WEBVTT - On the Debt Ceiling, the White House Is Doing What It Said It Wouldn't Do

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<v Speaker 1>Hello, and welcome to another episode of The Odd Lots Podcast.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm Joe Wisenthal.

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<v Speaker 2>And I'm Tracy Alloway.

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<v Speaker 1>Uh, Tracy, stupidest law in the world. The debt ceiling.

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<v Speaker 1>We're still here.

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<v Speaker 2>I was gonna say, you'll have to narrow that one down,

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<v Speaker 2>but I know exactly what you're talking about. Yeah, the

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<v Speaker 2>debt ceiling. I am really struggling with this one. I'm

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<v Speaker 2>struggling to get into it because I feel like we've

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<v Speaker 2>been here before and we kind of know how it's

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<v Speaker 2>going to play out. But of course the wild card

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<v Speaker 2>this time around is just I guess the lengths to

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<v Speaker 2>which a certain portion of a certain party is willing

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<v Speaker 2>to go and using this as political leverage.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, well, you know, I think what you said sort

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<v Speaker 1>of captures the spirit perfectly. We know how this plays out,

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<v Speaker 1>and it probably will play out as you have in

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<v Speaker 1>your head, except that the potential in the scenario where

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<v Speaker 1>it doesn't play out like that is very bad. People

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<v Speaker 1>think yes, and so you have this situation where like, oh, everything,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, we all know how it works out. It's

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<v Speaker 1>all theater. They resolve it, and that's probably true, and

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<v Speaker 1>yet the possibility that somehow it doesn't get worked out,

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<v Speaker 1>it would be unprecedented and potentially very calamitous.

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<v Speaker 2>Well, the other thing that's happened this time around, and

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<v Speaker 2>again I am sort of struggling to get excited about

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<v Speaker 2>this particular debt ceiling episode. But the other thing that's

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<v Speaker 2>happened is that the White House started out this whole

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<v Speaker 2>thing saying that it wasn't going to negotiate on the

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<v Speaker 2>debt ceiling, and yet here we are, we're recording this

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<v Speaker 2>on May twenty third. It seems like they're negotiating.

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<v Speaker 1>They're absolutely negotiating. And it made sense for the White

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<v Speaker 1>House to say that. And the reason I say that

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<v Speaker 1>is because Biden was there in twenty eleven when Obama

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<v Speaker 1>negotiated the dead ceiling deal with the House Republicans and

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<v Speaker 1>sort of saw first hand how that sort of derailed

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<v Speaker 1>Obama's presidency, and Biden had front or seats to that,

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<v Speaker 1>and so you figure, like, from Biden's perspective, it's like, well,

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<v Speaker 1>I'm not going to go down that road again. I

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<v Speaker 1>saw how this derailed the White House the last time

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<v Speaker 1>I was in the White House, and yet here we

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<v Speaker 1>are and they I would say, at a minimum, the

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<v Speaker 1>White House has failed to a stick by that and

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<v Speaker 1>failed to sort of avoid the same path that Obama

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<v Speaker 1>went down.

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<v Speaker 2>What if saying you're not going to negotiate was in

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<v Speaker 2>itself a negotiation tactic.

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<v Speaker 1>It may have been. It may have been, but it

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<v Speaker 1>seems to have failed. And so right, like that's like

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<v Speaker 1>that's sort of the thing. It's like, well, that was, no,

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<v Speaker 1>here we are.

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<v Speaker 2>I don't think the intent was that in late May

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<v Speaker 2>of this year we would be talking about the President

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<v Speaker 2>potentially invoking the fourteenth Amendment to deal with this issue.

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<v Speaker 2>That couldn't have been the game plan. And can I

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<v Speaker 2>just say one more thing about this episode. I really

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<v Speaker 2>resent having to turn this into a constitutional law podcast,

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<v Speaker 2>Like I never wanted that for my career. And yet

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<v Speaker 2>here we are.

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<v Speaker 1>And yet here we are exactly right, and you know,

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<v Speaker 1>again you sort of said it like we the problem.

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<v Speaker 1>You said, you know, the president, the White House might

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<v Speaker 1>have to invoke the fourteenth Amendment or might except that,

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<v Speaker 1>except that the White House has already said that's not

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<v Speaker 1>a great option. It doesn't really want to do that option.

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<v Speaker 1>And so if there are these various off ramps, like

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<v Speaker 1>if there are these various alternatives to just sort of

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<v Speaker 1>raising the dead ceiling via Congress, like it's been done

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<v Speaker 1>dozens of times in the past. The White House has

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<v Speaker 1>like trashed every one of those operations.

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<v Speaker 2>This is the process with talking specifically about the off

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<v Speaker 2>ramps is you kind of tell everyone what your least

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<v Speaker 2>preferred option is, and all of them are bad options,

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<v Speaker 2>it seems like for the White House. And so there's

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<v Speaker 2>no like they have to really pointed to this is

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<v Speaker 2>the thing that would be a massive win for us.

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<v Speaker 1>Right, they just point to the things that would be

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<v Speaker 1>a loss for them. Should we get started? So how

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<v Speaker 1>did the White House get into a position in which

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<v Speaker 1>it expressly said it would not? How is the White

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<v Speaker 1>House negotiating over the debt ceiling when it expressly said

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<v Speaker 1>for months and months that there would be no negotiation.

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<v Speaker 1>Today we are going to be speaking with two guests,

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<v Speaker 1>Gonda Amernath, executive director and Employe America and Arnap Data,

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<v Speaker 1>senior counsel for employ America. So let's get started. Is

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<v Speaker 1>the basic intro true skanda that the White House said

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<v Speaker 1>it wasn't going to negotiate and is now negotiating.

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<v Speaker 3>Thanks for having me on a thank I think that

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<v Speaker 3>descriptively checks out that they promised to not negotiate that

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<v Speaker 3>they wanted a clean debt ceiling increase, right, and yet

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<v Speaker 3>here we are where it very likely will not be

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<v Speaker 3>a clean debt ceiling increase, and they are very clearly negotiating.

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<v Speaker 3>I don't know how to take issue with that description.

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<v Speaker 2>Can I ask a really basic question just before we

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<v Speaker 2>go any further, But I would be curious to get

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<v Speaker 2>either of your opinions on this. But what is it

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<v Speaker 2>about the debt ceiling that makes it such an attractive

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<v Speaker 2>pressure point for this kind of political wrangling?

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<v Speaker 3>I think it's a ransom note of sorts, right, So

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<v Speaker 3>it ends up being this catastrophic risk if people perceive

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<v Speaker 3>that we don't raise the deat ceiling, then we're going

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<v Speaker 3>to default or it's going to lead to chaos and

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<v Speaker 3>how government pays for various things, and that chaos is

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<v Speaker 3>owned by the executive branch. And so if you are

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<v Speaker 3>in Congress and you want to extract concessions, this is

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<v Speaker 3>a kind of holdout problem where I can effectively force

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<v Speaker 3>you into position of giving whatever I want in order

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<v Speaker 3>to raise the debt ceiling as a matter of procedure.

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<v Speaker 3>And it's all kind of operating in the shadow of

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<v Speaker 3>what is a reasonable concession to extract, and that hold

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<v Speaker 3>out problem is, yeah, a very real one that the

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<v Speaker 3>White House is facing right now.

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<v Speaker 4>Add to that too, Yeah, add to that too, And thanks,

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<v Speaker 4>thanks so much for having me that the uncertain timeline

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<v Speaker 4>of it, I think really necessitates that hostage tanking mentality.

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<v Speaker 4>This is not like the typical appropriation cycle where you

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<v Speaker 4>have an X date from the beginning. You know, when

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<v Speaker 4>this was first announced for four months ago, when Secretary

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<v Speaker 4>Ellen said we're going to hit the dead ceiling. We

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<v Speaker 4>have to start taking extraordinary measures. Even the date was

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<v Speaker 4>highly uncertain at that point. We're now a week before

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<v Speaker 4>June first, which they say might be the X date,

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<v Speaker 4>but we're still not sure. And so it creates this

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<v Speaker 4>kind of uncertain environment that I think is really because

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<v Speaker 4>you don't have the opportunity to make certain cuts or

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<v Speaker 4>certain demands during that typical process of authorization or appropriations.

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<v Speaker 4>It's kind of a convenient place to take hostage the

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<v Speaker 4>global economy.

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<v Speaker 1>So what was the White House hoping for when it

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<v Speaker 1>said months ago, we're not going to negotiate over the

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<v Speaker 1>dead ceiling this time. What was sort of the original

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<v Speaker 1>vision there?

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<v Speaker 3>So I think the hope in the gamble was that

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<v Speaker 3>the extremist nature of the demands, or what was perceived

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<v Speaker 3>to be extreme by the administration. It's called what's the

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<v Speaker 3>I know it as the LSGA Limit Save and Save

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<v Speaker 3>Growth Act or Limit Save and Grow Act would be

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<v Speaker 3>seen as so dangerous and even just the process of

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<v Speaker 3>getting to that piece of legislation would reveal so many

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<v Speaker 3>extreme demands, all to raise the dead ceiling, that you'd

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<v Speaker 3>have this confluence of political pressure, media driven pressure, and

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<v Speaker 3>a sort of maybe CEO driven pressure. There's a lot

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<v Speaker 3>of reports of Secretary Yellen trying to get major CEOs

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<v Speaker 3>to talk to Republicans persuade them of the importance of

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<v Speaker 3>raising the dead ceiling, and that through this sort of

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<v Speaker 3>these different pressures, the Republicans would see the light that

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<v Speaker 3>they would feel like they had no other choice of

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<v Speaker 3>the coalition would fracture and they would have to raise

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<v Speaker 3>the debt ceiling cleanly.

