WEBVTT - Tech News: A Perfect Storm Led to Microsoft's Big Breach

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<v Speaker 1>Welcome to tech Stuff, a production from iHeartRadio. Hey there,

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<v Speaker 1>and welcome to tech Stuff. I'm your host, Jonathan Strickland.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm an executive producer with iHeartRadio. And how the tech

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<v Speaker 1>are you. It's time for the tech news for let's

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<v Speaker 1>see Thursday. That's it September seventh, twenty twenty three. Sorry,

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<v Speaker 1>holiday weeks always mess me up, but let's get to

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<v Speaker 1>the news. First up, we have an update on the

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<v Speaker 1>European Union's efforts to push back against big tech companies

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<v Speaker 1>via the Digital Markets Act or DMA. The European Commission

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<v Speaker 1>has designated six tech companies as quote unquote gatekeepers of

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<v Speaker 1>the digital market in the EU. Now. To qualify as

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<v Speaker 1>a gatekeeper, a company has to have more than forty

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<v Speaker 1>five million end users per month, more than ten thousand

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<v Speaker 1>business users per year, to be active in at least

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<v Speaker 1>three member states of the EU, and to have either

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<v Speaker 1>a market cap of at least seventy five million euro

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<v Speaker 1>or a turnover of seven point five billion Euro. The

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<v Speaker 1>six companies that have the honor of being called gatekeepers

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<v Speaker 1>include Alphabet that's Google's parent company, Amazon, Apple, Meta, Microsoft,

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<v Speaker 1>and byte Dance, which is TikTok's parent company. Just in

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<v Speaker 1>case you've forgotten now, I've talked about this a little

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<v Speaker 1>bit this year about how Amazon has tried to fight

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<v Speaker 1>this designation as gatekeeper. Amazon's argued that doesn't really qualify

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<v Speaker 1>under those terms, but it appears that those arguments have

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<v Speaker 1>fallen on deaf ears. The EU has singled out some

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<v Speaker 1>specific platforms and services in these companies that will have

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<v Speaker 1>to comply with new rules under the DMA. Those platforms

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<v Speaker 1>include stuff like Apple's Safari browser or iOS, or Google's

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<v Speaker 1>Android or Chrome browser, Google Search, Google Ads, metas, Facebook

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<v Speaker 1>and Instagram, and messenger services. Those are just examples, that's

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<v Speaker 1>not all of them. In fact, the EU identified twenty

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<v Speaker 1>two services across the Big six, including some for the

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<v Speaker 1>companies I mentioned that I didn't go into. The rules

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<v Speaker 1>are meant to give EU citizens more control over the

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<v Speaker 1>services they use. So, for example, one rule states that

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<v Speaker 1>a company like Apple has to make all the pre

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<v Speaker 1>installed apps on iOS devices uninstallable and replaceable with third

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<v Speaker 1>party applications. So in other words, if you get an iPhone,

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<v Speaker 1>then you should be able to remove all the pre

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<v Speaker 1>installed Apple apps and just replace them with third party

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<v Speaker 1>apps if you want to. Now, that is to put

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<v Speaker 1>it lightly antithetical to Apple's approach, and there are a

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<v Speaker 1>lot of other rules. That's just one example, and they

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<v Speaker 1>really do push back hard against some of the key

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<v Speaker 1>strategies that tech company have been employing over the last decade.

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<v Speaker 1>So this is a big deal. The gatekeepers have six

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<v Speaker 1>months to comply with these rules. If they are found

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<v Speaker 1>in violation of the rules, the EU can find the

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<v Speaker 1>company up to ten percent of its total worldwide turnover.

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<v Speaker 1>Remember we're talking like seven and a half billion at

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<v Speaker 1>least here, so ten percent of that. But if a

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<v Speaker 1>company continues to break the rules, that actually can go

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<v Speaker 1>up to a twenty percent fine, which is, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>twice as much if my math is correct. Also, the

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<v Speaker 1>Commission asserts that it has the authority to force companies

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<v Speaker 1>to sell off parts of their businesses if they're unable

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<v Speaker 1>to apply comply rather with the DMA. So I'll be

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<v Speaker 1>really interested to see how the gatekeepers respond to this.

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<v Speaker 1>My guess is unfavorably. Microsoft has released information about an

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<v Speaker 1>infiltration attack that ultimately had a Chinese backed hacker group

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<v Speaker 1>called Storm zero five to five eight gaining access to

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<v Speaker 1>email systems belonging to more than two dozen high value

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<v Speaker 1>targets we're talking about like big companies and also big

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<v Speaker 1>government agencies, And it sounds like the way this attack

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<v Speaker 1>happened was a convergence of a whole bunch of stuff

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<v Speaker 1>that wasn't supposed to happen, and it was like a

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<v Speaker 1>perfect storm situation for the hackers. So first up is

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<v Speaker 1>an expired account consumer signing key, kind of like a

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<v Speaker 1>key to get into a system. I mean, that's kind

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<v Speaker 1>of what this is. And the key could but should

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<v Speaker 1>not have been able to but it could create tokens

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<v Speaker 1>that would allow access to stuff like Microsoft's Azure service.

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<v Speaker 1>Azure is Microsoft's cloud computing platform. But the beginning of

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<v Speaker 1>the story actually dates all the way back to April

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<v Speaker 1>twenty twenty one, So see, the system that this key

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<v Speaker 1>was on was meant to be a very heavily protected system.

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<v Speaker 1>The only person allowed to access this workstation was a

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<v Speaker 1>specific engineer who had been thoroughly vetted by Microsoft because

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<v Speaker 1>they were working in a production development environment that other

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<v Speaker 1>people were absolutely not supposed to be able to access.

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<v Speaker 1>So that also meant the workstation was not allowed to

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<v Speaker 1>have several basic applications and services on it because those

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<v Speaker 1>are frequently attack vectors. For hackers. So there was no

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<v Speaker 1>email on this thing, no web access on it, collaboration

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<v Speaker 1>tools couldn't be on it, that kind of thing. Essentially,

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<v Speaker 1>the workstation was approaching air gap status, although it still

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<v Speaker 1>had network connectivity, so it wasn't truly air gapped. If

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<v Speaker 1>it had been, then we'd have a different conversation going

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<v Speaker 1>on here. It also had multi factor authentication protection, and

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<v Speaker 1>all of this makes you wonder, well, then, how the

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<v Speaker 1>heck did the hackers get access to this If it

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<v Speaker 1>was such a heavily protected workstation, how did they manage

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<v Speaker 1>to get this key that had already expired, and how

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<v Speaker 1>then did they use to get access to all these

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<v Speaker 1>different organization's email systems. Well again, back in twenty twenty one,

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<v Speaker 1>in April, this particular workstation crashed and so Windows performed

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<v Speaker 1>a crash dump process. So this is when the computer

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<v Speaker 1>takes the data that's in the computer's memory and then

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<v Speaker 1>saves that data to long term storage. And the reason

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<v Speaker 1>for that is that someone can later look at the

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<v Speaker 1>data and kind of see what actually happened, what caused

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<v Speaker 1>the crash. Is there something that needs to be addressed

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<v Speaker 1>to prevent it from happening in the future. Well, it

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<v Speaker 1>turns out that this expired account consumer signing key was

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<v Speaker 1>in the computer's memory at the time of the crash,

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<v Speaker 1>so it was part of this crash dump. Now, it

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<v Speaker 1>was supposed to not make it through the next step

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<v Speaker 1>because Microsoft scans data to look for things that could

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<v Speaker 1>potentially be a security vulnerability and to remove them before

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<v Speaker 1>transporting the data to, you know, the the bug development group,

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<v Speaker 1>and that step failed. It did not detect the fact

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<v Speaker 1>that there was this key that was just sitting there.

