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Speaker 1: Also media.

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Speaker 2: Welcome to Better Offline. I am, of course your host

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Speaker 2: ed Zeitron. Now we're back in the studio in beautiful

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Speaker 2: New York City, New York State. You need to check

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Speaker 2: out the show notes. Of course, we have these beautiful

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Speaker 2: fuck Data Center t shirts. Subscribe to my newsletter and

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Speaker 2: so on and so forth. But today joining me at

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Speaker 2: Swaggage Claim are two of Barons's finest reporters, the legendary

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Speaker 2: Nick Dever who handles the gambling industry, and the Wall

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Speaker 2: Street reporting legend Rebecca Ungarno. Thank you so much for

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Speaker 2: joining us now, Nick, Yes, we have had so many

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Speaker 2: people emailing about prediction markets, and you cover the gambling

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Speaker 2: industry as well. How are they different? How are they

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Speaker 2: not the same thing, because they very much seem similar. Yeah.

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Speaker 3: I think from a consumer point of view, there's very

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Speaker 3: difference between these products. You put money on the line,

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Speaker 3: if your team wins, you get paid out. So from

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Speaker 3: like a layman's point of view, I think there's very

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Speaker 3: little difference. However, there is a difference on a gambling

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Speaker 3: In gambling, you're betting against the house, so the betting

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Speaker 3: firm sets the odds that you're betting against, right whereas

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Speaker 3: in a prediction market, your counter party is another trader.

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Speaker 3: So trader or prediction markets are just essentially brokers that

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Speaker 3: are putting two traders together on one contract. And I

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Speaker 3: can explain that in a little more detail.

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Speaker 2: If you like, please.

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Speaker 3: So prediction markets sell what are called event contracts. So

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Speaker 3: event contracts are futures contracts. They're also called binary options,

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Speaker 3: and they're built around yes or no questions. So each

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Speaker 3: contract is worth one dollar, and it has two traders.

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Speaker 3: There's a trader on the yes side and there's a

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Speaker 3: trader on the no side. So like, will this podcast

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Speaker 3: go well, we can make that a prediction market. I hope,

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Speaker 3: I hope it goes well.

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Speaker 2: Let's get this. I'm just set that up right now. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah.

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Speaker 3: So if person A thinks there's a seventy five percent

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Speaker 3: chance that it will go well, and person B thinks

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Speaker 3: there's a twenty five percent chance that it will not

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Speaker 3: go well, person A pays seventy five cents and person

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Speaker 3: B pays twenty five cents. Right, So if it turns

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Speaker 3: out yes, the yes trader gets the twenty five cents

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Speaker 3: put up by the no trader and makes and now

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Speaker 3: has a dollar contract. Now, let's say on a second contract,

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Speaker 3: person C thinks there's a twenty five percent chance of yes,

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Speaker 3: person D thinks there's a seventy five percent chance of no.

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Speaker 3: So these two contracts where the odds are flipped average out,

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Speaker 3: and there's a fifty to fifty chance that this podcast

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Speaker 3: goes well, right, right, So the price of the contract

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Speaker 3: is the predictions, and prediction markets are just brokers. The

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Speaker 3: businesses themselves are just connecting to trades.

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Speaker 2: So where's the crypto side as well? Because I remember

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Speaker 2: when polymarkets started it was a weird crypto thing. But

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Speaker 2: is it still that?

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Speaker 3: Yeah, I would say it's still a weird crypto thing.

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Speaker 3: They most of their business is still their international side

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Speaker 3: where they just take I think it's US d T,

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Speaker 3: it's some stable coin of that. They all of the

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Speaker 3: contracts are traded on that. That's poly Market. They're an

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Speaker 3: offshore run company. Yeah, offshore meaning right, yeah, I love this,

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Speaker 3: yeah yeah, meaning not regulated in the US, not a

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Speaker 3: US US based company. Contrast that with Calshi. Calshi was

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Speaker 3: the first registered designated contract market by the CFTC that's

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Speaker 3: the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. They regulate all of this stuff,

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Speaker 3: and so Calshi was the first firm to actually do

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Speaker 3: this in what we would call like the legal way,

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Speaker 3: whereas poly Market does not have to abide by the

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Speaker 3: US regulations because they are not a US firm and

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Speaker 3: they're trying to become They've gotten permissioned to operate in

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Speaker 3: the US, but they're like slowly rolling that out. A

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Speaker 3: lot of people in the US don't have Polymarket US accounts. Yeah,

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Speaker 3: if you want to trade on poly Market in the US,

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Speaker 3: you're mostly using a VPN.

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Speaker 2: A new zone, but you unique crypto to do it. Yes. Yeah.

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Speaker 3: For the international site, this feel was.

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Speaker 2: Like it be rife with manipulation though.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, yeah, definitely I think that there because poly market operates,

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Speaker 3: you know, on the blockchain, it's generally all anonymous, and

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Speaker 3: it's very easy to get any kind of market you

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Speaker 3: want created, there's a lot of concern around manipulation. I

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Speaker 3: think A helpful example is there was some football game

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Speaker 3: or some sporting event, and there was a market for

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Speaker 3: will someone streak at this event, you know, run onto

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Speaker 3: the field naked, and someone did end up streaking, and

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Speaker 3: the person that ended up streaking was someone who was

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Speaker 3: trading on the market, you know, betting yes that someone

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Speaker 3: would end up streaking, and then they went and did it,

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Speaker 3: and so they made you know, hundreds of thousands of dollars,

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Speaker 3: paid a small fine relative to the sporting people. And

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Speaker 3: you know, now we have so you get into this question.

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Speaker 3: I think a hopeful metaphor is like our prediction markets,

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Speaker 3: a thermostat or a thermometer. Are they like accurately pricing

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Speaker 3: the potential outcome? You know, are they saying that something

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Speaker 3: is going to happen? Or by their very existence do

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Speaker 3: they make something more likely to happen?

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Speaker 2: Right, Rebecca, How's how are the banker's dealing with this?

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Speaker 2: How's Wall Street looking at this? Because this it's tough

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Speaker 2: to really grosp whether this is gambling or a futures contract,

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Speaker 2: like banging on the chance of stock will go up,

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Speaker 2: will go down, And.

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Speaker 1: There's such a big difference right now.

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Speaker 4: It's really interesting because the banks themselves, and this is

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Speaker 4: separate from like the market makers or like you know,

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Speaker 4: higher frequency trading firms. The banks themselves are very highly

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Speaker 4: regulated by like three main agencies, the OCC the Office

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Speaker 4: of the Controller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve, and

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Speaker 4: the FD I see. So they're how they regulated, and

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Speaker 4: then they have a bunch of like state agencies that

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Speaker 4: regulate them too. So far, the biggest banks have stayed

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Speaker 4: pretty quiet on how they're thinking about these and they're

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Speaker 4: you know, kind of waiting for this regulatory you know clarity.

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Speaker 4: It reminds me a little bit of you know, bitcoin

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Speaker 4: and crypto going mainstream, you know, ten eleven years ago,

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Speaker 4: we're waiting for regulators. We're waiting for regulators, and banks

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Speaker 4: are They're really complex. They have a bunch of different

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Speaker 4: businesses where they could come in and you know, for example,

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Speaker 4: on the banking side, the investment bankers, you know, have

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Speaker 4: an interest in well, do we want to help them

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Speaker 4: raise money? Do we want to help them raise capital

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Speaker 4: or take them public?

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Speaker 2: Oh, they're touching any of the fundraising.

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Speaker 4: They they could my understanding, you would know better than me.

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Speaker 4: On Calsham and poly Market who their investors are. Is

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Speaker 4: a VC is a PE?

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Speaker 3: Yeah, it's I think it's mostly vcs right now. But

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Speaker 3: they're both targeting There was recent reporting in the Wall

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Speaker 3: Street Journal that they're both poly Market and Calshi are

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Speaker 3: targeting twenty billion dollar valuations.

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Speaker 1: Now it's just crazy, just totally totally business though.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, that's that's kind of the thing is there's not

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Speaker 3: like the there's not a lot of difference between trading

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Speaker 3: on poly market and trading on CALSHI, Like you're trading

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Speaker 3: the same kind of the same contract and in effect,

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Speaker 3: like it's the same kind of product that's being traded.

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Speaker 3: So you kind of get into a similar thing that

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Speaker 3: the sports betting businesses had to deal with, where fan

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Speaker 3: duel and draft kings are essentially you know, identical products

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Speaker 3: selling you know, identical products and trying to differentiate themselves.

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Speaker 3: And so we'll see in the coming months how how

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Speaker 3: that ends up working, Rebecca, on the on the.

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Speaker 4: Go ahead, we'll be usually well, I mean, and on

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Speaker 4: the trading side, it's a whole other like on the

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Speaker 4: other side of the house exactly. Yeah, And like at

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Speaker 4: the bank, so like you know, these massive trading businesses.

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Speaker 4: It's so some of the reporting that we have so

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Speaker 4: far and we're you know, working on this now and

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Speaker 4: again the banks are being very tight lept on what

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Speaker 4: they're saying about what they're getting involved in or not

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Speaker 4: getting involved in. This is something that so the investment banks,

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Speaker 4: they're like the bankers, the trading desks and then the

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Speaker 4: research and that's totally separate, and there's like this firewall, right,

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Speaker 4: so research analysts are definitely like looking at these things

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Speaker 4: just like any other input, any other source of information.

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Speaker 4: Of course, it's yes, there are differences, but it's like, okay,

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Speaker 4: well what is cal she saying about this when you know,

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Speaker 4: maybe a commodity's analyst who's looking at exactly exactly and

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Speaker 4: just another input to look at. So that's all well

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Speaker 4: and good. You can look at that. On the trading side, though,

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Speaker 4: it's more complicated because again the CFTC, like Nick brought up,

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Speaker 4: the Commodity Futures and Trading Commission that you know regulates

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Speaker 4: crypto and you know, is now regulating some of these

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Speaker 4: prediction marked auctivities. They have to weigh in and they

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Speaker 4: have you know, to some extent, but they're waiting for

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Speaker 4: kind of a more complete look at Okay, golden sacks,

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Speaker 4: you know, traders or enter any other like big bank traders,

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Speaker 4: Like what are we able to trade now? That is

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Speaker 4: still kind of out there, right. There are event contracts

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Speaker 4: like political elections and you know, things like that quote

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Speaker 4: event contracts, right, and then there are other markets where

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Speaker 4: on securities where it's like uh, that culture polymarket.