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<v Speaker 5>I would just yeah, I.

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<v Speaker 4>Would agree with all of that and say, I think

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<v Speaker 4>there was this particular question, that particular decision that just

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<v Speaker 4>gond disappointed about CEOs, that these interests would be advocating

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<v Speaker 4>lobbying with Congress. You guys have to do the right thing.

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<v Speaker 4>Here because they're demanding a clean debt ceiling hike. And

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<v Speaker 4>I think that was a real miscalculation because you know,

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<v Speaker 4>Jamie Diamond doesn't have an interest in a clean debt

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<v Speaker 4>ceiling hike on its own.

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<v Speaker 5>He just wants a debt ceiling hike.

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<v Speaker 4>And so I think that's really part of the miscalculation

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<v Speaker 4>that happened here.

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<v Speaker 2>Wait, can you can you talk a little bit more

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<v Speaker 2>about the distinction between a debt ceiling hike versus a

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<v Speaker 2>clean debt ceiling hike and so what is the difference there?

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<v Speaker 2>And then secondly, why does it seem like the Democrats

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<v Speaker 2>more into the idea of a clean debt ceiling hike

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<v Speaker 2>this time around?

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<v Speaker 4>Yeah, so, by clean debt ceiling hike, it just means

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<v Speaker 4>raising the limit on the debt ceiling without any other

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<v Speaker 4>changes in the law and no strings attached. And what's

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<v Speaker 4>likely to happen now with a deal is you're going

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<v Speaker 4>to have a hike in the debt ceiling, but it's

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<v Speaker 4>going to come attached with paps on spending, potentially cuts

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<v Speaker 4>to spending. And also there's all these other you know,

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<v Speaker 4>items that make I would emphasize very very little, have

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<v Speaker 4>very little impact on the budgetary outlook of the country.

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<v Speaker 4>But are things that a certain party is interested in,

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<v Speaker 4>for example, like work requirements on certain welfare programs. That's

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<v Speaker 4>those are kind of the concessions that the administration will

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<v Speaker 4>have to give here without having a clean debt ceiling hike.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, And so this is you know, again, we have

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<v Speaker 1>this in twenty eleven where it went down virtually to

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<v Speaker 1>the wire at the very last second. Oh, the Obama

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<v Speaker 1>administration and the newly elected Tea Party majority led by

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<v Speaker 1>John Bayner, they came up with this dead ceiling hike,

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<v Speaker 1>and they had the sequester, and there was sort of

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<v Speaker 1>a limit to growth of both discretionary and defense spending,

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<v Speaker 1>and arguably it slowed the trajectory of the recovery coming

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<v Speaker 1>out of the Great Financial Crisis. Talk to us about

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<v Speaker 1>the alternatives. So, okay, we saw what happened in twenty eleven,

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<v Speaker 1>We saw how that potentially derailed the recovery. What could

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<v Speaker 1>the White House theoretically have done differently, And we'll get

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<v Speaker 1>it into details, but months ago, other than say please

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<v Speaker 1>just give us a clean dead ceiling hike.

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<v Speaker 4>Yeah, I think the biggest thing I would emphasize here

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<v Speaker 4>and I think perhaps the biggest miscalculation was not developing

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<v Speaker 4>the operational readiness to undertake unilateral actions. So obviously there

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<v Speaker 4>are a number of different avenues that they could take

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<v Speaker 4>unilaterally that we can talk about more.

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<v Speaker 5>Platinum Coin is I think a favorite of some people,

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<v Speaker 5>perhaps some people on this podcasts.

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<v Speaker 4>Yeah, perhaps there's also this this idea that's been floating

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<v Speaker 4>around for console bonds, these perpetual bonds. All of these

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<v Speaker 4>things take some operational readiness to be executed, and the President,

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<v Speaker 4>I think, just a couple of days ago, said even

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<v Speaker 4>if we wanted to take unilateral action, we couldn't do

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<v Speaker 4>so in a number of weeks. And I think that

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<v Speaker 4>perhaps that lack of operational readiness is maybe the biggest

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<v Speaker 4>fault that you can put on the Treasury Department, which

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<v Speaker 4>which is when they're, for example, issuing a new security,

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<v Speaker 4>a new debt instrument, it takes a lot of work.

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<v Speaker 4>I'm not a debt expert, and I don't understand their

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<v Speaker 4>programs internally, but it takes a lot of coding. There's

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<v Speaker 4>a lot of different things with auction design and that

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<v Speaker 4>they need to do to get these securities ready, and

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<v Speaker 4>they could have taken steps four months ago when they

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<v Speaker 4>knew they were coming to the debt ceiling to be

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<v Speaker 4>able to do that if we came to a default moment.

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<v Speaker 4>And I think there's a broader principle to abstract here,

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<v Speaker 4>which is, when you are dealing with a environment of

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<v Speaker 4>high uncertainty, the most important course you could take, I

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<v Speaker 4>would argue, is to maintain as much optionality as possible,

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<v Speaker 4>and part of that is developing that operational readiness. And

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<v Speaker 4>so yes, let's say six months ago, if Treasury had

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<v Speaker 4>done an operational test to deposit a coin to mint

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<v Speaker 4>a new coin and depositive for ten thousand dollars, or

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<v Speaker 4>if it had started taking the steps to issue console bonds,

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<v Speaker 4>certainly that would have gotten noticed. These aren't you know,

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<v Speaker 4>it's not the Fed, the Treasury. Good agencies do a

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<v Speaker 4>number of tests and pilots. They don't always get a

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<v Speaker 4>lot of attention. This probably would, but I think in

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<v Speaker 4>the broader context of the uncertainty they were dealing with.

0:13:22.320 --> 0:13:26.360
<v Speaker 4>Both with divided government, we saw a very protracted speaker fight,

0:13:26.440 --> 0:13:29.720
<v Speaker 4>which just is another indicator of the volatility within Congress

0:13:29.800 --> 0:13:33.840
<v Speaker 4>that you have to manage. Not developing that operational readiness,

0:13:33.840 --> 0:13:36.480
<v Speaker 4>to me, is a really, really big mistake.

0:13:36.840 --> 0:13:39.840
<v Speaker 2>I'm just thinking back to the interview with Terry Duffy.

0:13:40.400 --> 0:13:41.920
<v Speaker 2>He was sort of talking about whether or not he

0:13:41.960 --> 0:13:44.920
<v Speaker 2>would leave Chicago, and he threw out there that they

0:13:44.920 --> 0:13:48.120
<v Speaker 2>had renegotiated all their leases to make them more flexible.

0:13:48.200 --> 0:13:50.640
<v Speaker 2>They didn't actually own any property. That seems like laying

0:13:50.679 --> 0:13:51.600
<v Speaker 2>the groundwork for a.

0:13:51.600 --> 0:13:53.559
<v Speaker 1>Possibility executive leadership.

0:13:54.480 --> 0:13:58.719
<v Speaker 2>Okay, can we talk about the fourteenth Amendment, because all

0:13:58.760 --> 0:14:02.640
<v Speaker 2>I know about it is that it says something along

0:14:02.679 --> 0:14:05.480
<v Speaker 2>the lines of the validity of the public debt of

0:14:05.520 --> 0:14:09.760
<v Speaker 2>the US shall not be questioned, something like that. What

0:14:09.960 --> 0:14:13.160
<v Speaker 2>is this option? Where did it come from? And why

0:14:13.200 --> 0:14:15.840
<v Speaker 2>does it seem to be a very big deal about

0:14:15.920 --> 0:14:18.880
<v Speaker 2>whether or not President Biden will actually invoke it.

0:14:20.400 --> 0:14:22.240
<v Speaker 3>I'm going to toss this over to my senior council.

0:14:25.680 --> 0:14:30.200
<v Speaker 4>Yeah, so basically, I mean, you got you got the

0:14:30.240 --> 0:14:32.120
<v Speaker 4>text right this thing.

0:14:32.240 --> 0:14:34.160
<v Speaker 2>I am reading it from the screen to be fair.

0:14:34.200 --> 0:14:39.720
<v Speaker 4>But yeah, okay, So basically, this is a post Civil

0:14:39.760 --> 0:14:43.240
<v Speaker 4>War amendment that was passed, and there are a number

0:14:43.320 --> 0:14:46.200
<v Speaker 4>of reasons.

0:14:45.880 --> 0:14:46.880
<v Speaker 5>Why it was passed.

0:14:46.880 --> 0:14:50.800
<v Speaker 4>There's they wanted to be able to They wanted to

0:14:50.800 --> 0:14:53.800
<v Speaker 4>make sure that bonds that were issued to pay for

0:14:53.840 --> 0:14:57.400
<v Speaker 4>the Civil War were not renegged on. But basically the

0:14:57.440 --> 0:15:01.120
<v Speaker 4>text of that that a lot of constant scholars who

0:15:01.120 --> 0:15:03.360
<v Speaker 4>are you know, I would say highly respective, believe is

0:15:03.400 --> 0:15:07.280
<v Speaker 4>that it is unconstitutional for the US to default.

0:15:07.480 --> 0:15:10.120
<v Speaker 5>Everything needs to be done to avoid a default.

0:15:10.240 --> 0:15:15.000
<v Speaker 4>And I think, just to take this into a broader

0:15:15.040 --> 0:15:18.840
<v Speaker 4>context here, there's because I think sometimes a bit of

0:15:18.840 --> 0:15:22.080
<v Speaker 4>a challenge, a bit of a mistake in how people

0:15:22.160 --> 0:15:25.800
<v Speaker 4>understand the fourteenth Amendment in this context. And basically, what

0:15:25.840 --> 0:15:28.720
<v Speaker 4>I would say is the fourteenth Amendment is not a verb.

