1
00:00:02,080 --> 00:00:04,640
Speaker 1: You're listening to the iHeartRadio and Coast to Coast Day

2
00:00:04,640 --> 00:00:08,079
Speaker 1: and Paranormal Podcast Network, where we offer you podcasts of

3
00:00:08,160 --> 00:00:12,520
Speaker 1: the paranormal, supernatural, and the unexplained. Get ready now for

4
00:00:12,640 --> 00:00:14,720
Speaker 1: Beyond Contact with Captain Ron.

5
00:00:21,400 --> 00:00:24,680
Speaker 2: Welcome to our podcast. Please be aware the thoughts and

6
00:00:24,760 --> 00:00:28,720
Speaker 2: opinions expressed by the host are their thoughts and opinions

7
00:00:28,760 --> 00:00:33,920
Speaker 2: only and do not reflect those of iHeartMedia, iHeartRadio, Coast

8
00:00:33,960 --> 00:00:38,440
Speaker 2: to Coast AM, employees of Premier Networks, or their sponsors

9
00:00:38,440 --> 00:00:41,640
Speaker 2: and associates. We would like to encourage you to do

10
00:00:41,680 --> 00:00:45,320
Speaker 2: your own research and discover the subject matter for yourself.

11
00:00:57,760 --> 00:01:01,920
Speaker 3: Hey everyone, it's Captain Ron and each week on Beyond Contact,

12
00:01:02,040 --> 00:01:05,800
Speaker 3: we'll explore the latest news in ufology, discuss some of

13
00:01:05,840 --> 00:01:09,399
Speaker 3: the classic cases, and bring you the latest information from

14
00:01:09,440 --> 00:01:12,440
Speaker 3: the newest cases as we talked with the top experts.

15
00:01:14,920 --> 00:01:17,440
Speaker 4: Welcome back to another episode of Beyond Contact. I am

16
00:01:17,480 --> 00:01:19,319
Speaker 4: Captain Ron, and today we're going to be speaking with

17
00:01:19,440 --> 00:01:23,959
Speaker 4: aviation safety engineer and educator doctor Todd Curtis. Doctor Curtis

18
00:01:23,959 --> 00:01:26,400
Speaker 4: has spent most of his career in some aspect of

19
00:01:26,480 --> 00:01:32,840
Speaker 4: aviation safety, particularly analyzing aviation safety data and understanding aviation risks.

20
00:01:33,360 --> 00:01:35,480
Speaker 4: While he's been aware of the UFO and the UAP

21
00:01:35,720 --> 00:01:38,720
Speaker 4: issue for decades, it was the famous case in two

22
00:01:38,720 --> 00:01:41,680
Speaker 4: thousand and six at the Chicago O'Hare Airport, and in

23
00:01:41,720 --> 00:01:45,280
Speaker 4: particular the lack of any real official response to that

24
00:01:45,360 --> 00:01:49,200
Speaker 4: event that medium realize that this phenomenon had both an

25
00:01:49,280 --> 00:01:53,800
Speaker 4: aviation safety issue and a national security dimension that deserved

26
00:01:53,920 --> 00:01:57,160
Speaker 4: more of a serious approach. How you doing, Todd, Good

27
00:01:57,160 --> 00:01:57,520
Speaker 4: to see you.

28
00:01:57,720 --> 00:01:59,400
Speaker 5: I'm doing just fine. Thanks for having me.

29
00:01:59,800 --> 00:02:03,000
Speaker 4: We saw you at the twenty twenty four Contact in

30
00:02:03,040 --> 00:02:05,480
Speaker 4: the Desert conference. Would you think of that? I know

31
00:02:05,520 --> 00:02:08,200
Speaker 4: you're a bit outside the UFO community and you're firmly

32
00:02:08,320 --> 00:02:11,160
Speaker 4: entrenched in the aviation safety Would you think of the conference?

33
00:02:11,280 --> 00:02:14,240
Speaker 5: Well, I was quite impressed by it because I knew

34
00:02:14,280 --> 00:02:16,280
Speaker 5: of the subject in general for quite some time, and

35
00:02:16,320 --> 00:02:19,560
Speaker 5: in fact, back in twenty fourteen, I was actually electronically

36
00:02:20,080 --> 00:02:22,919
Speaker 5: on the same show with Nick Pope, on a show

37
00:02:23,200 --> 00:02:26,160
Speaker 5: dealing with UFOs and airliners. So seeing these folks in

38
00:02:26,200 --> 00:02:27,760
Speaker 5: the flesh was a bit of a revelation.

39
00:02:28,160 --> 00:02:30,040
Speaker 4: It's a lot of fun. I saw your lecture there,

40
00:02:30,120 --> 00:02:32,280
Speaker 4: which was great, by the way, and it's nice to

41
00:02:32,320 --> 00:02:35,560
Speaker 4: get the perspective from an aviation safety expert like yourself

42
00:02:35,840 --> 00:02:39,000
Speaker 4: on this phenomenon. This issue comes up from time to

43
00:02:39,000 --> 00:02:41,480
Speaker 4: time for us as we hear these different reports from

44
00:02:41,520 --> 00:02:46,040
Speaker 4: airline pilots and from military personnel, and we genuinely wonder,

45
00:02:46,520 --> 00:02:49,240
Speaker 4: you know, if the Pentagon really has this a tip

46
00:02:49,280 --> 00:02:52,680
Speaker 4: program they've admitted they have, and if these pilots really

47
00:02:52,720 --> 00:02:56,840
Speaker 4: are seeing these objects. As Ryan Grave says all the time,

48
00:02:57,520 --> 00:02:59,680
Speaker 4: isn't there a genuine risk to flying?

49
00:03:00,040 --> 00:03:02,960
Speaker 5: Well, certainly there's a risk either a direct preas for example,

50
00:03:02,960 --> 00:03:05,160
Speaker 5: if you have some kind of aerospace vehicle I don't

51
00:03:05,160 --> 00:03:07,560
Speaker 5: care what it is in the same airspace as you,

52
00:03:07,639 --> 00:03:09,119
Speaker 5: and you don't know they're there, you can have admit

53
00:03:09,200 --> 00:03:13,880
Speaker 5: air collision. But more likely is someone sees something or

54
00:03:13,960 --> 00:03:17,480
Speaker 5: the instruments send something and decisions are made and actions

55
00:03:17,520 --> 00:03:19,840
Speaker 5: are taken which don't have to be taken, and you

56
00:03:19,919 --> 00:03:22,400
Speaker 5: might have a situation where oh my gosh, something's coming

57
00:03:22,400 --> 00:03:24,880
Speaker 5: at me when it's not and you lose control of

58
00:03:24,880 --> 00:03:28,560
Speaker 5: the aircraft. So regardless of what was causing that reaction,

59
00:03:28,880 --> 00:03:31,200
Speaker 5: whether it was a solid object, whether it was a projection,

60
00:03:31,560 --> 00:03:34,680
Speaker 5: it doesn't really matter. My concern from the aviation and

61
00:03:34,720 --> 00:03:37,760
Speaker 5: safety perspective is how does it affect the people in

62
00:03:37,800 --> 00:03:41,400
Speaker 5: the system, the technology in the system, or the infrastructure

63
00:03:41,400 --> 00:03:46,119
Speaker 5: in general, whether that's losing power, losing control, making poor decisions, etc.

64
00:03:46,880 --> 00:03:49,800
Speaker 4: Would you say that some people in the aviation community

65
00:03:50,240 --> 00:03:53,360
Speaker 4: take this more seriously than let's say, the government may

66
00:03:53,480 --> 00:03:57,360
Speaker 4: lead on or the perception, maybe not even jumping to

67
00:03:57,400 --> 00:03:59,880
Speaker 4: the speculation that these could be et craft or anything,

68
00:04:00,240 --> 00:04:02,280
Speaker 4: just the fact that there seems to be stuff flying

69
00:04:02,360 --> 00:04:05,120
Speaker 4: around that I would think any pilot would be concerned

70
00:04:05,160 --> 00:04:06,160
Speaker 4: about whatever it is.

71
00:04:06,600 --> 00:04:09,360
Speaker 5: Well, certainly that sort of thing is taken seriously, but

72
00:04:09,880 --> 00:04:13,440
Speaker 5: not formally in a sense of Even in my experience

73
00:04:13,440 --> 00:04:16,440
Speaker 5: in aviation, both military and civilian, I've heard stories for years.

74
00:04:16,839 --> 00:04:19,559
Speaker 5: I thought, Okay, they saw something. It was really weird.

75
00:04:19,680 --> 00:04:22,919
Speaker 5: But there's nowhere to go with this. In the military context,

76
00:04:22,960 --> 00:04:24,560
Speaker 5: when I was in the Air Force, if it didn't

77
00:04:24,560 --> 00:04:27,440
Speaker 5: affect the mission, didn't affect the equipment or the people

78
00:04:27,480 --> 00:04:30,400
Speaker 5: involved with the mission, it wasn't something that you would report.

79
00:04:30,560 --> 00:04:33,279
Speaker 5: It was an interesting thing, but not really our concern.

80
00:04:33,480 --> 00:04:36,599
Speaker 5: In a civilian world as well, unless it has something

81
00:04:36,640 --> 00:04:40,120
Speaker 5: to do with a reportable event, for example, an accent

82
00:04:40,240 --> 00:04:43,520
Speaker 5: or incident, or it had something to do with interrupting

83
00:04:43,560 --> 00:04:46,880
Speaker 5: whatever the civilian mission is, for example, an airline flight

84
00:04:46,960 --> 00:04:50,040
Speaker 5: landing on time. He wouldn't necessarily report it. And here's

85
00:04:50,080 --> 00:04:53,040
Speaker 5: the important thing. It might be reported. It might be

86
00:04:53,080 --> 00:04:57,680
Speaker 5: talked about within a company, within an organization, within even

87
00:04:57,880 --> 00:05:02,120
Speaker 5: a whole geographical area. If there's no formal requirement to

88
00:05:02,160 --> 00:05:05,200
Speaker 5: report it, the rest of the industry would have no

89
00:05:05,279 --> 00:05:07,960
Speaker 5: idea about it, including myself. Even though I keep close

90
00:05:08,040 --> 00:05:11,160
Speaker 5: track of all sorts of safety databases and aviation news.

91
00:05:11,600 --> 00:05:14,400
Speaker 5: Unless someone reports it formally, I really can't go anywhere

92
00:05:14,400 --> 00:05:14,680
Speaker 5: with it.

93
00:05:14,800 --> 00:05:16,680
Speaker 4: Well, as a pilot, I would think, you know, you've

94
00:05:16,720 --> 00:05:18,760
Speaker 4: got to wonder to yourself, do you report it? Like

95
00:05:18,800 --> 00:05:20,679
Speaker 4: you said, if it doesn't affect my flight, it doesn't

96
00:05:20,680 --> 00:05:24,040
Speaker 4: affect my mission, do you report this? Should you report this?

97
00:05:24,440 --> 00:05:27,279
Speaker 4: It doesn't seem like there's any incentive really to do so.

98
00:05:27,600 --> 00:05:30,400
Speaker 4: In fact, there may be some reasons not to do so.

