WEBVTT - Steve Eisman on the 'Paradigm Shift' Happening in Markets Right Now

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<v Speaker 1>Hello, and welcome to another episode of the All Thoughts Podcast.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm Tracy Allowin and I'm Joe. Joe. It feels like

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<v Speaker 1>an interesting moment in markets. Yes, I mean there's this

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<v Speaker 1>sort of short term obvious stuff that's interesting, like oh,

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<v Speaker 1>what's going to happen with the soft landing or what's

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<v Speaker 1>gonna happen with the Fed, etcetera. But it also feels

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<v Speaker 1>like a pretty big turning point in markets overall. Absolutely well.

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<v Speaker 1>To me, it feels like kind of a massive flip

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<v Speaker 1>flop from Doom and Gloom two, where it kind of

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<v Speaker 1>felt like everyone was talking about the world was actually

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<v Speaker 1>ending and suddenly, you know, fast forward to just the

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<v Speaker 1>beginning of three, and everyone's talking about a soft landing,

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<v Speaker 1>maybe the recession is averted. Markets are up quite remarkably,

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<v Speaker 1>including things that got absolutely crushed last year. So some

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<v Speaker 1>of the big stocks Bitcoin, I mean, some of the

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<v Speaker 1>Chinese companies like real estate and consumer tech companies, all

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<v Speaker 1>of those are surging, right, So like there's this hope

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<v Speaker 1>right that we let's just go back to or let's

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<v Speaker 1>just go back to one, like let's just hang on.

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<v Speaker 1>And it's sort of this thing because you know, when

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<v Speaker 1>I think of when I think of it was sort

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<v Speaker 1>of like the ultimate speculative froth low interest rate environment.

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<v Speaker 1>And as as everyone's tired of hearing me say, like

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<v Speaker 1>on this podcast, like you know, I, you know, I

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<v Speaker 1>first got interested in markets at the end of there

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<v Speaker 1>it comes, folks. But I remember like those periods where

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<v Speaker 1>it's like, you know, you have like you look at

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<v Speaker 1>the NAS deck and two thousand and one or two

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<v Speaker 1>thousand and you have like these fifty rallies. It's like

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<v Speaker 1>we're back. I don't know, we're back. It's over. And

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<v Speaker 1>that process of like I guess a bubble deflating is

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<v Speaker 1>like a long process. People are slow to give it up. Well,

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<v Speaker 1>that's exactly it, and it sort of happens in fits

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<v Speaker 1>and starts. And I'm glad you meant shined the keywords there,

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<v Speaker 1>which are bubble and you know, speculation, speculative interest, because

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<v Speaker 1>today we are going to be talking to someone who

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<v Speaker 1>is kind of an expert in exactly that and particularly

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<v Speaker 1>one period of speculative financial history. We are going to

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<v Speaker 1>be speaking with Steve Eisman. He has a portfolio manager

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<v Speaker 1>at New Burger Berman, and he famously bet against subprime

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<v Speaker 1>mortgages before the two thousand eight financial crisis. Of course,

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<v Speaker 1>you might recognize him from the movie The Big Short.

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<v Speaker 1>He was played by Steve Carrell. So really the perfect

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<v Speaker 1>guest to talk about markets right now. Perfect, let's do it,

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<v Speaker 1>all right, Steve, thank you so much for joining us,

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<v Speaker 1>Thanks for having me. So where should we start. Maybe

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<v Speaker 1>give us just your top line opinions on where markets

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<v Speaker 1>are right now. Um, there's gonna be a long intro. Okay,

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<v Speaker 1>that's fine. People are gonna look. So I remember back

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<v Speaker 1>in college, one of the most influential books I read

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<v Speaker 1>was a book by Thomas cune Cole, The Structure of

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<v Speaker 1>Scientific Revolutions. He invented the modern meaning of the word paradigm,

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<v Speaker 1>and the point of the book was that science paradigms

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<v Speaker 1>change over time. Sometimes those paradigms changed violently, and sometimes

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<v Speaker 1>those paradigms change over time because people don't give up

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<v Speaker 1>their paradigms easily. And I think we're going through a

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<v Speaker 1>period possibly like that again. So you know, markets have

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<v Speaker 1>long periods of paradigms where there are certain groups that

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<v Speaker 1>are leaders. So in the nineties, for example, it was

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<v Speaker 1>largely i'd call it large conglomerates like ge was what

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<v Speaker 1>people made money in and wanted to invest in. And

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<v Speaker 1>it lasted about eight years until there was a small

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<v Speaker 1>period of the dot com bubble, and obviously that ended

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<v Speaker 1>and there was a recession, and after that, really through

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<v Speaker 1>two thousand and seven, the new paradigm and just to

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<v Speaker 1>take a step back, when you know what market paradigm shift,

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<v Speaker 1>it's unusual that the old leaders become the new leaders.

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<v Speaker 1>There's a shift, and there's there's a new leadership group.

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<v Speaker 1>And you know, one of the most important leadership groups,

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<v Speaker 1>i'd call it, from two thousand and two through the

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<v Speaker 1>end of two thousand and seven were financials, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>largely invests in banks, very large banks, where the opinion

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<v Speaker 1>of the market was the people who ran these firms

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<v Speaker 1>were basically geniuses until they weren't. And you know, we

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<v Speaker 1>had a violent period in two thousand and eight and

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<v Speaker 1>two thousand and nine where those stocks got crushed. Almost

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<v Speaker 1>all of them would have gone bankrupt unless the government

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<v Speaker 1>bailed them out, which it did. But you know, financial

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<v Speaker 1>stocks that did well in the two thousand's did literally

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<v Speaker 1>nothing until probably two thousand and twenty, So call it

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<v Speaker 1>a dozen years where the old leadership group evaporated and

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<v Speaker 1>it was replaced by new leadership group, and that leadership

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<v Speaker 1>group was tech and growth stocks. And I think the

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<v Speaker 1>reason for that is that the FED cut rates essentially

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<v Speaker 1>to zero and kept them there and so you were

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<v Speaker 1>essentially paid to take risk. And as we all know,

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<v Speaker 1>there's a discounting mechanism of stocks where you know, you

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<v Speaker 1>plot out the earnings and the lower the discount rate,

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<v Speaker 1>the more the stock is worth. So the groups that

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<v Speaker 1>the group that did best were growth tech stocks, and

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<v Speaker 1>within growth tech stocks, the group that did the best

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<v Speaker 1>were the high growth no earning stocks, and that left

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<v Speaker 1>that basically lasted until last year. And if you look,

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<v Speaker 1>you know it was a bad market last year. But

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<v Speaker 1>the stocks that did the worst were the growth tech stocks.

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<v Speaker 1>And within the growth test tech stocks, the stocks that

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<v Speaker 1>did the worst were the high growth no earning stocks,

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<v Speaker 1>down generally anywhere from seventy to you know, it's a

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<v Speaker 1>crushing percentage, but like I said, you know, people don't

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<v Speaker 1>give up paradigms easily. And so so far this year,

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<v Speaker 1>the stocks have that have done best were the same

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<v Speaker 1>socks that did the worst. And you know, if you

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<v Speaker 1>go back to two thousand and nine through early two

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<v Speaker 1>thousand and ten, financial stocks had their last hurrah, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>Goldman Morgan Stanley had said it did very very well

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<v Speaker 1>until you know, Dodd Frank was passed and they had

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<v Speaker 1>to deliver, so they had kind of had a last hurror.

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<v Speaker 1>And maybe this is the last hurrah right now for

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<v Speaker 1>growth stocks. Possibly, And I think it'll all depend pretty

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<v Speaker 1>much on the FED. You know, Powell has said that

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<v Speaker 1>he's going to keep raising rates and the important sentences

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<v Speaker 1>and he'll leave them there. If he leaves them there,

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<v Speaker 1>I think we'll have a paradigm shift. If he cuts

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<v Speaker 1>it again, we'll go back to what we were, which

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<v Speaker 1>is growth stocks. I mean, I think he's going to

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<v Speaker 1>leave him there and then we'll have a paradigm shift.

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<v Speaker 1>But it's unknowable at this point, you know. Like I said,

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<v Speaker 1>paradigm shift can be very violent. They take time. I

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<v Speaker 1>think we're in the middle of that right now. And

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<v Speaker 1>like I said, it's unusual when you shift to new

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<v Speaker 1>paradigm that the old leaders become the new leaders. What

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<v Speaker 1>the new leaders will be assuming this happens at this point,

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<v Speaker 1>I don't really know, you know, Joe, I'm looking at

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<v Speaker 1>the Bubble portfolio, which was created by another all thoughts

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<v Speaker 1>guest Paul McNamara and basically has a lot of the

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<v Speaker 1>stocks that Steve was just talking about up so far

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<v Speaker 1>this year. Tracy was created by Paul and me. Oh,

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<v Speaker 1>I'm sorry, I co I co created. I'm so sorry.

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<v Speaker 1>Port By the way, some of those stocks are up.

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<v Speaker 1>It's pretty it's astonishing now they're up fifty from very

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<v Speaker 1>low levels. You know. Take I'm not picking on them.

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<v Speaker 1>Take a stock like a firm which is a buy now,

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<v Speaker 1>pay later company, really a financial company. I think it's

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<v Speaker 1>up sixty sent this year, but it's up sixty percent

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<v Speaker 1>this year after being down basically, so I think it

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<v Speaker 1>closed last year around eight and it's it's fifty, but

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<v Speaker 1>it used to be I don't remember a hundred, two hundred,

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<v Speaker 1>whatever it was. Yeah. Another one of these ones that

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<v Speaker 1>I've been watching is an open Door, which got below

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<v Speaker 1>a dollar at the end of December. Now so like

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<v Speaker 1>more than a double, but that was like a twelve dollar.

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<v Speaker 1>That was a spack, I mean, so it's incredible beat down.

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<v Speaker 1>And then this sort of about what is that process?

