1 00:00:05,040 --> 00:00:09,280 Speaker 1: Why do we have the experience of being conscious? Can 2 00:00:09,320 --> 00:00:12,840 Speaker 1: you build consciousness just by putting together lots of neurons 3 00:00:12,840 --> 00:00:17,320 Speaker 1: in the right way, or might there be deeper principles 4 00:00:17,360 --> 00:00:21,160 Speaker 1: at work. Could quantum physics have something to do with 5 00:00:21,200 --> 00:00:25,600 Speaker 1: the brain and specifically with consciousness. Is it possible that 6 00:00:25,680 --> 00:00:30,280 Speaker 1: consciousness is actually something that predates biology and there's a 7 00:00:30,360 --> 00:00:33,320 Speaker 1: sense in which biology evolved to take. 8 00:00:33,200 --> 00:00:34,120 Speaker 2: Advantage of it. 9 00:00:34,280 --> 00:00:37,000 Speaker 1: And what are the right ways to make new theories 10 00:00:37,000 --> 00:00:41,640 Speaker 1: in neuroscience when we don't know the answers. 11 00:00:42,720 --> 00:00:45,000 Speaker 2: Welcome to Inner Cosmos with me David Eagelman. 12 00:00:45,159 --> 00:00:48,000 Speaker 1: I'm a neuroscientist and author at Stanford and in these 13 00:00:48,040 --> 00:00:52,120 Speaker 1: episodes we sail deeply into our three pound universe to 14 00:00:52,280 --> 00:01:11,000 Speaker 1: uncover some of the most surprising aspects of our lives. 15 00:01:12,120 --> 00:01:17,160 Speaker 1: Today's episode is about consciousness and quantum mechanics and the 16 00:01:17,319 --> 00:01:21,600 Speaker 1: question of whether there could be even possibly. 17 00:01:21,440 --> 00:01:23,000 Speaker 2: Any connection between them. 18 00:01:23,560 --> 00:01:25,560 Speaker 1: So to get at this, I'll be talking today with 19 00:01:25,920 --> 00:01:30,360 Speaker 1: Roger Penrose, mathematical physicist and polymath and winner of the 20 00:01:30,400 --> 00:01:34,640 Speaker 1: twenty twenty Nobel Prize in Physics, and also Stuart Hammeroff, 21 00:01:34,680 --> 00:01:38,840 Speaker 1: an anesthesiologist who has collaborated with Penrose for many years 22 00:01:38,880 --> 00:01:42,200 Speaker 1: on a theory. Before we dive into those interviews, I 23 00:01:42,280 --> 00:01:44,640 Speaker 1: want to set the table by saying that what we're 24 00:01:44,640 --> 00:01:47,800 Speaker 1: going to talk about today are speculative ideas, and many 25 00:01:47,880 --> 00:01:50,520 Speaker 1: neuroscientists don't even like to go near them. 26 00:01:50,840 --> 00:01:53,960 Speaker 2: But the fact is that despite the thousands. 27 00:01:53,440 --> 00:01:59,200 Speaker 1: Of neuroscience journals and textbooks and laboratories, there are still fundamental, 28 00:01:59,360 --> 00:02:02,640 Speaker 1: basic questions that we don't know the answer to. And 29 00:02:02,640 --> 00:02:06,360 Speaker 1: one of the most fundamental is the question of consciousness. 30 00:02:06,400 --> 00:02:11,080 Speaker 1: Why does anything feel like something? In other words, imagine 31 00:02:11,320 --> 00:02:14,080 Speaker 1: that you built a little toy out of pulleys and 32 00:02:14,160 --> 00:02:15,280 Speaker 1: levers and switches. 33 00:02:15,840 --> 00:02:18,000 Speaker 2: Would you say that it is conscious? 34 00:02:18,240 --> 00:02:22,600 Speaker 1: Presumably you wouldn't now double your little toy in size 35 00:02:22,639 --> 00:02:25,960 Speaker 1: with new levers and switches and pulleys. Is it conscious? 36 00:02:26,000 --> 00:02:26,240 Speaker 2: Now? 37 00:02:26,880 --> 00:02:30,240 Speaker 1: There's no particular it's theoretical reason to think. So now 38 00:02:30,320 --> 00:02:33,200 Speaker 1: keep adding to it. Put on another pulley, in another lever, 39 00:02:33,320 --> 00:02:36,519 Speaker 1: and another little door, and attach a wheel, and keep 40 00:02:36,560 --> 00:02:39,680 Speaker 1: doing this until you fill a room and then a stadium. 41 00:02:40,240 --> 00:02:42,880 Speaker 1: Do you have any reason to assume that it becomes 42 00:02:43,360 --> 00:02:48,480 Speaker 1: conscious and has internal experience just because it's more and 43 00:02:48,480 --> 00:02:52,680 Speaker 1: more complex. If you now remove a pulley, does it 44 00:02:53,000 --> 00:02:56,920 Speaker 1: feel pain. And if you put a little molecular detector 45 00:02:56,960 --> 00:02:59,760 Speaker 1: on it such that it can recognize molecules of different 46 00:02:59,760 --> 00:03:05,440 Speaker 1: shit apes, does it have a different experience like displeasure 47 00:03:05,520 --> 00:03:09,520 Speaker 1: for some shapes and pleasure for other shapes, And where 48 00:03:09,639 --> 00:03:13,920 Speaker 1: is that happening. I certainly wouldn't think that your giant 49 00:03:13,960 --> 00:03:16,440 Speaker 1: toy is conscious, or at least let me say that, 50 00:03:16,480 --> 00:03:20,240 Speaker 1: I have no theoretical reason to believe that it suddenly 51 00:03:20,320 --> 00:03:26,760 Speaker 1: experiences pain or hunger or longing or pleasure, because it's 52 00:03:26,840 --> 00:03:30,560 Speaker 1: just pieces and parts. So this is a fundamental question 53 00:03:30,600 --> 00:03:34,720 Speaker 1: about the brain. We look at your eighty six billion neurons, 54 00:03:34,880 --> 00:03:38,280 Speaker 1: which are generally thought of, especially now in this era 55 00:03:38,400 --> 00:03:42,040 Speaker 1: of AI, as being units that are popping either on 56 00:03:42,200 --> 00:03:44,600 Speaker 1: or off one or zero. And so it's not clear 57 00:03:44,600 --> 00:03:48,160 Speaker 1: to any of us in neuroscience why we have private 58 00:03:48,360 --> 00:03:51,840 Speaker 1: subjective experience. And this is true whether you have eighty 59 00:03:51,880 --> 00:03:54,880 Speaker 1: six neurons or eighty six billion or eighty six gajillion 60 00:03:54,960 --> 00:03:58,280 Speaker 1: of them. Why do these little electrical signals and chemical 61 00:03:58,320 --> 00:04:03,160 Speaker 1: releases give us the the experience of eating a lemon, 62 00:04:03,360 --> 00:04:07,040 Speaker 1: or the pleasure of an orgasm, or the pain of 63 00:04:07,120 --> 00:04:12,600 Speaker 1: stubbing your toe. Now, we don't know the answer. But 64 00:04:12,680 --> 00:04:16,960 Speaker 1: here's a speculation that some people have put forward. Could consciousness, 65 00:04:17,360 --> 00:04:22,760 Speaker 1: the most intimate, subjective, elusive feature of our existence, have 66 00:04:23,000 --> 00:04:26,760 Speaker 1: something to do with quantum physics. Now, this is not 67 00:04:26,800 --> 00:04:30,040 Speaker 1: a mainstream idea in neuroscience. You're not going to find 68 00:04:30,080 --> 00:04:34,920 Speaker 1: it in the standard textbooks most cognitive scientists, if asked 69 00:04:35,040 --> 00:04:40,040 Speaker 1: to explain consciousness, we'll talk about neurons and synapses and 70 00:04:40,120 --> 00:04:44,840 Speaker 1: the emergent properties of complex systems. The language will be 71 00:04:45,200 --> 00:04:50,719 Speaker 1: biological and electrochemical and computational. But a few scientists have 72 00:04:50,800 --> 00:04:54,559 Speaker 1: suggested a hypothesis that there's something deeper going on, something 73 00:04:54,680 --> 00:04:57,320 Speaker 1: much stranger, and that's what we're going to explore today. 74 00:04:58,120 --> 00:05:02,599 Speaker 1: I'm not presenting an argument that auto mechanics does explain consciousness, 75 00:05:02,600 --> 00:05:06,000 Speaker 1: but it's worth understanding why some serious minds are entertaining 76 00:05:06,080 --> 00:05:10,080 Speaker 1: the hypothesis. So we'll begin with Roger Penrose, who is 77 00:05:10,360 --> 00:05:14,000 Speaker 1: perhaps an unexpected figure in this conversation because he's not 78 00:05:14,040 --> 00:05:18,400 Speaker 1: a neuroscientist. He's a mathematical physicist. He's done so many 79 00:05:18,400 --> 00:05:22,159 Speaker 1: amazing things in his career. He worked with Stephen Hawking 80 00:05:22,320 --> 00:05:25,360 Speaker 1: on black hole singularities, or he might know him for 81 00:05:25,440 --> 00:05:29,279 Speaker 1: his geometrical shapes called Penrose tiles. And you certainly know 82 00:05:29,360 --> 00:05:31,640 Speaker 1: him because in twenty twenty he won the Nobel Prize 83 00:05:31,640 --> 00:05:36,200 Speaker 1: in physics for showing that black holes result naturally from 84 00:05:36,240 --> 00:05:39,400 Speaker 1: Einstein's general theory of relativity. And by the way, he's 85 00:05:39,440 --> 00:05:43,640 Speaker 1: also the one who mathematically described black holes in detail, 86 00:05:43,839 --> 00:05:48,520 Speaker 1: including their singularity where all known laws of nature dissolve. 87 00:05:48,680 --> 00:05:49,560 Speaker 2: But especially in. 88 00:05:49,520 --> 00:05:53,159 Speaker 1: The nineteen eighties and nineties, Roger Penrose turned his attention 89 00:05:53,640 --> 00:05:56,320 Speaker 1: toward the brain, not because he wanted to build a 90 00:05:56,320 --> 00:05:59,679 Speaker 1: better theory about cognition, but because he had a concern 91 00:05:59,680 --> 00:06:05,680 Speaker 1: about out algorithms. Penrose felt that consciousness just can't be 92 00:06:05,800 --> 00:06:09,320 Speaker 1: explained by any rule based system. He pointed to an 93 00:06:09,320 --> 00:06:13,640 Speaker 1: idea called Girdle's incompleteness theorem, which said, look, there are 94 00:06:13,760 --> 00:06:16,640 Speaker 1: mathematical truths that we can see to be true, but 95 00:06:16,720 --> 00:06:21,000 Speaker 1: they can't be proven within mathematics. In other words, there 96 00:06:21,000 --> 00:06:23,520 Speaker 1: are many systems where we can see things to be true, 97 00:06:23,520 --> 00:06:26,520 Speaker 1: but the system itself can't prove them. You need to 98 00:06:26,560 --> 00:06:30,400 Speaker 1: somehow step outside of the system. Now, to Penrose, this 99 00:06:30,520 --> 00:06:35,159 Speaker 1: was a sign that human understanding operates in a way 100 00:06:35,600 --> 00:06:40,719 Speaker 1: that transcends computation. In other words, he said, brains aren't 101 00:06:40,800 --> 00:06:44,680 Speaker 1: just computers, and if they're not just computers, then the 102 00:06:44,720 --> 00:06:49,039 Speaker 1: mystery of consciousness might demand a different kind of physics. 