Speaker 1: Welcome to Crash Course, a podcast about business, political, and
Speaker 1: social disruption and what we can learn from it. I'm
Speaker 1: Tim O'Brien. Today's Crash Course China takes on the world
Speaker 1: and the US. Consider the numbers. China is home to
Speaker 1: one point four billion people, about eighteen percent of the
Speaker 1: planet's total population. Twenty two point three million people live
Speaker 1: in Shanghai and eleven point seven million in Beijing alone.
Speaker 1: China has the world's second largest economy and has been
Speaker 1: on track to eventually overtake the US, although China's recent
Speaker 1: economic problems may delay that trajectory. Its geographic footprint is vast,
Speaker 1: covering more than three point six million square miles. China
Speaker 1: is home to a thriving technology sector that birth such
Speaker 1: well known giants as ten Cent and Ali Baba, and
Speaker 1: China's corporate powerhouses collectively spent about two hundred and twenty
Speaker 1: eight billion dollars on research and development in twenty two
Speaker 1: twenty two. Over the past forty years, China has lifted
Speaker 1: eight hundred million people out of poverty, an epic achievement
Speaker 1: that some analysts consider the biggest reduction in inequality in
Speaker 1: the modern era. China has also built a formidable military
Speaker 1: capacity featuring a world class navy, air force, nuclear missiles,
Speaker 1: and cyber warfare proficiencies. It regards the US as a
Speaker 1: robust but flabby economic and military competitor, and America as
Speaker 1: beset by social chaos and individualism so extreme that it
Speaker 1: undermines civil society. The South China Sea and Taiwan are flashpoints.
Speaker 1: But China's economic growth may have plateaued and its politics
Speaker 1: have been so reshaped by President Xijinping that a cult
Speaker 1: of personality and raw authoritarianism has recast the country's image
Speaker 1: abroad and its direction at home. Joining me today here
Speaker 1: in Asia to discuss China's path present in future are
Speaker 1: two Bloomberg opinion columnists and wizards, Karishma Vaswani, who is
Speaker 1: a savvy political analyst, and Shulely Wren, who covers markets
Speaker 1: in China's economy. Welcome to crash course, ladies. Shulely, you
Speaker 1: grew up in Shanghai. So as someone who's had a
Speaker 1: foot literally on the ground in China and elsewhere over
Speaker 1: the years, how do you think about China when you
Speaker 1: look at its whole trajectory during your own lifetime?
Speaker 2: So to give you some background, I was born and
Speaker 2: grew up in Shanghai, and then I left for the
Speaker 2: United States for university in nineteen ninety six. By the
Speaker 2: time I was leaving for United States, Shanghai was already
Speaker 2: morphing into something I couldn't recognize, basically, like new subways
Speaker 2: and the new hiroads were coming up every year to
Speaker 2: this day. I was just in Shanghai this month, and
Speaker 2: what I saw was that, you know, if you are
Speaker 2: a taxpayer, you will see changes in the city pretty
Speaker 2: much every year. They're building new pedestrian walkways, and if
Speaker 2: you go complain about the government civil services, you will
Speaker 2: get responses immediately. Big cities in China have transformed themselves,
Speaker 2: and the China model is basically, I build it and
Speaker 2: the economy will come for you.
Speaker 1: Like what symbolizes that change most visibly? Is it skyscrapers?
Speaker 1: Is it the infrastructure? Like what are the most tangible
Speaker 1: reminders that this incredible change that occurred during your own lifetime?
Speaker 2: I think it's coming hours. The subway is very very efficient.
Speaker 2: If we talk about going from the city center to
Speaker 2: airport express you can take this very fast speed real
Speaker 2: at the three hundred kilometers an hour, and you can
Speaker 2: get to the airport in about five six minutes. And
Speaker 2: that high speed real was actually built when I was
Speaker 2: still in the US almost twenty years ago, and I
Speaker 2: find that efficiency is very transformative and glaring to visitors' eyes.
Speaker 1: Karishma, you were born in Singapore, raised in Indonesia, You've
Speaker 1: had a vast global experience apart from that, just like truly,
Speaker 1: when you look at China, what do you think about
Speaker 1: the last several decades of profound growth and change there?
Speaker 3: Yeah, you know, just picking up tim on what Schuly
Speaker 3: was saying. I remember when I was growing up that
Speaker 3: India and China were almost around the same level, right
Speaker 3: like forty years ago in terms of how unavailable resources
Speaker 3: were for people, basic sort of poverty levels, all of that.
Speaker 3: And it was as a journalist in India when I
Speaker 3: first went to visit Beijing, and there is always this
Speaker 3: comparison between China and India, and it's very envious of
Speaker 3: the achievements that China's been able to make. And I
Speaker 3: think nothing was more glaringly obvious in the strides that
Speaker 3: China had made for me at least you talked about
Speaker 3: the commuters and the subway system truly, but for me.
Speaker 3: It was the highways, because it was these gigantic highways
Speaker 3: that stretched out into the distance, huge monolithic structures that
Speaker 3: really showed the size and scale of the country and
Speaker 3: what it was able to to achieve and to your
Speaker 3: point about build it and they will come, it was
Speaker 3: exactly that. China's now seen around the world as a
Speaker 3: country that has made remarkable strides, and I think it's
Speaker 3: really important to remember the fact that when they have
Speaker 3: had a plan, they have managed to achieve that plan.
Speaker 3: And that's something that a lot of countries in the
Speaker 3: region one look up to because they are trying to
Speaker 3: find an alternative model of economic growth but also a
Speaker 3: political system. There's been a lot of lecturing from the
Speaker 3: West to countries out in Asia about how ideologies should be.
Speaker 3: That democracy is the right way forward. It's not always
Speaker 3: seen in the most palatable way for a lot of
Speaker 3: leaders out in this part of the world. But two,
Speaker 3: because it's actually been an achievement, They've done it. They
Speaker 3: said they were going to do it, and they've done it.
Speaker 3: And I think that evidence has helped to solidify the
Speaker 3: reputation of China as an economic genius in many ways,
Speaker 3: and that countries in the region have looked up to,
Speaker 3: and what do.
Speaker 1: You think China it's elf wants to be if China
Speaker 1: was a person. This is such a bad way to
Speaker 1: frame a question, but it's actually useful. I think in
Speaker 1: this case, who does China want to be accepted?