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Speaker 3: Market you can you can do like will and video

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Speaker 3: stock end the day up or down right, And this

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Speaker 3: is something that is happening every day.

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Speaker 1: Right exactly.

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Speaker 4: And that's a little more complicated because then you are

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Speaker 4: dealing with securities rather than just like some amorphis like

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Speaker 4: event contract.

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Speaker 2: So it's like complicated, but legally speaking that I'm sure

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Speaker 2: someone will argue, well, this isn't a security because I'm

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Speaker 2: betting on an outcome rather than scary itself.

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Speaker 1: Totally, totally, totally.

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Speaker 2: Also set us up for something kind of dystopian though,

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Speaker 2: if these if banks or traders start trading on these

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Speaker 2: markets where you have some of the bank interest and

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Speaker 2: whether I don't know, a guy streaks ye oh, whether

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Speaker 2: a place gets blown up, like this is where I

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Speaker 2: think the fringes of insanity begin.

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Speaker 4: Definitely completely, and I just like I'll want you to

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Speaker 4: weigh in or yeah, yeah, yeah, but like it just

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Speaker 4: opens a whole new for banks that are so regulated. Yeah,

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Speaker 4: it opens up a whole new source of like potential

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Speaker 4: liability and like you've done more reporting on.

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Speaker 3: That, yeah, yeah, we've we've from what we've heard there,

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Speaker 3: the banks are not as interested in those kinds of

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Speaker 3: markets just because there's no like, you know, they don't

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Speaker 3: have an election every single day, and like these destinies

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Speaker 3: to make money, right, so there needs to be like

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Speaker 3: a sustainable, constant kind of liquidity and like enough events

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Speaker 3: for them to actually you know, participate in the markets

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Speaker 3: and the kind of like securities related markets that maybe

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Speaker 3: these banks would be more interested in that they would

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Speaker 3: have a better edge on whatever. Those are still mostly

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Speaker 3: on poly market, and I really doubt that you know,

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Speaker 3: a tightly regulated like US based bank is going to

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Speaker 3: want to be trading like in stable coin, like on

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Speaker 3: poly market against you know, potential insiders all of this stuff.

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Speaker 3: That just doesn't sound like appealing, I would imagine.

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Speaker 2: But what about asset like the areas of the world,

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Speaker 2: or like private equity vms or private credit firms? Aren't

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Speaker 2: they different? And might they be dumb? Like might they

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Speaker 2: get them? Might they get themselves involved in I just

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Speaker 2: like yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. When I see the data

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Speaker 2: center stuff, when I hear in this private credit the

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Speaker 2: private credit stuff with like tricula and first brands and

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Speaker 2: positive gen and uh, I forget whatever was it was

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Speaker 2: the there was the one there's now one in Europe

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Speaker 2: where that's us. Yeah. Yeah, the random Onneswer is just

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Speaker 2: like yeah, you know when we said we promised you

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Speaker 2: this collateral, we also promised it to seventeen other people. Sorry. Yeah,

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Speaker 2: I worry that they are going to start, like are

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Speaker 2: they allowed to It's.

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Speaker 4: A great question and my reporting and it's a great storage.

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Speaker 4: It's a great question. I'm not entirely sure like where, if,

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Speaker 4: and how they're coming into these things. In other words,

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Speaker 4: I wouldn't be surprised. I don't know, but I wouldn't

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Speaker 4: be surprised if one of the big private credit players,

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Speaker 4: which is again like some of these things are they

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Speaker 4: are just very lightly regulated banks, like to be clear, right,

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Speaker 4: like they are lending money like and private credit.

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Speaker 1: Yes, it is a huge put.

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Speaker 2: So cool, so good.

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Speaker 1: I love that.

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Speaker 4: It's a huge debate right now, like is private credit

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Speaker 4: means a lot of different things whatever, But at the

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Speaker 4: end of the day, it is lending outside of the

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Speaker 4: banking system, Okay, like that that is safe to say.

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Speaker 4: So I don't know, but I wouldn't be surprised if

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Speaker 4: there's you know, like a calshie like a polymarket, if

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Speaker 4: there is you know, kind of lending from these firms.

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Speaker 4: I don't know, but they are becoming the private credit

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Speaker 4: you know, players are becoming so much more active in

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Speaker 4: the private sector, and and just all these private, privately

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Speaker 4: held companies where there's a whole matrix of like areas

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Speaker 4: where they could become involved. I don't know that, and

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Speaker 4: I would be curious, but it's probably an input that

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Speaker 4: they're looking at too, like just a research you know, input, right,

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Speaker 4: Like you know, we like we look at oh, what

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Speaker 4: is it saying about that we take about the grain

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Speaker 4: of salt, But like, you know, it's still something we're

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Speaker 4: going to look at. But it's an interesting question.

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Speaker 3: They are the predictions, yeah, sorry, they are. They are

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Speaker 3: quite accurate. The you know, there's you know, we can

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Speaker 3: there can be arguments made about whether or not they

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Speaker 3: are like good for society, whether it's like an okay

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Speaker 3: thing that we can bet on, you know, every single

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Speaker 3: kind of I think the the CAUSHI CEO trect Mansur

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Speaker 3: his quote is that you know, we want to make

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Speaker 3: a monetizable asset out of every difference in opinion Jesus.

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Speaker 2: Christ, which is like that's like, yeah, the paraphrase Will

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Speaker 2: Manicer of Chapo when he was seeing a video of

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Speaker 2: a new sport with two guys run into each other.

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Speaker 2: You see, this is the kind of thing you do

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Speaker 2: in like.

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Speaker 1: Robo call, that's what it's giving.

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Speaker 2: It's like, yeah, we could very like near future dystopian. Well,

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Speaker 2: someone who spends a lot of time lives in Vegas.

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Speaker 2: I just want to say, this is an insult to

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Speaker 2: my beautiful gambling. Yeah, beautiful honest dice roll even all

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Speaker 2: crapsless craps and not this crappy. Yeah, it's it's very strange,

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Speaker 2: and I think we've discussed.

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Speaker 4: That's a new state motto. By the way, I really

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Speaker 4: like that our craps are not this crappy.

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Speaker 1: I love that.

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Speaker 2: I'm gonna rush into that T shirt.

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Speaker 1: I love that.

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Speaker 2: No, it's it is really scary though. Someone. I feel

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Speaker 2: like someone's going to die from this, Like it's gonna

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Speaker 2: it's gonna be this person dies by December thirty first,

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Speaker 2: and they're going to get hunted like running men.

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Speaker 3: Yes, yeah, that's okay, So we're almost there.

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Speaker 2: Yeah.

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Speaker 3: So recently, actually there was a bit of controversy over

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Speaker 3: like I guess what we would call death markets on Calshi.

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Speaker 3: So when the US attacked Iran. There were lots of

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Speaker 3: markets on both poly Market and Calshi related to military

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Speaker 3: action in Iran, whether it would happen or not, by

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Speaker 3: when it would happen. Usually these are formatted in like,

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Speaker 3: you know, military strikes in Iran by xedate. Yeah, so

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Speaker 3: one of the contracts that both Calshi and Polymarket had

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Speaker 3: wash Camanie out by x date. Right, so this is

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Speaker 3: the supreme leader of Iran. Will he be out as

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Speaker 3: preme leader by this date? So the like layman's interpretation

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Speaker 3: of that would mean if he dies, he's out right.

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Speaker 3: You know, that's probably how you would So was he

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Speaker 3: in office anymore, he's dead, he's probably out right. So

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Speaker 3: when on that Saturday Trump announced that he had been

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Speaker 3: killed on poly Market, poly Market resolved their contract. Yes

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Speaker 3: he is out right, right, But Calshi did not do this.

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Speaker 3: They froze, well, they like pause the market for like

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Speaker 3: eight hours to like figure out how to handle this.

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Speaker 2: What is the consequence of posing the market just to him? Claire, Oh,

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Speaker 2: it's just that there's no more trading happening, right, does

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Speaker 2: the price move at all? So it's just frozen. It's

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Speaker 2: just frozen.

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Speaker 3: And what they did is they reset when they made

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Speaker 3: their decision, they refunded everyone their stakes the value of

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Speaker 3: their contracts at last traded price before death. So if

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Speaker 3: there was like a seventy four percent chance that he

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Speaker 3: would be out at twelve fifty nine and he died

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Speaker 3: at one, then they would pay the Yes, contract would

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Speaker 3: pay out seventy four cents, right, right, So they did

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Speaker 3: that in order to isolate the death component, right because Calshi,

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Speaker 3: in what they have told me, they don't want to

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Speaker 3: allow people to profit on death. That's just not something

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Speaker 3: they're interested in doing.

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Speaker 2: Right.

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Speaker 3: However, there was very large controversy around this because all

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Speaker 3: of the Calshi traders who hopped on the Calshi and

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Speaker 3: were like, oh cool, yeah, he's probably going to be out,

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Speaker 3: I'll bet on this, they were Suddenly they did not

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Speaker 3: get the money that they expected to. And Cawshi had

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Speaker 3: like in its rules, in its rule book that was

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Speaker 3: like laid out, there was like some fine print. But yeah,

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Speaker 3: we get into this like weird question of like why

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Speaker 3: didn't they pay because he was out?

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Speaker 2: Like what was the death?

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Speaker 3: They don't want people? Death was a carve out? There

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Speaker 3: was a death carve out, so out by any other

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Speaker 3: means but death. Now, the Commanie was like in his

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Speaker 3: mid eighties, so it's kind of hard to imagine that

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Speaker 3: he was going to resign or like, you know, they

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Speaker 3: don't hold snap elections, so I don't really know. So

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Speaker 3: it was just resignation, I guess that, you know, or

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Speaker 3: like kidnapping like we saw in Venezuela. Maybe that was

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Speaker 3: its own own yeah episode, Yeah, that was its own thing,

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Speaker 3: you know, was was what happened in Venezuela. Does that

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Speaker 3: count as like a war or just like an encourage?

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Speaker 3: So we get into all these really weird questions when

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Speaker 3: the quote unquote oracle of these prediction markets is only

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Speaker 3: resolving based on very specific outcomes, and so at a

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Speaker 3: certain point, the entire point of these prediction markets is

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Speaker 3: that they provide ways to hedge outcomes that you can't

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Speaker 3: find in other markets. Yes, there's no way to like

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Speaker 3: hedge against that happening in the stock market, and like

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Speaker 3: a clean way, right, but if like, like, okay, so

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Speaker 3: let's say that I'm a business owner and I want

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Speaker 3: to hedge against the pos stability that Trump does not

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Speaker 3: finish this term from my point of view as a

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Speaker 3: business owner, if he dies or resigns or is impeached.