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<v Speaker 1>You know, you talk about this sort of like the

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<v Speaker 1>giving up the dreams and the process by which people

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<v Speaker 1>aren't sure it's it over? Is it not over? We

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<v Speaker 1>don't want to change the paradigm, just in the sort

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<v Speaker 1>of like how do you talk a little bit more

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<v Speaker 1>about like how that happens? What that how that process works? Well,

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<v Speaker 1>it takes time, you know. I would recommend everybody read

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<v Speaker 1>this Thomas qun book. It was published the year I

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<v Speaker 1>was born nineteen sixty two, which is I guess revelatory

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<v Speaker 1>for me. But but what he describes is, like I said,

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<v Speaker 1>people don't give up their paradigms easily. When when Einstein

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<v Speaker 1>created his theory of relativity, for example, this is in

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<v Speaker 1>the book, is out like everybody said, Oh we've been

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<v Speaker 1>waiting for Einstein. Thank god, now we can get rid

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<v Speaker 1>of Newton. You know, people, it took several years for

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<v Speaker 1>people to realize that that was a better theory. I

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<v Speaker 1>think something like that happens in markets. You know. Paradigms

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<v Speaker 1>in essence are so deeply ingrained in people's brains they

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<v Speaker 1>can't even imagine at times that there could be anything else.

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<v Speaker 1>And so, like I said, since paradigms, people don't give

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<v Speaker 1>up their paradigms easily. The only thing that gets people

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<v Speaker 1>to give them up is time. Now, the financial stocks

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<v Speaker 1>that was quick because they utterly collapsed. But that's unusual.

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<v Speaker 1>It's not like it's not like in the nineties the

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<v Speaker 1>conglomerates collapse. They didn't collapse. Their earnings growth slowed, and

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<v Speaker 1>you know, people expected the earnings growth to re accelerate

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<v Speaker 1>and it didn't. So, you know, take Ge. You know,

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<v Speaker 1>Ge was a star for almost all the nine d

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<v Speaker 1>s and then when Emil took over just before nine eleven,

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<v Speaker 1>it's deteriorated. You know, one of probably one of the

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<v Speaker 1>best trades in the world would have been owning Amazon

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<v Speaker 1>and shorting g Right. You know, it's funny, Tracy, I

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<v Speaker 1>actually went I mentioned open Door. I got it kind

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<v Speaker 1>of wrong. I said it was at twelve and it

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<v Speaker 1>was a thirty five dollar stock that went to a dollar.

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<v Speaker 1>So I was sort of understating the scale of the collapse.

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<v Speaker 1>But more importantly, let's talk about open Doors. Let's get

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<v Speaker 1>right into it. So open Door had a business model

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<v Speaker 1>where they would buy homes, fix them up, and try

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<v Speaker 1>to sell them quickly. Now, when you think about it,

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<v Speaker 1>that business model only works if housing prices are going up.

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<v Speaker 1>If housing prices are going down, it's a disaster. Um.

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<v Speaker 1>So I never thought it was a real business model.

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<v Speaker 1>It was a timing model. And I think the reason

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<v Speaker 1>why the stock got crushed last year is because, I mean,

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<v Speaker 1>housing hasn't collapsed in the United States, but it's kind

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<v Speaker 1>of locked and housing prices have gone down, so it's

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<v Speaker 1>hard to sell and be you're selling for less, and

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<v Speaker 1>that's why Open Doors down so much. But you know

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<v Speaker 1>what it came out. It was another one of these

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<v Speaker 1>speculative going to conquer the world stocks until it wasn't.

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<v Speaker 1>I definitely want to talk more to you about housing

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<v Speaker 1>and real estate in a second, but just on the

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<v Speaker 1>paradigm shift. You know, when I think about the paradigm

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<v Speaker 1>of the past couple of years, you mentioned low interest

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<v Speaker 1>rates and that helping to boost valuations, but I also

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<v Speaker 1>think about momentum and people just identifying the thing that

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<v Speaker 1>they think other people are going to buy and then

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<v Speaker 1>pouring into that and so having a lot of valuations

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<v Speaker 1>driven by flows. Can you talk about that behavior in

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<v Speaker 1>the market. I call this what I call it this

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<v Speaker 1>the Amazon disease. I'm not saying Amazon is a bad company.

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<v Speaker 1>It's a great company. What I mean by the Amazon diseases,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, and when Amazon came public, there was a

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<v Speaker 1>lot of skepticism that this work. And Amazon has basically

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<v Speaker 1>conquered the world, and so people are always looking for

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<v Speaker 1>the next Amazon. And you know that they're looking for

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<v Speaker 1>the next Amazon when they just when they write when

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<v Speaker 1>when the cell side writes a research report and the

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<v Speaker 1>first sentences the TAM is huge, which means the total

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<v Speaker 1>available market is huge. Well, you know, take open door again.

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<v Speaker 1>Housing is huge. I mean, there's no question that housing

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<v Speaker 1>is huge. But that doesn't mean people's business models are

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<v Speaker 1>going to conquer housing. But people are constantly you know, again,

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<v Speaker 1>when rates or zero, you're paid to speculate. So you

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<v Speaker 1>look at open door and you say, well, the housing

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<v Speaker 1>market in the United States is I don't know, a

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<v Speaker 1>trillion to whatever, it is a trillion to trillion. If

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<v Speaker 1>open Door only gets one cent of that market, the

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<v Speaker 1>stock is huge. And as long as revenue growth is strong,

0:13:18.840 --> 0:13:22.120
<v Speaker 1>people are willing to make that bet. When revenue growth

0:13:22.120 --> 0:13:25.120
<v Speaker 1>starts to slow, they they get they don't think about

0:13:25.160 --> 0:13:27.760
<v Speaker 1>the TAM anymore. They start to think about the business model.

0:13:27.880 --> 0:13:33.840
<v Speaker 1>So you know, in two thousand and ten through tooth

0:13:34.160 --> 0:13:36.520
<v Speaker 1>beginning of two thousand and twenty two, if you were

0:13:36.559 --> 0:13:40.960
<v Speaker 1>a company that had no earnings that strong revenue growth,

0:13:41.160 --> 0:13:45.600
<v Speaker 1>people dream the dream. When the revenue grow slows, people

0:13:45.640 --> 0:13:50.480
<v Speaker 1>stopped dreaming the dream. Or combination of that with higher

0:13:50.559 --> 0:13:53.880
<v Speaker 1>rates and the discounting mechanism takes down the stock. You know,

0:13:53.920 --> 0:13:56.640
<v Speaker 1>even companies that did well last you went down because

0:13:56.640 --> 0:14:00.760
<v Speaker 1>of the discounting mechanism. So let's say we are at

0:14:00.800 --> 0:14:03.679
<v Speaker 1>this paradigm shift and we don't know what it's gonna be.

0:14:03.720 --> 0:14:07.000
<v Speaker 1>We don't know what it's gonna look like, but something

0:14:07.040 --> 0:14:10.720
<v Speaker 1>that's not speculative tech will be the new leadership, presumably

0:14:10.960 --> 0:14:14.760
<v Speaker 1>for a while. As an investor, like, do you feel

0:14:14.800 --> 0:14:17.160
<v Speaker 1>like you can wait and sort of see what it

0:14:17.240 --> 0:14:19.520
<v Speaker 1>is and like let the market kind of decide, or

0:14:19.520 --> 0:14:22.080
<v Speaker 1>do you feel like an impulse to try to anticipate

0:14:22.520 --> 0:14:26.640
<v Speaker 1>today what that thing. I think you anticipate a little bit,

0:14:27.040 --> 0:14:29.200
<v Speaker 1>you know. So, for example, I think one of the

0:14:29.200 --> 0:14:33.280
<v Speaker 1>themes for the next several year is what I would

0:14:33.280 --> 0:14:37.520
<v Speaker 1>call the ressoring of the industrial world back into the

0:14:37.560 --> 0:14:41.920
<v Speaker 1>United States. So, you know, for the last call it

0:14:42.080 --> 0:14:47.040
<v Speaker 1>thirty years, companies have essentially sent their supply lines out

0:14:47.080 --> 0:14:49.280
<v Speaker 1>to the inside the United States because labor in the

0:14:49.360 --> 0:14:52.720
<v Speaker 1>United States is expensive and labor in China and Vietnam

0:14:53.040 --> 0:14:56.840
<v Speaker 1>is cheap, and that worked for a very long time,

0:14:57.120 --> 0:15:03.800
<v Speaker 1>and it was very deflationary. And COVID proved one thing. Yes,

0:15:03.840 --> 0:15:08.320
<v Speaker 1>that supply chain is less expensive, but it's also very brittle.

0:15:09.240 --> 0:15:13.560
<v Speaker 1>And because of what happened during COVID, people are companies

0:15:13.560 --> 0:15:16.480
<v Speaker 1>are bringing back the supply chain, at least partially back

0:15:16.520 --> 0:15:20.040
<v Speaker 1>to the United States. So, you know, stocks that haven't

0:15:20.200 --> 0:15:25.600
<v Speaker 1>done anything in twenty years, let's say, might start to

0:15:25.640 --> 0:15:30.200
<v Speaker 1>do well, like b HP, iron ore, etcetera. That's one

0:15:30.280 --> 0:15:33.920
<v Speaker 1>theme that I think will last a long time. Greenisfication

0:15:34.040 --> 0:15:36.720
<v Speaker 1>I think will last a long time. Although some of

0:15:36.720 --> 0:15:40.640
<v Speaker 1>those stocks have no earnings and high revenue growth, I

0:15:40.680 --> 0:15:42.960
<v Speaker 1>never quite know what to make of them. But there

0:15:42.960 --> 0:15:45.640
<v Speaker 1>are other ways to play the same theme. You know,

0:15:45.880 --> 0:15:49.040
<v Speaker 1>their companies I won't mention any names, but their companies

0:15:49.080 --> 0:15:53.520
<v Speaker 1>that are that are well, let's call them normal, that

0:15:54.080 --> 0:15:57.120
<v Speaker 1>are helping rebuild the infrastructure of the United States and

0:15:57.160 --> 0:16:00.440
<v Speaker 1>the electrification of the United States, etcetera. So those are

0:16:00.480 --> 0:16:03.560
<v Speaker 1>things you could start to look at. So that's actually

0:16:03.560 --> 0:16:05.600
<v Speaker 1>something that we've spoken quite a lot about on all

0:16:05.680 --> 0:16:08.240
<v Speaker 1>lots of this idea of a sort of shift from

0:16:08.280 --> 0:16:15.440
<v Speaker 1>I guess ephemerate tech software to the reality of actual things.