Speaker 3: Is the sense that I get, you know, like for
Speaker 3: the longest time, my impression has been that China consistently
Speaker 3: and you see this in some of the rhetoric from
Speaker 3: the Foreign ministry as well, it has a model that
Speaker 3: it wants to show the world is possible, that it
Speaker 3: is achievable, and that alternative way of being and of
Speaker 3: doing politics and of growing your economy is something that
Speaker 3: should be considered as on par with the United States,
Speaker 3: if not in some ways superior. And I think what's
Speaker 3: happened in the last couple of years, particularly under the
Speaker 3: administration of Chijin Ping, because that's really where it all changed, right,
Speaker 3: Like I mean, up until that point, there was a
Speaker 3: sense that China was growing very well, there was engagement,
Speaker 3: there were concerns about some of the actions out in
Speaker 3: places like the South China Sea and Taiwan, but not
Speaker 3: to the extent that you have now. And I think
Speaker 3: under Xi Jinping. It's become a lot more difficult for
Speaker 3: the outside world to understand. What are the intentions of
Speaker 3: this new China? What are the ambitions? Is it a
Speaker 3: sort of expansive and territorial empire building policy or is
Speaker 3: it a country that is trying to make itself known
Speaker 3: and seen on the global stage. And right now a
Speaker 3: lot of people that I talk to still haven't figured
Speaker 3: out which of the two it is.
Speaker 1: So Shuley Karishma said that China just wants to be accepted.
Speaker 1: And I'm far less sophisticated than both of you on
Speaker 1: this topic. That would not have been my first goat
Speaker 1: to description of China. I feel like as an American
Speaker 1: watching this, but as someone who's trying to be objective
Speaker 1: beyond just being an American, I also see China as
Speaker 1: a country that wants to dominate certain aspects of its
Speaker 1: relationships with commercially and economically and diplomatically with others. You
Speaker 1: don't have to agree with that, but I think Karishma's
Speaker 1: introduced to provocative talking point. I wonder what you thought
Speaker 1: of it.
Speaker 2: I absolutely agree with the Karishma on that. Like going
Speaker 2: back to your question about China's identity, Okay, let me
Speaker 2: step back and say, going back to presenting Pin the politician,
Speaker 2: the political leader's sense of identity, he sees China as
Speaker 2: a producer first and then consumer. It's actually a very
Speaker 2: nineteen sixties mentality and ideology that he grew up with,
Speaker 2: whereas us it's a consumer based society. The philosophy of
Speaker 2: governors is very different. Like China basically say, let's do
Speaker 2: industrial ambition, industrial policy, and then as we get rich,
Speaker 2: there will be money for the consumers and the workers,
Speaker 2: whereas US basically says, perhaps that's my wrong impression that
Speaker 2: a government's job is more or less to do no
Speaker 2: harm and to let people live, and the consumer society
Speaker 2: will flourish and will generate demand for new products, etc.
Speaker 2: So it is an identity issue, and the present sheging
Speaker 2: Pin basically thinks the world have two ways of economic growth,
Speaker 2: when on the producer side one on the consumer side.
Speaker 1: You would say that that entire posture on China's part
Speaker 1: is about wanting to be accepted.
Speaker 2: Yes, I mean, if you look at Belt and Row initiative,
Speaker 2: and he just made a speech in Beijing right with
Speaker 2: President putting on his site, he basically said that we
Speaker 2: China are trying to improve the infrastructure, and that's the
Speaker 2: only economic growth model that he knows of, and he
Speaker 2: feels that China is doing good to the third world countries.
Speaker 1: So, Karushimaban, is there a central thing that animates China?
Speaker 1: Staying on the conversation we just had, like, what is
Speaker 1: propelling China itself forward in terms of its own goals?
Speaker 3: Perhaps it's worth looking at this tim from the perspective
Speaker 3: if I was to ask you that question about the
Speaker 3: United States, right, what is propelling the United States forward
Speaker 3: with its own goals? A desire to show that this
Speaker 3: is a country that is a global leader, a superpower,
Speaker 3: a military power. And China feels the same way. And
Speaker 3: I think that sometimes you know, there is an arrogance
Speaker 3: in the West about the the hierarchy. Right, the US
Speaker 3: is at the top of the tree, and then everybody
Speaker 3: else is on the democratic column and on the democratic camp.
Speaker 3: And so you are our friends, and you belong in
Speaker 3: the in crowd and in the cool crowd and everybody else. Sorry,
Speaker 3: don't want you at the party, right. But for China,
Speaker 3: what it's been able to do is actually achieve a
Speaker 3: remarkable as I'm repeating myself here. But you know, I
Speaker 3: don't think we can make that point enough that it's
Speaker 3: managed to bring, as you said in your introduction, eight
Speaker 3: hundred million people out of poverty and bring them to
Speaker 3: a level where they're creating world class companies, the sorts
Speaker 3: of companies that truly writes about every day, you know,
Speaker 3: with innovation at a level. The first time I went
Speaker 3: to China, it was the highways that I remarked on
Speaker 3: the second time, when I went to Shinjin to interview
Speaker 3: the boss of Huawei, I was amazed by the fact
Speaker 3: that everything was you know, facial identification in the subways.
Speaker 3: You know, the level of technology is really something to
Speaker 3: remark on. But to go back to that point, right,
Speaker 3: I think it is worth recognizing that China is trying
Speaker 3: to showcase its achievements. It wants to be accepted, and
Speaker 3: when it comes up against the US, that is where
Speaker 3: the conflict happens. That is where the clash happens. Because
Speaker 3: I think it's not just the Chinese side that is
Speaker 3: responsible for that.
Speaker 1: The US has its own set of issues for sure,
Speaker 1: especially in the kind of shambalic politically era we're in
Speaker 1: right now in the United States. Truly how does China
Speaker 1: think about its own recent history? Obviously, with a country
Speaker 1: that has had such a rich and storied past, you
Speaker 1: could say recent history is the last three hundred years,
Speaker 1: and that's still probably not recent. So I'm sort of
Speaker 1: thinking of recent like I was going to say post
Speaker 1: World War two, but I actually think almost postcolonial when
Speaker 1: she looks at nineteenth century China and twentieth century China,
Speaker 1: and now, how does he and the people around him
Speaker 1: think about the arc of that history.
