WEBVTT - Jury Offers Split Verdict in Nomura Trader Case (Audio)

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<v Speaker 1>The split verdict of a Connecticut jury reveals the challenges

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<v Speaker 1>of policing fraud in the market. The jury convicted one

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<v Speaker 1>former Nomura bond trader of conspiring to light of clients

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<v Speaker 1>about mortgage bond prices, but cleared another of all charges,

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<v Speaker 1>while clearing a third trader of all but the conspiracy charge,

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<v Speaker 1>which jurors could not decide on. Defense attorneys have argued

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<v Speaker 1>that bond trading takes place between sophisticated professionals who can't

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<v Speaker 1>be fooled by bluffing or puffing. My guests are John Coffey,

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<v Speaker 1>of professor Columbia Law School and Robert Hockett, a professor

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<v Speaker 1>Cornell University Law School. Jack. The jury acquitted the traders

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<v Speaker 1>or deadlocked on everything but the conspiracy charges. They found

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<v Speaker 1>Michael Gramman's guilty of conspiracy, Tyler Peter's not guilty, and

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<v Speaker 1>they deadlocked on conspiracy. As far as Rod Shapiro, what

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<v Speaker 1>does that show, Well, let's just underlinine how severe a

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<v Speaker 1>defeat this was in reality for the government. There were

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<v Speaker 1>twenty seven They got a conviction on one of those.

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<v Speaker 1>Twenty seven three, as you said, brahone and twenty three

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<v Speaker 1>were acquittals. Moreover, this case follows an earlier Connecticut case

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<v Speaker 1>in January involving Jesse Litteck, who was also charged with

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<v Speaker 1>ten counts of very similar kind of misconduct, and they're

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<v Speaker 1>the jury acquitted on nine convicted on one. So it

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<v Speaker 1>looks like the governments had in a great deal of

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<v Speaker 1>difficulty convincing the jury that there's something truly culpable here. Uh.

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<v Speaker 1>And I think the fact that they convicted Michael Gramman's

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<v Speaker 1>may be explained by his being the only defendant where

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<v Speaker 1>they had a tape recording of him instructing others on

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<v Speaker 1>how to lie to the clients. Bad evidence really hit

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<v Speaker 1>the jury, whereas every other case the witnesses seifying for

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<v Speaker 1>the government were cross examined and they had to admit

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<v Speaker 1>they had done the same thing and looked equally bad. Oh.

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<v Speaker 1>That I think left the jury pretty confused. But what's

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<v Speaker 1>your case gone this mixed jury verdict? Well, of course

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<v Speaker 1>it very much matches Jack. I think the main thing

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<v Speaker 1>to know is that it remains difficult to secure conviction

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<v Speaker 1>and the securities from the case of this kind on

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<v Speaker 1>not only the materiality UH portion of the large but

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<v Speaker 1>also the intense UH portion of the tribes. I think

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<v Speaker 1>it's not. It's not without significance that the count that

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<v Speaker 1>was the easiest to secure conviction on was that that

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<v Speaker 1>involved the smokiest of all possible smoking guns and Jack,

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<v Speaker 1>does this show that the jury didn't buy the theory

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<v Speaker 1>that the puffing and line by bond traders is fraud

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<v Speaker 1>or that the prosecutors just didn't give the jury enough evidence. Well,

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<v Speaker 1>we'd have to interview the jurors to really answer there.

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<v Speaker 1>But do recall that in securities fraud case, you have

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<v Speaker 1>to prove not simply that the defendant broke a legal rule,

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<v Speaker 1>you have to prove that he will fully did so,

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<v Speaker 1>that it was his to liberate intent to violate the law.

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<v Speaker 1>And that may have looked greater, particularly in the case

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<v Speaker 1>of the junior employees, who look like they were just

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<v Speaker 1>taking instructions from their superiors. So the wilfulness problem here

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<v Speaker 1>it may have been the biggest obstacle, because one defendant

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<v Speaker 1>did look like he'd willfully done this, and they did

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<v Speaker 1>convict him on at least one count. But it does

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<v Speaker 1>look like the government has difficulty explaining why this behavior

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<v Speaker 1>is truly criminal when the defendants keeps saying everybody was

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<v Speaker 1>doing it well, Bob, even after the defense attorney's also

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<v Speaker 1>got one of the alleged victims, Putnam Investments portfolio manager

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<v Speaker 1>Zachary Harrison, to admit under cross examination that he had

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<v Speaker 1>lied during negotiations and he wasn't charged with anything. So, Mike,

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<v Speaker 1>the jury have been thinking, well, where's the crime here?

