WEBVTT - Sculptor Sees Opportunity in Busted Capital Structures

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<v Speaker 1>Hello, and welcome to the Credit Edge, a weekly markets podcast.

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<v Speaker 1>My name is James Crombie. I'm a senior editor at Bloomberg.

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<v Speaker 1>This week, we're very pleased to welcome Jimmy Levin, CEO

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<v Speaker 1>and Chief investment officer of Sculptor Capital. How are you, Jimmy,

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<v Speaker 1>I am great, Thanks for having me. Thank you so

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<v Speaker 1>much for joining us today. We're very excited to get

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<v Speaker 1>your credit market views, and we're also delighted to have

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<v Speaker 1>back on the show Stefan Koba, chef from Bloomberg Intelligence. Hello, Stefan. Hi, James,

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<v Speaker 1>and from Bloomberg News, Renne Garthia Perez, who covers distressed

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<v Speaker 1>debt and of course football from London. How are you Rene?

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<v Speaker 2>Hello, I am freezing in our studio in London.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, Well, I hope it warms up with there. But

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<v Speaker 1>just to set the scene a bit here from New York.

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<v Speaker 1>Credit markets are rallying after taking a bit of a

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<v Speaker 1>hit at the start of August. Investors are bracing for

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<v Speaker 1>volatility in the run up to FED easing, which is

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<v Speaker 1>expected to start this month. Lower rates will take some

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<v Speaker 1>of the pressure off weak companies that were struggling with

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<v Speaker 1>high borrowing costs. Over the last few years, and there's

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<v Speaker 1>a lot more debt issuance. Companies are taking advantage of

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<v Speaker 1>very strong investor demand for corporate bonds and loans, with

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<v Speaker 1>yields at historically high levels, and September is typically a

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<v Speaker 1>heavy month for bond isshuents. We are off to a

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<v Speaker 1>record start today, but there's still a lot more demand

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<v Speaker 1>than net supply of corporate debt, which is a technical boost.

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<v Speaker 1>Credit markets are supported by resilience in the economy and

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<v Speaker 1>investors are betting on a soft blanding. However, there is

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<v Speaker 1>a lot to worry about in debt markets. We're seeing

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<v Speaker 1>more creditor on creditor violence, aggressive liability management exercises, and

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<v Speaker 1>cooperation agreements, as well as defaults and bankruptcies. Then there's

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<v Speaker 1>commercial real estate stress war, the US election, global geopolitics

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<v Speaker 1>plus recession risk hasn't really gone away. So Jimmy, what's

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<v Speaker 1>your take? Are you bullet for the rest of twenty

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<v Speaker 1>twenty four?

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<v Speaker 3>Well, maybe we have to zoom out a little bit

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<v Speaker 3>from that. You listed a handful of great sounding things

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<v Speaker 3>for the economy and markets. In a handful of items

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<v Speaker 3>that could be a problem for economies and markets, I'd

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<v Speaker 3>start by saying there's usually that list on both sides,

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<v Speaker 3>and today's no different. There are some tailwinds, there are

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<v Speaker 3>some headwinds, but I think to set the stage for

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<v Speaker 3>credit investing more broadly, you've heard, whether it's from US

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<v Speaker 3>firms like ours, you've heard talk over the last couple

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<v Speaker 3>of years that it's a great time to be a

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<v Speaker 3>credit investor. You've probably heard that over and over again,

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<v Speaker 3>and it always has a different phrase. Sometimes it's equity

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<v Speaker 3>like returns for credit like risk or some derivative of

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<v Speaker 3>that sort of concept. Golden age, Yeah, golden age. You know,

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<v Speaker 3>we've heard them all. So let's start with what is

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<v Speaker 3>that backdrop and why is everybody saying that? And from

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<v Speaker 3>our perspective, we try to frame it as the perspective,

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<v Speaker 3>returns on offering credit come from the risk free rate,

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<v Speaker 3>the i'll call it generic non investment grade credit spread,

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<v Speaker 3>and then the complexity premium, and people call that last bucket.

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<v Speaker 3>Sometimes that's called alpha, sometimes that's called excess return, excess spread.

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<v Speaker 3>But it's those three pieces. And so if you take

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<v Speaker 3>those three pieces today, and this has kind of been

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<v Speaker 3>true for the last couple of years, moving around up

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<v Speaker 3>and down for each of the three, but the risk

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<v Speaker 3>free part, depending on your rate view, it's in the

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<v Speaker 3>four or five range. The non investment grade credit spread

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<v Speaker 3>it's in the three four five range, and that complexity

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<v Speaker 3>premium is also in the three four five range. So

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<v Speaker 3>depending on which where we pick in these different ranges,

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<v Speaker 3>you're getting to a load to mid teens gross on

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<v Speaker 3>levered rate of return to generally take pretty reasonable credit risk.

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<v Speaker 3>So before we talk about anything else, we kind of

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<v Speaker 3>pause there if returns on offer are in the low

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<v Speaker 3>amid double digits to take reasonable credit risk. And we're

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<v Speaker 3>on radio, so you can't say you can't see the

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<v Speaker 3>reasonable in air quotes, right, Everyone's got their own version

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<v Speaker 3>of reasonable. But to take pretty reasonable credit risk and

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<v Speaker 3>make that kind of return, that generally counts as a

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<v Speaker 3>good time to be investing. Right, even at the simplest level,

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<v Speaker 3>Compare that to a few years ago. Risk free was

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<v Speaker 3>zero or one, and the credit spread component was two

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<v Speaker 3>or three or four, and that complexity premium was one

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<v Speaker 3>or two or three. And so the Old World's six, seven,

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<v Speaker 3>eight became the New World's eleven, twelve, thirteen, fourteen, fifteen.

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<v Speaker 3>And I think that generically is what have what has

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<v Speaker 3>credit market investors excited before we even talk about what's

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<v Speaker 3>what and what are the categories?

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<v Speaker 4>Hi, Jimmy, very interesting complexity premium view. I would agree.

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<v Speaker 4>I was curious to hear your views on interest rate

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<v Speaker 4>cuts from the Fed or across the globe more generally

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<v Speaker 4>as well. Do you see a risk rates remaining elevated

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<v Speaker 4>for longer to fight inflation or do you think the

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<v Speaker 4>central banks will do a good job at supporting growth

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<v Speaker 4>by steadily cutting rates in the next twelve months.

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<v Speaker 3>Well, I'll start with a disclaimer, which is that we're

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<v Speaker 3>generally not in the business of predicting the path of rates.

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<v Speaker 3>It matters a lot. We have to have review We

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<v Speaker 3>from time to time have a view, but trying to

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<v Speaker 3>figure out if the next meeting ought to be priced

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<v Speaker 3>at one or two or one point three, that's not

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<v Speaker 3>our exact skill set. I think what we try to

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<v Speaker 3>do as as investors, and I think this applies today.

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<v Speaker 3>Everything in the real world moves a little slower than

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<v Speaker 3>the market wants it to be. So again, if we

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<v Speaker 3>think about the last couple of years where interest rates

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<v Speaker 3>have been topics number one, two, three, four, and five

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<v Speaker 3>on everyone's list. For every conversation, there have been moments

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<v Speaker 3>in time where the market moves to and I'm exaggerating,

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<v Speaker 3>you know, one hundred percent probability of rates staying high forever,

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<v Speaker 3>and then it moves to a one hundred percent probability

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<v Speaker 3>of rates being dramatically cut instantly, and it oscillates back

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<v Speaker 3>and forth between those. I think what's realistic is rates

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<v Speaker 3>are pretty high right now. They're generically in the restrictive zone,

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<v Speaker 3>and they're going to go from that to something more

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<v Speaker 3>normal over a couple of years. And I know that's

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<v Speaker 3>a cop out answer, but I think it's not really

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<v Speaker 3>possible to predict. And I also think it doesn't hugely

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<v Speaker 3>matter for being a credit investor, Meaning if one is

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<v Speaker 3>doing a type of fundamental credit investing today, that works

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<v Speaker 3>out fabulously if there's six cuts, but it's a disaster.

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<v Speaker 3>If there's three cuts and it's the greatest thing of

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<v Speaker 3>all time. If it's the opposite, something's gone wrong already.

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<v Speaker 3>We shouldn't be that sensitive to that level of granularity.

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<v Speaker 3>But inflation is largely gotten under control and rates are

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<v Speaker 3>likely to come down over time. There is always a

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<v Speaker 3>risk of a reacceleration of inflation. Do we have an

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<v Speaker 3>ability to predict that better than the market, probably.

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<v Speaker 4>Not very clear. And on the back of normalizing rates

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<v Speaker 4>and inflation, just to follow up on the recession risks,

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<v Speaker 4>if you have a view on that, And the last

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<v Speaker 4>time I checked, the probability of the United States entering

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<v Speaker 4>recession the next twelve months stands at about thirty percent

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<v Speaker 4>according to Bluebird Sensus, and this is still relatively high,

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<v Speaker 4>but I believe this time last year the probability was

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<v Speaker 4>maybe about fifty to sixty percent. So I was wondering,

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<v Speaker 4>what's your take on these normalizing rates? Will they help

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<v Speaker 4>us avoid our recession in the US?

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<v Speaker 3>In your view, it's all circular, but inflation remaining under control,

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<v Speaker 3>are coming down further, rates beginning to normalize from being restrictive,

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<v Speaker 3>and all of that happening kind of slowly and smoothly

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<v Speaker 3>and under control helps avoid a recession. And so similar

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<v Speaker 3>to that rate comment that I made, where the market

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<v Speaker 3>flip flops between one hundred percent probability of one thing

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<v Speaker 3>and a one hundred percent probability of the other thing,

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<v Speaker 3>we see that with recession talk as well. And I

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<v Speaker 3>found last month the beginning of August during that selloff,

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<v Speaker 3>to be a bit of a head scratcher. Essentially, there

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<v Speaker 3>was a technical event in the Japanese market overnight and

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<v Speaker 3>by I don't know, five or six or seven am

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<v Speaker 3>New York time, there was there were calls for an

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<v Speaker 3>emergency FED meeting to make a cut to avoid this

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<v Speaker 3>impending recession. That seemed a little extreme. So I don't

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<v Speaker 3>think the probability moves as quickly like rates. It's this

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<v Speaker 3>is a slower moving machine. The economy has been growing

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<v Speaker 3>really well, both nominally and real. The rate of that

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<v Speaker 3>growth is slowing, which is what the FED and other

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<v Speaker 3>central banks have been trying to achieve for the last

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<v Speaker 3>couple of years. So it's not a surprise that the

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<v Speaker 3>rate of growth is slowing down. That's been the goal,

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<v Speaker 3>that's the point of the restrictive monetary policy. So we

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<v Speaker 3>are getting that slowing in growth so far, and again

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<v Speaker 3>this is not incredibly insightful. It's backward looking. So far,

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<v Speaker 3>so good. It's worked, inflation is kind of moderating. The

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<v Speaker 3>economy remains fairly strong, albeit slightly less strong. So we

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<v Speaker 3>are definitively on the soft landing path. Can we be derailed? Absolutely,

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<v Speaker 3>And again it could sound like a cop out, but

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<v Speaker 3>this is the beauty of being a credit investor, Especially

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<v Speaker 3>if you're a credit investor at a time where low

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<v Speaker 3>double digit or low to mid teens rates of return

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<v Speaker 3>are on offer. Credit investments shouldn't be that sensitive to this.

