00:46:17,840
Speaker 1: the public for some reason. It's a murky world, uh,

701
00:46:17,960 --> 00:46:20,840
Speaker 1: And in some of the discoveries or things that didn't

702
00:46:20,840 --> 00:46:23,840
Speaker 1: exist out there in a rock. I still wonder about

703
00:46:23,840 --> 00:46:26,760
Speaker 1: that story about that palette of a like a billion

704
00:46:26,800 --> 00:46:31,160
Speaker 1: dollars in cash. It's just gone somewhere, that one palette.

705
00:46:31,480 --> 00:46:36,080
Speaker 1: All them palettes, man telling you stuff. We're never in

706
00:46:36,080 --> 00:46:37,960
Speaker 1: the right time, at the right place for there's kind

707
00:46:37,960 --> 00:46:41,839
Speaker 1: of giveaways. It's just do you ever think about that?

708
00:46:42,040 --> 00:46:44,799
Speaker 1: I don't know. Well, just make sure there's lots and

709
00:46:44,920 --> 00:46:48,960
Speaker 1: lots of natural resources directly beneath your feet, and they

710
00:46:49,000 --> 00:46:52,160
Speaker 1: may just fall from the sky. I really should have

711
00:46:52,960 --> 00:46:59,319
Speaker 1: checked the lithium content that property about, but they were

712
00:46:59,320 --> 00:47:02,880
Speaker 1: not unified. The US government its leaders were not unified

713
00:47:02,920 --> 00:47:07,520
Speaker 1: on what action should occur. So apparently after his last,

714
00:47:07,600 --> 00:47:11,040
Speaker 1: the last attempt at a pitch didn't work, o'myre told

715
00:47:11,040 --> 00:47:15,680
Speaker 1: the US President, look, if you don't do it, we will.

716
00:47:17,680 --> 00:47:21,680
Speaker 1: And what was George Bush's reply, that's so weird. Well,

717
00:47:22,360 --> 00:47:25,480
Speaker 1: man's got to do what a man's gotta do, which

718
00:47:25,520 --> 00:47:29,160
Speaker 1: is what I get it. Trust me, I get it.

719
00:47:29,360 --> 00:47:33,759
Speaker 1: There's a cube out of the desert. It take it out.

720
00:47:34,840 --> 00:47:37,319
Speaker 1: He's saying, you know, the US is not leading this,

721
00:47:39,200 --> 00:47:42,319
Speaker 1: so a man's got to do what a man's gotta do.

722
00:47:42,440 --> 00:47:45,080
Speaker 1: Is is a weird, weird answer. I mean, shout out

723
00:47:45,120 --> 00:47:49,960
Speaker 1: to Dr Horrible. Do you guys remember that when Horrible

724
00:47:50,120 --> 00:47:54,520
Speaker 1: the singalong blog? Yes, yeah, yeah, it's so good still

725
00:47:54,560 --> 00:47:58,640
Speaker 1: holds up. Anyway, this all leads. I just want to

726
00:47:58,640 --> 00:48:00,759
Speaker 1: make sure I was speaking as that came in, so

727
00:48:00,800 --> 00:48:03,200
Speaker 1: we can really get the full brunt of that thunder strike.

728
00:48:03,280 --> 00:48:08,879
Speaker 1: Oh yeah, so so we um So, I think we've

729
00:48:08,920 --> 00:48:12,440
Speaker 1: done an okay job outlining the concerns that led to

730
00:48:12,480 --> 00:48:19,120
Speaker 1: this conspiracy, this decision to unilaterally strike this structure. Despite

731
00:48:19,120 --> 00:48:23,120
Speaker 1: the serious risk of Syrian retaliation. And it came from

732
00:48:24,640 --> 00:48:30,320
Speaker 1: the rationalization came from something called UH to begin doctrine,

733
00:48:31,080 --> 00:48:36,759
Speaker 1: which is this term for the Israeli government's position that

734
00:48:37,200 --> 00:48:44,200
Speaker 1: UH it's okay to make preventative strikes, preemptive strikes, so

735
00:48:44,239 --> 00:48:47,160
Speaker 1: long as in doing so, you're preventing one of your

736
00:48:47,280 --> 00:48:51,279
Speaker 1: enemies from gaining access to any kind of w m D,

737
00:48:52,000 --> 00:48:57,640
Speaker 1: but nuclear weapons especially. And they had already done stuff

738
00:48:57,800 --> 00:49:03,840
Speaker 1: supported by this doctrine early year in Iraq, Operation Opera,

739
00:49:04,040 --> 00:49:08,960
Speaker 1: Operation Outside the Boxes another another iteration of this. But

740
00:49:09,400 --> 00:49:13,960
Speaker 1: Operation Opera got a lot of bad press. Operation Outside

741
00:49:14,000 --> 00:49:17,640
Speaker 1: the Box did not. It is quite plausible that unless

742
00:49:17,680 --> 00:49:20,880
Speaker 1: you have lived in some aspect of this world geographically

743
00:49:21,239 --> 00:49:24,480
Speaker 1: or in your profession, you would have not heard of this.