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Speaker 3: None of all of those three things fulfill the same

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Speaker 3: thing for me, and I need a hedge against all

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Speaker 3: of those outcomes. But if we don't allow these markets

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Speaker 3: to resolve on death, and you know, we can argue

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Speaker 3: whether or not we could we should, they by definition

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Speaker 3: become less valuable hedging tools. And so you kind of

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Speaker 3: get into this point spot where you're like, what are

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Speaker 3: these actually for? Like who is the person that's hedging

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Speaker 3: against Camanie resigning?

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Speaker 2: Like you know what I mean? It feels like I

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Speaker 2: don't know. I have a weird view of this and

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Speaker 2: that I think prediction markets are scary and vile and

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Speaker 2: they enable something, but I also think they're a condition

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Speaker 2: created by the stock market brain take. But I think

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Speaker 2: that the stock market has stopped being logical in any way,

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Speaker 2: shape or form, and regular people, despite I would say,

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Speaker 2: what was like three or four years ago and Robinhood

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Speaker 2: went really nuts on options, I think that regular people

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Speaker 2: do not have access to a logical or rational way

368
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Speaker 2: of investing. Like you can't just invest in a company

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Speaker 2: for being good. You can't invest in a clean outcome

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Speaker 2: because you're going to dine up against hedge funds and

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Speaker 2: whoever fast trading and such that you couldn't possibly keep up.

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Speaker 2: They have information you don't have. There's no way you

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Speaker 2: could possibly keep up. I'm not saying prediction markets are good.

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Speaker 2: I think they're terrifying. They are RoboCop shit. But it

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Speaker 2: feels like something that could only occur in a world

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Speaker 2: where there is not enough other ways to accumulate wealth.

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Speaker 1: I could not agree more.

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Speaker 4: And I think that one thing, like to this point,

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Speaker 4: It was a few weeks ago, and I might have

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Speaker 4: even said it to you, but there was an AD

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Speaker 4: and I don't want to say for a certain it

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Speaker 4: was either Caulci or polymarket, but it came up on

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Speaker 4: TikTok or Instagram, and it was an AD or like

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Speaker 4: a user user generated content type thing where a woman

385
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Speaker 4: was holding a coffee and the did we talk about this?

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Speaker 4: And the tagline again it was for one of them.

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Speaker 4: I don't want to misspeak, but it said, you know,

388
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Speaker 4: like my bet will pay for my coffee, you know,

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Speaker 4: like my you know, da da da. And I was like,

390
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Speaker 4: oh my god, that is so bleak because it really

391
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Speaker 4: speaks to this broad like and again financialization of everything,

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Speaker 4: not I you know, that's a big conversation right now.

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Speaker 4: It's talking about a world in which it is hard

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Speaker 4: to accumulate wealth. I mean, just to state the most

395
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Speaker 4: obvious thing, you know, and like, you know, just broad inequality.

396
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Speaker 4: My bet will help me pay for my like again,

397
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Speaker 4: and I get it, Like I get that on I

398
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Speaker 4: get why that would be an advertisement, and like I understand,

399
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Speaker 4: but that is so you know, it's like a young woman,

400
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Speaker 4: a young person, and it's like, oh my god, that

401
00:20:50,600 --> 00:20:53,600
Speaker 4: is what that is a symptom of, you know, sort

402
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Speaker 4: of like the world we're living in. And I'm not

403
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Speaker 4: saying that's good or bad. I mean it probably it's bleak.

404
00:21:00,720 --> 00:21:02,000
Speaker 4: It's like very bleak.

405
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Speaker 2: It's the growth. It's the same thing with sports scambling.

406
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Speaker 2: And sports gambling seems for now like a lot more

407
00:21:07,600 --> 00:21:10,639
Speaker 2: exploitative because they have the account managers who come and

408
00:21:10,680 --> 00:21:13,600
Speaker 2: they're like, hey, you've lost three grand, why don't we

409
00:21:13,640 --> 00:21:16,280
Speaker 2: give you two grand? Work of credit? Yeah, and all

410
00:21:16,320 --> 00:21:19,159
Speaker 2: of these these ways that you could leverage that it

411
00:21:19,359 --> 00:21:21,560
Speaker 2: is exploiting the fact that because if you think about

412
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Speaker 2: other stock market is these days, what the fuck are

413
00:21:24,440 --> 00:21:26,560
Speaker 2: you meant to do if you if you actually if

414
00:21:26,600 --> 00:21:28,960
Speaker 2: you invest in a company based on its fundamentals, you're

415
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Speaker 2: going to lose money probably. Yeah, It's like Oracle is

416
00:21:32,200 --> 00:21:34,960
Speaker 2: twelve percent up right now. I think we're just going

417
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Speaker 2: out in a week, so who knows where it will be.

418
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Speaker 2: Even though they had like negative twenty four billion dollars

419
00:21:39,560 --> 00:21:43,119
Speaker 2: cash flow, they're obviously misleading people when it comes to

420
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Speaker 2: how like their capex because they're going to spend only

421
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Speaker 2: fifty billion this year and they've already spent over forty

422
00:21:50,480 --> 00:21:54,159
Speaker 2: that work. But if you, if you, because the market

423
00:21:54,320 --> 00:21:57,040
Speaker 2: and their hedge funds have decided there's something else they'd

424
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Speaker 2: like to do, you cannot join that. So what your

425
00:22:00,200 --> 00:22:02,399
Speaker 2: other options you've got? I don't know, Betting on the

426
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Speaker 2: slap fights, yeah, Micheal slap competition, you've got sports gambling,

427
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Speaker 2: and you've got this big, impenetrable thing at the stock market.

428
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Speaker 2: But then you've got these seemingly honest, easy bets of Oh,

429
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Speaker 2: I can just bet on an outcome that's fair. Yeah,

430
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Speaker 2: unless the outcome is full of asterisks?

431
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Speaker 3: Yes, correct? Yeah, yeah, I think there was some there

432
00:22:25,240 --> 00:22:28,359
Speaker 3: was some research recently. I don't know how I should.

433
00:22:29,480 --> 00:22:33,560
Speaker 3: I saw this on Twitter disclaimer that like only thirty

434
00:22:33,600 --> 00:22:38,399
Speaker 3: two and a half percent of prediction market customers are profitable, right,

435
00:22:38,600 --> 00:22:40,600
Speaker 3: so two thirds of players are losers.

436
00:22:40,840 --> 00:22:43,000
Speaker 2: I mean that's gamblingbling you.

437
00:22:44,320 --> 00:22:47,040
Speaker 3: So yeah, I think, yeah, we when we get into this,

438
00:22:47,240 --> 00:22:50,960
Speaker 3: I think gen Z especially, there's a certain amount of

439
00:22:51,119 --> 00:22:57,080
Speaker 3: financial nihilism just general, like dread visa via the future

440
00:22:58,320 --> 00:22:59,840
Speaker 3: and how am I ever going to have a house

441
00:23:00,280 --> 00:23:03,760
Speaker 3: and et cetera, et cetera, and oh here's poly market.

442
00:23:03,880 --> 00:23:06,600
Speaker 3: They let me bet on you know, whether Trump will

443
00:23:06,680 --> 00:23:08,720
Speaker 3: say China in his speech.

444
00:23:08,520 --> 00:23:09,720
Speaker 2: And how many times he'll say it.

445
00:23:09,840 --> 00:23:11,720
Speaker 3: Yeah, yeah, yeah, this could be a fun thing.

446
00:23:11,640 --> 00:23:14,240
Speaker 2: That I could make money on to it, like you

447
00:23:14,320 --> 00:23:16,560
Speaker 2: could make you could pay for your coffee with it. Yes,

448
00:23:16,800 --> 00:23:19,639
Speaker 2: and yes, I will admit. My favorite Cauchy story is

449
00:23:19,680 --> 00:23:21,160
Speaker 2: the one that I'm sure both of you read, where

450
00:23:21,160 --> 00:23:23,600
Speaker 2: it's they tried to hire a fifteen year old streamer

451
00:23:23,920 --> 00:23:26,600
Speaker 2: and I quote your brother legal team confirmed that we

452
00:23:26,640 --> 00:23:31,040
Speaker 2: can't work with minors. R N kind of sad DBH, the.

453
00:23:31,200 --> 00:23:34,200
Speaker 1: R N and the TVHR.

454
00:23:34,640 --> 00:23:34,880
Speaker 5: Brother.

455
00:23:35,160 --> 00:23:36,680
Speaker 1: It really just brings it all together.

456
00:23:36,760 --> 00:23:39,320
Speaker 2: It really brings it together. But also you need to

457
00:23:39,359 --> 00:23:41,720
Speaker 2: watch Running Man because all of this just reminds me

458
00:23:41,840 --> 00:23:44,679
Speaker 2: of that moment, just just like the I get your

459
00:23:44,760 --> 00:23:48,720
Speaker 2: slop in a bowl on whether Trump will will say

460
00:23:48,880 --> 00:23:51,840
Speaker 2: a difference, it's cool nuclear the N word, like how

461
00:23:51,880 --> 00:23:53,760
Speaker 2: many times will he do that? And he's done that

462
00:23:53,840 --> 00:23:55,920
Speaker 2: many times, by the way, did not joke indeed, which

463
00:23:55,960 --> 00:24:00,280
Speaker 2: is yet another dystopian thing. Yes, it just feel like

464
00:24:00,359 --> 00:24:03,120
Speaker 2: the actual solution here would be more regulation of banks

465
00:24:03,160 --> 00:24:04,920
Speaker 2: and also getting rid of all of this. I think

466
00:24:04,960 --> 00:24:07,600
Speaker 2: sports gamblings. I know you probably can't come out on

467
00:24:07,680 --> 00:24:10,280
Speaker 2: this directly, but I think sports gambling is like one

468
00:24:10,320 --> 00:24:13,920
Speaker 2: of the most noxious things because living in Vegas, gambling

469
00:24:14,080 --> 00:24:19,240
Speaker 2: is everywhere, but it's also very very regulated. If you listen,

470
00:24:19,680 --> 00:24:23,760
Speaker 2: if you look anything close to twenty one, they will

471
00:24:23,880 --> 00:24:26,760
Speaker 2: come and card you, and they will chase you a

472
00:24:26,760 --> 00:24:30,200
Speaker 2: wrend like they know I'm coming up on forty and

473
00:24:30,240 --> 00:24:32,879
Speaker 2: they still like d me sometimes I'm beautiful en not but.