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<v Speaker 1>It's like a shiny key hidden in a big pile

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<v Speaker 1>of dirty, old data, and so they didn't think that

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<v Speaker 1>there was anything problematic there, so they moved it on

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<v Speaker 1>over to the debugging environment. And sometime this year, hackers

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<v Speaker 1>were able to compromise a different Microsoft engineer's corporate account

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<v Speaker 1>and that gave them access to this debugging environment, which

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<v Speaker 1>normally wouldn't have anything in it that would be particularly dangerous,

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<v Speaker 1>but they were able to find that key, that gleaming

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<v Speaker 1>shining signing key in that crash dump data. And then

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<v Speaker 1>how could they then use an expired key, an expired

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<v Speaker 1>consumer key at that it wasn't even an enterprise key.

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<v Speaker 1>How could they use that to forge tokens that would

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<v Speaker 1>allow them to access enterprise accounts on Azure. Well, Microsoft

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<v Speaker 1>revealed that in twenty eighteen, the company created a new

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<v Speaker 1>framework that messed things up. This new framework couldn't actually

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<v Speaker 1>validate signing keys properly. It couldn't really tell the difference

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<v Speaker 1>between a consumer key and an enterprise key, and unless

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<v Speaker 1>system administrators had taken some pretty extraordinary steps, assuming that

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<v Speaker 1>Microsoft had not addressed this and automated the validation process,

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<v Speaker 1>which is a weird assumption to make, Like you would

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<v Speaker 1>assume that all of this would be taken care of

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<v Speaker 1>on Microsoft side, so there was no reason to take

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<v Speaker 1>these extraordinary steps. Well, unless you had taken those steps,

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<v Speaker 1>it meant that your system was potentially vulnerable to this attack.

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<v Speaker 1>And that's in fact what happened. That was the perfect storm,

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<v Speaker 1>and a lot of it ends up being the sole

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<v Speaker 1>responsibility of Microsoft itself. It actually gets way more technical

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<v Speaker 1>than the overview I just gave. I gave a very

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<v Speaker 1>very oversimplified version of what happened, But if you would

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<v Speaker 1>like to read up on the details, I recommend checking

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<v Speaker 1>out an article in Ours Technika. It's titled Microsoft finally

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<v Speaker 1>explains cause of Azure breach and engineer's account was hacked.

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<v Speaker 1>It goes into more detail and explains on a technical

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<v Speaker 1>level what was happening. So if you want to check

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<v Speaker 1>that out, I recommend it. Okay, we have now come

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<v Speaker 1>up to the section of tech news I like to

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<v Speaker 1>call AII because it's all about AI and so leading

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<v Speaker 1>the charge is Go Media that's the parent company of Gizmodo. So,

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<v Speaker 1>according to the Verge, on August twenty ninth, Geomedia fired

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<v Speaker 1>the entire staff of Gizmoto and Espanol, which, as I'm

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<v Speaker 1>sure you've gathered, is the Spanish language version of Gizmodo.

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<v Speaker 1>So the company replaced the staff with AI translators so

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<v Speaker 1>they would translate the English language articles into space Now.

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<v Speaker 1>Articles on the Spanish language site include a bit at

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<v Speaker 1>the end of the article at the bottom of the

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<v Speaker 1>page that says something like contents have been automatically translated

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<v Speaker 1>from the original. Due to the nuances of machine translation,

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<v Speaker 1>there can be slight differences. Well, readers have reported some

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<v Speaker 1>slight differences and some major ones too. They say that

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<v Speaker 1>this tool is far from perfect. They say there are

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<v Speaker 1>examples of articles that start in Spanish but then at

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<v Speaker 1>some way through the article, they change to English and

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<v Speaker 1>stay that way. As many have pointed out in recent months,

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<v Speaker 1>the shift toward using AI for content creation or even

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<v Speaker 1>auto translation isn't necessarily as cost saving or labor saving

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<v Speaker 1>as you might first imagine, because you have issues with

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<v Speaker 1>factual errors, technical hiccups, the AI hallucinating and inventing information

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<v Speaker 1>that is incorrect, and that means that humans still have

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<v Speaker 1>to pour over AI's work to make sure that the

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<v Speaker 1>work is right. And at some point you have to

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<v Speaker 1>ask yourself the question, isn't it just easier and smarter

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<v Speaker 1>to just use humans rather than to have to deal

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<v Speaker 1>with all the instances of robot goofa mups? But then,

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<v Speaker 1>what do I know? Just a dumb human. Earlier this year,

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<v Speaker 1>a music creator with the handle ghost writer made headlines

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<v Speaker 1>when they released a song they had written called Heart

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<v Speaker 1>on My Sleeve. This was the song that was voiced

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<v Speaker 1>by an AI version of real human artists Drake and

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<v Speaker 1>The Weekend, and that prompted a big old brew haha

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<v Speaker 1>in the music industry. Music companies argued that it was

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<v Speaker 1>a copyright violation. That doesn't track for me at all

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<v Speaker 1>because ghostwriter apparently wrote the actual song. So Ghostwriter has

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<v Speaker 1>the copyright for the song, at least the lyrics and

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<v Speaker 1>presumably the music, and you can't copyright a person's voice.

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<v Speaker 1>So I don't know where you could actually argue, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>in a valid way, that this is a copyright violation.

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<v Speaker 1>But the issue raised a lot of questions and it

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<v Speaker 1>pointed out that there are some big old gaps that

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<v Speaker 1>we have in IP law as far as AI generated

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<v Speaker 1>content goes. And now The Verge reports that one Ghostwriter

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<v Speaker 1>has released a new song called Whiplash that features AI

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<v Speaker 1>impressions of Travis Scott and twenty one Savage and two

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<v Speaker 1>Ghostwriter has posted a message stating that they're going to

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<v Speaker 1>release a record of music with impersonated voices if the

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<v Speaker 1>artists who were impersonated sign off on it. So it's

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<v Speaker 1>not that Ghostwriter is saying this is going out. You know,

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<v Speaker 1>I'm gonna sell this whether you like it or not.