103 00:06:49,400 --> 00:06:52,920 Speaker 1: So he wrote a very interesting book called The Emperor's 104 00:06:53,080 --> 00:06:57,760 Speaker 1: New Mind, which asserted that the brain can't just be 105 00:06:57,880 --> 00:07:01,320 Speaker 1: a computer. So in your Book's New Mind, which I 106 00:07:01,400 --> 00:07:05,120 Speaker 1: read as a young person and really loved, so you 107 00:07:05,560 --> 00:07:09,440 Speaker 1: argue that consciousness can't be explained by algorithms. 108 00:07:10,080 --> 00:07:11,840 Speaker 2: So help us to understand that. 109 00:07:12,240 --> 00:07:14,640 Speaker 3: But it really means, you see, an algorithm is just 110 00:07:14,640 --> 00:07:17,840 Speaker 3: the sort of technical word for a computer program. I 111 00:07:17,840 --> 00:07:20,360 Speaker 3: feel like maybe people use that term. It just means 112 00:07:20,400 --> 00:07:24,520 Speaker 3: that you have a rule which is a computational rule. 113 00:07:25,080 --> 00:07:28,679 Speaker 1: Right, And why what made you feel that consciousness can't 114 00:07:28,720 --> 00:07:30,360 Speaker 1: be explained by algorithms? 115 00:07:30,600 --> 00:07:33,400 Speaker 3: Well, it goes back to the Girdle the lecture that 116 00:07:33,520 --> 00:07:38,080 Speaker 3: Stein gave about Girdles theorem. And I realized that you see, 117 00:07:38,080 --> 00:07:42,960 Speaker 3: if you see mathematical proof, you could have a set 118 00:07:42,960 --> 00:07:48,360 Speaker 3: of rules, axioms and rules of procedure. These are of 119 00:07:48,520 --> 00:07:50,560 Speaker 3: a nature that you could put them on a computer. 120 00:07:51,080 --> 00:07:56,400 Speaker 1: You think there are forms of human insight that fundamentally 121 00:07:56,400 --> 00:07:59,800 Speaker 1: cannot be replicated by algorithms. 122 00:08:00,480 --> 00:08:01,480 Speaker 2: Is that that's correct. 123 00:08:01,720 --> 00:08:03,840 Speaker 3: Okay, yes, absolutely right. 124 00:08:03,680 --> 00:08:06,160 Speaker 1: Okay, great, and so and so that made you think 125 00:08:06,160 --> 00:08:10,600 Speaker 1: that maybe this mystery of consciousness needed to be taken 126 00:08:10,720 --> 00:08:16,680 Speaker 1: seriously by physicists and mathematicians. So, yes, So how did 127 00:08:16,760 --> 00:08:19,440 Speaker 1: you how did you start addressing this? 128 00:08:20,080 --> 00:08:21,960 Speaker 3: I was trying to think about the laws of physics 129 00:08:23,240 --> 00:08:28,000 Speaker 3: that we sort of understand, and some of them are 130 00:08:28,160 --> 00:08:32,280 Speaker 3: very powerful. Well, even you turn in mechanics explains an 131 00:08:32,280 --> 00:08:38,000 Speaker 3: awful lot and science general theory of relativity explains a 132 00:08:38,000 --> 00:08:42,440 Speaker 3: lot more, and it's more difficult to apply things, but 133 00:08:42,480 --> 00:08:45,440 Speaker 3: it's still computational. What about quantum mechanics? 134 00:08:45,640 --> 00:08:47,360 Speaker 1: Now, before we go further, I just want to give 135 00:08:47,400 --> 00:08:51,120 Speaker 1: a reminder about what quantum physics is. It's the branch 136 00:08:51,120 --> 00:08:54,720 Speaker 1: of physics that describes the behavior of matter and energy 137 00:08:54,840 --> 00:08:58,479 Speaker 1: at the smallest possible scales, at the level of atoms 138 00:08:58,600 --> 00:09:03,880 Speaker 1: and subatomic particles, and down there the world behaves nothing 139 00:09:04,000 --> 00:09:07,439 Speaker 1: like what we're used to. Particles can be in more 140 00:09:07,520 --> 00:09:10,800 Speaker 1: than one place at once. This is what's known as superposition. 141 00:09:11,080 --> 00:09:16,600 Speaker 1: Particles can become mysteriously linked across space in what's called entanglement. 142 00:09:17,160 --> 00:09:19,559 Speaker 1: And the most bizarre feature of all is that the 143 00:09:19,600 --> 00:09:24,240 Speaker 1: mere act of measuring a system seems to affect its outcome. 144 00:09:24,400 --> 00:09:27,600 Speaker 1: This is what's called the observer effect. In our current 145 00:09:27,679 --> 00:09:31,760 Speaker 1: understanding of quantum mechanics, the story is that until a 146 00:09:31,880 --> 00:09:36,680 Speaker 1: particle is observed, its properties don't exist in a definite way. 147 00:09:36,720 --> 00:09:38,760 Speaker 2: They exist only in probabilities. 148 00:09:39,160 --> 00:09:42,560 Speaker 1: In other words, a quantum particle doesn't have a precise 149 00:09:42,640 --> 00:09:46,200 Speaker 1: location until you look at it. Until that moment, it's 150 00:09:46,559 --> 00:09:51,200 Speaker 1: smeared across a range of possibilities, and then those possibilities 151 00:09:51,679 --> 00:09:55,720 Speaker 1: collapse to one outcome when you observe. Now, this isn't 152 00:09:55,760 --> 00:09:59,120 Speaker 1: just a metaphor. This general idea has been tested and 153 00:09:59,320 --> 00:10:02,679 Speaker 1: confirmed for over a century, and it's built into the 154 00:10:02,720 --> 00:10:06,800 Speaker 1: fabric of our technology. Quantum mechanics is the science that 155 00:10:07,040 --> 00:10:10,880 Speaker 1: allows the transistors in your cell phone, and the lasers 156 00:10:10,880 --> 00:10:14,439 Speaker 1: at the grocery store scanners and the GPS in your car. 157 00:10:14,840 --> 00:10:18,520 Speaker 1: Quantum mechanics is real, and it's very countereteitive, and it 158 00:10:18,559 --> 00:10:21,199 Speaker 1: seems to tell us that at the heart of reality 159 00:10:21,640 --> 00:10:26,640 Speaker 1: is a kind of indeterminacy, a fuzziness that only collapses 160 00:10:26,679 --> 00:10:31,160 Speaker 1: into certainty when it's observed. So think of it roughly 161 00:10:31,200 --> 00:10:33,800 Speaker 1: this way. You toss a coin in the air and 162 00:10:33,920 --> 00:10:37,040 Speaker 1: while it's spinning. It's not heads or tails. It's sort 163 00:10:37,080 --> 00:10:39,560 Speaker 1: of like it's both at once, but the instant you 164 00:10:39,800 --> 00:10:44,560 Speaker 1: catch it and look, it becomes just one heads or tails. 165 00:10:45,040 --> 00:10:48,640 Speaker 1: That moment of catching it is like the wave function collapsing. 166 00:10:48,800 --> 00:10:50,679 Speaker 2: Now here's the thing. In quantum mechanics. 167 00:10:50,720 --> 00:10:53,320 Speaker 1: There's no way to predict what the coin's going to be, 168 00:10:53,480 --> 00:10:59,160 Speaker 1: heads or tails, and so that non computable strangeness, that's 169 00:10:59,200 --> 00:11:04,520 Speaker 1: what Penrose was interested in. He wondered, what if that indeterminacy, 170 00:11:04,559 --> 00:11:09,120 Speaker 1: that collapse of possibilities into one real outcome, wasn't just 171 00:11:09,240 --> 00:11:13,120 Speaker 1: a physical process but also has to do with a 172 00:11:13,200 --> 00:11:16,360 Speaker 1: mental one. In other words, what if the flicker of 173 00:11:16,600 --> 00:11:20,680 Speaker 1: consciousness is related in some way to the collapse of 174 00:11:20,720 --> 00:11:41,280 Speaker 1: the quantum wave function. So back to Penrose talking about 175 00:11:41,320 --> 00:11:45,600 Speaker 1: his search for something non computable and getting interested in 176 00:11:45,640 --> 00:11:46,559 Speaker 1: the collapse. 177 00:11:46,960 --> 00:11:49,319 Speaker 3: What about quantum mechanics? Then I thought, wow, I was 178 00:11:49,360 --> 00:11:51,800 Speaker 3: shruding no equation, that has no problem about putting that 179 00:11:51,880 --> 00:11:55,640 Speaker 3: on there. Maybe lots of parameters involved, it's make it tricky. Well, 180 00:11:55,840 --> 00:11:58,360 Speaker 3: that's a well determined determined It is a good question. 181 00:12:00,080 --> 00:12:03,439 Speaker 3: Roading equation doesn't give you what happens in the world. 182 00:12:03,760 --> 00:12:06,680 Speaker 3: Why doesn't it give you what happens. Schrodering himself was 183 00:12:06,800 --> 00:12:10,920 Speaker 3: very keen on explaining these things and his well known cat. 184 00:12:11,360 --> 00:12:14,640 Speaker 3: He was making this is an absurdity. To have a 185 00:12:14,679 --> 00:12:16,720 Speaker 3: cat which is dead and alive at the same time 186 00:12:17,080 --> 00:12:20,679 Speaker 3: is a nonsense. This is point of what he was 187 00:12:20,720 --> 00:12:23,280 Speaker 3: trying to make. He was saying, this is an absurdity. 188 00:12:24,000 --> 00:12:27,480 Speaker 3: His equation he was trying to say. He was saying, 189 00:12:27,840 --> 00:12:32,080 Speaker 3: roughly speaking, my equation does not describe reality. There is 190 00:12:32,120 --> 00:12:36,320 Speaker 3: something more. And this something more is what we tend 191 00:12:36,400 --> 00:12:38,960 Speaker 3: to call the collapse of the wave function. You're a 192 00:12:39,000 --> 00:12:42,480 Speaker 3: wave function drugs along and behaves according to the Schroding 193 00:12:42,600 --> 00:12:47,240 Speaker 3: equation very reliably and honestly, and then from now time 194 00:12:47,280 --> 00:12:49,760 Speaker 3: to time it says, whoops, I'm going to do something else, 195 00:12:50,559 --> 00:12:54,240 Speaker 3: and then it becomes probabilistic, and it's all hidden in 196 00:12:54,280 --> 00:12:58,160 Speaker 3: all sorts of man and manical schemes. 