0:15:29.480 --> 0:15:33.000
<v Speaker 4>You can't fourteenth Amendment something. This isn't something that is

0:15:33.080 --> 0:15:36.240
<v Speaker 4>like as as our mutual friend Carlos Muchra says, this

0:15:36.360 --> 0:15:40.440
<v Speaker 4>is not a sword. And so I think sometimes people

0:15:40.480 --> 0:15:43.360
<v Speaker 4>think that you can just like invoke the fourteenth Amendment

0:15:43.520 --> 0:15:47.680
<v Speaker 4>like you're Michael Scott in the office declaring bankruptcy.

0:15:47.840 --> 0:15:53.720
<v Speaker 2>And somebody woke the fourteenth exactly, and that's not really

0:15:53.760 --> 0:15:54.680
<v Speaker 2>how it works.

0:15:54.960 --> 0:15:58.680
<v Speaker 4>What the fourteenth Amendment does is it places a obligation

0:15:58.800 --> 0:16:03.680
<v Speaker 4>a duty the executive branch to avoid default. That places

0:16:03.720 --> 0:16:07.160
<v Speaker 4>a duty on the executive branch to find every lawful

0:16:07.280 --> 0:16:10.760
<v Speaker 4>avenue to avoid a default. And that's where you start

0:16:10.800 --> 0:16:14.320
<v Speaker 4>to get into the different tools that are available at

0:16:14.320 --> 0:16:17.520
<v Speaker 4>the executive branch's discretion. But that's what I would really

0:16:17.760 --> 0:16:19.400
<v Speaker 4>emphasize about the fourteenth Amendment.

0:16:19.520 --> 0:16:23.320
<v Speaker 2>So it's more a frame of mind rather than like

0:16:23.360 --> 0:16:26.560
<v Speaker 2>an actual set of things that you could start doing,

0:16:26.640 --> 0:16:27.360
<v Speaker 2>right like Biden.

0:16:28.200 --> 0:16:32.280
<v Speaker 1>Biden took an oath to protect the constitution. In the

0:16:32.320 --> 0:16:36.200
<v Speaker 1>Constitution is the fourteenth Amendment, And therefore the argument would

0:16:36.240 --> 0:16:38.920
<v Speaker 1>be that in order to sort of uphold his oath

0:16:39.240 --> 0:16:42.040
<v Speaker 1>to defend the Constitution, he has to find a way

0:16:42.440 --> 0:16:45.200
<v Speaker 1>to pay the debt regardless of what the law says.

0:16:45.920 --> 0:16:46.160
<v Speaker 5>SCN.

0:16:46.280 --> 0:16:47.880
<v Speaker 1>I want to go to you because we sort of

0:16:47.880 --> 0:16:51.000
<v Speaker 1>glossed over something important. You and Arna were talking about

0:16:51.000 --> 0:16:55.840
<v Speaker 1>a console bond bond. How if the government is running

0:16:55.920 --> 0:16:58.800
<v Speaker 1>up against the debt ceiling, is there an argument that

0:16:58.840 --> 0:17:01.480
<v Speaker 1>there is a type of bond that would allow the

0:17:01.520 --> 0:17:05.200
<v Speaker 1>government to keep borrowing and not violate that What is

0:17:05.240 --> 0:17:08.560
<v Speaker 1>a console first of all? And why would that not

0:17:08.840 --> 0:17:10.160
<v Speaker 1>violate the debt sealing law?

0:17:10.800 --> 0:17:16.399
<v Speaker 3>So the debt sealing statute is very short, very easy

0:17:16.440 --> 0:17:18.760
<v Speaker 3>to read. You don't have to be a lawyer to

0:17:18.840 --> 0:17:20.720
<v Speaker 3>understand this. I am not a lawyer. I have a

0:17:20.720 --> 0:17:23.879
<v Speaker 3>lot agree so I'm in this sort of in between space.

0:17:24.160 --> 0:17:25.960
<v Speaker 3>But you can read the statute and you can see

0:17:26.280 --> 0:17:30.280
<v Speaker 3>how it is written in terms of face value of

0:17:30.320 --> 0:17:33.160
<v Speaker 3>the bond. Ah And so there are bonds that have

0:17:33.240 --> 0:17:37.440
<v Speaker 3>no face value, specifically perpetual bonds, and you can issue

0:17:37.640 --> 0:17:41.600
<v Speaker 3>perpetual bonds with obviously they existing perpetuity. You can put

0:17:41.640 --> 0:17:43.199
<v Speaker 3>call options on them so that you can take them

0:17:43.200 --> 0:17:47.560
<v Speaker 3>out of circulation later. But these bonds also have precedent

0:17:47.720 --> 0:17:51.600
<v Speaker 3>in US treasury history. You issued them as part of

0:17:51.920 --> 0:17:55.639
<v Speaker 3>financing the Panama Canal. These were things that existed before

0:17:55.760 --> 0:17:59.400
<v Speaker 3>the debt ceiling Statute was passed and general bond authorities

0:17:59.440 --> 0:18:04.000
<v Speaker 3>were passed. So if there are bonds that exist that

0:18:04.040 --> 0:18:08.200
<v Speaker 3>don't have a face without face value, and you can't

0:18:08.200 --> 0:18:11.120
<v Speaker 3>issue them under the bond authority. Again, there's also something

0:18:11.160 --> 0:18:15.240
<v Speaker 3>unique about issuing bonds. There doesn't have to be that's

0:18:15.280 --> 0:18:18.160
<v Speaker 3>for the statute. There doesn't have to be a time

0:18:18.240 --> 0:18:22.000
<v Speaker 3>limitation where principle must be repaid. This is in contrast

0:18:22.040 --> 0:18:24.680
<v Speaker 3>to treasury notes and treasury bills. Again, these are things

0:18:24.680 --> 0:18:27.840
<v Speaker 3>that are pretty plain to see in the statutes. You

0:18:27.920 --> 0:18:32.119
<v Speaker 3>don't have to make exotic interpretations, you don't have to

0:18:32.119 --> 0:18:34.560
<v Speaker 3>make any sort of particularly strained interpretation of the law

0:18:34.720 --> 0:18:37.200
<v Speaker 3>to figure out that these things are possible. These things

0:18:37.200 --> 0:18:40.640
<v Speaker 3>have been done. They were pretty well understood by Congress

0:18:40.640 --> 0:18:45.120
<v Speaker 3>when they passed the debt ceiling. And if this is possible,

0:18:45.240 --> 0:18:48.600
<v Speaker 3>if we all can agree that perpetual bonds are possible,

0:18:49.160 --> 0:18:52.360
<v Speaker 3>then what the implication of fourteenth Amendment, at least under

0:18:52.359 --> 0:18:55.840
<v Speaker 3>certain interpretations. I'm not here to tell you there's only one.

0:18:56.240 --> 0:18:58.520
<v Speaker 3>But if you think that that is a constraint, if

0:18:58.560 --> 0:19:00.800
<v Speaker 3>you think avoiding default is a really important thing for

0:19:00.840 --> 0:19:05.200
<v Speaker 3>both economic and constitutional reasons, you have actually every obligation

0:19:05.240 --> 0:19:07.480
<v Speaker 3>to find a solution to this problem and to try

0:19:07.480 --> 0:19:09.760
<v Speaker 3>and reconcile all of the laws of the United States.

0:19:10.400 --> 0:19:12.760
<v Speaker 3>That's the part that I think is sort of being

0:19:12.800 --> 0:19:15.240
<v Speaker 3>glossed over by the Treasury, which is to say, oh,

0:19:15.280 --> 0:19:18.520
<v Speaker 3>we don't have we have a bad situation where if

0:19:18.920 --> 0:19:22.280
<v Speaker 3>the dead ceiling binds, we have no choices. Therefore we

0:19:22.280 --> 0:19:25.000
<v Speaker 3>may have to talk about the fourteenth Amendment. But it's like, no,

0:19:25.080 --> 0:19:27.760
<v Speaker 3>you do have other options. Some are probably better than others,

0:19:27.920 --> 0:19:30.520
<v Speaker 3>but I will you do have a suite of solutions

0:19:30.520 --> 0:19:33.280
<v Speaker 3>on the table you could consider. One of them could

0:19:33.280 --> 0:19:35.960
<v Speaker 3>be the coin. There are pros and cons to it

0:19:36.080 --> 0:19:38.600
<v Speaker 3>from a legal perspective, but it's not, at least in

0:19:38.680 --> 0:19:42.040
<v Speaker 3>terms of literal interpretation. That's pretty strong. There are console bonds,

0:19:42.080 --> 0:19:44.359
<v Speaker 3>perpetual bonds that are stuff you can just read in

0:19:44.400 --> 0:19:47.199
<v Speaker 3>the I say, the bond authority is the statute right

0:19:47.240 --> 0:19:51.440
<v Speaker 3>after the dead cealing. So you have plenty of room

0:19:51.480 --> 0:19:55.480
<v Speaker 3>to identify alternative solutions. And if you identify alternative solutions,

0:19:55.680 --> 0:19:59.040
<v Speaker 3>I guess simple negotiation theory, simple game theory would say

0:19:59.560 --> 0:20:05.280
<v Speaker 3>that more alternatives, more viable alternatives, strengthens your negotiating position,

0:20:05.359 --> 0:20:08.359
<v Speaker 3>strengthens the likelihood of a clean debt sealing increase. And

0:20:08.520 --> 0:20:10.920
<v Speaker 3>if you play down those alternatives, if you think those

0:20:10.960 --> 0:20:14.040
<v Speaker 3>alternatives are less viable, and you telegraph that to the world,

0:20:14.560 --> 0:20:17.160
<v Speaker 3>that'll actually reduce your bargaining position.