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<v Speaker 1>Ghostwriter saying, if you consent, then we'll start selling this

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<v Speaker 1>and I'll direct royalties to you. So you're gonna make

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<v Speaker 1>money and you never had to do anything now. According

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<v Speaker 1>to Harvey Mason, junior head of the Recording Academy, the

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<v Speaker 1>other thing Ghostwriter wants to do is a distinct possibility,

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<v Speaker 1>which is ghostwriter wants to submit Hard on My Sleeve

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<v Speaker 1>for Grammy consideration. The Recording Academy is the organization that

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<v Speaker 1>essentially runs the Grammys, and so the head of the

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<v Speaker 1>Academy says, well, from a creative standpoint, he totally or

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<v Speaker 1>they totally can submit this song for consideration because it

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<v Speaker 1>was written by a human. Might not have been performed

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<v Speaker 1>by one, but it was written by one. That's all

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<v Speaker 1>that matters. However, there are other metrics that the song

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<v Speaker 1>has to meet in order to qualify for consideration. These

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<v Speaker 1>are metrics that involve things like distribution, and because so

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<v Speaker 1>many platforms pulled the song after being pressured by the

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<v Speaker 1>music labels, chances are this song does not meet those qualifications.

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<v Speaker 1>So I don't think it's going to be considered for

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<v Speaker 1>a Grammy, not because of the creative side, but because

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<v Speaker 1>of the business side. But according to the head of

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<v Speaker 1>Recording Academy, it totally could be Grammy eligible. Interesting. Okay,

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<v Speaker 1>We've got a lot more stories to cover before we

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<v Speaker 1>wrap up today, but first let's take a quick break

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<v Speaker 1>to thank our sponsors. NBC News reports that platforms like

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<v Speaker 1>Instagram and TikTok are being inundated with sexualized AI generated content. Essentially,

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<v Speaker 1>we're talking about chatbots and AI generated images. Here. The

0:14:33.720 --> 0:14:37.640
<v Speaker 1>news agency found thirty five app developers running more than

0:14:37.720 --> 0:14:41.400
<v Speaker 1>one thousand ads for these kinds of services on Meta's

0:14:41.480 --> 0:14:44.840
<v Speaker 1>various platforms, and that's notable for a few reasons. A

0:14:44.880 --> 0:14:47.600
<v Speaker 1>big one is that Meta has really cracked down hard

0:14:47.760 --> 0:14:52.760
<v Speaker 1>on sexualized content from human beings, so people like sex

0:14:52.840 --> 0:14:56.200
<v Speaker 1>workers have been pushed off the platform. Companies that make

0:14:57.000 --> 0:15:00.800
<v Speaker 1>sexual aids and sexual toys have been deny aid the

0:15:00.920 --> 0:15:04.160
<v Speaker 1>ability to run ads on the platform. And yet here

0:15:04.200 --> 0:15:09.200
<v Speaker 1>we have this influx of AI powered services, adult oriented

0:15:09.240 --> 0:15:13.240
<v Speaker 1>services that aren't just appearing on the platform. They're running

0:15:13.440 --> 0:15:18.120
<v Speaker 1>in ads like this is this is a paid service there,

0:15:18.360 --> 0:15:22.040
<v Speaker 1>they're working with Meta. And yet despite the fact that

0:15:22.040 --> 0:15:24.400
<v Speaker 1>Meta has cracked down on this in these other situations,

0:15:24.440 --> 0:15:27.680
<v Speaker 1>they don't seem to have done it here. The same thing,

0:15:27.800 --> 0:15:30.680
<v Speaker 1>or a very similar thing is happening over at TikTok.

0:15:31.120 --> 0:15:34.640
<v Speaker 1>NBC only found fourteen app developers running ads over there, however,

0:15:35.400 --> 0:15:37.760
<v Speaker 1>and there's a lot going on here. Obviously, there's this

0:15:37.880 --> 0:15:41.760
<v Speaker 1>double standard that disenfranchises you know, human beings who are

0:15:41.800 --> 0:15:45.280
<v Speaker 1>working in this space, but doesn't do that to AI.

0:15:46.320 --> 0:15:50.080
<v Speaker 1>And then there's the concern about security and privacy. This

0:15:50.160 --> 0:15:53.920
<v Speaker 1>is my big concern because we already know that AI

0:15:54.440 --> 0:15:58.280
<v Speaker 1>can be real loosey goosey with your private information, right Like,

0:15:58.720 --> 0:16:02.680
<v Speaker 1>if the AI model is taking the stuff you communicate

0:16:02.720 --> 0:16:05.760
<v Speaker 1>to the model in account, then you are feeding that

0:16:05.840 --> 0:16:09.240
<v Speaker 1>AI model, which then can regurgitate the stuff you fed

0:16:09.280 --> 0:16:13.320
<v Speaker 1>to it to other people. So maybe you don't want

0:16:13.400 --> 0:16:17.440
<v Speaker 1>to express your most intimate desires and preferences to an

0:16:17.520 --> 0:16:20.840
<v Speaker 1>AI chatbot. It just might not turn out so well

0:16:20.880 --> 0:16:24.640
<v Speaker 1>for you in the long run anyway. NBC News rightfully

0:16:24.680 --> 0:16:27.560
<v Speaker 1>raises the question as to why these AI powered ads

0:16:28.000 --> 0:16:30.720
<v Speaker 1>seem to be getting a pass when it would be

0:16:30.760 --> 0:16:33.280
<v Speaker 1>against the rules for a human to post something similar.

0:16:33.600 --> 0:16:36.480
<v Speaker 1>I don't know, maybe the robots already got to them.

0:16:36.720 --> 0:16:40.560
<v Speaker 1>Starting in November, Google will require political ads that rely

0:16:40.680 --> 0:16:45.240
<v Speaker 1>on AI for content generation to prominently disclose the involvement

0:16:45.360 --> 0:16:50.280
<v Speaker 1>of the AI. Specifically, Google will require ads that contain

0:16:50.440 --> 0:16:55.360
<v Speaker 1>quote synthetic content end quote that appears to show realistic

0:16:55.440 --> 0:17:00.760
<v Speaker 1>people or events to label it as such. So let's say,

0:17:00.760 --> 0:17:03.640
<v Speaker 1>for example, that you had a political ad and it

0:17:03.720 --> 0:17:07.000
<v Speaker 1>shows a certain politician appearing at a certain event, and

0:17:07.040 --> 0:17:12.120
<v Speaker 1>that event is absolutely overflowing with a huge, enthusiastic, supportive audience.

0:17:12.680 --> 0:17:16.119
<v Speaker 1>But perhaps in reality they did appear at an event,

0:17:16.240 --> 0:17:18.800
<v Speaker 1>but maybe it was poorly attended. So AI has been

0:17:18.880 --> 0:17:22.440
<v Speaker 1>used to generate this crowd. Well, the ad would need

0:17:22.480 --> 0:17:26.920
<v Speaker 1>to disclose that it had used AI to augment these images.