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<v Speaker 1>I suppose that's that's that's possible. I mean that the

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<v Speaker 1>trouble I think was figuring out exactly what was pompting

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<v Speaker 1>the juries decision at the case that so much evidence

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<v Speaker 1>going in so many different directions, and worse, it's also

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<v Speaker 1>a relatively complex charge that was brought. That's hard is

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<v Speaker 1>brought against the defense where themselves relatively complex as well,

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<v Speaker 1>and so it's actually quite difficult appear at exactly what

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<v Speaker 1>what it mattered both uh to the jurors. Maybe one

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<v Speaker 1>other point of making this connection is that there is

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<v Speaker 1>in a sense that kind of an underlying link between

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<v Speaker 1>the intention elements of the offense on the one hand

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<v Speaker 1>and the materiality part of the offense on the other.

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<v Speaker 1>And that is as fall as if somebody believes that

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<v Speaker 1>the person to whom one is selling something, he's taking

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<v Speaker 1>what he is saying with the grain of salt. Anyway,

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<v Speaker 1>then it's all the more difficult right to show that

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<v Speaker 1>the person actually intended to defraud the person, because the

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<v Speaker 1>person actually thinks that the counterparty is in fact taking

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<v Speaker 1>but he says with the grain of solvent, he gets

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<v Speaker 1>harder to show that he's actually thinking himself to be

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<v Speaker 1>committing a fraud. E Jack. The defendants did not take

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<v Speaker 1>the stand. They didn't even present a evidence, and I

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<v Speaker 1>wonder if some of them are reconsidering that at this point.

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<v Speaker 1>But does the split verdicts show that that didn't make

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<v Speaker 1>any difference, or can't we really read anything into that. Well,

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<v Speaker 1>of course, it's the normal position of what colored defense

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<v Speaker 1>counsel to resist having the defendant take the stand, because

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<v Speaker 1>you could easily get a perjury conviction coming out of

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<v Speaker 1>that if you deny guilt and the court thinks you

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<v Speaker 1>were lying about that. Uh So it's it's the normal

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<v Speaker 1>case to attack the witnesses rather than to try to

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<v Speaker 1>put the defendant on the stand to tell his side

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<v Speaker 1>of the story. All in all, the significance of this

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<v Speaker 1>is the government has wanted best a very weak peric victory,

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<v Speaker 1>and I think it may deter his apartments justice from

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<v Speaker 1>bringing similar cases it has in the past. Bob might

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<v Speaker 1>deter the Department of Justice from retrying the two defendants

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<v Speaker 1>on the deadlock counts. That's a call, um, I mean,

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<v Speaker 1>it might almost be a kind of mood point at

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<v Speaker 1>this point, right, because I have a funny feeling that

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<v Speaker 1>the Justice departments during the Trunk years, he's going to

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<v Speaker 1>be a little bit less to sell us about prosecutions

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<v Speaker 1>of this kind in any of that. Um. On the

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<v Speaker 1>other hands, you know where things different. Right, let's assume

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<v Speaker 1>that we were still, you know, the middle of the

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<v Speaker 1>Obama era. Um, would this future prosecutions. I tend to

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<v Speaker 1>think not. Actually, I tend to think that they're going

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<v Speaker 1>to sort of keep at that. They would keep at it,

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<v Speaker 1>uh in hopes of making a point and at least

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<v Speaker 1>sort of frightening market participants with the possibility of prosecution, uh,

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<v Speaker 1>and thereby frighten them into maybe making puppery a little

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<v Speaker 1>bit less common of practice or less sort of central

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<v Speaker 1>to their common practices today, Jack, have these cases cases,

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<v Speaker 1>excuse me, have these cases, including the lip fact case

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<v Speaker 1>that you were talking about, and some of the please

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<v Speaker 1>been a wake up call for traders who believed once

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<v Speaker 1>that they could do anything to sell a bond. Oh,

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<v Speaker 1>I think it has I think it has them very concerned.

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<v Speaker 1>The problem is they may just be hiding their behavior better.

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<v Speaker 1>Some of them are now using encryptic codes that the

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<v Speaker 1>government can't correct. Some of them are doing face to

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<v Speaker 1>face conversations. I think it has affected the industry because

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<v Speaker 1>these are intelligent people and they have been surprised to

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<v Speaker 1>find out that the government has been studying them and

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<v Speaker 1>tape recording them, and they know they are generally susceptible

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<v Speaker 1>to such tape recording. By the way, I think what's

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<v Speaker 1>likely to happen here is that the government will give

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<v Speaker 1>them something like a deferred prosecution agreement, because the government

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<v Speaker 1>usually when there's been a mistrial does offer reduced charges,

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<v Speaker 1>and here reduced charges would likely be something like a

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<v Speaker 1>deferred prosecution agreement for the two who are not convicted. Bob,

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<v Speaker 1>do you believe that the scrutiny by the government has

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<v Speaker 1>pushed questionable sales tactics farther into the shadows rather than

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<v Speaker 1>making people change the way that they do business. Well,

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<v Speaker 1>I think I think it's really raised the incentive, of course,

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<v Speaker 1>people to push more of what they do in the shadows. Um,

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<v Speaker 1>But I don't know that that's actually a problem as such.

