Speaker 1: Bloomberg Audio Studios, podcasts, radio News.
Speaker 2: On January tewod, Nicolas Maduro met with Chinese officials in Caracas.
Speaker 1: Sibil Mbiado President in pin Paramerica latinbe.
Speaker 2: There's video of that meeting on Maduro's Instagram account. The
Speaker 2: narrator touts Chinese investment in Venezuela in energy and technology
Speaker 2: and infrastructure, and praises the relationship between the two nations.
Speaker 1: Yeahiva Venezuela, you know Nidas.
Speaker 2: Hours later, Maduro was captured by US special forces.
Speaker 1: Well, that was very unfortunate, tell me for the Chinese government.
Speaker 1: There's no question in my mind that the Chinese, in
Speaker 1: a way where humiliated.
Speaker 2: Nicholas Burns was a US diplomat for decades under Republican
Speaker 2: and Democratic presidents, including Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and
Speaker 2: Barack Obama. Most recently, he was the US Ambassador to
Speaker 2: China under President Biden. China and Venezuela have had what
Speaker 2: the Chinese call an all weather strategic partnership, a very
Speaker 2: close relationship. China promised to stand by Venezuela through thick
Speaker 2: and thin, Burns explains, through any crisis.
Speaker 1: But when that crisis came, Chinese could have just send
Speaker 1: Nicholas Maduro. So I think, frankly, this has been a
Speaker 1: loss of face since, been a loss of influence for China,
Speaker 1: certainly in Venezuela. And I have to imagine that some
Speaker 1: countries in Latin America will begin to question whether an
Speaker 1: all encompassing embrace of China, and some of them have
Speaker 1: made that is really in their long term interest.
Speaker 2: I'm David Gera, and this is the big take from
Speaker 2: Bloomberg News today, A conversation with Ambassador Nicholas Burns, now
Speaker 2: a professor at the Harvard Kennedy School, about how Beijing
Speaker 2: will respond to the US incursion into Venezuela, how it
Speaker 2: could change China's approach to Taiwan, and how the so
Speaker 2: called don Roe doctrine, President Trump's focus on the Western
Speaker 2: Hemisphere could hand China an edge on the world stage.
Speaker 2: When I sat down with Ambassador Nicholas Burns this week,
Speaker 2: he brought up an article he read in twenty twenty
Speaker 2: four as he made his way to what ended up
Speaker 2: being the last summit meeting between President Biden and President.
Speaker 1: She an extraordinary front page story which essentially said that
Speaker 1: in two thousand and two, the United States was a
Speaker 1: leading trade partner of every country in South America, but
Speaker 1: by twenty twenty four, the People's Repubma fifth China was
Speaker 1: the leading trade partner of every country in South America,
Speaker 1: with the exception at that time of Columbia.
Speaker 2: It illustrated vividly, Burns says, the extraordinary commitment China has
Speaker 2: made to compete for influence in Latin America, and Venezuela
Speaker 2: has been a key part of that. Over nearly two decades,
Speaker 2: China has loaned the country tens of billions of dollars,
Speaker 2: and Venezuela has paid interest on those loans with oil.
Speaker 2: I asked Ambassador Burns about how China responded to the
Speaker 2: capture of Nicholas Maduro and to the Trump administration's assertion
Speaker 2: it's going to control the flow of oil from Venezuela.
Speaker 2: How do its policy priorities in South America change as
Speaker 2: a result of what happened to Maduro.
Speaker 1: Well, that Chinese are going to compete. They're not going
Speaker 1: to leave the field in a new Monroe doctrine just
Speaker 1: because the United States has said move out of Latin America.
Speaker 1: I actually have a lot of sympathy for the view
Speaker 1: that we should push back against the more competitive Chinese
Speaker 1: actions against the United States, certainly in Latin America for instance.