197 00:12:58,360 --> 00:13:04,200 Speaker 1: So you mean is that classical computation can't explain consciousness, 198 00:13:04,679 --> 00:13:07,800 Speaker 1: and so the question is then what can? And this 199 00:13:07,840 --> 00:13:11,760 Speaker 1: is where you make the fascinating proposal that quantum mechanics, 200 00:13:11,760 --> 00:13:15,760 Speaker 1: and specifically the collapse of the wave function, might be 201 00:13:15,880 --> 00:13:17,640 Speaker 1: involved in consciousness. 202 00:13:17,880 --> 00:13:20,160 Speaker 3: See people say sometimes I'm just not say, well, here's 203 00:13:20,160 --> 00:13:22,319 Speaker 3: the problem, and here's a problem. So they're the same thing. 204 00:13:22,600 --> 00:13:25,920 Speaker 3: It's not that it's that we need something which is 205 00:13:26,000 --> 00:13:28,880 Speaker 3: not a computable part of physics. What is it in 206 00:13:28,960 --> 00:13:32,160 Speaker 3: the physics that we know it would not be possible 207 00:13:32,160 --> 00:13:34,760 Speaker 3: to put on a computer. Well, you see, if the 208 00:13:34,760 --> 00:13:38,360 Speaker 3: collapse of the wave function is purely random, then you 209 00:13:38,559 --> 00:13:42,040 Speaker 3: could put it on a computer source off. And it's 210 00:13:42,080 --> 00:13:46,560 Speaker 3: not perhaps really random, it's something very subtle, and you 211 00:13:46,720 --> 00:13:50,000 Speaker 3: need that for the collapse of the wave function. And 212 00:13:50,320 --> 00:13:53,559 Speaker 3: the story has developed in other ways beyond what I had. 213 00:13:53,559 --> 00:13:55,679 Speaker 3: Then you see, this was the beginning of the story, 214 00:13:55,679 --> 00:13:58,200 Speaker 3: and you're asking me about the beginning. The beginning was 215 00:13:58,240 --> 00:14:00,839 Speaker 3: the story. It was a little bit in the sense 216 00:14:00,920 --> 00:14:03,400 Speaker 3: that I didn't know really much about what to do. 217 00:14:04,000 --> 00:14:08,079 Speaker 3: I could see that in according to my new point, 218 00:14:08,360 --> 00:14:12,360 Speaker 3: the collapse of the wave function had to be a 219 00:14:12,440 --> 00:14:18,439 Speaker 3: major part of the physics which is responsible for evoking consciousness. 220 00:14:18,559 --> 00:14:21,640 Speaker 1: So to summarize where we are, Roger felt certain that 221 00:14:21,680 --> 00:14:27,120 Speaker 1: consciousness couldn't be explained just by classical computation. Again, most 222 00:14:27,120 --> 00:14:30,000 Speaker 1: of quantum mechanics you can easily model on a computer, 223 00:14:30,280 --> 00:14:33,600 Speaker 1: like the evolution of the Schrodinger wave function, but there's 224 00:14:33,640 --> 00:14:37,040 Speaker 1: something very weird about the collapse. That's the part you 225 00:14:37,080 --> 00:14:41,120 Speaker 1: can't compute. So Roger felt he was onto something interesting there. 226 00:14:41,280 --> 00:14:43,920 Speaker 1: So he sat down and wrote The Emperor's New Mind, 227 00:14:44,160 --> 00:14:46,760 Speaker 1: and the title, as you might guess, was a reference 228 00:14:46,800 --> 00:14:51,080 Speaker 1: to the story of the Emperor's New Clothes. The idea 229 00:14:51,160 --> 00:14:55,880 Speaker 1: being that everyone is assuming we can explain consciousness by 230 00:14:56,120 --> 00:14:59,600 Speaker 1: putting together enough neurons, but in fact, in his view, 231 00:14:59,640 --> 00:15:04,520 Speaker 1: the burr is naked consciousness possibly can't be explained by 232 00:15:04,680 --> 00:15:07,400 Speaker 1: just a bunch of neurons. So I asked Roger what 233 00:15:07,560 --> 00:15:10,960 Speaker 1: happened just after he published the book In nineteen eighty nine, 234 00:15:11,080 --> 00:15:11,680 Speaker 1: I wrote. 235 00:15:11,440 --> 00:15:14,840 Speaker 3: My book Them Prisoner Mind and hoping some young people 236 00:15:14,920 --> 00:15:17,360 Speaker 3: might be stimulating, and only got old retired people. I 237 00:15:17,440 --> 00:15:19,160 Speaker 3: thought I'd done lo It was sort of a fairly 238 00:15:19,240 --> 00:15:22,600 Speaker 3: reasonable job as an ignoramus, but not too bad at 239 00:15:22,600 --> 00:15:27,600 Speaker 3: a job of trying to learn the main features of neurophysiology. 240 00:15:27,720 --> 00:15:30,280 Speaker 1: So Roger started studying up on the brain, really as 241 00:15:30,320 --> 00:15:32,800 Speaker 1: a side gig to his mathematical physics career. But the 242 00:15:32,840 --> 00:15:35,239 Speaker 1: more he looked at it, he thought that maybe the 243 00:15:35,280 --> 00:15:38,040 Speaker 1: macro level at which we were able to study. 244 00:15:38,080 --> 00:15:41,040 Speaker 2: The brain wasn't really revealing its secrets. 245 00:15:41,240 --> 00:15:46,520 Speaker 3: And I would say that it has a genuine, deep purpose, 246 00:15:47,960 --> 00:15:51,960 Speaker 3: and that purpose is not clearly revealed in the structures. 247 00:15:52,040 --> 00:15:55,560 Speaker 3: But it's not something which is obviously like a computer. 248 00:15:56,240 --> 00:15:58,360 Speaker 3: Something else going on. But I didn't know what was 249 00:15:58,360 --> 00:16:00,480 Speaker 3: going on. I had no real idea by the time 250 00:16:00,520 --> 00:16:02,000 Speaker 3: I got to the end of my own presuming but 251 00:16:02,160 --> 00:16:05,080 Speaker 3: I just I might. I could have stopped writing in 252 00:16:05,160 --> 00:16:06,880 Speaker 3: this point, and I said, well, that's I've written so 253 00:16:06,960 --> 00:16:07,480 Speaker 3: much so far. 254 00:16:07,560 --> 00:16:08,320 Speaker 2: I better go on. 255 00:16:09,080 --> 00:16:11,120 Speaker 3: And so I'm more or less sort of some idea 256 00:16:11,120 --> 00:16:14,160 Speaker 3: which I didn't really believe. I tried to think of 257 00:16:14,200 --> 00:16:16,360 Speaker 3: something that might be non computable, you see. 258 00:16:16,480 --> 00:16:19,160 Speaker 2: So that's where things were for Rogers' idea. 259 00:16:19,280 --> 00:16:22,560 Speaker 1: He suspected there must be some kind of quantum effects 260 00:16:22,560 --> 00:16:24,560 Speaker 1: in the brain, but he didn't know where to look. 261 00:16:24,800 --> 00:16:27,280 Speaker 1: But at the same time, in America, there was a 262 00:16:27,320 --> 00:16:32,680 Speaker 1: young antesthesiologist named Stuart Hammeroff who was interested in consciousness. 263 00:16:32,720 --> 00:16:35,600 Speaker 4: And I got interested in consciousness, and I went to 264 00:16:35,640 --> 00:16:39,560 Speaker 4: med school and was interested in neurology, neurosurgery, psychiatry. But 265 00:16:39,600 --> 00:16:43,280 Speaker 4: I didn't like those lifestyles, particularly what they got to do. 266 00:16:43,320 --> 00:16:45,640 Speaker 4: They didn't actually get to do the surgency, but the 267 00:16:45,680 --> 00:16:49,320 Speaker 4: neurologists in particularly didn't have much to do. And I 268 00:16:49,360 --> 00:16:53,000 Speaker 4: took a research elective over summer in a cancer lab 269 00:16:53,040 --> 00:16:55,160 Speaker 4: and studied my toasters. I figured just try something different, 270 00:16:55,600 --> 00:16:58,960 Speaker 4: and so we uh studying cell division. And as you know, 271 00:16:59,040 --> 00:17:02,760 Speaker 4: the cell divide, the chromosomes are separated by these spindles, 272 00:17:02,760 --> 00:17:03,920 Speaker 4: which are microtubules. 273 00:17:04,160 --> 00:17:05,400 Speaker 2: That's Stuart hammer Off. 274 00:17:05,720 --> 00:17:08,880 Speaker 1: And while everyone in that lab was interested in the chromosomes, 275 00:17:08,880 --> 00:17:13,440 Speaker 1: where the genes are, he found himself interested in the microtubules. Now, 276 00:17:13,480 --> 00:17:17,120 Speaker 1: what are microtubules. The starting point here is that all 277 00:17:17,160 --> 00:17:19,760 Speaker 1: the cells in the brain, like neurons and glial cells, 278 00:17:20,080 --> 00:17:24,080 Speaker 1: are not empty. Inside every single brain cell is a 279 00:17:24,280 --> 00:17:27,760 Speaker 1: bustling inner world. You've got all kinds of structures that 280 00:17:27,840 --> 00:17:31,719 Speaker 1: help the cell keep its shape and transport materials around. 281 00:17:31,920 --> 00:17:36,880 Speaker 1: And among these structures are microtubules, which are tiny hollow tubes. 282 00:17:37,080 --> 00:17:40,520 Speaker 1: They're part of the cells skeleton. Sometimes people think of 283 00:17:40,560 --> 00:17:44,240 Speaker 1: these like the tracks that guide packages through a warehouse. 284 00:17:44,800 --> 00:17:47,960 Speaker 1: Now these are very very tiny. Each microtubule is about 285 00:17:48,280 --> 00:17:52,080 Speaker 1: twenty five nanometers in diameter, which means you can line 286 00:17:52,160 --> 00:17:54,840 Speaker 1: up four thousand of them across the width of a 287 00:17:54,920 --> 00:17:58,080 Speaker 1: single human hair, and they're long too, so they stretch 288 00:17:58,200 --> 00:18:02,040 Speaker 1: like tiny straws all through the interior of the neuron. 289 00:18:02,240 --> 00:18:06,240 Speaker 1: Now what's amazing is these are constantly assembling and disassembling themselves, 290 00:18:06,280 --> 00:18:11,080 Speaker 1: almost like living legos, and this adjusts the internal architecture 291 00:18:11,119 --> 00:18:15,200 Speaker 1: of the cell in real time. So Stuart got interested 292 00:18:15,280 --> 00:18:18,640 Speaker 1: in these microtubules and wondered if they were more than 293 00:18:18,840 --> 00:18:20,680 Speaker 1: just railroad tracks. 