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<v Speaker 1>I mean, for for two reasons, right. The first is, uh,

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<v Speaker 1>the shadow kinds of communications are themselves problematic as far

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<v Speaker 1>as the law is concerned. Uh, And so there are

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<v Speaker 1>you know, in the sense, what you're doing is pushing

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<v Speaker 1>people into committing another kind of offense if you persisted

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<v Speaker 1>doing that, and that's of course going to render them vulnerable.

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<v Speaker 1>Charges along those lines are just sort of actions brought.

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<v Speaker 1>They are predicted on those behaviors. The second point, I

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<v Speaker 1>think that it's very often said, right that you shouldn't

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<v Speaker 1>regulate this or that, because then you'll push this or

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<v Speaker 1>that into some sort of realm where it's harder to

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<v Speaker 1>regulate it. But that's a bit like uh see. To me,

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<v Speaker 1>that's something bit like saying, you know, you shouldn't constitute

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<v Speaker 1>any crime at all because otherwise people become us secretive

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<v Speaker 1>in committing your crimes. I mean, that's no, there's no

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<v Speaker 1>real answer. It's not it's not a good reason not

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<v Speaker 1>to prosecute something if it on otherwise to be prosecuted.

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<v Speaker 1>What it's a good reason to do is to make

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<v Speaker 1>sure that you actually be hunt your enforcement in these

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<v Speaker 1>sort of shadow realms as well. If that's where the

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<v Speaker 1>behavior moves after, it's kind of uh wished out of

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<v Speaker 1>lawyer sort of legitimate or well wit days Jeff. Market

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<v Speaker 1>analysts say because of this change in traders in the

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<v Speaker 1>way they're doing business, whether they're cleaning up their act

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<v Speaker 1>or doing it um more surreptitiously, that liquidity has been reduced.

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<v Speaker 1>Do you see that, I really don't. I think that

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<v Speaker 1>the bond markets are robust, there's tremendous demand. I believe

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<v Speaker 1>we should have stronger enforcement, but I have to say

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<v Speaker 1>it's easier said than done. It is very difficult to

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<v Speaker 1>interfere with traders who are going to move off the

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<v Speaker 1>normal venues into a non paper corded settings. I think

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<v Speaker 1>we'll deter some people and will cause others to go underground.

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<v Speaker 1>I still believe we should have stronger enforcement, but I

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<v Speaker 1>have to say these kinds of defeats are going to

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<v Speaker 1>chill the government. Young use attorneys do not like to

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<v Speaker 1>effectively lose cases, and I think the government may go

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<v Speaker 1>back to things they're easier to prosecute, like insider trade.

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<v Speaker 1>We're having a much better track record, Bobby, do you

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<v Speaker 1>believe that it's clear to traders, to bond traders what

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<v Speaker 1>exactly fraudy is whether an omission can have the same

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<v Speaker 1>effect as a misrepresentation for example. Yeah, I think it's

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<v Speaker 1>been somewhat unclear actually in recent years. And and one

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<v Speaker 1>way of interpreting what has been doing in these cases

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<v Speaker 1>is actually the triberally impose a bit of player life.

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<v Speaker 1>I mean, a line is fairly difficult to draw between

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<v Speaker 1>each adjuration or puffery on the one hand and just

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<v Speaker 1>outright lining on the other, so that at least he

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<v Speaker 1>was kind of gray. And that's actually one reason that

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<v Speaker 1>this case was kind of gray, and why I suspect

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<v Speaker 1>it is the case that some of the charges were

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<v Speaker 1>sort of easier for the diary to find sort of

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<v Speaker 1>convincing than others. But one way to deal with that

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<v Speaker 1>in a problem, it's precisely to sort of reimpose a

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<v Speaker 1>certain bright line rules such as the rule is simply

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<v Speaker 1>not to lie. Right if you actually, if it's a

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<v Speaker 1>nice cut and dried answer to how much you pay

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<v Speaker 1>for exture security that you're not now trying to sell, Um,

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<v Speaker 1>it's not that difficult to understand, right, all right, don't

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<v Speaker 1>tell people that you paid at different price than you

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<v Speaker 1>actually pay. Right, it's very easy I think to impose

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<v Speaker 1>a bright line with respect of that kind of uh