Speaker 1: The Trump administration has been right to say in the
Speaker 1: Penwa Canal that at Chinese state company shouldn't control the
Speaker 1: infed forts. That just makes sense from an American national
Speaker 1: security standpoint. But they will compete. China is a major
Speaker 1: creditor to Venezuela, and if part of the solution to
Speaker 1: try to stabilize Venezuela in the next six to twelve
Speaker 1: months turns out to be a big debt negotiation, China
Speaker 1: will demand a seat at the table. They'll also look
Speaker 1: for fishers in the US relationship with Venezuela and try
Speaker 1: to exploit them. You know, very cynically. China was a
Speaker 1: major supporter of this brutal regime, the Maduro regime. Many
Speaker 1: of the people who ran that machine are still in place,
Speaker 1: and so I think they'll look to see if they
Speaker 1: can divide the United States from that regime. And so
Speaker 1: I don't think they're going to quit. And this is
Speaker 1: all part of this global competition that's been underway for
Speaker 1: many years now between the US and China.
Speaker 2: So much of President Trump's focus has been on and
Speaker 2: continues to be on Venezuela's oil. You were talking about
Speaker 2: the debt that Venezuela is into China and there was
Speaker 2: this oil for Day program that was in place. How
Speaker 2: critical is that oil to China today.
Speaker 1: I think it's more symbolically important than it is in
Speaker 1: real terms. Chinese imports of Venezuelan oil represent about four
Speaker 1: percent of China's total imports around the world, so it's
Speaker 1: not that strategically important, but I think it's politically important
Speaker 1: for them that they not be shut out of that market,
Speaker 1: which certainly China's very interested in developing the entire South
Speaker 1: American market. If you think of Brazil, for instance, where
Speaker 1: China has made extraordinary inroads with Chinese electric vehicles, with
Speaker 1: Chinese purchases of Brazilian soybeans, and so I think you'll
Speaker 1: see the Chinese ramp up their state enterprise investment in
Speaker 1: many different parts of South America, and it's going to
Speaker 1: be interesting to watch to see if they can be successful.
Speaker 2: As you mentioned, China likely ones has seen at the
Speaker 2: table as all of this unfolds. A spokesperson for the
Speaker 2: Chinese Foreign Ministry set at a press conference the Lawful
Speaker 2: Rights and interests of China in Venezuela must be protected.
Speaker 2: How big a concern is that to the Chinese that
Speaker 2: they could lose access to what they help build? Where
Speaker 2: does that leave China in trying to plot a path forward?
Speaker 1: Well, I think they're two Chinese concerns here, and I
Speaker 1: don't have sympathy for either of them. Onely is again
Speaker 1: they don't want to see a dramatic decline in their
Speaker 1: trade and investment activities in South America, I was even
Speaker 1: Latin America, because they see it as such a major market,
Speaker 1: both in importing critical food stuff but also in terms
Speaker 1: of making inroads for their most competitive industries. But secondly,
Speaker 1: this may turn out to help the United States and
Speaker 1: help Scott best In, for instance, in his trade, tariff
Speaker 1: and supply chain negotiations with the Chinese. There's the truth,
Speaker 1: as you know, between the United States and China from
Speaker 1: the extraordinary tariff and supply chain the wars of twenty
Speaker 1: twenty five. But it's a very unstable truth. And so
Speaker 1: if the United States suddenly, because of this intervention in Venezuela,
Speaker 1: has a lock on the oil industry, that's going to
Speaker 1: help perhaps the United States, as the Chinese the United
Speaker 1: States try to one up each other, and certainly I
Speaker 1: hope the United States can be successful. I'm not rooting
Speaker 1: for China at all. Having served as ambassador, I've seen
Speaker 1: how quick they are to deploy unfair trade practices against
Speaker 1: our own companies, and I hope the administration can be successful,
Speaker 1: certainly in the supply chain issue as well as on tariff.
Speaker 2: You mentioned the role that China is playing across the continent.
Speaker 2: Can you put into context of Venezuela's role in that, well.
Speaker 1: I think it's it was a function of both Russia,
Speaker 1: China and other authoritarian countries coalescing just support an unlawful
Speaker 1: regime in Caracas. Maduro stole the election of twenty twenty four.