474
00:24:33,359 --> 00:24:35,240
Speaker 3: Yeah, you look you don't look a day over, you

475
00:24:35,320 --> 00:24:36,440
Speaker 3: look youth twenty.

476
00:24:37,480 --> 00:24:41,600
Speaker 2: But nevertheless it's you. It's because they know that gambling

477
00:24:41,720 --> 00:24:44,720
Speaker 2: is scary and that it's addictive, and that a win

478
00:24:44,880 --> 00:24:47,560
Speaker 2: can make you think every other one will happen. Except

479
00:24:47,640 --> 00:24:49,439
Speaker 2: now it's just you can do it anywhere. You can

480
00:24:49,520 --> 00:24:51,440
Speaker 2: just do it. Everything in the phone you've got every

481
00:24:51,480 --> 00:24:55,120
Speaker 2: device you can gamble. Ah. There are Instagram accounts, yes,

482
00:24:55,440 --> 00:24:57,600
Speaker 2: that just there's there's this one with a guy who

483
00:24:57,680 --> 00:25:00,360
Speaker 2: just dresses up like an old man and has beer

484
00:25:00,440 --> 00:25:03,760
Speaker 2: full of bush fridge full of bush light and it's

485
00:25:03,880 --> 00:25:08,199
Speaker 2: just him being like and he's on a gambling site that.

486
00:25:08,320 --> 00:25:12,639
Speaker 4: Is extremely extremely bleak. And I think it's yeah, and

487
00:25:12,800 --> 00:25:14,840
Speaker 4: I think that like it is prompting like in the

488
00:25:14,960 --> 00:25:17,440
Speaker 4: more traditional like so in banking and kind of like

489
00:25:17,800 --> 00:25:20,720
Speaker 4: I think it is prompting these bigger questions and kind

490
00:25:20,720 --> 00:25:24,560
Speaker 4: of existential questions about like, yeah, what is the difference,

491
00:25:24,840 --> 00:25:26,760
Speaker 4: you know, in what we're doing and kind of like

492
00:25:26,920 --> 00:25:29,359
Speaker 4: what is like what are we doing here? I mean,

493
00:25:29,400 --> 00:25:32,879
Speaker 4: you know again, it's like it is going back to

494
00:25:32,960 --> 00:25:35,359
Speaker 4: the regulation that is playing out right now. And that

495
00:25:35,480 --> 00:25:37,399
Speaker 4: is why it's such an interesting conversation where you do

496
00:25:37,480 --> 00:25:41,200
Speaker 4: have the Trump administration rolling back so many aspects of

497
00:25:41,320 --> 00:25:43,159
Speaker 4: banking regulation separate from prediction.

498
00:25:42,920 --> 00:25:45,520
Speaker 1: You know, forget prediction markets, all kind of things different.

499
00:25:45,920 --> 00:25:48,520
Speaker 4: So one example is, you know, for years banks have

500
00:25:48,560 --> 00:25:52,320
Speaker 4: tried to get regulators to go a little bit uh

501
00:25:52,920 --> 00:25:56,280
Speaker 4: make the stress testing process you know again super important

502
00:25:56,480 --> 00:26:01,600
Speaker 4: post where regulators every year will kind of simulate different

503
00:26:01,880 --> 00:26:06,760
Speaker 4: like disaster scenarios again, like totally hypothetical employment shoots up,

504
00:26:07,080 --> 00:26:10,159
Speaker 4: stock market crashes, you know, these hypothetical scenarios bank and

505
00:26:10,200 --> 00:26:12,200
Speaker 4: they test the banks currently like with the amount of

506
00:26:12,280 --> 00:26:15,120
Speaker 4: capital that a Wells Fargo or a JP Morgan has,

507
00:26:15,480 --> 00:26:16,200
Speaker 4: can you weather this?

508
00:26:16,440 --> 00:26:17,080
Speaker 1: Can you withstand?

509
00:26:17,280 --> 00:26:20,480
Speaker 4: They always do very they always do very well with

510
00:26:20,800 --> 00:26:23,000
Speaker 4: caveats obviously, but you know they come and say, okay,

511
00:26:23,040 --> 00:26:24,080
Speaker 4: you know that could be a weakness.

512
00:26:24,119 --> 00:26:24,919
Speaker 1: That could be a weakness.

513
00:26:25,200 --> 00:26:27,479
Speaker 4: Private credit has also introduced an interesting, you know kind

514
00:26:27,480 --> 00:26:31,320
Speaker 4: of wrinkle here because it is by definition there is

515
00:26:31,480 --> 00:26:33,480
Speaker 4: you know, kind of this hidden leverage, and regulators have

516
00:26:33,520 --> 00:26:36,800
Speaker 4: talked about that don't but they're not thanks correct and

517
00:26:36,960 --> 00:26:39,320
Speaker 4: so that's a whole other, fascinating, you know kind of

518
00:26:39,359 --> 00:26:41,720
Speaker 4: ecosystem where it's like, okay, you are a bank, I'm

519
00:26:41,760 --> 00:26:45,160
Speaker 4: going to stress tests you, you are lending you bank

520
00:26:46,000 --> 00:26:49,280
Speaker 4: are ed bank okay incorporated? You are going to lend

521
00:26:49,400 --> 00:26:53,520
Speaker 4: to private credit lender Okay. But when you lend to there,

522
00:26:53,960 --> 00:26:57,760
Speaker 4: there's not as much tracking what that what your borrower

523
00:26:58,160 --> 00:27:00,600
Speaker 4: is lending to. So you can see it is hard

524
00:27:00,680 --> 00:27:02,120
Speaker 4: to track where that money is going.

525
00:27:02,200 --> 00:27:03,920
Speaker 2: And I read the other day. I think it was

526
00:27:04,000 --> 00:27:06,520
Speaker 2: middle of last year the Boston Fed, I think it

527
00:27:06,680 --> 00:27:09,680
Speaker 2: was said that fourteen percent of large banks loans went

528
00:27:09,720 --> 00:27:11,240
Speaker 2: to private credit and private equity.

529
00:27:12,880 --> 00:27:17,440
Speaker 4: It's a massive is a massive chunk and of loan

530
00:27:17,520 --> 00:27:19,600
Speaker 4: growth overall. And I think that like when you go

531
00:27:19,760 --> 00:27:22,040
Speaker 4: to so when you take prediction markets and you kind

532
00:27:22,040 --> 00:27:24,600
Speaker 4: of take like the current regulatory backdrop, it's like and

533
00:27:24,800 --> 00:27:28,160
Speaker 4: adds an interesting wrinkle because it's like, okay, by and large,

534
00:27:28,160 --> 00:27:30,240
Speaker 4: a lot of the financial regulators are like, yes, we

535
00:27:30,440 --> 00:27:33,040
Speaker 4: want to be Like. The bottom line is they are

536
00:27:33,119 --> 00:27:37,800
Speaker 4: rolling back like traditional guardrails, you know, like around the banks,

537
00:27:38,160 --> 00:27:41,080
Speaker 4: but now prediction markets like okay, and that is currently

538
00:27:41,160 --> 00:27:44,600
Speaker 4: being like you know, kind of that is being sorted

539
00:27:44,680 --> 00:27:47,119
Speaker 4: out right now, so we'll see. And like the CFTC,

540
00:27:47,359 --> 00:27:49,760
Speaker 4: I want to say, is like the only regulator again,

541
00:27:49,800 --> 00:27:51,600
Speaker 4: it's like the most relevant one here. It's like come

542
00:27:51,680 --> 00:27:55,240
Speaker 4: out with like some guidance, but it remains to be seen,

543
00:27:55,400 --> 00:27:57,680
Speaker 4: so you know, we'll see kind of how the administration

544
00:27:57,800 --> 00:27:58,200
Speaker 4: handles that.

545
00:27:58,440 --> 00:28:01,760
Speaker 2: I just I feel like right now now personal opinion

546
00:28:01,880 --> 00:28:04,359
Speaker 2: not held by I guess I think that there is

547
00:28:04,400 --> 00:28:10,680
Speaker 2: a massive regulatory problem with laying because right now my

548
00:28:10,840 --> 00:28:15,119
Speaker 2: favorite example is open Ai. So open Ai signed a

549
00:28:15,160 --> 00:28:17,640
Speaker 2: deal with AMD, except they didn't. It was just an

550
00:28:17,640 --> 00:28:21,160
Speaker 2: agreement without any formal contract. AMD is not increased guidance

551
00:28:21,680 --> 00:28:24,440
Speaker 2: oracle three hundred billion dollar deal with our open Ai

552
00:28:24,640 --> 00:28:27,320
Speaker 2: can't afford to serve it, don't have the has to

553
00:28:27,400 --> 00:28:31,680
Speaker 2: raise debt. Data centers aren't built. S k Heinez and

554
00:28:31,760 --> 00:28:34,280
Speaker 2: open Ai. Samsung and open Ai signed a big deal

555
00:28:34,359 --> 00:28:36,480
Speaker 2: to take forty percent of RAM, except they didn't. It

556
00:28:36,560 --> 00:28:38,680
Speaker 2: was a letter of intent. All of these stocks have

557
00:28:39,000 --> 00:28:42,000
Speaker 2: popped off of these deals. H nothing happened. It's very

558
00:28:42,120 --> 00:28:47,240
Speaker 2: obvious there was never anything official. There should be regulated

559
00:28:47,520 --> 00:28:50,760
Speaker 2: because people in the audience might hear this and say,

560
00:28:50,840 --> 00:28:55,360
Speaker 2: that's not stock manipulation, But what is if that isn't?

561
00:28:55,720 --> 00:28:58,120
Speaker 2: If that isn't and people could say, oh, it's marketing.

562
00:28:58,640 --> 00:29:01,960
Speaker 2: Oh we used weezer words. But it's like it feels

563
00:29:02,080 --> 00:29:05,720
Speaker 2: like things like this will lead to outcomes that lose

564
00:29:05,960 --> 00:29:08,000
Speaker 2: a lot of money. There's a lot of people a

565
00:29:08,040 --> 00:29:11,360
Speaker 2: lot of money, and unless we do something soon, it's

566
00:29:11,440 --> 00:29:13,440
Speaker 2: own to get only gonna get worse. Because every time

567
00:29:13,560 --> 00:29:17,719
Speaker 2: someone like this is not stopped, someone else doesn't. They

568
00:29:17,800 --> 00:29:20,720
Speaker 2: just like fuck it. Why would we bother. That will

569
00:29:20,800 --> 00:29:22,640
Speaker 2: lead into the prediction markets as well, because you could

570
00:29:22,680 --> 00:29:26,160
Speaker 2: just start saying whatever. But that's actually that is the

571
00:29:26,200 --> 00:29:28,320
Speaker 2: biggest thing with prediction. You can just say stuff.