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<v Speaker 1>talk that's in a communication, something in the way of

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<v Speaker 1>bright line order lines. Here at least with respect of

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<v Speaker 1>these questions, where the easy about to impose those sense

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<v Speaker 1>of wines and that will actually then clarify the beginning

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<v Speaker 1>of fraud. I suspect to market participants on both sides

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<v Speaker 1>of trades. Jack, How is the SEC proceeding in this

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<v Speaker 1>area in tandem with the federal prosecutors or separately? Oh? Yes,

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<v Speaker 1>they very very much act in tandem. But there's one

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<v Speaker 1>big difference. The SEC brings about eighty percent of their

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<v Speaker 1>enforcement cases in front of the administrative law judges in

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<v Speaker 1>inherse proceedings. That means there's no jury, and the administrative

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<v Speaker 1>lawd judge is someone who's a specialist in securities law.

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<v Speaker 1>It's much easier to convince that kind of judge than

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<v Speaker 1>a somewhat innocent jury that doesn't really know what's going on.

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<v Speaker 1>And I quiffe some of these cases moved back to

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<v Speaker 1>civil sec enforcement in administrative law proceedings, Bob, if you

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<v Speaker 1>could explain about the bond market and why for so long,

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<v Speaker 1>it has been more difficult to deal with, and the

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<v Speaker 1>government has sort of left it alone till about four

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<v Speaker 1>years ago the actions of bond traders and then decided

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<v Speaker 1>to crack down. Okay, so we've lost Bob for a

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<v Speaker 1>few minutes, Jack, Can you talk a little bit about

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<v Speaker 1>the bond the bond business and why there was this

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<v Speaker 1>crackdown started about four and a half years ago on

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<v Speaker 1>bond traders actions when they had basically been dealing in

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<v Speaker 1>this level where they said that they were dealing in

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<v Speaker 1>sophisticated transactions and they didn't have to behave in the

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<v Speaker 1>same way that other people did, other business people did,

0:12:56.920 --> 0:13:00.920
<v Speaker 1>other traders. The bond market has always been very opaque.

0:13:01.160 --> 0:13:04.240
<v Speaker 1>You're not trading against the backdrop of a constant stream

0:13:04.280 --> 0:13:08.360
<v Speaker 1>of prices going across one market. There's possibility that different

0:13:08.400 --> 0:13:11.840
<v Speaker 1>prices are occurring at the same time between different traders,

0:13:12.200 --> 0:13:15.400
<v Speaker 1>and because it's much more opaque, there was more room

0:13:15.480 --> 0:13:18.840
<v Speaker 1>for people to engage in little white lies. A trader

0:13:18.960 --> 0:13:21.520
<v Speaker 1>would tell the other side, I can't sell it that

0:13:21.640 --> 0:13:23.719
<v Speaker 1>price because that's less than I pay for it. I

0:13:23.760 --> 0:13:25.880
<v Speaker 1>don't want to report a loss, and the other side

0:13:25.960 --> 0:13:27.200
<v Speaker 1>was like, all right, I'll give you an eighth of

0:13:27.200 --> 0:13:29.680
<v Speaker 1>a point more, so we don't have to do that. Uh,

0:13:29.880 --> 0:13:33.520
<v Speaker 1>those little white lies were the culture of treading, and

0:13:33.559 --> 0:13:36.880
<v Speaker 1>I think the government, after the financial crisis decided they

0:13:36.880 --> 0:13:40.200
<v Speaker 1>were no longer going to accept this cultural story of

0:13:40.240 --> 0:13:43.520
<v Speaker 1>little white lies, and they found some pretty egregious cases

0:13:43.520 --> 0:13:50.920
<v Speaker 1>where public investors were regularly hurt injured by phony trading data.

0:13:52.360 --> 0:13:55.720
<v Speaker 1>Welcome back, fam, I understand your back on the phone.

0:13:55.760 --> 0:13:58.400
<v Speaker 1>We lost you for a moment there. Let's talk a

0:13:58.480 --> 0:14:01.839
<v Speaker 1>little bit about Jesse. It's fact who whenever you hear

0:14:01.880 --> 0:14:05.800
<v Speaker 1>about bond cases, you'd hear about Jesse lit fact because

0:14:05.880 --> 0:14:11.280
<v Speaker 1>he was tried twice and found guilty twice. So let's

0:14:11.320 --> 0:14:13.480
<v Speaker 1>talk a little bit about that case and what it's

0:14:13.480 --> 0:14:18.040
<v Speaker 1>sort of established. Yeah. So, really this was sort of

0:14:18.080 --> 0:14:20.840
<v Speaker 1>the font of all of the cases that we've been

0:14:20.840 --> 0:14:23.240
<v Speaker 1>talking about along these lines lately. Right, I mean, this