99
00:05:30,600 --> 00:05:34,000
Speaker 5: Right well, some of the reasons might be a common sense,

100
00:05:34,240 --> 00:05:37,520
Speaker 5: and I talked about this in my presentation. The FAA

101
00:05:37,560 --> 00:05:41,359
Speaker 5: actually has in one of their regulations a specific suggestion

102
00:05:41,680 --> 00:05:43,720
Speaker 5: if you see a UFO, and they did use UFO

103
00:05:43,880 --> 00:05:47,000
Speaker 5: in this documentation, you can report it either to a

104
00:05:47,080 --> 00:05:51,400
Speaker 5: civilian organization, and they specifically mentioned the National UFO Reporting Center,

105
00:05:51,480 --> 00:05:54,160
Speaker 5: which is run by Peter Davenport, who was also aut

106
00:05:54,240 --> 00:05:57,120
Speaker 5: contact in the Desert You. I wrote to them many

107
00:05:57,160 --> 00:05:59,320
Speaker 5: times by email over the years. I had a nice

108
00:05:59,320 --> 00:06:01,560
Speaker 5: long talk with him, and that was probably the highlight

109
00:06:01,600 --> 00:06:02,240
Speaker 5: of my time.

110
00:06:02,360 --> 00:06:04,159
Speaker 4: Oh, I'm so happy to hear that he's such a

111
00:06:04,240 --> 00:06:04,719
Speaker 4: nice man.

112
00:06:05,200 --> 00:06:09,200
Speaker 5: Oh he is. And it's great that the FA says

113
00:06:09,320 --> 00:06:11,520
Speaker 5: to go to him because he is a stand up guy.

114
00:06:11,600 --> 00:06:16,200
Speaker 5: He's done fantastic work for decades compiling the things that

115
00:06:16,200 --> 00:06:18,920
Speaker 5: he compiles. But the problem with that is he is

116
00:06:19,000 --> 00:06:21,599
Speaker 5: not in the government. He is not supported by the government.

117
00:06:21,880 --> 00:06:24,880
Speaker 5: There is no formalized process to keep that database up

118
00:06:24,920 --> 00:06:28,440
Speaker 5: and running when for whatever reason, mister Davenport no longer

119
00:06:28,560 --> 00:06:31,479
Speaker 5: is able or willing to keep that database up. That's

120
00:06:31,520 --> 00:06:34,000
Speaker 5: one part. But the second part that really got me upset.

121
00:06:34,240 --> 00:06:37,279
Speaker 5: Reported to your local law enforcement and I thought, Okay,

122
00:06:37,400 --> 00:06:39,719
Speaker 5: I'm not a lawyer when it comes to aviation, but

123
00:06:39,920 --> 00:06:44,320
Speaker 5: anything in the sky above the United States is federal responsibility,

124
00:06:44,400 --> 00:06:47,039
Speaker 5: the FAA, the Department of Defense, what have you. The

125
00:06:47,080 --> 00:06:50,680
Speaker 5: sky belongs to Uncle Sam, not to the States, not

126
00:06:50,760 --> 00:06:53,280
Speaker 5: to the local community. So let's say I'm flying around

127
00:06:53,279 --> 00:06:56,520
Speaker 5: the Bay Area and again presentation. I had an example

128
00:06:56,640 --> 00:06:58,920
Speaker 5: where one of my flights in the Bay Area said, look,

129
00:06:59,120 --> 00:07:03,559
Speaker 5: I'm going in this there are several jurisdictions I'm flying over, state, local,

130
00:07:03,600 --> 00:07:06,040
Speaker 5: and federal. If I see something outside of my window,

131
00:07:06,160 --> 00:07:09,600
Speaker 5: outside of my windscreen, I might not know which organization

132
00:07:09,640 --> 00:07:12,440
Speaker 5: to call. And if I call the city, the county,

133
00:07:12,520 --> 00:07:15,480
Speaker 5: the state, and the federal jurisdiction of that piece of territory,

134
00:07:15,720 --> 00:07:17,600
Speaker 5: would they laugh in my face or would they take

135
00:07:17,640 --> 00:07:20,520
Speaker 5: me seriously? They would do neither. It'll probably say things

136
00:07:20,520 --> 00:07:24,200
Speaker 5: I can't say after contact and hang up in my face.

137
00:07:24,600 --> 00:07:28,040
Speaker 5: So that was not useful. And in my world the

138
00:07:28,160 --> 00:07:31,280
Speaker 5: years I've studied aviation safety, one of the most useful

139
00:07:31,360 --> 00:07:36,280
Speaker 5: things is to have solid objective data, preferably something that's

140
00:07:36,280 --> 00:07:39,840
Speaker 5: been vetted by an organization that's trusted by the aviation community.

141
00:07:39,960 --> 00:07:42,000
Speaker 5: So the rest of the community can take that data

142
00:07:42,360 --> 00:07:45,480
Speaker 5: and analyze it to whatever ends they have in mind.

143
00:07:45,600 --> 00:07:49,559
Speaker 5: But the first step is, after something is encountered or seen,

144
00:07:50,200 --> 00:07:52,040
Speaker 5: is it going to be put in a place where

145
00:07:52,040 --> 00:07:53,600
Speaker 5: it can be seen by the rest of the community.

146
00:07:53,880 --> 00:07:57,080
Speaker 4: Isn't there possibly some repercussions for some of these pilots.

147
00:07:57,200 --> 00:07:58,840
Speaker 4: Maybe they don't want to say that.

148
00:07:59,120 --> 00:08:01,920
Speaker 5: Well, certainly, there have been many many cases over the years.

149
00:08:01,920 --> 00:08:04,320
Speaker 5: Probably the most famous was I believe it was nineteen

150
00:08:04,360 --> 00:08:08,160
Speaker 5: eighty six over Alaska where was the Japan Airlines where

151
00:08:08,200 --> 00:08:10,600
Speaker 5: the crew there was a three person flight crew. They

152
00:08:10,640 --> 00:08:14,560
Speaker 5: saw some extraordinary things over Alaska at night in the

153
00:08:14,640 --> 00:08:17,440
Speaker 5: vicinity of Anchorage. Not only that they were communicating with

154
00:08:17,480 --> 00:08:20,160
Speaker 5: the FAA, the FA the air traffic controllers were apparently

155
00:08:20,160 --> 00:08:25,000
Speaker 5: communicating with military assets as well. It was very well documented,

156
00:08:25,120 --> 00:08:28,760
Speaker 5: so well documented that there was a fairly decent analysis

157
00:08:28,800 --> 00:08:31,920
Speaker 5: done by the FAA. And as the story goes, this

158
00:08:32,040 --> 00:08:34,079
Speaker 5: was one that was told by I believe his name

159
00:08:34,120 --> 00:08:36,199
Speaker 5: is Jim Callahan, who was the FA official who was

160
00:08:36,280 --> 00:08:39,160
Speaker 5: running the presentation. They had a presentation a lot of

161
00:08:39,200 --> 00:08:43,920
Speaker 5: government representatives, including apparently someone from the National Intelligence area,

162
00:08:44,040 --> 00:08:46,680
Speaker 5: and after the meeting he was sold everything in this room,

163
00:08:46,880 --> 00:08:49,240
Speaker 5: we're taking it with us. Well, everything in the room

164
00:08:49,360 --> 00:08:51,920
Speaker 5: was given, he followed orders, but everything that was in

165
00:08:51,960 --> 00:08:54,200
Speaker 5: his office or not in that room was not taken.

166
00:08:54,360 --> 00:08:57,400
Speaker 5: And he has four years gone out and said to

167
00:08:57,480 --> 00:09:01,719
Speaker 5: anyone who's willing to listen, what they saw what they analyzed,

168
00:09:02,320 --> 00:09:05,080
Speaker 5: and just so, I mean, the useful information that was

169
00:09:05,120 --> 00:09:08,400
Speaker 5: from that analysis was fantastic, the best I'd ever seen.

170
00:09:08,880 --> 00:09:12,520
Speaker 4: Absolutely, he specifically said he described it the pilot as

171
00:09:12,600 --> 00:09:15,839
Speaker 4: two small ships and a mothership. He used that word,

172
00:09:15,840 --> 00:09:18,560
Speaker 4: which is unique. There was no sign of anything else

173
00:09:18,640 --> 00:09:21,640
Speaker 4: on his radar or ground control's radar even though they

174
00:09:21,720 --> 00:09:23,000
Speaker 4: saw these three craft.

175
00:09:23,280 --> 00:09:25,880
Speaker 5: This is nineteen eighty six. This was years before the

176
00:09:25,920 --> 00:09:28,640
Speaker 5: first still aircraft was known to the public, So to

177
00:09:28,800 --> 00:09:33,160
Speaker 5: have something that was apparently solid and not reflecting radar

178
00:09:33,280 --> 00:09:37,160
Speaker 5: energy was not something that was common. That was very anomalous,

179
00:09:37,400 --> 00:09:40,480
Speaker 5: although they didn't use the word back then and going forward,

180
00:09:40,960 --> 00:09:44,200
Speaker 5: this is something where that pilot, the captain, who was

181
00:09:44,280 --> 00:09:48,000
Speaker 5: very public about what he had seen, was actually grounded

182
00:09:48,040 --> 00:09:50,080
Speaker 5: by his airline for a year more because he was

183
00:09:50,080 --> 00:09:54,320
Speaker 5: public with what he saw. So, yes, there are professional repercussions. Now,

184
00:09:54,320 --> 00:09:57,920
Speaker 5: going back further in aviation history, this is something that

185
00:09:58,000 --> 00:10:01,160
Speaker 5: started in the nineteen fifties and sixties high altitude pilot's

186
00:10:01,200 --> 00:10:04,360
Speaker 5: military pilots who saw unusual phenomena high.

187
00:10:04,200 --> 00:10:04,679
Speaker 4: In the sky.

188
00:10:04,960 --> 00:10:07,600
Speaker 5: Fast forward to the eighties. It wasn't until the Space

189
00:10:07,640 --> 00:10:10,120
Speaker 5: Shuttle era that they actually started studying what they call

190
00:10:10,240 --> 00:10:13,720
Speaker 5: jets and sprites, upper atmospheric lightning that goes from the

191
00:10:13,840 --> 00:10:16,280
Speaker 5: upper part of thunderstorms to the lower reaches of space.

192
00:10:16,440 --> 00:10:17,120
Speaker 5: Bizarre looking.

193
00:10:17,200 --> 00:10:19,600
Speaker 4: I've seen pictures of it that's crazy. It looks like

194
00:10:19,960 --> 00:10:22,480
Speaker 4: almost like an X ray kind of gone bad. Like

195
00:10:22,559 --> 00:10:23,680
Speaker 4: it's kind of crazy.

196
00:10:23,800 --> 00:10:25,920
Speaker 5: In the day, if you reported that, you'd be grounded.

197
00:10:25,960 --> 00:10:28,839
Speaker 5: But now it's like, oh, we understand this, we'll note

198
00:10:28,880 --> 00:10:30,679
Speaker 5: it when it happens, and we'll see if there's any

199
00:10:30,679 --> 00:10:32,920
Speaker 5: effects on the aircraft. And that's the way it should

200
00:10:32,960 --> 00:10:35,480
Speaker 5: go when it comes to unusual phenomena in the sky.

201
00:10:35,760 --> 00:10:37,880
Speaker 4: Yeah, it's interesting that those guys got grounded, and like

202
00:10:37,920 --> 00:10:40,480
Speaker 4: you said here, this guy got grounded if you reported

203
00:10:40,520 --> 00:10:42,920
Speaker 4: such a thing, you know, I can add anecdotally that

204
00:10:43,000 --> 00:10:45,240
Speaker 4: I've spoke to a couple of pilots myself and an

205
00:10:45,280 --> 00:10:49,640
Speaker 4: astronaut actually, who each have given me incredible sightings, and

206
00:10:49,720 --> 00:10:52,360
Speaker 4: yet they didn't talk about it publicly or on the air.