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<v Speaker 3>So obviously certain credit investments are. And I'm speaking very

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<v Speaker 3>generically now, if if one is investing in a zero

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<v Speaker 3>to fifty percent LTV loan, whether the economy grows at

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<v Speaker 3>three or shrinks at one, sure it's going to feel

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<v Speaker 3>better growing at three than shrinking at one. But that

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<v Speaker 3>loan ought to be protected. So as credit investors, we

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<v Speaker 3>don't have to be as precise.

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<v Speaker 2>Jimmy, for the soft lending that you were describing, is

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<v Speaker 2>it impacting the opportunity set of what you were saying?

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<v Speaker 3>Not really, so it has. So if I took that

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<v Speaker 3>generic rate plus spread plus premium, and I just said

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<v Speaker 3>four plus four plus four equals twelve. If we looked

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<v Speaker 3>a year ago at this time, we would have said

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<v Speaker 3>five plus five plus five, and so fifteen was the

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<v Speaker 3>number on offer, again wildly genericizing across asset based finance

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<v Speaker 3>and corporate credit and real estate finance and so on.

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<v Speaker 3>So why did fifteen go to twelve? Because every day

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<v Speaker 3>the soft landing remains in effect. Is a data landing

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<v Speaker 3>remains in effect. So the smoother the landing, the better

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<v Speaker 3>the narrative, and the longer it persists for allows the

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<v Speaker 3>market to take some return out of the market. So

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<v Speaker 3>would credit investors rather be investing against fifteen than against twelve? Sure,

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<v Speaker 3>but twelve works works nicely as well.

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<v Speaker 1>So you see return staying in the double digits range

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<v Speaker 1>for the foreseeable that say year or more.

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<v Speaker 3>Yeah, I think as long as the base rate is high,

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<v Speaker 3>there's some correlation between all this, right. Some people quote yield,

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<v Speaker 3>some people quote spread. There's always been correlation between those

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<v Speaker 3>three components of return. Yeah, But while base rates are

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<v Speaker 3>in the zone of where they are now, again, forget

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<v Speaker 3>if they're twenty five high or lower, fifty high or lower.

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<v Speaker 3>As long as they're in the zone of where they

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<v Speaker 3>are now, we ought to stay in the type of

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<v Speaker 3>return environment that we're in. But to your point, if

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<v Speaker 3>it's a quarter and then a year and then two

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<v Speaker 3>years where it turns out the economy grew really nicely

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<v Speaker 3>and earnings have growth has been strong, and inflation got

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<v Speaker 3>back to target, then yeah, the returns on offer to

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<v Speaker 3>be a credit investor probably won't be as good then

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<v Speaker 3>as they are.

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<v Speaker 4>Today, right, Indeed, good times to be in credit. But

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<v Speaker 4>then similarly, I want to ask about the state of

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<v Speaker 4>the US consumer. I cover container shipping, which is very

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<v Speaker 4>much driven by consumer demand and by the number of

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<v Speaker 4>containers filled with goods bit clothing, shoes, furniture shipped from

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<v Speaker 4>Asia to the US personally, with interest rates going from

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<v Speaker 4>zero to five percent, I'm rather surprised that the consumer

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<v Speaker 4>demand seems to be holding on at least for now,

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<v Speaker 4>and this is what container shipping companies that I cover

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<v Speaker 4>tail investors. But I was curious to hear your views

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<v Speaker 4>on the state of the UNS consumer going into Q

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<v Speaker 4>four and next year as well.

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<v Speaker 3>So the consumer started all this in a really good place.

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<v Speaker 3>And by the way that's circular, maybe part of the

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<v Speaker 3>reason that we were in this inflationary environment and that

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<v Speaker 3>such restrictive monetary policy rates were required is because the

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<v Speaker 3>consumer was so strong, meaning there was this accumulation of

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<v Speaker 3>savings post COVID, both from stimulus and from lack of

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<v Speaker 3>the opportunity to spend as much. Employment stayed really good,

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<v Speaker 3>and so the consumer came into this period of time

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<v Speaker 3>with a better financial position than it had had in

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<v Speaker 3>a really long time. And again on this the real

0:13:54.679 --> 0:13:57.959
<v Speaker 3>world moves more slowly than the Bloomberg screen we all

0:13:58.000 --> 0:14:00.880
<v Speaker 3>stare at all day. Takes a while for that to

0:14:00.880 --> 0:14:06.400
<v Speaker 3>burn off. But you see it in particularly in consumer credit,

0:14:06.400 --> 0:14:10.240
<v Speaker 3>within asset based finance, you see that that excess has

0:14:10.280 --> 0:14:14.000
<v Speaker 3>started to burn off, and like it does historically, it

0:14:14.080 --> 0:14:17.880
<v Speaker 3>starts at the most challenged consumer at the lowest end

0:14:17.920 --> 0:14:20.120
<v Speaker 3>and then kind of slowly works its way up. But

0:14:20.640 --> 0:14:24.280
<v Speaker 3>you've seen that in consumer lending delinquencies, You've seen that

0:14:24.360 --> 0:14:28.000
<v Speaker 3>in subprime audo versus prime auto. So yeah, some of

0:14:28.040 --> 0:14:30.760
<v Speaker 3>the air is coming out of the ball, and again

0:14:31.040 --> 0:14:34.160
<v Speaker 3>that shouldn't be a surprise because that's how this all

0:14:34.280 --> 0:14:36.240
<v Speaker 3>was designed. It was designed to take air out of

0:14:36.280 --> 0:14:40.200
<v Speaker 3>the ball. And there was a period time at the

0:14:40.240 --> 0:14:44.040
<v Speaker 3>beginning of the inflation rate period that we're in where

0:14:44.520 --> 0:14:49.400
<v Speaker 3>inflation was in excess of wage growth, and now you're

0:14:49.480 --> 0:14:52.680
<v Speaker 3>kind of seeing that catchup. So you're getting the wage

0:14:52.720 --> 0:14:56.280
<v Speaker 3>growth in excess of the now moderating inflation. And again

0:14:56.360 --> 0:15:02.080
<v Speaker 3>maybe that's just kind kind of getting back to new.

0:15:00.960 --> 0:15:06.040
<v Speaker 2>Going into specifics, how does sculpture trade this macro rates view?

0:15:06.080 --> 0:15:08.760
<v Speaker 2>Where do you see opportunities.

0:15:08.600 --> 0:15:12.040
<v Speaker 3>So to be clear, we don't intentionally trade the macro

0:15:12.160 --> 0:15:18.480
<v Speaker 3>rates view. If anything, Our funds generally run duration neutral,

0:15:18.840 --> 0:15:21.360
<v Speaker 3>or we try to have them be duration neutral, meaning

0:15:21.400 --> 0:15:24.600
<v Speaker 3>we try not to take the interest rate risk. What

0:15:24.640 --> 0:15:29.120
<v Speaker 3>we try to take is well selected credit risk, and

0:15:29.160 --> 0:15:33.040
<v Speaker 3>we try to harvest that complexity premium or that excess

0:15:33.040 --> 0:15:37.040
<v Speaker 3>spread or that alpha where whether it comes from process

0:15:37.200 --> 0:15:42.240
<v Speaker 3>or from sourcing, or from complexity or from illiquidity, that's

0:15:42.280 --> 0:15:45.040
<v Speaker 3>what we're trying to take out of the market, so

0:15:45.080 --> 0:15:47.880
<v Speaker 3>to speak. And maybe it's worth for a second just

0:15:48.600 --> 0:15:52.080
<v Speaker 3>laying out the three categories of the credit world that

0:15:52.680 --> 0:15:54.600
<v Speaker 3>we try to invest in, or the way we define it.

0:15:55.080 --> 0:15:59.120
<v Speaker 3>There's the corporate credit market. I'll say everyone knows that one.

0:15:59.120 --> 0:16:02.560
<v Speaker 3>It's when companies are money more or less. There's the

0:16:02.640 --> 0:16:06.840
<v Speaker 3>real estate credit market, which is think of that as

0:16:07.480 --> 0:16:10.080
<v Speaker 3>loans on a building or loans on a real estate asset.

0:16:10.680 --> 0:16:13.320
<v Speaker 3>It's conceptually similar to corporate credit in that it's a

0:16:13.400 --> 0:16:17.280
<v Speaker 3>single name underwriting. And then there's asset based finance, which

0:16:18.040 --> 0:16:21.160
<v Speaker 3>is the hardest to define. It's probably the most topical

0:16:21.160 --> 0:16:24.000
<v Speaker 3>today and maybe the easiest way to start with the

0:16:24.000 --> 0:16:29.200
<v Speaker 3>definition is asset based finance is everything else so it's

0:16:29.240 --> 0:16:32.440
<v Speaker 3>all types of credit risk that aren't corporate credit and

0:16:32.480 --> 0:16:37.480
<v Speaker 3>aren't single name real estate credit. So that includes generally

0:16:37.520 --> 0:16:41.280
<v Speaker 3>pooled assets or pooled cash flows, or pooled loans of

0:16:42.080 --> 0:16:46.400
<v Speaker 3>residential real estate, commercial real estate, consumer credit, auto loans,

0:16:46.480 --> 0:16:54.760
<v Speaker 3>credit card loans, student loans, transportation, aviation, infrastructure. Those are

0:16:54.800 --> 0:16:58.680
<v Speaker 3>all the underlying feedstock for this asset based finance market.

0:16:59.040 --> 0:17:02.680
<v Speaker 3>And it includes taking that feedstock or those pools of

0:17:02.720 --> 0:17:07.480
<v Speaker 3>assets and turning them into securitized products, or turning them

0:17:07.480 --> 0:17:14.080
<v Speaker 3>into SRTs or CRTs or even unlevered asset pools. So

0:17:14.119 --> 0:17:17.440
<v Speaker 3>there's the type of risk, which is all those categories

0:17:17.480 --> 0:17:20.240
<v Speaker 3>I laid out, and then there's the structure of that risk,

0:17:20.600 --> 0:17:25.840
<v Speaker 3>which can be varied again cash synthetic, thicknches, thin tronches,

0:17:25.880 --> 0:17:30.800
<v Speaker 3>safe trunches, risky tranches. But it's pooling all those underlying

0:17:30.880 --> 0:17:34.360
<v Speaker 3>risks into pools that can then be analyzed and assessed.

0:17:34.640 --> 0:17:37.359
<v Speaker 3>That's what we call asset based finance. I'd say the

0:17:37.400 --> 0:17:40.960
<v Speaker 3>words it used to be called would include securitized products,

0:17:41.040 --> 0:17:48.000
<v Speaker 3>structured credit, principal finance, specialty finance, acid based finance reg CAP.