0:14:23.360 --> 0:14:25.200
<v Speaker 1>was the first sort of mark of a sea change,

0:14:25.240 --> 0:14:27.800
<v Speaker 1>so that the government was no longer going to treat

0:14:28.400 --> 0:14:30.760
<v Speaker 1>uh little white lines, as says Jack was calling them,

0:14:30.840 --> 0:14:33.000
<v Speaker 1>or even larger white lines, uh, as if they were

0:14:33.000 --> 0:14:34.920
<v Speaker 1>sort of innocent. Right. This was the first sort of

0:14:35.000 --> 0:14:37.960
<v Speaker 1>signal that the guvernment was going to get curious about

0:14:38.000 --> 0:14:42.520
<v Speaker 1>at least ensuring that people don't affirmatively mislead or affirmatively

0:14:42.640 --> 0:14:45.560
<v Speaker 1>lie uh to to those to the counterparties or two

0:14:45.520 --> 0:14:47.400
<v Speaker 1>others in the park. That's I mean, one of the

0:14:47.400 --> 0:14:49.560
<v Speaker 1>things that to keep in mind here is, you know,

0:14:49.640 --> 0:14:52.680
<v Speaker 1>even a common law outright line was that it was

0:14:52.720 --> 0:14:55.640
<v Speaker 1>a problem, I was what would would constitute drawing. And

0:14:55.680 --> 0:14:57.800
<v Speaker 1>one of the innovations made by the securities laws was

0:14:57.880 --> 0:15:00.080
<v Speaker 1>to sort of adds to sort of traditional commissi of

0:15:00.240 --> 0:15:03.720
<v Speaker 1>fraud a category of omissive fraud. And that's the sense

0:15:03.720 --> 0:15:06.400
<v Speaker 1>in which securities laws and securities regulations can be here

0:15:06.440 --> 0:15:08.200
<v Speaker 1>to sort of having pushed a kind of envelope. But

0:15:08.320 --> 0:15:10.720
<v Speaker 1>sort of ironic, I think about all of these post

0:15:10.760 --> 0:15:14.000
<v Speaker 1>lift back cases, including the case itself actually uh is

0:15:14.160 --> 0:15:17.560
<v Speaker 1>these were cases of actual commissive fraud. Uh. And the

0:15:17.600 --> 0:15:19.960
<v Speaker 1>thought that that these would have been controversial, or that

0:15:20.000 --> 0:15:21.600
<v Speaker 1>it would be thought to be sort of odd that

0:15:21.680 --> 0:15:24.480
<v Speaker 1>the should be prosecuted, I think is itself quite odd.

0:15:24.480 --> 0:15:26.400
<v Speaker 1>It sort of tells us something about where we've come

0:15:26.440 --> 0:15:29.360
<v Speaker 1>as a sort of financial culture. Uh. And and and

0:15:29.400 --> 0:15:31.120
<v Speaker 1>I think as as Jack was suggesting, and as I

0:15:31.200 --> 0:15:33.560
<v Speaker 1>was suggesting earlier, I mean One way of doing what

0:15:33.600 --> 0:15:36.040
<v Speaker 1>the government's been doing of lage is is saying, okay, look,

0:15:36.080 --> 0:15:38.320
<v Speaker 1>let's get back at least to a sort of standards

0:15:38.320 --> 0:15:41.400
<v Speaker 1>pursuance which you can't just sort of outright lie to

0:15:41.480 --> 0:15:44.000
<v Speaker 1>your counterparties. Uh and and and hope to sort of

0:15:44.040 --> 0:15:46.440
<v Speaker 1>get away with if I think, well, everybody discounts where

0:15:46.480 --> 0:15:48.480
<v Speaker 1>I say anyway, because it's sort of expected that we

0:15:48.600 --> 0:15:53.000
<v Speaker 1>lie here, that's just not going to cut it any longer. Jack,

0:15:53.280 --> 0:15:58.440
<v Speaker 1>do you see more plea deals or less plea deals

0:15:58.480 --> 0:16:01.520
<v Speaker 1>because we see some people getting off. As you said,

0:16:01.520 --> 0:16:05.080
<v Speaker 1>this wasn't a roaring victory for the government. To put

0:16:05.120 --> 0:16:08.760
<v Speaker 1>it mildly, well, a government, of course, can point to

0:16:08.800 --> 0:16:11.760
<v Speaker 1>the fact that one trader was convicted and that will

0:16:11.800 --> 0:16:14.920
<v Speaker 1>destroy his career. He'll never be a trader ever. Again,

0:16:15.400 --> 0:16:18.200
<v Speaker 1>it's only one count out of twenty seven. But they