207
00:10:52,640 --> 00:10:55,319
Speaker 4: So there's still, you know, something about people not wanting

208
00:10:55,360 --> 00:10:58,200
Speaker 4: to report that stuff in this field. When we come back, Todd,

209
00:10:58,200 --> 00:11:00,240
Speaker 4: we're going to talk about a few more cases. Is

210
00:11:00,400 --> 00:11:02,400
Speaker 4: similar to the one we just talked about. You are

211
00:11:02,400 --> 00:11:05,000
Speaker 4: listening to Beyond Contact on the iHeartRadio on Coast to

212
00:11:05,040 --> 00:11:07,280
Speaker 4: Coast AM Paranormal Podcast Network.

213
00:11:13,559 --> 00:11:16,400
Speaker 6: Hey, folks, we need your music. Hey, it's producer Tom

214
00:11:16,400 --> 00:11:18,719
Speaker 6: at Coast to Coast AM and every first Sunday of

215
00:11:18,760 --> 00:11:21,960
Speaker 6: the month, we play music from emerging artists just like you.

216
00:11:22,120 --> 00:11:24,720
Speaker 6: If you're a musician or a singer and have recorded

217
00:11:24,800 --> 00:11:27,440
Speaker 6: music you'd like to submit, it's very easy. Just go

218
00:11:27,520 --> 00:11:30,840
Speaker 6: to Coast tocoastam dot com, click the emerging Artist banner

219
00:11:30,880 --> 00:11:33,920
Speaker 6: in the carousel, follow the instructions and we just might

220
00:11:33,960 --> 00:11:36,560
Speaker 6: play your music on the air. Go now to Coast

221
00:11:36,559 --> 00:11:39,760
Speaker 6: tocoastam dot com to send us your recording. That's Coast

222
00:11:39,760 --> 00:11:47,760
Speaker 6: to COASTAM dot com. Hey, it's producer Tom, and you're

223
00:11:47,880 --> 00:11:50,240
Speaker 6: right where you need to be. This is the iHeartRadio

224
00:11:50,280 --> 00:11:53,240
Speaker 6: and Coast to Coast AM Paranormal Podcast Network.

225
00:12:00,080 --> 00:12:01,920
Speaker 7: The Coast to Coast AM mobile app is here and

226
00:12:01,920 --> 00:12:04,000
Speaker 7: waiting for you right now. With the app, you can

227
00:12:04,000 --> 00:12:06,640
Speaker 7: hear classic shows from the past seven years, listen to

228
00:12:06,679 --> 00:12:08,959
Speaker 7: the current live show, and get access to the artbel

229
00:12:09,040 --> 00:12:11,560
Speaker 7: vault where you can listen to uninterrupted audio. So head

230
00:12:11,600 --> 00:12:14,040
Speaker 7: on over to the Coast to COASTDAM dot com website.

231
00:12:14,120 --> 00:12:15,800
Speaker 7: We have a handy video guide to help you get

232
00:12:15,800 --> 00:12:16,360
Speaker 7: the most out.

233
00:12:16,280 --> 00:12:17,920
Speaker 8: Of your mobile app usage.

234
00:12:18,000 --> 00:12:20,040
Speaker 7: All the infos waiting for you now at Coast to

235
00:12:20,320 --> 00:12:35,319
Speaker 7: COASTAM dot com. That's Coast to COASTAM dot com.

236
00:12:35,400 --> 00:12:38,200
Speaker 4: We are back on Beyond Contact. It's Captain Ron talking

237
00:12:38,240 --> 00:12:41,960
Speaker 4: to doctor Todd Curtis. Doctor Curtis, let's talk about some

238
00:12:42,000 --> 00:12:45,640
Speaker 4: of these famous UFO cases that have involved other aircraft,

239
00:12:46,240 --> 00:12:49,120
Speaker 4: starting with the case I mentioned in your intro, which

240
00:12:49,160 --> 00:12:52,000
Speaker 4: is the two thousand and six UFO case that happened

241
00:12:52,040 --> 00:12:56,000
Speaker 4: at Chicago O'Hare Airport. We're at least a dozen employees

242
00:12:56,040 --> 00:12:59,600
Speaker 4: claim to have witnessed a metallic saucer shaped craft hovering

243
00:12:59,600 --> 00:13:01,520
Speaker 4: over a game. Do you remember that case?

244
00:13:01,840 --> 00:13:05,360
Speaker 5: I remember well. In fact, that case was the triggering

245
00:13:05,480 --> 00:13:10,199
Speaker 5: event that maybe become professionally interested in whatever was going on,

246
00:13:10,320 --> 00:13:13,320
Speaker 5: because this was November two thousand and six, nearly six

247
00:13:13,400 --> 00:13:16,240
Speaker 5: years after nine to eleven, four or five years after

248
00:13:16,280 --> 00:13:19,000
Speaker 5: TSA was up and running, after Homeland security was up

249
00:13:19,000 --> 00:13:22,080
Speaker 5: and running, where airport and aviation security was top of

250
00:13:22,080 --> 00:13:25,040
Speaker 5: mind with the government, and you have something to this day,

251
00:13:25,360 --> 00:13:27,120
Speaker 5: I don't know what it is, and neither does anyone

252
00:13:27,160 --> 00:13:30,640
Speaker 5: else that was violating the airspace, not over an airport,

253
00:13:30,960 --> 00:13:33,600
Speaker 5: but one of the most important airports in the world,

254
00:13:33,600 --> 00:13:35,720
Speaker 5: the busiest airports in the world, one of the top

255
00:13:35,760 --> 00:13:39,199
Speaker 5: five or ten, and nothing officially was done. Covering over

256
00:13:39,720 --> 00:13:43,000
Speaker 5: a terminal in full view of personnel on the ground,

257
00:13:43,240 --> 00:13:46,960
Speaker 5: no investigation by the FAA or the FBI or whomever.

258
00:13:47,240 --> 00:13:49,400
Speaker 5: I said to myself, Look, there have been hundreds of

259
00:13:49,440 --> 00:13:53,160
Speaker 5: millions of tax dollars going to these organizations. Here is

260
00:13:53,320 --> 00:13:57,200
Speaker 5: a humongous example of Hey, investigate this, because check it out.

261
00:13:57,280 --> 00:13:59,800
Speaker 5: If I'm a bad guy or bad woman sitting over

262
00:14:00,000 --> 00:14:02,080
Speaker 5: across the world thinking, if I want to attack an

263
00:14:02,120 --> 00:14:04,160
Speaker 5: airport in America, all I have to do is make

264
00:14:04,200 --> 00:14:06,120
Speaker 5: it look like a flying saucer and I can just

265
00:14:06,200 --> 00:14:08,760
Speaker 5: waltz right in. No one's going to touch me. So

266
00:14:08,880 --> 00:14:11,680
Speaker 5: again I got mad, and instead of writing an angry

267
00:14:11,760 --> 00:14:13,760
Speaker 5: letter to the editor, I said, what can I do

268
00:14:13,800 --> 00:14:17,120
Speaker 5: about this? From my professional perspective, So I started to

269
00:14:17,480 --> 00:14:21,320
Speaker 5: ask questions, questions like what's the risk? And risk is

270
00:14:21,320 --> 00:14:24,440
Speaker 5: a very specific term in the regulatory world of aviation.

271
00:14:24,760 --> 00:14:27,200
Speaker 5: Risk is something you can measure. It's a combination of

272
00:14:27,440 --> 00:14:32,120
Speaker 5: some likelihood of an unwanted event, the consequences of that event,

273
00:14:32,440 --> 00:14:35,320
Speaker 5: and the magnitude of those things put together. For example,

274
00:14:35,520 --> 00:14:38,520
Speaker 5: chance of plane crashing very very low, the consequence many

275
00:14:38,560 --> 00:14:41,360
Speaker 5: people killed. So yes, that is a risk. You can

276
00:14:41,400 --> 00:14:43,120
Speaker 5: measure it, you can hang a number on it. What

277
00:14:43,240 --> 00:14:45,520
Speaker 5: is the action, what was the effect on the aircraft,

278
00:14:45,560 --> 00:14:47,680
Speaker 5: what was the damage to the system. So looking at

279
00:14:47,720 --> 00:14:49,920
Speaker 5: it from that perspective, I began to get a much

280
00:14:49,960 --> 00:14:53,160
Speaker 5: better feel for it. And subsequent to Chicago, the next

281
00:14:53,200 --> 00:14:55,800
Speaker 5: triggering event was Leslie King. She had her book in

282
00:14:55,800 --> 00:14:59,920
Speaker 5: twenty ten about UFOs generals, and she had documented cases

283
00:15:00,120 --> 00:15:03,680
Speaker 5: around the world where you had high level officials France, US,

284
00:15:03,920 --> 00:15:08,000
Speaker 5: Ron elsewhere who spoke in detail and sometimes in their

285
00:15:08,000 --> 00:15:10,720
Speaker 5: own words about what they had experienced. I was so

286
00:15:10,840 --> 00:15:12,680
Speaker 5: impressed with that. I actually reached out to her and

287
00:15:12,840 --> 00:15:15,360
Speaker 5: this is what twenty thirteen, which actually came on my

288
00:15:15,440 --> 00:15:18,440
Speaker 5: podcast on my website, and we had a lovely conversation.

289
00:15:18,560 --> 00:15:20,280
Speaker 5: It's still out there on the internet. You can here

290
00:15:20,360 --> 00:15:21,320
Speaker 5: Leslie and I, yeah.

291
00:15:21,200 --> 00:15:23,920
Speaker 4: It's great. Actually, that's when her UFO book came up.

292
00:15:24,080 --> 00:15:27,200
Speaker 5: And my attitude really hasn't changed since then. What has

293
00:15:27,360 --> 00:15:29,480
Speaker 5: changed is my ability to go out there and see

294
00:15:29,480 --> 00:15:32,960
Speaker 5: if there's any additional evidence out there, not just evidence

295
00:15:33,000 --> 00:15:36,080
Speaker 5: from people talking online or whatever, but are there formal

296
00:15:36,120 --> 00:15:39,320
Speaker 5: reports in any sort of database that's reputable that has

297
00:15:39,360 --> 00:15:42,360
Speaker 5: these things. And there is one database funded by the

298
00:15:42,440 --> 00:15:45,520
Speaker 5: United States government which has in my opinion, bona fide

299
00:15:45,640 --> 00:15:48,360
Speaker 5: UFO slash UAP cases in them. Some of them are

300
00:15:48,440 --> 00:15:52,240
Speaker 5: just pretty stunning as well. This is NASA's Aviation Safety

301
00:15:52,240 --> 00:15:55,240
Speaker 5: Reporting System database, something that's been up and running since

302
00:15:55,240 --> 00:15:59,320
Speaker 5: the late nineteen seventies, where the purpose is to encourage

303
00:15:59,360 --> 00:16:03,520
Speaker 5: pilot's and others to send in reports that affect aviation safety.