294 00:18:20,720 --> 00:18:21,760 Speaker 2: Back to Stuart Well. 295 00:18:21,680 --> 00:18:24,640 Speaker 4: Micro teams are found in all cells, including neurons, which 296 00:18:24,680 --> 00:18:27,120 Speaker 4: are full of them, and they are like the skeleton 297 00:18:27,800 --> 00:18:30,040 Speaker 4: and the scaffolding on the cell, but they're also the 298 00:18:30,080 --> 00:18:33,280 Speaker 4: nervous system of the cell. They organize things, and their 299 00:18:33,320 --> 00:18:36,080 Speaker 4: structure I learned back then is a lattice kind of 300 00:18:36,119 --> 00:18:39,720 Speaker 4: like a computer lattice, where you have individual units proteins 301 00:18:39,720 --> 00:18:43,440 Speaker 4: called turbulence that I thought back then can be in 302 00:18:43,480 --> 00:18:47,880 Speaker 4: two states, like flexing like a peanut open and closed, 303 00:18:48,080 --> 00:18:49,760 Speaker 4: and that would be like a bit at one or zero. 304 00:18:49,960 --> 00:18:52,920 Speaker 1: So Hammerff is looking carefully at these and he proposed 305 00:18:53,200 --> 00:18:57,239 Speaker 1: that microtubules might be doing something beyond structural work, that 306 00:18:57,480 --> 00:19:01,240 Speaker 1: instead of just looking at the microtubule as a roadway, 307 00:19:01,560 --> 00:19:05,159 Speaker 1: you might think about the details of the microtubules and 308 00:19:05,320 --> 00:19:08,679 Speaker 1: ask whether this could be a structure that was a 309 00:19:08,680 --> 00:19:11,800 Speaker 1: lot more interesting than it first appeared. So he started 310 00:19:11,880 --> 00:19:15,560 Speaker 1: modeling tubulens, the little bricks of microtubules, and came to 311 00:19:15,600 --> 00:19:18,480 Speaker 1: the conclusion that you could store something like ten to 312 00:19:18,520 --> 00:19:23,440 Speaker 1: the sixteenth bits of information in a single neuron using microtubules. 313 00:19:23,680 --> 00:19:25,880 Speaker 1: And this was essentially the number that people were talking 314 00:19:25,960 --> 00:19:28,760 Speaker 1: about for the storage capacity of the entire brain. 315 00:19:29,440 --> 00:19:31,520 Speaker 2: Now, his colleagues were skeptical. They didn't want to hear it. 316 00:19:31,520 --> 00:19:32,359 Speaker 2: Tell me to get lost. 317 00:19:32,920 --> 00:19:36,480 Speaker 4: So except then one day, fateful day, this guy said 318 00:19:36,520 --> 00:19:39,040 Speaker 4: to me, Okay, why is that asked? Let's say you're right, 319 00:19:39,080 --> 00:19:43,560 Speaker 4: how would that explain consciousness? How would that explain love, feelings, pinkness, joy, 320 00:19:43,600 --> 00:19:47,200 Speaker 4: blah blah blah. Essentially the hard problem five years before 321 00:19:47,320 --> 00:19:52,520 Speaker 4: Dave announces. But you knew the problem, I said, WHOA, 322 00:19:52,600 --> 00:19:55,000 Speaker 4: you're right, I have no idea. I was a reductionist nudgeon, 323 00:19:55,040 --> 00:19:56,920 Speaker 4: and I was ashamed of myself. 324 00:19:56,960 --> 00:19:58,760 Speaker 1: Actually, so we actually just want to say, I want 325 00:19:58,800 --> 00:20:00,879 Speaker 1: to make sure everyone's following. So the hard problem of 326 00:20:00,920 --> 00:20:03,320 Speaker 1: consciousness is you've got all this physical stuff happening in 327 00:20:03,320 --> 00:20:05,119 Speaker 1: the brain, why does it feel like anything. 328 00:20:05,119 --> 00:20:07,560 Speaker 2: Why do we have experience? That's the hard problem. 329 00:20:07,560 --> 00:20:10,320 Speaker 1: Okay, Right, so you were looking at these microtubules which 330 00:20:10,320 --> 00:20:13,239 Speaker 1: are made up of these tubulin peanut shaped proteins, and 331 00:20:13,280 --> 00:20:17,040 Speaker 1: you're saying, hey, there's something really interesting here. But it 332 00:20:17,080 --> 00:20:18,560 Speaker 1: didn't solve the hard problem. 333 00:20:18,960 --> 00:20:19,240 Speaker 2: Right. 334 00:20:19,320 --> 00:20:23,159 Speaker 4: So I was just saying, more computation, more information processing. 335 00:20:23,320 --> 00:20:25,840 Speaker 4: So and the guy had a beautiful point, and I 336 00:20:25,880 --> 00:20:27,560 Speaker 4: was kind of stunned. And he said, you should read 337 00:20:27,600 --> 00:20:30,320 Speaker 4: this book by Roger Penrose called The Emperor's New Mind. 338 00:20:30,800 --> 00:20:32,600 Speaker 4: I said, I've kind of heard of that guy. So 339 00:20:32,680 --> 00:20:34,439 Speaker 4: I bought the book. I read it, and I was 340 00:20:34,560 --> 00:20:37,040 Speaker 4: kind of blown away. I mean, it's an amazing book. 341 00:20:37,480 --> 00:20:40,840 Speaker 4: The first half is about why consciousness is not a computation. 342 00:20:41,560 --> 00:20:44,640 Speaker 4: He used something called Girdle's theorem from mathematics, which said 343 00:20:44,800 --> 00:20:47,920 Speaker 4: a mathematical theorem cannot prove itself. You need somebody or 344 00:20:47,960 --> 00:20:50,960 Speaker 4: something outside the system, like a mathematician, to say yeah, 345 00:20:51,000 --> 00:20:53,600 Speaker 4: it's true or not. And he extrapolated and said it's 346 00:20:53,640 --> 00:20:56,119 Speaker 4: like understanding, you know, to understand something, you need to 347 00:20:56,240 --> 00:20:59,760 Speaker 4: be outside the system, very similar to John Searle's Chinese 348 00:20:59,840 --> 00:21:02,560 Speaker 4: room argument. You know, the guy has the Chinese symbols. 349 00:21:02,560 --> 00:21:04,359 Speaker 4: He looks them up and he translates, but he doesn't 350 00:21:04,400 --> 00:21:05,359 Speaker 4: understand Chinese. 351 00:21:05,640 --> 00:21:08,720 Speaker 2: So that's the sense just doing computer operations, right. 352 00:21:08,560 --> 00:21:11,800 Speaker 4: And so that was the difference and Roger. So the 353 00:21:11,840 --> 00:21:14,360 Speaker 4: second half of the book was Roger's solution, which had 354 00:21:14,359 --> 00:21:16,520 Speaker 4: something to do with quantum physics and collapse of the 355 00:21:16,560 --> 00:21:19,520 Speaker 4: wave function, the measurement problem in quantum Kinnis, which was 356 00:21:19,560 --> 00:21:22,800 Speaker 4: a whole other mystery. But he said, the solution to 357 00:21:22,840 --> 00:21:25,639 Speaker 4: that mystery is the same as is for consciousness. But 358 00:21:25,760 --> 00:21:29,159 Speaker 4: Roger didn't have a biological structure that could be at 359 00:21:29,200 --> 00:21:31,040 Speaker 4: the quantum level. And he said in the book, I 360 00:21:31,040 --> 00:21:33,399 Speaker 4: don't know what it is. Maybe somebody does. So I 361 00:21:33,440 --> 00:21:35,880 Speaker 4: read the book and I said, holy crap, he needs microtubules. 362 00:21:35,960 --> 00:21:37,280 Speaker 4: I've been studying for twenty years. 363 00:21:37,359 --> 00:21:40,320 Speaker 2: So Stuart wrote Roger a letter. 364 00:21:40,640 --> 00:21:45,120 Speaker 3: But then Stuart Haerrov read my book and wrote back 365 00:21:45,119 --> 00:21:49,320 Speaker 3: to me said, evidently you don't know about microtubules. He 366 00:21:49,400 --> 00:21:53,119 Speaker 3: was absolutely right. If I'd known about microtubules, that's it. 367 00:21:53,200 --> 00:21:57,959 Speaker 3: Here's a much better bet. For various reasons, they are 368 00:21:58,280 --> 00:22:01,919 Speaker 3: probably because they're too See. It seemed to me that 369 00:22:02,000 --> 00:22:06,680 Speaker 3: there is a much better chance you could isolate quantum effection. 370 00:22:06,800 --> 00:22:09,680 Speaker 1: So they met up in England and Roger was very 371 00:22:09,720 --> 00:22:13,960 Speaker 1: taken by the geometry of these microtubules. Tell us what 372 00:22:14,119 --> 00:22:15,840 Speaker 1: is special about microtubules? 373 00:22:16,080 --> 00:22:20,160 Speaker 3: Well, what's special about microtubules? There's several things which excited 374 00:22:20,200 --> 00:22:23,000 Speaker 3: me about them. Some of them are sort of peripheral, 375 00:22:23,119 --> 00:22:28,080 Speaker 3: but not so stupid. Maybe they are two to begin with, 376 00:22:29,000 --> 00:22:33,040 Speaker 3: and that struck me as much better chance preserve coherence. 377 00:22:33,680 --> 00:22:35,119 Speaker 3: You see, if you're going to have the collapse of 378 00:22:35,119 --> 00:22:37,080 Speaker 3: the wave function, you've got to have a well defined 379 00:22:37,080 --> 00:22:41,160 Speaker 3: wave function which isn't collapsed by the environment. You see, 380 00:22:41,200 --> 00:22:44,359 Speaker 3: normally what happens is that the environment collapses that and 381 00:22:44,359 --> 00:22:46,960 Speaker 3: that's no use to anybody this standard, As I say, 382 00:22:47,040 --> 00:22:52,120 Speaker 3: Ladi von Neumann arguments, do you say that the collapse 383 00:22:52,160 --> 00:22:56,120 Speaker 3: occurs because the environment gets involved? You have no control 384 00:22:56,160 --> 00:22:59,920 Speaker 3: over the environment and so therefore it behaves randomly in someone. 385 00:23:00,480 --> 00:23:03,800 Speaker 1: In other words, he's pointing out that the environment normally 386 00:23:03,840 --> 00:23:07,600 Speaker 1: collapses the wave function very rapidly. But he appreciated the 387 00:23:07,640 --> 00:23:12,320 Speaker 1: possibility that microtubules might serve as a wave guide, which 388 00:23:12,320 --> 00:23:15,679 Speaker 1: means there's something about the particular structure of these long, 389 00:23:15,800 --> 00:23:20,000 Speaker 1: thin straws that keeps the wave function uncollapsed for a 390 00:23:20,119 --> 00:23:21,399 Speaker 1: longer time. A. 391 00:23:21,600 --> 00:23:28,760 Speaker 3: Their tubes. B. They have a very symmetrical structure of 392 00:23:28,920 --> 00:23:34,320 Speaker 3: the tubulence, and they combined together in this particular structure, 393 00:23:34,320 --> 00:23:39,720 Speaker 3: which I found fascinating because it has, for example, symmetries 394 00:23:39,880 --> 00:23:43,640 Speaker 3: in three different directions. One is along the axis, one 395 00:23:43,720 --> 00:23:46,320 Speaker 3: is twisting one way, and the other is twisting the 396 00:23:46,359 --> 00:23:49,920 Speaker 3: other way. So it just struck me what's funny about 397 00:23:49,920 --> 00:23:53,440 Speaker 3: these microtubules. You have these microtubules which have one direction 398 00:23:54,400 --> 00:23:59,320 Speaker 3: along the tube, and that seems mirror what you get 399 00:23:59,440 --> 00:24:03,720 Speaker 3: in these tubes, that they become super conductive. So this 400 00:24:03,840 --> 00:24:09,639 Speaker 3: suggested to me that maybe there is some quantum super 401 00:24:09,640 --> 00:24:13,600 Speaker 3: conductive effect along the tubes, which is quite different from 402 00:24:13,720 --> 00:24:17,800 Speaker 3: nerve transmission, which is absolutely a quantum effect. 