744
00:49:25,200 --> 00:49:29,279
Speaker 1: But they they sent, they sent some major stuff, and

745
00:49:29,280 --> 00:49:34,240
Speaker 1: they did some pretty impressive, just objectively impressive electronic jamming

746
00:49:34,960 --> 00:49:39,919
Speaker 1: and signal signal intelligence work like they had. They had

747
00:49:40,840 --> 00:49:46,560
Speaker 1: ten F fifteens or F fifteen eyes fly along with

748
00:49:46,640 --> 00:49:51,680
Speaker 1: an escort of F sixteen jets and then signal intelligence aircraft.

749
00:49:52,120 --> 00:49:55,799
Speaker 1: Three of those fighter jets get ordered back, seven continue

750
00:49:55,800 --> 00:50:01,960
Speaker 1: into Syria, and then Israel just doesn't say anything, yeah,

751
00:50:02,200 --> 00:50:06,040
Speaker 1: just silence. And one of the main reasons that the

752
00:50:06,160 --> 00:50:09,680
Speaker 1: entire thing was kept so quiet is because Syria did

753
00:50:09,920 --> 00:50:13,799
Speaker 1: a an excellent job at covering its tracks, covering up

754
00:50:13,840 --> 00:50:16,600
Speaker 1: its activities of what we were actually going down at

755
00:50:16,640 --> 00:50:21,000
Speaker 1: the cube and um. They also didn't cooperate with that

756
00:50:21,160 --> 00:50:26,279
Speaker 1: Atomic Energy Group. So, I don't know, it's weird. It's

757
00:50:26,280 --> 00:50:29,840
Speaker 1: almost like on Sirius behalf. It's almost like, oh, okay,

758
00:50:30,120 --> 00:50:33,800
Speaker 1: you got us. Hey, no fair play, you got us. Okay,

759
00:50:33,960 --> 00:50:35,440
Speaker 1: we'll we'll just we'll just be quiet. We'll just go

760
00:50:35,440 --> 00:50:38,120
Speaker 1: over here, we understand. I don't know, that's not exactly

761
00:50:38,160 --> 00:50:40,239
Speaker 1: what happened, but at least at least they knew that

762
00:50:40,280 --> 00:50:44,200
Speaker 1: they had been caught, that their clandestine nuclear program had

763
00:50:44,280 --> 00:50:47,160
Speaker 1: been caught. If that's in fact what was happening there, well,

764
00:50:47,200 --> 00:50:50,320
Speaker 1: they also they made kind of a bet, which was

765
00:50:50,400 --> 00:50:54,920
Speaker 1: an interesting bet. I think they said, based on what

766
00:50:54,960 --> 00:50:59,719
Speaker 1: we know about how secret this is, how limited information

767
00:50:59,719 --> 00:51:03,759
Speaker 1: about this is, if we attack in this way, we

768
00:51:03,840 --> 00:51:07,160
Speaker 1: are going to force the president and government of Syria

769
00:51:07,280 --> 00:51:12,120
Speaker 1: into what they called the denial space. The denial space

770
00:51:12,239 --> 00:51:18,000
Speaker 1: is interesting because they're saying, if this attack avoids embarrassing

771
00:51:18,880 --> 00:51:25,480
Speaker 1: and publicly humiliating assade. There's a non zero chance that

772
00:51:25,560 --> 00:51:28,160
Speaker 1: he'll decide to hold back and that he won't respond

773
00:51:28,600 --> 00:51:31,560
Speaker 1: by going to war because it's an event with a

774
00:51:31,680 --> 00:51:36,280
Speaker 1: small footprint, it's quiet, it's so far away from where

775
00:51:36,440 --> 00:51:40,800
Speaker 1: a lot of civilians are living. Israel doesn't take responsibility

776
00:51:40,920 --> 00:51:45,040
Speaker 1: for it. And if we don't crow or call too