0:17:27.520 --> 0:17:29.440
<v Speaker 1>I don't think it would have to get as granular

0:17:29.520 --> 0:17:32.880
<v Speaker 1>as to say what actually was done to the images,

0:17:33.160 --> 0:17:35.480
<v Speaker 1>but it would have to alert you that AI was

0:17:35.600 --> 0:17:39.680
<v Speaker 1>used as part of that ad generation. Now there is

0:17:39.720 --> 0:17:42.679
<v Speaker 1>a threshold here. If someone were just using AI to

0:17:42.720 --> 0:17:45.840
<v Speaker 1>do some minor tweaks like removing red eye or something

0:17:45.880 --> 0:17:48.800
<v Speaker 1>like that, they don't have to disclose that. That doesn't

0:17:48.840 --> 0:17:52.520
<v Speaker 1>meet the criteria. But if you're doing something like making

0:17:52.560 --> 0:17:56.159
<v Speaker 1>someone appear someone that somewhere where they weren't or with

0:17:56.359 --> 0:18:00.800
<v Speaker 1>someone who was not there, anything like that, that would

0:18:00.840 --> 0:18:04.040
<v Speaker 1>have to be disclosed. All right, we are now done

0:18:04.040 --> 0:18:07.400
<v Speaker 1>with AI for this episode, but I'm not done with Google.

0:18:08.040 --> 0:18:11.920
<v Speaker 1>YouTube is removing some control options for content creators when

0:18:11.960 --> 0:18:15.600
<v Speaker 1>it comes to ads. So right now a content creator

0:18:15.880 --> 0:18:19.360
<v Speaker 1>has a decent amount of freedom of where they will

0:18:19.400 --> 0:18:23.840
<v Speaker 1>allow ads to run against monetized content. So, for example,

0:18:24.320 --> 0:18:28.399
<v Speaker 1>a lot of ASMR artists will allow pre roll ads

0:18:28.800 --> 0:18:31.760
<v Speaker 1>these are the ads that play before a video plays,

0:18:32.440 --> 0:18:35.399
<v Speaker 1>but they turn off mid roll ads, which of course

0:18:35.440 --> 0:18:38.240
<v Speaker 1>play in the middle of a video. Like the video stops,

0:18:38.240 --> 0:18:39.880
<v Speaker 1>you get an ad and then the video keeps going,

0:18:39.960 --> 0:18:43.120
<v Speaker 1>kind of like the ads in this podcast. Also, they'll

0:18:43.119 --> 0:18:45.840
<v Speaker 1>turn off post roll ads. Those are the ads that

0:18:45.880 --> 0:18:49.320
<v Speaker 1>play after a video has finished playing. And the reason

0:18:49.359 --> 0:18:53.000
<v Speaker 1>why ASMR artists turn off mid role in post roll

0:18:53.040 --> 0:18:55.879
<v Speaker 1>ads as a rule is because they can be really

0:18:56.000 --> 0:18:59.280
<v Speaker 1>jarring to listen to if you are using ASMR to

0:18:59.320 --> 0:19:02.399
<v Speaker 1>try and relax or to lull yourself to sleep, because

0:19:02.520 --> 0:19:06.280
<v Speaker 1>chances are having some obnoxious ad playing right after the

0:19:06.359 --> 0:19:10.800
<v Speaker 1>video ends will kind of spoil the effect anyway. YouTube's

0:19:10.880 --> 0:19:14.200
<v Speaker 1>changes mean that creators can select whether or not ads

0:19:14.280 --> 0:19:16.439
<v Speaker 1>can play on either side of a video, but they

0:19:16.440 --> 0:19:19.640
<v Speaker 1>don't get to choose whether those ads will be pre

0:19:19.760 --> 0:19:22.840
<v Speaker 1>roll or post roll or both. They can say yes,

0:19:22.920 --> 0:19:26.280
<v Speaker 1>I will allow ads to play before or after, but

0:19:26.280 --> 0:19:29.800
<v Speaker 1>they don't get to say which one. Just it's before

0:19:29.920 --> 0:19:34.040
<v Speaker 1>or after collectively, and YouTube gets to decide whether the

0:19:34.080 --> 0:19:36.840
<v Speaker 1>ads will play before the video or after the video

0:19:37.280 --> 0:19:40.560
<v Speaker 1>or both. They also are not going to be able

0:19:40.560 --> 0:19:42.840
<v Speaker 1>to choose whether or not the ads are skippable or

0:19:42.960 --> 0:19:45.320
<v Speaker 1>non skippable. There are also going to be some other

0:19:45.400 --> 0:19:47.880
<v Speaker 1>changes to things like mineral ads as well, but they're

0:19:47.920 --> 0:19:51.440
<v Speaker 1>not quite to the extreme that I just mentioned. And

0:19:51.760 --> 0:19:53.919
<v Speaker 1>for a lot of content creators this may not be

0:19:54.040 --> 0:19:58.040
<v Speaker 1>that disruptive, but for folks in the meditation or ASMR

0:19:58.240 --> 0:20:02.480
<v Speaker 1>or relaxation spaces, it's causing a lot of anxiety. Heads

0:20:02.600 --> 0:20:06.320
<v Speaker 1>up to Chrome users, Google has been rolling out an

0:20:06.440 --> 0:20:11.359
<v Speaker 1>enhanced ad privacy feature. Some might say this feature is

0:20:11.440 --> 0:20:15.719
<v Speaker 1>perhaps a bit misleading because the name when have you think, Ah,

0:20:15.840 --> 0:20:19.680
<v Speaker 1>this feature will help keep my data private from advertisers.

0:20:20.560 --> 0:20:23.960
<v Speaker 1>Now it kind of does that, but it kind of doesn't.

0:20:24.119 --> 0:20:29.280
<v Speaker 1>So this ties into an application programming interface that's called Topics,

0:20:29.359 --> 0:20:32.679
<v Speaker 1>the Topics API, and what's going on here is that

0:20:32.800 --> 0:20:37.360
<v Speaker 1>Chrome uses your browser history to serve you targeted ads.

0:20:37.920 --> 0:20:40.880
<v Speaker 1>So based upon the kinds of sites you visit and

0:20:40.920 --> 0:20:43.680
<v Speaker 1>how often you visit them and how long you stay there,

0:20:44.160 --> 0:20:46.239
<v Speaker 1>Chrome will be able to serve ads to you that

0:20:46.320 --> 0:20:50.199
<v Speaker 1>it judges are more relevant to your interests. So Topics

0:20:50.280 --> 0:20:54.080
<v Speaker 1>is supposed to help replace third party cookies something that

0:20:54.160 --> 0:20:56.959
<v Speaker 1>Chrome will stop supporting in the not too distant future.

0:20:57.400 --> 0:21:00.920
<v Speaker 1>Cookies can act as trackers for your behavior across the web.

0:21:01.359 --> 0:21:04.880
<v Speaker 1>So the benefit of topics, according to Google, is that

0:21:05.320 --> 0:21:08.560
<v Speaker 1>it doesn't hand your browser history over to advertisers. It

0:21:08.560 --> 0:21:12.720
<v Speaker 1>doesn't explicitly say, oh, you went to site X, site y,

0:21:12.880 --> 0:21:16.600
<v Speaker 1>and site z. Instead, what Google does is hold on

0:21:16.720 --> 0:21:19.960
<v Speaker 1>to that information and it just indicates the types of

0:21:20.119 --> 0:21:23.959
<v Speaker 1>stuff you're interested in. So for me, it might tell

0:21:24.119 --> 0:21:28.240
<v Speaker 1>an advertiser something about me without going into details. So

0:21:28.320 --> 0:21:31.160
<v Speaker 1>for example, it would not say, oh, yeah, Jonathan, he's

0:21:31.160 --> 0:21:34.080
<v Speaker 1>on the I Fix It page like five times a week.