403 00:24:18,000 --> 00:24:19,040 Speaker 2: So the idea is you've. 404 00:24:18,920 --> 00:24:23,119 Speaker 1: Got these microtubules which are inside all the neurons and 405 00:24:23,160 --> 00:24:27,480 Speaker 1: these conservative waves guides. One of the criticisms that people 406 00:24:27,480 --> 00:24:30,760 Speaker 1: have had about quantum mechanics in the brain is they say, look, 407 00:24:30,800 --> 00:24:33,840 Speaker 1: it's too warm and noisy in there. 408 00:24:34,480 --> 00:24:37,800 Speaker 2: What do you say in response to that. 409 00:24:38,119 --> 00:24:40,720 Speaker 3: Well, that's a general comment you might expect that applies 410 00:24:40,800 --> 00:24:45,320 Speaker 3: if it hasn't gone some very very specific structure, and 411 00:24:45,359 --> 00:24:48,560 Speaker 3: the market tube was I thought, much better chance of 412 00:24:48,640 --> 00:24:51,720 Speaker 3: that sort of thing. I mean, they're doing a pretty trick, 413 00:24:51,760 --> 00:24:55,040 Speaker 3: pretty good trick, you see. If they actually are preserving 414 00:24:55,119 --> 00:25:00,120 Speaker 3: coherence along the tubes, this is a neat trick that 415 00:25:00,320 --> 00:25:04,160 Speaker 3: nature allegedly. I'm saying that to say that's my viewpoint, 416 00:25:04,680 --> 00:25:09,439 Speaker 3: must actually have succeeded and making this trick. I'm The 417 00:25:09,480 --> 00:25:12,720 Speaker 3: general comment is warm and messy, sure as a whole, 418 00:25:13,040 --> 00:25:15,640 Speaker 3: but there are structures when this warm and messy thing. 419 00:25:16,119 --> 00:25:19,040 Speaker 3: You don't need the whole thing to be structured in 420 00:25:19,080 --> 00:25:24,440 Speaker 3: this way. You just need certain elements in this complicated structure, 421 00:25:24,480 --> 00:25:26,119 Speaker 3: which as a whole may be warm and messy and 422 00:25:26,160 --> 00:25:28,879 Speaker 3: all sorts of things. But there are things, the claim goes, 423 00:25:29,359 --> 00:25:33,000 Speaker 3: which can preserve quantum coherence. And the idea is that 424 00:25:33,080 --> 00:25:36,920 Speaker 3: maybe microtubules do. And when I heard about them from Stuart, 425 00:25:37,440 --> 00:25:39,879 Speaker 3: I thought that was a much better case than anything 426 00:25:39,920 --> 00:25:40,760 Speaker 3: I'd seen before. 427 00:25:40,960 --> 00:25:44,160 Speaker 1: So hammer Off and Penrose got interested in this possible 428 00:25:44,200 --> 00:25:49,119 Speaker 1: relationship between microtubules and quantum mechanics. But what does any 429 00:25:49,160 --> 00:25:52,320 Speaker 1: of this have to do with consciousness? Back to my 430 00:25:52,359 --> 00:25:55,399 Speaker 1: interview with Stewart in quantum Mechanics, things can be in 431 00:25:55,680 --> 00:25:59,520 Speaker 1: different positions. The wave function predicts how that moves along nicely. 432 00:25:59,520 --> 00:26:01,600 Speaker 1: But what happened as you get a collapse of the 433 00:26:01,600 --> 00:26:04,320 Speaker 1: wave function, which tells you, hey, let's say the particle 434 00:26:04,359 --> 00:26:07,600 Speaker 1: is over here, over here, and the idea was the 435 00:26:07,760 --> 00:26:13,879 Speaker 1: collapse that moment when that happened, there's some consciousness in 436 00:26:13,920 --> 00:26:14,439 Speaker 1: the universe. 437 00:26:14,520 --> 00:26:16,199 Speaker 2: That's what he predicted. That's what he predicted. 438 00:26:16,640 --> 00:26:18,840 Speaker 4: People are saying conscious comes to the outside and causes 439 00:26:18,880 --> 00:26:21,680 Speaker 4: the collapse, but that puts consciousness outside science. It's a 440 00:26:21,760 --> 00:26:24,360 Speaker 4: dualist position. And actually one of the charmers takes now, 441 00:26:24,720 --> 00:26:27,399 Speaker 4: but it goes back to Vignaer and von Norman and 442 00:26:27,880 --> 00:26:32,840 Speaker 4: Boord early part of the twentieth century and then and 443 00:26:33,200 --> 00:26:36,840 Speaker 4: others had didn't want collapse to deal with it or consciousness, 444 00:26:36,880 --> 00:26:39,040 Speaker 4: so they just said many worlds, it's easier to think 445 00:26:39,040 --> 00:26:43,960 Speaker 4: about the consciousness. And Roger came up with a solution, says, 446 00:26:44,080 --> 00:26:48,080 Speaker 4: the separations are unstable and will collapse and give consciousness 447 00:26:48,400 --> 00:26:51,800 Speaker 4: and due to an objective threshold given by the indeterminacy 448 00:26:51,840 --> 00:26:52,800 Speaker 4: principle one equation. 449 00:26:53,000 --> 00:26:57,119 Speaker 1: Okay, and so who is experiencing the consciousness or the 450 00:26:57,200 --> 00:26:59,480 Speaker 1: quality of when there's a collapse of the wave function. 451 00:27:00,040 --> 00:27:03,879 Speaker 4: The collapse itself is who's is who, what is experiencing. 452 00:27:04,400 --> 00:27:06,840 Speaker 4: I don't think it is controversial. I don't think there 453 00:27:06,840 --> 00:27:10,480 Speaker 4: needs to be a separate self. Other people disagree with 454 00:27:10,520 --> 00:27:13,240 Speaker 4: me on that, but I think if you have a 455 00:27:13,280 --> 00:27:17,359 Speaker 4: sequence of experiences and memory, you have a self. You 456 00:27:17,400 --> 00:27:19,359 Speaker 4: know who you are, you know when you wake up 457 00:27:19,359 --> 00:27:21,840 Speaker 4: the morning, the same person moment to moment. So I 458 00:27:21,840 --> 00:27:24,320 Speaker 4: don't think there's any separate entity as the self. I 459 00:27:24,359 --> 00:27:27,680 Speaker 4: think just I think you have a sequence of experiences, 460 00:27:27,680 --> 00:27:30,600 Speaker 4: complex experiences. I should go back and say when, when 461 00:27:31,040 --> 00:27:34,800 Speaker 4: when the objective reduction that's his name for objector threshold, 462 00:27:36,200 --> 00:27:41,160 Speaker 4: quantum state reduction, objector reduction, or or when that occurs 463 00:27:41,240 --> 00:27:44,640 Speaker 4: in the environment and in the chair anywhere other than 464 00:27:45,000 --> 00:27:51,120 Speaker 4: in particular arrangements. It's the experience is random, fleeting, disconnected. 465 00:27:51,359 --> 00:27:54,320 Speaker 4: It comes and it goes. It's apparently happening all around us. 466 00:27:54,359 --> 00:27:57,480 Speaker 4: We never noticed. It's like and that was proto conscious, 467 00:27:57,560 --> 00:28:00,600 Speaker 4: so that they call that proto conscious, and I liken 468 00:28:00,680 --> 00:28:03,200 Speaker 4: that too. If you go to the symphony and the 469 00:28:03,359 --> 00:28:06,479 Speaker 4: musicians are tuning their instruments before and you hear all 470 00:28:06,480 --> 00:28:09,719 Speaker 4: this to me noise to train the musicians different. But 471 00:28:09,720 --> 00:28:12,320 Speaker 4: to me, it's like uh uh, you know, it's it's 472 00:28:12,400 --> 00:28:15,399 Speaker 4: noise and then they start to play and it's Broms 473 00:28:15,440 --> 00:28:19,359 Speaker 4: or Beethoven or whatever, and uh. And that's what the 474 00:28:19,359 --> 00:28:22,000 Speaker 4: brain does, that's what the micro tubuas do. Orchestrates the 475 00:28:22,040 --> 00:28:25,840 Speaker 4: objective reduction. Hence the theory is orchestrated objective reduction. 476 00:28:26,320 --> 00:28:29,480 Speaker 1: Okay, so when there's the collapse of the wave function, 477 00:28:29,560 --> 00:28:34,159 Speaker 1: there's a little bit of consciousness. But if you build 478 00:28:34,200 --> 00:28:35,879 Speaker 1: a device in the right way where you've got all 479 00:28:35,920 --> 00:28:39,280 Speaker 1: these microtubules that are guiding this, that are orchestrating this 480 00:28:39,360 --> 00:28:41,640 Speaker 1: whole thing, then you get something like our contry and 481 00:28:41,680 --> 00:28:42,600 Speaker 1: they have to they. 482 00:28:42,440 --> 00:28:43,320 Speaker 2: Have to be entangled. 483 00:28:43,360 --> 00:28:47,080 Speaker 4: So the superposition states become part of one one much 484 00:28:47,080 --> 00:28:50,800 Speaker 4: more complicated state. So when you when we're collapsing our 485 00:28:50,920 --> 00:28:54,040 Speaker 4: conscious moments, now there's a lot of richness in it. 486 00:28:54,080 --> 00:28:55,720 Speaker 4: I see you, you see me, I see this stuff 487 00:28:55,720 --> 00:28:59,000 Speaker 4: behind you, et cetera, et cetera. And so and there's sound, 488 00:28:59,080 --> 00:29:03,280 Speaker 4: there's different senses. It's all orchestrated. I would say integrated, 489 00:29:03,280 --> 00:29:05,560 Speaker 4: but that's a different theory. It's more orchestrated. 