777
00:51:45,080 --> 00:51:50,760
Speaker 1: loudly in the aftermath, then that gives aside this space,

778
00:51:50,920 --> 00:51:56,000
Speaker 1: this denial space, this opportunity to downplay the event. So

779
00:51:56,040 --> 00:51:58,960
Speaker 1: we're going to launch this surprise attack, and the trick

780
00:51:59,120 --> 00:52:04,160
Speaker 1: is UH not to take responsibility immediately afterwards and then

781
00:52:04,239 --> 00:52:07,040
Speaker 1: just push ahead. And we have like this diplomatic effort

782
00:52:08,000 --> 00:52:10,400
Speaker 1: while we're sitting and while we're not publicly saying we

783
00:52:10,480 --> 00:52:13,200
Speaker 1: did it behind closed doors, we're gonna go to other

784
00:52:13,239 --> 00:52:16,120
Speaker 1: countries and we're gonna be like, check out these photos, bro,

785
00:52:17,560 --> 00:52:20,640
Speaker 1: you know what I mean, Like I told you so.

786
00:52:20,640 --> 00:52:25,239
Speaker 1: So this led to their calculation and and their bet

787
00:52:25,360 --> 00:52:29,719
Speaker 1: did work because there were signals that Syria was obviously

788
00:52:29,800 --> 00:52:33,640
Speaker 1: on high alert after this. They put long range missiles

789
00:52:33,719 --> 00:52:39,319
Speaker 1: armed with chemical warfare warheads rather UH into play, but

790
00:52:39,400 --> 00:52:44,160
Speaker 1: they didn't retaliate because they were worried about that car

791
00:52:44,360 --> 00:52:46,680
Speaker 1: that may or may not be in the garage, and

792
00:52:46,719 --> 00:52:49,520
Speaker 1: they thought, you know, if we deploy something, this may

793
00:52:49,520 --> 00:52:53,440
Speaker 1: be the excuse Israel needs to take these weapons of

794
00:52:53,680 --> 00:52:56,719
Speaker 1: mass destruction for a ride around the block, which is

795
00:52:56,760 --> 00:53:01,480
Speaker 1: a very real possibility and very dangerous. It So fast

796
00:53:01,520 --> 00:53:08,080
Speaker 1: forward more than ten years of March one, Israel officially

797
00:53:08,080 --> 00:53:12,000
Speaker 1: acknowledged the operation and they were and when they did so,

798
00:53:12,400 --> 00:53:17,799
Speaker 1: they released more material to justify what they've done, to

799
00:53:17,880 --> 00:53:21,360
Speaker 1: say like, hey, played fast and loosed with some laws,

800
00:53:21,360 --> 00:53:24,880
Speaker 1: but we've been pretty clear that we we felt like

801
00:53:24,920 --> 00:53:27,440
Speaker 1: we had a good reason to do it. And depending

802
00:53:27,440 --> 00:53:30,479
Speaker 1: on what you believe, this may have prevented a much

803
00:53:30,600 --> 00:53:34,799
Speaker 1: larger conflict in the future. This was a conspiracy, Was

804
00:53:34,840 --> 00:53:38,760
Speaker 1: it successful? I mean maybe for a while. And also,

805
00:53:39,120 --> 00:53:41,880
Speaker 1: you know, it leads to the question Matt, that we

806
00:53:41,680 --> 00:53:45,000
Speaker 1: were asking before, like this is this is clearly the

807
00:53:45,080 --> 00:53:48,840
Speaker 1: shadow of a q Khan. You can trace the knowledge

808
00:53:48,880 --> 00:53:51,760
Speaker 1: that he gained, knowledge that he earned in the knowledge

809
00:53:51,760 --> 00:53:55,960
Speaker 1: that he disseminated throughout the world. Uh. But who should

810
00:53:55,960 --> 00:53:59,880
Speaker 1: have the right to possess nuclear weapons? I mean, we

811
00:54:00,040 --> 00:54:04,040
Speaker 1: see a spectrum of answers um A lot of countries

812
00:54:04,080 --> 00:54:07,040
Speaker 1: that have them, now take the flying car approach, like,

813
00:54:07,120 --> 00:54:09,839
Speaker 1: it's really cool if I have a flying car, as

814
00:54:09,840 --> 00:54:12,200
Speaker 1: long as no one else has one, otherwise there might

815
00:54:12,200 --> 00:54:14,719
Speaker 1: be accidents. But then there are other you know, like

816
00:54:15,400 --> 00:54:19,520
Speaker 1: nonprofits that say, oh, I've got the answer for you,

817
00:54:19,520 --> 00:54:23,560
Speaker 1: no one, no one should have this. Oh yeah, and

818
00:54:23,640 --> 00:54:26,520
Speaker 1: some some really are the the answer for some people

819
00:54:26,560 --> 00:54:29,600
Speaker 1: really is everyone Like literally, the only way to stop

820
00:54:29,640 --> 00:54:33,120
Speaker 1: it now is if everybody has nukes, because you can't.