304
00:16:03,800 --> 00:16:06,680
Speaker 5: And the thing about this is anonymous you send in

305
00:16:06,760 --> 00:16:09,160
Speaker 5: a report, it ends up on their database. Your name's

306
00:16:09,200 --> 00:16:12,239
Speaker 5: not associated with it, the aircraft hill number isn't associated

307
00:16:12,280 --> 00:16:15,200
Speaker 5: with it, your company name isn't associated with And NASA

308
00:16:15,320 --> 00:16:17,120
Speaker 5: is very proud of the fact they've had I think

309
00:16:17,160 --> 00:16:19,160
Speaker 5: it's something like one and a half to two million

310
00:16:19,360 --> 00:16:22,640
Speaker 5: reports over the years. They've never had the privacy of

311
00:16:22,640 --> 00:16:26,400
Speaker 5: the reporting people violated. And here's the big end. They

312
00:16:26,440 --> 00:16:29,520
Speaker 5: have a staff of people who review all these experts

313
00:16:29,800 --> 00:16:32,440
Speaker 5: in aviation air traffic control mechanics. So if you put

314
00:16:32,480 --> 00:16:34,840
Speaker 5: in some report, they'll look it over. They might even

315
00:16:34,840 --> 00:16:37,480
Speaker 5: call you up again ask you more questions. So is

316
00:16:37,480 --> 00:16:39,960
Speaker 5: it possible you can put in a BIGUS report. Sure,

317
00:16:40,040 --> 00:16:43,840
Speaker 5: But professionally, if you're a pilot or mechanic, air traffic controller,

318
00:16:44,000 --> 00:16:46,880
Speaker 5: flight attendant, anyone who has to be certified by the FAA,

319
00:16:47,480 --> 00:16:50,440
Speaker 5: and you lie to the FAA via NASA, many things

320
00:16:50,440 --> 00:16:53,040
Speaker 5: can happen to you, none of them good, So there's

321
00:16:53,080 --> 00:16:55,360
Speaker 5: a huge incentive to tell it to them straight.

322
00:16:55,720 --> 00:16:58,480
Speaker 4: It's great that you have plausible deniability by using that

323
00:16:58,520 --> 00:17:00,000
Speaker 4: system if you don't have to put your name on it.

324
00:17:00,400 --> 00:17:02,920
Speaker 5: Absolutely as good as the database is. And I did

325
00:17:02,960 --> 00:17:06,359
Speaker 5: find literally thirteen events which I talked about the presentation

326
00:17:06,640 --> 00:17:08,960
Speaker 5: that I thought fit the criteria that I have for

327
00:17:09,240 --> 00:17:12,600
Speaker 5: what a UAP is. I didn't see any events around events,

328
00:17:12,760 --> 00:17:15,520
Speaker 5: around times and places you would think. For example, I

329
00:17:15,560 --> 00:17:17,800
Speaker 5: went to the database which goes back to nineteen eighty eight,

330
00:17:17,880 --> 00:17:20,800
Speaker 5: I said, okay, what about the month of November two

331
00:17:20,840 --> 00:17:24,399
Speaker 5: thousand and six, by the way right there exactly, they

332
00:17:24,440 --> 00:17:25,760
Speaker 5: give you the month, they don't give you the day.

333
00:17:25,760 --> 00:17:27,320
Speaker 5: So I said, all right, let me give the month

334
00:17:27,320 --> 00:17:31,080
Speaker 5: of November, State of Illinois. How many reports were in there?

335
00:17:31,440 --> 00:17:33,920
Speaker 5: I went through every report none of them had something

336
00:17:33,920 --> 00:17:37,119
Speaker 5: to do with the o'haravan Stephenville, Texas, which was during

337
00:17:37,160 --> 00:17:39,800
Speaker 5: the George W. Bush administration where there was no wait,

338
00:17:40,119 --> 00:17:42,840
Speaker 5: that's no way, Stephenville, Texas. I went through the entire

339
00:17:42,880 --> 00:17:47,280
Speaker 5: month nothing. Phoenix Lights ninety seven. I did Phoenix, Arizona,

340
00:17:47,320 --> 00:17:50,160
Speaker 5: and Nevada for that entire month. Nothing by the way,

341
00:17:50,320 --> 00:17:53,959
Speaker 5: Phoenix Lights Reportedly Kurt Russell, who was a licensed pilot

342
00:17:54,040 --> 00:17:57,440
Speaker 5: at the time he saw whatever this object was, has

343
00:17:57,520 --> 00:17:59,680
Speaker 5: talked about it in public since then, but to the

344
00:17:59,760 --> 00:18:02,800
Speaker 5: best my analogy, hasn't filed a formal report or informal report.

345
00:18:02,800 --> 00:18:04,600
Speaker 4: Well, he called it in. There's a recording. You can

346
00:18:04,640 --> 00:18:06,639
Speaker 4: actually find the recording of him calling it in. We

347
00:18:06,640 --> 00:18:08,439
Speaker 4: were going to invite him to contact in the desert.

348
00:18:08,480 --> 00:18:10,280
Speaker 4: Because of that, I don't think he filed with this.

349
00:18:10,359 --> 00:18:13,119
Speaker 4: It doesn't seem like people are filing using this system.

350
00:18:13,160 --> 00:18:15,280
Speaker 4: You just named all these things and there are no

351
00:18:15,440 --> 00:18:17,080
Speaker 4: reports about this. Well.

352
00:18:17,160 --> 00:18:20,320
Speaker 5: The aviation saftory reporting system is something that if you

353
00:18:20,359 --> 00:18:22,439
Speaker 5: are in aviation you may or may not be aware of,

354
00:18:22,920 --> 00:18:26,119
Speaker 5: in part because there are two kinds of data you

355
00:18:26,240 --> 00:18:28,600
Speaker 5: tend to have when it comes to aviation safetry reporting.

356
00:18:28,680 --> 00:18:31,679
Speaker 5: That which is required to be reported, that which is voluntary.

357
00:18:32,040 --> 00:18:34,400
Speaker 5: If you have an accident as defined by the NTSB,

358
00:18:34,640 --> 00:18:37,120
Speaker 5: you're required to report it within so many days where

359
00:18:37,119 --> 00:18:39,080
Speaker 5: you'll be in big trouble, and if it's a serious

360
00:18:39,119 --> 00:18:42,240
Speaker 5: incident also it has to be reported. Just about everything

361
00:18:42,280 --> 00:18:45,159
Speaker 5: else is voluntary. For example, there's a database called the

362
00:18:45,240 --> 00:18:48,359
Speaker 5: Near Midair Collision System Database. Where he didn't have a

363
00:18:48,400 --> 00:18:50,639
Speaker 5: midair collision. You might not have even been in a

364
00:18:50,680 --> 00:18:54,119
Speaker 5: situation where traffic controllers reported it. But if you're a

365
00:18:54,119 --> 00:18:56,320
Speaker 5: pilot and you're in a situation, it's like, oh my gosh,

366
00:18:56,600 --> 00:18:59,960
Speaker 5: let report this almost accident that happened. There's another database

367
00:19:00,200 --> 00:19:03,639
Speaker 5: for wildlife strikes aircraft, another one for laser encounters, another

368
00:19:03,640 --> 00:19:07,679
Speaker 5: one for errant drones drones are misbehaving. These are all voluntary,

369
00:19:07,840 --> 00:19:10,119
Speaker 5: as is the ASRS system of NASA.

370
00:19:10,280 --> 00:19:12,880
Speaker 4: I see very interesting, Todd. I actually remember this case

371
00:19:12,920 --> 00:19:14,840
Speaker 4: that we were talking about earlier, about the two thousand

372
00:19:14,840 --> 00:19:17,200
Speaker 4: and six oh haair case, and I remember it came

373
00:19:17,240 --> 00:19:18,960
Speaker 4: out and then it just sort of went away and

374
00:19:18,960 --> 00:19:21,040
Speaker 4: we never really got an explanation. You know. This is

375
00:19:21,080 --> 00:19:25,080
Speaker 4: another example of the government not acknowledging anything about anything

376
00:19:25,119 --> 00:19:28,400
Speaker 4: unidentified in the sky. I recently mentioned on the air

377
00:19:28,520 --> 00:19:31,720
Speaker 4: how there's this disconnect somehow in our government. On one hand,

378
00:19:31,840 --> 00:19:35,160
Speaker 4: they've come out recently and acknowledged the Advanced Aerospace Threat

379
00:19:35,160 --> 00:19:37,919
Speaker 4: Identification program that they had, that that they were doing. That,

380
00:19:38,000 --> 00:19:41,040
Speaker 4: they acknowledged that several of these leaked videos are authentic

381
00:19:41,119 --> 00:19:44,240
Speaker 4: military videos. They acknowledged in two thousand and one that

382
00:19:44,280 --> 00:19:47,200
Speaker 4: the Director of the National Intelligence released a report saying

383
00:19:47,200 --> 00:19:49,000
Speaker 4: they couldn't explain one hundred and forty three out of

384
00:19:49,000 --> 00:19:51,800
Speaker 4: one hundred and forty four UAP cases that it looked at. Yet,

385
00:19:51,840 --> 00:19:54,640
Speaker 4: on the other hand, we have this long history from

386
00:19:54,680 --> 00:19:57,280
Speaker 4: the government of blatant denial of anything to do with

387
00:19:57,400 --> 00:20:01,680
Speaker 4: UFO phenomenon, going back to Project Sign, Grunge Blue Book,

388
00:20:01,840 --> 00:20:04,440
Speaker 4: the other so called reports, the Robertson Panel, the kind

389
00:20:04,480 --> 00:20:06,600
Speaker 4: of committee, all of these things. Then in twenty twenty

390
00:20:06,600 --> 00:20:09,320
Speaker 4: four we get this new department called the All Domain

391
00:20:09,440 --> 00:20:12,400
Speaker 4: Anomaly Resolution Office, and we thought we're going to get

392
00:20:12,400 --> 00:20:14,600
Speaker 4: some real information here, But they came out with this

393
00:20:14,760 --> 00:20:18,359
Speaker 4: ridiculous conclusion that there's absolutely nothing to see, not even

394
00:20:18,359 --> 00:20:20,600
Speaker 4: acknowledging that there might be objects in the sky that

395
00:20:20,640 --> 00:20:23,840
Speaker 4: we can't explain. It's just simply not realistic. How do

396
00:20:23,880 --> 00:20:26,040
Speaker 4: you feel about the government responses like this.

397
00:20:26,520 --> 00:20:29,080
Speaker 5: Well, the government at which full disclosure, I used to

398
00:20:29,080 --> 00:20:31,080
Speaker 5: be a part of. I was an Air Force officer

399
00:20:31,160 --> 00:20:33,639
Speaker 5: and I was assigned both the Flight Test Center at

400
00:20:33,680 --> 00:20:36,120
Speaker 5: Edwards and I was actually at the National Security Agency

401
00:20:36,320 --> 00:20:38,440
Speaker 5: last part of my service, so I got a look

402
00:20:38,480 --> 00:20:41,160
Speaker 5: to see at the intelligence community from the inside. So

403
00:20:41,240 --> 00:20:43,360
Speaker 5: the government has many parts when it comes to aviation,

404
00:20:43,680 --> 00:20:46,159
Speaker 5: and generally you have the civilian part and you have

405
00:20:46,240 --> 00:20:49,000
Speaker 5: the military part, and many of their safety programs and

406
00:20:49,040 --> 00:20:52,080
Speaker 5: reporting systems are quite separate from one another. If you're

407
00:20:52,080 --> 00:20:54,720
Speaker 5: in a civilian aircraft something goes seriously wrong and there's

408
00:20:54,720 --> 00:20:57,800
Speaker 5: a crash, there'll be an investigation, there'll be a detailed report.

409
00:20:57,960 --> 00:21:01,680
Speaker 5: Anyone around the world can download report and the supporting

410
00:21:01,720 --> 00:21:04,439
Speaker 5: documents of it. The same sort of accident happens in

411
00:21:04,440 --> 00:21:06,280
Speaker 5: the military. You'll be lucky if you get a one

412
00:21:06,280 --> 00:21:09,040
Speaker 5: page summary saying this is the accident and this is

413
00:21:09,119 --> 00:21:11,879
Speaker 5: kind of what happened, and that's it. My colleagues and

414
00:21:11,960 --> 00:21:14,440
Speaker 5: I did a podcast about an accident on Air Force

415
00:21:14,480 --> 00:21:17,320
Speaker 5: one about five years ago that cost four million dollars

416
00:21:17,320 --> 00:21:19,560
Speaker 5: worth of damage. Someone used the wrong tools, on an

417
00:21:19,560 --> 00:21:22,600
Speaker 5: auction system. The average person would think this is crazy.