572
00:29:28,440 --> 00:29:31,720
Speaker 3: Now there's like over the the extent to which the

573
00:29:31,760 --> 00:29:35,800
Speaker 3: stock market is reliant on like increasingly complicated bits of semantics. Yes,

574
00:29:35,960 --> 00:29:38,960
Speaker 3: it's like we've just never we're ad like a the

575
00:29:39,000 --> 00:29:43,560
Speaker 3: semantic indexes, the asters.

576
00:29:42,440 --> 00:29:48,080
Speaker 2: Like letter of intent, agreement consideration too. There are deals,

577
00:29:48,360 --> 00:29:52,160
Speaker 2: their deals, their agreements, but we've not changed guidance. We've

578
00:29:52,200 --> 00:29:54,520
Speaker 2: not put any money. Now one's actually doing anything. But

579
00:29:54,880 --> 00:29:56,920
Speaker 2: you know, it's just.

580
00:29:57,600 --> 00:29:59,560
Speaker 1: Lest we forget a memorandum of understanding.

581
00:29:59,600 --> 00:30:03,280
Speaker 2: Memory MOUs are the best. I love a good MoU

582
00:30:03,440 --> 00:30:07,600
Speaker 2: They mean nothing, but they mean absolutely everyone. I love ANU.

583
00:30:24,120 --> 00:30:28,240
Speaker 2: It's frustrating because I am not a particularly sophisticated trader.

584
00:30:28,320 --> 00:30:30,320
Speaker 2: I may have only recently started putting money in the

585
00:30:30,400 --> 00:30:33,200
Speaker 2: S and P five hundred after a period of not

586
00:30:34,000 --> 00:30:36,840
Speaker 2: but it's and that's in an index, by the way.

587
00:30:37,760 --> 00:30:40,960
Speaker 1: It's very responsible, very responsible.

588
00:30:41,800 --> 00:30:43,280
Speaker 2: But the point loves the eighty twenty.

589
00:30:43,800 --> 00:30:45,000
Speaker 1: Yeah, I love diversification.

590
00:30:45,200 --> 00:30:49,320
Speaker 2: Here's the thing. My worry is is that it's very

591
00:30:49,440 --> 00:30:52,280
Speaker 2: obvious how you manipulate these markets, and without regulations to

592
00:30:52,320 --> 00:30:55,080
Speaker 2: stop people, it's only going to get more ridiculous. You're

593
00:30:55,120 --> 00:30:58,160
Speaker 2: just going to get CEOs that say things to create

594
00:30:58,240 --> 00:31:01,320
Speaker 2: a market, possibly creating them themselves. And if they're a

595
00:31:01,360 --> 00:31:05,880
Speaker 2: private company, that's not illegal, I believe. Yeah.

596
00:31:06,080 --> 00:31:09,000
Speaker 3: So when we talk about like, mentioned markets are a

597
00:31:09,040 --> 00:31:10,760
Speaker 3: good example of where I think a lot of the

598
00:31:10,880 --> 00:31:16,680
Speaker 3: like more manipulation concerns are. So a mention market is like, Okay,

599
00:31:16,840 --> 00:31:21,200
Speaker 3: during this podcast, will ed say fuck with We're like

600
00:31:21,320 --> 00:31:25,200
Speaker 3: we're betting on that, like that, the odds are the

601
00:31:25,240 --> 00:31:31,680
Speaker 3: odds are high. You just did it, Ben, Yeah, So

602
00:31:32,160 --> 00:31:35,200
Speaker 3: like will Caroline Levitt at the next White House press

603
00:31:35,240 --> 00:31:37,000
Speaker 3: conference say the word China?

604
00:31:37,880 --> 00:31:38,120
Speaker 2: People?

605
00:31:38,280 --> 00:31:40,520
Speaker 3: These are mentioned markets, So we're literally just betting on

606
00:31:40,720 --> 00:31:42,760
Speaker 3: the words that will come out of someone's mouth.

607
00:31:43,000 --> 00:31:43,160
Speaker 4: Right.

608
00:31:43,640 --> 00:31:48,720
Speaker 3: So, a very high profile example of this is coinbase

609
00:31:48,840 --> 00:31:52,560
Speaker 3: CEO Brian Armstrong. You know, at the end of an

610
00:31:52,600 --> 00:31:56,400
Speaker 3: earnings call, there was a polymarket mentioned market for what

611
00:31:56,520 --> 00:32:00,200
Speaker 3: will Brian Armstrong say on the earnings call? And and

612
00:32:00,840 --> 00:32:04,320
Speaker 3: you know literally like right before the like moderator was

613
00:32:04,360 --> 00:32:06,800
Speaker 3: like thanks for joining everyone, like right before he's like, oh,

614
00:32:06,880 --> 00:32:09,560
Speaker 3: someone just handed me the polymarket for what I'm gonna say,

615
00:32:09,840 --> 00:32:12,480
Speaker 3: So I'll just get through all these you know, Bitcoin

616
00:32:12,720 --> 00:32:14,840
Speaker 3: web three. It just like went down the list and

617
00:32:15,000 --> 00:32:19,120
Speaker 3: like paid all of them off. So he has come

618
00:32:19,160 --> 00:32:21,240
Speaker 3: out and said that he was not trading on that

619
00:32:21,360 --> 00:32:24,600
Speaker 3: market or involved in any way. But like we are

620
00:32:24,680 --> 00:32:28,520
Speaker 3: opening ourselves up to like new ways that we can

621
00:32:28,680 --> 00:32:32,000
Speaker 3: like manipulate markets. Yeah, insider trade and like when we

622
00:32:32,360 --> 00:32:36,120
Speaker 3: create a market for everything and everything can become a

623
00:32:36,200 --> 00:32:40,440
Speaker 3: bet more people than ever can become insider traders because

624
00:32:40,480 --> 00:32:43,600
Speaker 3: there's just so much more things to insider trade on.

625
00:32:44,120 --> 00:32:47,840
Speaker 2: Well, is a question, how do you how much is

626
00:32:48,040 --> 00:32:51,440
Speaker 2: necessary to create a market, Like what how much money

627
00:32:51,600 --> 00:32:53,120
Speaker 2: does it require? This is a good question.

628
00:32:53,480 --> 00:32:58,720
Speaker 3: So polymarket pr has told me that the primary criteria

629
00:32:59,120 --> 00:33:03,480
Speaker 3: for if a market can be created, because they field

630
00:33:03,600 --> 00:33:08,840
Speaker 3: suggestions from their users. The primary criteria is if there's

631
00:33:08,880 --> 00:33:11,480
Speaker 3: evidence of demand for the yes side.

632
00:33:11,280 --> 00:33:14,560
Speaker 2: And the no side. That's it. What is evidence in

633
00:33:14,680 --> 00:33:15,320
Speaker 2: this case.

634
00:33:15,720 --> 00:33:19,600
Speaker 3: You know, if there's activity on Twitter about it, if

635
00:33:19,640 --> 00:33:21,960
Speaker 3: people in the discord are like, please, I want to

636
00:33:21,960 --> 00:33:24,680
Speaker 3: bet on this, it seems pretty ad hoc. I don't

637
00:33:24,760 --> 00:33:27,240
Speaker 3: have much more detail than that, because they give me

638
00:33:27,320 --> 00:33:27,720
Speaker 3: more detail.

639
00:33:27,760 --> 00:33:31,560
Speaker 2: Imagine they don't need to yeah, yeah, it's not money.

640
00:33:32,120 --> 00:33:35,520
Speaker 3: It's I mean, it's just like evidence of trading demand, right,

641
00:33:35,640 --> 00:33:37,480
Speaker 3: and then they'll open it and then people can start

642
00:33:37,640 --> 00:33:40,160
Speaker 3: right on it. You don't have to they have to

643
00:33:40,200 --> 00:33:42,200
Speaker 3: be They don't have to be like, all right, you

644
00:33:42,280 --> 00:33:43,960
Speaker 3: all have five hundred dollars ready to go on this,

645
00:33:44,160 --> 00:33:46,360
Speaker 3: like there's nothing like you like, there's just as long

646
00:33:46,440 --> 00:33:50,160
Speaker 3: as they can see that people will want to trade

647
00:33:50,200 --> 00:33:51,160
Speaker 3: on it, they will make.

648
00:33:51,040 --> 00:33:52,920
Speaker 4: It makes sense, yes, And that kind of goes to

649
00:33:53,000 --> 00:33:55,200
Speaker 4: the question of just like thinly like with banks, like

650
00:33:55,360 --> 00:33:59,640
Speaker 4: thin thinly regulated versus not thinly traded excuse me, versus

651
00:33:59,680 --> 00:34:01,720
Speaker 4: not right. It goes to the question of like when

652
00:34:01,760 --> 00:34:04,560
Speaker 4: banks look at something, they're like, we can't make a

653
00:34:04,720 --> 00:34:07,360
Speaker 4: market out of like, you know, trading on this one.

654
00:34:09,000 --> 00:34:11,120
Speaker 3: Two hundred thousand dollars in volume, Like there's just no

655
00:34:11,239 --> 00:34:13,440
Speaker 3: way that like exactly huge bank is ever going to

656
00:34:13,600 --> 00:34:16,399
Speaker 3: like yeah, you just open yourself up to so much.

657
00:34:16,640 --> 00:34:19,400
Speaker 2: So it goes back to that, Yeah, I mean also,

658
00:34:19,480 --> 00:34:21,560
Speaker 2: I guess banks I didn't even think if that ye

659
00:34:21,640 --> 00:34:23,399
Speaker 2: banks went want will touch because there's not enough money

660
00:34:23,400 --> 00:34:23,560
Speaker 2: in it.

661
00:34:24,320 --> 00:34:26,719
Speaker 1: I think it's when I think of like a thinly

662
00:34:26,800 --> 00:34:28,560
Speaker 1: traded like stock. Yeah, exactly.