0:16:16.000 --> 0:16:17.600
<v Speaker 1>This might be a slightly weird question, but do you

0:16:17.600 --> 0:16:23.280
<v Speaker 1>think investors are well positioned or well informed to grasp

0:16:23.440 --> 0:16:26.320
<v Speaker 1>that shift, because I imagine there must be a fundamental

0:16:26.320 --> 0:16:30.400
<v Speaker 1>difference between looking at a tech company versus say, I

0:16:30.480 --> 0:16:33.400
<v Speaker 1>don't know, in an oil major or something like that. Oh,

0:16:33.440 --> 0:16:35.720
<v Speaker 1>I don't think people are prepared yet. You know, they've

0:16:35.720 --> 0:16:39.320
<v Speaker 1>owned tech stocks for so long. You know, they look

0:16:39.360 --> 0:16:42.440
<v Speaker 1>at revenue growth, they look at e v D. But uh,

0:16:43.440 --> 0:16:45.640
<v Speaker 1>you know, one of the things that I find astonishing,

0:16:45.680 --> 0:16:49.080
<v Speaker 1>for example, about tech stocks is they don't include stock

0:16:49.120 --> 0:16:53.160
<v Speaker 1>based compensation and earnings, which I just find a little weird.

0:16:53.960 --> 0:16:59.080
<v Speaker 1>And because I would always ask, do you deduct stock

0:16:59.120 --> 0:17:02.840
<v Speaker 1>based competence? Stock based come from your taxes? And the

0:17:02.920 --> 0:17:05.639
<v Speaker 1>ends to that is always yeah, So in that sense

0:17:05.680 --> 0:17:08.520
<v Speaker 1>it's real, but when the report earnings, they pretend it's

0:17:08.560 --> 0:17:11.879
<v Speaker 1>not real. But the market doesn't seem to care. But

0:17:12.040 --> 0:17:15.600
<v Speaker 1>I think it's going to take time, you know, like I,

0:17:15.840 --> 0:17:18.159
<v Speaker 1>like I always talked about before some of these very

0:17:18.200 --> 0:17:22.640
<v Speaker 1>speculative stocks are up this year, it's going to take

0:17:22.640 --> 0:17:25.040
<v Speaker 1>time for people to start to do I think research

0:17:25.119 --> 0:17:29.200
<v Speaker 1>on other stuff. I know you weren't investing yet at

0:17:29.240 --> 0:17:32.879
<v Speaker 1>this point. But you know, as a student of market history,

0:17:33.080 --> 0:17:35.840
<v Speaker 1>was there the same process like with the like earlier

0:17:35.880 --> 0:17:38.880
<v Speaker 1>tech bubbles, like in the sixties, with the aerospace stocks

0:17:38.920 --> 0:17:41.600
<v Speaker 1>and some of those other waves. I mean, I was

0:17:41.640 --> 0:17:43.280
<v Speaker 1>in great school, and that's what I'm saying. No, I

0:17:43.280 --> 0:17:45.119
<v Speaker 1>figured out. But I although the two of you, I

0:17:45.119 --> 0:17:48.639
<v Speaker 1>don't think we're alive back then. Um. You know, I

0:17:48.640 --> 0:17:51.800
<v Speaker 1>think if you look at economic history, probably it's true.

0:17:51.880 --> 0:17:54.280
<v Speaker 1>I haven't really looked at that much. But you know,

0:17:54.359 --> 0:17:57.600
<v Speaker 1>in the in the late seventies, the group that people

0:17:57.640 --> 0:18:01.640
<v Speaker 1>wanted to own work whil stocks. Oil stocks haven't done

0:18:01.680 --> 0:18:05.520
<v Speaker 1>well for god knows how many years until basically the

0:18:05.600 --> 0:18:09.520
<v Speaker 1>last two Now let's talk about old stocks for a second.

0:18:09.880 --> 0:18:12.440
<v Speaker 1>You know, pipeline stocks, oil stocks. You know, why did

0:18:12.440 --> 0:18:15.800
<v Speaker 1>they do so poorly? This is not a paradigm shift.

0:18:15.840 --> 0:18:19.560
<v Speaker 1>This is a shareholder's revolt issue. So you know, if

0:18:19.560 --> 0:18:22.440
<v Speaker 1>you look back, call it two thousand and ten through

0:18:22.720 --> 0:18:26.320
<v Speaker 1>maybe two thousand eighteen or so. And this is where

0:18:26.480 --> 0:18:32.760
<v Speaker 1>I would say incentives trump ethics every time. So the

0:18:32.840 --> 0:18:35.800
<v Speaker 1>people who ran these companies where it was the midstream

0:18:35.840 --> 0:18:41.240
<v Speaker 1>pipelines or the drillers the c e O s of

0:18:41.280 --> 0:18:46.159
<v Speaker 1>those companies were all compensated essentially on volume, so it

0:18:46.200 --> 0:18:49.280
<v Speaker 1>didn't matter whether the oil prices with thirty or they're

0:18:49.280 --> 0:18:53.399
<v Speaker 1>all prices were eighty. They kept growing their production and

0:18:53.400 --> 0:18:56.160
<v Speaker 1>in most cases they basically never made money whether oil

0:18:56.240 --> 0:18:59.600
<v Speaker 1>prices with thirty or prices were eighty. And at some

0:18:59.760 --> 0:19:03.199
<v Speaker 1>poll point, probably around two thousand and sixteen, when the

0:19:03.240 --> 0:19:07.399
<v Speaker 1>group got crushed, I think that the shareholders literally revolted

0:19:07.880 --> 0:19:11.119
<v Speaker 1>and they went to these managements and said enough and

0:19:11.160 --> 0:19:14.159
<v Speaker 1>you have to change your compensation to R O E, etcetera.

0:19:14.960 --> 0:19:17.640
<v Speaker 1>And the stocks have done pretty well since that, especially

0:19:17.680 --> 0:19:21.359
<v Speaker 1>in the last two years, because the way they operate

0:19:21.440 --> 0:19:25.320
<v Speaker 1>now is they basically planned their business models for oil

0:19:25.359 --> 0:19:28.680
<v Speaker 1>prices as something like fifty to sixty, and if oil

0:19:28.720 --> 0:19:33.240
<v Speaker 1>prices are above they return the money to shareholders, which

0:19:33.280 --> 0:19:35.560
<v Speaker 1>is one of the reasons why despite the fact that

0:19:35.600 --> 0:19:40.080
<v Speaker 1>all prices were so high last year, those same companies

0:19:40.080 --> 0:19:42.760
<v Speaker 1>did not increase their production that much. Now, some people

0:19:42.760 --> 0:19:45.960
<v Speaker 1>accused the Biden administration of this. I don't think it

0:19:46.000 --> 0:19:48.399
<v Speaker 1>has anything to do with the Biden administration. Has to

0:19:48.440 --> 0:19:52.240
<v Speaker 1>do with the change and incentive structure for these companies.

0:19:52.600 --> 0:19:55.760
<v Speaker 1>Incentives trumping ethics is such a good line and I'm

0:19:55.840 --> 0:19:58.520
<v Speaker 1>definitely going to steal it from you at some point, Steve,

0:19:58.720 --> 0:20:00.560
<v Speaker 1>you can play giarize. You don't even a the quotemak.

0:20:00.920 --> 0:20:03.399
<v Speaker 1>Thank you. I think I appreciate that, um I have

0:20:03.440 --> 0:20:06.840
<v Speaker 1>a full license on that line. You know, given your background,

0:20:06.920 --> 0:20:08.919
<v Speaker 1>I think we would be remissed to not talk a

0:20:08.960 --> 0:20:12.600
<v Speaker 1>little bit about financial risk and financial stability. And this

0:20:12.640 --> 0:20:14.640
<v Speaker 1>is something that has come up over the past year

0:20:14.840 --> 0:20:18.359
<v Speaker 1>with the FED raising interest rates so rapidly, and yet

0:20:18.440 --> 0:20:25.040
<v Speaker 1>we haven't actually seen a significant break Is the system fixed?

0:20:25.280 --> 0:20:28.399
<v Speaker 1>Is it just not going to come that big breakage

0:20:28.440 --> 0:20:31.520
<v Speaker 1>that you know some people have been anticipating for a while. Well,

0:20:31.560 --> 0:20:34.280
<v Speaker 1>I can't say that they won't be breakage any anywhere

0:20:34.320 --> 0:20:38.280
<v Speaker 1>that I mean, there always could be breakage. What I

0:20:38.320 --> 0:20:42.280
<v Speaker 1>would say definitively is that there will not be breakage

0:20:42.280 --> 0:20:46.040
<v Speaker 1>in the US financial system, especially in the banks. We

0:20:46.080 --> 0:20:51.960
<v Speaker 1>can owe that to one person, which is Daniel Tarullo,

0:20:52.119 --> 0:20:55.720
<v Speaker 1>who was the first Vice Chairman in charge of Financial

0:20:55.760 --> 0:20:58.479
<v Speaker 1>Supervision at the FED, which was a position that was

0:20:58.600 --> 0:21:03.480
<v Speaker 1>created only from Dodd Frank and he was given the job.