0:20:17.600 --> 0:20:21.400
<v Speaker 1>Tracy, I have a question for you. No, No, it's

0:20:21.400 --> 0:20:25.720
<v Speaker 1>a serious question. It's a serious question. Actually, does the

0:20:25.800 --> 0:20:30.720
<v Speaker 1>idea of issuing perpetual console bonds offend you less than

0:20:30.720 --> 0:20:31.119
<v Speaker 1>the coin?

0:20:31.320 --> 0:20:31.560
<v Speaker 3>Yes?

0:20:31.680 --> 0:20:33.879
<v Speaker 1>Okay, I kind of feeling this is like this is

0:20:34.000 --> 0:20:36.679
<v Speaker 1>me and Tracy. It's like coin consopts, Like both of

0:20:36.680 --> 0:20:39.280
<v Speaker 1>them are like these sort of accounting legal workarounds, and

0:20:39.320 --> 0:20:42.200
<v Speaker 1>they sort of like appeal and disappeal to different parts

0:20:42.200 --> 0:20:42.720
<v Speaker 1>of us.

0:20:43.080 --> 0:20:47.919
<v Speaker 2>I find comfort in using like the traditional language and

0:20:48.000 --> 0:20:52.880
<v Speaker 2>structure of the existing financial system in solving a looming problem,

0:20:53.080 --> 0:20:56.679
<v Speaker 2>rather than trying to do something completely out of the box.

0:20:56.760 --> 0:20:57.800
<v Speaker 2>Let's just put it that way.

0:20:58.200 --> 0:20:58.920
<v Speaker 1>That's a good uh.

0:20:59.000 --> 0:21:01.600
<v Speaker 2>But actually, could I since we're on the topic of

0:21:02.320 --> 0:21:07.320
<v Speaker 2>like more reasonable solutions versus large novelty coins, can I

0:21:07.359 --> 0:21:10.600
<v Speaker 2>ask about like another basic solution that I have seen?

0:21:11.080 --> 0:21:13.280
<v Speaker 2>You know, people talk about a little bit, But couldn't

0:21:13.400 --> 0:21:15.960
<v Speaker 2>couldn't you just have like a vote on the debt

0:21:16.000 --> 0:21:20.280
<v Speaker 2>ceiling and just like maybe create a situation where some

0:21:20.760 --> 0:21:25.080
<v Speaker 2>more moderate Republicans could switch sides and make it happen.

0:21:25.800 --> 0:21:28.119
<v Speaker 3>You can pass the debt ceiling increase. You could. The

0:21:28.240 --> 0:21:30.920
<v Speaker 3>challenge with doing this through Congress when it's center divide

0:21:30.920 --> 0:21:36.359
<v Speaker 3>government is the legislative procedure, where again they're certainly better

0:21:36.440 --> 0:21:41.360
<v Speaker 3>experts and more thoughtful people than myself. But a discharge

0:21:41.400 --> 0:21:44.520
<v Speaker 3>tradition in which you can actually get something through government,

0:21:44.680 --> 0:21:47.560
<v Speaker 3>even while the Speaker of the House very intently wants

0:21:47.640 --> 0:21:50.760
<v Speaker 3>to have the debt ceiling increase be attached to other

0:21:50.800 --> 0:21:55.200
<v Speaker 3>policy itself. That takes a long time. That takes a

0:21:55.240 --> 0:21:56.960
<v Speaker 3>long time, and it's not something that's very easy to

0:21:57.000 --> 0:21:59.440
<v Speaker 3>execute on. And I think these are things that get

0:21:59.440 --> 0:22:01.639
<v Speaker 3>to talk to about a lot in maybe sort of

0:22:02.359 --> 0:22:06.119
<v Speaker 3>more kind of wish casting of like, oh, there will

0:22:06.160 --> 0:22:07.760
<v Speaker 3>be a clean debt's the only increase because there'll be

0:22:07.760 --> 0:22:10.560
<v Speaker 3>a discharge petition that will undercut Kevin McCarthy. And these

0:22:10.600 --> 0:22:13.600
<v Speaker 3>things have always been kind of a hope's wishes, dreams

0:22:13.640 --> 0:22:15.680
<v Speaker 3>as opposed to the realities of how long it takes

0:22:15.680 --> 0:22:18.479
<v Speaker 3>to get some of those things through, and it may

0:22:18.520 --> 0:22:22.440
<v Speaker 3>even take longer than trying to identify alternative lawful solutions

0:22:22.560 --> 0:22:23.720
<v Speaker 3>on the part of Treasury.

0:22:24.280 --> 0:22:28.080
<v Speaker 4>Wow, these process take time. Legislative You know, I worked

0:22:28.080 --> 0:22:29.600
<v Speaker 4>in the Senate, so I don't have a good sense

0:22:29.600 --> 0:22:32.680
<v Speaker 4>of House procedures. But these things take a lot of time,

0:22:32.760 --> 0:22:35.600
<v Speaker 4>and there's a lot of maneuvering that can happen even

0:22:36.440 --> 0:22:39.160
<v Speaker 4>with the discharge petition, And so you know, you're you're

0:22:39.240 --> 0:22:42.399
<v Speaker 4>kind of in that place where if you had tried

0:22:42.400 --> 0:22:44.520
<v Speaker 4>some of that stuff a couple of months ago, maybe

0:22:44.520 --> 0:22:47.840
<v Speaker 4>the urgency wouldn't be there for the moderate Republicans that

0:22:48.040 --> 0:22:51.400
<v Speaker 4>Tracy may mentioned, And so you're always trying to balance

0:22:51.840 --> 0:22:53.720
<v Speaker 4>those issues. And I think it's it's really hard to

0:22:53.760 --> 0:22:55.080
<v Speaker 4>do this stuff legislatively.

0:22:56.359 --> 0:22:59.080
<v Speaker 2>So this is one of those instances where a technocratic

0:22:59.160 --> 0:23:02.359
<v Speaker 2>solution that would be i mean hopefully done fairly quickly,

0:23:02.359 --> 0:23:04.280
<v Speaker 2>it might be the more viable option.

0:23:05.680 --> 0:23:26.160
<v Speaker 6>Yes, yeah, yeah, So I want to actually talk about

0:23:26.200 --> 0:23:28.880
<v Speaker 6>the operational aspect of some of these workarounds.

0:23:28.880 --> 0:23:31.440
<v Speaker 1>So one where you know, the coin and theoretically could

0:23:31.480 --> 0:23:35.159
<v Speaker 1>be minted tomorrow and according to Philip Deal who he

0:23:35.240 --> 0:23:37.840
<v Speaker 1>had on the podcast, it'd be a few days. What

0:23:38.000 --> 0:23:42.960
<v Speaker 1>is you mentioned arna the coding, So it's like, let's

0:23:42.960 --> 0:23:46.040
<v Speaker 1>say Janet Yellen woke up Tomorrow's like, all right, you

0:23:46.040 --> 0:23:48.440
<v Speaker 1>know what, We're going to issue consoles. We're going to

0:23:48.520 --> 0:23:52.680
<v Speaker 1>issue these perpetual bonds because it'll allow us to keep

0:23:52.680 --> 0:23:55.160
<v Speaker 1>borrowing money without adding to the face value of the debt.

0:23:55.520 --> 0:23:59.960
<v Speaker 1>What do we know about the you talked about operational preparedness,

0:24:00.119 --> 0:24:02.440
<v Speaker 1>which the Treasury could have been working on six months ago.

0:24:02.800 --> 0:24:04.359
<v Speaker 1>What do we know about what it would take to

0:24:04.440 --> 0:24:09.080
<v Speaker 1>even like launch console auctions the way we'd have for

0:24:09.119 --> 0:24:11.720
<v Speaker 1>like thirty year and ten year and five year bonds,

0:24:11.760 --> 0:24:12.160
<v Speaker 1>et cetera.

0:24:13.640 --> 0:24:17.200
<v Speaker 4>Yeah, So there's there's a number of things that happen

0:24:17.640 --> 0:24:21.200
<v Speaker 4>when I should clarify this is not my area of expertise.

0:24:21.240 --> 0:24:23.480
<v Speaker 4>I'm kind of just going off with small other smart

0:24:23.480 --> 0:24:25.480
<v Speaker 4>folks have told me so apologies if I get something

0:24:25.560 --> 0:24:30.640
<v Speaker 4>slightly wrong. But basically what it is is when Treasury

0:24:30.680 --> 0:24:33.959
<v Speaker 4>issues and new security, they go through a number of

0:24:34.680 --> 0:24:38.880
<v Speaker 4>tests and a number of calculations, and they test kind

0:24:38.920 --> 0:24:41.880
<v Speaker 4>of how this is going to be priced by the market,

0:24:41.920 --> 0:24:44.919
<v Speaker 4>whether they're actually going to sell. So there's all of

0:24:44.960 --> 0:24:47.440
<v Speaker 4>that prep work first that has to go into it,

0:24:47.520 --> 0:24:52.720
<v Speaker 4>and then there's the coding challenge itself of they've never

0:24:52.840 --> 0:24:56.280
<v Speaker 4>priced a perpetual bond before, at least on their new

0:24:56.480 --> 0:24:58.120
<v Speaker 4>auction system, so I think the.

0:24:58.119 --> 0:24:59.960
<v Speaker 5>Highest they've gone is thirty years.

0:25:00.400 --> 0:25:03.159
<v Speaker 4>Maybe they've done fifty, but they've never really tried to

0:25:03.200 --> 0:25:07.600
<v Speaker 4>price a perpetual bond, and so there's time that once

0:25:07.600 --> 0:25:10.400
<v Speaker 4>you've kind of once you've put that into the coding

0:25:11.040 --> 0:25:14.800
<v Speaker 4>into the computer mechanism, you then also have to go

0:25:14.880 --> 0:25:18.720
<v Speaker 4>through all that analysis and Treasury just doesn't have I

0:25:18.720 --> 0:25:20.800
<v Speaker 4>think the muscle memory. There was a new security that

0:25:20.920 --> 0:25:24.440
<v Speaker 4>was issued sometime during the Obama administration and it took

0:25:24.440 --> 0:25:26.879
<v Speaker 4>about six seven months for it to get off the ground,

0:25:27.560 --> 0:25:29.000
<v Speaker 4>and I don't think.