0:16:18.280 --> 0:16:22.360
<v Speaker 1>do have an effective body on which they can hinge

0:16:22.400 --> 0:16:25.320
<v Speaker 1>a little bit of general deterrence. I do think, however,

0:16:25.600 --> 0:16:28.440
<v Speaker 1>we're going to see the government push more of these

0:16:28.480 --> 0:16:32.480
<v Speaker 1>cases into administrative proceedings where they avoid the difficulties of

0:16:32.560 --> 0:16:37.520
<v Speaker 1>juries and have an administrative law judge make the decision. Bobby,

0:16:37.920 --> 0:16:41.320
<v Speaker 1>is it actually more fitting for these kinds of cases

0:16:41.480 --> 0:16:47.080
<v Speaker 1>to be um SEC cases with civil penalties rather than

0:16:47.160 --> 0:16:49.960
<v Speaker 1>criminal cases. I mean, this is also the talk of

0:16:50.160 --> 0:16:52.680
<v Speaker 1>about insider trading as well. A lot you know, is

0:16:52.720 --> 0:16:58.320
<v Speaker 1>it is it really criminal or should it more be civil? Right? Well,

0:16:58.600 --> 0:17:01.360
<v Speaker 1>you know, I sind to think that in it if

0:17:02.040 --> 0:17:04.800
<v Speaker 1>in these kinds of cases it makes sense for the

0:17:04.840 --> 0:17:07.480
<v Speaker 1>greater part of them to be regulatory offenses or for

0:17:07.520 --> 0:17:10.399
<v Speaker 1>the sec to belcats. But it's very helpful for you know,

0:17:10.840 --> 0:17:14.359
<v Speaker 1>some some smallish attraction of such cases I think to

0:17:14.400 --> 0:17:17.280
<v Speaker 1>be prosecuted as criminal offenses, because that really sends the

0:17:17.320 --> 0:17:19.760
<v Speaker 1>signal much more dramatically. Right. And as you know, one

0:17:19.800 --> 0:17:22.560
<v Speaker 1>of the principal criticisms has been sort of leveled against

0:17:22.640 --> 0:17:25.280
<v Speaker 1>regulators or against the sort of the general governmental response

0:17:25.680 --> 0:17:28.800
<v Speaker 1>UH to financial broad and financial misdeeds in the wake

0:17:28.880 --> 0:17:32.520
<v Speaker 1>of the crashes, because it has been precisely the fact

0:17:32.600 --> 0:17:34.439
<v Speaker 1>that there's been so little in the way of criminal

0:17:34.480 --> 0:17:38.159
<v Speaker 1>prosecution done and so much more in the way of

0:17:37.600 --> 0:17:41.080
<v Speaker 1>UH regulatory settlements UH. And the why um and and

0:17:41.080 --> 0:17:43.840
<v Speaker 1>and the reason for the criticism might think is precisely

0:17:43.880 --> 0:17:46.440
<v Speaker 1>because people sort of understand that even one or two

0:17:46.880 --> 0:17:49.720
<v Speaker 1>criminal cases UH can carry a great deal of sort

0:17:49.720 --> 0:17:52.640
<v Speaker 1>of symbolic value and in that sense exercise a great

0:17:52.680 --> 0:17:56.440
<v Speaker 1>deal of the turrent effects. Uh, even if the great

0:17:56.480 --> 0:17:58.800
<v Speaker 1>bulk of cases are are brought by the regulators rather

0:17:58.840 --> 0:18:06.080
<v Speaker 1>than prosecutors. Jack insider trading was Preet Barra's domain. Let's

0:18:06.119 --> 0:18:08.720
<v Speaker 1>say he became famous as a sheriff of Wall Street

0:18:08.760 --> 0:18:13.600
<v Speaker 1>for prosecuting insider trading. Have the bond cases centered more

0:18:13.800 --> 0:18:23.560
<v Speaker 1>in Connecticut, Jack s c h C chairman have gone

0:18:23.560 --> 0:18:26.840
<v Speaker 1>out and lobbied U S attorneys to bring more criminal cases.