0:21:03.520 --> 0:21:06.600
<v Speaker 1>Although it's funny he was never actually officially appointed to

0:21:06.640 --> 0:21:09.320
<v Speaker 1>the job, because you know, it makes it. He'd have

0:21:09.359 --> 0:21:11.359
<v Speaker 1>to testify in front of the Senate. It would have

0:21:11.400 --> 0:21:15.800
<v Speaker 1>been difficult, but he he was essentially given the job anyway,

0:21:15.920 --> 0:21:20.920
<v Speaker 1>and he really took the banks. He was very harsh

0:21:21.200 --> 0:21:24.200
<v Speaker 1>what he did to them. The banks objected to literally

0:21:24.280 --> 0:21:28.560
<v Speaker 1>kicking and screaming, but today they probably all thank him.

0:21:28.760 --> 0:21:32.160
<v Speaker 1>There are two things that he did. He reduced leverage

0:21:32.200 --> 0:21:36.560
<v Speaker 1>in the banks enormously, and even within that leverage, he

0:21:36.960 --> 0:21:41.439
<v Speaker 1>made them cut off the tails of risk. So, just

0:21:41.520 --> 0:21:46.800
<v Speaker 1>to give you an example, City Group before the crisis,

0:21:46.920 --> 0:21:50.240
<v Speaker 1>if you included all the off balance sheets stuff that

0:21:50.320 --> 0:21:54.800
<v Speaker 1>eventually came back on balance sheet, it was probably levered

0:21:55.240 --> 0:21:58.840
<v Speaker 1>anywhere from thirty five to forty to one, and by

0:21:58.840 --> 0:22:03.240
<v Speaker 1>the time he was on it was lever tent to one. Now,

0:22:03.400 --> 0:22:08.080
<v Speaker 1>for listeners, that may not mean that much. You know,

0:22:08.640 --> 0:22:11.040
<v Speaker 1>forty to ten, you know, those are just numbers. But

0:22:11.200 --> 0:22:15.720
<v Speaker 1>the way I would describe it is, when you're levered

0:22:15.840 --> 0:22:19.199
<v Speaker 1>forty to one, to destroy the bank, you need a pebble,

0:22:19.920 --> 0:22:22.760
<v Speaker 1>but when the bank is levered ten to one, you

0:22:22.840 --> 0:22:28.800
<v Speaker 1>need a meteor. So now we could have worst credit

0:22:28.960 --> 0:22:31.600
<v Speaker 1>in the United States, Although that really hasn't happened yet,

0:22:31.840 --> 0:22:37.359
<v Speaker 1>So under those circumstances, the banks would earn less. But

0:22:37.520 --> 0:22:41.919
<v Speaker 1>I would say other than a couple of banks, not

0:22:42.040 --> 0:22:44.879
<v Speaker 1>one bank in the United States will lose money. M hm.

0:22:45.520 --> 0:22:47.360
<v Speaker 1>I seem to remember, weren't you one of the few

0:22:47.400 --> 0:22:50.480
<v Speaker 1>people that read all of Dodd Frank from like front

0:22:50.520 --> 0:22:52.920
<v Speaker 1>to back. I think it was two thousand pages? Or well,

0:22:53.440 --> 0:22:59.040
<v Speaker 1>that's not true, that's a myth. Okay, So you're talking

0:22:59.040 --> 0:23:02.480
<v Speaker 1>about finding controls stability, but you know, we also touched

0:23:02.480 --> 0:23:05.080
<v Speaker 1>on real estate earlier, and again, you know, you you

0:23:05.200 --> 0:23:08.199
<v Speaker 1>sort of characterized the housing market it's kind of in

0:23:08.200 --> 0:23:11.679
<v Speaker 1>a freeze. Maybe it's already stabilized a little bit, but

0:23:11.800 --> 0:23:14.000
<v Speaker 1>with rage having shot up so much, I mean, like,

0:23:14.080 --> 0:23:16.720
<v Speaker 1>how are you thinking about like housing and where it's

0:23:16.720 --> 0:23:19.880
<v Speaker 1>going to go? And can like, can it stabilize with

0:23:20.000 --> 0:23:23.440
<v Speaker 1>such a repricing of mortgages in a short period of time? Um?

0:23:23.480 --> 0:23:26.600
<v Speaker 1>I mean sure it can reprice, it takes time. I

0:23:26.640 --> 0:23:30.119
<v Speaker 1>did a small calculation when mortgage rates got to seven,

0:23:31.119 --> 0:23:35.200
<v Speaker 1>which was if you calculated the monthly payment of someone

0:23:35.240 --> 0:23:39.200
<v Speaker 1>who bought a home with a three percent mortgage versus

0:23:39.240 --> 0:23:41.960
<v Speaker 1>someone who wants to buy the same home at the

0:23:42.000 --> 0:23:47.080
<v Speaker 1>same price with the same mortgage at seven percent. For

0:23:47.200 --> 0:23:50.199
<v Speaker 1>that person to have the same monthly payment as the

0:23:50.280 --> 0:23:53.080
<v Speaker 1>person with a three percent mortgage, the price of the

0:23:53.119 --> 0:23:58.560
<v Speaker 1>house has to go down from now. As long as

0:23:58.600 --> 0:24:02.160
<v Speaker 1>people are employed, they're not going to sell their home down.

0:24:03.240 --> 0:24:07.040
<v Speaker 1>They'll just live in their home. So housing prices have

0:24:07.200 --> 0:24:10.920
<v Speaker 1>come down some, but it's still the case I think

0:24:11.000 --> 0:24:14.280
<v Speaker 1>that the housing market is locked. Let's say you want

0:24:14.280 --> 0:24:17.240
<v Speaker 1>to you have a small home. You got a couple

0:24:17.320 --> 0:24:19.560
<v Speaker 1>of kids now, so you want to sell your house

0:24:19.600 --> 0:24:22.560
<v Speaker 1>and you want to buy a larger house. You can't.

0:24:22.640 --> 0:24:28.520
<v Speaker 1>You're stuck, so you're buy bunk beds. But well, it's

0:24:28.560 --> 0:24:32.720
<v Speaker 1>nothing wrong with that. But not only is housing locked.

0:24:33.000 --> 0:24:37.719
<v Speaker 1>You know, building suppliers have you know, less ability to

0:24:37.720 --> 0:24:40.960
<v Speaker 1>sell their products because housing is not turning over. So

0:24:41.200 --> 0:24:42.919
<v Speaker 1>that would be a short area. But I'm not going

0:24:42.960 --> 0:24:46.199
<v Speaker 1>to give you any names. So this is actually something

0:24:46.359 --> 0:24:48.520
<v Speaker 1>that I've been thinking about a little bit, which is

0:24:48.960 --> 0:24:52.320
<v Speaker 1>house prices are sort of being supported by a liquidity

0:24:52.359 --> 0:24:54.800
<v Speaker 1>at the moment right And I don't think they's supported

0:24:54.800 --> 0:24:58.280
<v Speaker 1>by a liquidity. I think they're being supported by employment.

0:24:59.320 --> 0:25:01.320
<v Speaker 1>You know, Like I said, if if you're you have

0:25:01.359 --> 0:25:04.120
<v Speaker 1>a three percent mortgage, so your monthly payment is very

0:25:04.200 --> 0:25:06.520
<v Speaker 1>very low. You have a job, you don't have to

0:25:06.520 --> 0:25:08.439
<v Speaker 1>sell your house. You're just not going to sell it

0:25:08.640 --> 0:25:11.160
<v Speaker 1>down a lot, so you just sit there and hope

0:25:11.160 --> 0:25:14.200
<v Speaker 1>that eventually people will get used to a seven percent

0:25:14.240 --> 0:25:16.280
<v Speaker 1>mortgage and you can sell your home. But that can

0:25:16.359 --> 0:25:18.399
<v Speaker 1>take a long time. That's fair. What I was going

0:25:18.440 --> 0:25:21.159
<v Speaker 1>to ask about is recent events that we've seen with

0:25:21.240 --> 0:25:24.399
<v Speaker 1>the Real Estate Investment Trust. And we're recording this on

0:25:24.600 --> 0:25:28.199
<v Speaker 1>February first, Blackstone just announced that it hit a monthly

0:25:28.240 --> 0:25:31.440
<v Speaker 1>redemption limit. Is there going to be what was the number?

0:25:31.480 --> 0:25:37.000
<v Speaker 1>Did they say, okay, that was in line with people's expectations.

0:25:37.080 --> 0:25:41.400
<v Speaker 1>I think it's not a great number. And they have gates,

0:25:42.160 --> 0:25:44.800
<v Speaker 1>so I forget what the number is, but you can't

0:25:44.800 --> 0:25:47.520
<v Speaker 1>withdraw five billion in a month. It's probably I don't know,

0:25:47.640 --> 0:25:52.800
<v Speaker 1>five millions something like that maybe, so you know, they

0:25:52.800 --> 0:25:55.000
<v Speaker 1>have gates. But this is kind of where I was

0:25:55.040 --> 0:25:58.720
<v Speaker 1>going with a liquidity point, right. I mean, you know,

0:25:58.800 --> 0:26:01.880
<v Speaker 1>let'st's talk about the black drown you know, private read.