663
00:34:28,680 --> 00:34:31,160
Speaker 4: It just goes back to liquidity and like the volatility,

664
00:34:31,280 --> 00:34:33,960
Speaker 4: and like if banks can find a way to make

665
00:34:34,239 --> 00:34:35,239
Speaker 4: money on something.

666
00:34:35,200 --> 00:34:37,680
Speaker 1: Legally, they will, Yeah, yeah, they will.

667
00:34:37,800 --> 00:34:39,640
Speaker 4: And so it's i you know, you could see a

668
00:34:39,680 --> 00:34:41,960
Speaker 4: world in which and I'm not saying like there is

669
00:34:42,080 --> 00:34:44,000
Speaker 4: no regulatory framework that would allow this.

670
00:34:44,120 --> 00:34:46,440
Speaker 1: No, I'm not saying that because in the future, in

671
00:34:46,560 --> 00:34:49,720
Speaker 1: the future you could see it, like who.

672
00:34:49,680 --> 00:34:51,279
Speaker 4: Knows what that could look like. And so the banks

673
00:34:51,320 --> 00:34:52,800
Speaker 4: are just like, Okay, we're going to wait for the

674
00:34:52,840 --> 00:34:55,320
Speaker 4: regulators to say something. But like it comes to a

675
00:34:55,440 --> 00:34:58,640
Speaker 4: question of also like internal enforcement, like banks all have

676
00:34:58,880 --> 00:35:02,799
Speaker 4: like very very clear, you know, kind of rules around

677
00:35:02,800 --> 00:35:08,160
Speaker 4: insider trading. Someone has non public information, if you trade

678
00:35:08,200 --> 00:35:09,759
Speaker 4: on that, you will be fired. Like you know, that's

679
00:35:09,920 --> 00:35:12,640
Speaker 4: very like well worn, you know kind of like but

680
00:35:13,000 --> 00:35:17,680
Speaker 4: now with prediction markets, how do you enforce that? It

681
00:35:17,880 --> 00:35:20,560
Speaker 4: is hard And so banks are like actively and again

682
00:35:20,560 --> 00:35:22,359
Speaker 4: I'm just like talking about banks specifically. You could also

683
00:35:22,400 --> 00:35:25,760
Speaker 4: talk about like chech companies, healthcare companies, whatever. But banks

684
00:35:25,840 --> 00:35:27,680
Speaker 4: where like we have talked about this a lot, like

685
00:35:28,040 --> 00:35:31,279
Speaker 4: being this nexus of the markets, and they do have

686
00:35:31,320 --> 00:35:33,400
Speaker 4: a lot of information that you know, Okay, that's different

687
00:35:33,440 --> 00:35:36,200
Speaker 4: from someone in another sector, like how does a compliance

688
00:35:36,239 --> 00:35:38,920
Speaker 4: team enforce that? That is an open question right now

689
00:35:39,000 --> 00:35:41,360
Speaker 4: that banks are like actively figuring out, and it's a

690
00:35:41,400 --> 00:35:44,040
Speaker 4: really interesting question of compliance and enforcement.

691
00:35:44,120 --> 00:35:44,239
Speaker 3: You know.

692
00:35:44,360 --> 00:35:47,800
Speaker 2: Internally, it's just it feels like the wauls of breaking

693
00:35:47,880 --> 00:35:50,040
Speaker 2: down around everything. Because before we do the prep call

694
00:35:50,120 --> 00:35:52,400
Speaker 2: for this, we talk about analysts, for example, and I

695
00:35:52,520 --> 00:35:54,719
Speaker 2: named someone. I'm not going to name people on this

696
00:35:55,040 --> 00:35:57,680
Speaker 2: just for professional reasons, but people know who are.

697
00:35:58,040 --> 00:35:59,960
Speaker 1: We're very professional, all very professor.

698
00:36:00,600 --> 00:36:03,840
Speaker 2: I say, fuck, but there are these I need someone

699
00:36:03,960 --> 00:36:05,960
Speaker 2: and you were like, that's not an analyst. Yeah. And

700
00:36:06,040 --> 00:36:08,800
Speaker 2: it's becoming obviously because they're on CNBC, they're on Bloomberg.

701
00:36:08,880 --> 00:36:11,360
Speaker 2: It's like, you've got these people pretending to be analysts.

702
00:36:11,360 --> 00:36:14,319
Speaker 2: You've got these entities like private credit pretending to be thanks,

703
00:36:14,320 --> 00:36:17,880
Speaker 2: You've got prediction markets pretending to be stocked. Yeah, it

704
00:36:18,040 --> 00:36:20,680
Speaker 2: just feels like the walls are being torn down, and

705
00:36:20,840 --> 00:36:23,160
Speaker 2: I know that this is gonna People aren't gonna like this.

706
00:36:23,440 --> 00:36:25,239
Speaker 2: I don't think most people should have access to the

707
00:36:25,280 --> 00:36:28,000
Speaker 2: stock market or gambling. I think that they are dangerous

708
00:36:28,680 --> 00:36:31,000
Speaker 2: and I think or at least they should be regulated

709
00:36:31,040 --> 00:36:34,200
Speaker 2: in such a way that it's less dangerous, not just

710
00:36:34,880 --> 00:36:38,480
Speaker 2: open season. And then the third guy on Twitter is like,

711
00:36:38,600 --> 00:36:40,920
Speaker 2: I'm an analyst, mate, you are a poster.

712
00:36:41,480 --> 00:36:42,680
Speaker 1: Well that's the interesting question.

713
00:36:42,760 --> 00:36:44,320
Speaker 4: And I mean, like I couldn't help but think in

714
00:36:44,400 --> 00:36:47,919
Speaker 4: that moment of journalism, right, I mean, like obviously, okay,

715
00:36:47,920 --> 00:36:51,600
Speaker 4: they're journalists and writers, and then they're like people who

716
00:36:51,760 --> 00:36:53,560
Speaker 4: do not have the same are not held to the

717
00:36:53,600 --> 00:36:55,480
Speaker 4: same standards, and that's a whole other conversation.

718
00:36:55,840 --> 00:36:57,240
Speaker 1: But like with analysts, yeah, totally.

719
00:36:57,320 --> 00:36:59,759
Speaker 4: I mean, like it's there are very clear kind of

720
00:36:59,880 --> 00:37:02,399
Speaker 4: like you are regulated by FINRA, which is the self

721
00:37:02,480 --> 00:37:05,560
Speaker 4: regulated you know, they're a regulator and they regulator. They

722
00:37:05,640 --> 00:37:09,480
Speaker 4: regulate the brokerage industry, and like any quote cell side analyst,

723
00:37:09,640 --> 00:37:11,839
Speaker 4: so like you know, an analyst who is again held

724
00:37:11,920 --> 00:37:15,400
Speaker 4: to these standards like industry standards of disclosures and like

725
00:37:15,480 --> 00:37:17,360
Speaker 4: conflict of interests and things like that, like that is

726
00:37:17,480 --> 00:37:20,040
Speaker 4: quote an analyst. Yeah, you can be an of course,

727
00:37:20,120 --> 00:37:22,799
Speaker 4: there are like other ways, but like that, you can

728
00:37:22,840 --> 00:37:25,279
Speaker 4: be an analyst in and that is legitimate in like

729
00:37:25,360 --> 00:37:29,399
Speaker 4: another sector or like another like on the by side. Okay, fine,

730
00:37:29,440 --> 00:37:32,120
Speaker 4: that's all legitimate, but there are certain standards that you're

731
00:37:32,160 --> 00:37:34,279
Speaker 4: held to if you're like, for example, you know, like

732
00:37:34,360 --> 00:37:38,200
Speaker 4: a FINRA analyst, and like that's not analyst capital a analyst,

733
00:37:38,239 --> 00:37:40,200
Speaker 4: and that's not always clear to like a viewer of CMOS.

734
00:37:40,640 --> 00:37:43,120
Speaker 2: This is actually a question what is a sell side analyst?

735
00:37:43,280 --> 00:37:45,920
Speaker 2: Because I have listeners who have lost this before, and

736
00:37:45,960 --> 00:37:47,839
Speaker 2: I realized I haven't really defined it myself very well.

737
00:37:47,960 --> 00:37:52,800
Speaker 4: You would not for sure you're at a brokerage, something

738
00:37:52,960 --> 00:37:55,719
Speaker 4: like brokerage inside of a bank, or you're just like

739
00:37:55,760 --> 00:37:59,880
Speaker 4: a standalone kind of brokerage a Morgan Stanley. Great great example.

740
00:38:00,040 --> 00:38:02,520
Speaker 4: They have their investment bank and that's like okay, they

741
00:38:02,560 --> 00:38:04,400
Speaker 4: have their bankers over here. And on the other side

742
00:38:04,760 --> 00:38:06,799
Speaker 4: and it's not this simple, but like on the other side,

743
00:38:06,800 --> 00:38:09,440
Speaker 4: you have the cell side, and that is these analysts

744
00:38:09,480 --> 00:38:11,800
Speaker 4: who are writing research reports.

745
00:38:11,920 --> 00:38:15,359
Speaker 1: They are held to FINRA rule two two for one.

746
00:38:15,600 --> 00:38:19,320
Speaker 1: I think SECTIONNE six two two for one. Go google it.

747
00:38:19,440 --> 00:38:21,960
Speaker 4: That covers everything that like a cell side analyst must

748
00:38:22,040 --> 00:38:24,960
Speaker 4: be held to. They are on the cell side versus

749
00:38:25,000 --> 00:38:28,680
Speaker 4: the buy side. So they are selling you know, like

750
00:38:28,880 --> 00:38:31,840
Speaker 4: research and you know, versus like they're not managing a

751
00:38:31,920 --> 00:38:35,719
Speaker 4: fund right like they are giving information, they're issuing a

752
00:38:35,800 --> 00:38:39,040
Speaker 4: buy hold sell. They are giving price targets, they are

753
00:38:39,120 --> 00:38:42,360
Speaker 4: looking at financial models. They are in a different spot

754
00:38:42,520 --> 00:38:45,200
Speaker 4: than against someone on the buy side. That is like

755
00:38:45,719 --> 00:38:51,720
Speaker 4: reading the cell side selling selling research, sell selling knowledge

756
00:38:51,760 --> 00:38:55,200
Speaker 4: and wisdom. I don't know how the SEC defines that,

757
00:38:55,280 --> 00:38:57,200
Speaker 4: I'll be very clear, And it's kind of like, I mean,

758
00:38:57,239 --> 00:38:57,920
Speaker 4: it's kind.

759
00:38:57,800 --> 00:38:59,000
Speaker 2: Of outdated this way.