0:17:48.160 --> 0:17:51.280
<v Speaker 3>All that today we'll put into that ABF bucket.

0:17:51.800 --> 0:17:57.000
<v Speaker 2>In that acid in that broad universe of acid basin

0:17:57.040 --> 0:18:00.560
<v Speaker 2>an sid you were just describing wearing partique or do

0:18:00.640 --> 0:18:05.840
<v Speaker 2>you see the opportunities like are there any specific areas

0:18:05.960 --> 0:18:08.360
<v Speaker 2>or products that you like more than others? And are

0:18:08.400 --> 0:18:11.800
<v Speaker 2>there any corners or pockets of that market that you avoid?

0:18:12.480 --> 0:18:15.159
<v Speaker 3>So it's the common question, and I wish I had

0:18:15.200 --> 0:18:18.600
<v Speaker 3>a fancier answer to it, which is you know a

0:18:18.760 --> 0:18:20.679
<v Speaker 3>kind of sector with a bow on it that looks

0:18:21.080 --> 0:18:25.600
<v Speaker 3>perfectly dislocated. I guess the spoiler alert is that there's

0:18:25.640 --> 0:18:29.480
<v Speaker 3>not one. And really the inefficiency is in the asset

0:18:29.480 --> 0:18:32.880
<v Speaker 3>class itself. Well, I'll start with this anything that takes

0:18:33.280 --> 0:18:36.680
<v Speaker 3>like two or three minutes to even start to describe

0:18:36.680 --> 0:18:38.840
<v Speaker 3>at a high level, the asset class we're talking about

0:18:38.920 --> 0:18:42.520
<v Speaker 3>is probably not the world's most efficient asset class. So

0:18:43.680 --> 0:18:48.480
<v Speaker 3>because there's so much different collateral and so much different structure,

0:18:48.560 --> 0:18:53.719
<v Speaker 3>and so many different forms of origination, it's an imperfect market.

0:18:53.920 --> 0:18:57.159
<v Speaker 3>It's a market that's nowhere near as mature as the

0:18:57.200 --> 0:19:01.640
<v Speaker 3>corporate credit market, and so the opera ortunity comes by

0:19:02.320 --> 0:19:05.560
<v Speaker 3>waiting for what falls through the cracks. Now, at different

0:19:05.560 --> 0:19:09.199
<v Speaker 3>points within the last couple of years, has there have

0:19:09.280 --> 0:19:13.200
<v Speaker 3>there been more distinct themes. Yes, you know, at the

0:19:13.240 --> 0:19:17.320
<v Speaker 3>beginning of the rate rise, it was, well, home prices

0:19:17.400 --> 0:19:21.560
<v Speaker 3>must be going down, so you know, anything residential real

0:19:21.640 --> 0:19:24.560
<v Speaker 3>estate related could be an opportunity. And then at some

0:19:24.640 --> 0:19:27.760
<v Speaker 3>point it was, you know, commercial real estate is crashing

0:19:27.800 --> 0:19:30.240
<v Speaker 3>and there's a regional bank crisis, and so anything related

0:19:30.240 --> 0:19:33.440
<v Speaker 3>to commercial real estate must be the opportunity. And I

0:19:33.440 --> 0:19:37.320
<v Speaker 3>could kind of keep going with each one, but there

0:19:37.359 --> 0:19:43.119
<v Speaker 3>isn't a specific dislocation that The prevailing principle across the

0:19:43.119 --> 0:19:45.240
<v Speaker 3>board in all of asset based finance is that it's

0:19:45.640 --> 0:19:50.880
<v Speaker 3>generally a wholesale funded market. So when rates go from

0:19:50.880 --> 0:19:53.919
<v Speaker 3>low to high and spreads go from tight to wide,

0:19:54.560 --> 0:19:57.719
<v Speaker 3>it's disruptive to a wholesale funded market. And so it

0:19:57.760 --> 0:20:00.679
<v Speaker 3>doesn't matter if the underlying asset classes a non QM

0:20:00.760 --> 0:20:04.960
<v Speaker 3>loan or a single family rental pool, or a portfolio

0:20:05.040 --> 0:20:08.840
<v Speaker 3>of aircraft, whatever it is at that moment in time.

0:20:08.880 --> 0:20:13.240
<v Speaker 3>It's more that the market structure has been disrupted, and

0:20:13.280 --> 0:20:19.000
<v Speaker 3>it's disrupted today cyclically, meaning the high rates and the

0:20:19.040 --> 0:20:23.320
<v Speaker 3>inflationary environment and the regional bank consequences over the subsequent

0:20:23.359 --> 0:20:28.399
<v Speaker 3>couple of years, and it's disrupted secularly, which is the

0:20:28.520 --> 0:20:32.600
<v Speaker 3>twenty year trend of more and more regulation on both

0:20:33.000 --> 0:20:34.360
<v Speaker 3>big banks and small banks.

0:20:34.760 --> 0:20:36.919
<v Speaker 1>The stuff that falls through the cracks, as you put it,

0:20:36.960 --> 0:20:38.720
<v Speaker 1>is it falling through the cracks because no one else

0:20:38.720 --> 0:20:40.920
<v Speaker 1>wants it, because it's toxic, it's distressed, it's something you

0:20:40.960 --> 0:20:42.119
<v Speaker 1>should be worried about.

0:20:42.680 --> 0:20:45.240
<v Speaker 3>I would say, falling through the cracks because the market

0:20:45.320 --> 0:20:48.280
<v Speaker 3>is more immature, and so I'll give you maybe some

0:20:48.400 --> 0:20:54.200
<v Speaker 3>numbers that would help. When I started in the business,

0:20:55.280 --> 0:20:58.560
<v Speaker 3>private credit meant direct lending, which meant small to middle

0:20:58.600 --> 0:21:03.360
<v Speaker 3>market lending, and it was tiny. Today, as we all

0:21:03.359 --> 0:21:06.399
<v Speaker 3>know and you all cover probably daily, private credit is

0:21:06.440 --> 0:21:09.240
<v Speaker 3>close to two trillion dollars and direct lending is seventy

0:21:09.280 --> 0:21:14.600
<v Speaker 3>five percent of that round numbers. So it sort of

0:21:14.640 --> 0:21:17.440
<v Speaker 3>goes with logic that that market's now more efficient. When

0:21:17.480 --> 0:21:20.520
<v Speaker 3>a financial sponsor buys a company and they want to

0:21:20.560 --> 0:21:24.359
<v Speaker 3>borrow the first sixty percent of the capital structure, they

0:21:24.400 --> 0:21:27.120
<v Speaker 3>can go to the investment banks that have been doing

0:21:27.200 --> 0:21:31.560
<v Speaker 3>it for eternity. They can now go to the direct

0:21:31.640 --> 0:21:34.400
<v Speaker 3>lending market, which has trillions of dollars and growing by

0:21:34.400 --> 0:21:37.320
<v Speaker 3>the day, with I don't know dozens or hundreds of

0:21:37.359 --> 0:21:40.639
<v Speaker 3>players and so there's going to be some efficiency to

0:21:40.680 --> 0:21:46.200
<v Speaker 3>that market. Well, the private ABF market today is deminimus,

0:21:47.560 --> 0:21:50.840
<v Speaker 3>and so it looks a lot from an efficiency standpoint,

0:21:50.920 --> 0:21:53.400
<v Speaker 3>or from a falling through the crack standpoint, it looks

0:21:53.440 --> 0:21:56.080
<v Speaker 3>a lot like the direct lending market looked fifteen years ago.

0:21:56.640 --> 0:22:00.760
<v Speaker 3>It's niche, it's smaller, there are less players, every deal

0:22:00.840 --> 0:22:06.399
<v Speaker 3>is different, relationships matter, all of that. It's the direct

0:22:06.440 --> 0:22:08.920
<v Speaker 3>lending from fifteen years ago.

0:22:09.640 --> 0:22:13.960
<v Speaker 2>And how much do you expect to see this market

0:22:14.000 --> 0:22:18.600
<v Speaker 2>grow in the next I don't know, five to ten years.

0:22:18.320 --> 0:22:22.200
<v Speaker 3>So I think because the playbook's already been written by

0:22:22.240 --> 0:22:24.640
<v Speaker 3>the direct lending market, it won't take as long as

0:22:24.760 --> 0:22:28.760
<v Speaker 3>that took. Right, So if that took fifteen years to

0:22:28.800 --> 0:22:31.280
<v Speaker 3>get from a number close to zero to a number

0:22:31.320 --> 0:22:34.679
<v Speaker 3>close to a couple a trillion, it won't take fifteen years.

0:22:34.840 --> 0:22:37.639
<v Speaker 3>I don't know if it'll move twice as fast or

0:22:37.640 --> 0:22:41.520
<v Speaker 3>what the coefficient is, but it'll go faster because the

0:22:41.560 --> 0:22:44.879
<v Speaker 3>playbook's been written and the players who wrote the playbook

0:22:44.920 --> 0:22:50.240
<v Speaker 3>are doing it again here. So it's coming to a

0:22:50.280 --> 0:22:50.960
<v Speaker 3>theater near you.

0:22:51.920 --> 0:22:53.439
<v Speaker 2>Do you expect it to be I don't know, like

0:22:54.359 --> 0:22:58.240
<v Speaker 2>five times private credit or seven times the size of

0:22:58.240 --> 0:23:00.760
<v Speaker 2>private credit quote.

0:23:01.000 --> 0:23:03.320
<v Speaker 3>And I think that's probably where maybe some of those

0:23:04.160 --> 0:23:06.240
<v Speaker 3>the numbers you were just thrown out come from. If

0:23:06.280 --> 0:23:11.720
<v Speaker 3>you look at the underlying markets. The underlying credit markets

0:23:11.800 --> 0:23:15.680
<v Speaker 3>upon which ABF are based are five to seven times

0:23:15.920 --> 0:23:18.920
<v Speaker 3>the size of the non investment grade corporate credit market.

0:23:19.320 --> 0:23:22.639
<v Speaker 3>So it's not illogical to think that it would have

0:23:22.680 --> 0:23:25.159
<v Speaker 3>to move in that ratio. Right. And again this is

0:23:25.640 --> 0:23:27.600
<v Speaker 3>these are all widely quoted numbers now. But if you

0:23:27.640 --> 0:23:30.119
<v Speaker 3>take the direct lending market, the high yield market, and

0:23:30.160 --> 0:23:33.080
<v Speaker 3>the bronze syndicated loan market and you get to five

0:23:33.160 --> 0:23:39.679
<v Speaker 3>or six trillion, do that same math on REZI, consumer, commercial, corporate,

0:23:39.880 --> 0:23:42.960
<v Speaker 3>hard asset, infra, etc. And that five or six is

0:23:43.000 --> 0:23:46.600
<v Speaker 3>more like twenty five or thirty trillion. And that's what

0:23:47.240 --> 0:23:50.040
<v Speaker 3>kind of creates some of these eye popping figures as

0:23:50.080 --> 0:23:52.600
<v Speaker 3>far as predictions for the future. But to be clear,

0:23:53.920 --> 0:23:56.959
<v Speaker 3>that's happening with or without us, with any of us.