Speaker 1: He wasn't a legitimate leader, and yet he had this support,
Speaker 1: very overt political support from Jijinping and from Vladimir Putin.
Speaker 1: And so I think in this sense it's been a
Speaker 1: loss of influence for all those authoritarians, which is a
Speaker 1: very positive development. And that's what they've lost. There are
Speaker 1: now and some of their other primary supporters, Cuba being
Speaker 1: the most notable. Well, we saw what happened, and the
Speaker 1: US Special forces out maneuvered completely the Cuban Craetorian guard
Speaker 1: around Nicholas Maduro and thus throughout the President Trump has
Speaker 1: made against you. But it has to be concentrating mines
Speaker 1: in Havana. So I think the tables have been turned
Speaker 1: a little bit here in the global competition, these very
Speaker 1: self confident uoritarian powers and China, Russia, North Korea and Iran,
Speaker 1: the tables have been turned against certainly the Iranians, certainly
Speaker 1: the vath Whalens as part of this in the Western hemisphere.
Speaker 1: And so you know, we're not going to know how
Speaker 1: this all plays out until several years of history of past.
Speaker 1: But this has been a dramatic diminution of Chinese influence
Speaker 1: in the Western hemisphere.
Speaker 2: Well, I want to turn to what's being called the
Speaker 2: don Roe doctrine.
Speaker 1: They now call it the Dunro document. I don't know,
Speaker 1: it's uh Monroe doctrine. We sort of forgot about it.
Speaker 1: It was very important, but we forgot about it. We
Speaker 1: don't forget about it anymore.
Speaker 2: Under name, President Trump making no bones about the fact
Speaker 2: that he wants to focus on the Western hemisphere. How
Speaker 2: does that change China's approach to foreign policy?
Speaker 1: Well, the Chinese now know that the game has been
Speaker 1: changed that the United States under President Trump, it's going
Speaker 1: to be very aggressive and pushing back against aspects of
Speaker 1: Chinese influence. That's what this new Chump corollary to the
Speaker 1: Monroe doctrine that was announced in the National Security Strategy Report,
Speaker 1: That's what that means. But I think that the administration
Speaker 1: would be more effective if they stopped talking just about
Speaker 1: oil and they started talking more about the real strength
Speaker 1: of the United States. The President has talked almost solely
Speaker 1: about the petroleum oil benefits to the United States. I
Speaker 1: think most American presidents, if not all American presidents but
Speaker 1: the last century, would have said, we want the hemisphere
Speaker 1: to be governed by rule of law, societies by governments
Speaker 1: that are elected by the people of the country. We
Speaker 1: want human rights on her That's a glaring omission in
Speaker 1: the policy of the Trump administration, and it's not going
Speaker 1: to be attractive at leads to average people in Venezuela
Speaker 1: or other parts of Central and South America if the
Speaker 1: United States is seen to be saying we only care
Speaker 1: about your resources.
Speaker 2: Coming up, how President Trump's incursion in Venezuela could influence
Speaker 2: Presidents She and Putin and how it's shaping President Trump's
Speaker 2: designs on Greenland. The US military blockade of Venezuela and
Speaker 2: the apprehension of Nicholas Maduro has put other countries on edge.
Speaker 2: President Trump has put Cuba on notice, and he suggested
Speaker 2: the US could strike cartels in Mexico. And then there's Greenland.
Speaker 2: When President Trump talks about Greenland, he often brings up China.
Speaker 2: He's made unsupported claims that there are Chinese destroyers off Greenland.
Speaker 2: And here's what he said when he met with oil
Speaker 2: executives last week at the White House.
Speaker 1: I get along very well with President she I'm going
Speaker 1: to go over to China in April, but I don't
Speaker 1: want them as a neighbor in Greenland not going to
Speaker 1: happen anywhere.
Speaker 2: To what degree are President Trump's designs on Greenland do
Speaker 2: you think tied to China.