418
00:21:22,840 --> 00:21:26,159
Speaker 5: There was only a one page report available to the public.

419
00:21:26,320 --> 00:21:28,800
Speaker 5: The details were in the military file somewhere it can

420
00:21:28,920 --> 00:21:31,880
Speaker 5: access them. But let's go back in time to Chicago

421
00:21:32,000 --> 00:21:34,359
Speaker 5: two thousand and six. Was the air requirement for the

422
00:21:34,440 --> 00:21:37,240
Speaker 5: FA to report this event to the best of my knowledge,

423
00:21:37,320 --> 00:21:40,960
Speaker 5: or was not a formal regulatory requirement in the regulations

424
00:21:41,000 --> 00:21:43,800
Speaker 5: that dictate how the FA behaves that require them to

425
00:21:43,840 --> 00:21:46,560
Speaker 5: report it. Could you, as a civilian ask for a

426
00:21:46,600 --> 00:21:49,399
Speaker 5: Freedom of Information Act request with things like air traffic

427
00:21:49,400 --> 00:21:52,240
Speaker 5: control tapes in a reports, et cetera. You could have

428
00:21:52,840 --> 00:21:55,800
Speaker 5: you put it on a public database online easily accessible.

429
00:21:56,000 --> 00:21:58,400
Speaker 5: You put it behind a foil wall. It's available puts

430
00:21:58,400 --> 00:22:00,920
Speaker 5: you have to work for it. So, in my opinion,

431
00:22:01,080 --> 00:22:03,399
Speaker 5: there was no reporting of it because there is no

432
00:22:03,480 --> 00:22:04,840
Speaker 5: requirement to report it.

433
00:22:05,000 --> 00:22:06,800
Speaker 4: We're going to take a break there. You're listening to

434
00:22:06,840 --> 00:22:09,800
Speaker 4: Beyond Contact and the iHeartRadio and Coast to Coast AM

435
00:22:09,840 --> 00:22:11,280
Speaker 4: paranormal podcast network.

436
00:22:19,000 --> 00:22:23,480
Speaker 1: The Art Belvault never disappoints classic audio at your fingertips.

437
00:22:23,560 --> 00:22:26,760
Speaker 1: Go now to Coast tocoastam dot com for full details.

438
00:22:32,200 --> 00:22:35,520
Speaker 2: You're listening to the iHeartRadio and Coast to Coast am

439
00:22:35,800 --> 00:22:41,800
Speaker 2: Paranormal podcast Network with the best shows that explore the paranormal, supernatural,

440
00:22:42,080 --> 00:22:45,639
Speaker 2: and the unexplained. You can enjoy all shows on the

441
00:22:45,680 --> 00:22:51,760
Speaker 2: iHeartRadio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you find your favorite podcasts.

442
00:22:55,280 --> 00:22:58,840
Speaker 8: My name is Mark Rawlings, president of Paranormal Day dot Com.

443
00:22:58,840 --> 00:23:01,560
Speaker 8: Over five years ago, George Norri approached me with a

444
00:23:01,760 --> 00:23:05,399
Speaker 8: unique concept, a dating site for people searching for someone

445
00:23:05,480 --> 00:23:10,000
Speaker 8: with interest in UFOs, ghosts, Bigfoot, conspiracy theories and the paranormal.

446
00:23:10,119 --> 00:23:13,119
Speaker 8: From that, Paranormal Day dot Com was born. It's a

447
00:23:13,200 --> 00:23:15,720
Speaker 8: unique site for unique people and it's free to join

448
00:23:15,800 --> 00:23:17,920
Speaker 8: to look around. If you want to upgrade and enjoy

449
00:23:18,000 --> 00:23:20,760
Speaker 8: more of our great features, use promo code George for

450
00:23:20,840 --> 00:23:23,160
Speaker 8: a great discount. So check it out. You got nothing

451
00:23:23,200 --> 00:23:35,920
Speaker 8: to lose Paranormal Day dot com.

452
00:23:36,080 --> 00:23:38,160
Speaker 4: We are back on Beyond Contact. We're talking with doctor

453
00:23:38,200 --> 00:23:40,920
Speaker 4: Todd Curtis. Doctor Curtis, do you know of any cases

454
00:23:40,960 --> 00:23:43,800
Speaker 4: involving a plane hitting one of these unknown objects like

455
00:23:43,800 --> 00:23:46,199
Speaker 4: a UAP or even like a close call with one.

456
00:23:46,400 --> 00:23:49,240
Speaker 5: I don't, and I literally looked at thousands of accent

457
00:23:49,320 --> 00:23:51,880
Speaker 5: instant reports over the decades. I've been in the business,

458
00:23:52,480 --> 00:23:55,880
Speaker 5: and this for one of two reasons. A it never happened,

459
00:23:56,040 --> 00:23:59,320
Speaker 5: or b it happened, and whoever wrote reports rooted in

460
00:23:59,359 --> 00:24:01,560
Speaker 5: such a way to write around the fact that this

461
00:24:01,720 --> 00:24:05,159
Speaker 5: was something highly unusual and more full disclosure. Had I

462
00:24:05,320 --> 00:24:07,800
Speaker 5: been in well, I was going for a number of

463
00:24:07,920 --> 00:24:10,159
Speaker 5: years as a safety engineer, which I've never seen a

464
00:24:10,200 --> 00:24:13,000
Speaker 5: report at going. But had we seen one, I'm pretty

465
00:24:13,040 --> 00:24:15,280
Speaker 5: combident we would have done exactly that. It's like, Okay,

466
00:24:15,480 --> 00:24:18,480
Speaker 5: is there a plane crashed, the reports are something really

467
00:24:18,480 --> 00:24:21,639
Speaker 5: bizarre hit it. We'll write a full report and do

468
00:24:22,000 --> 00:24:24,560
Speaker 5: our level best not to mention the bizarre part, because

469
00:24:24,640 --> 00:24:27,639
Speaker 5: otherwise it would not be seen as credible for our

470
00:24:27,640 --> 00:24:31,520
Speaker 5: home colleagues. And also we might call some bad blood

471
00:24:31,560 --> 00:24:33,920
Speaker 5: with people we have to have a long term relationship

472
00:24:33,960 --> 00:24:36,320
Speaker 5: with in the government, so there is an incentive to

473
00:24:36,640 --> 00:24:39,320
Speaker 5: I wouldn't say a lie, but I would say tell

474
00:24:39,359 --> 00:24:44,560
Speaker 5: as little truth as possible. And again, well, but yeah,

475
00:24:45,080 --> 00:24:48,359
Speaker 5: that's not a conspiracy, that's just you know, organizational and

476
00:24:48,359 --> 00:24:49,760
Speaker 5: bureaucratic survival at work.

477
00:24:49,960 --> 00:24:52,159
Speaker 4: I'm going to use that in my dating world. I

478
00:24:52,240 --> 00:24:54,560
Speaker 4: was like, I think that's a good one.

479
00:24:54,640 --> 00:24:54,800
Speaker 3: Todd.

480
00:24:54,840 --> 00:24:57,160
Speaker 4: I liked that, Hey, do you feel any of these

481
00:24:57,200 --> 00:24:59,879
Speaker 4: things could be anomalous? Where do you sit? Do you

482
00:25:00,080 --> 00:25:02,360
Speaker 4: feel like any of this could be something unknown?

483
00:25:03,080 --> 00:25:06,200
Speaker 5: Well? Absolutely, there is one of the thirteen that were

484
00:25:06,240 --> 00:25:10,239
Speaker 5: in the ASRS database. I talked about my presentation. There

485
00:25:10,240 --> 00:25:13,320
Speaker 5: were a couple where what I would call conventional objects

486
00:25:13,359 --> 00:25:17,359
Speaker 5: in very unconventional places. For example, you're flying fifteen or

487
00:25:17,400 --> 00:25:19,960
Speaker 5: so miles from New York and you see a missile

488
00:25:20,000 --> 00:25:23,359
Speaker 5: go by, and the pilot reported I could see that

489
00:25:23,400 --> 00:25:25,560
Speaker 5: the missile had a rounded shape in the front. I

490
00:25:25,600 --> 00:25:27,719
Speaker 5: thought to myself, Okay, I've been around a few missiles

491
00:25:27,720 --> 00:25:30,359
Speaker 5: here and there in the military. How close do you

492
00:25:30,480 --> 00:25:32,919
Speaker 5: have to be or how big does this missile have

493
00:25:32,960 --> 00:25:35,560
Speaker 5: to be for you to know what shape it was?

494
00:25:36,080 --> 00:25:38,159
Speaker 5: And by the way, you're like fifteen miles out of

495
00:25:38,200 --> 00:25:41,280
Speaker 5: New York City. There are no military test ranges anywhere

496
00:25:41,320 --> 00:25:45,400
Speaker 5: near that territory. Having a missile flying without everyone knowing

497
00:25:45,440 --> 00:25:47,680
Speaker 5: about it, the FA says, hey, we have missile tests

498
00:25:47,720 --> 00:25:49,320
Speaker 5: going on between this hour and this hour.

499
00:25:49,320 --> 00:25:50,119
Speaker 4: Avoid this space.

500
00:25:50,680 --> 00:25:54,280
Speaker 5: To have someone fire this without going through the protocols

501
00:25:54,560 --> 00:25:57,640
Speaker 5: would put that program, whatever that program is, in jeopardy.

502
00:25:58,160 --> 00:26:00,840
Speaker 5: Not to mention all the flights or put in jeopardy.

503
00:26:01,080 --> 00:26:03,199
Speaker 5: So yeah, that's one kind of anomally in that it's

504
00:26:03,240 --> 00:26:06,760
Speaker 5: a conventional object in an unconventional space. There is at

505
00:26:06,840 --> 00:26:08,679
Speaker 5: least one other one in there. It's like, I have

506
00:26:08,760 --> 00:26:11,440
Speaker 5: no idea what this is. This looks like nothing I've

507
00:26:11,440 --> 00:26:15,440
Speaker 5: ever seen. And whatever was flying this thing had extraordinary

508
00:26:15,440 --> 00:26:18,720
Speaker 5: piloting skills, well beyond what you expect from even an

509
00:26:18,760 --> 00:26:19,760
Speaker 5: above average pilot.

510
00:26:20,119 --> 00:26:21,920
Speaker 4: What do you speculate that could be? Do you think

511
00:26:21,960 --> 00:26:24,320
Speaker 4: it could be a test military craft? Do you think

512
00:26:24,320 --> 00:26:26,560
Speaker 4: it could be drones? Could it be a foreign government?

513
00:26:26,640 --> 00:26:28,240
Speaker 4: Could it be something off world?

514
00:26:28,440 --> 00:26:30,120
Speaker 5: I'll give you a very short description of the most

515
00:26:30,200 --> 00:26:32,080
Speaker 5: bizarre on and and I'll let you tell me what

516
00:26:32,119 --> 00:26:35,320
Speaker 5: you think. A sailplane pilot which is no engine on it.

517
00:26:35,640 --> 00:26:37,640
Speaker 5: He's flying near all but in New York. He's about

518
00:26:37,640 --> 00:26:40,320
Speaker 5: thirty five hundred feet above of the ground. There's another

519
00:26:40,400 --> 00:26:42,600
Speaker 5: person in back. This person's first flight in the glider.