0:23:56.760 --> 0:24:02.320
<v Speaker 3>It's not a path. What we're focused on is when

0:24:02.359 --> 0:24:05.560
<v Speaker 3>you start with that market that's five or seven times

0:24:05.560 --> 0:24:08.960
<v Speaker 3>the size of the corporate market that doesn't yet really

0:24:09.080 --> 0:24:12.399
<v Speaker 3>have an established private credit market, and you're in an

0:24:12.480 --> 0:24:15.720
<v Speaker 3>environment where the base rates four or five and credit

0:24:15.760 --> 0:24:18.440
<v Speaker 3>spreads are four or five and complexity premiums four or five.

0:24:19.760 --> 0:24:21.639
<v Speaker 3>We think we've got a good few years ahead of

0:24:21.680 --> 0:24:25.439
<v Speaker 3>us to go after that opportunity and create some return.

0:24:26.720 --> 0:24:29.480
<v Speaker 2>Do you have dedicated funds for debt strategy or does

0:24:29.520 --> 0:24:33.879
<v Speaker 2>it come from opportunistic credit or other funds that you

0:24:33.880 --> 0:24:34.399
<v Speaker 2>already have?

0:24:34.680 --> 0:24:38.239
<v Speaker 3>All of the above, all the above, So we do

0:24:38.280 --> 0:24:42.760
<v Speaker 3>it in a few different formats. But you're certainly seeing

0:24:42.840 --> 0:24:47.480
<v Speaker 3>from a again maturation or the very beginnings of maturation,

0:24:47.720 --> 0:24:51.320
<v Speaker 3>the marketplace is now clearly more accepting of the idea

0:24:51.840 --> 0:24:56.640
<v Speaker 3>of an ABF fund. Whereas you know, when we were

0:24:56.680 --> 0:25:02.680
<v Speaker 3>doing this close to twenty years ago, that didn't really exist,

0:25:02.960 --> 0:25:05.479
<v Speaker 3>and so it was very niche and very small, and

0:25:05.520 --> 0:25:09.720
<v Speaker 3>the capital for that had to come from the flexible, tactical,

0:25:09.800 --> 0:25:14.080
<v Speaker 3>opportunistic bucket of an allocator. It wasn't an official allocation

0:25:14.400 --> 0:25:16.639
<v Speaker 3>in the world, It wasn't in a consultant model, it

0:25:16.680 --> 0:25:20.639
<v Speaker 3>wasn't anywhere. What you're seeing today is that it's starting

0:25:20.680 --> 0:25:23.600
<v Speaker 3>to make its way again. It's at the leading edge,

0:25:23.600 --> 0:25:27.720
<v Speaker 3>but it's making its way into the mainstream allocation model.

0:25:28.200 --> 0:25:33.160
<v Speaker 2>Right. Just to clarify, do you already have a dedicated

0:25:34.200 --> 0:25:37.840
<v Speaker 2>fund to this or are you fundraising for this strategy?

0:25:38.080 --> 0:25:40.480
<v Speaker 3>If you can say, I think we can't talk about

0:25:40.520 --> 0:25:42.800
<v Speaker 3>fundraising and I forget exactly how that works, so I'm

0:25:42.840 --> 0:25:45.080
<v Speaker 3>going to avoid it. But suffice it to say, we've

0:25:45.080 --> 0:25:47.560
<v Speaker 3>been doing it for close to twenty years, we are

0:25:47.600 --> 0:25:49.720
<v Speaker 3>actively doing it today, and we are doing it across

0:25:49.760 --> 0:25:52.959
<v Speaker 3>a variety of fund structures in the world. Is moving

0:25:53.000 --> 0:25:57.240
<v Speaker 3>towards ABF as a standalone allocation?

0:25:57.640 --> 0:26:01.040
<v Speaker 2>And are there any tangible examples on that space that

0:26:01.080 --> 0:26:04.680
<v Speaker 2>you could provide? And also if you could see what

0:26:04.760 --> 0:26:07.200
<v Speaker 2>kind of returns to they do they offer?

0:26:07.840 --> 0:26:12.119
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, so, so the returns on offer are consistent with

0:26:12.160 --> 0:26:14.800
<v Speaker 3>that that four plus four plus four you know again

0:26:14.880 --> 0:26:20.840
<v Speaker 3>called that low to mid teens returns in terms of example.

0:26:21.040 --> 0:26:26.320
<v Speaker 3>So this is a classic this this this one sort

0:26:26.320 --> 0:26:29.680
<v Speaker 3>of catches all elements of what's topical today in terms

0:26:29.680 --> 0:26:34.159
<v Speaker 3>of pressures on banks, in terms of uh S, r T,

0:26:34.400 --> 0:26:37.480
<v Speaker 3>c RT, you know, again, using all the buzzwords that

0:26:37.520 --> 0:26:41.440
<v Speaker 3>are out there. We were involved in a transaction where

0:26:42.280 --> 0:26:46.640
<v Speaker 3>a bank had been providing warehouse financing for an aggregation

0:26:47.200 --> 0:26:50.800
<v Speaker 3>of single family rental properties that were meant to be

0:26:50.840 --> 0:26:55.680
<v Speaker 3>aggregated until they got large enough to securitize. And as

0:26:55.680 --> 0:26:59.280
<v Speaker 3>the securitization market became disrupted by rates going up and

0:26:59.320 --> 0:27:02.440
<v Speaker 3>spreads going up and the world becoming less comfortable with

0:27:02.760 --> 0:27:07.800
<v Speaker 3>warehouse financing and banks becoming less comfortable with holding risk

0:27:07.880 --> 0:27:11.639
<v Speaker 3>against that, the bank decided that it would like to

0:27:11.800 --> 0:27:16.160
<v Speaker 3>have less of that risk. And so the bank said, Okay,

0:27:16.280 --> 0:27:19.720
<v Speaker 3>if we're lending the first seventy five percent against the

0:27:19.800 --> 0:27:24.640
<v Speaker 3>value of these homes, let's lay off the bottom ten

0:27:24.680 --> 0:27:28.560
<v Speaker 3>points of that. But that sort of transaction is so

0:27:29.320 --> 0:27:31.880
<v Speaker 3>customized that it can't be done in one of these

0:27:31.920 --> 0:27:36.040
<v Speaker 3>broadly syndicated SRTs or CRTs that again we read about

0:27:36.040 --> 0:27:39.760
<v Speaker 3>we hear covered kind of every day. That's a bespoke transaction,

0:27:39.960 --> 0:27:42.760
<v Speaker 3>and so that means the bank can really only call

0:27:43.359 --> 0:27:46.119
<v Speaker 3>a handful of players because it's just too cumbersome to

0:27:46.200 --> 0:27:50.240
<v Speaker 3>do it broadly. And so step number one be one

0:27:50.240 --> 0:27:54.679
<v Speaker 3>of a handful. Step number two be able to be flexible,

0:27:54.720 --> 0:27:59.640
<v Speaker 3>to structure, to work quickly through that collateral. The punchline

0:27:59.720 --> 0:28:04.480
<v Speaker 3>is that for doing all that, we can create what

0:28:04.520 --> 0:28:07.639
<v Speaker 3>we think is safe risk against a portfolio of homes

0:28:07.680 --> 0:28:10.040
<v Speaker 3>with plenty of enhancement by the way. As it turns out,

0:28:10.040 --> 0:28:12.120
<v Speaker 3>home prices didn't go down, they actually kind of kept

0:28:12.119 --> 0:28:15.560
<v Speaker 3>going up and do that for that kind of load

0:28:15.560 --> 0:28:17.359
<v Speaker 3>to mid teens rate of return.

0:28:18.720 --> 0:28:22.480
<v Speaker 1>So in other than real estate, other opportunities in ABF,

0:28:22.480 --> 0:28:25.840
<v Speaker 1>in consumer infrastructure, transport, that kind of thing. I mean,

0:28:25.840 --> 0:28:26.840
<v Speaker 1>you're looking at those deals.

0:28:26.920 --> 0:28:30.639
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, So we did almost identical to the transaction I

0:28:30.720 --> 0:28:36.080
<v Speaker 3>just described with single family rental pools was one that

0:28:36.119 --> 0:28:40.480
<v Speaker 3>we did in the auto finance space. Again, same idea.

0:28:40.600 --> 0:28:43.560
<v Speaker 3>The you know, people talk about this and we're guilty

0:28:43.600 --> 0:28:47.160
<v Speaker 3>of this sometimes as well, like it's some brand new innovation.

0:28:47.640 --> 0:28:50.600
<v Speaker 3>Structured finance has existed for you know, thirty years in

0:28:50.640 --> 0:28:53.760
<v Speaker 3>modern form, and I think thousands before that. Right, it's

0:28:53.800 --> 0:28:56.040
<v Speaker 3>taken up taking a bunch of risk, pulling it together

0:28:56.080 --> 0:29:02.280
<v Speaker 3>and slicing it. And so they're as a in this

0:29:02.400 --> 0:29:06.760
<v Speaker 3>case a smaller scale auto finance platform. Again, if you're

0:29:06.800 --> 0:29:11.360
<v Speaker 3>a huge auto finance platform, you can do a big, syndicated,

0:29:11.920 --> 0:29:16.320
<v Speaker 3>transparent deal that you know, sort of cookie cutter, and

0:29:16.360 --> 0:29:19.239
<v Speaker 3>you're going to get better execution as an issuer. If

0:29:19.280 --> 0:29:21.640
<v Speaker 3>you're smaller and you have this pool of auto loans,

0:29:21.640 --> 0:29:23.640
<v Speaker 3>and maybe they're kind of unique because you're a lender

0:29:23.640 --> 0:29:26.160
<v Speaker 3>that does something a little different, and you don't have

0:29:26.200 --> 0:29:29.520
<v Speaker 3>the kind of balance sheetter financial wherewithal to access capital

0:29:29.560 --> 0:29:33.120
<v Speaker 3>more cheaply, but you still need to accomplish the same objective.

0:29:33.680 --> 0:29:37.240
<v Speaker 3>What does that mean You're going into that bespoke ABF market.

0:29:37.360 --> 0:29:41.600
<v Speaker 3>You're having a handful of conversations to say, how can

0:29:41.640 --> 0:29:45.600
<v Speaker 3>I get capital relief as an issuer or get liquidity

0:29:45.640 --> 0:29:49.160
<v Speaker 3>as an issuer. We look at that and say, Okay,

0:29:49.680 --> 0:29:52.400
<v Speaker 3>we know where double B auto abs ought to be,

0:29:52.720 --> 0:29:55.520
<v Speaker 3>or we know where triple B auto abs ought to be.