821
00:54:33,640 --> 00:54:37,480
Speaker 1: You can never confirm that any country has zero nukes.

822
00:54:37,920 --> 00:54:41,360
Speaker 1: You're it's it would be very difficult to fully confirm

823
00:54:43,080 --> 00:54:46,520
Speaker 1: that anyone country, no matter what their capabilities outside of

824
00:54:46,640 --> 00:54:51,040
Speaker 1: nuclear weapons, to confirm that they don't have them, right, Yeah,

825
00:54:51,120 --> 00:54:54,080
Speaker 1: that's that's the problem. It's tough to prove that it's

826
00:54:54,120 --> 00:54:58,680
Speaker 1: not around. And if you think about it, logically, the

827
00:54:58,920 --> 00:55:03,600
Speaker 1: fewer countries that have nuclear weapons, the more valuable they become.

828
00:55:04,320 --> 00:55:09,160
Speaker 1: So if everybody officially agreed that let's let's say over

829
00:55:09,200 --> 00:55:12,239
Speaker 1: a period of I don't know, ten twenty years, it

830
00:55:12,320 --> 00:55:16,239
Speaker 1: would reduce the world's population of nuclear warheads down to

831
00:55:16,360 --> 00:55:21,200
Speaker 1: zero immediately. What would happen or somewhere between those two

832
00:55:21,200 --> 00:55:25,520
Speaker 1: decades there would be this huge program very well funded

833
00:55:25,520 --> 00:55:28,600
Speaker 1: by any country that could afford it, to keep some

834
00:55:28,719 --> 00:55:31,439
Speaker 1: in secret, you know, just just for us, just for later,

835
00:55:31,719 --> 00:55:36,320
Speaker 1: just hide all their news nukes across Iowa in the heartland.

836
00:55:36,800 --> 00:55:40,120
Speaker 1: Uh So, put them on subs, put them on subs

837
00:55:40,160 --> 00:55:42,400
Speaker 1: that are hard to track and could be anywhere in

838
00:55:42,440 --> 00:55:46,560
Speaker 1: the world's oceans. How about this, everybody gets one. Everybody

839
00:55:46,600 --> 00:55:51,080
Speaker 1: gets just the one every You have to bring enough

840
00:55:51,120 --> 00:55:55,040
Speaker 1: for class folks. Uh that's I mean, that's a question,

841
00:55:55,080 --> 00:55:57,239
Speaker 1: and it's it's a tough question to answer. You can

842
00:55:57,280 --> 00:56:00,239
Speaker 1: make the argument. So you've stated before that there are

843
00:56:00,320 --> 00:56:04,480
Speaker 1: some groups that might be better suited to have them

844
00:56:04,480 --> 00:56:08,719
Speaker 1: and not do destructive things. But nuclear weapons are designed

845
00:56:08,960 --> 00:56:14,520
Speaker 1: to do destructive things. You know. They don't detonate and

846
00:56:14,560 --> 00:56:20,120
Speaker 1: produce flowers. Honestly, they produce arguably one mushroom, and it's

847
00:56:20,160 --> 00:56:23,719
Speaker 1: a deadly one. But the this is an idea the

848
00:56:23,760 --> 00:56:27,839
Speaker 1: world still whirls with, and the conversation is very much um,

849
00:56:28,560 --> 00:56:31,600
Speaker 1: very much led and run by the countries that are

850
00:56:31,600 --> 00:56:37,160
Speaker 1: currently nuclear powers, and those countries are at a standoff

851
00:56:37,280 --> 00:56:41,440
Speaker 1: that's been going on for a long time, and neither

852
00:56:42,400 --> 00:56:44,839
Speaker 1: especially Russia in the US, neither are going to back

853
00:56:44,880 --> 00:56:48,640
Speaker 1: down because they envision a world where they may be

854
00:56:48,800 --> 00:56:52,760
Speaker 1: in the position in some ways that Libya was. It's

855
00:56:52,760 --> 00:56:56,440
Speaker 1: it's something that doesn't really have an answer. And so

856
00:56:56,560 --> 00:57:01,280
Speaker 1: for folks who agree with the policy of preemptive unilateral strikes,

857
00:57:01,480 --> 00:57:03,479
Speaker 1: you know, there's a clear argument for the greater good.