Speaker 1: Well, it's hard to know because there are so many
Speaker 1: different explanations being offered by the Trump administration about this
Speaker 1: really problematic focus on Greenland. And I just say this,
Speaker 1: there's no question that there is a longer term strategic
Speaker 1: threat given the fact that the passageway between Asia and
Speaker 1: the Atlantic is now navigable in the summer months, there
Speaker 1: is more of a threat which took me from Russia.
Speaker 1: Greenland is very strategic. We have to contain and toture Russia.
Speaker 1: But the way to do that is to work through
Speaker 1: the NATO alliance. There is an Arctic Council of the
Speaker 1: eight Arctic countries. Russia is a member. The other seven
Speaker 1: members are all members of NATO, including Denmark and Greenland
Speaker 1: as part of the Danish Kingdom, and of course the
Speaker 1: United States. So if the concern here is that there
Speaker 1: is a threat from Russia, and if maybe the long
Speaker 1: term strategic partner of China, the way to deal with
Speaker 1: it is to have a united NATO and seven of
Speaker 1: those nations, including the United States, working with Denmark and others,
Speaker 1: and not attempting to buy or acquire by force Greenland
Speaker 1: from a vaunted and very reliable NATO ally Denmark. And
Speaker 1: if you think about this, I was ambassador to NATO
Speaker 1: between two thousand and one and two thousand and five.
Speaker 1: I remember very clearly what happened on nine to eleven
Speaker 1: that afternoon in Brussels. As we looked at the Twin
Speaker 1: Towers falling in New York, three thousand people dead. We
Speaker 1: looked at the Anegon being attacked, and the Danish ambassador
Speaker 1: called me and said they were with us, they would
Speaker 1: defend us, they would invoke Article five of the NATO
Speaker 1: Treaty an attack on one as an attack on all,
Speaker 1: which we did. The next day. The Danes went into Afghanistan.
Speaker 1: Suffer a higher level of casualties on the per capita basis.
Speaker 1: They suffered the most of any of the troop contributing
Speaker 1: nations in terms of the numbers of people of their
Speaker 1: soldiers who were killed and were wounded. They really stood
Speaker 1: with us, And now suddenly we have a situation and
Speaker 1: it's hard to believe we've come to this point where
Speaker 1: the leading member of NATO is threatening another NATO member
Speaker 1: with military force that will break NATO. If the Trump
Speaker 1: administration tries to use a military force to occupy Freeland,
Speaker 1: that will be the end of NATO. It will cause
Speaker 1: irreparably harm to the United States. It will be a
Speaker 1: shameful episode in our history. And I've got to believe
Speaker 1: that the Trump administration is going to find a way
Speaker 1: to back down from this ludicrous claim that President Trump
Speaker 1: has made to Greenland itself.
Speaker 2: The journalist Christopher Being wrote a piece for Bloomberg business
Speaker 2: Week recently, and he made what I think is a
Speaker 2: really interesting point about how this could backfire on the US.
Speaker 2: He wrote, President Trump's norm busting incursion in Venezuela makes
Speaker 2: China look like the adult in the room. This reinforces
Speaker 2: the country's reputation in the region as a calm, predictable
Speaker 2: partner with whom one can do business. Do you agree
Speaker 2: with that.
Speaker 1: Well, it's what the Chinese are trying to insinuate, not
Speaker 1: just insinuate. China is saying we are the defender of
Speaker 1: the international order that was established after the Second World War.
Speaker 1: We are the cautious and responsible party in the United
Speaker 1: States is an agent of instability. That's a little bit
Speaker 1: of softistry from the Chinese. The Chinese are threatening Taiwan
Speaker 1: with military force as we speak. That Chinese have stolen
Speaker 1: in the Scratlely and Parasol Islands of the South China
Speaker 1: see territory from both Vietnam and the Philippines. That Chinese
Speaker 1: are harassing Japan over Japanese control of the Sinkoku Islands
Speaker 1: in the East Chenesee. The Chinese have been contesting Indian
Speaker 1: sovereignty on their border in the him in Malayas. So
Speaker 1: it's like the plot calling the kettle black. You know,
Speaker 1: there was a meeting several months ago that the South
Speaker 1: Africans hosted, and of course the Chinese were there, and
Speaker 1: the South Africans and most of our major allies in
Speaker 1: the world, and the United States state away. If we
Speaker 1: continue to act unilaterally, and if we continue to lecture
Speaker 1: the European allies as if they're the problem of the
Speaker 1: world and yet not be tough enough in our rhetoric
Speaker 1: towards both China and Russia, I think that these authoritarian
Speaker 1: regimes are going to make more in ropes in global
Speaker 1: public opinion about who's the agent of instability and who isn't.