490 00:29:05,760 --> 00:29:09,800 Speaker 1: Now, what would that get us to have entanglement across 491 00:29:09,880 --> 00:29:13,320 Speaker 1: different regions of the brain. Well, one example Stewart turns 492 00:29:13,360 --> 00:29:16,600 Speaker 1: to is what's called the binding problem. The binding problem 493 00:29:16,840 --> 00:29:20,560 Speaker 1: is a long recognized mystery that different regions of the 494 00:29:20,600 --> 00:29:24,640 Speaker 1: brain encode very different types of information like. 495 00:29:24,960 --> 00:29:27,320 Speaker 2: Movement here, and colors here. 496 00:29:27,080 --> 00:29:31,120 Speaker 1: And face recognition and sound and touch, and yet you 497 00:29:31,360 --> 00:29:36,600 Speaker 1: enjoy a totally unified experience. For example, let's hey watching 498 00:29:36,640 --> 00:29:40,400 Speaker 1: a basketball player race down the court dribbling the ball. 499 00:29:41,120 --> 00:29:43,800 Speaker 1: Different areas of your brain are processing the shape and 500 00:29:43,840 --> 00:29:46,280 Speaker 1: the movement and the sound of the ball hitting the court, 501 00:29:46,440 --> 00:29:50,000 Speaker 1: but you perceive the whole thing as one guy racing 502 00:29:50,080 --> 00:29:52,959 Speaker 1: down the court. The colors and the motions and the 503 00:29:53,000 --> 00:29:57,520 Speaker 1: sounds don't separate off from one another. So how are 504 00:29:57,520 --> 00:30:03,320 Speaker 1: these distinct features processed in total different brain regions integrated 505 00:30:03,360 --> 00:30:08,560 Speaker 1: into one seamless perception. This remains a central mystery in neuroscience. 506 00:30:08,760 --> 00:30:11,360 Speaker 1: So how might their theory address. 507 00:30:11,000 --> 00:30:14,320 Speaker 4: That spatial temporal binding? You know, you see something moving 508 00:30:14,360 --> 00:30:16,600 Speaker 4: through the sky and its shape, color, motion, meaning or 509 00:30:16,640 --> 00:30:20,440 Speaker 4: processed at different places at different times in the visual 510 00:30:20,480 --> 00:30:23,480 Speaker 4: cortex and cortex in general. And yet we see one object, 511 00:30:23,480 --> 00:30:26,760 Speaker 4: we see a yellow kite fluttering instead of yellow kite 512 00:30:27,120 --> 00:30:30,360 Speaker 4: fluttering move. We see one thing instantaneously, so it's it's 513 00:30:30,400 --> 00:30:36,479 Speaker 4: integrated or orchestrated in time, and also in different regions 514 00:30:36,520 --> 00:30:38,520 Speaker 4: of the brain. So I think the brain needs entanglement 515 00:30:38,600 --> 00:30:39,240 Speaker 4: one way or the other. 516 00:30:39,400 --> 00:30:43,920 Speaker 1: So, in other words, neuroscience traditionally just thinks about neurons, 517 00:30:44,200 --> 00:30:46,520 Speaker 1: and those are in some sense quite slow. 518 00:30:46,840 --> 00:30:48,520 Speaker 2: But maybe Hammers. 519 00:30:48,200 --> 00:30:52,840 Speaker 1: Suggests there are much faster processes. They're binding things together. 520 00:30:53,120 --> 00:30:57,120 Speaker 4: It's more like music. It's more like resonance harmonics, interference beats. 521 00:30:57,120 --> 00:30:58,840 Speaker 4: In fact, to get from the very fast and very 522 00:30:58,840 --> 00:31:03,160 Speaker 4: slow interference beat, it's probably what does it. So I 523 00:31:03,160 --> 00:31:06,240 Speaker 4: think the brain is more a quantum orchestra than a computer. 524 00:31:06,600 --> 00:31:07,040 Speaker 2: Got it. 525 00:31:07,080 --> 00:31:10,000 Speaker 1: And so essentially all our technologies are just measuring what 526 00:31:10,080 --> 00:31:12,200 Speaker 1: neurons are doing. Like you dunk electrode in and you 527 00:31:12,200 --> 00:31:13,760 Speaker 1: see the spike head of the neuron. 528 00:31:14,400 --> 00:31:18,040 Speaker 4: And so they're only listening to the base and percussion 529 00:31:18,200 --> 00:31:21,400 Speaker 4: of the symphony. They're missing the flutes and the piccolos 530 00:31:21,440 --> 00:31:25,960 Speaker 4: and everything else. And what makes you think this The 531 00:31:26,000 --> 00:31:28,400 Speaker 4: other theories don't work. All the other theories are based 532 00:31:28,400 --> 00:31:31,200 Speaker 4: on a neuron firing is a bit or a neuron 533 00:31:31,520 --> 00:31:34,200 Speaker 4: is essentially a one or a zero. And if you 534 00:31:34,200 --> 00:31:37,760 Speaker 4: look at a single cell organism like a paramesium, it 535 00:31:37,840 --> 00:31:40,000 Speaker 4: swims around, It finds food, it finds the mate, it 536 00:31:40,040 --> 00:31:42,320 Speaker 4: has sex, it can learn. If you suck it into 537 00:31:42,360 --> 00:31:44,360 Speaker 4: a capillary tube, it gets out faster and faster each 538 00:31:44,640 --> 00:31:47,560 Speaker 4: It's one cell, and it does all that with its microtubules, 539 00:31:47,560 --> 00:31:50,880 Speaker 4: whether it's silly and it's internal microtubules. So if a 540 00:31:50,880 --> 00:31:53,720 Speaker 4: paramesium can do that, and are you serious and thinking 541 00:31:53,720 --> 00:31:55,160 Speaker 4: that a neuron is a one or a zero and 542 00:31:55,200 --> 00:32:13,560 Speaker 4: that's it, it's an insult in neurons. 543 00:32:15,600 --> 00:32:18,800 Speaker 1: So together, Penrose and Hammeroff worked on their idea of 544 00:32:19,000 --> 00:32:19,960 Speaker 1: entanglement going on. 545 00:32:19,960 --> 00:32:20,720 Speaker 2: Across the brain. 546 00:32:21,080 --> 00:32:24,720 Speaker 1: And the hypothesis is that these deep tubes humming away 547 00:32:24,800 --> 00:32:30,840 Speaker 1: deep inside the brain's machinery, these orchestrate when and what collapses. 548 00:32:31,240 --> 00:32:35,600 Speaker 1: So they call this orchestrated objective reduction. Give me the 549 00:32:35,640 --> 00:32:39,480 Speaker 1: idea of orchestrated objective reduction? 550 00:32:39,640 --> 00:32:40,400 Speaker 2: What does that. 551 00:32:40,320 --> 00:32:44,520 Speaker 1: Mean and how does that explain consciousness potentially? 552 00:32:44,840 --> 00:32:48,400 Speaker 3: Okay, think of as I used to play ping pong 553 00:32:48,400 --> 00:32:51,680 Speaker 3: when I was at school, for instance. You see, as 554 00:32:51,880 --> 00:32:55,080 Speaker 3: I never achieved any great skill with this, but I 555 00:32:55,080 --> 00:32:59,120 Speaker 3: can understand there's just a game where you have to 556 00:32:59,200 --> 00:33:02,760 Speaker 3: act very quickly, and the way if I flick the 557 00:33:02,800 --> 00:33:05,920 Speaker 3: ball into the right hand corner as opposed to the 558 00:33:06,000 --> 00:33:09,400 Speaker 3: left hand corner, it's because I think by looking at 559 00:33:09,440 --> 00:33:12,360 Speaker 3: my opponent that he's not expecting it for me to 560 00:33:12,360 --> 00:33:15,240 Speaker 3: flick it into the left hand corner, and so I 561 00:33:15,280 --> 00:33:18,400 Speaker 3: do that flick into that corner because I think from 562 00:33:18,400 --> 00:33:22,400 Speaker 3: what I've just gained it's very small fraction of a second, 563 00:33:22,480 --> 00:33:26,880 Speaker 3: much less than half a second. I estimated that this 564 00:33:26,920 --> 00:33:30,280 Speaker 3: is a good thing to do, so I think that 565 00:33:30,440 --> 00:33:33,520 Speaker 3: was a conscious choice. Now, what is the current view 566 00:33:33,680 --> 00:33:36,120 Speaker 3: amongst I believe, and I get this from Stewart. The 567 00:33:36,200 --> 00:33:42,120 Speaker 3: current view amongst neurophysiologists is that these actions are not conscious, 568 00:33:42,960 --> 00:33:46,440 Speaker 3: they're much too quick. But Stewart's view and mine is 569 00:33:46,480 --> 00:33:51,080 Speaker 3: it is conscious, but it can only occur because of 570 00:33:51,120 --> 00:33:54,720 Speaker 3: the following mechanism. The argument would be that you could 571 00:33:54,760 --> 00:33:59,240 Speaker 3: preserve quantum coherence at a big level that is sufficiently 572 00:33:59,360 --> 00:34:03,240 Speaker 3: isolated from the outside world that in this layer you 573 00:34:03,320 --> 00:34:07,400 Speaker 3: could preserve a lot of quantum coherence, so that this 574 00:34:07,440 --> 00:34:11,960 Speaker 3: would mean that the action of flicking the ball this 575 00:34:12,000 --> 00:34:16,359 Speaker 3: way rather than that way, and this choice is it 576 00:34:16,440 --> 00:34:20,360 Speaker 3: made conscious consciously. The current view is there's no time, 577 00:34:20,880 --> 00:34:23,920 Speaker 3: that the consciousness come about, much too late for this. 578 00:34:24,600 --> 00:34:28,480 Speaker 3: But our view is no, there is time because the 579 00:34:28,640 --> 00:34:33,720 Speaker 3: choice of which action to take can be a conscious one. 580 00:34:34,440 --> 00:34:38,319 Speaker 3: The action taking involves a lot of nerve transmissions and 581 00:34:38,400 --> 00:34:42,359 Speaker 3: making your this way rather than that way, and all 582 00:34:42,400 --> 00:34:45,480 Speaker 3: these things. I think of a tennis player deciding to 583 00:34:45,719 --> 00:34:48,240 Speaker 3: go cross court rather than the bat down the line, 584 00:34:48,840 --> 00:34:53,160 Speaker 3: and that involves different muscle muscle actions. Now those different 585 00:34:53,239 --> 00:34:58,719 Speaker 3: muscle actions can be in superposition, kept in superposition, so 586 00:34:58,800 --> 00:35:01,680 Speaker 3: which one of them is truck It can be done 587 00:35:01,800 --> 00:35:05,960 Speaker 3: very quickly and those then the actions take place and 588 00:35:06,280 --> 00:35:09,480 Speaker 3: the person that's what has decided to be done. So 589 00:35:09,560 --> 00:35:14,080 Speaker 3: although the conscious action to move all those particular muscles 590 00:35:14,120 --> 00:35:18,680 Speaker 3: like this, and that's not conscious, what's consciousness. I'm going 591 00:35:18,680 --> 00:35:20,680 Speaker 3: to flick the ball to the right rather to the left. 592 00:35:21,880 --> 00:35:24,360 Speaker 3: And so that is a whole lot of different motions 593 00:35:24,360 --> 00:35:28,200 Speaker 3: which are all together in superposition. So this is the 594 00:35:28,239 --> 00:35:31,920 Speaker 3: idea that this collection of motions and that collection's motions 595 00:35:32,040 --> 00:35:36,279 Speaker 3: and which ones are activated are all there together, and 596 00:35:36,360 --> 00:35:40,840 Speaker 3: which one is activated is a conscious choice. And that 597 00:35:41,040 --> 00:35:43,840 Speaker 3: conscious choice, as it is at a quantum level choice 598 00:35:44,200 --> 00:35:48,320 Speaker 3: in these very specific cells that you get the coherent 599 00:35:48,400 --> 00:35:53,600 Speaker 3: superposition of different actions. So it could be this it's 600 00:35:53,719 --> 00:35:58,279 Speaker 3: under control all this one or this one, and they're 601 00:35:58,320 --> 00:36:02,000 Speaker 3: all there in quantum superposiniess. So the choice you make 602 00:36:02,160 --> 00:36:05,560 Speaker 3: as to which one is controlled is a quantum choice. 