0:25:28.840 --> 0:25:29.840
<v Speaker 5>You can, you know.

0:25:29.960 --> 0:25:33.679
<v Speaker 4>Unfortunately, I mean we saw this in a different context

0:25:34.520 --> 0:25:39.080
<v Speaker 4>during the COVID recovery, during the pandemic, when they passed

0:25:39.080 --> 0:25:42.200
<v Speaker 4>the Cares Act and had unemployment this great, these great

0:25:42.480 --> 0:25:47.440
<v Speaker 4>additions to unemployment, insurance and state agencies couldn't change their

0:25:47.600 --> 0:25:52.040
<v Speaker 4>Cobel programmed systems to actually give out money in time.

0:25:52.119 --> 0:25:54.399
<v Speaker 4>And so I think there's like, you know, Treasuries I

0:25:54.440 --> 0:25:58.120
<v Speaker 4>think probably better equipped and probably has better software systems,

0:25:58.160 --> 0:26:00.600
<v Speaker 4>but these things still take a lot of time.

0:26:01.160 --> 0:26:03.679
<v Speaker 3>If I could just give a quicker more recent example, obviously,

0:26:03.760 --> 0:26:08.000
<v Speaker 3>the Undersecretary reneution they launched the twenty year bond, right so,

0:26:08.160 --> 0:26:11.200
<v Speaker 3>and that took a long time to sort of plan out. Ideally,

0:26:11.240 --> 0:26:13.920
<v Speaker 3>this is going to be an emergency. And look, I

0:26:14.000 --> 0:26:16.600
<v Speaker 3>think arm is probably selling some of his knowledge a

0:26:16.640 --> 0:26:18.960
<v Speaker 3>little short in terms of we've talked to a few

0:26:18.960 --> 0:26:22.000
<v Speaker 3>people who've worked into Treasury and gave us some insight

0:26:22.040 --> 0:26:25.240
<v Speaker 3>into the time it takes to execute this. It's not

0:26:25.280 --> 0:26:27.840
<v Speaker 3>it would not be easy to do it super quickly,

0:26:28.000 --> 0:26:30.760
<v Speaker 3>but it certainly would be. It could still be done

0:26:30.800 --> 0:26:33.199
<v Speaker 3>if you give it enough time. The question really is,

0:26:33.359 --> 0:26:35.280
<v Speaker 3>is the treasure you've been thinking and working about on

0:26:35.320 --> 0:26:38.919
<v Speaker 3>this in the background. Is there something that's like they've

0:26:38.920 --> 0:26:42.359
<v Speaker 3>been trying to keep their cards closer to the vest.

0:26:43.080 --> 0:26:46.879
<v Speaker 3>They're trying to indicate that they're not looking at alternatives,

0:26:46.880 --> 0:26:49.040
<v Speaker 3>but they really are. I don't know why they would

0:26:49.480 --> 0:26:52.400
<v Speaker 3>trash alternatives while still working on them, but it's possible

0:26:52.440 --> 0:26:54.840
<v Speaker 3>they are, And if they are, that would be good

0:26:54.840 --> 0:26:57.720
<v Speaker 3>to know because that would obviously create the kind of

0:26:57.760 --> 0:27:00.159
<v Speaker 3>pathway to avoid default and avoid a lot of the

0:27:00.359 --> 0:27:02.560
<v Speaker 3>chaos that's tied to the debt ceiling itself.

0:27:02.720 --> 0:27:06.240
<v Speaker 4>There's no opportunity like a crisis, and I think there's

0:27:06.320 --> 0:27:10.040
<v Speaker 4>obviously this process that they go through with issuing these bonds.

0:27:10.440 --> 0:27:13.000
<v Speaker 4>But I hope that someone at Treasury is thinking, Okay,

0:27:13.200 --> 0:27:15.400
<v Speaker 4>let's say we can't do it through our existing process.

0:27:15.400 --> 0:27:17.840
<v Speaker 4>We can't do it like that twenty year issuance that

0:27:17.920 --> 0:27:19.160
<v Speaker 4>Secretary Mnuchin did.

0:27:19.440 --> 0:27:20.320
<v Speaker 5>Is there another way?

0:27:20.800 --> 0:27:24.320
<v Speaker 4>Is there some you know, we obviously we did bond

0:27:24.400 --> 0:27:28.080
<v Speaker 4>issuances and new bond issuances before all the software is created.

0:27:28.200 --> 0:27:29.720
<v Speaker 5>So can I hope that.

0:27:29.760 --> 0:27:32.280
<v Speaker 4>Someone there is going through and trying to find an

0:27:32.320 --> 0:27:35.760
<v Speaker 4>avenue to do this quickly if possible. But that also

0:27:35.800 --> 0:27:37.359
<v Speaker 4>doesn't take away from the fact that they should have

0:27:37.359 --> 0:27:41.080
<v Speaker 4>been doing the operational readiness exercises six months ago.

0:27:42.000 --> 0:27:45.720
<v Speaker 2>Is there any indication why they wouldn't have done that? Is,

0:27:45.960 --> 0:27:48.359
<v Speaker 2>do we just think they sort of dropped the ball

0:27:48.400 --> 0:27:50.920
<v Speaker 2>and thought that this issue would be resolved, even though

0:27:50.920 --> 0:27:53.240
<v Speaker 2>there's quite a lot of evidence out there that there

0:27:53.320 --> 0:27:56.520
<v Speaker 2>is a sort of more extremist element of the Republican

0:27:56.640 --> 0:27:59.679
<v Speaker 2>Party who is maybe willing more willing to take this

0:27:59.720 --> 0:28:00.440
<v Speaker 2>down to the wire.

0:28:01.720 --> 0:28:01.800
<v Speaker 5>No.

0:28:01.920 --> 0:28:05.080
<v Speaker 4>Look, I think I mean, I tend to give I

0:28:05.119 --> 0:28:07.040
<v Speaker 4>think it's good to give a lot of these people

0:28:07.040 --> 0:28:07.960
<v Speaker 4>the benefit of the doubt.

0:28:07.960 --> 0:28:09.120
<v Speaker 5>They're good faith actors.

0:28:09.200 --> 0:28:11.919
<v Speaker 4>I think that what they would probably tell you is

0:28:11.960 --> 0:28:16.440
<v Speaker 4>that if we take these steps, people are going to notice,

0:28:16.680 --> 0:28:20.280
<v Speaker 4>and then it's going to become oh, you're doing an

0:28:20.280 --> 0:28:22.960
<v Speaker 4>operational test for the coin, Biden is thinking about minting

0:28:22.960 --> 0:28:26.160
<v Speaker 4>the core, and it becomes a story, and I think

0:28:26.200 --> 0:28:29.439
<v Speaker 4>they view some risk in that. To me, that just

0:28:29.480 --> 0:28:31.960
<v Speaker 4>comes down to a different risk calculation. I think that

0:28:31.960 --> 0:28:35.560
<v Speaker 4>that would be a if there is risk to those

0:28:35.560 --> 0:28:38.080
<v Speaker 4>stories coming out, I think that's a risk worth taking.

0:28:38.720 --> 0:28:42.480
<v Speaker 4>And I think, if any if it also would strengthen

0:28:42.480 --> 0:28:46.160
<v Speaker 4>your hand in negotiation. In negotiations, knowing that you're taking

0:28:46.160 --> 0:28:48.520
<v Speaker 4>the steps to do this, and if Congress wants to

0:28:48.520 --> 0:28:50.960
<v Speaker 4>take away that authority, they can go ahead and do it.

0:28:51.560 --> 0:28:53.719
<v Speaker 4>But until then, we're going to make sure we have

0:28:54.480 --> 0:28:57.479
<v Speaker 4>the operational readiness to do what we need to do.

0:28:58.280 --> 0:29:00.800
<v Speaker 2>I would just like to say that Treasury has an

0:29:00.840 --> 0:29:03.800
<v Speaker 2>open invitation to come on this show and reveal that

0:29:03.800 --> 0:29:06.680
<v Speaker 2>they have in fact been working on either premium bonds

0:29:06.840 --> 0:29:08.719
<v Speaker 2>or the coin. Just throwing that out there.

0:29:08.760 --> 0:29:11.480
<v Speaker 1>That's the invite. Twenty four to seven. You want to

0:29:11.520 --> 0:29:13.720
<v Speaker 1>schedule something, get two and in the morning we'll wake

0:29:13.800 --> 0:29:16.440
<v Speaker 1>Kerman up and say, hey, we're talking to the Treasury

0:29:16.760 --> 0:29:19.760
<v Speaker 1>about consoles and the coin. We're recording in fifteen minutes,

0:29:19.840 --> 0:29:23.160
<v Speaker 1>let's do it. I want to talk about one more

0:29:23.240 --> 0:29:26.680
<v Speaker 1>option that we haven't talked about, and I think there's

0:29:26.720 --> 0:29:29.560
<v Speaker 1>two dimensions to it, which is the idea of we

0:29:29.680 --> 0:29:33.920
<v Speaker 1>hit the debt ceiling and then the Treasury theoretically prioritizes

0:29:34.040 --> 0:29:38.000
<v Speaker 1>interest payments and so it preserves the incoming revenue from

0:29:38.040 --> 0:29:41.920
<v Speaker 1>taxation so that it can meet its constitutional obligations to

0:29:42.000 --> 0:29:44.200
<v Speaker 1>honor the debt. And I feel like there's two dimensions

0:29:44.240 --> 0:29:48.080
<v Speaker 1>to this question. Maybe is this possible software wise? Do

0:29:48.160 --> 0:29:51.480
<v Speaker 1>we know if the Treasury has the software capabilities to

0:29:51.520 --> 0:29:55.680
<v Speaker 1>set aside certain payments as going ahead while other payments

0:29:55.680 --> 0:30:00.120
<v Speaker 1>don't go through. And then b is that legal in

0:30:00.120 --> 0:30:03.480
<v Speaker 1>the sense that can the executive branch just decide, Hey,

0:30:03.520 --> 0:30:05.200
<v Speaker 1>these are the payments we're not going to make, even

0:30:05.200 --> 0:30:07.800
<v Speaker 1>though the Congress is authorized X and Y, welfare and

0:30:07.880 --> 0:30:10.640
<v Speaker 1>defense and all this stuff, We're just gonna not make them.

