1
00:00:00,960 --> 00:00:05,080
Speaker 1: You're listening to Bloomberg Law. I'm June Grosso. Privacy versus

2
00:00:05,160 --> 00:00:08,600
Speaker 1: National security? How close are we coming to the surveillance

3
00:00:08,600 --> 00:00:11,240
Speaker 1: state that we've seen in movies and TV for years?

4
00:00:11,640 --> 00:00:15,120
Speaker 1: We know that the n s A, the FBI, Homeland Security,

5
00:00:15,160 --> 00:00:18,000
Speaker 1: and local police are collecting data on us, but to

6
00:00:18,040 --> 00:00:22,360
Speaker 1: what extent The debate has been going on unresolved for years.

7
00:00:22,400 --> 00:00:25,040
Speaker 1: Here Senator Bernie Sanders speaking from the floor of the

8
00:00:25,120 --> 00:00:30,560
Speaker 1: Senate in May of pretty much anything and everything that

9
00:00:30,720 --> 00:00:35,239
Speaker 1: we do these days can be tracked and recorded. Now

10
00:00:35,240 --> 00:00:37,480
Speaker 1: I hear many of my colleagues coming to the floor

11
00:00:37,520 --> 00:00:40,239
Speaker 1: of the Senate, and they talk about America being a

12
00:00:40,400 --> 00:00:45,480
Speaker 1: free country. Well, if somebody knows everything you are doing,

13
00:00:46,200 --> 00:00:49,160
Speaker 1: maybe it is time to recognize that we are not

14
00:00:49,280 --> 00:00:53,680
Speaker 1: quite so free as we think we are. Monitoring of

15
00:00:53,720 --> 00:00:56,160
Speaker 1: the public by police is in the spotlight again because

16
00:00:56,160 --> 00:00:59,160
Speaker 1: the Boston Police Department is about to spend up to

17
00:00:59,200 --> 00:01:02,600
Speaker 1: one point four million dollars for new software that will

18
00:01:02,600 --> 00:01:06,120
Speaker 1: scan social media and the Internet for criminal activity and

19
00:01:06,160 --> 00:01:10,120
Speaker 1: potential threats. Civil liberties groups are concerns about the risk

20
00:01:10,200 --> 00:01:13,880
Speaker 1: to free speech and privacy. My guests are former federal

21
00:01:13,920 --> 00:01:18,160
Speaker 1: prosecutor George Newhouse, a partner at Denton's and CADE. Crockford,

22
00:01:18,360 --> 00:01:21,200
Speaker 1: director of the Technology for Liberty Program at the a

23
00:01:21,319 --> 00:01:25,319
Speaker 1: c l U of Massachusetts, Kate, will you describe briefly

24
00:01:25,360 --> 00:01:29,120
Speaker 1: what this software does? Well, we're not exactly sure because

25
00:01:29,200 --> 00:01:32,480
Speaker 1: the Boston Police Department hasn't selected a vendor yet UM,

26
00:01:32,480 --> 00:01:34,759
Speaker 1: and they might not actually select one because there's been

27
00:01:34,959 --> 00:01:38,320
Speaker 1: UM somewhat of a public uprising against this plan. UH.

28
00:01:38,400 --> 00:01:40,560
Speaker 1: Here in Boston, there was a city council meeting yesterday

29
00:01:40,560 --> 00:01:42,680
Speaker 1: I can talk about if you like UM where this

30
00:01:42,880 --> 00:01:45,960
Speaker 1: was discussed. But they lay out what they're looking for

31
00:01:46,080 --> 00:01:49,280
Speaker 1: in an ADIA page request for for for Proposals, which

32
00:01:49,400 --> 00:01:53,400
Speaker 1: was UM published in October of this year, and it's

33
00:01:53,600 --> 00:01:57,240
Speaker 1: pre alarming what they're looking for. UM. Police departments across

34
00:01:57,240 --> 00:02:01,240
Speaker 1: the country use social media monitoring tool OLS that BPD

35
00:02:01,360 --> 00:02:05,240
Speaker 1: seems to want something quite more estancially more advanced than

36
00:02:05,280 --> 00:02:08,440
Speaker 1: what most departments have. And we know that because of

37
00:02:08,480 --> 00:02:11,480
Speaker 1: the price tag attached to this proposal, they are planning

38
00:02:11,480 --> 00:02:14,960
Speaker 1: to spend one point four million dollars on this software,

39
00:02:15,040 --> 00:02:20,000
Speaker 1: which is really UM unusual. It's an unusually large figure.

40
00:02:20,280 --> 00:02:24,000
Speaker 1: The Los Angeles Police Department, for example, UM spent seventy

41
00:02:24,440 --> 00:02:27,800
Speaker 1: dollars over a period of three years on technology like this.