603 00:36:05,880 --> 00:36:11,040 Speaker 1: And presumably when when the waveform collapses, that's when you 604 00:36:11,120 --> 00:36:12,760 Speaker 1: become conscious of something. 605 00:36:12,840 --> 00:36:15,360 Speaker 2: That's that's the idea. Yes, that's what it is. 606 00:36:15,600 --> 00:36:18,480 Speaker 3: Consciousness is to do with the actual collapse. 607 00:36:18,680 --> 00:36:23,120 Speaker 1: One intriguing thing is that this proposal seems to blur 608 00:36:23,239 --> 00:36:27,279 Speaker 1: the line between physics and philosophy in an interesting way. So, 609 00:36:27,320 --> 00:36:34,200 Speaker 1: if consciousness arises through quantum processes, does that suggest that 610 00:36:34,320 --> 00:36:37,759 Speaker 1: consciousness is not just a feature of brains, but a 611 00:36:37,800 --> 00:36:40,800 Speaker 1: more fundamental property of the universe. 612 00:36:41,440 --> 00:36:42,040 Speaker 2: How do you see this? 613 00:36:42,080 --> 00:36:45,160 Speaker 3: Yes, but you see, But it might be you've got 614 00:36:45,160 --> 00:36:48,120 Speaker 3: to get it organized in a very subtle way in 615 00:36:48,200 --> 00:36:51,520 Speaker 3: order to reveal. You see, the collapse part of it 616 00:36:51,600 --> 00:36:55,080 Speaker 3: might be easy to reveal, but the way in which 617 00:36:55,120 --> 00:36:59,320 Speaker 3: it's not quite random and quite random, probably in a 618 00:36:59,440 --> 00:37:00,719 Speaker 3: very sophisticated way. 619 00:37:01,200 --> 00:37:05,520 Speaker 1: Does this hypothesis have implications for free will? 620 00:37:08,520 --> 00:37:09,640 Speaker 2: That's a very good question. 621 00:37:10,520 --> 00:37:14,200 Speaker 3: You see, I'm even quite recently sort of changed my 622 00:37:14,360 --> 00:37:17,239 Speaker 3: view on this question. I often thought it's a sort 623 00:37:17,280 --> 00:37:20,680 Speaker 3: of meaningless question in a way. I mean, does it 624 00:37:20,800 --> 00:37:24,680 Speaker 3: mean that a quantum effect is brought into play because 625 00:37:24,800 --> 00:37:28,080 Speaker 3: quantum thing is not deterministic? And does the fact that 626 00:37:28,120 --> 00:37:32,520 Speaker 3: it's not deterministic mean free will? Not normally because it's random? 627 00:37:32,680 --> 00:37:34,759 Speaker 3: And if it's random, that's not free will. I mean 628 00:37:34,800 --> 00:37:39,080 Speaker 3: you're just tossing a toy. It's not random because it's 629 00:37:39,080 --> 00:37:44,520 Speaker 3: got to be doing something. I mean, randomness isn't beneficial. 630 00:37:43,880 --> 00:37:44,319 Speaker 2: In a way. 631 00:37:44,440 --> 00:37:47,759 Speaker 3: You see, you could make it random, but that's not 632 00:37:47,880 --> 00:37:51,480 Speaker 3: the point free will. You could say that, you see, 633 00:37:51,520 --> 00:37:55,759 Speaker 3: people often say that free will could be there if 634 00:37:55,760 --> 00:37:59,359 Speaker 3: it's not deterministic, but it doesn't know you any good 635 00:37:59,400 --> 00:38:03,640 Speaker 3: if it's just right. So the view I have is 636 00:38:03,640 --> 00:38:06,560 Speaker 3: more or less this. It's not even money. It's a 637 00:38:06,680 --> 00:38:09,040 Speaker 3: very recent view, I think. But the view is more this. 638 00:38:10,800 --> 00:38:14,440 Speaker 3: There is something rtrachursal about it. What free will really 639 00:38:14,480 --> 00:38:17,440 Speaker 3: means and what I'm arguing for here. It's not that 640 00:38:17,480 --> 00:38:20,239 Speaker 3: you can do anything you like, and you can act 641 00:38:20,320 --> 00:38:23,759 Speaker 3: randomly if you like. You're doing what you think is 642 00:38:23,800 --> 00:38:27,040 Speaker 3: the right thing to do, so you have the free 643 00:38:27,080 --> 00:38:29,560 Speaker 3: will to do what you think is the right thing 644 00:38:29,600 --> 00:38:32,839 Speaker 3: to do, and it doesn't necessarily be righteousness center virtuous. 645 00:38:33,320 --> 00:38:37,160 Speaker 3: It means, in your judgment, the correct thing to do. 646 00:38:37,920 --> 00:38:41,759 Speaker 3: Whether it's correct, desper for or beneficial less or for 647 00:38:41,960 --> 00:38:44,840 Speaker 3: the goodest, the whole, or whatever, that's not the point. 648 00:38:45,120 --> 00:38:47,719 Speaker 3: The point is that you are doing it because you 649 00:38:47,760 --> 00:38:50,399 Speaker 3: think it's the right thing to do. Now that means 650 00:38:50,400 --> 00:38:51,560 Speaker 3: you're understanding it. 651 00:38:53,520 --> 00:38:58,000 Speaker 1: What kind of experimental result would excite you most in 652 00:38:58,719 --> 00:38:59,640 Speaker 1: the coming years. 653 00:39:00,080 --> 00:39:04,080 Speaker 3: I think if you're looking at things plausible within current technology, 654 00:39:05,320 --> 00:39:09,760 Speaker 3: maybe some convincing kind of quantum coherence within microtubules. 655 00:39:09,960 --> 00:39:11,440 Speaker 2: I want to ask you about AI. 656 00:39:11,840 --> 00:39:17,080 Speaker 1: We've seen such incredible progress in classical AI systems, but 657 00:39:17,360 --> 00:39:23,440 Speaker 1: given your view that consciousness involves non computable processes, do 658 00:39:23,480 --> 00:39:29,440 Speaker 1: you think that AI is conscious, could be conscious or 659 00:39:29,480 --> 00:39:31,000 Speaker 1: is it just an impressive simulation. 660 00:39:31,640 --> 00:39:36,759 Speaker 3: No, in one word, it's not conscious, and it's not 661 00:39:36,840 --> 00:39:39,360 Speaker 3: going to be conscious by having more and more and 662 00:39:39,440 --> 00:39:41,960 Speaker 3: more elements in your computers. 663 00:39:42,200 --> 00:39:45,160 Speaker 1: So could a quantum computer in the future. Could a 664 00:39:45,200 --> 00:39:47,840 Speaker 1: quantum computer be conscious if it were designed with the 665 00:39:47,920 --> 00:39:50,280 Speaker 1: right architecture or is something else still missing? 666 00:39:50,560 --> 00:39:52,680 Speaker 3: You have to be careful about what you mean by 667 00:39:52,680 --> 00:39:56,520 Speaker 3: a quantum computer, because I don't think quantum computer in 668 00:39:56,560 --> 00:40:00,399 Speaker 3: the sense that people use that term does actively role 669 00:40:01,320 --> 00:40:04,279 Speaker 3: using the collapse of the wave function as part of 670 00:40:04,320 --> 00:40:07,320 Speaker 3: the mechanism in quotes, because it's not really a mechanism. 671 00:40:07,480 --> 00:40:09,359 Speaker 2: That's right, Yeah, okay, got it. 672 00:40:09,440 --> 00:40:12,680 Speaker 1: So the kind of quantum computers that for example, Google 673 00:40:12,760 --> 00:40:17,279 Speaker 1: is working on now, because presumably it doesn't involve the 674 00:40:17,360 --> 00:40:19,880 Speaker 1: collapse of the wave function, you think it wouldn't be 675 00:40:20,280 --> 00:40:21,680 Speaker 1: conscious as such. 676 00:40:22,280 --> 00:40:23,680 Speaker 2: Yes, that's right, Okay, great. 677 00:40:24,000 --> 00:40:28,200 Speaker 1: I asked Stuart the same question about whether contemporary AI 678 00:40:28,760 --> 00:40:30,719 Speaker 1: could be conscious. 679 00:40:30,400 --> 00:40:32,680 Speaker 4: Not with the kind of computers we am now, not 680 00:40:32,800 --> 00:40:36,440 Speaker 4: with a silicon based And you know, our friend Dave Chalmer's, 681 00:40:36,960 --> 00:40:40,120 Speaker 4: after decades of the heart problem, recently came out and said, 682 00:40:40,160 --> 00:40:45,640 Speaker 4: well AI consciousness is inevitable and throwing the heart problem 683 00:40:45,680 --> 00:40:46,760 Speaker 4: under the bus. 684 00:40:46,760 --> 00:40:50,319 Speaker 2: Totally interesting, and then backing up and. 685 00:40:50,280 --> 00:40:52,600 Speaker 4: When I questioned him about it, he said, well, what's 686 00:40:52,600 --> 00:40:55,560 Speaker 4: the fundament there's no fundamental difference between silicon and carbon. 687 00:40:56,239 --> 00:40:58,760 Speaker 2: I said, wrong answer today. First of all, it's not carbon. 688 00:40:59,040 --> 00:41:03,760 Speaker 4: It's organic carbon, which means aromatic rings, which means quantum. 689 00:41:04,080 --> 00:41:08,240 Speaker 4: So that and there's a huge difference between organic carbon 690 00:41:08,280 --> 00:41:13,000 Speaker 4: and silicon. Silicon can't do that. So and this organic 691 00:41:13,040 --> 00:41:16,960 Speaker 4: carbon aromatic hydrocarbons have been in the universe right from 692 00:41:16,960 --> 00:41:17,400 Speaker 4: the start. 693 00:41:17,640 --> 00:41:18,880 Speaker 2: So let's summarize. 