520
00:26:43,119 --> 00:26:45,960
Speaker 5: He sees something that's about six foot tall, too small

521
00:26:46,000 --> 00:26:47,879
Speaker 5: to have a person side of. It has like a

522
00:26:47,920 --> 00:26:51,000
Speaker 5: speckled shiny rainbow thing on the top, a couple of

523
00:26:51,119 --> 00:26:54,280
Speaker 5: antenna thingies sticking out on the bottom, and he sees

524
00:26:54,320 --> 00:26:57,000
Speaker 5: it flying in my estimation, about three hundred miles an hour,

525
00:26:57,240 --> 00:27:00,240
Speaker 5: very close to the ground. Okay, drones existed into they

526
00:27:00,359 --> 00:27:03,160
Speaker 5: fifteen drones going three hundred miles an hour. I don't

527
00:27:03,160 --> 00:27:06,280
Speaker 5: think so. But it gets worse or more bizarre. It

528
00:27:06,320 --> 00:27:10,359
Speaker 5: goes toward this distant mountain. Then it comes directly at

529
00:27:10,600 --> 00:27:14,680
Speaker 5: this lider, passes by his right wing, doesn't U turn,

530
00:27:15,440 --> 00:27:18,560
Speaker 5: ends up forming off about fifty feet off his left way.

531
00:27:19,160 --> 00:27:21,320
Speaker 5: That's an airshow kind of maneuver that you would see

532
00:27:21,320 --> 00:27:23,920
Speaker 5: the Blue Angels of the Thunderbirds do, and you would

533
00:27:23,960 --> 00:27:27,080
Speaker 5: not see them do it unless everyone involved knew exactly

534
00:27:27,080 --> 00:27:30,080
Speaker 5: what was going on. This was a sailplane pilot who

535
00:27:30,119 --> 00:27:32,480
Speaker 5: does not have the ability to do juking and driving

536
00:27:32,520 --> 00:27:34,640
Speaker 5: maneuvers to get out of the way, and this thing

537
00:27:34,720 --> 00:27:38,720
Speaker 5: with extraordinary capability is flying in formation and I love it.

538
00:27:38,760 --> 00:27:41,040
Speaker 5: The statement said in the right up. This is why

539
00:27:41,040 --> 00:27:42,879
Speaker 5: I decided to go back to the airport, And I thought,

540
00:27:43,160 --> 00:27:44,959
Speaker 5: this is a smart pilot. He's getting the heck out

541
00:27:44,960 --> 00:27:48,520
Speaker 5: of dotage. The wait there's more. Two similar objects about

542
00:27:48,560 --> 00:27:51,000
Speaker 5: six foot toll come out of the clouds, form up

543
00:27:51,040 --> 00:27:54,280
Speaker 5: with the first one flies off into the distance. Now

544
00:27:54,400 --> 00:27:57,040
Speaker 5: any one small part of that could be a conventional

545
00:27:57,400 --> 00:28:02,560
Speaker 5: craft of some kind. Everything put together makes no sense whatsoever.

546
00:28:03,080 --> 00:28:05,680
Speaker 4: What about you, I ask a UAP case, I mean

547
00:28:05,720 --> 00:28:09,600
Speaker 4: that is by definition right there, that's an unidentified phenomenon

548
00:28:09,760 --> 00:28:11,760
Speaker 4: going on right there. I think that's a great one.

549
00:28:11,880 --> 00:28:13,240
Speaker 4: I've never seen it.

550
00:28:13,240 --> 00:28:19,200
Speaker 5: It's a certified, vetted, government sponsored database that is open

551
00:28:19,280 --> 00:28:21,359
Speaker 5: to the entire world to go look at. And again

552
00:28:21,480 --> 00:28:24,600
Speaker 5: in my presentation I links to the actual code number.

553
00:28:24,640 --> 00:28:27,520
Speaker 5: You can go in there yourself, download this, look at yourself,

554
00:28:27,560 --> 00:28:29,359
Speaker 5: scratch your head and say, what's going on?

555
00:28:29,840 --> 00:28:32,040
Speaker 4: Right? How often do you stumble across things that are

556
00:28:32,119 --> 00:28:33,159
Speaker 4: of interest like that?

557
00:28:33,840 --> 00:28:37,960
Speaker 5: Very rarely? Because again I very specifically said to myself,

558
00:28:38,320 --> 00:28:41,000
Speaker 5: as a little research project, is there anything in any

559
00:28:41,040 --> 00:28:43,320
Speaker 5: formal database that looks as bizarre? I would go to

560
00:28:43,400 --> 00:28:46,160
Speaker 5: the NTSB database, do searches for the word UFO or

561
00:28:46,240 --> 00:28:49,000
Speaker 5: UAP and whatnot. I thought, let me try the Aviation

562
00:28:49,080 --> 00:28:52,040
Speaker 5: Safety Reporting System. That's when I hit PAYDART. I only

563
00:28:52,040 --> 00:28:54,760
Speaker 5: did three searchers. One had a single word missile about

564
00:28:54,760 --> 00:28:57,640
Speaker 5: four hundred events, like three or four of them were legitimate.

565
00:28:58,000 --> 00:29:01,360
Speaker 5: Another single word UAV, which is for the acronym for

566
00:29:01,360 --> 00:29:04,960
Speaker 5: a drone unmanned aerospace vehicle. They were like sixty of those,

567
00:29:05,000 --> 00:29:08,240
Speaker 5: and four of them were legit, and there was actually

568
00:29:08,320 --> 00:29:11,600
Speaker 5: a coded variable in the database for UFO. So I did, Okay,

569
00:29:11,640 --> 00:29:13,360
Speaker 5: let me do a general search UFO. You at p

570
00:29:13,560 --> 00:29:15,160
Speaker 5: on adentified flight object, etc.

571
00:29:15,480 --> 00:29:15,760
Speaker 4: Cetera.

572
00:29:16,080 --> 00:29:17,960
Speaker 5: There were nine of them, six for legit, and I

573
00:29:18,080 --> 00:29:20,160
Speaker 5: quit doing a search after that. Hey, I did three

574
00:29:20,160 --> 00:29:24,480
Speaker 5: searches in like twenty minutes and I found thirteen events.

575
00:29:24,880 --> 00:29:26,760
Speaker 5: If I spent a whole lot more time doing this,

576
00:29:26,840 --> 00:29:30,640
Speaker 5: I'll probably find more in that specific database. So this

577
00:29:30,680 --> 00:29:32,760
Speaker 5: is my challenge to the audience. Go check out the

578
00:29:32,800 --> 00:29:35,680
Speaker 5: Aviation Safety Reporting System, figure out how to use their

579
00:29:35,760 --> 00:29:37,400
Speaker 5: search process, which.

580
00:29:37,200 --> 00:29:37,840
Speaker 4: Is very easy.

581
00:29:38,040 --> 00:29:40,040
Speaker 5: See if you can find something, please.

582
00:29:40,080 --> 00:29:41,920
Speaker 4: That is awesome. We should all take a look at

583
00:29:41,920 --> 00:29:43,480
Speaker 4: that and see if we can't come up with more.

584
00:29:44,280 --> 00:29:47,360
Speaker 4: Doctor Curtis, let's talk about that San Francisco case at

585
00:29:47,360 --> 00:29:48,200
Speaker 4: twenty thirteen.

586
00:29:48,920 --> 00:29:51,840
Speaker 5: This was a conventional accident. This was a Triple seven

587
00:29:51,960 --> 00:29:55,040
Speaker 5: on July sixth, twenty thirteen, happened to be a Saturday,

588
00:29:55,200 --> 00:29:57,840
Speaker 5: and it crashed, killing three people on board. I'd been

589
00:29:57,920 --> 00:30:01,240
Speaker 5: a blowing engineer years before work on the Triple seven project.

590
00:30:01,440 --> 00:30:04,760
Speaker 5: This is the very first fatal crash of a Triple seven,

591
00:30:04,880 --> 00:30:06,440
Speaker 5: and I was out of voting at that time and

592
00:30:06,520 --> 00:30:08,760
Speaker 5: did the occasional media interview. And as soon as I

593
00:30:08,800 --> 00:30:11,240
Speaker 5: found out that Saturday morning it's a crash, I said

594
00:30:11,280 --> 00:30:13,440
Speaker 5: to myself, my god, it's Triple seven. And no one

595
00:30:13,440 --> 00:30:15,720
Speaker 5: called me. Typically when there's a major airline crash in

596
00:30:15,720 --> 00:30:17,880
Speaker 5: the US, I get all sorts of phone calls, emails,

597
00:30:17,880 --> 00:30:20,800
Speaker 5: text messages. I had nothing. I called around to producers

598
00:30:20,800 --> 00:30:22,920
Speaker 5: I knew, and I called down to IT line. I said, hey,

599
00:30:22,920 --> 00:30:24,719
Speaker 5: you know I'm in New York. It's there a studio

600
00:30:24,760 --> 00:30:26,400
Speaker 5: I can go to. Somebody won't ask me a question.

601
00:30:26,440 --> 00:30:28,880
Speaker 5: I said, oh yeah, I go down the road Columbus Circle.

602
00:30:28,920 --> 00:30:31,520
Speaker 5: We have a studio there. I hadn't followed CNN, so

603
00:30:31,560 --> 00:30:34,440
Speaker 5: I didn't realize they had basically moved their major operations

604
00:30:34,440 --> 00:30:36,480
Speaker 5: in New York. So I walk into this big room,

605
00:30:36,560 --> 00:30:39,600
Speaker 5: fifty desk. Don Lemon's off in the corner, little studio

606
00:30:39,640 --> 00:30:41,240
Speaker 5: giving us talk. I said, oh my god. I thought

607
00:30:41,280 --> 00:30:43,320
Speaker 5: i'd be a little room for five minutes. I'll have

608
00:30:43,480 --> 00:30:45,680
Speaker 5: five minutes of Don Lemon. This will make my day.

609
00:30:45,960 --> 00:30:48,479
Speaker 5: This is a tragic event. People had died but I

610
00:30:48,520 --> 00:30:50,840
Speaker 5: had a job to do. Give some information, then go

611
00:30:50,880 --> 00:30:53,600
Speaker 5: out and party. It's like Saturday in New York. Why

612
00:30:53,640 --> 00:30:55,960
Speaker 5: did they call me and let me come in? Because

613
00:30:56,040 --> 00:31:00,800
Speaker 5: everyone was on vacation. Their producers couldn't be caught. There

614
00:31:00,800 --> 00:31:02,760
Speaker 5: are all sorts of experts who they couldn't call. It's

615
00:31:02,760 --> 00:31:05,320
Speaker 5: like I showed up. It's like, okay, my five minutes

616
00:31:05,400 --> 00:31:07,560
Speaker 5: rough up. I'm about to leave this. Oh, doctor Curtis,

617
00:31:07,600 --> 00:31:09,720
Speaker 5: would you like to stay a little bit longer. Six

618
00:31:09,800 --> 00:31:13,600
Speaker 5: hours later, I leave the studio and all day I'm thinking, okay,

619
00:31:13,800 --> 00:31:17,280
Speaker 5: we're on live. I have to give some useful information,

620
00:31:17,720 --> 00:31:22,000
Speaker 5: very little information starting off, and I try to keep

621
00:31:22,040 --> 00:31:26,480
Speaker 5: it my usual EMO is I'm going to stick with

622
00:31:26,520 --> 00:31:29,360
Speaker 5: facts and data. If I have an opinion, I'll stay

623
00:31:29,360 --> 00:31:32,120
Speaker 5: in an opinion. I'll try and give some context to

624
00:31:32,200 --> 00:31:36,760
Speaker 5: similar accidents in that city or that aircraft type, et cetera.