0:30:10.640 --> 0:30:13.400
<v Speaker 1>Can we talk about both the software and legal prioritization.

0:30:13.920 --> 0:30:16.720
<v Speaker 3>I'll leave the legal aspect of this question to aren't.

0:30:16.800 --> 0:30:19.000
<v Speaker 3>But at least terms of feasibility, there was a lot

0:30:19.000 --> 0:30:23.479
<v Speaker 3>of reporting about Secretary Geithner taking the steps to make

0:30:23.520 --> 0:30:27.280
<v Speaker 3>sure that prioritization became a possibility of feasibility. So I

0:30:27.280 --> 0:30:30.040
<v Speaker 3>think at least there was reporting that effect either.

0:30:29.920 --> 0:30:32.880
<v Speaker 1>From a software perspective, at least it could theoretically be.

0:30:32.880 --> 0:30:36.000
<v Speaker 3>Done that this kind of prioritization would become more feasible.

0:30:36.280 --> 0:30:40.880
<v Speaker 3>I would be curious at the standpoint of the law,

0:30:40.960 --> 0:30:42.440
<v Speaker 3>what artifs take is here?

0:30:42.760 --> 0:30:45.880
<v Speaker 5>Yeah, so I do not believe that would be lawful.

0:30:46.520 --> 0:30:50.280
<v Speaker 4>This is basically I think there's the Fourteenth Amendment constitutional

0:30:50.360 --> 0:30:53.280
<v Speaker 4>challenges that you run into that we've already talked about.

0:30:53.320 --> 0:30:55.240
<v Speaker 5>But then there's this separation.

0:30:54.840 --> 0:30:58.440
<v Speaker 4>Of powers issue that you would run into with prioritization,

0:30:59.320 --> 0:31:01.360
<v Speaker 4>and i'll I can go a bit more into detail

0:31:01.360 --> 0:31:06.080
<v Speaker 4>on that, which is, the executive branch does not have

0:31:06.160 --> 0:31:11.640
<v Speaker 4>the authority to prioritize mandatory payments. So there's different you know,

0:31:11.680 --> 0:31:14.560
<v Speaker 4>the government, the federal government spends trillions of dollars on

0:31:14.720 --> 0:31:17.320
<v Speaker 4>a number of different things. Some of that spending is

0:31:17.320 --> 0:31:21.600
<v Speaker 4>discretionary and some of it is mandatory. And mandatory spending

0:31:21.680 --> 0:31:27.400
<v Speaker 4>includes things like Social Security, Medicare, certain veterans programs, certain

0:31:27.440 --> 0:31:29.320
<v Speaker 4>student loan programs.

0:31:29.080 --> 0:31:30.719
<v Speaker 5>And a couple of other small things.

0:31:30.960 --> 0:31:35.560
<v Speaker 4>And regardless of who is in power, what the president's

0:31:35.600 --> 0:31:40.160
<v Speaker 4>ideological persuasions are, even if we're in government shutdown, those

0:31:40.200 --> 0:31:43.720
<v Speaker 4>payments continue to be made because their Congress has simply

0:31:43.720 --> 0:31:47.600
<v Speaker 4>given no discretion to the president to do so. Congress,

0:31:47.720 --> 0:31:53.640
<v Speaker 4>in the Constitution, is afforded the authority to control the strings.

0:31:53.720 --> 0:31:57.040
<v Speaker 4>And so what you would end up in here is

0:31:57.160 --> 0:32:00.480
<v Speaker 4>you would end up in the situation where let's say

0:32:01.560 --> 0:32:05.760
<v Speaker 4>the President decides we're going to stop making certain student

0:32:05.840 --> 0:32:11.720
<v Speaker 4>loan payments and not to keep making interest payments. That

0:32:12.160 --> 0:32:14.520
<v Speaker 4>act in of itself the first time that that payment

0:32:14.600 --> 0:32:16.280
<v Speaker 4>is not made or the first time that a Social

0:32:16.280 --> 0:32:21.680
<v Speaker 4>Security payment is not made for a political decision is

0:32:21.720 --> 0:32:26.240
<v Speaker 4>a constitutional crisis. Congress is not allowed to delegate that

0:32:26.320 --> 0:32:31.080
<v Speaker 4>authority to the president, and they where they do delegate

0:32:31.320 --> 0:32:35.720
<v Speaker 4>spending discretion, they have to provide what's called an intelligible

0:32:35.760 --> 0:32:39.080
<v Speaker 4>principle to guide the president's decision making, and they haven't

0:32:39.120 --> 0:32:43.320
<v Speaker 4>done that here. The debt limit Statute has nothing to

0:32:43.400 --> 0:32:46.840
<v Speaker 4>say about if we run into the limit, what.

0:32:46.720 --> 0:32:49.360
<v Speaker 5>Payments should be prioritized or what shouldn't.

0:32:49.480 --> 0:32:53.320
<v Speaker 4>And if Congress were to do that, maybe this would

0:32:53.320 --> 0:32:57.360
<v Speaker 4>be a constitutional law. But until they do that, they

0:32:57.360 --> 0:33:03.120
<v Speaker 4>can't delegate that to the president. Congress can't advocate that authority.

0:33:03.240 --> 0:33:04.720
<v Speaker 3>If I can just like add on to that part,

0:33:04.760 --> 0:33:07.480
<v Speaker 3>it's let's think about it. If any president, whether it's

0:33:07.520 --> 0:33:11.000
<v Speaker 3>Biden or Trump or Bush or Obama, that they have

0:33:11.080 --> 0:33:14.680
<v Speaker 3>to prioritize payments, some will have different ecological persuasions about

0:33:14.720 --> 0:33:16.960
<v Speaker 3>what's important to keep spending on and what's important what's

0:33:16.960 --> 0:33:19.080
<v Speaker 3>worth cutting. Let's say there's a president that wanted to

0:33:19.080 --> 0:33:22.920
<v Speaker 3>cut the entire Department of Defense until uh, the deat

0:33:22.920 --> 0:33:25.000
<v Speaker 3>ceiling was lifted. Like that's a lot of discretion.

0:33:25.320 --> 0:33:27.960
<v Speaker 1>Someone listeners somewhere.

0:33:28.720 --> 0:33:30.960
<v Speaker 3>I'm sure I go with the program that would scare

0:33:31.000 --> 0:33:37.400
<v Speaker 3>every single listener here, And that discretion scares this almost

0:33:37.440 --> 0:33:40.640
<v Speaker 3>surely uh scare of the Supreme Court. It would scare

0:33:40.680 --> 0:33:42.400
<v Speaker 3>a lot of legal scholars with a lot of different

0:33:42.440 --> 0:33:46.160
<v Speaker 3>persuasions about the notion that there's so much unchecked power

0:33:46.160 --> 0:33:50.120
<v Speaker 3>and discretion that would arise from the situation. And I

0:33:50.120 --> 0:33:53.680
<v Speaker 3>think that's like actually something worth reckoning with. When people say, oh,

0:33:53.720 --> 0:33:57.239
<v Speaker 3>we'll just like prioritize payments and keep like making sure

0:33:57.280 --> 0:33:59.280
<v Speaker 3>we pay bondholders, like this is not actually a very

0:33:59.800 --> 0:34:03.320
<v Speaker 3>lead goal solution either, And.

0:34:03.360 --> 0:34:05.000
<v Speaker 5>It would set a really poor precedent.

0:34:05.840 --> 0:34:09.440
<v Speaker 4>Right if if the dead ceiling allows the president to

0:34:10.480 --> 0:34:14.719
<v Speaker 4>limit certain types of mandatory spending, what other situations do.

0:34:15.360 --> 0:34:18.040
<v Speaker 4>Where is that extraordinary power coming from? And could a

0:34:18.120 --> 0:34:21.040
<v Speaker 4>future president abuse it? I think that's like a real

0:34:21.160 --> 0:34:24.440
<v Speaker 4>real constitutional problem that not enough folks are wrestling with.

0:34:24.719 --> 0:34:24.879
<v Speaker 5>Right.

0:34:24.920 --> 0:34:27.680
<v Speaker 1>I guess the situation that arises is what if a

0:34:27.719 --> 0:34:31.680
<v Speaker 1>president one could imagine, let's just say a future Republican

0:34:31.760 --> 0:34:36.239
<v Speaker 1>president and Democratic House, the House votes to raise the

0:34:36.239 --> 0:34:40.200
<v Speaker 1>dead ceiling, the president doesn't agree to the dead ceiling hike,

0:34:40.239 --> 0:34:41.279
<v Speaker 1>and just to say do you know what I'm going

0:34:41.360 --> 0:34:43.799
<v Speaker 1>to prioritize instead? Because the dead ceiling has been hit.