0:18:27.200 --> 0:18:31.760
<v Speaker 1>But generally federal criminal prosecutors want a very clear cut

0:18:31.840 --> 0:18:34.960
<v Speaker 1>case with much stronger evidence, with a real witness, with

0:18:35.040 --> 0:18:38.000
<v Speaker 1>a real victim. And that's why there's been very few

0:18:38.000 --> 0:18:41.720
<v Speaker 1>of these cases insider trading or bond trading brought outside

0:18:41.840 --> 0:18:45.200
<v Speaker 1>one or two jurisdictions, most notably the Southern District of

0:18:45.240 --> 0:18:47.879
<v Speaker 1>New York, which likes to bring these cases, has gotten

0:18:47.960 --> 0:18:50.560
<v Speaker 1>very experienced and very good at them. And it's also

0:18:50.640 --> 0:18:53.400
<v Speaker 1>possible that New York juries are a little bit more

0:18:53.400 --> 0:18:57.080
<v Speaker 1>skeptical of investment bankers and brokers and traders um. But

0:18:57.160 --> 0:19:01.520
<v Speaker 1>getting criminal enforcement brought outside of the Northeast is really

0:19:01.600 --> 0:19:04.360
<v Speaker 1>quite rare and I think that's still an area where

0:19:04.359 --> 0:19:06.919
<v Speaker 1>their sec and the government has got a lobby and

0:19:07.280 --> 0:19:10.080
<v Speaker 1>proselytiz all u S attorneys that they need to look

0:19:10.119 --> 0:19:15.040
<v Speaker 1>at white collar crime more than just street crime. And

0:19:15.040 --> 0:19:20.120
<v Speaker 1>and uh, Bob, what's what's your answer to that? If

0:19:20.160 --> 0:19:24.399
<v Speaker 1>you remember the question theory, remember whether whether it seems

0:19:24.400 --> 0:19:27.000
<v Speaker 1>as if there there is more of a focus There

0:19:27.080 --> 0:19:31.359
<v Speaker 1>wasn't as much of a focus in in Manhattan on

0:19:31.359 --> 0:19:34.320
<v Speaker 1>on this on bond trading. It was more you know,

0:19:34.480 --> 0:19:37.600
<v Speaker 1>insider trading, and it was all about insider trading that

0:19:37.760 --> 0:19:42.560
<v Speaker 1>really brought free Berrara into the spotlight, right right, Yeah,

0:19:42.640 --> 0:19:44.600
<v Speaker 1>So so part of it, of course, it's the fact

0:19:44.600 --> 0:19:47.560
<v Speaker 1>that the way to bond trading, uh trade that goes

0:19:47.680 --> 0:19:50.359
<v Speaker 1>that it's not centered as as as as much of

0:19:50.400 --> 0:19:53.760
<v Speaker 1>Manhattan as a lot of other securities trading is. And

0:19:53.760 --> 0:19:56.439
<v Speaker 1>that's probably part of the reason. And a lot of

0:19:56.440 --> 0:19:58.560
<v Speaker 1>it in that does occur right out of Connecticut, So

0:19:58.680 --> 0:20:01.040
<v Speaker 1>it sort of makes sense. I is right that there

0:20:01.040 --> 0:20:03.359
<v Speaker 1>will be more focused on it there than in New York.

0:20:05.680 --> 0:20:08.920
<v Speaker 1>So where do you see the investigations going now, Jack,

0:20:09.080 --> 0:20:14.760
<v Speaker 1>do you see them even even more investigations as far

0:20:14.840 --> 0:20:17.359
<v Speaker 1>as some of the things that traders may be doing

0:20:17.480 --> 0:20:20.760
<v Speaker 1>now to try to hide what they're doing. For example,

0:20:21.160 --> 0:20:26.760
<v Speaker 1>you talked about using encrypted messaging apps or personal cell phones.

0:20:27.359 --> 0:20:31.760
<v Speaker 1>So do you see the SEC or the federal prosecutors

0:20:31.800 --> 0:20:35.520
<v Speaker 1>trying to look into that which seems like it's difficult. Well,

0:20:35.560 --> 0:20:38.640
<v Speaker 1>they have in the recent prosecution of the Wall Street gambler.

0:20:38.840 --> 0:20:41.600
<v Speaker 1>There could be of these Las Vegas gambler. Mr Walters, Uh,

0:20:41.800 --> 0:20:45.320
<v Speaker 1>he used encrypted phones and that sounded very very suspicious

0:20:45.320 --> 0:20:49.399
<v Speaker 1>to the jury. Um, I think we do have. Southern

0:20:49.440 --> 0:20:52.919
<v Speaker 1>District prosecuters have become very attempt they now how to

0:20:53.000 --> 0:20:57.240
<v Speaker 1>bring certain kinds of criminal prosecutions. The SEC has well

0:20:57.280 --> 0:21:00.880
<v Speaker 1>known priorities they advertise with their priority. These are one

0:21:00.920 --> 0:21:03.359
<v Speaker 1>of their largest priorities, which is where I think future

0:21:03.400 --> 0:21:07.000
<v Speaker 1>criminal cases will come from, is the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.