0:21:34.560 --> 0:21:37.159
<v Speaker 1>It wouldn't say that. Instead, it might say Jonathan is

0:21:37.200 --> 0:21:42.040
<v Speaker 1>interested in technology, gadgets, dioy repair, et cetera. And you

0:21:42.080 --> 0:21:44.800
<v Speaker 1>can argue that's an improvement, right, Like, it's not as

0:21:44.840 --> 0:21:48.199
<v Speaker 1>explicit as listing out all the different specific sites you

0:21:48.240 --> 0:21:51.400
<v Speaker 1>went to. But the way Google has rolled this out

0:21:51.440 --> 0:21:54.280
<v Speaker 1>has left some people upset because users are seeing a

0:21:54.320 --> 0:21:58.280
<v Speaker 1>pop up that alerts them to the enhanced privacy from ads.

0:21:59.240 --> 0:22:02.159
<v Speaker 1>But what this really means is that it's already opting

0:22:02.200 --> 0:22:07.959
<v Speaker 1>you into this browser history rec recording feature that Google

0:22:08.040 --> 0:22:10.800
<v Speaker 1>that you're enabling this, you're enabling Google to use your

0:22:10.800 --> 0:22:14.639
<v Speaker 1>browser history as a way to target ads to you. Like,

0:22:14.960 --> 0:22:17.440
<v Speaker 1>that's that's what happens. If you just hit got it,

0:22:17.440 --> 0:22:20.960
<v Speaker 1>it just it opts you in. And people are saying, oh,

0:22:21.000 --> 0:22:23.960
<v Speaker 1>it makes it sound like by the name of the

0:22:23.960 --> 0:22:26.800
<v Speaker 1>feature that if you hit got it it opts you out.

0:22:27.320 --> 0:22:29.240
<v Speaker 1>The opposite is true. It opts you in, And in

0:22:29.320 --> 0:22:31.359
<v Speaker 1>order to opt out, you then have to go to

0:22:31.480 --> 0:22:35.520
<v Speaker 1>your browser settings, go to the privacy settings. There's a

0:22:35.560 --> 0:22:38.399
<v Speaker 1>selection called ad privacy. If you do that, then you

0:22:38.400 --> 0:22:41.320
<v Speaker 1>can go in and turn off this feature, but you

0:22:41.400 --> 0:22:43.360
<v Speaker 1>have to do it manually at that point because you've

0:22:43.359 --> 0:22:46.679
<v Speaker 1>already said got it. Well they got me because I

0:22:46.720 --> 0:22:51.320
<v Speaker 1>said got it. I probably didn't read it properly. But

0:22:51.480 --> 0:22:53.400
<v Speaker 1>even if I had, like, there's a chance I would

0:22:53.440 --> 0:22:55.760
<v Speaker 1>have just thought, oh, by clicking got it, it means

0:22:55.800 --> 0:22:58.919
<v Speaker 1>I've opted to be out of this program, when in

0:22:58.960 --> 0:23:01.520
<v Speaker 1>fact the opposite was true. And when I went into

0:23:01.520 --> 0:23:04.160
<v Speaker 1>the settings, that's what I saw. The settings were all

0:23:04.160 --> 0:23:06.640
<v Speaker 1>turned on and I needed to turn them off manually.

0:23:06.760 --> 0:23:09.800
<v Speaker 1>So just want to let you folks know that, so

0:23:09.840 --> 0:23:12.360
<v Speaker 1>that if you use Chrome, you can go into those

0:23:12.359 --> 0:23:15.399
<v Speaker 1>privacy settings check that ad privacy. See if it's on,

0:23:15.680 --> 0:23:17.320
<v Speaker 1>and you know, if you have no problem with that,

0:23:17.320 --> 0:23:19.879
<v Speaker 1>that's fine, just leave it on. But if, like me,

0:23:20.119 --> 0:23:22.800
<v Speaker 1>you thought you were opting out and it turns out

0:23:22.840 --> 0:23:26.119
<v Speaker 1>you were opting in, you might want to make some changes. Okay,

0:23:26.160 --> 0:23:28.959
<v Speaker 1>I've got some more news stories to come, but before

0:23:29.080 --> 0:23:42.520
<v Speaker 1>we jump into all of that, let's take another quick break. Okay,

0:23:42.600 --> 0:23:47.160
<v Speaker 1>quick story here. The FAA is extending how far UPS

0:23:47.240 --> 0:23:50.479
<v Speaker 1>is allowed to fly delivery drones. So this week the

0:23:50.560 --> 0:23:54.199
<v Speaker 1>FAA updated its rules and will allow deliveries that go

0:23:54.359 --> 0:23:58.919
<v Speaker 1>beyond line of sight. So previously, an operator or a

0:23:59.000 --> 0:24:03.680
<v Speaker 1>spotter need to be able to maintain eyes maintain sight

0:24:04.119 --> 0:24:07.200
<v Speaker 1>on a delivery drone as it was dropping off a package, which,

0:24:07.200 --> 0:24:10.320
<v Speaker 1>of course, you could argue eliminates the benefits of having

0:24:10.359 --> 0:24:12.520
<v Speaker 1>a delivery drone in the first place. So now, for

0:24:12.560 --> 0:24:16.360
<v Speaker 1>the first time, companies will not have to employ spotters

0:24:16.400 --> 0:24:18.359
<v Speaker 1>to keep an eye on a drone as it makes

0:24:18.359 --> 0:24:21.159
<v Speaker 1>its way to the drop off. So the days of

0:24:21.320 --> 0:24:25.600
<v Speaker 1>robots delivering our small packages are closer than ever. Next up,

0:24:25.880 --> 0:24:28.520
<v Speaker 1>have you ever had the problem of running out of

0:24:28.560 --> 0:24:31.560
<v Speaker 1>disk space? Maybe it was on a video game console

0:24:31.680 --> 0:24:35.200
<v Speaker 1>and it told you that no, you cannot download Starfield

0:24:35.200 --> 0:24:38.320
<v Speaker 1>because your console's disk drive is already full, so you're

0:24:38.320 --> 0:24:41.199
<v Speaker 1>gonna have to uninstall some stuff to make room, or

0:24:41.480 --> 0:24:45.240
<v Speaker 1>maybe you've encountered it on a work or home PC. Well,

0:24:45.320 --> 0:24:47.679
<v Speaker 1>if you have, just be comforted in knowing that you

0:24:47.720 --> 0:24:51.600
<v Speaker 1>are not alone. Because last week, a disk capacity issue

0:24:52.080 --> 0:24:57.199
<v Speaker 1>shut down Toyota, like all of Toyota's assembly plants in