0:34:44.080 --> 0:34:47.440
<v Speaker 1>So I guess there's all kinds of permutations there where

0:34:47.480 --> 0:34:49.759
<v Speaker 1>if you sort of like give the executive branch that

0:34:49.840 --> 0:34:53.080
<v Speaker 1>discretion to prioritize, who knows where you go anyway, Tracy

0:34:53.120 --> 0:34:54.759
<v Speaker 1>say no, I was going to say.

0:34:55.040 --> 0:34:57.560
<v Speaker 2>That makes a lot of sense to me, and has

0:34:57.640 --> 0:35:00.840
<v Speaker 2>been also, ironically one of my criticism of the trillion

0:35:00.880 --> 0:35:03.360
<v Speaker 2>dollar coin, which is like, Okay, maybe you agree with

0:35:03.480 --> 0:35:06.239
<v Speaker 2>using it in this one instance, but what happens in

0:35:06.280 --> 0:35:08.920
<v Speaker 2>the next presidency. Maybe it's someone you don't agree with

0:35:09.000 --> 0:35:12.440
<v Speaker 2>and they decide to use it to fund something outrageous.

0:35:12.480 --> 0:35:12.840
<v Speaker 3>I don't know.

0:35:12.920 --> 0:35:17.000
<v Speaker 2>But anyway, getting back to the current situation, what's your

0:35:17.080 --> 0:35:19.600
<v Speaker 2>base case for how this plays out? I know I

0:35:19.680 --> 0:35:21.640
<v Speaker 2>joked in the intro that you know, we've kind of

0:35:21.640 --> 0:35:24.120
<v Speaker 2>been here before, we've seen it all before, but there

0:35:24.120 --> 0:35:26.879
<v Speaker 2>are some elements that are different this time. So where

0:35:26.880 --> 0:35:27.959
<v Speaker 2>do you think we go from here?

0:35:29.400 --> 0:35:33.200
<v Speaker 3>It seems like the direction of travel is towards what

0:35:33.360 --> 0:35:36.279
<v Speaker 3>Republicans are seeking and what they can get away with

0:35:36.360 --> 0:35:39.319
<v Speaker 3>from at least some faction of centrist Democrats I would

0:35:39.360 --> 0:35:42.080
<v Speaker 3>call it. So It probably will be a some kind

0:35:42.120 --> 0:35:44.560
<v Speaker 3>of bipartisan increase in the debt ceiling and some kind

0:35:44.600 --> 0:35:48.560
<v Speaker 3>of government spending deal that will involve spending caps and

0:35:48.640 --> 0:35:50.480
<v Speaker 3>cuts of a few different kinds. There will be some

0:35:50.520 --> 0:35:53.520
<v Speaker 3>debate about how much composition that should shift towards non

0:35:53.560 --> 0:35:56.040
<v Speaker 3>defense over defense. I think it's going to be an

0:35:56.040 --> 0:35:58.479
<v Speaker 3>open question about how much work requirements sort of see

0:35:58.560 --> 0:36:00.879
<v Speaker 3>their find their way in to this type of deal.

0:36:01.160 --> 0:36:03.479
<v Speaker 3>But that's something that's been talked about. The one place

0:36:03.520 --> 0:36:08.920
<v Speaker 3>of bipartisan interest that may actually serve some administrator in

0:36:08.960 --> 0:36:11.600
<v Speaker 3>some of the interests of the administration or on permitting reform,

0:36:12.200 --> 0:36:14.520
<v Speaker 3>but that actually will take time to kind of craft

0:36:15.000 --> 0:36:17.879
<v Speaker 3>well and craft correctly, and I'm not sure that can

0:36:17.920 --> 0:36:20.359
<v Speaker 3>be done so quickly on a dime, even though there

0:36:20.400 --> 0:36:23.640
<v Speaker 3>is actually a lot of mutual interest across party lines there.

0:36:24.040 --> 0:36:26.160
<v Speaker 3>That's something that's been talked about. I wouldn't want to

0:36:26.480 --> 0:36:28.120
<v Speaker 3>hype that up too much in terms of this deal,

0:36:28.160 --> 0:36:30.560
<v Speaker 3>even though it seems like it's a point of mutual

0:36:30.920 --> 0:36:34.080
<v Speaker 3>agreement that could possibly come about. But those are the

0:36:34.120 --> 0:36:36.840
<v Speaker 3>kinds of things that we're hearing, and it does seem

0:36:36.880 --> 0:36:39.200
<v Speaker 3>to me that for all to talk about clean debt

0:36:39.160 --> 0:36:42.000
<v Speaker 3>ceiling increase, We're going to get a dirty debt ceiling increase,

0:36:42.360 --> 0:36:47.760
<v Speaker 3>and the incentives to do more ransom taking hostage taking

0:36:48.880 --> 0:36:51.959
<v Speaker 3>are going to increase. This worked, That's what it seems

0:36:52.000 --> 0:36:52.279
<v Speaker 3>like to me.

0:36:52.640 --> 0:36:56.319
<v Speaker 4>One thing I am not certain about a lot of

0:36:56.360 --> 0:36:58.600
<v Speaker 4>things in this environment. One thing I am certain about

0:36:58.760 --> 0:37:01.920
<v Speaker 4>is that whatever happens, it's not going to change the

0:37:02.040 --> 0:37:06.040
<v Speaker 4>long term budgetary trajectory of the federal government. And I

0:37:06.040 --> 0:37:09.560
<v Speaker 4>think that's something really worth emphasizing because the debt ceiling.

0:37:09.719 --> 0:37:11.120
<v Speaker 4>You know, a lot of people say the coin is

0:37:11.120 --> 0:37:13.400
<v Speaker 4>a gimmick, or consoles are a gimmick.

0:37:13.760 --> 0:37:15.320
<v Speaker 5>The debt ceiling is the real gimmick.

0:37:15.840 --> 0:37:21.440
<v Speaker 4>It allows people to feign seriousness about the debt picture

0:37:21.719 --> 0:37:25.960
<v Speaker 4>of the United States without actually doing anything to make

0:37:25.960 --> 0:37:26.520
<v Speaker 4>a difference.

0:37:26.840 --> 0:37:30.520
<v Speaker 5>Work requirements on welfare programs are not going to change

0:37:30.520 --> 0:37:34.279
<v Speaker 5>the budget picture. This is really something that is not

0:37:34.520 --> 0:37:35.399
<v Speaker 5>a serious thing.

0:37:35.680 --> 0:37:39.160
<v Speaker 4>No other country has it, and it won't impact the

0:37:39.239 --> 0:37:40.200
<v Speaker 4>debt picture at all.

0:37:40.360 --> 0:37:42.400
<v Speaker 5>And I think if you believe I'm.

0:37:42.280 --> 0:37:43.960
<v Speaker 4>Not one of the people who believes we're on an

0:37:44.040 --> 0:37:49.359
<v Speaker 4>unsustainable debt path, but if you believe that, then what's

0:37:49.440 --> 0:37:51.720
<v Speaker 4>going to come out of this is probably not something

0:37:51.719 --> 0:37:54.200
<v Speaker 4>that is actually going to seriously address your concerns.

0:37:54.440 --> 0:37:57.120
<v Speaker 1>Arnabn Sconda, thank you so much for coming on.

0:37:57.040 --> 0:37:59.120
<v Speaker 5>Oddlins, Thanks for having me, Thanks for having me.

0:38:15.040 --> 0:38:18.280
<v Speaker 1>Tracy, I thought that was I liked your line about

0:38:18.520 --> 0:38:22.319
<v Speaker 1>the Constitution. Sorry, the fourteenth Amendment is more like, rather

0:38:22.360 --> 0:38:25.640
<v Speaker 1>than a tool, is a frame of mind like the Obligator.

0:38:25.680 --> 0:38:27.120
<v Speaker 1>The frame of mind to that would.

0:38:26.960 --> 0:38:28.800
<v Speaker 2>Make a good T shirt. Don't you think the fourteenth

0:38:28.840 --> 0:38:31.800
<v Speaker 2>Amendment is a frame of mind?

0:38:32.040 --> 0:38:35.200
<v Speaker 1>Like like there's like teristy T shirts like the Bahamas.

0:38:35.239 --> 0:38:37.200
<v Speaker 1>It's a frame of mind. I love that.

0:38:37.600 --> 0:38:39.719
<v Speaker 2>I'm gonna I'm gonna make it. Yeah, No, but I

0:38:40.040 --> 0:38:43.200
<v Speaker 2>actually really agree. Well, two things stood out for me there.

0:38:43.239 --> 0:38:47.759
<v Speaker 2>So One the point about like you would expect the

0:38:47.800 --> 0:38:51.160
<v Speaker 2>business base of the Republican Party to maybe make more

0:38:51.280 --> 0:38:55.040
<v Speaker 2>noise about this issue and force their hand at some point.

0:38:55.080 --> 0:38:57.520
<v Speaker 2>That doesn't seem to have happened this time around. That's

0:38:57.600 --> 0:38:59.959
<v Speaker 2>kind of interesting. Where is everyone? Why is in everyone

0:39:00.040 --> 0:39:03.880
<v Speaker 2>on issuing you know, big warnings about this. I know

0:39:03.920 --> 0:39:06.959
<v Speaker 2>some people are, but there could be more. Maybe we're

0:39:07.000 --> 0:39:09.440
<v Speaker 2>just so used to it at this point it's hard

0:39:09.520 --> 0:39:12.480
<v Speaker 2>to get worked up about it. And then secondly, Arnub's

0:39:12.520 --> 0:39:16.799
<v Speaker 2>last point about the debt ceiling kind of has never

0:39:16.920 --> 0:39:19.920
<v Speaker 2>mattered that much, Like it just gets raised and raised

0:39:19.960 --> 0:39:23.600
<v Speaker 2>and raised, and the public debt continues building and not

0:39:23.719 --> 0:39:26.839
<v Speaker 2>to go full on MMT, but you know that can

0:39:26.880 --> 0:39:30.320
<v Speaker 2>become a problem at certain points with inflation, but not always.