0:26:02.119 --> 0:26:05.360
<v Speaker 1>So I'm not being critical to Blackstone, but when when

0:26:05.400 --> 0:26:09.560
<v Speaker 1>you think about the structure of that read, it has

0:26:09.640 --> 0:26:13.600
<v Speaker 1>what i'd call an asset liability mismatch, meaning you're investing

0:26:13.760 --> 0:26:18.520
<v Speaker 1>in real estate. Those investments could be good, but they're

0:26:18.560 --> 0:26:21.159
<v Speaker 1>a liquid so it's not like you can sell a

0:26:21.200 --> 0:26:26.640
<v Speaker 1>building overnight, but your your liabilities, meaning your investors, can

0:26:26.720 --> 0:26:30.720
<v Speaker 1>withdraw money every single month, so if the withdrawals get

0:26:30.800 --> 0:26:32.640
<v Speaker 1>too bad, you can have to sell some of your

0:26:32.680 --> 0:26:36.920
<v Speaker 1>real estate. Now, Blackstone has a very good reputation, so

0:26:37.000 --> 0:26:39.200
<v Speaker 1>it might be fine. But I think what happened last

0:26:39.280 --> 0:26:41.960
<v Speaker 1>year with that it's called the be read, is that

0:26:42.920 --> 0:26:48.040
<v Speaker 1>about of the Breads investors were from Asia, and those

0:26:48.080 --> 0:26:55.080
<v Speaker 1>Asian investors got from some investment banks enormous leverage to invest,

0:26:55.760 --> 0:26:58.800
<v Speaker 1>and given what the markets did last year, they got

0:26:58.840 --> 0:27:01.640
<v Speaker 1>margin calls and they to, you know, withdraw money from

0:27:01.640 --> 0:27:04.240
<v Speaker 1>Blackstone to pay off their margin calls. Now, how much

0:27:04.280 --> 0:27:06.560
<v Speaker 1>more that's going to take place in the next several months,

0:27:06.560 --> 0:27:26.480
<v Speaker 1>I have no idea. So we talked about how investors

0:27:26.920 --> 0:27:29.600
<v Speaker 1>leave the old paradigm kicking and screaming, But I'm thinking

0:27:29.680 --> 0:27:32.560
<v Speaker 1>also about scars from the past. And I feel like

0:27:32.600 --> 0:27:35.240
<v Speaker 1>people listening to here like there's some liquid fund and

0:27:35.280 --> 0:27:39.600
<v Speaker 1>there's some margin call, and there's this real people ganking

0:27:39.640 --> 0:27:41.720
<v Speaker 1>their money out and they're like, they reached for the

0:27:41.760 --> 0:27:45.400
<v Speaker 1>two thou seven playbook in their minds and the two eight.

0:27:45.640 --> 0:27:48.720
<v Speaker 1>To what degree do you think memories of that crisis

0:27:49.119 --> 0:27:52.520
<v Speaker 1>are still informing how investors think about and try to

0:27:52.560 --> 0:27:55.720
<v Speaker 1>assess the market today. Oh, I think two thousand and

0:27:55.760 --> 0:27:58.920
<v Speaker 1>two thousand eight for some investors is like PTSD. Look,

0:27:58.960 --> 0:28:02.199
<v Speaker 1>financials are implicated. There aren't a lot of people on

0:28:02.280 --> 0:28:06.879
<v Speaker 1>planet Earth who really understand how much the financial structure

0:28:06.960 --> 0:28:09.600
<v Speaker 1>of the United States and Europe has really changed. So

0:28:09.760 --> 0:28:12.160
<v Speaker 1>they see they see the markets go down, and they

0:28:12.160 --> 0:28:15.080
<v Speaker 1>say to themselves, oh, my god, something bad is going

0:28:15.160 --> 0:28:18.600
<v Speaker 1>to happen. Now, something bad could happen. You know, we

0:28:18.640 --> 0:28:21.879
<v Speaker 1>could have a recession. But my feeling is will have

0:28:22.640 --> 0:28:24.960
<v Speaker 1>an old fashioned run of the mill recession. We're not

0:28:25.000 --> 0:28:29.879
<v Speaker 1>going to have some enormous, you know, meltdown crisis where

0:28:29.880 --> 0:28:32.359
<v Speaker 1>the system is completely at risk, which is what happened

0:28:32.359 --> 0:28:34.760
<v Speaker 1>in a way before you forget I mean you use

0:28:34.880 --> 0:28:38.080
<v Speaker 1>the pebble versus meteor analogy. Can you just explain, like,

0:28:38.200 --> 0:28:40.960
<v Speaker 1>what is it about the nature of US banks? Now

0:28:41.600 --> 0:28:45.320
<v Speaker 1>there you say they cannot lose money, Well, you're level

0:28:45.320 --> 0:28:49.040
<v Speaker 1>at forty two one. You know what happened in the

0:28:49.040 --> 0:28:51.920
<v Speaker 1>financial crisis. One of the things that's very important, and

0:28:53.280 --> 0:28:56.400
<v Speaker 1>getting back to my line which I've donated to you,

0:28:56.560 --> 0:29:01.320
<v Speaker 1>incentives trump ethics every time, is there there's a concept

0:29:01.320 --> 0:29:05.880
<v Speaker 1>called risk weighted assets where the system, you know, the

0:29:05.880 --> 0:29:10.120
<v Speaker 1>regulatory system, tried to merge the concept of leverage with

0:29:10.280 --> 0:29:13.440
<v Speaker 1>risk and so every asset on the balance sheet got

0:29:13.440 --> 0:29:18.440
<v Speaker 1>a risk weight, and so when regulators and companies calculated leverage,

0:29:18.920 --> 0:29:23.720
<v Speaker 1>it wasn't assets divided by equity, it was risk weighted

0:29:23.720 --> 0:29:26.200
<v Speaker 1>assets divided by equity. So if you look at Europe,

0:29:26.240 --> 0:29:29.480
<v Speaker 1>for example, where you know the banks are much more uniform,

0:29:29.560 --> 0:29:33.000
<v Speaker 1>from two thousand and seven, I'm sorry, from through two

0:29:33.000 --> 0:29:36.760
<v Speaker 1>thousand and seven, absolute leverage in the banks in Europe

0:29:36.960 --> 0:29:41.000
<v Speaker 1>went up three times, but on a risk weighted asset basis,

0:29:41.040 --> 0:29:45.680
<v Speaker 1>they were flat. So a lot of the executives who

0:29:45.720 --> 0:29:48.120
<v Speaker 1>ran these companies, when they looked at their balance sheet,

0:29:48.160 --> 0:29:50.400
<v Speaker 1>they said, oh, our leverage is the same when an

0:29:50.440 --> 0:29:53.760
<v Speaker 1>actuality was much higher and they had a lot of

0:29:53.840 --> 0:29:55.560
<v Speaker 1>risk on their balance sheets. They had a lot of

0:29:55.560 --> 0:29:59.880
<v Speaker 1>subprime assets of various kinds, which all blew up in

0:30:00.000 --> 0:30:02.640
<v Speaker 1>their face. And so because they were levered so much,

0:30:03.440 --> 0:30:07.160
<v Speaker 1>they essentially died. The only reason why they survived because

0:30:07.200 --> 0:30:11.440
<v Speaker 1>they were bailed out. So today, not only is the

0:30:11.520 --> 0:30:14.760
<v Speaker 1>absolute leverage lower, like I said, City has come from

0:30:14.760 --> 0:30:18.000
<v Speaker 1>thirty five to forty times too went to ten. Maybe

0:30:18.040 --> 0:30:23.760
<v Speaker 1>today it's twelve, but the type of risk that they take,

0:30:24.320 --> 0:30:28.000
<v Speaker 1>generally speaking, is far far lower because the regulators who

0:30:28.160 --> 0:30:32.360
<v Speaker 1>essentially live in these banks are not allowing them to

0:30:32.480 --> 0:30:37.480
<v Speaker 1>take enormous types of risk in their loan books. So look,

0:30:37.520 --> 0:30:40.960
<v Speaker 1>the system, like I said, is probably safe for the

0:30:41.000 --> 0:30:44.640
<v Speaker 1>first time in my lifetime in that sense, But I

0:30:44.680 --> 0:30:47.320
<v Speaker 1>don't think a lot of people really understand that that's

0:30:47.360 --> 0:30:51.360
<v Speaker 1>the case. You know, you mentioned investors getting PTSD from

0:30:51.600 --> 0:30:53.760
<v Speaker 1>two thousand and eight, and it's sort of informing and

0:30:53.800 --> 0:30:57.240
<v Speaker 1>affecting their subsequent behavior. And I don't think you got

0:30:57.280 --> 0:30:59.760
<v Speaker 1>PTSD because you made a lot of money out of it,

0:30:59.800 --> 0:31:04.280
<v Speaker 1>but it was a defining moment of your career. How

0:31:04.320 --> 0:31:09.600
<v Speaker 1>did you yourself move past that particular era? And what

0:31:09.640 --> 0:31:12.240
<v Speaker 1>I mean by that is there are people out there

0:31:12.640 --> 0:31:14.200
<v Speaker 1>who made a lot of money in two thousand and

0:31:14.240 --> 0:31:18.200
<v Speaker 1>eight who subsequently every year had been issuing warnings about

0:31:18.240 --> 0:31:20.240
<v Speaker 1>how the entire market is going to fall apart. The

0:31:20.240 --> 0:31:22.840
<v Speaker 1>financial system is going to collapse. How did you move

0:31:22.880 --> 0:31:27.480
<v Speaker 1>past that? Great question? A lot of therapy? Uh no, no,

0:31:27.560 --> 0:31:32.920
<v Speaker 1>I I where I got past it was well, I

0:31:32.920 --> 0:31:36.440
<v Speaker 1>actually got friendly with Daniel Torulo, so I watched what

0:31:36.520 --> 0:31:40.880
<v Speaker 1>he did very very closely, and you know, I realized

0:31:40.960 --> 0:31:47.080
<v Speaker 1>that what he'd accomplished was actually astonishing, and so the system,

0:31:47.160 --> 0:31:50.040
<v Speaker 1>you know, was fine. What what I didn't anticipate until

0:31:50.200 --> 0:31:53.080
<v Speaker 1>years later was that because the FED cut rates, you

0:31:53.120 --> 0:31:55.200
<v Speaker 1>were paid to take so much risk, you could do

0:31:55.360 --> 0:31:58.120
<v Speaker 1>what you wanted to do was buy companies with no earnings.