760
00:38:59,120 --> 00:39:01,439
Speaker 4: You know, it's almost like an antiquated thing sellside versus

761
00:39:01,480 --> 00:39:04,360
Speaker 4: by high just kind of how like a wirehouse Like

762
00:39:04,440 --> 00:39:06,359
Speaker 4: that's a very antiquated way of saying, like a big

763
00:39:06,440 --> 00:39:07,359
Speaker 4: wealth manager.

764
00:39:07,160 --> 00:39:08,839
Speaker 2: Big thing. That's scattering me at the moment. And I'm

765
00:39:08,880 --> 00:39:13,480
Speaker 2: not naming anyone specific for professional reasons, but why is

766
00:39:13,560 --> 00:39:17,680
Speaker 2: it that these analysts always set these massive targets and

767
00:39:17,880 --> 00:39:21,239
Speaker 2: don't seem to be affected by reality. Because there is

768
00:39:21,360 --> 00:39:27,919
Speaker 2: a nonspecific prominent data center analyst who quite literally went

769
00:39:28,040 --> 00:39:32,280
Speaker 2: out on television yesterday and said the oracle was a goodbye,

770
00:39:33,000 --> 00:39:35,080
Speaker 2: and it was that it's actually better when you look

771
00:39:35,080 --> 00:39:37,600
Speaker 2: at the report. This is factually incorrect. It's not even

772
00:39:37,600 --> 00:39:40,920
Speaker 2: an opinion thing. The cell side analysts always seem very

773
00:39:41,000 --> 00:39:45,480
Speaker 2: positive even when reality isn't reflecting that. Shouldn't they know better?

774
00:39:45,760 --> 00:39:48,400
Speaker 2: Is there a reason they would be more positive in

775
00:39:48,600 --> 00:39:50,799
Speaker 2: general not talking about this person. Yeah.

776
00:39:50,920 --> 00:39:52,800
Speaker 4: I mean it's like this is like one of my

777
00:39:52,960 --> 00:39:55,359
Speaker 4: favorite issues. It's just it's really fascinating because it kind

778
00:39:55,360 --> 00:39:58,759
Speaker 4: of speaks to like this proliferation of like anyone can

779
00:39:58,840 --> 00:40:00,840
Speaker 4: put out research and like you can kind of like

780
00:40:00,920 --> 00:40:04,440
Speaker 4: a lowercase a analyst versus capital a analyst. I think

781
00:40:04,520 --> 00:40:06,880
Speaker 4: that the thing to always go back to is, you know,

782
00:40:07,000 --> 00:40:09,279
Speaker 4: two thousand and one. I think two thousand and two

783
00:40:09,800 --> 00:40:13,080
Speaker 4: new regulations were put in you know, spearheaded by Elliott Spitzer,

784
00:40:13,120 --> 00:40:15,319
Speaker 4: who was the New York AG at the time, after

785
00:40:15,520 --> 00:40:19,120
Speaker 4: you know, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley put you know, certain

786
00:40:19,160 --> 00:40:22,600
Speaker 4: analysts had put out research that were like was super

787
00:40:22,680 --> 00:40:25,640
Speaker 4: bullish and was total mismatch to how they were privately

788
00:40:25,719 --> 00:40:29,759
Speaker 4: describing Amazon. You know, Henry Blodgett famously, you know, put

789
00:40:29,840 --> 00:40:32,560
Speaker 4: out a report band from the industry that's all well,

790
00:40:32,640 --> 00:40:36,240
Speaker 4: you know, chronicled. All new regulations were put in place

791
00:40:36,400 --> 00:40:42,359
Speaker 4: around from security regulators around like okay, you are an analyst, Okay,

792
00:40:42,600 --> 00:40:45,480
Speaker 4: you have to include all sorts of new disclosures, which

793
00:40:45,520 --> 00:40:47,440
Speaker 4: is great, I mean, you know, and and again very

794
00:40:47,480 --> 00:40:52,000
Speaker 4: high a member of my household. I think the language

795
00:40:52,040 --> 00:40:53,719
Speaker 4: is something like me or a member of my household

796
00:40:54,640 --> 00:40:57,000
Speaker 4: owns a security and X y z or something like that.

797
00:40:57,960 --> 00:41:00,839
Speaker 4: And also, you know kind of these charts you'll see

798
00:41:00,840 --> 00:41:04,360
Speaker 4: at the bottom of a report where it shows the

799
00:41:04,760 --> 00:41:07,919
Speaker 4: stock price, like an Apple, for example, the stock price

800
00:41:08,040 --> 00:41:10,920
Speaker 4: relative to like where their price target is to hold

801
00:41:10,960 --> 00:41:13,439
Speaker 4: them accountable for like you know kind of what that's

802
00:41:13,480 --> 00:41:15,120
Speaker 4: looking like and stop, uh.

803
00:41:15,280 --> 00:41:17,040
Speaker 2: That would require someone to hold them accountable.

804
00:41:17,719 --> 00:41:18,480
Speaker 1: Yes, exactly.

805
00:41:18,640 --> 00:41:21,680
Speaker 4: And analysts are like, by and large, I mean, there's

806
00:41:21,800 --> 00:41:23,320
Speaker 4: plenty of data on this, but like they are a

807
00:41:23,480 --> 00:41:28,719
Speaker 4: very like bullish group. I mean the data if you

808
00:41:28,840 --> 00:41:31,120
Speaker 4: just look at buy hold sell, like, they continue to

809
00:41:31,160 --> 00:41:34,480
Speaker 4: be that and and the whole industry has really evolved

810
00:41:34,600 --> 00:41:36,560
Speaker 4: where you know, this is a whole other conversation. We

811
00:41:36,640 --> 00:41:38,600
Speaker 4: talked about this a little bit, but like people should

812
00:41:38,600 --> 00:41:41,480
Speaker 4: be aware that like corporate access is you know, just

813
00:41:41,600 --> 00:41:44,520
Speaker 4: a much bigger part of the analyst.

814
00:41:44,239 --> 00:41:45,080
Speaker 1: Job and and all that.

815
00:41:45,400 --> 00:41:47,440
Speaker 2: When you say access, what do you mean, Yeah, Like.

816
00:41:48,560 --> 00:41:52,040
Speaker 4: You're an analyst at a again, a Morgan Stanley or

817
00:41:52,239 --> 00:41:55,799
Speaker 4: a UBS. And just to call out two random ones

818
00:41:56,960 --> 00:42:00,160
Speaker 4: you your clients, like a hedge fund investor, you know,

819
00:42:00,320 --> 00:42:04,040
Speaker 4: like a big institutional investor access to the management team

820
00:42:04,440 --> 00:42:06,560
Speaker 4: of the company that I cover as an analyst. So

821
00:42:06,800 --> 00:42:11,080
Speaker 4: I'm covering I'm covering the you know, I'm a healthcare

822
00:42:11,080 --> 00:42:13,400
Speaker 4: analyst and I'm covering Johnson and Johnson, and like I

823
00:42:13,480 --> 00:42:15,680
Speaker 4: can connect, you know, like the investor who's reading my

824
00:42:15,760 --> 00:42:18,880
Speaker 4: research with the CFO of Johnson and Johnson. I'm just

825
00:42:18,920 --> 00:42:22,279
Speaker 4: calling out random companies, but it's that connection. It's that

826
00:42:22,400 --> 00:42:23,839
Speaker 4: like link, and it's well, it's access.

827
00:42:23,960 --> 00:42:29,879
Speaker 2: It's just access feels that feels like a bad thing,

828
00:42:30,120 --> 00:42:32,239
Speaker 2: like that doesn't feel like it benefits.

829
00:42:33,239 --> 00:42:35,239
Speaker 4: It is definitely a you know, it's one of these

830
00:42:35,280 --> 00:42:38,200
Speaker 4: things that that analysts have to manage and like these

831
00:42:38,239 --> 00:42:39,880
Speaker 4: one of these and I don't want to call it

832
00:42:39,920 --> 00:42:42,400
Speaker 4: a conflict, because it's not inherently a conflict, but it

833
00:42:42,560 --> 00:42:45,560
Speaker 4: is another kind of piece of the job that frankly,

834
00:42:46,640 --> 00:42:48,640
Speaker 4: and there are many fantastic analysts out there who do

835
00:42:48,800 --> 00:42:51,600
Speaker 4: manage that well and put out you know, have great relationships,

836
00:42:51,640 --> 00:42:54,880
Speaker 4: but put out critical research, you know, like substantive research,

837
00:42:54,960 --> 00:42:56,799
Speaker 4: and you just have to manage that. And there are

838
00:42:56,840 --> 00:42:59,279
Speaker 4: many fantastic analysts who do. But I even said, it's

839
00:42:59,400 --> 00:43:03,000
Speaker 4: not unlike sometimes being a beat reporter, where you have

840
00:43:03,200 --> 00:43:06,080
Speaker 4: to maintain just like good working relationships with the people

841
00:43:06,160 --> 00:43:09,400
Speaker 4: you cover, even if you're going to say an accurate

842
00:43:09,520 --> 00:43:11,920
Speaker 4: but like critical fair thing, and then you just have

843
00:43:12,040 --> 00:43:14,560
Speaker 4: to like move on again. Very different from the role

844
00:43:14,600 --> 00:43:16,520
Speaker 4: of an analyst, you know, but it.

845
00:43:16,640 --> 00:43:19,200
Speaker 1: Is there are similarities. I don't know if it's different,

846
00:43:19,320 --> 00:43:20,239
Speaker 1: there are similarities.

847
00:43:20,400 --> 00:43:21,759
Speaker 3: I just wait, I just want to make sure I

848
00:43:21,840 --> 00:43:26,080
Speaker 3: please please, right, So, a sell side analyst writes reports

849
00:43:26,280 --> 00:43:29,960
Speaker 3: about companies in a certain sector and puts those reports

850
00:43:30,000 --> 00:43:33,240
Speaker 3: out publicly and disseminates them to other banks, et cetera.

851
00:43:33,600 --> 00:43:36,839
Speaker 3: And then hedge funds can go to the analyst and say,

852
00:43:37,360 --> 00:43:40,600
Speaker 3: I want your specific research that you've done on these companies,

853
00:43:40,680 --> 00:43:43,759
Speaker 3: and also can you introduce me to their management team.

854
00:43:44,160 --> 00:43:46,520
Speaker 1: That's part of the offering exactly, I see exactly.