0:29:56.120 --> 0:30:01.960
<v Speaker 3>If we can do something private, bespoke, highly structured, sometimes

0:30:01.960 --> 0:30:05.800
<v Speaker 3>that means less liquid sometimes it doesn't. If we can

0:30:06.160 --> 0:30:10.120
<v Speaker 3>create that same risk, but do it for hundreds of

0:30:10.120 --> 0:30:13.520
<v Speaker 3>basis points wider than what exists in the market, that's

0:30:13.560 --> 0:30:15.920
<v Speaker 3>that last four. I keep talking about the four plus

0:30:15.960 --> 0:30:19.080
<v Speaker 3>four plus four. That last four comes from what I

0:30:19.200 --> 0:30:22.320
<v Speaker 3>just described. And again we've done it in various parts

0:30:22.360 --> 0:30:25.000
<v Speaker 3>of REZI and various parts of auto, and various parts

0:30:25.000 --> 0:30:30.080
<v Speaker 3>of consumer, in various parts of the aviation market. All

0:30:30.120 --> 0:30:31.720
<v Speaker 3>of those are are in play.

0:30:31.920 --> 0:30:33.000
<v Speaker 1>How big can these deals be?

0:30:33.920 --> 0:30:34.000
<v Speaker 4>So?

0:30:34.280 --> 0:30:40.640
<v Speaker 3>Interestingly, the bigger the deal, the more efficient to the pricing.

0:30:41.440 --> 0:30:46.440
<v Speaker 3>So there's a correlation sometimes between size and quality. Right,

0:30:46.520 --> 0:30:49.880
<v Speaker 3>So if you're a European bank and you've been doing

0:30:51.320 --> 0:30:56.080
<v Speaker 3>multiple billion dollar SRT transactions under a standard shelf for

0:30:56.120 --> 0:31:00.360
<v Speaker 3>the last twenty years, you're going to get better execution. Right. So,

0:31:00.360 --> 0:31:04.680
<v Speaker 3>if you're the bank with the five billion portfolio, and

0:31:05.680 --> 0:31:09.680
<v Speaker 3>in order to get capital relief, let's say the bank

0:31:09.680 --> 0:31:12.680
<v Speaker 3>would need to lay off or transform ten percent of

0:31:12.680 --> 0:31:16.240
<v Speaker 3>the risk. So five billion portfolio, five hundred million of

0:31:16.320 --> 0:31:19.120
<v Speaker 3>risk transfer. That's a big deal. And that's going to

0:31:19.160 --> 0:31:23.560
<v Speaker 3>be sort of broadly syndicated or at least broadly reached out.

0:31:23.600 --> 0:31:25.880
<v Speaker 3>It's going to follow a kind of standard form. By

0:31:25.880 --> 0:31:29.280
<v Speaker 3>the way, even with all that still pretty attractive. Meaning

0:31:29.800 --> 0:31:32.320
<v Speaker 3>when we're looking at that, we're not saying, oh my gosh,

0:31:32.360 --> 0:31:34.360
<v Speaker 3>that's such a unattractive risk to take. We're saying that's

0:31:34.360 --> 0:31:38.520
<v Speaker 3>actually pretty good risk too. But then take the financial

0:31:38.560 --> 0:31:42.400
<v Speaker 3>institution that has the five hundred million portfolio that needs

0:31:42.440 --> 0:31:44.680
<v Speaker 3>the ten points of relief, and it's the fifty million.

0:31:45.440 --> 0:31:48.800
<v Speaker 3>There's just less players because the sophistication to do that,

0:31:49.160 --> 0:31:53.960
<v Speaker 3>again correlations means big firm, lots of resources, big capital.

0:31:56.320 --> 0:31:58.800
<v Speaker 3>That group would probably rather work on the five hundred

0:31:58.800 --> 0:32:01.000
<v Speaker 3>million dollar check than the fifty million dollar check. And

0:32:01.040 --> 0:32:02.920
<v Speaker 3>again it doesn't have to be so prescriptive, and the

0:32:02.960 --> 0:32:06.880
<v Speaker 3>truth is kind of somewhere in between. But the bigger,

0:32:07.040 --> 0:32:12.520
<v Speaker 3>more standardized transferences of risk, whether that's the sale of

0:32:12.600 --> 0:32:15.640
<v Speaker 3>loans or an SRT or a CRT or some sort

0:32:15.640 --> 0:32:21.160
<v Speaker 3>of structured financing, the really big tends to be more efficient.

0:32:21.400 --> 0:32:23.480
<v Speaker 1>And they are being held for what five to seven years,

0:32:23.520 --> 0:32:24.960
<v Speaker 1>like a private credit deal, that kind of thing.

0:32:25.280 --> 0:32:33.680
<v Speaker 3>It depends, so you know, the classic version of these

0:32:33.720 --> 0:32:39.440
<v Speaker 3>transactions were really post crisis post financial crisis, were the

0:32:39.480 --> 0:32:44.200
<v Speaker 3>corporate revolvers. Because the bank would, for relationship reasons, or

0:32:44.240 --> 0:32:47.440
<v Speaker 3>for investment banking fee reasons, or for cash management effects

0:32:47.480 --> 0:32:49.800
<v Speaker 3>all the other things banks do to make money with corporates,

0:32:50.080 --> 0:32:53.600
<v Speaker 3>they would also extend these revolvers. Revolvers, it turns out,

0:32:54.120 --> 0:32:56.480
<v Speaker 3>are a tough business to make money on, right, because

0:32:56.480 --> 0:32:58.360
<v Speaker 3>a bank needs to hold the capital in case it

0:32:58.400 --> 0:33:00.920
<v Speaker 3>gets drawn, but they don't get paid much for that risk.

0:33:00.920 --> 0:33:03.400
<v Speaker 3>It's kind of a loss leader. And so the one

0:33:03.400 --> 0:33:07.520
<v Speaker 3>of the classic forms of these transactions, a bank would say, Okay,

0:33:07.560 --> 0:33:09.960
<v Speaker 3>here's a pool of ten or fifty or one hundred

0:33:10.000 --> 0:33:13.680
<v Speaker 3>of these names, they you know, all started off as

0:33:13.760 --> 0:33:17.160
<v Speaker 3>five year but there's some you know, some runoff in there,

0:33:17.240 --> 0:33:19.920
<v Speaker 3>so it's a you know, it's a four year waited

0:33:19.960 --> 0:33:24.800
<v Speaker 3>average life portfolio. When you talk about things like consumer

0:33:24.920 --> 0:33:28.800
<v Speaker 3>or auto, those are much shorter. Weaightter average life that

0:33:28.880 --> 0:33:31.920
<v Speaker 3>could be one, two, three years. When we talk about

0:33:32.320 --> 0:33:36.360
<v Speaker 3>capital relief transactions off of warehouse financings, those can be

0:33:36.800 --> 0:33:40.880
<v Speaker 3>twelve or twenty four month maturity, So depends on the collateral.

0:33:41.040 --> 0:33:43.720
<v Speaker 3>If you're talking to someone like aviation, those are seven

0:33:43.760 --> 0:33:44.360
<v Speaker 3>year leases.

0:33:45.440 --> 0:33:47.200
<v Speaker 1>What kind of risks are we running into?

0:33:47.200 --> 0:33:47.400
<v Speaker 3>Though?

0:33:48.000 --> 0:33:50.280
<v Speaker 1>You know, you mentioned the crisis, and there was a

0:33:50.320 --> 0:33:53.120
<v Speaker 1>ton of structure finance pre crisis, and there was a

0:33:53.160 --> 0:33:55.240
<v Speaker 1>ton of stuff being done that really no one kind

0:33:55.280 --> 0:33:58.320
<v Speaker 1>of ended up understanding. It got so complex then it

0:33:58.360 --> 0:34:02.440
<v Speaker 1>will blew up. Are we kind of build another big mess?

0:34:02.600 --> 0:34:06.560
<v Speaker 3>No, So in our mind we're we're if that was

0:34:06.600 --> 0:34:10.720
<v Speaker 3>the pendulum swinging to its furthest point left, we're closer

0:34:10.719 --> 0:34:15.799
<v Speaker 3>to the furthest point right, meaning the hangover from the

0:34:15.800 --> 0:34:19.520
<v Speaker 3>financial crisis, which is a wild thing to me, right,

0:34:19.520 --> 0:34:23.080
<v Speaker 3>because financial markets tend to have much shorter memories. Right, somebody,

0:34:23.760 --> 0:34:27.759
<v Speaker 3>somebody gets burned. Give it a day, week, month, year,

0:34:27.840 --> 0:34:32.600
<v Speaker 3>and you know everyone's back in the game. The financial

0:34:32.640 --> 0:34:38.160
<v Speaker 3>crisis had a much more long lasting shadow overhang impact

0:34:39.440 --> 0:34:42.760
<v Speaker 3>on that market, and you see it in tons of stats,

0:34:42.800 --> 0:34:44.600
<v Speaker 3>and there's some of these charts kind of make their

0:34:44.640 --> 0:34:47.439
<v Speaker 3>way around over and over again. But it's bank share

0:34:47.440 --> 0:34:53.360
<v Speaker 3>of securitization, bank's share of origination, it's credit stats around

0:34:53.400 --> 0:34:57.600
<v Speaker 3>what is being securitized or what's being risk transferred in

0:34:57.680 --> 0:35:03.239
<v Speaker 3>some way, and the the moment in time underwriting from

0:35:03.239 --> 0:35:06.200
<v Speaker 3>before the financial crisis, we are at the other end

0:35:06.239 --> 0:35:08.680
<v Speaker 3>of the spectrum. Maybe we're coming back towards the middle now,

0:35:08.719 --> 0:35:12.520
<v Speaker 3>but we are not on that side of the pendulum

0:35:12.600 --> 0:35:14.040
<v Speaker 3>swing at that era.

0:35:14.520 --> 0:35:14.600
<v Speaker 2>Right.

0:35:14.680 --> 0:35:16.840
<v Speaker 3>If you think about how money gets lost in credit,

0:35:18.000 --> 0:35:20.440
<v Speaker 3>an investor either gets it wrong on the asset side

0:35:20.760 --> 0:35:23.799
<v Speaker 3>or the liability side, meaning you think an asset is

0:35:23.800 --> 0:35:27.839
<v Speaker 3>going to recover par that doesn't, or the liability side.

0:35:27.880 --> 0:35:29.799
<v Speaker 3>Too much leverage or the wrong kind of leverage is

0:35:29.880 --> 0:35:34.000
<v Speaker 3>used to take that risk. Pre financial crisis was both right.

0:35:34.040 --> 0:35:38.880
<v Speaker 3>There were loans against houses or against other assets that

0:35:39.920 --> 0:35:44.160
<v Speaker 3>were closer to worthless than being worth par and there

0:35:44.239 --> 0:35:49.200
<v Speaker 3>was leverage upon leverage upon leverage upon leverage. Both of

0:35:49.239 --> 0:35:51.600
<v Speaker 3>those kind of came out of the market and went

0:35:51.640 --> 0:35:54.839
<v Speaker 3>to the other extreme of the pendulum again, maybe now

0:35:54.880 --> 0:35:58.600
<v Speaker 3>working back towards the middle. But today we don't see

0:35:58.640 --> 0:36:02.680
<v Speaker 3>that type of head scratching behavior on the asset or

0:36:02.680 --> 0:36:03.680
<v Speaker 3>the liability side.