625
00:31:37,280 --> 00:31:40,560
Speaker 5: And it was an eye opening experience seeing media work

626
00:31:40,760 --> 00:31:44,240
Speaker 5: in real time at CNN. I thought, my god, this

627
00:31:44,400 --> 00:31:47,520
Speaker 5: is like the pinnacle of live news. And I'm the

628
00:31:47,560 --> 00:31:51,720
Speaker 5: only guy that got you. Gotta be kidding me. You

629
00:31:51,800 --> 00:31:53,040
Speaker 5: are mister Fax and Data.

630
00:31:53,120 --> 00:31:56,000
Speaker 4: That is for sure. You absolutely could be like that investigator.

631
00:31:56,520 --> 00:31:59,320
Speaker 4: It's great, fascinating stuff. We'll be right back here talking

632
00:31:59,320 --> 00:32:02,160
Speaker 4: more with doctor t Curtis. You're listening to Beyond Contact

633
00:32:02,200 --> 00:32:05,960
Speaker 4: on the iHeartRadio and Coast to Coast AM Paranormal Podcast Network.

634
00:32:14,320 --> 00:32:18,920
Speaker 2: The Internet is an extraordinary resource that links our children

635
00:32:18,960 --> 00:32:24,120
Speaker 2: to a world of information, experiences, and ideas. It can

636
00:32:24,200 --> 00:32:28,760
Speaker 2: also expose them to risk. Teach your children the basic

637
00:32:28,840 --> 00:32:33,520
Speaker 2: safety rules of the virtual world. Our children are everything,

638
00:32:34,120 --> 00:32:54,880
Speaker 2: Do everything for them.

639
00:32:45,240 --> 00:32:52,240
Speaker 6: On the Iheartradiot Paranoral Podcast Network. Listen anytime, any place.

640
00:33:01,200 --> 00:33:04,640
Speaker 2: Hi, this is Sandras Champlain. Ever wonder what happens when

641
00:33:04,640 --> 00:33:07,480
Speaker 2: we die? Well, I'm going to make it easier for

642
00:33:07,520 --> 00:33:11,000
Speaker 2: you to understand. Join me for my show Shades of

643
00:33:11,040 --> 00:33:14,920
Speaker 2: the Afterlife. New shows come out every Friday, so I'll

644
00:33:14,920 --> 00:33:18,360
Speaker 2: be looking for you right here on the iHeartRadio and

645
00:33:18,440 --> 00:33:21,880
Speaker 2: Coast to Coast AM Paranormal Podcast Network.

646
00:33:32,120 --> 00:33:34,760
Speaker 4: We are back on Beyond Contact. We're talking with doctor

647
00:33:34,800 --> 00:33:38,080
Speaker 4: Todd Curtis. Here. Todd, you brought up Boeing Man in

648
00:33:38,120 --> 00:33:41,000
Speaker 4: twenty twenty four. There's been a lot of stuff happening

649
00:33:41,000 --> 00:33:43,240
Speaker 4: with Boeing. They had the door fall off, they had

650
00:33:43,240 --> 00:33:46,360
Speaker 4: the wheel fall off. What do you feel about all.

651
00:33:46,320 --> 00:33:49,080
Speaker 5: That respect the Boeing or any entity. If you have

652
00:33:49,120 --> 00:33:51,400
Speaker 5: a crash of a certain type of a certain aircraft type,

653
00:33:51,440 --> 00:33:53,840
Speaker 5: a certain airline, or in a certain country, there tends

654
00:33:53,880 --> 00:33:57,200
Speaker 5: to be heightened awareness of anything happening in that same context.

655
00:33:57,240 --> 00:34:00,200
Speaker 5: So Boeing after their seven three seven Next events, there's

656
00:34:00,240 --> 00:34:03,680
Speaker 5: a heightened awareness when anything happens. For example, will falling

657
00:34:03,680 --> 00:34:06,760
Speaker 5: off an airliner happens multiple times a year around the world.

658
00:34:07,040 --> 00:34:09,400
Speaker 5: Very rarely is it national news, but if it involves

659
00:34:09,400 --> 00:34:12,680
Speaker 5: a Boeing aircraft, it's national news. Anything dealing with the

660
00:34:12,680 --> 00:34:15,920
Speaker 5: seven three seven Max. People could have a hangnail in coach,

661
00:34:16,040 --> 00:34:17,839
Speaker 5: it'll be national news if it's on the seven three

662
00:34:17,920 --> 00:34:19,880
Speaker 5: seven Max. So I got a call. This is one

663
00:34:19,920 --> 00:34:22,080
Speaker 5: of those cases where I did get a call. They said, well,

664
00:34:22,080 --> 00:34:24,120
Speaker 5: doctor Curtis, what do you think about what just happened?

665
00:34:24,280 --> 00:34:24,480
Speaker 4: Now?

666
00:34:24,480 --> 00:34:26,920
Speaker 5: About two days before, there's been a crash in Japan.

667
00:34:27,080 --> 00:34:29,440
Speaker 5: No one got killed, but it was like a spectacular crash,

668
00:34:29,480 --> 00:34:32,120
Speaker 5: everything burned up. I start talking about the Japan crashes.

669
00:34:32,280 --> 00:34:34,080
Speaker 5: Oh no, it's a seven three seven Max. It's like,

670
00:34:34,320 --> 00:34:36,640
Speaker 5: what door fell off? What are you talking about? I

671
00:34:36,680 --> 00:34:39,319
Speaker 5: look up that model of the seven three seven This

672
00:34:39,520 --> 00:34:41,480
Speaker 5: was a later model of the seven three seven. They

673
00:34:41,520 --> 00:34:44,120
Speaker 5: actually put a different door in an area of the

674
00:34:44,160 --> 00:34:46,279
Speaker 5: aircraft that wasn't on the earlier model. So it took

675
00:34:46,280 --> 00:34:47,960
Speaker 5: me like a half hour to get my head around

676
00:34:47,960 --> 00:34:50,600
Speaker 5: the fact that there's another door here. What's a plug door? Oh,

677
00:34:50,800 --> 00:34:53,480
Speaker 5: it's supposed to be an emergency exit door, unless you

678
00:34:53,520 --> 00:34:55,560
Speaker 5: don't have that many seats and you're not required to

679
00:34:55,560 --> 00:34:57,839
Speaker 5: put an emergency accept so you put what they call

680
00:34:57,880 --> 00:35:00,840
Speaker 5: a plug door. It's a simple fix, basically bolted in.

681
00:35:01,120 --> 00:35:04,839
Speaker 5: It stays there permanently. This is a no brainer technology.

682
00:35:04,880 --> 00:35:07,600
Speaker 5: I've never heard of a plug door coming out. I

683
00:35:07,680 --> 00:35:10,440
Speaker 5: called up a former NTSP board number. I said, have

684
00:35:10,520 --> 00:35:12,120
Speaker 5: you ever heard of a plug door coming off of

685
00:35:12,120 --> 00:35:14,800
Speaker 5: an aircraft? He said now, And he was a former mechanic,

686
00:35:14,800 --> 00:35:18,120
Speaker 5: he'd been working on airplanes for decades. So yeah, and

687
00:35:18,280 --> 00:35:20,520
Speaker 5: it happened to be Boeing in the seven thirty seven Max.

688
00:35:20,600 --> 00:35:24,800
Speaker 5: So everybody, rightfully so knows about this plug door. BOI

689
00:35:25,160 --> 00:35:29,440
Speaker 5: rightfully so is being taken to the woodshed and the

690
00:35:29,640 --> 00:35:33,080
Speaker 5: company was convicted of a crime, but no individuals were

691
00:35:33,560 --> 00:35:36,560
Speaker 5: So is the CEO going to jail now? Unfortunately he

692
00:35:36,560 --> 00:35:39,200
Speaker 5: has a golden parachute and he's out the door. That's

693
00:35:39,239 --> 00:35:39,680
Speaker 5: an opinion.

694
00:35:39,960 --> 00:35:43,360
Speaker 4: Yeah, no, we saw that. Yeah, absolutely, Dodd do you

695
00:35:43,360 --> 00:35:45,439
Speaker 4: you I think said as of May twenty twenty four,

696
00:35:45,560 --> 00:35:47,920
Speaker 4: the FAA and the Department Defense still do not have

697
00:35:47,960 --> 00:35:52,680
Speaker 4: a systematic or comprehensive process for collecting and organizing UAP reports.

698
00:35:53,000 --> 00:35:54,799
Speaker 4: Is that still the case, I'm assuming it is.

699
00:35:55,280 --> 00:35:58,680
Speaker 5: Let me add that there is no publicly acknowledge systematic

700
00:35:58,760 --> 00:36:02,440
Speaker 5: method methodology on the military or the National security side,

701
00:36:02,520 --> 00:36:05,240
Speaker 5: and there is definitely nothing public on the FA side.

702
00:36:05,440 --> 00:36:08,480
Speaker 5: And by systematic we're talking something as simple as what

703
00:36:08,640 --> 00:36:11,799
Speaker 5: is the definition of a UAP the military and National

704
00:36:11,880 --> 00:36:14,520
Speaker 5: security side of the house have is a working definition.

705
00:36:14,840 --> 00:36:18,520
Speaker 5: NASA actually did an independent study team back in twenty

706
00:36:18,640 --> 00:36:21,279
Speaker 5: twenty three. They published the report in twenty twenty four

707
00:36:21,600 --> 00:36:24,360
Speaker 5: where they had to generalize definition of what a UAP

708
00:36:24,600 --> 00:36:28,080
Speaker 5: is and absent one from the FAA or the NTSP,

709
00:36:28,520 --> 00:36:31,000
Speaker 5: actually put together for the purpose of the presentation, what

710
00:36:31,080 --> 00:36:35,239
Speaker 5: I think is a reasonable definition of the UAP, which would,

711
00:36:35,239 --> 00:36:38,239
Speaker 5: among other things, include a classic UFO and like I

712
00:36:38,280 --> 00:36:41,200
Speaker 5: said earlier in our discussion, a conventional aircraft and an

713
00:36:41,280 --> 00:36:47,080
Speaker 5: unconventional location or a phenomena that is simply unknown and unexplainable.

714
00:36:47,160 --> 00:36:50,440
Speaker 5: I would like them to follow something not exactly mine,

715
00:36:50,440 --> 00:36:53,880
Speaker 5: but something where it's comprehensive, it's objected. It's something where

716
00:36:54,000 --> 00:36:56,400
Speaker 5: if you're a pilot or an air traffic controller and

717
00:36:56,440 --> 00:36:58,560
Speaker 5: you see a UAP, you'd like to look up in

718
00:36:58,600 --> 00:37:00,960
Speaker 5: the REGs and say, Okay, does this fit the definition?

719
00:37:01,320 --> 00:37:01,759
Speaker 4: Yes or no?

720
00:37:02,160 --> 00:37:05,279
Speaker 5: If yes, I go reported over here that system does

721
00:37:05,320 --> 00:37:06,160
Speaker 5: not yet exist.

722
00:37:06,400 --> 00:37:09,400
Speaker 4: And you say that this information, forget all this alien

723
00:37:09,440 --> 00:37:12,719
Speaker 4: et curant whatever. You say that just compiling all this

724
00:37:12,840 --> 00:37:16,960
Speaker 4: information using that data, you're saying even old data from

725
00:37:17,000 --> 00:37:22,600
Speaker 4: fifty years ago can help us with safety in flight today. Correct. Absolutely.