0:24:57.280 --> 0:25:01.680
<v Speaker 1>Japan had to shut down, and some of the company's

0:25:01.800 --> 0:25:05.159
<v Speaker 1>servers just detected that there was insufficient disk space to

0:25:05.200 --> 0:25:10.280
<v Speaker 1>continue operations, and so operations stopped continuing. This raised concerns

0:25:10.280 --> 0:25:13.040
<v Speaker 1>that perhaps the auto company had been the target of hackers,

0:25:13.040 --> 0:25:14.800
<v Speaker 1>but in fact it turned out to be a pretty

0:25:14.800 --> 0:25:18.359
<v Speaker 1>simple problem with a pretty simple solution. Toyota transferred the

0:25:18.480 --> 0:25:21.680
<v Speaker 1>data to a server that had much more storage capacity

0:25:22.040 --> 0:25:24.480
<v Speaker 1>and then things got back on track. But it really

0:25:24.520 --> 0:25:27.639
<v Speaker 1>does show that the little frustrations that can irritate us

0:25:27.840 --> 0:25:31.960
<v Speaker 1>as end users can cause much larger problems in other contexts.

0:25:32.400 --> 0:25:36.280
<v Speaker 1>The Mozilla Foundation recently conducted a study on the privacy

0:25:36.320 --> 0:25:40.720
<v Speaker 1>practices of certain segment of technology, and they found that

0:25:40.760 --> 0:25:46.000
<v Speaker 1>this particular sector of technology underperforms across the board when

0:25:46.040 --> 0:25:50.119
<v Speaker 1>it comes to privacy, and that segment is drum roll, please,

0:25:50.840 --> 0:25:55.760
<v Speaker 1>the automobile industry. So, according to the Mozilla Foundation, ninety

0:25:55.880 --> 0:25:59.879
<v Speaker 1>two percent of auto manufacturers give drivers very little or

0:25:59.880 --> 0:26:04.199
<v Speaker 1>no control over how their private information is gathered and used.

0:26:04.720 --> 0:26:08.160
<v Speaker 1>More than eighty percent of them will share driver data

0:26:08.240 --> 0:26:11.760
<v Speaker 1>with outside partners. Out of the twenty five car companies

0:26:11.760 --> 0:26:15.040
<v Speaker 1>that the Foundation studied, not a single one of them

0:26:15.480 --> 0:26:19.520
<v Speaker 1>even met the minimum privacy standards that they had established

0:26:20.240 --> 0:26:23.760
<v Speaker 1>they being the Foundation, I should say. Plus, the Foundation said,

0:26:23.760 --> 0:26:27.520
<v Speaker 1>these companies aren't just collecting and sharing data, they're collecting

0:26:27.640 --> 0:26:31.040
<v Speaker 1>more information than they need in order to provide services

0:26:31.040 --> 0:26:33.879
<v Speaker 1>to drivers. So this reminds me of how platforms like

0:26:33.960 --> 0:26:37.960
<v Speaker 1>Facebook used to let developers get access to all sorts

0:26:37.960 --> 0:26:41.240
<v Speaker 1>of data, even if their app didn't need that data

0:26:41.520 --> 0:26:44.000
<v Speaker 1>to operate. That's part of what led to the whole

0:26:44.000 --> 0:26:47.679
<v Speaker 1>Cambridge Analytica scandal in fact, and it turns out a

0:26:47.760 --> 0:26:50.240
<v Speaker 1>very similar thing is playing out in our vehicles to

0:26:50.280 --> 0:26:53.880
<v Speaker 1>an extent. Anyway. Some other stuff that the study discovered

0:26:54.080 --> 0:26:57.080
<v Speaker 1>includes the fun fact that more than half of auto

0:26:57.119 --> 0:27:00.600
<v Speaker 1>manufacturers are willing to share driver information to law enforcement

0:27:00.880 --> 0:27:04.880
<v Speaker 1>upon request. If you can trast that with Internet based platforms,

0:27:05.480 --> 0:27:09.199
<v Speaker 1>they are known to exert a pretty decent deal of

0:27:09.240 --> 0:27:12.320
<v Speaker 1>effort to try and keep user data secure, because otherwise

0:27:12.600 --> 0:27:15.960
<v Speaker 1>you lose the trust of your user base. But the

0:27:16.000 --> 0:27:20.760
<v Speaker 1>car companies don't seem to have that same perspective. Seventy

0:27:20.920 --> 0:27:24.639
<v Speaker 1>six percent of those auto companies claimed that they actually

0:27:24.640 --> 0:27:27.560
<v Speaker 1>have the right to sell driver information to data brokers,

0:27:28.200 --> 0:27:31.679
<v Speaker 1>like they just have that right inherently doesn't require you

0:27:31.760 --> 0:27:34.920
<v Speaker 1>to consent to it. If you're wondering which company scored

0:27:34.960 --> 0:27:39.040
<v Speaker 1>the lowest on the test results, that would be Tesla.

0:27:39.160 --> 0:27:41.680
<v Speaker 1>And I know I have a tendency to criticize Tesla

0:27:41.800 --> 0:27:44.359
<v Speaker 1>a lot on the show, but it's stuff like this,

0:27:44.520 --> 0:27:48.560
<v Speaker 1>I would argue that kind of justifies that approach. As

0:27:48.600 --> 0:27:50.600
<v Speaker 1>for what you, as a driver can do about this,

0:27:51.200 --> 0:27:55.240
<v Speaker 1>the answer is not a whole lot. Mozilla Foundation has

0:27:55.280 --> 0:27:57.960
<v Speaker 1>called out to car companies to make substantive changes to

0:27:58.080 --> 0:28:01.199
<v Speaker 1>how they collect and utilize data because this problem is

0:28:01.240 --> 0:28:04.960
<v Speaker 1>too big for individual drivers to tackle in any meaningful way.

0:28:05.600 --> 0:28:09.000
<v Speaker 1>Hey do you remember Clubhouse. That's the app that debuted

0:28:09.040 --> 0:28:12.479
<v Speaker 1>in twenty twenty one made a real big splash. It

0:28:12.560 --> 0:28:16.639
<v Speaker 1>let people create virtual spaces where they could broadcast audio

0:28:16.760 --> 0:28:19.120
<v Speaker 1>to an audience. So it's kind of like you could

0:28:19.320 --> 0:28:22.720
<v Speaker 1>have a live streaming podcaster, or you could be even

0:28:22.760 --> 0:28:25.119
<v Speaker 1>a DJ if you wanted to be. You could have

0:28:25.240 --> 0:28:28.719
<v Speaker 1>shows with guests and allow folks to listen in. And

0:28:28.960 --> 0:28:33.920
<v Speaker 1>initially Clubhouse had this air of exclusivity. Originally the app

0:28:34.000 --> 0:28:36.919
<v Speaker 1>was invitation only and it was also limited to the

0:28:36.960 --> 0:28:40.840
<v Speaker 1>iOS platform at first, and there's nothing like an exclusive

0:28:40.920 --> 0:28:43.720
<v Speaker 1>club to make people want to become a member. But