0:36:03.719 --> 0:36:07.960
<v Speaker 4>Really, And going back to your point about finding alpha

0:36:08.080 --> 0:36:12.239
<v Speaker 4>in corporate credit markets, do you have a preference when

0:36:12.239 --> 0:36:15.520
<v Speaker 4>it comes to a specific sector or maybe sectors that

0:36:15.600 --> 0:36:17.600
<v Speaker 4>you are avoiding in today's market.

0:36:18.360 --> 0:36:22.560
<v Speaker 3>Not really. We always try to be you know, most

0:36:23.080 --> 0:36:25.160
<v Speaker 3>most of what I'm talking about here is more on

0:36:25.200 --> 0:36:28.399
<v Speaker 3>the private credit side. But to use an old trader's term,

0:36:28.560 --> 0:36:30.840
<v Speaker 3>no such thing as a bad bond, just a bad price.

0:36:32.880 --> 0:36:35.479
<v Speaker 3>There's no there's there doesn't tend to be something we say,

0:36:35.560 --> 0:36:37.400
<v Speaker 3>you know, we always do this or we never do that.

0:36:38.360 --> 0:36:42.239
<v Speaker 3>We're open based on where we see value, where we

0:36:42.280 --> 0:36:44.840
<v Speaker 3>see loan to value, and where we see pricing, I

0:36:44.880 --> 0:36:48.520
<v Speaker 3>would say from a and this can move across industries.

0:36:49.719 --> 0:36:52.440
<v Speaker 3>Where we've been most active in corporate credit again, a

0:36:52.440 --> 0:36:57.279
<v Speaker 3>topic probably well covered by you all, has been on

0:36:57.520 --> 0:37:02.759
<v Speaker 3>the liability management exercise side of the corporate credit market. Right,

0:37:02.840 --> 0:37:04.880
<v Speaker 3>That's one way of saying it. There's a more cynical

0:37:04.880 --> 0:37:07.680
<v Speaker 3>way of saying it, which is the creditor on creditor violence.

0:37:07.719 --> 0:37:13.840
<v Speaker 3>But the provision of new capital, new credit capital to

0:37:13.960 --> 0:37:20.000
<v Speaker 3>an existing capital structure that might not be sustainable. That

0:37:20.080 --> 0:37:23.320
<v Speaker 3>has been the best opportunity in the corporate credit market

0:37:23.360 --> 0:37:25.719
<v Speaker 3>over the last year or two. I'd say at the

0:37:25.800 --> 0:37:30.040
<v Speaker 3>beginning of the high rates, high inflation period, it was

0:37:30.080 --> 0:37:34.560
<v Speaker 3>more classic dislocation, meaning there were hung financings at banks,

0:37:34.560 --> 0:37:38.280
<v Speaker 3>and there was a secondary market that was sort of crashing,

0:37:38.760 --> 0:37:41.520
<v Speaker 3>and there was a primary market that was frozen and shut.

0:37:41.600 --> 0:37:47.240
<v Speaker 3>And so that's more traditional dislocation. So by good bonds

0:37:47.239 --> 0:37:50.040
<v Speaker 3>and loans in the secondary getting thrown out with the market,

0:37:50.680 --> 0:37:55.600
<v Speaker 3>make safe loans to good companies that have to pay

0:37:55.680 --> 0:37:57.960
<v Speaker 3>up for capital because markets are shut. You know, that

0:37:58.080 --> 0:38:02.120
<v Speaker 3>was maybe the parts of twenty two twenty two. That's

0:38:02.160 --> 0:38:05.799
<v Speaker 3>not the case anymore. I think sometimes it still gets

0:38:05.800 --> 0:38:07.439
<v Speaker 3>talked about it like it's the case, but I would

0:38:07.480 --> 0:38:11.120
<v Speaker 3>say that's not really the case today. Where the opportunity

0:38:11.200 --> 0:38:15.320
<v Speaker 3>set really got to from late twenty three into twenty

0:38:15.360 --> 0:38:20.400
<v Speaker 3>four was more of the existing capital structure, typically in

0:38:20.480 --> 0:38:25.440
<v Speaker 3>a you know, a buyout situation, meaning a leverage buyout

0:38:25.600 --> 0:38:30.359
<v Speaker 3>where when rates were zero. Cash Flow was fine when

0:38:30.440 --> 0:38:33.480
<v Speaker 3>rates were five. Cash flow was not fine when the

0:38:33.520 --> 0:38:38.759
<v Speaker 3>economy was sort of growing massively and margins were peak.

0:38:38.840 --> 0:38:41.600
<v Speaker 3>Maybe it was okay. When the economy slowed a little

0:38:41.600 --> 0:38:44.080
<v Speaker 3>and margins came off peak, maybe not okay. So you

0:38:44.160 --> 0:38:48.120
<v Speaker 3>had this accumulation of cash flows not as good as

0:38:48.800 --> 0:38:54.320
<v Speaker 3>everyone had hoped. Interest eating up most of free cash flow,

0:38:54.360 --> 0:38:57.080
<v Speaker 3>if not more than all of free cash flow i e.

0:38:57.280 --> 0:39:01.120
<v Speaker 3>You know, companies becoming free cash flow negative. And instead

0:39:01.120 --> 0:39:05.200
<v Speaker 3>of the old fashioned way to resolve this, which used

0:39:05.200 --> 0:39:08.600
<v Speaker 3>to be some sort of insolvency proceeding for a whole

0:39:08.600 --> 0:39:11.520
<v Speaker 3>host of reasons, the world evolved to a different way

0:39:11.560 --> 0:39:14.560
<v Speaker 3>of resolving that, which is some version of an extension,

0:39:14.680 --> 0:39:17.200
<v Speaker 3>some version of a moving assets around, some version of

0:39:17.239 --> 0:39:23.000
<v Speaker 3>a moving the capital structure around, and so that that

0:39:23.080 --> 0:39:26.040
<v Speaker 3>premium I keep talking about the third the third four,

0:39:26.120 --> 0:39:29.720
<v Speaker 3>if you will. The best place to find that third

0:39:29.800 --> 0:39:32.680
<v Speaker 3>four in the corporate credit market over the last year

0:39:33.200 --> 0:39:40.120
<v Speaker 3>has been from either the complexity structure sourcing alpha sort

0:39:40.120 --> 0:39:45.480
<v Speaker 3>of tech wherewithal on the technology for this to participate

0:39:45.520 --> 0:39:48.759
<v Speaker 3>in that amend and extent market, or that provision of

0:39:48.840 --> 0:39:52.760
<v Speaker 3>new capital to a stressed capital structure.

0:39:54.840 --> 0:39:57.480
<v Speaker 4>It just maybe a quick follow up on corporate credit

0:39:57.800 --> 0:40:01.320
<v Speaker 4>would be curious to hear your views on six industrials,

0:40:02.080 --> 0:40:04.919
<v Speaker 4>at least from the universe of cyclical names that I cover,

0:40:05.040 --> 0:40:08.279
<v Speaker 4>mostly in Europe, some of them are in the US.

0:40:08.280 --> 0:40:12.880
<v Speaker 4>Spreads are tight compared to historical levels, and credit metrics

0:40:12.880 --> 0:40:16.520
<v Speaker 4>seem to be going in the wrong direction, so to speak.

0:40:17.320 --> 0:40:20.800
<v Speaker 4>Do you think that we're past the peak of the cycle,

0:40:21.280 --> 0:40:23.759
<v Speaker 4>and would you just be maybe more defensive in your

0:40:23.800 --> 0:40:27.480
<v Speaker 4>portfolios going twenty twenty five or is it a question

0:40:27.520 --> 0:40:31.640
<v Speaker 4>of being more selective as you said earlier on cyclical

0:40:31.800 --> 0:40:33.040
<v Speaker 4>industrial names.

0:40:33.680 --> 0:40:37.360
<v Speaker 3>I would say selective, and that's kind of always the answer,

0:40:37.400 --> 0:40:42.480
<v Speaker 3>to be honest. It's about selecting the It's about selecting

0:40:42.520 --> 0:40:46.480
<v Speaker 3>the right names. And so I think there's a broader

0:40:46.520 --> 0:40:52.120
<v Speaker 3>phenomenon that you touched on there, which is hey wire

0:40:52.239 --> 0:40:58.320
<v Speaker 3>spread seemingly tight in cyclical names. If half the time

0:40:59.120 --> 0:41:01.760
<v Speaker 3>we're all talking about an impending recession, that doesn't seem

0:41:01.760 --> 0:41:05.399
<v Speaker 3>to make sense. Two answers to that. One, maybe there's

0:41:05.400 --> 0:41:09.200
<v Speaker 3>not an impending recession, but two, a lot of the

0:41:09.200 --> 0:41:14.040
<v Speaker 3>world of credit investors are yield buyers, so spreads might

0:41:14.080 --> 0:41:18.200
<v Speaker 3>be tighter than opportunistic credit investors want them to be,

0:41:18.560 --> 0:41:21.920
<v Speaker 3>whether that's in European industrial names or just in aggregate.

0:41:23.200 --> 0:41:25.840
<v Speaker 3>But a lot of the world needs a total return,

0:41:25.960 --> 0:41:30.799
<v Speaker 3>needs a total yield, and so whether that part of

0:41:30.800 --> 0:41:32.759
<v Speaker 3>the yield is coming from the base rate or the

0:41:32.800 --> 0:41:36.800
<v Speaker 3>credit spread, maybe isn't as important to a lot of

0:41:36.840 --> 0:41:41.960
<v Speaker 3>those buyers, and so the tighter spread then you'll want

0:41:42.000 --> 0:41:44.600
<v Speaker 3>it to be. So to speak, is an output, not

0:41:44.680 --> 0:41:45.240
<v Speaker 3>an input.

0:41:46.600 --> 0:41:49.240
<v Speaker 2>I wanted to ask you on lme's you were mentioning

0:41:49.280 --> 0:41:52.600
<v Speaker 2>how they have provided great opportunity incorporate credit the last

0:41:52.640 --> 0:41:56.160
<v Speaker 2>couple of years. I wanted to ask your views on

0:41:56.800 --> 0:41:59.960
<v Speaker 2>cooperation agreements because here and here we're starting to see

0:42:00.200 --> 0:42:05.440
<v Speaker 2>them in some situations influenced by US accounts, in situations

0:42:05.440 --> 0:42:09.280
<v Speaker 2>where it's either a cross border like LDS or Altis

0:42:09.320 --> 0:42:15.080
<v Speaker 2>Friends or others like Klogner Pentoplease that it's a German

0:42:15.200 --> 0:42:19.799
<v Speaker 2>name but has US debt, and investors here seemed to

0:42:21.600 --> 0:42:25.280
<v Speaker 2>look at those co op agreements with at least skepticism,

0:42:25.320 --> 0:42:30.600
<v Speaker 2>if not concerned. What's your view on those cope agreements

0:42:30.640 --> 0:42:33.760
<v Speaker 2>that we're also seeing them being longer and longer.