Speaker 2: I will say that there a little bit passive aggressive,
Speaker 2: aggressive in the sense that they feel that they were
Speaker 2: round in the nineteenth century and that China was almost colonialized,
Speaker 2: and then we have World War Two, the ninteen massacre
Speaker 2: by the Japanese Army, etc. Passive in the sense that
Speaker 2: they just feel that China is a huge empire. It
Speaker 2: has lasted longer than the Ottoman Empire, longer than the
Speaker 2: Roman Empire, and there is a cultural superiority that the
Speaker 2: Chinese leadership feels that they can leverage on. For instance,
Speaker 2: if we talk about the global supply chain, the Chinese
Speaker 2: workers are stellar. They are the ones who are willing
Speaker 2: to work nine ninety six. You know from nine am
Speaker 2: to nine pm for six days a week. They feel
Speaker 2: that there is a very very strong cultural superiority. Last year,
Speaker 2: when I was on the reporting trip in Viennam, I
Speaker 2: spoke to quite a few Chinese entrepreneurs who opened factories
Speaker 2: in Vietnam, and it was very politically incorrect. They said
Speaker 2: they prefer to open factories in northern Vietnam because it's
Speaker 2: culturally closer to Chinese Confucian spot and the people there
Speaker 2: were harder working in the southern Saigong area. So there
Speaker 2: is that sense. But sometimes they also get very angry
Speaker 2: if they feel that they are being slighted by global
Speaker 2: powers such as the United States. They will think back
Speaker 2: on the eighteen hundreds, how China was so humiliated by
Speaker 2: the European and later on by the Japanese powers. So
Speaker 2: it's kind of that conflict that I see.
Speaker 3: Just picking up on what Shirley said, because I think
Speaker 3: it can bring us down, you know, the sort of
Speaker 3: understanding of why then China, if it's just trying to
Speaker 3: be accepted or recognized for its achievements, get such a
Speaker 3: negative reaction in the outside world, right, Why does it
Speaker 3: have this bad press so to speak? That example that
Speaker 3: you brought up of the entrepreneurs that you met in Vietnam,
Speaker 3: and you know the Belton Road projects where Chinese companies
Speaker 3: go overseas, but they want to bring Chinese labor with them,
Speaker 3: they want to bring that Chinese expertise. And then these
Speaker 3: projects that end up becoming vessels in a way for
Speaker 3: an export of Chinese workers to these countries is then
Speaker 3: viewed is not something that's beneficial to that country. Rather,
Speaker 3: it's all going back to the empire. And I'm putting
Speaker 3: the word empire in quotation marks, and I think that's
Speaker 3: what China struggles with, right It is a rising superpower.
Speaker 3: There's no way we can deny that it's here to stay.
Speaker 3: It's not going anywhere. And I think learning how to
Speaker 3: manage China, learning how to navigate it is essential for
Speaker 3: a country like the United States, because Biden has done
Speaker 3: a remarkable job of this deterrence and integrated deterrence, getting
Speaker 3: all of the partners in the region to sort of
Speaker 3: work together on this, recognizing China is this existential sort
Speaker 3: of conflict that they've got to come up with. But
Speaker 3: nobody wants a conflict between the US and China, right,
Speaker 3: Like a lot of the countries in this part of
Speaker 3: the world and wondering why can't you just sort it
Speaker 3: out and get along, right.
Speaker 2: I just want to add one more thing, just like
Speaker 2: a world Karishma said, we do need to think about
Speaker 2: what the Chinese leaders are thinking. They are a little
Speaker 2: bit like people were, like to say, an overconfident in China.
Speaker 2: But I think the outside were also should think about
Speaker 2: China being historically insecure. So when is these aggressive gestures
Speaker 2: from the US, it will overreact. So I think it's
Speaker 2: very important to tone it down on the western side,
Speaker 2: on both sides.
Speaker 1: Actually, we'll probably get into this a little bit more
Speaker 1: later in the show, but Hong Kong to me, is
Speaker 1: such an emblematic city state for this very discussion because
Speaker 1: England turned it into a vassal property. They used it
Speaker 1: to introduce opium into mainland China. They used it controlled
Speaker 1: China so they could dominate and try to colonize China.
Speaker 1: And China has come out of that era and people
Speaker 1: now criticize China for the way it's pulling Hong Kong
Speaker 1: back into its own orbit. But I also am sympathetic
Speaker 1: to the idea that Chinese have that it was never
Speaker 1: out of our orbit, other people came in and abused
Speaker 1: it essentially at different points in our history. And I
Speaker 1: still think you can be critical of the way that
Speaker 1: China is trying to absorb it now while also respecting
Speaker 1: I think truly what you just mentioned, that this insecurity
Speaker 1: China has that's born out of the way the history
Speaker 1: has played out. You don't have to agree with me
Speaker 1: about that either, but Hong Kong fascinates me in that regard. Sure.
Speaker 2: One thing that's interesting about Hong Kong is I live
Speaker 2: in Hong Kong, and you know the twenty nineteen protests.
Speaker 2: I spoke to Hong Kong local people, right, but they're
Speaker 2: ultimately Chinese. Got migrated from the north, and I notice
Speaker 2: a very strong generational divide. Like say, I speak to
Speaker 2: like people who are older, like in their sixties or whatever,
Speaker 2: like my juror mister Ma. He told me, he said,
Speaker 2: before China has Bruce Lee, now we have Chi Jin Pin.
Speaker 2: He is actually very patriotic. A lot of old Hong
Speaker 2: Kong Chinese people are very patriotic, but if you move
Speaker 2: down to like people in their twenties or even thirties,
Speaker 2: they prefer British rule, believe it or not. And I
Speaker 2: think ultimately it's about governors. They see China as being
Speaker 2: too intrusive. The Chinese way of government is being too intrusive,
Speaker 2: whereas the British kind of sort of just left them
Speaker 2: alone and.
Speaker 1: There was free speech, there was a free press, it
Speaker 1: was a very creative community. It was authentically international, and
Speaker 1: there's a real danger now that China is sort of
Speaker 1: squeezing that out of that kind of Hong Kong.
Speaker 2: Yes, absolutely, But on the other side, Hong Kong's Chief
Speaker 2: executive Youngly just had his policy address earlier this week, right,
Speaker 2: and you can see the Hong Kong governance is changing.
Speaker 2: They're trying to give you more cash handouts. They're trying
Speaker 2: to build infrastructure. They're trying to incentivize and stimulate you
Speaker 2: through money and the buildings and the new artificial islands.
Speaker 2: You can see the way of a Hong Kong governess
Speaker 2: is heading towards the Chinese way. And I have to say,
Speaker 2: like I personally think of Hong Kong, the infrastructure is
Speaker 2: getting dilapidated. If you go to the Central Business District
Speaker 2: this summer has been terrible. We can smell switch, you know.
Speaker 2: But the Hong Kong government much left you alone, and
Speaker 2: I think they are shifting to the mainland China model.
Speaker 1: Couragem. I can see that you have some thoughts on
Speaker 1: that so way in here.
Speaker 3: Yeah, I think this idea or the framing of you
Speaker 3: can accept and sort of remark positively on aspects of
Speaker 3: how China has done things, but also be clear eyed
Speaker 3: and critical of the way, for example, it's operated in
Speaker 3: Hong Kong is crucial for our understanding of China. From
Speaker 3: the Chinese side, it's very clear. We've discussed that why
Speaker 3: they feel about Hong Kong the way that they do.