0:31:58.640 --> 0:32:00.480
<v Speaker 1>That was much harder to make that shift. But I

0:32:00.560 --> 0:32:02.600
<v Speaker 1>didn't think that the financial system was going to go

0:32:02.680 --> 0:32:07.240
<v Speaker 1>down again. Yeah, it really is extraordinary, Like how I

0:32:07.280 --> 0:32:09.160
<v Speaker 1>mean you see it's still you know, like what was

0:32:09.200 --> 0:32:11.920
<v Speaker 1>it credit sweets a few months ago? Like people are

0:32:12.000 --> 0:32:15.440
<v Speaker 1>just not able to get past this sort of like yeah,

0:32:15.640 --> 0:32:18.040
<v Speaker 1>great financial I wasn't going to name any names job,

0:32:18.160 --> 0:32:19.880
<v Speaker 1>nobody was just like people were like it was in

0:32:19.960 --> 0:32:22.360
<v Speaker 1>the headlines and stuff, and you know, people just like

0:32:22.440 --> 0:32:26.880
<v Speaker 1>reach for those old analogies. So just looking back at

0:32:26.920 --> 0:32:29.760
<v Speaker 1>your career, you know, you're very long and illustrious career,

0:32:29.880 --> 0:32:34.280
<v Speaker 1>But what was your flattering Yeah, what was your most

0:32:34.560 --> 0:32:38.560
<v Speaker 1>shocking moment, Like what surprised you the most, Whether it

0:32:38.600 --> 0:32:42.440
<v Speaker 1>was a company that you know failed or maybe succeeded,

0:32:42.840 --> 0:32:47.200
<v Speaker 1>or the particular behavior by someone or an entity. Well,

0:32:47.240 --> 0:32:50.400
<v Speaker 1>what surprised me the most was what happened in O eight.

0:32:52.160 --> 0:32:58.200
<v Speaker 1>I thought that surely the regulators knew what I knew.

0:32:58.760 --> 0:33:02.600
<v Speaker 1>How could they not because they had much more information

0:33:02.640 --> 0:33:07.080
<v Speaker 1>than I did. And it became very very clear as

0:33:07.120 --> 0:33:10.960
<v Speaker 1>OH eight went on that they didn't really understand what

0:33:11.120 --> 0:33:13.760
<v Speaker 1>was going on until it was too late. And I

0:33:13.800 --> 0:33:21.480
<v Speaker 1>remember Bernanke made a speech he said something like subprime

0:33:21.760 --> 0:33:26.600
<v Speaker 1>mortgage risk is confined. And I turned to one of

0:33:26.640 --> 0:33:29.280
<v Speaker 1>my colleagues and I said, yeah, it's confined. Alright, it's

0:33:29.320 --> 0:33:36.640
<v Speaker 1>confined the planet Earth. That's funny. By the way, pay attention.

0:33:36.720 --> 0:33:41.840
<v Speaker 1>I'm laughing internally. So you know, when you read um,

0:33:42.000 --> 0:33:44.960
<v Speaker 1>I figured the book by but it was a book

0:33:45.160 --> 0:33:47.480
<v Speaker 1>that was a very early book about the financial crisis.

0:33:47.600 --> 0:33:53.080
<v Speaker 1>And there was a scene where it was the weekend

0:33:53.080 --> 0:33:58.880
<v Speaker 1>when Lehman went down, and there was a scene described

0:33:58.920 --> 0:34:03.560
<v Speaker 1>in the book where as Lehman is going down, they

0:34:03.600 --> 0:34:06.640
<v Speaker 1>know what's going down. Someone walks into the room. I mean,

0:34:06.680 --> 0:34:10.600
<v Speaker 1>I'm just paraphrasing and basically says a I G is

0:34:10.640 --> 0:34:14.440
<v Speaker 1>also in trouble, and I'm thinking this is a shock

0:34:14.520 --> 0:34:17.000
<v Speaker 1>to you a lot, Like don't you read the research?

0:34:17.520 --> 0:34:20.640
<v Speaker 1>I mean, I couldn't believe it. But that was the

0:34:20.640 --> 0:34:23.320
<v Speaker 1>most shocking thing in my career. I could not believe

0:34:23.960 --> 0:34:27.560
<v Speaker 1>that the regulators and the government really had no idea

0:34:27.600 --> 0:34:30.919
<v Speaker 1>what was going on. Can you talk a little bit

0:34:30.920 --> 0:34:34.160
<v Speaker 1>more about Like, Okay, to make any real money in

0:34:34.200 --> 0:34:37.680
<v Speaker 1>the market, there must be some sustained periods where you

0:34:37.719 --> 0:34:41.520
<v Speaker 1>have a different view than the overall mark. I don't

0:34:41.520 --> 0:34:45.960
<v Speaker 1>think that's necessarily true, you know, oh six oh seven,

0:34:46.000 --> 0:34:49.719
<v Speaker 1>oh eight, I had a very different view. Yeah. Is

0:34:49.760 --> 0:34:53.160
<v Speaker 1>that hard? Oh my god, it's ridiculously hard. The whole

0:34:53.160 --> 0:34:55.799
<v Speaker 1>world is telling you that you're an idiot, and then

0:34:55.840 --> 0:34:58.879
<v Speaker 1>sometimes you think you're an idiot. So that's hard. Well,

0:34:58.920 --> 0:35:00.680
<v Speaker 1>because like I mean, I've you know, I've been thinking

0:35:00.680 --> 0:35:04.080
<v Speaker 1>about that to like a lot of people, for example,

0:35:04.760 --> 0:35:06.680
<v Speaker 1>and I don't I don't want to like actually dive

0:35:06.719 --> 0:35:08.560
<v Speaker 1>into this specific they went a lot of people for

0:35:08.640 --> 0:35:11.040
<v Speaker 1>example of like had to deal with this in the

0:35:11.120 --> 0:35:14.120
<v Speaker 1>last year related to cryptocurrencies, where like everyone's calling them

0:35:14.120 --> 0:35:16.279
<v Speaker 1>an idiot for like not really getting it and then

0:35:16.520 --> 0:35:19.200
<v Speaker 1>maybe they're right. But that process of like being called

0:35:19.200 --> 0:35:22.440
<v Speaker 1>an idiot, maybe underperforming or missing some market move for

0:35:22.520 --> 0:35:25.040
<v Speaker 1>years and being told like you fool, don't you see

0:35:25.080 --> 0:35:29.520
<v Speaker 1>what's happening, it seems like psychologically you mentioned therapy earlier, Steve,

0:35:29.560 --> 0:35:31.439
<v Speaker 1>this is where if I had a therapist, I would

0:35:31.440 --> 0:35:35.399
<v Speaker 1>talk about abuse from bitcoiners. Well, let's let's talk about

0:35:35.400 --> 0:35:38.560
<v Speaker 1>big quarter can mean getting back to do you have

0:35:38.640 --> 0:35:41.040
<v Speaker 1>to be different? You know, from two thousand and ten

0:35:41.320 --> 0:35:46.160
<v Speaker 1>through two thousand and twenty, if you objected to high

0:35:46.239 --> 0:35:51.720
<v Speaker 1>growth stocks with no earnings and you will short them,

0:35:51.760 --> 0:35:55.319
<v Speaker 1>you'd basically be dead. So that can last a long

0:35:55.400 --> 0:35:58.640
<v Speaker 1>time even though you have a different opinion. You do

0:35:58.680 --> 0:36:01.040
<v Speaker 1>not have to have pretty good time to deal with that.

0:36:01.560 --> 0:36:04.480
<v Speaker 1>But let's talk about bitcoin. That's a great fun topic.

0:36:05.080 --> 0:36:11.400
<v Speaker 1>So I remember during COVID, you know, I was out

0:36:11.719 --> 0:36:14.719
<v Speaker 1>on Long Island in the north for basically living there,

0:36:14.760 --> 0:36:17.239
<v Speaker 1>and I would come back to the city every Tuesday

0:36:17.280 --> 0:36:19.719
<v Speaker 1>to visit my mother, and so I would drive to

0:36:19.760 --> 0:36:22.399
<v Speaker 1>the city. There would be no traffic and it would

0:36:22.400 --> 0:36:24.680
<v Speaker 1>take me about two hours. So I listened to podcasts.

0:36:24.719 --> 0:36:27.279
<v Speaker 1>What else are you gonna do? I even listened to

0:36:27.400 --> 0:36:31.040
<v Speaker 1>this podcast every now and and but one of the

0:36:31.200 --> 0:36:34.040
<v Speaker 1>group of podcasts that I listened to were the so

0:36:34.200 --> 0:36:39.719
<v Speaker 1>called experts on bitcoin. And there are always two questions

0:36:39.800 --> 0:36:44.960
<v Speaker 1>that I had. Number one, why is bitcoin a currency?

0:36:45.280 --> 0:36:49.120
<v Speaker 1>And number two, Okay, it's a currency, but how should

0:36:49.120 --> 0:36:54.160
<v Speaker 1>it trade now? On every single podcast, they completely skipped

0:36:54.200 --> 0:36:58.360
<v Speaker 1>over the why is it a currency issue? That was

0:36:58.400 --> 0:37:00.960
<v Speaker 1>like that was just a given, and that's not given

0:37:01.000 --> 0:37:02.960
<v Speaker 1>to me. We can get back to that, but it

0:37:03.040 --> 0:37:05.760
<v Speaker 1>was a given. The second part of the story about

0:37:05.800 --> 0:37:08.680
<v Speaker 1>how should bitcoin act, they all had the same opinion,

0:37:09.280 --> 0:37:14.480
<v Speaker 1>which was fear currency, which is government issued currency, has

0:37:14.520 --> 0:37:17.799
<v Speaker 1>been terribly debased because of all the deficits that all

0:37:17.840 --> 0:37:22.800
<v Speaker 1>these countries have issued. But it's very hard to short

0:37:22.880 --> 0:37:26.280
<v Speaker 1>fear currency because they all trade relative to one another.

0:37:26.560 --> 0:37:30.920
<v Speaker 1>So if you short the dollar, your problem is that

0:37:31.040 --> 0:37:36.040
<v Speaker 1>in in a basketball team where everybody's five four, the

0:37:36.120 --> 0:37:39.719
<v Speaker 1>dollar is five eleven. So it's hard to short the

0:37:39.760 --> 0:37:43.479
<v Speaker 1>dollar because it's it's taller than the other currencies. Even

0:37:43.480 --> 0:37:48.600
<v Speaker 1>though quote unquote has been debased. So therefore you should

0:37:48.600 --> 0:37:53.840
<v Speaker 1>buy bitcoin as a hedge against the debasement of all currencies. Okay,

0:37:53.840 --> 0:37:57.160
<v Speaker 1>so let's accept that theory for a second. If that's

0:37:57.200 --> 0:38:01.800
<v Speaker 1>the case, then bitco point should go up when people

0:38:01.840 --> 0:38:05.960
<v Speaker 1>are nervous and rates are going up, and Bitcoin should

0:38:05.960 --> 0:38:09.840
<v Speaker 1>go down when rates are going down. Every everybody feels good.