42
00:02:27,960 --> 00:02:30,200
Speaker 1: So what is the DPT looking for. Well, in the

43
00:02:30,320 --> 00:02:34,040
Speaker 1: RFP they describe capabilities that they want, such as the

44
00:02:34,440 --> 00:02:38,640
Speaker 1: ability to manage multiple covert identities online. So one of

45
00:02:38,680 --> 00:02:42,600
Speaker 1: the things that officials at the hearing yesterday here in

46
00:02:42,639 --> 00:02:45,920
Speaker 1: town said about this program is that don't worry, nobody's

47
00:02:45,919 --> 00:02:49,239
Speaker 1: gonna be looking at your private information, reading your direct

48
00:02:49,280 --> 00:02:53,079
Speaker 1: messages or your private Facebook messages. Well, that's not strictly true.

49
00:02:53,400 --> 00:02:58,079
Speaker 1: If the VPD manages these covert online profiles um, and

50
00:02:58,360 --> 00:03:01,440
Speaker 1: leads one just to you and manages to get you

51
00:03:01,480 --> 00:03:03,600
Speaker 1: to accept a fun requests while all of a sudden

52
00:03:03,600 --> 00:03:08,440
Speaker 1: now they are behind the wall of your private Facebook page. Um.

53
00:03:08,480 --> 00:03:12,600
Speaker 1: They also want to be able to develop comprehensive daciers

54
00:03:12,720 --> 00:03:18,079
Speaker 1: on individuals that cross social media platforms. So let's let

55
00:03:18,120 --> 00:03:23,359
Speaker 1: George get get an information in here. George, your former prosecutor.

56
00:03:24,040 --> 00:03:26,760
Speaker 1: Do you agree with the police that they need this

57
00:03:26,880 --> 00:03:31,760
Speaker 1: technology to fight terrorism or are you concerned that they

58
00:03:31,760 --> 00:03:34,359
Speaker 1: are not going to follow you know, the straight and

59
00:03:34,440 --> 00:03:38,800
Speaker 1: narrow guidelines they set out. Well, the answer, June is

60
00:03:38,880 --> 00:03:42,760
Speaker 1: that security comes with a cost. There is a delicate

61
00:03:42,760 --> 00:03:45,360
Speaker 1: balancing that needs to be to be done here. I

62
00:03:45,400 --> 00:03:48,240
Speaker 1: don't necessarily agree with the A C l U. I

63
00:03:48,280 --> 00:03:51,440
Speaker 1: don't share a suspicion that the police and you can

64
00:03:51,480 --> 00:03:54,760
Speaker 1: bet the federal agencies are doing this right now, um.

65
00:03:54,840 --> 00:03:57,000
Speaker 1: And what they're what they're purporting to do is there

66
00:03:57,080 --> 00:04:00,480
Speaker 1: is a tremendous volume of information that's out on the

67
00:04:00,560 --> 00:04:04,480
Speaker 1: net um drinking of the proverbial drinking from a fire host.

68
00:04:04,520 --> 00:04:09,440
Speaker 1: So this software will enable law enforcement to selectively monitor

69
00:04:09,720 --> 00:04:13,320
Speaker 1: what would be considered high risk type messages where there

70
00:04:13,360 --> 00:04:17,279
Speaker 1: may be threats or some indications of terrorist activity. I

71
00:04:17,320 --> 00:04:20,080
Speaker 1: think it's important to point out that we're not talking

72
00:04:20,080 --> 00:04:24,840
Speaker 1: about going into private emails. We're talking about information that

73
00:04:24,920 --> 00:04:28,479
Speaker 1: really his does have some public dissemination UM. So I

74
00:04:28,520 --> 00:04:31,719
Speaker 1: think it's you know, again that the balancing has to

75
00:04:31,760 --> 00:04:34,440
Speaker 1: be done by both the police and the federal agencies

76
00:04:34,800 --> 00:04:37,880
Speaker 1: with with privacy and mind. But certainly I think some

77
00:04:37,960 --> 00:04:41,400
Speaker 1: measure of this UM and these tools are very important

78
00:04:41,440 --> 00:04:46,680
Speaker 1: for enhancing security. Kate, the police says, say, this is

79
00:04:46,880 --> 00:04:50,360
Speaker 1: out there already. We're not going into anyone's email, We're

80
00:04:50,440 --> 00:04:54,440
Speaker 1: just going through public sources like Twitter. Right. Well, what

81
00:04:54,600 --> 00:04:57,680
Speaker 1: I said, they also intend to develop covert online identities

82
00:04:57,720 --> 00:05:01,040
Speaker 1: to get behind people's privacy settings so that they actually

83
00:05:01,080 --> 00:05:03,640
Speaker 1: can read things that people don't want the police reading.