855
00:43:46,560 --> 00:43:50,600
Speaker 3: And therefore, to be able to connect clients to management

856
00:43:50,960 --> 00:43:54,240
Speaker 3: and make money for your firm, you have to maybe

857
00:43:54,320 --> 00:43:57,200
Speaker 3: you have to be a little more positive in your

858
00:43:57,280 --> 00:43:59,799
Speaker 3: report on that firm than you normally would in order

859
00:43:59,880 --> 00:44:02,359
Speaker 3: to be able to connect your clients with them.

860
00:44:02,640 --> 00:44:03,279
Speaker 2: That's that's it.

861
00:44:04,040 --> 00:44:08,040
Speaker 4: That would be the cynical take, absolutely, but the very

862
00:44:08,160 --> 00:44:16,240
Speaker 4: fair criticism I would say yes, absolutely, I don't cynical

863
00:44:16,280 --> 00:44:18,360
Speaker 4: take but but but it is it's just like a

864
00:44:18,440 --> 00:44:22,280
Speaker 4: feature that and again they're like excellent, excellent, excellent analysts

865
00:44:22,280 --> 00:44:23,600
Speaker 4: who just like manage.

866
00:44:23,239 --> 00:44:25,799
Speaker 2: That's why we're being on specifically, but and.

867
00:44:25,840 --> 00:44:27,680
Speaker 1: Who just manage that. And it's just like being again

868
00:44:27,680 --> 00:44:28,000
Speaker 1: and again.

869
00:44:28,200 --> 00:44:30,640
Speaker 4: Yes, okay, there are differences, but it is not unlike

870
00:44:31,920 --> 00:44:34,040
Speaker 4: you write a tough story on a company. You are

871
00:44:34,280 --> 00:44:36,719
Speaker 4: fair and then you got to move on and then

872
00:44:36,719 --> 00:44:38,319
Speaker 4: you got to like move on, you know what I mean.

873
00:44:38,640 --> 00:44:39,600
Speaker 2: But the thing is, I don't know.

874
00:44:39,680 --> 00:44:39,840
Speaker 3: I know.

875
00:44:40,200 --> 00:44:43,120
Speaker 2: I think access journalism is bullshing and I think we're

876
00:44:43,160 --> 00:44:45,719
Speaker 2: in the beginning of history. As I wrote yeah last week,

877
00:44:46,160 --> 00:44:50,080
Speaker 2: it is it's no longer useful to do access. Access

878
00:44:50,120 --> 00:44:52,320
Speaker 2: journalism doesn't work. It doesn't get you anything. If a

879
00:44:52,360 --> 00:44:55,400
Speaker 2: PR firm or a PR person at a company doesn't

880
00:44:55,400 --> 00:44:57,480
Speaker 2: answer your question because they're mad at you, that's their

881
00:44:57,560 --> 00:44:59,919
Speaker 2: fucking problem. This is not the opinion of my guests,

882
00:45:00,160 --> 00:45:02,840
Speaker 2: is just me. I just when you told me this

883
00:45:02,960 --> 00:45:04,400
Speaker 2: for the first time in the pre courl I was

884
00:45:04,520 --> 00:45:06,560
Speaker 2: kind of I sat and thought about it a lot

885
00:45:06,600 --> 00:45:09,080
Speaker 2: because it's like, you don't have to agree with me here.

886
00:45:09,320 --> 00:45:12,759
Speaker 2: It feels antithetical to good analysis to be like, well,

887
00:45:12,840 --> 00:45:15,839
Speaker 2: I can't be too mean, especially when your job is hey,

888
00:45:15,880 --> 00:45:18,640
Speaker 2: should I invest in this, and it's like, well, you

889
00:45:18,800 --> 00:45:21,800
Speaker 2: maybe should, because I I gotta get you the company.

890
00:45:22,320 --> 00:45:24,120
Speaker 2: I got to make sure the company. Fuck that, I

891
00:45:24,239 --> 00:45:26,879
Speaker 2: I don't know. This is the thing though, gets back

892
00:45:26,880 --> 00:45:28,880
Speaker 2: to my wife feeling about the stock market. It's like

893
00:45:29,280 --> 00:45:33,040
Speaker 2: that feels rigged. It feels like you've got analysts who

894
00:45:33,080 --> 00:45:36,279
Speaker 2: go on CNBC Bloomberg and I'm sure people will say,

895
00:45:36,320 --> 00:45:40,040
Speaker 2: oh Bloomberg, real traders use the terminal whatever. But it's

896
00:45:40,120 --> 00:45:43,279
Speaker 2: like the growth of retail investors is what makes this

897
00:45:43,400 --> 00:45:46,319
Speaker 2: dangerous to me, The fact that it's the easiest time

898
00:45:46,440 --> 00:45:49,239
Speaker 2: ever to invest in stocks. If I felt like buying

899
00:45:49,280 --> 00:45:50,680
Speaker 2: a stock right now, I could do so in a

900
00:45:50,719 --> 00:45:54,399
Speaker 2: few taps. If that's the case, having or that should

901
00:45:54,400 --> 00:45:58,480
Speaker 2: be the disclosure. Here's a good centrist path. I think

902
00:45:58,520 --> 00:46:02,319
Speaker 2: that they should have to write down reintroduction they've made. Oh,

903
00:46:02,440 --> 00:46:05,120
Speaker 2: they should say every time every time they've introduced a

904
00:46:05,160 --> 00:46:06,799
Speaker 2: hedge fund, and they don't even need to name them.

905
00:46:07,080 --> 00:46:10,120
Speaker 2: There's these say made introduction on this date. That way

906
00:46:10,200 --> 00:46:12,520
Speaker 2: we could see because I bet there'd be a lot

907
00:46:12,560 --> 00:46:12,799
Speaker 2: of them.

908
00:46:13,760 --> 00:46:16,920
Speaker 1: Also, I'm getting all new ideas for Foyer requests.

909
00:46:17,960 --> 00:46:19,759
Speaker 4: Not that they would be not that I had many

910
00:46:19,840 --> 00:46:21,920
Speaker 4: who actually fall into that at all, because it's all

911
00:46:22,000 --> 00:46:24,480
Speaker 4: private sector. But that's, you know, like, but I'm just

912
00:46:24,560 --> 00:46:27,240
Speaker 4: I'm just getting ideas. I'm just getting ideas again, totally different.

913
00:46:27,280 --> 00:46:30,040
Speaker 2: But but this is the thing what good journalism is

914
00:46:30,120 --> 00:46:34,160
Speaker 2: because it's like, these messy little lines between informations are

915
00:46:34,239 --> 00:46:37,680
Speaker 2: not disclosed exactly. It wouldn't be as big a deal

916
00:46:37,880 --> 00:46:41,800
Speaker 2: if they disclose this stuff. But also the term analyst

917
00:46:41,960 --> 00:46:47,520
Speaker 2: is used very vaguely these days, totally confusing people. Citriny

918
00:46:47,600 --> 00:46:50,600
Speaker 2: research for example, that.

919
00:46:50,800 --> 00:46:53,200
Speaker 4: People who are for example, again get to the heart

920
00:46:53,239 --> 00:46:55,239
Speaker 4: of people who are like held to an industry reg

921
00:46:55,520 --> 00:46:58,120
Speaker 4: you know, regulated industry standard that like is very like

922
00:46:58,480 --> 00:47:03,480
Speaker 4: closely held, closely watch versus not. That's a perfect yeah,

923
00:47:03,640 --> 00:47:04,360
Speaker 4: perfect example.

924
00:47:04,560 --> 00:47:06,279
Speaker 2: All Right, I think we're gonna wrap it there. We've

925
00:47:06,280 --> 00:47:07,080
Speaker 2: had a great time.

926
00:47:07,239 --> 00:47:10,239
Speaker 3: Where can we find you two, I'm on x at

927
00:47:10,400 --> 00:47:13,360
Speaker 3: Nick Dever Underscore, or you can check out my newly

928
00:47:13,480 --> 00:47:18,759
Speaker 3: launched website Nicked and sorry, don't cancel the ed I

929
00:47:18,800 --> 00:47:25,080
Speaker 3: can't believe you outed me at the end or Barons

930
00:47:25,120 --> 00:47:25,480
Speaker 3: dot com.

931
00:47:25,680 --> 00:47:27,359
Speaker 1: Yes, you can find me on Barons dot com.

932
00:47:27,840 --> 00:47:30,320
Speaker 2: All right, everyone, you can find me of course, where's

933
00:47:30,360 --> 00:47:32,760
Speaker 2: your ed dot at Better offline dot com. This podcast

934
00:47:32,800 --> 00:47:34,879
Speaker 2: that you're already listening to you love them one log

935
00:47:34,960 --> 00:47:46,000
Speaker 2: later in the week. Thank you all, Thank you, thank

936
00:47:46,000 --> 00:47:47,360
Speaker 2: you for listening to Better Offline.

937
00:47:47,640 --> 00:47:50,040
Speaker 6: The editor and composer of the Better Offline theme song

938
00:47:50,120 --> 00:47:52,759
Speaker 6: is Matasowski. You can check out more of his music

939
00:47:52,800 --> 00:47:56,279
Speaker 6: and audio projects at Matasowski dot com, M A T

940
00:47:56,440 --> 00:47:59,920
Speaker 6: T O, S O W S k I dot com.

941
00:48:00,840 --> 00:48:03,080
Speaker 5: You can email me at easy at better offline dot

942
00:48:03,160 --> 00:48:05,400
Speaker 5: com or visit better offline dot com to find more

943
00:48:05,440 --> 00:48:08,759
Speaker 5: podcast links and of course my newsletter. I also really

944
00:48:08,840 --> 00:48:11,040
Speaker 5: recommend you go to chat dot Where's youread dot at

945
00:48:11,160 --> 00:48:13,560
Speaker 5: to visit the discord, and go to our slash.

946
00:48:13,360 --> 00:48:16,400
Speaker 1: Better Offline to check out I'll Reddit. Thank you so

947
00:48:16,600 --> 00:48:20,000
Speaker 1: much for listening. Better Offline is a production of cool

948
00:48:20,080 --> 00:48:20,600
Speaker 1: Zone Media.

949
00:48:20,800 --> 00:48:23,640
Speaker 4: For more from cool Zone Media, visit our website cool

950
00:48:23,680 --> 00:48:27,040
Speaker 4: Zonemedia dot com, or check us out on the iHeartRadio app,

951
00:48:27,120 --> 00:48:29,480
Speaker 4: Apple Podcasts, or wherever you get your podcasts.