Speaker 3: But from young Hong konger's that I spoke to, just
Speaker 3: as you mentioned, surely on some of those reporting trips
Speaker 3: I made there, they do not feel Chinese. They do
Speaker 3: not feel mainland Chinese, even if they are ethnically Chinese.
Speaker 3: And I think the fact that a political system in China,
Speaker 3: this is going to be my sense, is one of
Speaker 3: the biggest issues going forward for young people who've grown
Speaker 3: up in that system but no longer feel that they
Speaker 3: have opportunities the way they saw for their parents. They
Speaker 3: don't feel that they have the ability to say the
Speaker 3: things that you know, we talk about a sort of
Speaker 3: closed system in China, but it's become even more closed
Speaker 3: now to the extent where you know, somebody says something
Speaker 3: on Wabo and within minutes it's wiped away, right, And
Speaker 3: I think it's really important for us to be clear
Speaker 3: eyed about what is happening there and be able to
Speaker 3: criticize but also to commend.
Speaker 1: I would suspect, And it seems evident in the way
Speaker 1: this has progressed that Chinese government when it sees young
Speaker 1: Hong Kongers who are saying I like the Hong Kong
Speaker 1: my parents had, and I want a Hong Kong that's
Speaker 1: not specifically on the Chinese model, that the Chinese say, well,
Speaker 1: then go live somewhere else, because this is the model
Speaker 1: we're going to have. Whether or not you feel romantic
Speaker 1: about the past, am I you know, misinterpreting them to me?
Speaker 1: It just seems patently obvious that that's where we're headed.
Speaker 2: Absolutely the Chinese government, so far head and stop the
Speaker 2: Hong Kongers from leaving. If you don't like this model,
Speaker 2: just please go ahead and leave.
Speaker 3: And I think that's the danger, right because when you
Speaker 3: look at the way that the mainland has operated in
Speaker 3: Hong Kong, it is increasingly clear that that is the
Speaker 3: root that is going to consistently be the way that
Speaker 3: they approach politics there. There hasn't been a lessening of
Speaker 3: Beijing's influence in Hong Kong. To the contrary, you see
Speaker 3: it in every aspect of public life.
Speaker 1: Precisely because some of the things I cited in the introduction,
Speaker 1: this incredible economic success that mainland China has had, and
Speaker 1: its muscularity around its military presence and the way it's
Speaker 1: asserting itself in the world. They can point to a
Speaker 1: successful track record as reason for why they want to
Speaker 1: continue to roll the way they have. Though, and we'll
Speaker 1: get into this later in the show, there's starting to
Speaker 1: be a little bit of cracks in the model. On
Speaker 1: that note, I'm going to take a quick break to
Speaker 1: hear from one of our sponsors, and then we'll come
Speaker 1: right back. We're back with karisim of Uswani and Shuley Wren.
Speaker 1: They're both Bloomberg opinion columnists, and we're talking about China.
Speaker 1: So surely, what is the secret sauce in China's economic rives?
Speaker 1: If you were to identify the things that are very
Speaker 1: specifically Chinese that were key to its growth, that differentiated
Speaker 1: it from the growth paths that other countries, including the US,
Speaker 1: has taken. What would those be.
Speaker 2: I would now say it's the Chinese people. I think
Speaker 2: that the Chinese Communist Party can be very very efficient,
Speaker 2: at least in the era when the economic growth was
Speaker 2: very fast. If there was a directive from the top,
Speaker 2: it will get executed very quickly. I remember, I mean
Speaker 2: I saw Chump high transform right, like a highway will
Speaker 2: be built within just a year. There will be all
Speaker 2: sorts of lend issues that people don't want to move.
Speaker 2: What the government would just say, Okay, if you don't
Speaker 2: want to move, I'm just going to cut off water, electricity,
Speaker 2: gas and as important you will want to move right,
Speaker 2: So everything gets built very quickly, whereas places that I've
Speaker 2: seen in Vietnam, Indonesia, land rights is always an issue,
Speaker 2: even in like other communist countries. So in that sense,
Speaker 2: I think the Chinese government is very efficient. If it
Speaker 2: wants to do something, it will get it done.
Speaker 1: And it's loaded with talented people. It has the kind
Speaker 1: of civil service you want. The UK is famous for
Speaker 1: having a lifelong civil service that tries to be nonpartisan. Singapore,
Speaker 1: I think, is a great example of a very well
Speaker 1: compensated civil service that recruits for talent. And I think
Speaker 1: China has done that at a massive, massive scale, hasn't it.
Speaker 2: Absolutely? Like if you look at Seisha, I'm hi right,
Speaker 2: Like the government has an app and then they have
Speaker 2: also of entries, say like a switch problem, electricity problem.
Speaker 2: You can click on the entry and then you can
Speaker 2: leave a comment. Within twenty five hours, somebody will contact
Speaker 2: you and say, what's your problem, and now don't try
Speaker 2: to get a fixed winning a week.
Speaker 1: Wow, So that doesn't happen in the United States. Karishma,
Speaker 1: what are your thoughts about China's economic rise?
Speaker 3: Yeah, I wonder surely whether you'll agree with this, But
Speaker 3: to me, you know, it's also the private entrepreneurs. And
Speaker 3: when you look back at the Ero and China opened
Speaker 3: up and Dougshaoping, etc. There was a real encouragement of
Speaker 3: private industry that governments sort of you know, at least
Speaker 3: to me, it seemed let flourish without too much interference.
Speaker 3: It only started to get involved when these companies became
Speaker 3: so big and they started to become more popular, or
Speaker 3: the CEOs became more popular in the mind space of
Speaker 3: young people than Sheijin Ping did you know, the sort
Speaker 3: of jackmasied and ping plash that we can get into later.
Speaker 3: But the companies themselves grew up in this rather messy
Speaker 3: and chaotic environment, which then they had to deal with
Speaker 3: the problems that were apparent to them. In China, they
Speaker 3: had those opportunities, and initially they were servicing that market
Speaker 3: by selling products to the United States, but also leveraging
Speaker 3: off the vast labor force that they had in the country.
Speaker 3: And I think that's also really remarkable. It's the unique
Speaker 3: thing that China had that other countries in the region
Speaker 3: didn't have at the time. The nation of private entrepreneurs,
Speaker 3: government efficiency as you point out, and a huge labor force.
Speaker 1: And in part, I think China studied the Russian model
Speaker 1: and it found it wanting. It was statism, so bureaucratic
Speaker 1: and extreme and corrupt and inefficient, and it didn't really
Speaker 1: allow for free enterprise. It seems to me that Chinese said,
Speaker 1: we can have efficient central planning and an efficient government
Speaker 1: plumbing around our economy, but we will also allow people
Speaker 1: to become wealthy, will allow people to own their own property,
Speaker 1: own their own businesses. So it was this unusual hybrid model.