Speaker 1: I would never call President Trump on isolation, as he's not.
Speaker 1: He's certainly an interventionist. But the United States, I think
Speaker 1: is strongest when we're working with and through our allies,
Speaker 1: our NATO allies like Denmark and Each Asia, our allies
Speaker 1: like Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, our strategic partner India, Australia.
Speaker 1: I really hope that Trump administration will get back to
Speaker 1: what has been so successful for every president since Truman
Speaker 1: and Eisenhower, and that is the United States leads these
Speaker 1: alliances that China and Russia do not have. That's our
Speaker 1: strategic advantage over them. But if we drive them away,
Speaker 1: then we weaken ourselves.
Speaker 2: You mentioned Taiwan, and I'm curious how the US intervention
Speaker 2: in Venezuela might have changed President She's approach to Taiwan.
Speaker 2: The reporter David Sanger asked President Trump about this during
Speaker 2: an interview he and his colleagues at The New York
Speaker 2: Times conducted last week. Sanger asked, have you created a
Speaker 2: president that you may come to regret later on?
Speaker 1: No, because this was a real threat.
Speaker 2: But Trump added, Taiwan is quote a source of pride
Speaker 2: for President She.
Speaker 1: He considers it to be part of China, and that's
Speaker 1: up to him what he's going to be doing.
Speaker 2: But you know, President Trump said, I've expressed to him
Speaker 2: that I would be very unhappy if he did that,
Speaker 2: meaning invaded Taiwan.
Speaker 1: I don't think he'll do that. I hope he does.
Speaker 1: You don't think you've set a president?
Speaker 2: Do you think? To borrow David Sanger's question, President Trump
Speaker 2: has created a president here he may come to regret
Speaker 2: later on.
Speaker 1: It is a slippery slow I don't think the Chinese
Speaker 1: feel that the People's Liberation Army is ready to invade Taiwan,
Speaker 1: at least not ready to mount a cross straight invasion,
Speaker 1: a combined forces operation of naval vessels, of submarines, aircraft.
Speaker 1: It's extraordinarily difficult to do. And the Taiwanese, of course,
Speaker 1: have been watching the Ukrainians in the ways the Ukrainians
Speaker 1: have held off a much larger Russian army through drone warfare,
Speaker 1: through intelligence operations, and so I think there's a doubt
Speaker 1: in the Chinese mind about it. But there's no question
Speaker 1: that Chichinpin wants to bring Taiwan under the control directly
Speaker 1: of the People's Republic of China, and should he attempt
Speaker 1: to do that at some point in the future, he
Speaker 1: may well use what the United States did in Venezuela
Speaker 1: to justify, well, if the United States can invade a
Speaker 1: sovereign member of the United Nations, that's the Chinese line.
Speaker 1: Of course, we have the right to take back what
Speaker 1: they believe incorrectly is a territory of the People's Republic
Speaker 1: of China. I think it also makes Putin's argument about
Speaker 1: wanting to claim Ukrainian territory. At least you know, in
Speaker 1: the minds of some people, not you, not me, a
Speaker 1: more plausible explanation of what they're trying to do. So
Speaker 1: we're giving them a tactical advantage and how they describe
Speaker 1: what their own strategies are in the case of China, Taiwan,
Speaker 1: the case of Russia Ukraine, and that's very ill advised
Speaker 1: for the United States to be doing.
Speaker 2: Ambassador Burns, thank you very.
Speaker 1: Much, David. Thank you always a pleasure.
Speaker 2: This is The Big Take from Bloomberg News. I'm David Gerat.
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