0:42:34.600 --> 0:42:39.400
<v Speaker 3>Sure, so I would say here to stay and just

0:42:39.520 --> 0:42:44.200
<v Speaker 3>the next evolution in the marketplace. So again, if I oversimplify,

0:42:45.360 --> 0:42:48.759
<v Speaker 3>the way it used to work was the first lean

0:42:48.880 --> 0:42:51.279
<v Speaker 3>lender got paid back first, and then the second lean

0:42:51.320 --> 0:42:54.040
<v Speaker 3>lender got paid back, and then the unsecured and then

0:42:54.080 --> 0:42:57.600
<v Speaker 3>whoever was below that, and there was really simple priority

0:42:57.600 --> 0:42:59.880
<v Speaker 3>of payment, and it was really hard for that to

0:43:00.160 --> 0:43:04.400
<v Speaker 3>become altered in any way. And then over a period

0:43:04.440 --> 0:43:08.480
<v Speaker 3>of years, documents became much looser, particularly the ability to

0:43:08.560 --> 0:43:11.759
<v Speaker 3>amend a document with majority as opposed to super majority

0:43:12.080 --> 0:43:19.600
<v Speaker 3>or super duper majority. Market participants meaning borrowers, lenders, banks,

0:43:19.640 --> 0:43:25.399
<v Speaker 3>advisors all got smarter on this technology, and all got

0:43:25.440 --> 0:43:30.160
<v Speaker 3>smarter on how to optimize, and so sponsors started doing

0:43:30.520 --> 0:43:36.680
<v Speaker 3>very aggressive maneuvers. Then new lenders started to take advantage

0:43:36.719 --> 0:43:41.880
<v Speaker 3>of that through the provision of new capital, and sponsors

0:43:42.320 --> 0:43:45.920
<v Speaker 3>then sought a different angle, and the response to that

0:43:46.360 --> 0:43:49.359
<v Speaker 3>was the co op. And so it's just it's this

0:43:49.600 --> 0:43:58.200
<v Speaker 3>ping ponging of capitalism. There's old lenders, new perspective lenders,

0:43:58.680 --> 0:44:01.080
<v Speaker 3>and the borrower. Those are three parties in there. Now,

0:44:01.239 --> 0:44:04.920
<v Speaker 3>a typical situation is way more complex because old lenders

0:44:05.000 --> 0:44:08.680
<v Speaker 3>might be five, six, seven different layers of a capital structure.

0:44:08.719 --> 0:44:11.640
<v Speaker 3>But the pingponging of trying to get an edge, get

0:44:11.680 --> 0:44:14.759
<v Speaker 3>an edge, create a response, create a counter response is

0:44:14.800 --> 0:44:19.440
<v Speaker 3>what led to the co op. And on a no

0:44:19.560 --> 0:44:22.080
<v Speaker 3>names basis, we're in our morning meeting this morning on

0:44:22.120 --> 0:44:27.040
<v Speaker 3>credit debating when a co op might break and there's

0:44:27.080 --> 0:44:28.719
<v Speaker 3>going to be a splinter group off a co op

0:44:28.719 --> 0:44:30.480
<v Speaker 3>that's going to create a new co op. And so

0:44:31.200 --> 0:44:34.279
<v Speaker 3>this is just this is just capitalism at work. It's

0:44:34.320 --> 0:44:36.680
<v Speaker 3>neither good nor bad. It just is. And so the

0:44:36.800 --> 0:44:40.600
<v Speaker 3>job of the credit investor is to make sure you

0:44:40.600 --> 0:44:43.600
<v Speaker 3>can see around that corner again, not every single time,

0:44:43.640 --> 0:44:46.279
<v Speaker 3>but hopefully most of the time, to avoid being on

0:44:46.320 --> 0:44:48.440
<v Speaker 3>the wrong side and hopefully be on the right side.

0:44:49.280 --> 0:44:51.719
<v Speaker 2>And when you say they are here to stay, do

0:44:51.840 --> 0:44:54.399
<v Speaker 2>you see them here to stay in Europe as well?

0:44:54.480 --> 0:44:57.200
<v Speaker 2>Or perhaps director duties are stricter than in the US,

0:44:57.280 --> 0:45:02.760
<v Speaker 2>and this kind of that are typically played in enemies

0:45:02.880 --> 0:45:06.120
<v Speaker 2>like upstreaming are not a thing.

0:45:07.560 --> 0:45:10.640
<v Speaker 3>So yes, I do believe that it's going to be

0:45:10.680 --> 0:45:14.840
<v Speaker 3>there in Europe. Every country in Europe is different. Some

0:45:14.880 --> 0:45:17.440
<v Speaker 3>of the director's duties you're referring to are stronger in

0:45:17.480 --> 0:45:22.480
<v Speaker 3>some countries than other countries, and that director duty angle

0:45:23.400 --> 0:45:26.320
<v Speaker 3>is kind of just for a specific line of attack

0:45:26.440 --> 0:45:30.960
<v Speaker 3>on the creative lme front. So if it's if it's

0:45:31.000 --> 0:45:33.719
<v Speaker 3>not that line of attack, someone will think of a

0:45:33.760 --> 0:45:39.800
<v Speaker 3>really clever new line of attack. So co op agreements

0:45:40.640 --> 0:45:43.840
<v Speaker 3>are as I shouldn't say necessary, are going to be

0:45:43.920 --> 0:45:45.960
<v Speaker 3>as part of the process in Europe as they are

0:45:45.960 --> 0:45:49.360
<v Speaker 3>in the US. Notwithstanding the fact that certain avenues to

0:45:49.520 --> 0:45:54.400
<v Speaker 3>create pressure that are used in the US, and you

0:45:54.440 --> 0:45:57.400
<v Speaker 3>alluded to it, there's fancier ways of talking about it,

0:45:57.440 --> 0:46:00.760
<v Speaker 3>but it's basically the moving of assets up and out.

0:46:02.120 --> 0:46:04.080
<v Speaker 3>It can be harder to do that in certain European

0:46:04.160 --> 0:46:08.120
<v Speaker 3>jurisdictions due to director liability that kind of kicks in

0:46:08.520 --> 0:46:12.319
<v Speaker 3>and around this zone of insolvency concept. But someone will

0:46:12.320 --> 0:46:14.279
<v Speaker 3>think of a new angle and the cop agreement will

0:46:14.280 --> 0:46:14.759
<v Speaker 3>address that.

0:46:14.800 --> 0:46:19.600
<v Speaker 2>One and one thing that we've seen in the restructurings

0:46:19.600 --> 0:46:23.440
<v Speaker 2>in the US in particular with these liability management exercises

0:46:23.560 --> 0:46:28.479
<v Speaker 2>was these creater and creator violence. What are the long

0:46:28.560 --> 0:46:34.240
<v Speaker 2>term negative impacts that you foresee with this kind of trend,

0:46:34.840 --> 0:46:35.520
<v Speaker 2>if any.

0:46:36.120 --> 0:46:39.000
<v Speaker 3>Maybe a cop out, but I view that as not

0:46:39.160 --> 0:46:43.400
<v Speaker 3>our job either, right. Our job is to try and

0:46:43.440 --> 0:46:46.080
<v Speaker 3>make smart credit investments. And so again in the case

0:46:46.160 --> 0:46:49.400
<v Speaker 3>of this specific issue of movement of assets that can

0:46:49.480 --> 0:46:51.960
<v Speaker 3>help one creditor and hurt another. Our job is to

0:46:52.040 --> 0:46:54.960
<v Speaker 3>avoid getting and hurt and to hopefully be on the

0:46:55.480 --> 0:46:59.520
<v Speaker 3>side that gets helped. It's not going away, let's put

0:46:59.560 --> 0:47:02.799
<v Speaker 3>it that way. It's not going away. As long as

0:47:02.800 --> 0:47:06.040
<v Speaker 3>there are contracts, and as long as contract law prevails,

0:47:06.320 --> 0:47:09.080
<v Speaker 3>and as long as there is a capitalist interest on

0:47:09.200 --> 0:47:14.640
<v Speaker 3>all sides amongst all constituents, there will be continued innovation

0:47:14.800 --> 0:47:20.560
<v Speaker 3>in this. So I think there are traditional lenders who

0:47:20.600 --> 0:47:22.640
<v Speaker 3>say this is bad for business, and it's going to

0:47:22.719 --> 0:47:25.160
<v Speaker 3>raise the cost of capital for companies, and everything should

0:47:25.160 --> 0:47:26.879
<v Speaker 3>go back to the simple way it used to be,

0:47:27.239 --> 0:47:29.880
<v Speaker 3>which is if you were the first in line lender,

0:47:29.920 --> 0:47:32.760
<v Speaker 3>you got paid before anyone else, and then the second line,

0:47:32.800 --> 0:47:35.400
<v Speaker 3>second in line lender, and then so on down the line.

0:47:35.800 --> 0:47:39.000
<v Speaker 3>I don't think that's coming back. I think that is

0:47:39.520 --> 0:47:41.920
<v Speaker 3>that is wishful wishful thinking.

0:47:42.480 --> 0:47:44.759
<v Speaker 1>So the year of tit to covenants, that's gone. You can't.

0:47:45.520 --> 0:47:51.279
<v Speaker 3>It'll come and go cyclically. But I don't think that

0:47:52.680 --> 0:47:55.799
<v Speaker 3>we are sort of suddenly all at once going to

0:47:55.840 --> 0:48:02.640
<v Speaker 3>go back to traditional credit document. It's across the board on.

0:48:02.520 --> 0:48:05.960
<v Speaker 1>The structure finance. You launched a platform to invest in

0:48:05.960 --> 0:48:09.120
<v Speaker 1>the riskiest challenges of clos classmized loan obligations earlier this year.

0:48:09.120 --> 0:48:10.480
<v Speaker 1>How's that going? Is that a good business?

0:48:11.400 --> 0:48:13.360
<v Speaker 3>So it's been a great business for a long time.