Speaker 2: Right absolutely, I mean, I do agree that private entrepreneurship
Speaker 2: is very important, and I still think there is a
Speaker 2: lot of animal spirits remaining in China based on my
Speaker 2: conversations with entrepreneurs, et cetera. But I think that the
Speaker 2: government's role is also very important. Like I think about
Speaker 2: how China got rich. It was world's biggest factory floor, right,
Speaker 2: and then to grow rich through manufacturing, you have to
Speaker 2: have the high way, the big deep seap ports, and
Speaker 2: the good cargo planes, etc. And the government has built that.
Speaker 2: So I think it's a combination.
Speaker 1: And Karushima, How has Chinese politics evolved during this time?
Speaker 1: During this massive economic boom, we end up at its
Speaker 1: peak state with Shijinping, who is now on his third
Speaker 1: term he comes into power in twenty twelve. Has the
Speaker 1: political architecture in China taken turns that surprise you? Is
Speaker 1: it also strategic or is it more a little bit
Speaker 1: of a cult of personality or some of both?
Speaker 3: Gosha, I think it's really disappointing, actually more than anything else,
Speaker 3: because in some respects if China had continued down a
Speaker 3: path where you didn't have a Shijinping as commander in
Speaker 3: chief for what now looks like life, it would have
Speaker 3: still grown economically strong. It would have still, in my view,
Speaker 3: you get to a point where developing economy reaches a
Speaker 3: sort of mature level. These five percent growth rates that
Speaker 3: we're seeing now, they're excellent growth rates by any account,
Speaker 3: But you could have still had a very rich, profitable,
Speaker 3: and thriving China without a Shi Jin pain at the
Speaker 3: helm of China. And I often wonder if you'd had
Speaker 3: a different kind of leader, somebody who doesn't seem as
Speaker 3: inclined as Shei jinping is to build this cultive personality
Speaker 3: around him, around the idea of what the party should
Speaker 3: be in public life, in the minds of people. Then
Speaker 3: you know what kind of country would that be? Would
Speaker 3: that be a nation that would be far more willing
Speaker 3: to cooperate and collaborate with the United States? Would it
Speaker 3: have set itself up in this way on a path
Speaker 3: of competition but also conflict rather than competition and cooperation.
Speaker 3: And obviously we'll never know, but I do think there
Speaker 3: was a real turning point when Xijin Pin came into power.
Speaker 1: Talk a little bit more about that, truly, because I
Speaker 1: want to talk about some also some specific things she
Speaker 1: has done recently are I think revelatory, and we can
Speaker 1: get into some of those, But tell me what you
Speaker 1: think about the Shi era, for lack of a better term, I.
Speaker 2: Think she is pretty much a puritan. He is nothing
Speaker 2: like the other Communist political leaders of his era. He
Speaker 2: doesn't go party drink, you know. I mean. There are
Speaker 2: talks of his family's business associations, like in particular his sister,
Speaker 2: but he himself seems a little bit of a more
Speaker 2: anti materialistic, if I may use the term. He is
Speaker 2: more ideologically driven, I think, and he seems to be
Speaker 2: genuinely interested in the everlasting dynasty of the Chinese Communist Party.
Speaker 2: I mean, what we hear is that his mother, who's
Speaker 2: in her nineties, she's still alive, and despite all the
Speaker 2: pursion of his own family, right, his mother is still
Speaker 2: a big believer and a very very red heart. So
Speaker 2: the sum perhaps it's just carrying on the family legacy.
Speaker 1: I think. It was two years ago when Hu Jinta
Speaker 1: got publicly embarrassed and escorted out of a major party
Speaker 1: meeting in China in front of the country's political leaders.
Speaker 1: It seemed very calculated and felt to me at the
Speaker 1: time like she signaling a demonstrable break from a past,
Speaker 1: a different kind of leadership. More recently, he's been purging
Speaker 1: the military. They say that it's for corruption, that he's
Speaker 1: uncovered corruption, but both of his leading defense ministers had
Speaker 1: very short terms and they were shown the door, most
Speaker 1: recently Li Shangfu. And he's been purging obviously, the business class.
Speaker 1: Some of the entrepreneurs that Kirishima mentioned earlier who had
Speaker 1: been I think symbolic to younger Chinese who wanted to
Speaker 1: get rich, wanted to be creative, wanted to be entrepreneurial,
Speaker 1: wanted to have their own companies, have now seen this
Speaker 1: whole class of entrepreneurs sort of defenestrated. What do you
Speaker 1: make of all of that?
Speaker 2: I think ultimately it goes down to his production first,
Speaker 2: consumption second ideology. I mean what you see is he's
Speaker 2: encouraging industrial tech and he wants to build those little
Speaker 2: little deep tech companies that the world's supply chain system
Speaker 2: cannot deal without, and they will be always integrated into
Speaker 2: the world no matter what happens too politically, consumer tach
Speaker 2: he's knocking out. I mean, perhaps it's his own ideas
Speaker 2: about how an economy can grow, but it's also like,
Speaker 2: if you think about China become a very consumer oriented society,
Speaker 2: young people will have their own thoughts, their own ideas,
Speaker 2: and will the CCP's dynasty last. They have lasted for
Speaker 2: fifty sixty years, but how about much longer another hundred
Speaker 2: two hundred. He's thinking about in terms of Chin or
Speaker 2: Ming dynasty terms.
Speaker 1: So he's playing long ball and everyone else is playing shirtball.
Speaker 2: In fact, he is very sensitive when people these days
Speaker 2: talk about the Ming dynasty or Chin dynasty, because China's
Speaker 2: censorship thinks people are just making very veal reference to him,
Speaker 2: for instance, founding father of Ming dynasty. After he became
Speaker 2: the emperor, he basically killed all his comrades. So when
Speaker 2: people make these kind of jokes, they will as censored online.
Speaker 3: And in fact, a book recently has disappeared from bookshops
Speaker 3: in Beijing because it exactly implies the fact that if
Speaker 3: a certain kind of emperor proceeds in this way, you
Speaker 3: end up having an awful end. But just to the
Speaker 3: point of why the party or why Shi Jinping would
Speaker 3: want ideology to be controlled in this way, I think
Speaker 3: it's precisely that that private entrepreneurs and the economy that
Speaker 3: you were talking about just now Shirley. Young people felt
Speaker 3: like they had a way out of the system, and
Speaker 3: when you curtail those opportunities for young people, then the
Speaker 3: party becomes the most important thing inside the minds of
Speaker 3: people as well. It interferes in every aspect of public
Speaker 3: and private life, and I think that's what he is
Speaker 3: attempting to do.