726
00:37:22,719 --> 00:37:25,960
Speaker 5: Aviation safety is what I like to describe as something

727
00:37:26,000 --> 00:37:28,840
Speaker 5: that does not care about time or space. There are

728
00:37:28,920 --> 00:37:31,640
Speaker 5: events that happen almost one hundred years ago. For example,

729
00:37:31,840 --> 00:37:33,799
Speaker 5: everyone in the world has seen the famous picture of

730
00:37:33,840 --> 00:37:36,920
Speaker 5: the Zeppelin going up in Lake Hers, New Jersey, Brandenberg

731
00:37:37,120 --> 00:37:40,839
Speaker 5: Classic case, and some of the elements of that you

732
00:37:40,840 --> 00:37:42,760
Speaker 5: can still learn from today if you're in the aviation

733
00:37:42,840 --> 00:37:44,879
Speaker 5: safety business. So yes, if you have an encounter from

734
00:37:44,880 --> 00:37:47,680
Speaker 5: fifty years ago, there's certain characteristics. You have one from

735
00:37:47,680 --> 00:37:51,960
Speaker 5: fifty minutes ago. Certain characteristics are there similarities. Is there

736
00:37:52,000 --> 00:37:54,319
Speaker 5: a pattern that one should look for? And if you

737
00:37:54,400 --> 00:37:57,040
Speaker 5: had this certain pattern, does that inform you as to

738
00:37:57,120 --> 00:37:59,879
Speaker 5: what counter moves a pilot should make should they encounter

739
00:38:00,080 --> 00:38:02,960
Speaker 5: something like this. If you knew nothing about starlink, you're

740
00:38:02,960 --> 00:38:06,359
Speaker 5: flying along and you see fifty lights in a row

741
00:38:06,480 --> 00:38:09,439
Speaker 5: going across the sky above you. You're flying at thirty

742
00:38:09,480 --> 00:38:12,560
Speaker 5: thousand feet, your first thought might be, that's at fifty

743
00:38:12,600 --> 00:38:16,160
Speaker 5: thousand feet because actually, because of the speed and the

744
00:38:16,200 --> 00:38:19,680
Speaker 5: distance looks like the speed of a stratospheric airliner going over.

745
00:38:19,880 --> 00:38:22,759
Speaker 5: You say, who the heck is flying fifty airliners in

746
00:38:22,840 --> 00:38:28,759
Speaker 5: a row without reporting? For shure, So again, if no

747
00:38:28,800 --> 00:38:32,600
Speaker 5: one feels that they have the ability or we respect

748
00:38:32,640 --> 00:38:34,600
Speaker 5: it if they report this. If no one reports this,

749
00:38:35,040 --> 00:38:37,200
Speaker 5: you cannot analyze it. If you can't analyze it, you

750
00:38:37,200 --> 00:38:39,840
Speaker 5: can't make rational decisions as to what you do next.

751
00:38:39,960 --> 00:38:44,120
Speaker 5: You can't assess the risk and therefore assess the potential

752
00:38:44,200 --> 00:38:46,239
Speaker 5: safety impacts without the data.

753
00:38:46,400 --> 00:38:49,000
Speaker 4: You've mentioned these drones several times today. Do you know

754
00:38:49,000 --> 00:38:51,560
Speaker 4: where we're at with the drone technology? Because it feels

755
00:38:51,600 --> 00:38:53,640
Speaker 4: to me, like, you know, these things seem like they

756
00:38:53,640 --> 00:38:56,719
Speaker 4: could be quiet. They run on hydrogen or electric there's

757
00:38:56,760 --> 00:38:59,799
Speaker 4: different things they're proposing. It seems like we're on the

758
00:39:00,239 --> 00:39:04,040
Speaker 4: but these drones becoming more manned drones I'm talking about

759
00:39:04,200 --> 00:39:06,839
Speaker 4: coming out soon. This might lead to a whole bunch

760
00:39:06,920 --> 00:39:09,240
Speaker 4: of uaper reports because people won't know what they're seeing.

761
00:39:09,440 --> 00:39:12,359
Speaker 5: Well, for that, I recommended that people look at all

762
00:39:12,400 --> 00:39:14,600
Speaker 5: the many, many, many videos that are coming out out

763
00:39:14,640 --> 00:39:19,480
Speaker 5: of Ukraine. The evolution of drone technique and technology is

764
00:39:19,560 --> 00:39:22,000
Speaker 5: like massive going on over there. There are things that

765
00:39:22,280 --> 00:39:24,080
Speaker 5: I look at that and it's like, yeah, this is

766
00:39:24,120 --> 00:39:27,680
Speaker 5: conventional technology being used in ways that the military minds

767
00:39:27,680 --> 00:39:30,200
Speaker 5: and the Pentagon never thought of because they have to

768
00:39:30,560 --> 00:39:34,200
Speaker 5: rapidly evolve their technique and their skills in the field.

769
00:39:34,239 --> 00:39:39,040
Speaker 5: So yes, this will inform the design of future technology

770
00:39:39,320 --> 00:39:42,160
Speaker 5: and how that future technology is used. Right now today,

771
00:39:42,200 --> 00:39:44,520
Speaker 5: you or I can off the shelf, go to Amazon

772
00:39:44,600 --> 00:39:47,759
Speaker 5: get a semi autonomous drone where you can program it

773
00:39:47,840 --> 00:39:50,759
Speaker 5: to fly at certain place, take pictures and come back.

774
00:39:51,120 --> 00:39:53,480
Speaker 5: It's only a small hop, skip and a jump to

775
00:39:53,960 --> 00:39:56,480
Speaker 5: program it to do something other than take pictures. And

776
00:39:56,520 --> 00:39:58,360
Speaker 5: you see that happening in Ukraine as we speak.

777
00:39:58,560 --> 00:40:00,600
Speaker 4: I can imagine this is going to get get even

778
00:40:00,640 --> 00:40:04,000
Speaker 4: more convoluted than it is already. Before I let you go,

779
00:40:04,040 --> 00:40:06,239
Speaker 4: I definitely want to ask you about You've been in

780
00:40:06,320 --> 00:40:09,040
Speaker 4: aviation for a long time, obviously. Have you looked at

781
00:40:09,080 --> 00:40:12,680
Speaker 4: these different videos, the famous military videos that came out,

782
00:40:12,719 --> 00:40:16,480
Speaker 4: like the TikTok video, Tictac video, and the go Fast

783
00:40:16,520 --> 00:40:18,799
Speaker 4: and gimbal Have you seen those? And what are your

784
00:40:18,840 --> 00:40:19,600
Speaker 4: thoughts on those?

785
00:40:20,040 --> 00:40:22,279
Speaker 5: I have, and I sort of casually looked at them

786
00:40:22,360 --> 00:40:27,040
Speaker 5: until the military the government said yes, these are authentic

787
00:40:27,120 --> 00:40:29,640
Speaker 5: videos and we don't know what they are. It's like,

788
00:40:29,800 --> 00:40:33,600
Speaker 5: what you're acknowledging that this multi billion dollar over decades

789
00:40:33,680 --> 00:40:39,520
Speaker 5: technology caught something that you can't explain. Now, I'm really intrigued. Yes,

790
00:40:39,600 --> 00:40:43,600
Speaker 5: I have seen those and seen many others, and some

791
00:40:43,760 --> 00:40:46,160
Speaker 5: of them it's like, Okay, I've been around aviation for

792
00:40:46,200 --> 00:40:48,880
Speaker 5: a while. And in fact, when nineteen eighties, when I

793
00:40:48,880 --> 00:40:52,320
Speaker 5: was at Edwards, I was working at a test facility

794
00:40:52,600 --> 00:40:56,240
Speaker 5: where they had some of the early infrared targeting systems

795
00:40:56,239 --> 00:40:58,520
Speaker 5: for aircraft. This is like what eighty four eighty five

796
00:40:59,120 --> 00:41:02,400
Speaker 5: and crewed by today's standards, but even back then it

797
00:41:02,440 --> 00:41:05,719
Speaker 5: was like a revelation to see what this technology could do.

798
00:41:06,480 --> 00:41:09,799
Speaker 5: And again we've had forty years of improving computers and

799
00:41:09,800 --> 00:41:13,920
Speaker 5: microchips and everything else. So not just infrared, not just

800
00:41:14,040 --> 00:41:18,520
Speaker 5: visible light. You also have electromagnetic sensing systems on board aircraft.

801
00:41:18,640 --> 00:41:22,400
Speaker 5: You also have multiple platforms. You might have space based

802
00:41:22,440 --> 00:41:27,319
Speaker 5: assets combined with land based assets, and you know, in

803
00:41:27,360 --> 00:41:31,560
Speaker 5: the atmosphere assets and human eyeballs looking at the same thing.

804
00:41:31,920 --> 00:41:35,640
Speaker 5: Compiling that information and then coming to a conclusion way

805
00:41:35,719 --> 00:41:39,040
Speaker 5: more complex than just a single tic TAC video. This

806
00:41:39,080 --> 00:41:42,680
Speaker 5: happens on a daily basis. Oh wow, if something big

807
00:41:42,719 --> 00:41:47,399
Speaker 5: happens like in other Phoenix lights. Phoenix Lights was ninety seven,

808
00:41:47,960 --> 00:41:51,120
Speaker 5: Chicago's two thousand and six. This is before the iPhone era.

809
00:41:51,600 --> 00:41:54,239
Speaker 5: If it happens today, it will be like Kobe's helicopter crash.

810
00:41:54,400 --> 00:41:57,840
Speaker 5: You have all kinds of dor cams, you know, audio crams,

811
00:41:58,280 --> 00:42:00,399
Speaker 5: you can go on the flight tracking system and flight

812
00:42:00,440 --> 00:42:03,719
Speaker 5: the track. We'll have more information you can shake a

813
00:42:03,760 --> 00:42:04,200
Speaker 5: stick at.

814
00:42:04,239 --> 00:42:06,880
Speaker 4: So if something I think about that now and Roswell happened,

815
00:42:06,920 --> 00:42:10,080
Speaker 4: nobody had a camera and nobody knew it. Now, my god,

816
00:42:10,280 --> 00:42:12,040
Speaker 4: I think if something did happen, we're going to have

817
00:42:12,080 --> 00:42:15,120
Speaker 4: a lot of footage. Oh yeah, wow, Well we're gonna

818
00:42:15,120 --> 00:42:17,600
Speaker 4: have to stop there, Todd, I really really appreciate it.

819
00:42:17,600 --> 00:42:19,839
Speaker 4: I really enjoyed talking to you about this stuff. So

820
00:42:20,040 --> 00:42:23,120
Speaker 4: thanks for coming on. Well, thanks for having me absolutely brother,

821
00:42:23,520 --> 00:42:25,600
Speaker 4: Thanks for listening to Beyond Contact. We're going to be

822
00:42:25,640 --> 00:42:27,719
Speaker 4: back next week with an all new episode. You can

823
00:42:27,719 --> 00:42:31,319
Speaker 4: follow me Captain Ron on Twitter and Instagram at CID

824
00:42:31,560 --> 00:42:35,080
Speaker 4: Underscore Captain Ron. Stay connected by checking out Contact intheesert

825
00:42:35,080 --> 00:42:38,320
Speaker 4: dot com. Stay open minded and rational as we explore

826
00:42:38,360 --> 00:42:40,840
Speaker 4: the unknown right here on the iHeartRadio and Coast to

827
00:42:40,880 --> 00:42:43,000
Speaker 4: Coast am Paranormal Podcast Network.

828
00:42:51,520 --> 00:42:54,040
Speaker 1: Thanks for listening to the iHeartRadio and Coast to Coast

829
00:42:54,120 --> 00:42:57,120
Speaker 1: Day and Paranormal Podcast Network. Make sure and check out

830
00:42:57,160 --> 00:43:00,520
Speaker 1: all our shows on the iHeartRadio app by going to

831
00:43:00,600 --> 00:43:06,759
Speaker 1: iHeartRadio dot com.

832
00:43:06,840 --> 00:43:07,279
Speaker 6: Mm hmm