84
00:05:03,880 --> 00:05:07,719
Speaker 1: But even aside from that issue, UM, we're really talking

85
00:05:07,720 --> 00:05:09,960
Speaker 1: about what we want the future of our society to

86
00:05:10,000 --> 00:05:11,360
Speaker 1: look like. Do we want to live in a free

87
00:05:11,400 --> 00:05:13,600
Speaker 1: society or do we want to live in a digital

88
00:05:13,640 --> 00:05:17,360
Speaker 1: police state? And you know, the claim that programs like

89
00:05:17,400 --> 00:05:21,480
Speaker 1: this would advance public safety is accepted as fact. I mean,

90
00:05:21,520 --> 00:05:23,679
Speaker 1: you set up this segment saying this is a contest

91
00:05:23,720 --> 00:05:26,920
Speaker 1: between privacy and security, but that's not actually true. There's

92
00:05:26,960 --> 00:05:30,520
Speaker 1: no evidence to suggest that programs like this advanced public safety.

93
00:05:30,720 --> 00:05:34,599
Speaker 1: In fact, we know, through um the example of the

94
00:05:34,680 --> 00:05:39,360
Speaker 1: NSAS dragnet surveillance programs targeting domestic phone calls, that those

95
00:05:39,440 --> 00:05:42,520
Speaker 1: kinds of dragnet surveillance programs in fact do not benefit

96
00:05:42,560 --> 00:05:46,720
Speaker 1: public safety. Um. There was not a single example of

97
00:05:46,760 --> 00:05:49,520
Speaker 1: that program stopping a terrorist attack, for example, that the

98
00:05:49,640 --> 00:05:53,160
Speaker 1: n s A could UM provide to Congress when asked so.

99
00:05:53,480 --> 00:05:55,000
Speaker 1: And this is not the a c L you saying this.

100
00:05:55,120 --> 00:05:58,480
Speaker 1: Two Blue Ribbon presidential commissions found that dragnet surveillance does

101
00:05:58,520 --> 00:06:02,560
Speaker 1: not advance public safety. The notion that you know, expanding

102
00:06:02,600 --> 00:06:05,960
Speaker 1: this dragnet surveillance to state and local police departments is

103
00:06:06,000 --> 00:06:09,960
Speaker 1: going to advanced security is just not at all proven

104
00:06:10,040 --> 00:06:12,880
Speaker 1: and we shouldn't accept it as fact um as a

105
00:06:12,920 --> 00:06:16,360
Speaker 1: framework by having this conversation. So, George, what's your response

106
00:06:16,440 --> 00:06:18,720
Speaker 1: to that, has there been any proof that this is

107
00:06:18,720 --> 00:06:22,039
Speaker 1: working at all? Well, I mean it's true, there isn't.

108
00:06:22,160 --> 00:06:26,679
Speaker 1: There aren't concrete examples. Even the FBI does from time

109
00:06:26,680 --> 00:06:31,120
Speaker 1: to time intercept plots that they bring down. But that's

110
00:06:31,279 --> 00:06:34,400
Speaker 1: actually part of the point here is that by catching

111
00:06:34,440 --> 00:06:37,000
Speaker 1: these things, nipping it in the bud before there is

112
00:06:37,040 --> 00:06:41,960
Speaker 1: a horrific shooting or a bombing, that then injures hundreds

113
00:06:41,960 --> 00:06:46,520
Speaker 1: of people. Um, what the FBI and the law enforcement

114
00:06:46,520 --> 00:06:48,560
Speaker 1: want to do is be alerted to people who are

115
00:06:49,000 --> 00:06:53,000
Speaker 1: out there, who are making threats, who are raising a

116
00:06:53,080 --> 00:06:56,480
Speaker 1: profile that's of concern, and then yes, sometimes they will

117
00:06:56,720 --> 00:07:01,360
Speaker 1: actually interceeds, set up undercover operations and uh and get

118
00:07:01,400 --> 00:07:03,880
Speaker 1: these people to to tip their hand before they have

119
00:07:03,960 --> 00:07:08,000
Speaker 1: actually done harm. But it's very difficult, I think, indeed

120
00:07:08,080 --> 00:07:12,040
Speaker 1: maybe near impossible to expect the law enforce and agencies

121
00:07:12,080 --> 00:07:15,040
Speaker 1: to show some kind of a track record. Um, you know,

122
00:07:15,240 --> 00:07:17,760
Speaker 1: here are all the cases that we've we've stopped in

123
00:07:17,800 --> 00:07:20,120
Speaker 1: their tracks. But I think it does happen from time