Speaker 1: By the time this episode heirs, I think Joe Biden
Speaker 1: will have already met with Yang Yi, China's foreign minister.
Speaker 1: They're scheduled to meet during the time that we were
Speaker 1: producing this, so we don't have to be specific about
Speaker 1: the outcome of that meeting. But it does feel actually
Speaker 1: significant to me that in this moment where we've got
Speaker 1: a lot of geopolitical conflicts Russia and Ukraine, the Gaza
Speaker 1: Strip has flamed up, and there's been constant talk about
Speaker 1: whether or not China wants to invade Taiwan, and if
Speaker 1: it does invade Taiwan, what are the geopolitical knockoff effects
Speaker 1: of that. So within an environment like that, the fact
Speaker 1: that Biden is taking a meeting with a senior, the
Speaker 1: senior Chinese foreign affairs diplomat, it seems significant to me.
Speaker 1: But do you think about it in a different way.
Speaker 3: No, I think it's extremely significant, and it's the latest
Speaker 3: in a series of what I would say are very
Speaker 3: significant engagements between the US and China. Shijinping has met
Speaker 3: with Kevin Yusom from California. A group of US senators
Speaker 3: who were in Beijing also meeting with him. You know,
Speaker 3: it's all leading up to what everybody is hoping will
Speaker 3: be a meeting between chi Jinping and Joe Biden at
Speaker 3: APEX in San Francisco. At the same time, though, going
Speaker 3: back to that point of how we must be clear
Speaker 3: eyed about China and also be willing to criticize when
Speaker 3: the time is right, the Chinese Coastguard has been involved
Speaker 3: in at least two collisions with two ships from the
Speaker 3: Philippine side in the South China Sea, blaming Manila and
Speaker 3: the United States for interfering in what Beijing sees as
Speaker 3: its own water waste. So, on the one hand, you
Speaker 3: see strategic engagement improving, and it's an encouraging sign between
Speaker 3: the United States and China. But you know this isn't
Speaker 3: going to be solved overnight, right. You know, it's going
Speaker 3: to be a situation where Beijing consistently says, this is
Speaker 3: our backyard. The thing I think China would want the
Speaker 3: most is us please leave, please leave from this part
Speaker 3: of the world. We'll manage it. And as long as
Speaker 3: you understand that these are our strategic interests so you
Speaker 3: don't get involved, then we're fine. We can continue to cooperate.
Speaker 1: Does that ring true to you too, Shuley?
Speaker 2: I think one question we can ask is like, why
Speaker 2: is President Chimpin suddenly trying to be friendly with the
Speaker 2: United States again? And I think it's because within China
Speaker 2: there are a lot of concerns about your political risks.
Speaker 2: A lot of Chinese entrepreneurs have told me, they said,
Speaker 2: if we cannot get along with the world's most powerful country,
Speaker 2: the Chinese economy cannot do well and the China has
Speaker 2: no future. And I think presence she needs to address
Speaker 2: that kind of very valid concerns in mainland China. I mean,
Speaker 2: just given an example, there was news that China was
Speaker 2: going to investigate Fox CONT's landues, right and the day after,
Speaker 2: China had our Black Monday on the store market. Because
Speaker 2: people just say, what you're talking about Taiwan and invasion.
Speaker 2: This is very very much on the business people's mind
Speaker 2: and when China is clearly in the recession. Chi Chimpin
Speaker 2: has two to somehow tom down that very aggressive or rhetoric.
Speaker 1: On that happy note of kumbaya and maybe reprochemomp between
Speaker 1: the United States and China. I'm going to take another
Speaker 1: quick break and we'll come right back. We're back with
Speaker 1: Karishma Vaswani and Shuly Ren and we're continuing to discuss
Speaker 1: the ever fascinating subject of China. Surely you have done
Speaker 1: incredible work, original work around China's looming debt problem, and
Speaker 1: you've really wetted great of gum shoe reporting, looking at
Speaker 1: local debt levels, looking at corporate debt levels, looking at
Speaker 1: sectors like the real estate industry, where the debt is
Speaker 1: suffocating and potentially more systemically dangerous. Obviously, China's economic growth
Speaker 1: was fueled by a lot of debt spending, with the
Speaker 1: idea that it was rational spending. It was spending for
Speaker 1: the long term, the country could earned back from that debt.
Speaker 1: It created jobs, it created infrastructure, created new property. But
Speaker 1: maybe the accounting for all of that debt wasn't as
Speaker 1: clear as it should have been. And you've just written
Speaker 1: a series of columns over the last two years, probably
Speaker 1: at least laying out for readers and analysts how bad
Speaker 1: this could get. How do you think now about China's
Speaker 1: debt problem.
Speaker 2: So we talked about China building a lot of infrastructure
Speaker 2: and the public good, and I mentioned the high spirial
Speaker 2: in Shanghai that gets you to the airport in five minutes, right,
Speaker 2: and guess how much it costs. The ticket is only
Speaker 2: five US dollars and then if you go to the
Speaker 2: ticket counter you can get an extra twenty percent disco.
Speaker 2: That's the problem with China. That's the ultimate problem with
Speaker 2: China's step path. So far, the government has built a
Speaker 2: lot of beautiful things and the public we enjoy it
Speaker 2: very very much. Everyone will enjoy it. But the question is,
Speaker 2: as China slows down, who is going to pay for it?
Speaker 2: And it's unclear so far. A lot of bund investors
Speaker 2: they complain they have been paying for and then they
Speaker 2: complain to me why they are the ones that have
Speaker 2: been paid for and on the other hand, like it
Speaker 2: should be the people who have been paying for So
Speaker 2: basically that's the ultimate question. China has buil beautiful things
Speaker 2: and how is it going to pay for this?
Speaker 1: It has about one hundred and thirty seven billion dollars
Speaker 1: in sovereign that it's running its biggest deficits I think
Speaker 1: in decades. At this point, how does that get resolved? Like,
Speaker 1: how do you see this getting cleaned up?
Speaker 2: I think what needs to happen is that China needs
Speaker 2: to have another physical reform. So what happened was that
Speaker 2: in nineteen ninety four, when China was just opening up right,
Speaker 2: the government had a tax reform. Basically, the central government
Speaker 2: will get most of the tax revenue and then the
Speaker 2: local government will do most of the physical spending. That
Speaker 2: is not going to work for the local government. So
Speaker 2: what they've been doing the last thirty years is basically
Speaker 2: relying on lensales to developers, which propel China's property bubble,
Speaker 2: and by borrowing that with this kind of unclear shell
Speaker 2: company's titles. So what will happen is that I think
Speaker 2: the central government will have to put on more that
Speaker 2: on its own balance sheet. And by the way, China's
Speaker 2: Central Bank of People's Bank of China, its balance sheet
Speaker 2: is squeaky cling, unlike the federal reserve. So I think
Speaker 2: inevitably at this point, unless China is willing to have
Speaker 2: local government that blow up, China will have to do
Speaker 2: its own quantitative.