0:28:43.800 --> 0:28:46.960
<v Speaker 1>the shine wore off of Clubhouse, and while the app

0:28:47.080 --> 0:28:50.360
<v Speaker 1>did have sort of a meteoric rise, it faded from

0:28:50.400 --> 0:28:54.480
<v Speaker 1>conversations not too long after that. Now the company has

0:28:54.600 --> 0:28:57.680
<v Speaker 1>laid off about half its staff and it's looking to

0:28:57.760 --> 0:29:01.120
<v Speaker 1>reframe Clubhouse as more of a message app than a

0:29:01.200 --> 0:29:03.960
<v Speaker 1>live audio app. So rather than being a bunch of

0:29:04.040 --> 0:29:07.920
<v Speaker 1>virtual town halls that could be hosted by anybody you know,

0:29:08.000 --> 0:29:11.760
<v Speaker 1>from a no one like me to an actual celebrity,

0:29:12.240 --> 0:29:15.640
<v Speaker 1>the focus now is for Clubhouse users to form groups

0:29:15.680 --> 0:29:19.000
<v Speaker 1>with people they actually know, like real life friends and family.

0:29:19.760 --> 0:29:22.040
<v Speaker 1>In fact, it sounds a lot like what Twitter was

0:29:22.160 --> 0:29:25.360
<v Speaker 1>intended to be when it was first launched. It wasn't

0:29:25.360 --> 0:29:29.360
<v Speaker 1>thought of as like broadcasting to everyone. The use case

0:29:29.440 --> 0:29:31.959
<v Speaker 1>was more like you would follow people you actually know,

0:29:32.040 --> 0:29:33.800
<v Speaker 1>so that you could keep up with what they were doing.

0:29:34.720 --> 0:29:38.000
<v Speaker 1>Now users will be leaving audio messages for each other.

0:29:38.640 --> 0:29:40.800
<v Speaker 1>I'm not really sure how this is at all different

0:29:40.800 --> 0:29:44.640
<v Speaker 1>from other messaging apps that also incorporate audio elements, and

0:29:44.680 --> 0:29:47.240
<v Speaker 1>I'm not sure if Clubhouse can actually leverage this approach

0:29:47.320 --> 0:29:50.480
<v Speaker 1>to regain relevancy in the market. But then I never

0:29:50.520 --> 0:29:53.800
<v Speaker 1>actually joined Clubhouse because I'm not one of the cool kids,

0:29:54.160 --> 0:29:56.120
<v Speaker 1>So I'm out of the loop here. I don't know

0:29:56.120 --> 0:29:58.560
<v Speaker 1>what I'm talking about. I guess now. I was going

0:29:58.600 --> 0:30:02.680
<v Speaker 1>to talk about a secret rocket launch at Cape Canaveral

0:30:02.720 --> 0:30:06.120
<v Speaker 1>this week, one that isn't part of SpaceX, it's not

0:30:06.280 --> 0:30:09.360
<v Speaker 1>part of NASA, it's not part of any other like

0:30:09.440 --> 0:30:12.520
<v Speaker 1>space agency. But it turns out this secret launch was

0:30:12.520 --> 0:30:16.400
<v Speaker 1>scrubbed and didn't happen. Technically, it was a secret for

0:30:16.640 --> 0:30:19.600
<v Speaker 1>at least a while, but folks figured out pretty quickly

0:30:19.640 --> 0:30:23.360
<v Speaker 1>that it was a US military operation and that it

0:30:23.400 --> 0:30:26.320
<v Speaker 1>was most likely meant to conduct a test launch of

0:30:26.760 --> 0:30:31.760
<v Speaker 1>hypersonic missiles. So as that term suggests, these are missiles

0:30:31.800 --> 0:30:34.720
<v Speaker 1>that travel faster than the sweet of sound, and with

0:30:34.880 --> 0:30:38.200
<v Speaker 1>this incredible speed and their maneuverability, they would be more

0:30:38.240 --> 0:30:44.480
<v Speaker 1>capable of avoiding anti missile weaponry. But today, or rather yesterday,

0:30:44.480 --> 0:30:47.960
<v Speaker 1>I should say, the military scrubbed those plans. They also

0:30:47.960 --> 0:30:51.760
<v Speaker 1>acknowledged that this was meant to test hypersonic missile technology,

0:30:52.200 --> 0:30:55.680
<v Speaker 1>but the reason for scrubbing was very vague. It just

0:30:55.680 --> 0:30:58.360
<v Speaker 1>said that during pre flight checks they had to make

0:30:58.400 --> 0:31:03.520
<v Speaker 1>the call to scrub launch. This would have been the

0:31:03.560 --> 0:31:07.040
<v Speaker 1>first surface test of a US hypersonic missile, but other

0:31:07.120 --> 0:31:10.640
<v Speaker 1>countries like China, which actually leads the world in this technology,

0:31:10.960 --> 0:31:15.160
<v Speaker 1>and Russia have already deployed, in Russia's case, even used

0:31:15.240 --> 0:31:19.160
<v Speaker 1>hypersonic capable weaponry. We haven't heard the last of this,

0:31:19.360 --> 0:31:22.560
<v Speaker 1>I don't think or I mean maybe we won't hear it.

0:31:22.600 --> 0:31:25.000
<v Speaker 1>We'll see it. I mean we'll hear it, because hypersonic

0:31:25.040 --> 0:31:27.520
<v Speaker 1>you'll get a sonic boom afterward, and then an actual

0:31:27.520 --> 0:31:31.680
<v Speaker 1>boom if it's a missile. I'm getting off track now.

0:31:31.720 --> 0:31:35.760
<v Speaker 1>If you were going to remake Alanis Morissett's song Ironic Today,

0:31:36.320 --> 0:31:40.400
<v Speaker 1>you might include this last news item there. So, Rockstar Games,

0:31:40.680 --> 0:31:44.040
<v Speaker 1>the company behind popular franchises like Grand Theft Auto, has

0:31:44.080 --> 0:31:47.840
<v Speaker 1>included some of the same technology the company has previously

0:31:47.920 --> 0:31:52.000
<v Speaker 1>campaigned against in some of its games. That's now selling

0:31:52.040 --> 0:31:55.600
<v Speaker 1>on Steam. So this all has to do with Digital

0:31:55.760 --> 0:31:59.320
<v Speaker 1>Rights Management or DRM. So the purpose of DRM is

0:31:59.360 --> 0:32:03.840
<v Speaker 1>to prevent or discourage piracy, though advocates often argue that

0:32:04.000 --> 0:32:07.800
<v Speaker 1>pirates will find ways around DRM, so then the only

0:32:07.840 --> 0:32:11.600
<v Speaker 1>people who have to deal with DRM are actual valid customers,

0:32:11.960 --> 0:32:14.480
<v Speaker 1>which means you're just making the experience worse for people

0:32:14.480 --> 0:32:17.520
<v Speaker 1>who were already paying for the experience, and the people

0:32:17.520 --> 0:32:19.840
<v Speaker 1>who didn't want to pay for the experience, they just

0:32:20.040 --> 0:32:23.320
<v Speaker 1>found ways to get around the protections you had put

0:32:23.320 --> 0:32:28.880
<v Speaker 1>in place. And anyway, a hacker group called Razor nineteen eleven,

0:32:29.320 --> 0:32:32.040
<v Speaker 1>years and years and years ago created a bunch of

0:32:32.080 --> 0:32:36.080
<v Speaker 1>cracks for Rockstar Games, for certain titles in Rockstar Games.