0:21:07.320 --> 0:21:10.600
<v Speaker 1>They are very eager to find people paying foreign bribes

0:21:10.960 --> 0:21:12.879
<v Speaker 1>on behalf of the U. S Company or a foreign

0:21:12.920 --> 0:21:16.520
<v Speaker 1>company that's trying to broad to obtain business, and that

0:21:16.720 --> 0:21:19.160
<v Speaker 1>I think will be the source of quite a few

0:21:19.400 --> 0:21:23.159
<v Speaker 1>future criminal prosecutions. So well, money laundering, those are somewhat

0:21:23.200 --> 0:21:26.360
<v Speaker 1>easier cases to bring. They don't get you involved with

0:21:26.680 --> 0:21:29.280
<v Speaker 1>what it means when you make a particular crypto comment

0:21:29.400 --> 0:21:32.439
<v Speaker 1>to another in a quick phone conversation. They look at

0:21:32.440 --> 0:21:34.840
<v Speaker 1>the follow the money and you see hundreds of thousands

0:21:34.840 --> 0:21:39.480
<v Speaker 1>of dollars moving, and the jury understands that that's money laundering. Bob.

0:21:39.680 --> 0:21:44.640
<v Speaker 1>When you teach your students UH is bond or bond trading?

0:21:44.720 --> 0:21:47.560
<v Speaker 1>Is that is that an area that they're very interested in?

0:21:47.680 --> 0:21:52.240
<v Speaker 1>Or do they go more towards UH securities and and

0:21:52.400 --> 0:21:57.440
<v Speaker 1>insider trading? Well, I mean my stings are quite unenlinded.

0:21:57.480 --> 0:22:00.040
<v Speaker 1>It seems about what kind of UH financial practice of

0:22:00.119 --> 0:22:02.080
<v Speaker 1>going in, going to go into but of course make

0:22:02.160 --> 0:22:05.480
<v Speaker 1>it right now. Contact is it's very hot. Hedge funds,

0:22:05.480 --> 0:22:08.080
<v Speaker 1>private equity are very hot as well. If this assumed

0:22:08.080 --> 0:22:11.240
<v Speaker 1>to be a great deal of interest in bond trading

0:22:11.400 --> 0:22:14.280
<v Speaker 1>as such. But I think a part of that is because, um,

0:22:14.320 --> 0:22:17.439
<v Speaker 1>you know, the students at that stage are not really

0:22:17.480 --> 0:22:19.960
<v Speaker 1>fully aware of all of the differences that that's sort

0:22:20.000 --> 0:22:22.200
<v Speaker 1>of finer distinctions about what the life of a bond

0:22:22.200 --> 0:22:24.320
<v Speaker 1>trader looks like on the one hand, and the bond

0:22:24.359 --> 0:22:26.760
<v Speaker 1>they felt life of a security trader or securities underwriter

0:22:26.960 --> 0:22:29.000
<v Speaker 1>looks like on the other hand. They do know, however,

0:22:29.040 --> 0:22:31.960
<v Speaker 1>that there's something kind of vaguely sexy sounding or a

0:22:32.320 --> 0:22:35.280
<v Speaker 1>sort of exciting and futuristic sounding about things like skin

0:22:35.359 --> 0:22:40.000
<v Speaker 1>tech and startup law and UH and again private equity

0:22:40.119 --> 0:22:44.000
<v Speaker 1>operations UM cases like this. I don't know, perhaps they'll

0:22:44.000 --> 0:22:45.920
<v Speaker 1>make bond trading with a little bit wor it because

0:22:46.240 --> 0:22:47.560
<v Speaker 1>at least in the sense that this sort of thing

0:22:47.880 --> 0:22:50.680
<v Speaker 1>has become a public topics again in a certain sense

0:22:50.680 --> 0:22:52.320
<v Speaker 1>of it hadn't been for a while. But but I

0:22:52.359 --> 0:22:54.359
<v Speaker 1>have a funny feeling that the future, as far as

0:22:54.720 --> 0:22:57.280
<v Speaker 1>again the sort of being coming cohorted student systems learned

0:22:57.640 --> 0:22:59.840
<v Speaker 1>UH is still going to be with again the intact

0:22:59.880 --> 0:23:02.520
<v Speaker 1>of private equity at the startup type stuff for a

0:23:02.520 --> 0:23:04.760
<v Speaker 1>while now. Well, I thank you both for being on

0:23:04.840 --> 0:23:07.560
<v Speaker 1>Bloomberg Law. That's Robert Hack and he's a professor at

0:23:07.560 --> 0:23:11.680
<v Speaker 1>Cornell University Law School and John Coffee, professor at Columbia

0:23:11.760 --> 0:23:14.199
<v Speaker 1>Law School and two of our favorite guests here on

0:23:14.320 --> 0:23:16.720
<v Speaker 1>Bloomberg Law. Thank you both for being here.