Speaker 1: Easy Let's switch gears a little bit on that Karishma.
Speaker 1: We talked a lot about in this episode China's relationship
Speaker 1: with the US. I want to talk about some of
Speaker 1: the other regional players that are equally important in my
Speaker 1: mind as the US in terms of the future of
Speaker 1: the region, China's place in the region. Let's get the
Speaker 1: big wildcard question out of the way first. Do you
Speaker 1: think China will invade Taiwan.
Speaker 3: I don't think it wants to. I think peaceful reunification.
Speaker 3: I think we should believe that when China says that
Speaker 3: it's serious about that. What it doesn't like is when
Speaker 3: the United States get involved. It does not want any
Speaker 3: declaration of independence from Taiwanese government political parties. The status
Speaker 3: quo would be ideal in the sense that as long
Speaker 3: as Taiwan doesn't declare independence and doesn't make too many noises,
Speaker 3: that makes it far closer to the United States. Beijing would,
Speaker 3: I think accept that. So I think that unless it
Speaker 3: is pushed to invade Taiwan, it won't do so of
Speaker 3: its own volition.
Speaker 1: In that same context, I feel like whenever we talk
Speaker 1: about Taiwan and excluding the US from the discussion for now,
Speaker 1: you also have to talk about Japan, and when I've
Speaker 1: visited the region in the past, I've met with national
Speaker 1: security officials within the Japanese government who are very hawkish
Speaker 1: about the idea, at least that China might invade Taiwan.
Speaker 1: I think the Japanese government has obviously started to ramp
Speaker 1: up their own military spending as a I don't know
Speaker 1: if it's a hedge against an invasion, but certainly to
Speaker 1: just be rational about the possibility of a military action.
Speaker 1: How do you think about Japan as a player in
Speaker 1: the region right now, I think.
Speaker 3: That as a hedge to what you're seeing as a
Speaker 3: ramp up to military build up in China, they have
Speaker 3: to do that. I think it only makes sense to
Speaker 3: do that. What Japan's been able to do quite cleverly,
Speaker 3: I think, is be the proxy for the United States
Speaker 3: in this part of the world. I know you said, like,
Speaker 3: let's leave the US out, but it's impossible to have
Speaker 3: a discussion about this region without bringing Washington into it.
Speaker 3: And I think you can see that, particularly in the
Speaker 3: Strategic Alliance of the Quad, because through the Quad, which
Speaker 3: is actually a Japanese idea to begin with.
Speaker 1: And let's define the quad for our listeners, which is Australia,
Speaker 1: in the ED, Japan, and the US for countries that
Speaker 1: are trying to have an alliance as a bulwark against
Speaker 1: Chinese ambitions in the region exactly.
Speaker 3: And it's supposed to be a sort of unified like
Speaker 3: minded countries coming together working together to be able to
Speaker 3: provide deterrence. And I think that's the key thing, right,
Speaker 3: how do you provide deterrence, because that's the best way
Speaker 3: to avoid conflict, And you're seeing that even with regards
Speaker 3: not just to Taiwan, but also the South China Sea.
Speaker 3: Japan plays a crucial role in all of that because
Speaker 3: it has strategic interests in all of these places. So
Speaker 3: when you hear from national security analysts, for instance, in
Speaker 3: the Japanese government that they're worried about Taiwan, I think
Speaker 3: it's a big a worry about China's militarization in this
Speaker 3: part of the world. And you know, in the latest
Speaker 3: twenty twenty three report, China's Military Power Report that's come
Speaker 3: out of the United States, the US has echoed that
Speaker 3: as well. It is the biggest concern going forward. The
Speaker 3: way that the Chinese have built up their militaries, spent
Speaker 3: money on submarines, on fighter jets in the region, and
Speaker 3: it looks if you don't do anything to combat that
Speaker 3: you will be left behind. So it makes sense for
Speaker 3: these countries to take the actions that they're doing.
Speaker 1: Surely another intriguing country to me in the region, not
Speaker 1: just for me, I think, but for anyone looking at
Speaker 1: all these interesting dynamics going on as India. You've done
Speaker 1: a lot of travel in the region, specifically that to Vietnam,
Speaker 1: where you sort of looked at other countries in the
Speaker 1: regions that are equally entrepreneurial in both their culture and
Speaker 1: the execution of policy and business growth. Like China, India
Speaker 1: has a very entrepreneurial tradition. It does not have a
Speaker 1: large tradition of an honest and capable civil service. But
Speaker 1: China is India rather is in the midst of its
Speaker 1: own I think, muscularity and thinking about how it wants
Speaker 1: to play a role in the region. Obviously Visa VI Russia,
Speaker 1: visa VI China, visa viv the United States. How do
Speaker 1: you see the Chinese relationship with India playing out?
Speaker 2: I think there are a lot of Chinese entrepreneurs who
Speaker 2: are genuinely interested in investing India. What they see is
Speaker 2: that they're very practical and hard knows people. They don't
Speaker 2: care about democracy or whatever. What they see in Ranger
Speaker 2: Modi is basically somebody who's willing to take the China
Speaker 2: growth model. Produce first and then they will come right
Speaker 2: and then they tell me, oh, you know, is a
Speaker 2: really nice new highway between Eli and Mumbaya and they
Speaker 2: were modeling at it. So I think on the civilian level,
Speaker 2: there is genuine interest in foreign direct investment into India.
Speaker 1: Since we're doing geopolitical bingo Karishma, I also want to
Speaker 1: talk about Russia and China's relationship with Russia, and particularly
Speaker 1: in the context of the Ukraine invasion. It's been hard
Speaker 1: for me watching this to figure out whether or not
Speaker 1: China really wants to step onto the world stage and
Speaker 1: be an authentic broker of complex diplomatic situations. This has
Speaker 1: come up obviously around Gaza. People have wondered whether or
Speaker 1: not that conflict will kind of compel China to step up.
Speaker 1: But it seems even clearer to me in the Ukraine
Speaker 1: conflict because she has gone out of his way to
Speaker 1: Putin up over the years Russia's leader Vladimir Putin. I
Speaker 1: think Putin has maneuvered to where that relationship on his sleeve.
Speaker 1: How do you see China's relationship with Russia evolving and
Speaker 1: does China really want to be a global diplomat or not.