0:38:10.600 --> 0:38:14.080
<v Speaker 1>And the problem was it actually did the opposite. It

0:38:14.120 --> 0:38:17.960
<v Speaker 1>would go up with everything else speculative, and it would

0:38:17.960 --> 0:38:21.160
<v Speaker 1>go down with everything else speculative. So what was the point.

0:38:22.400 --> 0:38:25.439
<v Speaker 1>So you know, Bitcoin is up a lot this year

0:38:25.600 --> 0:38:28.440
<v Speaker 1>because it's up a lot with everything else speculative. Now,

0:38:29.000 --> 0:38:35.239
<v Speaker 1>you can't have a currency that moves every six months.

0:38:35.280 --> 0:38:38.759
<v Speaker 1>That's not a currency, that's a speculation. And the thing

0:38:38.800 --> 0:38:44.040
<v Speaker 1>I don't understand about bitcoin is what problem is it solving?

0:38:45.160 --> 0:38:48.200
<v Speaker 1>You know, is there a problem with currency? I mean,

0:38:48.200 --> 0:38:50.560
<v Speaker 1>the last time you went to the store and you

0:38:50.560 --> 0:38:52.680
<v Speaker 1>you pulled out a twenty dollar bill, you paid with

0:38:52.719 --> 0:38:55.440
<v Speaker 1>your credit card, did the store owners say, oh, no,

0:38:55.560 --> 0:38:58.200
<v Speaker 1>I don't take dollars. I mean, it's not even an issue.

0:38:58.760 --> 0:39:01.879
<v Speaker 1>And by the way, the currency markets are the most

0:39:01.920 --> 0:39:04.440
<v Speaker 1>liquid markets in the world. You know, I like to say,

0:39:04.520 --> 0:39:09.280
<v Speaker 1>how long does it take to buy dollar? Euro? Done?

0:39:10.200 --> 0:39:12.719
<v Speaker 1>A billion dollars done? That's how quickly it is. So

0:39:13.080 --> 0:39:18.600
<v Speaker 1>I don't understand what bitcoin solves. And I don't understand

0:39:19.000 --> 0:39:21.520
<v Speaker 1>the purpose of owning it other than it's another form

0:39:21.600 --> 0:39:25.239
<v Speaker 1>of speculation. So I just don't get it. So you

0:39:25.280 --> 0:39:27.959
<v Speaker 1>mentioned speculation and COVID, and I mean this was something

0:39:27.960 --> 0:39:31.000
<v Speaker 1>that played into a lot of the cryptocurrency boom, this

0:39:31.040 --> 0:39:33.480
<v Speaker 1>idea that you know, people are stuck at home their board,

0:39:33.680 --> 0:39:36.880
<v Speaker 1>maybe they got some extra money thanks to the US government,

0:39:36.920 --> 0:39:39.399
<v Speaker 1>and they're using it to trade. When you look at

0:39:39.440 --> 0:39:43.320
<v Speaker 1>consumers now, and I know at various points in time

0:39:43.520 --> 0:39:46.400
<v Speaker 1>you've had positions in subprime auto lending and some consumer

0:39:46.480 --> 0:39:48.920
<v Speaker 1>facing things like that, But how would you characterize the

0:39:49.000 --> 0:39:51.600
<v Speaker 1>US consumer because this is also something that comes up

0:39:51.640 --> 0:39:57.360
<v Speaker 1>as people talk about a potential recession in So let's

0:39:57.640 --> 0:40:03.000
<v Speaker 1>just say that over the last several years, credit quality

0:40:03.040 --> 0:40:07.200
<v Speaker 1>on the consumer side in the United States, the delinquencies

0:40:07.200 --> 0:40:10.120
<v Speaker 1>and losses got so low they were they've been lower

0:40:10.160 --> 0:40:15.480
<v Speaker 1>than any time and basically in history. So do I

0:40:15.640 --> 0:40:20.800
<v Speaker 1>think there's going to be a normalization of delinquencies and losses.

0:40:21.520 --> 0:40:24.120
<v Speaker 1>I mean, I think that Jamie Diamond said that on

0:40:24.160 --> 0:40:26.680
<v Speaker 1>the most recent conference goal of JP Morgan, But you

0:40:26.719 --> 0:40:30.120
<v Speaker 1>really haven't seen it yet. So some are still in

0:40:30.160 --> 0:40:32.920
<v Speaker 1>pretty good shape, you know, as long as everybody's got

0:40:32.920 --> 0:40:36.359
<v Speaker 1>a job. People will pay off their debts, So it's

0:40:36.360 --> 0:40:39.439
<v Speaker 1>really a question of unemployment. If unemployment goes up, you'll

0:40:39.480 --> 0:40:42.960
<v Speaker 1>see an increase in delinquencies and losses. But it's not

0:40:43.040 --> 0:40:45.680
<v Speaker 1>going to be a calamity. It's just going to be

0:40:45.719 --> 0:40:49.160
<v Speaker 1>what i'd call a normalization. So what are you sort

0:40:49.160 --> 0:40:52.239
<v Speaker 1>of looking for next? I mean, you you mentioned that

0:40:52.719 --> 0:40:55.520
<v Speaker 1>at the beginning of the conversation, like there's still some ambiguity,

0:40:55.640 --> 0:40:57.400
<v Speaker 1>is like, oh, it's the FED you know later and

0:40:57.400 --> 0:41:00.960
<v Speaker 1>that you're gonna start cutting. Well, this revive the growth stocks.

0:41:01.000 --> 0:41:03.160
<v Speaker 1>What are the other signs that you would look for,

0:41:03.200 --> 0:41:06.680
<v Speaker 1>either like yes, the paradigm shift is here and happening,

0:41:07.160 --> 0:41:10.120
<v Speaker 1>and or this is the this is the sector that

0:41:10.200 --> 0:41:12.680
<v Speaker 1>really is going to define the next decade, and do

0:41:12.719 --> 0:41:15.719
<v Speaker 1>these things like is it reasonable to say they kind

0:41:15.719 --> 0:41:18.440
<v Speaker 1>of go by decades, Like if a new paradigm emerges,

0:41:18.560 --> 0:41:21.520
<v Speaker 1>that is there like a ten years as well. There's

0:41:21.520 --> 0:41:23.680
<v Speaker 1>no reason to say they go by decades. It just

0:41:23.719 --> 0:41:27.399
<v Speaker 1>happens to be historically true that they do. Um why

0:41:27.480 --> 0:41:29.799
<v Speaker 1>that's so, I don't know, but it just happens to

0:41:29.840 --> 0:41:34.239
<v Speaker 1>be the case, you know, And unfortunately, over the last

0:41:34.280 --> 0:41:37.360
<v Speaker 1>couple of years. The only thing that's mattered in the

0:41:37.400 --> 0:41:41.120
<v Speaker 1>markets is one variable, what's Powell going to do and

0:41:41.160 --> 0:41:45.320
<v Speaker 1>how much is he gonna do. There's been very little

0:41:46.040 --> 0:41:51.600
<v Speaker 1>what I call dispersion within sectors. So you know, one group,

0:41:52.239 --> 0:41:55.040
<v Speaker 1>you know, let's call it tech stocks goes up, they

0:41:55.120 --> 0:41:58.400
<v Speaker 1>all go up, and this is because of ETFs. Oil

0:41:58.440 --> 0:42:01.440
<v Speaker 1>stocks go up, they all go up. There's no, there's no,

0:42:01.640 --> 0:42:04.439
<v Speaker 1>there's not much of dispersion within groups, and that's because

0:42:04.440 --> 0:42:07.800
<v Speaker 1>everybody's so focused on rates. I think the key moment

0:42:07.960 --> 0:42:11.440
<v Speaker 1>will be, you know, the obviously the FED at some

0:42:11.560 --> 0:42:14.440
<v Speaker 1>point will stop. When that is, I don't know. The

0:42:14.680 --> 0:42:18.560
<v Speaker 1>The operative question at that point is will the Fed

0:42:18.840 --> 0:42:22.759
<v Speaker 1>keep rates there or will they cut? The market is

0:42:23.080 --> 0:42:26.400
<v Speaker 1>completely convinced that they will cut, despite the fact that

0:42:26.520 --> 0:42:30.000
<v Speaker 1>Powell says that every press conference that we're going to

0:42:30.120 --> 0:42:32.040
<v Speaker 1>leave it there. So either you take him at his

0:42:32.160 --> 0:42:34.760
<v Speaker 1>word or you don't, and we won't know until that happens.