0:48:15.239 --> 0:48:18.239
<v Speaker 3>It's it doesn't often get discussed this way, but it's

0:48:18.360 --> 0:48:21.759
<v Speaker 3>essentially the arbitrage between the assets spread and the cost

0:48:21.760 --> 0:48:24.520
<v Speaker 3>of liabilities. It's just being a bank, right, That's what

0:48:24.560 --> 0:48:27.480
<v Speaker 3>a bank does. It borrows money in one place and

0:48:27.560 --> 0:48:30.239
<v Speaker 3>lends it in another. And so that's that's what a

0:48:30.280 --> 0:48:34.080
<v Speaker 3>CLO does. It owns a diversified portfolio of loans. Those

0:48:34.160 --> 0:48:37.359
<v Speaker 3>loans pay a spread. That spread is an excess of

0:48:37.360 --> 0:48:40.000
<v Speaker 3>what it costs to finance it on a term non

0:48:40.040 --> 0:48:43.040
<v Speaker 3>mark to market basis. Right, So I'd argue it's it's

0:48:43.080 --> 0:48:45.440
<v Speaker 3>better than the business of banking, because in the business

0:48:45.440 --> 0:48:48.640
<v Speaker 3>of banking, as as people learned over the last couple

0:48:48.680 --> 0:48:51.160
<v Speaker 3>of years, sometimes your funding runs out the door, and

0:48:51.200 --> 0:48:53.520
<v Speaker 3>when your funding can use a mobile phone to do so,

0:48:53.560 --> 0:48:58.520
<v Speaker 3>it runs out even faster. Clos are a term financed

0:48:59.480 --> 0:49:05.360
<v Speaker 3>funding arbitrage. So there are times the arbitrage is wider

0:49:05.640 --> 0:49:09.560
<v Speaker 3>or narrower. There are times where we or others as

0:49:09.680 --> 0:49:13.839
<v Speaker 3>manager do a better or worse job, But fundamentally it's

0:49:13.880 --> 0:49:19.360
<v Speaker 3>a really great tool to extract the assets spread less

0:49:19.400 --> 0:49:20.920
<v Speaker 3>the cost of funds.

0:49:21.160 --> 0:49:22.799
<v Speaker 1>And if you look at all the stuff, you get

0:49:22.840 --> 0:49:26.520
<v Speaker 1>to see, which is quite very broad and global, where

0:49:26.600 --> 0:49:28.759
<v Speaker 1>is the best relative value opportunity right now?

0:49:28.920 --> 0:49:33.600
<v Speaker 3>And why credit broadly? And I just can't get away

0:49:33.680 --> 0:49:39.439
<v Speaker 3>from the four plus four plus four math, especially as

0:49:39.480 --> 0:49:44.520
<v Speaker 3>compared to you know, over almost the last twenty years,

0:49:46.040 --> 0:49:48.480
<v Speaker 3>we haven't had that at all. Right, We've had a

0:49:48.520 --> 0:49:52.239
<v Speaker 3>handful of episodes that are huge dislocations, and that's different, right,

0:49:52.280 --> 0:49:57.360
<v Speaker 3>the GFC and the sovereign debt crisis and the energy crisis,

0:49:57.360 --> 0:50:00.279
<v Speaker 3>the twenty fifteen twenty sixteen period, and the COVID sis.

0:50:00.360 --> 0:50:04.120
<v Speaker 3>That's different if you take just a generic period of time.

0:50:05.640 --> 0:50:08.960
<v Speaker 3>There just hasn't been that much return on offer in credit.

0:50:09.960 --> 0:50:16.360
<v Speaker 3>So where we have dollars that can move between asset classes,

0:50:17.880 --> 0:50:20.520
<v Speaker 3>more of those dollars are deployed in credit. Where we

0:50:20.600 --> 0:50:26.200
<v Speaker 3>have credit funds that can draw down capital, they draw

0:50:26.239 --> 0:50:30.200
<v Speaker 3>it down even faster. Where we have evergreen credit funds,

0:50:30.400 --> 0:50:33.880
<v Speaker 3>they're fully invested. So when we have the chance to

0:50:33.920 --> 0:50:36.319
<v Speaker 3>make these types of returns relative to this type of risk.

0:50:37.080 --> 0:50:37.920
<v Speaker 3>We want to take it.

0:50:38.400 --> 0:50:40.160
<v Speaker 1>The credit people. You know, we live in fear with

0:50:41.520 --> 0:50:44.640
<v Speaker 1>permanently paranoid something's going to happen. I mean, you're not

0:50:44.719 --> 0:50:48.480
<v Speaker 1>thinking it's too good to be true.

0:50:48.760 --> 0:50:53.840
<v Speaker 3>No things, surprises do always happen. They absolutely do happen.

0:50:54.120 --> 0:50:58.560
<v Speaker 3>And so getting back to the point I made earlier,

0:50:59.480 --> 0:51:01.759
<v Speaker 3>at any give point, an investor can mess up on

0:51:01.800 --> 0:51:04.920
<v Speaker 3>the asset side or mess up on the liability side.

0:51:05.719 --> 0:51:08.120
<v Speaker 3>We try to take messing up on the liability side

0:51:08.120 --> 0:51:16.080
<v Speaker 3>out of the equation by using minimal financial leverage and

0:51:16.120 --> 0:51:19.040
<v Speaker 3>in the case of private credit, doing it in funds

0:51:19.120 --> 0:51:22.200
<v Speaker 3>that have multi year time horizons. So if you can

0:51:22.239 --> 0:51:26.799
<v Speaker 3>take the liability side off the table, or you can

0:51:26.840 --> 0:51:30.839
<v Speaker 3>reduce the risk of the liability side, now your risk

0:51:30.920 --> 0:51:34.880
<v Speaker 3>is just on the asset side. And so in generally

0:51:34.920 --> 0:51:39.560
<v Speaker 3>making you know, senior type of loans or taking senior

0:51:39.600 --> 0:51:43.120
<v Speaker 3>type of cash flows, we can do worse than we underwrite.

0:51:43.120 --> 0:51:48.560
<v Speaker 3>But it's hard to to catastrophically get that wrong in aggregate.

0:51:49.320 --> 0:51:52.719
<v Speaker 1>And so nothing at all that worries you about the outlook.

0:51:53.280 --> 0:51:57.040
<v Speaker 3>Now, if there's a recession, put it this way, I'll

0:51:57.040 --> 0:52:00.880
<v Speaker 3>give you I'll give you a scenario again, we're not

0:52:01.040 --> 0:52:03.680
<v Speaker 3>like wildly bullish. Sort of where I'm trying to describe

0:52:03.760 --> 0:52:06.600
<v Speaker 3>is we're not wildly bullish or wildly bearish. We're just

0:52:06.680 --> 0:52:09.080
<v Speaker 3>credit investors. And if we can underwrite low LTVs and

0:52:09.120 --> 0:52:11.960
<v Speaker 3>reasonably say for good assets with good structure, we think

0:52:12.000 --> 0:52:13.520
<v Speaker 3>we're gonna do all right if things are good or

0:52:13.520 --> 0:52:18.440
<v Speaker 3>things are bad in the world. And you know, forgive

0:52:18.560 --> 0:52:21.040
<v Speaker 3>the lack of brilliance there, but those are the two options.

0:52:21.120 --> 0:52:22.680
<v Speaker 3>Things might be kind of good or might be kind

0:52:22.680 --> 0:52:24.759
<v Speaker 3>of bad. And if we think we're okay either way,

0:52:25.400 --> 0:52:30.160
<v Speaker 3>you know that's the goal. Where where could the unexpected

0:52:30.200 --> 0:52:36.239
<v Speaker 3>come from? If inflation were to re accelerate, that would

0:52:37.440 --> 0:52:41.160
<v Speaker 3>be highly disruptive to everything, because if inflation were to

0:52:41.200 --> 0:52:46.880
<v Speaker 3>re accelerate, then the entire framework of don't worry that

0:52:47.000 --> 0:52:49.719
<v Speaker 3>rates are high because they're gonna come down, and that's

0:52:49.760 --> 0:52:52.719
<v Speaker 3>what allows commercial real estate values to stay okay, and

0:52:52.800 --> 0:52:56.000
<v Speaker 3>residential real estate values to stay okay, and corporate multiples

0:52:56.000 --> 0:53:03.920
<v Speaker 3>to stay okay. If that foundational factor were to be challenged,

0:53:04.640 --> 0:53:09.600
<v Speaker 3>that would seriously stir the pot Now for existing investments.

0:53:10.520 --> 0:53:12.640
<v Speaker 3>If you were right that you made a fifty LTV

0:53:12.800 --> 0:53:16.000
<v Speaker 3>loan and the value goes down by fifty percent, You're

0:53:16.040 --> 0:53:18.400
<v Speaker 3>still okay. You're not going to feel great while it's happening,

0:53:18.480 --> 0:53:22.440
<v Speaker 3>but you're still going to be okay. But a reacceleration

0:53:22.520 --> 0:53:26.719
<v Speaker 3>of inflation, that is one of the primary risks. Again,

0:53:26.760 --> 0:53:29.560
<v Speaker 3>we can always make the list of there's geopolitical risk,

0:53:29.600 --> 0:53:32.080
<v Speaker 3>and there's election risk and so on and so on

0:53:32.160 --> 0:53:36.960
<v Speaker 3>and so on, but and those you know, no one

0:53:37.040 --> 0:53:39.200
<v Speaker 3>knew the pandemic a year before the pandemic, right, a

0:53:39.239 --> 0:53:40.840
<v Speaker 3>lot of us knew it the month before, but not

0:53:40.880 --> 0:53:45.440
<v Speaker 3>the year before. That would change everything.

0:53:46.280 --> 0:53:49.840
<v Speaker 1>Great stuff, Jimmy Levin, CEO and chief investment officer of

0:53:49.840 --> 0:53:51.480
<v Speaker 1>Sculpt the Capital. It's been a pleasure having on the

0:53:51.480 --> 0:53:54.160
<v Speaker 1>credit edge, Manny. Thanks thanks for having me, and of

0:53:54.160 --> 0:53:57.040
<v Speaker 1>course we're very grateful to Stefan Kovichef from Bloomberg Intelligence.

0:53:57.040 --> 0:53:58.120
<v Speaker 1>Thank you for joining us today.

0:53:58.320 --> 0:54:00.239
<v Speaker 4>Thanks James, nice to be here.

0:54:00.040 --> 0:54:03.040
<v Speaker 1>And tone Gartia Perez many thanks. Follow her coverage on

0:54:03.080 --> 0:54:04.960
<v Speaker 1>the terminal and at Bloomberg dot com.

0:54:05.040 --> 0:54:05.760
<v Speaker 2>Thank you James.

0:54:06.000 --> 0:54:08.279
<v Speaker 1>For more credit market analysis and insight. Read all of

0:54:08.280 --> 0:54:12.000
<v Speaker 1>Stefan Kovichev's great work on the Bloomberg terminal. Bloomberg Intelligence

0:54:12.080 --> 0:54:14.400
<v Speaker 1>is part of our research department with five hundred analysts

0:54:14.400 --> 0:54:17.799
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0:54:17.840 --> 0:54:20.840
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0:54:25.200 --> 0:54:27.520
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0:54:27.800 --> 0:54:31.040
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0:54:34.600 --> 0:54:37.319
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0:54:37.320 --> 0:54:40.640
<v Speaker 1>Bloomberg dot net. I'm James Crombie. It's been a pleasure

0:54:40.680 --> 0:54:43.160
<v Speaker 1>having you join us again next week on the Credit

0:54:43.320 --> 0:55:03.080
<v Speaker 1>Edge