0:32:36.480 --> 0:32:39.280
<v Speaker 1>So these were pieces of software that are meant to

0:32:39.360 --> 0:32:42.440
<v Speaker 1>get around DRM. Really just files that allow you to

0:32:42.600 --> 0:32:47.840
<v Speaker 1>bypass DRM. And the interesting thing is that now Rockstar

0:32:47.880 --> 0:32:50.560
<v Speaker 1>has put some of those old titles for sale on Steam.

0:32:51.000 --> 0:32:54.960
<v Speaker 1>But Rockstar needed a way to get around this DRM

0:32:55.000 --> 0:32:57.719
<v Speaker 1>that they themselves had put on these old games, and

0:32:57.880 --> 0:33:02.120
<v Speaker 1>to do that, what the company apparently has done is

0:33:02.200 --> 0:33:05.640
<v Speaker 1>to include some of the very same cracks made by

0:33:05.640 --> 0:33:09.280
<v Speaker 1>those hackers. A hacker group that Rockstar Games was very

0:33:09.320 --> 0:33:12.120
<v Speaker 1>gung ho on going up against back in the day,

0:33:12.160 --> 0:33:16.320
<v Speaker 1>and now they're using the hacker's own tools because these

0:33:16.360 --> 0:33:19.320
<v Speaker 1>old games have DRM on them that otherwise would make

0:33:19.360 --> 0:33:24.760
<v Speaker 1>the playing experience suboptimal. Bleeping Computer uncovered this and has

0:33:24.800 --> 0:33:28.040
<v Speaker 1>screenshots of code that indicate that, yeah, some of those

0:33:28.040 --> 0:33:31.400
<v Speaker 1>cracks do appear in certain Rockstar game files, which is

0:33:31.520 --> 0:33:35.360
<v Speaker 1>pretty wild stuff. Okay, I've got a couple of recommendations

0:33:35.520 --> 0:33:38.000
<v Speaker 1>of articles for you all this week. First up is

0:33:38.040 --> 0:33:41.880
<v Speaker 1>an article and Wired. It's titled The Burning Man Fiasco

0:33:42.120 --> 0:33:46.000
<v Speaker 1>is the Ultimate Tech culture Clash. So obviously this goes

0:33:46.040 --> 0:33:49.760
<v Speaker 1>into detail about how thousands of people found themselves stranded

0:33:49.800 --> 0:33:53.080
<v Speaker 1>in the desert at the Burning Man Festival while torrential

0:33:53.200 --> 0:33:56.120
<v Speaker 1>rains move through the area. But it's also about how

0:33:56.200 --> 0:34:01.120
<v Speaker 1>a cultural subset essentially appropriated and you know, took over.

0:34:01.200 --> 0:34:04.840
<v Speaker 1>They hijacked an art festival, and how that in turn

0:34:04.920 --> 0:34:07.520
<v Speaker 1>has changed the festival itself, so well worth a read.

0:34:08.080 --> 0:34:12.560
<v Speaker 1>The second recommendation I have is titled Airbnb bookings dry

0:34:12.680 --> 0:34:15.600
<v Speaker 1>up in New York as the new short stay rules

0:34:15.640 --> 0:34:20.120
<v Speaker 1>are introduced. I think this is a really interesting read.

0:34:20.160 --> 0:34:23.720
<v Speaker 1>It's in the Guardian and it's only partly tech related.

0:34:23.719 --> 0:34:26.040
<v Speaker 1>I would argue a lot of people put Airbnb and

0:34:26.120 --> 0:34:30.080
<v Speaker 1>tech company status, so it kind of fits in that regard.

0:34:30.120 --> 0:34:35.240
<v Speaker 1>But it's also really about how the tech startup culture

0:34:35.280 --> 0:34:41.040
<v Speaker 1>that's centered around disruption can be i can have some

0:34:41.080 --> 0:34:45.239
<v Speaker 1>really negative consequences. So in this case, the disruption was

0:34:45.280 --> 0:34:48.080
<v Speaker 1>meant to be to the hospitality industry, right, that's what

0:34:48.160 --> 0:34:51.080
<v Speaker 1>Airbnb is taking aim for. They're taking aim at like

0:34:51.360 --> 0:34:55.400
<v Speaker 1>hotels and cabin rentals and things like that in an

0:34:55.440 --> 0:34:58.960
<v Speaker 1>effort to you know, democratize it to some extent and

0:34:59.000 --> 0:35:01.880
<v Speaker 1>also just to make a a ton of cash in

0:35:01.920 --> 0:35:05.960
<v Speaker 1>the process. But New York. The response to New York

0:35:06.080 --> 0:35:09.239
<v Speaker 1>was that we need to make up rules to curtail

0:35:09.560 --> 0:35:13.439
<v Speaker 1>this because people who are owning properties rather than selling them,

0:35:14.040 --> 0:35:18.840
<v Speaker 1>they are renting them out for these short stays. And meanwhile,

0:35:18.880 --> 0:35:21.799
<v Speaker 1>we have a housing crisis in the city. There's not

0:35:21.920 --> 0:35:24.520
<v Speaker 1>enough housing for the people who need it. And part

0:35:24.560 --> 0:35:26.759
<v Speaker 1>of the reason is because there are all these landlords

0:35:27.160 --> 0:35:30.279
<v Speaker 1>who are renting out these spaces in short term. So

0:35:30.320 --> 0:35:33.080
<v Speaker 1>we're going to make it really really hard for them

0:35:33.120 --> 0:35:36.719
<v Speaker 1>to do that. The rules are making it very challenging

0:35:37.320 --> 0:35:40.919
<v Speaker 1>to run an Airbnb kind of business in New York

0:35:40.960 --> 0:35:43.719
<v Speaker 1>City in order to address this issue. So I just

0:35:43.760 --> 0:35:48.279
<v Speaker 1>thought it was interesting to see the interplay between disruption

0:35:48.880 --> 0:35:53.560
<v Speaker 1>and legislative response, so I recommend that one as well. Okay,

0:35:53.640 --> 0:35:56.279
<v Speaker 1>that's it for the tech News for Thursday, September seventh,

0:35:56.400 --> 0:36:00.839
<v Speaker 1>twenty twenty three. I hope you're all well, and I'll

0:36:00.880 --> 0:36:10.319
<v Speaker 1>talk to you again really soon. Tech Stuff is an

0:36:10.400 --> 0:36:15.920
<v Speaker 1>iHeartRadio production. For more podcasts from iHeartRadio, visit the iHeartRadio app,

0:36:16.040 --> 0:36:19.200
<v Speaker 1>Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.