0:42:35.040 --> 0:42:38.080
<v Speaker 1>You mentioned E t F changing the nature of how

0:42:38.360 --> 0:42:42.600
<v Speaker 1>stocks trade and the sectoral internal sectoral correlations. Is that

0:42:42.920 --> 0:42:46.239
<v Speaker 1>here for good? Oh? Definitely. I mean, I'll give you

0:42:46.239 --> 0:42:49.480
<v Speaker 1>an example. There are lots of different E t F

0:42:49.640 --> 0:42:52.600
<v Speaker 1>s or algorithms. I'll give you two stocks, and I'm

0:42:52.640 --> 0:42:54.600
<v Speaker 1>not being critical of them, but I'm just gonna give

0:42:54.600 --> 0:42:57.640
<v Speaker 1>an example of it. So you have a firm which

0:42:58.960 --> 0:43:01.600
<v Speaker 1>we discuss, which is buy now, pay later, which is

0:43:01.880 --> 0:43:06.279
<v Speaker 1>call it a quasi financial payment stock. And then there's

0:43:06.280 --> 0:43:09.680
<v Speaker 1>another stock which I'm very familiar with called Trupanion, which

0:43:09.840 --> 0:43:13.080
<v Speaker 1>is a company that does animal health insurance insurance. I

0:43:13.160 --> 0:43:15.560
<v Speaker 1>think I might have I think maybe at one point

0:43:15.600 --> 0:43:17.480
<v Speaker 1>I had had it too. I had it with them

0:43:17.520 --> 0:43:19.240
<v Speaker 1>for a little while. I have I have two dogs,

0:43:19.360 --> 0:43:21.640
<v Speaker 1>so for a while I used to have four, and

0:43:21.840 --> 0:43:25.239
<v Speaker 1>so we used Trupanion for a while. Now, when you

0:43:25.320 --> 0:43:27.759
<v Speaker 1>think about it, what does a firm have to do

0:43:27.880 --> 0:43:31.640
<v Speaker 1>with Trupanion. Nothing. I mean one's an animal health insurance

0:43:31.719 --> 0:43:34.719
<v Speaker 1>and ones in buy now, pay later. So the two

0:43:34.800 --> 0:43:38.279
<v Speaker 1>stocks literally have no overlap in their businesses. They have

0:43:38.480 --> 0:43:42.040
<v Speaker 1>nothing to do with one another. They're in different sectors, etcetera.

0:43:42.120 --> 0:43:44.400
<v Speaker 1>The only thing they have in common is that they

0:43:44.440 --> 0:43:48.160
<v Speaker 1>were high revenue growth, negative earnings companies. And I think

0:43:48.200 --> 0:43:50.400
<v Speaker 1>if you would watch the markets on a daily basis,

0:43:50.480 --> 0:43:53.719
<v Speaker 1>the correlation between the two is very high because it's

0:43:53.760 --> 0:43:56.120
<v Speaker 1>got to be in some kind of et F an algorithm,

0:43:56.800 --> 0:43:59.400
<v Speaker 1>which all right, it's but like I said, they have

0:43:59.640 --> 0:44:04.480
<v Speaker 1>nothing to do with one another, but they trade together

0:44:04.680 --> 0:44:07.640
<v Speaker 1>because there somebody's got some algorithm or et F where

0:44:07.640 --> 0:44:10.080
<v Speaker 1>they're both in there E t f s and benchmarks

0:44:10.120 --> 0:44:13.920
<v Speaker 1>turned the market into a giant blob. Steve, final question

0:44:14.000 --> 0:44:17.520
<v Speaker 1>for you, what one piece of advice would you give

0:44:17.760 --> 0:44:20.800
<v Speaker 1>investors and perhaps financial journalists as they go through this

0:44:21.080 --> 0:44:26.239
<v Speaker 1>paradigm shift. That's a tough question. I actually don't know

0:44:26.280 --> 0:44:31.640
<v Speaker 1>the answer to that. I guess skepticism. You know, you

0:44:31.640 --> 0:44:37.200
<v Speaker 1>should always be skeptical about what management say. You should

0:44:37.200 --> 0:44:40.160
<v Speaker 1>do your own whole work. That's all I would say.

0:44:40.480 --> 0:44:42.680
<v Speaker 1>I don't have what I call it leaving question that

0:44:42.760 --> 0:44:47.239
<v Speaker 1>everybody should ask. All right, Steve Eisman, wonderful having you

0:44:47.320 --> 0:44:49.040
<v Speaker 1>on a blots Thank you so much for coming on.

0:44:49.360 --> 0:45:07.160
<v Speaker 1>Thank you for having me. Thanks Steve. That's great, So Joe,

0:45:07.400 --> 0:45:10.640
<v Speaker 1>I enjoyed that conversation so much. It was sort of

0:45:10.840 --> 0:45:14.520
<v Speaker 1>wonderful to relive some of the drama of financial crisis.

0:45:14.760 --> 0:45:17.400
<v Speaker 1>But I did think the point about this idea that

0:45:17.680 --> 0:45:21.200
<v Speaker 1>I think in two everyone thought the FED raising interest

0:45:21.280 --> 0:45:24.320
<v Speaker 1>rates was such a big break in the market, and

0:45:24.440 --> 0:45:26.880
<v Speaker 1>so there's a sense of whiplash as we kind of

0:45:27.080 --> 0:45:29.880
<v Speaker 1>enter three, where we start to see some of the

0:45:29.960 --> 0:45:35.360
<v Speaker 1>things that had the most excesses of recover. It's confusing

0:45:35.440 --> 0:45:38.160
<v Speaker 1>to everyone. But Steve's point about how you know, this

0:45:38.520 --> 0:45:41.719
<v Speaker 1>isn't a sort of one direction process, and you can

0:45:41.880 --> 0:45:45.200
<v Speaker 1>get these stops and starts in a paradigm shift. I

0:45:45.280 --> 0:45:47.840
<v Speaker 1>think that was interesting. Yeah, no, it really is, like

0:45:47.960 --> 0:45:50.560
<v Speaker 1>people give up the dream. It takes a long time,

0:45:50.800 --> 0:45:53.680
<v Speaker 1>you know, even like myself and I have never been

0:45:53.760 --> 0:45:57.560
<v Speaker 1>like some like Czech cheerleader. I don't think anyone accused

0:45:57.600 --> 0:46:00.200
<v Speaker 1>me of even in myself when I think about markets, like, wait,

0:46:00.320 --> 0:46:02.879
<v Speaker 1>can like can you make money in other industries? Could

0:46:02.920 --> 0:46:05.960
<v Speaker 1>there be a period in time in which these high,

0:46:06.239 --> 0:46:10.560
<v Speaker 1>fast growing Silicon Valley companies aren't the darlings of markets,

0:46:10.680 --> 0:46:13.400
<v Speaker 1>like even you know, like I never like wanted the

0:46:13.480 --> 0:46:15.480
<v Speaker 1>cooler in the first place, but I still like it's

0:46:15.560 --> 0:46:18.080
<v Speaker 1>hard to like, you know, turn my head in a

0:46:18.160 --> 0:46:21.680
<v Speaker 1>different direction. Well, and also there's so much additional artifice

0:46:21.880 --> 0:46:24.279
<v Speaker 1>like built on top of the tech industry at this

0:46:24.360 --> 0:46:27.799
<v Speaker 1>point in time, Like there's so much media and things,

0:46:27.880 --> 0:46:30.239
<v Speaker 1>like people talk about it so much. I just can't

0:46:30.280 --> 0:46:33.920
<v Speaker 1>imagine such you know another industry, like I don't know,

0:46:34.080 --> 0:46:36.880
<v Speaker 1>some boring conglomerate that like pulls things out of the

0:46:36.920 --> 0:46:40.200
<v Speaker 1>ground something like that, having the same excitement attached to it.

0:46:40.280 --> 0:46:42.640
<v Speaker 1>I know, like are people like and even if like

0:46:42.719 --> 0:46:44.320
<v Speaker 1>we do have another like let's say we have like

0:46:44.400 --> 0:46:46.640
<v Speaker 1>a decade of oil and commodity booms, like we're gonna

0:46:46.680 --> 0:46:48.920
<v Speaker 1>have like people on Twitter like doing big threads about

0:46:49.520 --> 0:46:52.719
<v Speaker 1>just like to work at you know, Pioneer, it's like

0:46:52.800 --> 0:46:54.640
<v Speaker 1>to work I just like don't see it. It's hard

0:46:54.760 --> 0:46:57.439
<v Speaker 1>for getting excited about total market size right just steep

0:46:57.600 --> 0:47:02.000
<v Speaker 1>Town anyway, total markets as of every car owner in

0:47:02.080 --> 0:47:04.680
<v Speaker 1>the entire world. Yeah, so much goes. I've also just

0:47:04.840 --> 0:47:07.520
<v Speaker 1>I thought, you know, the part about how much safe

0:47:07.560 --> 0:47:10.359
<v Speaker 1>for the financial systems and coming from what I would

0:47:10.360 --> 0:47:12.879
<v Speaker 1>say is a very credible source on that top. Yeah,

0:47:12.960 --> 0:47:14.960
<v Speaker 1>it is something that we have been hearing repeatedly on

0:47:15.000 --> 0:47:17.520
<v Speaker 1>the podcast, and every time I hear it, I do

0:47:17.760 --> 0:47:20.959
<v Speaker 1>have that knee jerk two thousand eight PTSD reaction thinking,

0:47:21.000 --> 0:47:24.040
<v Speaker 1>oh gosh, we're going to jinx it, but hopefully we

0:47:24.040 --> 0:47:26.799
<v Speaker 1>should get Dan Tarulo. Yeah, yeah, I had the same thought.

0:47:26.840 --> 0:47:28.440
<v Speaker 1>Let's do it all right? Should we leave it there?

0:47:28.520 --> 0:47:31.400
<v Speaker 1>Let's leave it there. This has been another episode of

0:47:31.520 --> 0:47:34.040
<v Speaker 1>the All Thoughts podcast. I'm Tracy Alloway. You can follow

0:47:34.120 --> 0:47:37.239
<v Speaker 1>me on Twitter at Tracy Alloway and I'm Joe Wisnal.

0:47:37.320 --> 0:47:39.959
<v Speaker 1>You can follow me on Twitter at the Stalwork, follow

0:47:40.040 --> 0:47:44.080
<v Speaker 1>our producers Carmen Rodriguez at Carmen Armand and Dash Bennett

0:47:44.160 --> 0:47:46.719
<v Speaker 1>at dash Bot, and check out all of our podcasts

0:47:46.760 --> 0:47:50.719
<v Speaker 1>at Bloomberg onto the handle at podcasts, and for more

0:47:50.760 --> 0:47:53.839
<v Speaker 1>odd Lots content, go to bloomberg dot com slash odd Lots,

0:47:54.120 --> 0:47:56.560
<v Speaker 1>where we post transcripts. Tracy and I write a blog,

0:47:56.760 --> 0:47:59.040
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0:47:59.120 --> 0:48:01.240
<v Speaker 1>Go there and sign thanks for listening.