858
00:57:04,080 --> 00:57:07,320
Speaker 1: For folks who disagree with it, uh, there's the idea

859
00:57:07,520 --> 00:57:11,640
Speaker 1: that this may have been despite the official lines, despite

860
00:57:11,640 --> 00:57:14,279
Speaker 1: the later declassified stuff. There's a gulf of tonk in

861
00:57:14,400 --> 00:57:19,600
Speaker 1: argument like maybe this was just politically convenient. Maybe this

862
00:57:19,760 --> 00:57:24,440
Speaker 1: was an opportunity more than an accident or an attempt

863
00:57:24,440 --> 00:57:27,600
Speaker 1: to repair a cover up. I'm imagining a scenario where

864
00:57:28,120 --> 00:57:32,800
Speaker 1: representatives from the DPRK like struck a deal to start

865
00:57:32,840 --> 00:57:37,680
Speaker 1: a factory somewhere in Syria and then secretly just they

866
00:57:37,880 --> 00:57:43,760
Speaker 1: were building nuclear weapons, are starting to build the capabilities

867
00:57:43,800 --> 00:57:46,560
Speaker 1: to have nuclear weapons created in that facility, and this,

868
00:57:46,880 --> 00:57:51,680
Speaker 1: you know, series had no idea. That's the thing. No

869
00:57:51,720 --> 00:57:55,640
Speaker 1: one ever has any idea until it benefits them, right,

870
00:57:55,760 --> 00:57:58,320
Speaker 1: Like I no idea. Of course I knew that, and

871
00:57:58,360 --> 00:58:01,160
Speaker 1: then I knew it all along. Yeah, uh, and that

872
00:58:01,640 --> 00:58:04,320
Speaker 1: you know that happens to everybody in the personal life too.

873
00:58:04,400 --> 00:58:07,720
Speaker 1: But uh, but this is Uh, you hit on a

874
00:58:07,760 --> 00:58:10,200
Speaker 1: crucial point, Matt. I don't know if I told you this,

875
00:58:10,280 --> 00:58:15,240
Speaker 1: but I spoke with diplomatic representatives in the DPRK a

876
00:58:15,320 --> 00:58:19,360
Speaker 1: number of years ago for not something sketchy. Are you

877
00:58:19,440 --> 00:58:24,120
Speaker 1: sure it was for school? Come on, man? And they

878
00:58:24,360 --> 00:58:27,840
Speaker 1: It was strange because I was surprised by how openly

879
00:58:28,080 --> 00:58:32,560
Speaker 1: antagonistic the U. S forces escorting them were. And I

880
00:58:32,840 --> 00:58:37,680
Speaker 1: was surprised by how openly the DPRK representatives spoke about

881
00:58:38,160 --> 00:58:43,440
Speaker 1: nuclear weaponry or nuclear power or hydro electric power, to

882
00:58:43,520 --> 00:58:47,440
Speaker 1: the point where some of the U. S. State Department

883
00:58:47,800 --> 00:58:52,080
Speaker 1: folks cut the lecture short. Uh. They did not want

884
00:58:52,360 --> 00:58:55,200
Speaker 1: the Q and A to continue. So we have to

885
00:58:55,240 --> 00:59:00,640
Speaker 1: be careful when we hear these varying narratives and perspectives. Um.

886
00:59:00,880 --> 00:59:04,280
Speaker 1: Of course, these kind of things are things that later

887
00:59:04,440 --> 00:59:08,080
Speaker 1: historians have to suss out the truth of. But we

888
00:59:08,120 --> 00:59:10,520
Speaker 1: want to pass the torch to you, folks, or we

889
00:59:10,560 --> 00:59:13,240
Speaker 1: want to pass the warhead to you. What do you

890
00:59:13,320 --> 00:59:18,280
Speaker 1: think was this the right or wrong action to take? Uh?