124
00:07:20,120 --> 00:07:23,360
Speaker 1: to time. Um, And of course when it doesn't go

125
00:07:23,400 --> 00:07:27,640
Speaker 1: to court, we don't necessarily even hear about it. George,

126
00:07:27,720 --> 00:07:32,600
Speaker 1: Why aren't any of these cases really going to court? Well,

127
00:07:32,840 --> 00:07:37,120
Speaker 1: it's here's part of the problem. It's very delicate when

128
00:07:37,320 --> 00:07:41,800
Speaker 1: intelligence sources are used or sensitive monitoring techniques that the

129
00:07:41,800 --> 00:07:45,480
Speaker 1: authorities do not want the public necessarily to know about this.

130
00:07:46,120 --> 00:07:49,520
Speaker 1: But the BUST and pd UH had to come forward

131
00:07:49,600 --> 00:07:52,720
Speaker 1: and UH they were asking for a basically budget allocation.

132
00:07:53,360 --> 00:07:57,520
Speaker 1: But there are very sensitive surveillance and law enforcement techniques

133
00:07:58,000 --> 00:08:01,280
Speaker 1: UM that sometimes they won't bring the case because they

134
00:08:01,320 --> 00:08:06,400
Speaker 1: don't want to disclose um, investigative techniques that are that

135
00:08:06,440 --> 00:08:09,160
Speaker 1: are not getting publicity, for fear that by tipping off

136
00:08:09,200 --> 00:08:15,680
Speaker 1: your adversaries. Remember, the bad guys, both terrorists and sophisticated

137
00:08:15,720 --> 00:08:19,679
Speaker 1: cyber criminals are usually one step ahead of authorities. They're

138
00:08:19,720 --> 00:08:24,680
Speaker 1: constantly changing and adapting to technological advances by the police.

139
00:08:24,720 --> 00:08:27,280
Speaker 1: So there's there's some sensitivity I'm aware of on the

140
00:08:27,360 --> 00:08:30,480
Speaker 1: law enforcement side about you know, not disclosing some of

141
00:08:30,520 --> 00:08:34,600
Speaker 1: their successes for fear that it will be counterproductive over

142
00:08:34,640 --> 00:08:37,959
Speaker 1: the long term. Jaide, we only have about thirty seconds here.

143
00:08:38,120 --> 00:08:41,160
Speaker 1: Does the a c l U intend to take this

144
00:08:41,320 --> 00:08:44,520
Speaker 1: to court? Is not a legal issue at the matter

145
00:08:44,880 --> 00:08:46,680
Speaker 1: at the moment. This is a really an issue about

146
00:08:46,679 --> 00:08:48,640
Speaker 1: public policy and what the people of Boston think is

147
00:08:48,679 --> 00:08:50,400
Speaker 1: appropriate for our police department. And I just want to

148
00:08:50,400 --> 00:08:53,040
Speaker 1: say that I find what you just said extremely problematic.

149
00:08:53,520 --> 00:08:55,960
Speaker 1: Police departments are not the n s A. They are

150
00:08:55,960 --> 00:08:59,119
Speaker 1: not the CIA. These are public institutions that are responsible

151
00:08:59,120 --> 00:09:01,800
Speaker 1: for the public. They have to abide by our rules

152
00:09:01,880 --> 00:09:05,240
Speaker 1: and laws, um, primary, which is the Constitution. So no,

153
00:09:05,440 --> 00:09:08,520
Speaker 1: there should not be secret surround programs that police are

154
00:09:08,600 --> 00:09:12,560
Speaker 1: keeping out of courtrooms, um, keeping secret evidence of how

155
00:09:12,640 --> 00:09:15,439
Speaker 1: they spied on people from defendants. That that runs contrary

156
00:09:15,440 --> 00:09:18,520
Speaker 1: to everything that our criminal justice system is supposed to

157
00:09:18,600 --> 00:09:22,040
Speaker 1: stand for. Thank you both. That's Cade Crockford, director of

158
00:09:22,040 --> 00:09:24,439
Speaker 1: Technology for Liberty Program at the a c l U

159
00:09:24,520 --> 00:09:28,200
Speaker 1: of Massachusetts, and George Newhouse, partner at Denton's and former

160
00:09:28,200 --> 00:09:32,160
Speaker 1: federal prosecutor, coming up on Bloomberg law. A jury fails

161
00:09:32,200 --> 00:09:34,720
Speaker 1: to reach a verdict in the trial of Michael Slager,

162
00:09:34,840 --> 00:09:38,600
Speaker 1: the police officer whose videotaped killing of an unarmed black

163
00:09:38,640 --> 00:09:41,480
Speaker 1: man shocked the country. This is Bloomberg