Speaker 3: I think you'll see the relationship with Russia continue to
Speaker 3: grow strong. I think it's interesting in the first days
Speaker 3: after the Ukraine invasion, you didn't actually see Beijing jump
Speaker 3: to Russia's defense right away. I think it was making
Speaker 3: up its mind. And it's the same sort of pattern
Speaker 3: that you've seen post the conflict between Israel and Hamas
Speaker 3: and what you're seeing in Gaza. China doesn't jump right
Speaker 3: away to sort of make a decision about how it feels.
Speaker 3: I think it's still trying to figure itself out and
Speaker 3: figure out what is the foreign policy statement that we
Speaker 3: should make about this. And we can get into that
Speaker 3: in the second part of this answer. But to go
Speaker 3: back to Russia, that relationship serves as a bulwark to
Speaker 3: the United States because it makes Beijing feel like it's
Speaker 3: got a powerful companion that is going to go up
Speaker 3: against the US with it. China on its own is
Speaker 3: in and of itself a strategic concern. A rival competitor
Speaker 3: to the US. China with Russia is even more concerning
Speaker 3: for the United States, so I think it provides it
Speaker 3: a little bit of security. The second part of this
Speaker 3: is is China ready to be a global diplomat? And
Speaker 3: I think yes, it wants to be, but it doesn't
Speaker 3: necessarily have the foreign policy infrastructure that other countries have
Speaker 3: had because it hasn't wanted to get its hands messy
Speaker 3: and get involved in some of these geopolitical struggles that
Speaker 3: you've seen countries like the US do you know, it
Speaker 3: has a long history, obviously with lots of flaws in
Speaker 3: the process. But the problem for China is that on
Speaker 3: the one hand, it says it is this rising superpower,
Speaker 3: it is emerging as a global power, but it hasn't
Speaker 3: had the experience or the foreign policy capacity to be
Speaker 3: able to get involved in complex regional or global issues
Speaker 3: beyond providing solutions like we should have a two state solution,
Speaker 3: for instance, in the Israeli and Gaza. And I think
Speaker 3: that's going to consistently be a problem for China as
Speaker 3: it tries to navigate this role of global diplomat.
Speaker 1: The future surely you perked up during that little conversation
Speaker 1: I was just having with Kurashima. Tell me your thoughts
Speaker 1: on the exact same thing.
Speaker 2: I just think people need to know that Hijinping's Joe
Speaker 2: political also over the United States really has taken its
Speaker 2: toll on the Chinese economy. I was just in Shanghai
Speaker 2: two weeks ago. You know, when you enter the Pudong, beautiful,
Speaker 2: big put On airport, you don't see international rivals. Now
Speaker 2: we're in Tokyo, there's so many foreigners, Americans, you know,
Speaker 2: people from everywhere in the world. And two weeks ago,
Speaker 2: when I was in Shanghai speaking to friends, you know,
Speaker 2: they just say, have you noticed Shanghai has very very
Speaker 2: few foreigners left? And then if you really look carefully,
Speaker 2: they're the wrong kind. I was like, what do you
Speaker 2: mean they're the wrong kind? They said, they're white Russians. Literally,
Speaker 2: it's true. Like in Pudon, at the Mandarin Oriental at
Speaker 2: Risk Carton, if you look at the elevator, people going
Speaker 2: up and down one sing in a while, you see
Speaker 2: like a foreign face and they speak Russian. A lot
Speaker 2: of private entrepreneurs they're very, very concerned about that. I mean,
Speaker 2: I agree with them, Like Shanghai these days feel very
Speaker 2: very insulated, like it's all Chinese people and maybe one
Speaker 2: in a thousand that you see a foreigner, and that
Speaker 2: feels like late nineteen eighties Shamghai, you know, like it's
Speaker 2: very very different.
Speaker 1: Yeah, this is an easy segue into the last question,
Speaker 1: and I wanted to ask both of you, but I
Speaker 1: always like to ask people at the end of the show,
Speaker 1: since the show is about learning moments and what we
Speaker 1: can learn from epic collisions, what have you learned if
Speaker 1: you look at China over the last couple of years
Speaker 1: and all of the stuff that has surfaced in the
Speaker 1: economy and in its diplomatic relationships, What have you learned
Speaker 1: that you didn't know before? What has been sort of
Speaker 1: a signal sort of aha for you?
Speaker 2: I think shi Jinping's administration is not as efficient as
Speaker 2: the previous administrations, and that China is growing up, but
Speaker 2: it doesn't know where it wants to go the next.
Speaker 3: I think that the world is trying to come to
Speaker 3: grips with this new China and the shi Jinping. I
Speaker 3: think for me what really showed me the difference was
Speaker 3: COVID actually and how China managed COVID under Shijinping was
Speaker 3: the turning point, the sort of a ha moment for
Speaker 3: me about what kind of China we were going to
Speaker 3: see next, Because up until that point we had seen
Speaker 3: Sijinping go out to the Davos's and speak at big
Speaker 3: international conferences that seemed to be implying that he was
Speaker 3: going to consistently take China down a route which would
Speaker 3: be palatable to the global economy and the sort of
Speaker 3: global geopolitical dynamics. But for me, it was COVID that
Speaker 3: sort of made me think, this is something different, the
Speaker 3: way that he managed COVID and how China's come out
Speaker 3: of that.
Speaker 1: We've run out of time, Karishma, will you come back
Speaker 1: again sometime and converse about all this stuff again?
Speaker 3: Sure?
Speaker 1: I would love to. Shulely, thanks for joining us when
Speaker 1: you come back to Absolutely. Shuly Ren and Karashima Vaswani
Speaker 1: our Bloomberg Opinion columnists, and you can find their work
Speaker 1: on the Bloomberg Opinion website and on the Bloomberg terminal.
Speaker 1: Here at Crash Course, we believe the collisions can be messy, impressive, challenging, surprising,
Speaker 1: and always instructive. In today's Crash Course. I learned that
Speaker 1: my own gloomy outlook about China that a hardening of
Speaker 1: sides between the US and China may not be as
Speaker 1: inevitable as I once thought it was. What did you learn?
Speaker 1: We'd love to hear from you. You can tweet the
Speaker 1: Bloomberg Opinion, handle at Opinion or me at Tim O'Brien
Speaker 1: using the hashtag Bloomberg Crash Course. You can also subscribe
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Speaker 1: This episode was produced by the indispensable Anna Maserakas and me.
Speaker 1: Our supervising producer is Magnus Hendrickson, and we had editing
Speaker 1: help from Sage Bauman, Jeff Grocott, Mike Nize and Christine
Speaker 1: Vanden Bilart. Blake Maples does our sound engineering, and our
Speaker 1: original theme song was composed by Luis Gara. I'm Tim O'Brien.
Speaker 1: We'll be back next week with another Crash Course