891
00:59:18,400 --> 00:59:21,760
Speaker 1: And perhaps even more importantly, what other countries might be

892
00:59:21,840 --> 00:59:26,880
Speaker 1: secretly working towards the creation of a bomb today? And

893
00:59:27,000 --> 00:59:30,640
Speaker 1: if you believe those countries exist then how should they

894
00:59:30,640 --> 00:59:33,640
Speaker 1: be handled? Let us know. We try to be easy

895
00:59:33,680 --> 00:59:39,000
Speaker 1: to find online. Um, got my eye squarely on Jamaica

896
00:59:39,320 --> 00:59:43,080
Speaker 1: looking at you guys making making nukes out there, and

897
00:59:43,240 --> 00:59:48,720
Speaker 1: I know it. No, I'm just shoking. I'm thinking Macedonia. Yeah,

898
00:59:48,920 --> 00:59:56,280
Speaker 1: classic Macedonians. No, I think we're joking. We're joking. We

899
00:59:56,320 --> 01:00:00,200
Speaker 1: are joking. Sorry, apologies to Macedonia and Jamaica. That's right,

900
01:00:00,280 --> 01:00:02,000
Speaker 1: but please let us know what you think. We'd love

901
01:00:02,040 --> 01:00:06,800
Speaker 1: to hear your reasoning, you know, but behind your opinions,

902
01:00:06,800 --> 01:00:09,480
Speaker 1: we we'd love to just understand. And you can tell

903
01:00:09,560 --> 01:00:11,800
Speaker 1: us those opinions in all kinds of different ways. You

904
01:00:11,840 --> 01:00:14,320
Speaker 1: can find us on social media where we are conspiracy

905
01:00:14,360 --> 01:00:18,040
Speaker 1: stuff on Twitter and Facebook. We are conspiracy stuff show

906
01:00:18,240 --> 01:00:22,000
Speaker 1: on Instagram. If you don't want to do those things, hey,

907
01:00:22,080 --> 01:00:24,360
Speaker 1: you can tell us how you feel in a review

908
01:00:24,600 --> 01:00:27,800
Speaker 1: on iTunes. Hey, leave a leave a positive one that

909
01:00:27,800 --> 01:00:31,040
Speaker 1: would be amazing. Leave a negative one wouldn't be so amazing,

910
01:00:31,240 --> 01:00:34,320
Speaker 1: but we'd appreciate it any No, we wouldn't appreciate it,

911
01:00:35,280 --> 01:00:37,120
Speaker 1: you know what. Just just be nice if you can,

912
01:00:37,600 --> 01:00:41,680
Speaker 1: and if if you don't particularly enjoy sipping the social needs,

913
01:00:42,440 --> 01:00:46,560
Speaker 1: if you're a person who doesn't doesn't feel called to

914
01:00:46,600 --> 01:00:49,000
Speaker 1: review things, but you have a story to share it,

915
01:00:49,040 --> 01:00:51,000
Speaker 1: we'd still love to hear it. You can call us

916
01:00:51,000 --> 01:00:53,560
Speaker 1: directly on our phone number. We are one eight three

917
01:00:53,640 --> 01:00:57,479
Speaker 1: three st d w y t K three minutes. Those

918
01:00:57,480 --> 01:01:01,160
Speaker 1: three minutes are yours. Give yourself a will nickname, let

919
01:01:01,240 --> 01:01:03,080
Speaker 1: us know if we can use your voice and or

920
01:01:03,200 --> 01:01:06,360
Speaker 1: story on the air. Uh, and then tell us what's

921
01:01:06,400 --> 01:01:09,480
Speaker 1: on your mind. Most importantly, if you have something to

922
01:01:09,520 --> 01:01:13,040
Speaker 1: relate that needs more than three minutes, do not censor yourself.

923
01:01:13,360 --> 01:01:15,840
Speaker 1: Don't feel like you have to just give bullet points.

924
01:01:16,160 --> 01:01:19,000
Speaker 1: You can tell us the story in full. You can

925
01:01:19,040 --> 01:01:23,040
Speaker 1: send us a message. We read every single message we get.

926
01:01:23,440 --> 01:01:26,120
Speaker 1: How do I send you that message you're asking, Well,

927
01:01:26,160 --> 01:01:29,480
Speaker 1: the answer is simple. Get head on over to your computer,

928
01:01:29,800 --> 01:01:33,240
Speaker 1: browser device, thinky of choice and send us a good

929
01:01:33,280 --> 01:01:36,600
Speaker 1: old fashioned email where we are conspiracy at i heeart

930
01:01:36,680 --> 01:01:57,680
Speaker 1: radio dot com. Stuff they don't want you to know

931
01:01:57,920 --> 01:02:00,880
Speaker 1: is a production of I Heart Radio. For more podcasts

932
01:02:00,880 --> 01:02:03,120
Speaker 1: from my heart Radio, visit the i heart Radio app,

933
01:02:03,200 --> 01:02:06,080
Speaker 1: Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.