694 00:41:19,040 --> 00:41:22,200 Speaker 1: According to this idea from Penrose and hammer Off, the 695 00:41:22,280 --> 00:41:26,200 Speaker 1: brain isn't just a network of firing neurons. It's also 696 00:41:26,800 --> 00:41:31,040 Speaker 1: a kind of quantum computer. Inside every single brain cell 697 00:41:31,440 --> 00:41:36,640 Speaker 1: is a whole world of microtubules, these tiny cylindrical structures 698 00:41:36,880 --> 00:41:40,400 Speaker 1: that are so small they've traditionally been ignored. But maybe 699 00:41:40,600 --> 00:41:44,560 Speaker 1: they suggest these structures are doing more than organizing the 700 00:41:44,640 --> 00:41:51,080 Speaker 1: cell's interior. Maybe these microtubules are hosting quantum processes. Maybe 701 00:41:51,200 --> 00:41:55,600 Speaker 1: they're sustaining delicate quantum states long enough to do something 702 00:41:55,719 --> 00:42:00,799 Speaker 1: meaningful and entangling across cells, and that the collapse of 703 00:42:00,840 --> 00:42:06,279 Speaker 1: these states might correspond to moments of conscious experience. Now, 704 00:42:06,360 --> 00:42:09,280 Speaker 1: I just want to repeat one point. You might be thinking, Wait, 705 00:42:09,280 --> 00:42:13,520 Speaker 1: doesn't quantum physics get washed out in warm, wet environments 706 00:42:13,600 --> 00:42:16,560 Speaker 1: like the brain. That's a reasonable objection. In fact, it's 707 00:42:16,560 --> 00:42:19,239 Speaker 1: one of the main reasons that many scientists have been 708 00:42:19,480 --> 00:42:25,040 Speaker 1: skeptical of the orchestrated objective reduction theory. Quantum coherence usually 709 00:42:25,080 --> 00:42:28,880 Speaker 1: does not last long in messy biological environments. 710 00:42:28,960 --> 00:42:29,759 Speaker 2: It's fragile. 711 00:42:30,360 --> 00:42:33,680 Speaker 1: But on the other hand, that skepticism has been challenged 712 00:42:33,719 --> 00:42:37,000 Speaker 1: in recent years by findings in other parts of biology. 713 00:42:37,360 --> 00:42:42,320 Speaker 1: Quantum effects have now been observed in photosynthesis, in bird navigation, 714 00:42:42,640 --> 00:42:47,080 Speaker 1: in the sense of smell. Somehow, living systems might be 715 00:42:47,120 --> 00:42:51,279 Speaker 1: more hospitable to quantum phenomenon than we thought. And if 716 00:42:51,320 --> 00:42:55,040 Speaker 1: that's the case, then maybe, just maybe, the brain has 717 00:42:55,120 --> 00:42:59,200 Speaker 1: found a way to leverage quantum effects, not just for computation, 718 00:43:00,080 --> 00:43:04,720 Speaker 1: for consciousness itself. Now, Penrose and Hamros's theory and others 719 00:43:04,800 --> 00:43:09,160 Speaker 1: like it remain highly speculative. Neuroscience continues to make great 720 00:43:09,239 --> 00:43:14,600 Speaker 1: progress without invoking quantum mechanics artificial neural networks, which are 721 00:43:14,760 --> 00:43:19,800 Speaker 1: entirely classical in their architecture. These have achieved unbelievable feats 722 00:43:19,840 --> 00:43:23,960 Speaker 1: like the modern blossoming of AI. But so far as 723 00:43:24,040 --> 00:43:29,200 Speaker 1: we know, artificial neural networks like CHATCHPT are not conscious, 724 00:43:29,360 --> 00:43:31,239 Speaker 1: and so the idea here is that we need to 725 00:43:31,239 --> 00:43:36,040 Speaker 1: think not just bigger, but perhaps also sub microscopically smaller. 726 00:43:36,360 --> 00:43:39,440 Speaker 1: So we've just heard from two thinkers who aren't afraid 727 00:43:39,880 --> 00:43:43,400 Speaker 1: to step beyond the comfortable borders of their fields. To 728 00:43:43,480 --> 00:43:47,080 Speaker 1: probe around in areas that most scientists won't touch. What 729 00:43:47,160 --> 00:43:49,960 Speaker 1: I find so compelling isn't the certainty of the theory. 730 00:43:50,040 --> 00:43:54,759 Speaker 1: It's the audacity of the question. It's the willingness to say, look, 731 00:43:54,840 --> 00:43:59,400 Speaker 1: perhaps our current tools aren't enough. Maybe consciousness isn't just 732 00:43:59,520 --> 00:44:04,680 Speaker 1: a clever computation, but something much stranger. Maybe the deepest 733 00:44:04,719 --> 00:44:09,399 Speaker 1: puzzles in neuroscience can't be solved without rethinking everything from 734 00:44:09,400 --> 00:44:12,360 Speaker 1: the ground up. There's a long history of big leaps 735 00:44:12,400 --> 00:44:17,360 Speaker 1: in science, beginning with questions that sounded naive or mystical. 736 00:44:17,760 --> 00:44:19,920 Speaker 1: There was a time when most of the ideas we 737 00:44:20,000 --> 00:44:23,279 Speaker 1: take for granted today were ridiculous. So I want to 738 00:44:23,320 --> 00:44:26,319 Speaker 1: return to one last thought from Roger. What advice would 739 00:44:26,360 --> 00:44:30,600 Speaker 1: you give to young scientists who are drawn to the big, 740 00:44:30,719 --> 00:44:35,719 Speaker 1: risky questions about consciousness but are afraid to step too 741 00:44:35,760 --> 00:44:38,200 Speaker 1: far outside conventional boundaries. 742 00:44:37,840 --> 00:44:40,560 Speaker 3: To try and do the following. You will have some 743 00:44:40,719 --> 00:44:43,560 Speaker 3: specialist view that you see in order to make progress, 744 00:44:43,719 --> 00:44:47,680 Speaker 3: you have to dig deeply in a certain area and 745 00:44:47,880 --> 00:44:50,560 Speaker 3: understand that area as well as you can and better 746 00:44:50,640 --> 00:44:53,799 Speaker 3: than most other people. But you also, at the same 747 00:44:53,880 --> 00:44:57,359 Speaker 3: time should keep a broad outlook of what's going on 748 00:44:57,480 --> 00:45:00,920 Speaker 3: in the outside world and pick up maybe if you 749 00:45:01,000 --> 00:45:03,080 Speaker 3: see something which might connect with what you're doing. 750 00:45:03,239 --> 00:45:05,360 Speaker 1: There are plenty of critics of this idea who point 751 00:45:05,360 --> 00:45:09,279 Speaker 1: out reasonably that there's not enough experimental evidence to take 752 00:45:09,320 --> 00:45:13,280 Speaker 1: this idea with the requisite seriousness yet. But it's okay 753 00:45:13,360 --> 00:45:16,200 Speaker 1: to explore the speculative as long as we keep one 754 00:45:16,200 --> 00:45:19,600 Speaker 1: foot planted in the empirical. It's a key to making 755 00:45:19,680 --> 00:45:26,200 Speaker 1: progress in science is balancing skepticism with curiosity and openness. 756 00:45:26,800 --> 00:45:29,239 Speaker 1: All of us in neuroscience like to believe that we're 757 00:45:29,320 --> 00:45:32,439 Speaker 1: close to cracking the puzzle of consciousness, but the fact 758 00:45:32,600 --> 00:45:35,160 Speaker 1: is we're probably just at the foot of the mountain, 759 00:45:35,520 --> 00:45:38,359 Speaker 1: and it's always possible, just like in any field, that 760 00:45:38,400 --> 00:45:40,360 Speaker 1: we're not even asking the right questions. 761 00:45:40,440 --> 00:45:40,880 Speaker 2: Yet. 762 00:45:41,120 --> 00:45:43,920 Speaker 1: What if we've been looking at the hardware in an 763 00:45:44,040 --> 00:45:48,319 Speaker 1: incomplete way and missing the best tricks of physics. The 764 00:45:48,400 --> 00:45:51,640 Speaker 1: fact is that the central mystery of neuroscience, for which 765 00:45:51,680 --> 00:45:54,680 Speaker 1: no one has a good answer, is the hard problem 766 00:45:54,719 --> 00:45:58,080 Speaker 1: of consciousness. Why if we have an organ that goes 767 00:45:58,080 --> 00:46:01,719 Speaker 1: around and collects information than a camera or a microphone, 768 00:46:02,040 --> 00:46:05,720 Speaker 1: why does it feel like something, presumably in a way 769 00:46:06,000 --> 00:46:09,200 Speaker 1: that your iPhone does not When it makes recording. Why 770 00:46:09,239 --> 00:46:13,800 Speaker 1: do we have private, subjective experience of the world. Quantum 771 00:46:13,840 --> 00:46:16,759 Speaker 1: mechanics may or may not provide the answer. Maybe we're 772 00:46:16,760 --> 00:46:19,080 Speaker 1: all just shooting in the dark until we discover a 773 00:46:19,239 --> 00:46:23,400 Speaker 1: new field and one hundred years from now called Schwanton mechanics. 774 00:46:23,760 --> 00:46:26,400 Speaker 1: But whatever the case turns out to be, it seems 775 00:46:26,640 --> 00:46:30,719 Speaker 1: likely to me that the neuroscience textbooks used by our 776 00:46:31,200 --> 00:46:34,920 Speaker 1: great great grandchildren will have very different stories than we 777 00:46:34,960 --> 00:46:38,960 Speaker 1: do today, and future centuries will look back on our 778 00:46:39,080 --> 00:46:43,480 Speaker 1: scientific frameworks with the quaintness that we look back on 779 00:46:43,600 --> 00:46:48,759 Speaker 1: ideas of flagiston or spontaneous generation, or that the Earth 780 00:46:48,880 --> 00:46:50,320 Speaker 1: was at the center of the universe. 781 00:46:50,880 --> 00:46:52,160 Speaker 2: But the only way we're going to. 782 00:46:52,160 --> 00:46:56,200 Speaker 1: Get there is to keep digging deeper and asking, by 783 00:46:56,239 --> 00:46:58,920 Speaker 1: not falling for the assumption that we've got it all 784 00:46:58,960 --> 00:47:02,040 Speaker 1: figured out with our stand in textbook models, but by 785 00:47:02,160 --> 00:47:08,440 Speaker 1: continuing to propose and put to the test brave new hypotheses. 786 00:47:13,120 --> 00:47:15,880 Speaker 1: Go to Eagleman dot com slash podcast for more information 787 00:47:15,960 --> 00:47:17,400 Speaker 1: and to find further reading. 788 00:47:18,160 --> 00:47:20,879 Speaker 2: Check out my newsletter on substack and be a part 789 00:47:20,880 --> 00:47:22,160 Speaker 2: of the online chats there. 790 00:47:23,000 --> 00:47:25,560 Speaker 1: You can watch the videos of Inner Cosmos on YouTube, 791 00:47:25,719 --> 00:47:26,719 Speaker 1: where you can leave. 792 00:47:26,640 --> 00:47:29,040 Speaker 2: Comments until next time. 793 00:47:29,200 --> 00:47:33,960 Speaker 1: I'm David Eagleman and this is inner Cosmos.