0:39:31.440 --> 0:39:34.799
<v Speaker 2>And so I would my personal preference would be for

0:39:34.880 --> 0:39:38.400
<v Speaker 2>the debt ceiling to remain as meaningless as it has

0:39:38.480 --> 0:39:40.759
<v Speaker 2>throughout all of history and for us to not even

0:39:40.800 --> 0:39:43.640
<v Speaker 2>be recording this episode as interesting as it has been.

0:39:44.680 --> 0:39:46.840
<v Speaker 1>Uh, do you regret during the episode or do you

0:39:46.880 --> 0:39:48.160
<v Speaker 1>just want to do you want to live in a

0:39:48.200 --> 0:39:49.319
<v Speaker 1>future in which we never have.

0:39:49.280 --> 0:39:49.719
<v Speaker 5>To do it again.

0:39:49.880 --> 0:39:52.160
<v Speaker 2>I want to live in a world where we don't

0:39:52.280 --> 0:39:55.279
<v Speaker 2>have to talk about this at all, because you know,

0:39:55.560 --> 0:39:58.920
<v Speaker 2>it happens automatically. You know, maybe well we.

0:39:58.960 --> 0:40:02.120
<v Speaker 1>Did it, did you know? For years? So this was

0:40:02.280 --> 0:40:05.080
<v Speaker 1>so I think like at one point and we you know,

0:40:05.080 --> 0:40:06.920
<v Speaker 1>there's a lot of history. I think like throughout much

0:40:06.920 --> 0:40:09.839
<v Speaker 1>of the eighties, Congress had a rule which is when

0:40:09.880 --> 0:40:11.839
<v Speaker 1>they approved a new budget, I think it was called

0:40:12.200 --> 0:40:14.480
<v Speaker 1>the gap heart rule, which is when they approved a

0:40:14.480 --> 0:40:17.719
<v Speaker 1>new budget, they just increased the dead ceiling automatically, which

0:40:17.760 --> 0:40:19.360
<v Speaker 1>is what obviously what they should do. And then I

0:40:19.360 --> 0:40:22.360
<v Speaker 1>think nude Ingridge ended that. But it is really silly

0:40:22.400 --> 0:40:24.360
<v Speaker 1>that you know we're not going to That's the thing like,

0:40:24.440 --> 0:40:27.960
<v Speaker 1>because I think it was Tisconda's last point, because there

0:40:28.040 --> 0:40:31.280
<v Speaker 1>is most likely going to be a quote dirty increase.

0:40:31.800 --> 0:40:35.720
<v Speaker 1>The message to future congresses is this is your chance

0:40:35.800 --> 0:40:38.880
<v Speaker 1>to extract the concession right, and so we're going to

0:40:38.920 --> 0:40:40.680
<v Speaker 1>have to do more in twenty twenty five.

0:40:40.840 --> 0:40:44.080
<v Speaker 2>Every time this happens, the less attention is going to

0:40:44.120 --> 0:40:45.920
<v Speaker 2>be paid to it, because it's sort of like a

0:40:45.960 --> 0:40:48.360
<v Speaker 2>Boy who Cried Wolf kind of thing where everyone just

0:40:48.360 --> 0:40:49.560
<v Speaker 2>becomes very a nerd to it.

0:40:49.600 --> 0:40:51.640
<v Speaker 1>And then what happened with the boy who cried Wolf?

0:40:52.120 --> 0:40:54.640
<v Speaker 1>I can't remember, No, I think it was, and then

0:40:54.680 --> 0:40:57.279
<v Speaker 1>eventually something bad happened. I think, yeah, I just think

0:40:57.320 --> 0:40:59.000
<v Speaker 1>that's why we tell That's why we tell our kids

0:40:59.040 --> 0:40:59.440
<v Speaker 1>this story.

0:40:59.560 --> 0:41:01.560
<v Speaker 2>I just want to clarify though I do not regret

0:41:01.880 --> 0:41:03.560
<v Speaker 2>recording this episode.

0:41:03.640 --> 0:41:04.040
<v Speaker 5>I do.

0:41:04.239 --> 0:41:07.960
<v Speaker 2>I really resent having to look up section four of

0:41:08.000 --> 0:41:11.319
<v Speaker 2>the fourteenth Amendment and learn about it on what is,

0:41:11.360 --> 0:41:14.440
<v Speaker 2>you know, ostensibly a finance and economics and markets podcast.

0:41:14.600 --> 0:41:16.799
<v Speaker 1>You know what I thought is really interesting too. People

0:41:16.960 --> 0:41:19.440
<v Speaker 1>say like, oh, just invoke the fourteenth Amendment. And I

0:41:19.520 --> 0:41:23.480
<v Speaker 1>really appreciated arno argument about why that really is inherently

0:41:23.520 --> 0:41:25.799
<v Speaker 1>problematic that no matter who it is, no matter what

0:41:25.840 --> 0:41:28.960
<v Speaker 1>the president, what you're basically saying is, let's create a

0:41:29.000 --> 0:41:31.880
<v Speaker 1>condition in which the president can start picking and choosing

0:41:32.400 --> 0:41:35.360
<v Speaker 1>which appropriations to make. So you might have one president

0:41:35.440 --> 0:41:38.080
<v Speaker 1>who is like a big pacifist piece, and they say, Okay,

0:41:38.520 --> 0:41:40.759
<v Speaker 1>the Defense Department doesn't get any money, and then another

0:41:40.800 --> 0:41:43.600
<v Speaker 1>one say okay, the EPA and Social Security and Medicaid

0:41:43.680 --> 0:41:46.760
<v Speaker 1>recipients don't get any money. If you think it through

0:41:46.880 --> 0:41:49.799
<v Speaker 1>what prioritization entails, it is pretty problematic.

0:41:49.960 --> 0:41:53.120
<v Speaker 2>I thought that was a really interesting and important point

0:41:53.160 --> 0:41:55.800
<v Speaker 2>because you do see a lot of people talking about, oh,

0:41:55.840 --> 0:41:57.880
<v Speaker 2>this might not be such a big tale because they

0:41:57.880 --> 0:42:01.120
<v Speaker 2>can just prioritize payments. But actually that opens up a

0:42:01.120 --> 0:42:04.120
<v Speaker 2>whole other count of wars and a potential, i guess,

0:42:04.120 --> 0:42:09.320
<v Speaker 2>overturning of political and social norms. So interesting stuff all round.

0:42:09.440 --> 0:42:10.240
<v Speaker 1>We'll see what happens.

0:42:10.280 --> 0:42:11.000
<v Speaker 2>Shall we leave it there?

0:42:11.120 --> 0:42:11.839
<v Speaker 1>Let's leave it there.

0:42:12.120 --> 0:42:14.960
<v Speaker 2>This has been another episode of the All Thoughts podcast.

0:42:15.040 --> 0:42:17.680
<v Speaker 2>I'm Tracy Alloway. You can follow me on Twitter at

0:42:17.680 --> 0:42:18.440
<v Speaker 2>Tracy alloway.

0:42:18.520 --> 0:42:21.120
<v Speaker 1>Oh I meant to say, cobol came up again. Oh yeah,

0:42:21.200 --> 0:42:22.600
<v Speaker 1>it's always, It's always coming back.

0:42:22.920 --> 0:42:23.920
<v Speaker 2>You can't escape Coball.

0:42:24.400 --> 0:42:27.000
<v Speaker 1>I'm Jill wisanth All. You can follow me on Twitter

0:42:27.120 --> 0:42:31.200
<v Speaker 1>at The Stalwart, follow Scanda at Irving Swisher, and follow

0:42:31.320 --> 0:42:34.960
<v Speaker 1>Arnab at Arnab Data three two one. Follow our producer

0:42:35.040 --> 0:42:39.600
<v Speaker 1>Carman Rodriguez at Carmen Arman and dash Old Bennett at Dashbot.

0:42:40.200 --> 0:42:44.120
<v Speaker 1>Follow all of the Bloomberg podcasts under the handle at podcasts,

0:42:44.200 --> 0:42:46.560
<v Speaker 1>and for more odd Lots content, go to Bloomberg dot

0:42:46.600 --> 0:42:49.759
<v Speaker 1>com slash odd Lots, where we post transcripts. We have

0:42:49.800 --> 0:42:52.360
<v Speaker 1>a blog and a newsletter that comes out every Friday.

0:42:52.520 --> 0:42:56.760
<v Speaker 1>And check out our discord discord dot gg slash odd logs,

0:42:57.040 --> 0:42:59.480
<v Speaker 1>where listeners are talking about all these topics. Twenty four

0:42:59.480 --> 0:43:02.040
<v Speaker 1>seven thirty been tons of debt ceiling talk. So if

0:43:02.040 --> 0:43:03.640
<v Speaker 1>you want to wake up at two in the morning

0:43:03.680 --> 0:43:07.120
<v Speaker 1>and talk debt ceiling, there's almost certainly in there someone

0:43:07.160 --> 0:43:10.120
<v Speaker 1>who will talk about the intricacies of the fourteenth Amendment

0:43:10.480 --> 0:43:13.120
<v Speaker 1>and Section three one two one K and the coin

0:43:13.160 --> 0:43:14.799
<v Speaker 1>and all there. Go there and check it out. It's

0:43:14.840 --> 0:43:17.160
<v Speaker 1>really fun. I hang out in there a lot thanks

0:43:17.160 --> 0:43:38.600
<v Speaker 1>for listening,