WEBVTT - How the EFF Works

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<v Speaker 1>Again text technology with tech Stuff from stuff works dot com.

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<v Speaker 1>Hey there, and welcome to tech Stuff. I am your host,

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<v Speaker 1>Jonathan Strickland, and I'm just super I'm also the executive

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<v Speaker 1>producer or an executive producer here ed how stuff works

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<v Speaker 1>and I love talking about technology. And if you listen

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<v Speaker 1>to the previous episodes of tech Stuff, the two that

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<v Speaker 1>came before this, you heard about the the evolution did

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<v Speaker 1>the birth really of the Electronic Frontier Foundation as a

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<v Speaker 1>result of a really bizarre and ultimately over zealous sting

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<v Speaker 1>operation that the Secret Service did back in the early nineties.

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<v Speaker 1>So I want to talk more about the Electronic Frontier

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<v Speaker 1>Foundation and exactly what they do since really I just

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<v Speaker 1>talked about them kind of coming into being in the

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<v Speaker 1>last episode, and you know all about how uh the

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<v Speaker 1>Steve Jackson, who was the target of the Secret Service

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<v Speaker 1>in part of their sting operation, felt that his and

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<v Speaker 1>his employees civil liberties had been violated and was looking

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<v Speaker 1>for someone to help him pursue a claim against the

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<v Speaker 1>United States government, but found that none of the civil

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<v Speaker 1>liberties organizations that were in existence were really prepared to

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<v Speaker 1>help him out because they just weren't savvy as far

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<v Speaker 1>as the Internet goes, and so the Electronic Frontier Foundation

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<v Speaker 1>was borne out necessity by a group of people who

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<v Speaker 1>felt that they're definitely needed to be an organization dedicated

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<v Speaker 1>to defending civil liberties in the Internet space space, especially

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<v Speaker 1>since they foresaw the Internet becoming an increasingly important role

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<v Speaker 1>in our lives. And that has absolutely been the case.

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<v Speaker 1>The Internet has become instrumental to the point where some

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<v Speaker 1>people argue that it is a a fundamental necessity, the

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<v Speaker 1>kind of like food and water. You pretty much need

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<v Speaker 1>the Internet to make a go of it today, which

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<v Speaker 1>is now for at least for on the national level,

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<v Speaker 1>certainly you can make a case for that. Well, we're

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<v Speaker 1>gonna talk more about what the Electronic Frontier Foundation is

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<v Speaker 1>and what they do in this episode. The e f

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<v Speaker 1>F focuses on several broad areas of civil liberties, and

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<v Speaker 1>here's how the organization itself defines that. They actually have

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<v Speaker 1>a selection where they have a page where they talk

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<v Speaker 1>about all of these different ones. And we'll start with

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<v Speaker 1>free speech. So, freedom of speech typically means that the

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<v Speaker 1>people of any given population have the right to express

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<v Speaker 1>their opinions publicly without governmental interference, and a lot of

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<v Speaker 1>countries around the world have this as a fundamental freedom

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<v Speaker 1>codified in some way. Here in the United States, we

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<v Speaker 1>have the Constitution, and freedom of speech is in the

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<v Speaker 1>first Amendment in the Bill of Right, those first ten

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<v Speaker 1>Amendments to the Constitution. Is therefore a foundational right of

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<v Speaker 1>a citizen in the United States. There are some considerations

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<v Speaker 1>we have to make, however, freedom of speech does not

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<v Speaker 1>give you absolute freedom to say anything without governmental interference.

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<v Speaker 1>As it turns out, uh first, the right typically protects

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<v Speaker 1>against governmental abuse. Only that's something a lot of people

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<v Speaker 1>don't seem to understand, is that this concept of censorship

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<v Speaker 1>and denying someone their First Amendment rights. The Constitution protects

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<v Speaker 1>citizens against the government doing this. It's not meant to

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<v Speaker 1>be a an overall protection against any entity doing this

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<v Speaker 1>under any circumstances. So in other words, I make a blog. Alright,

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<v Speaker 1>create a blog, and I include a comments section. But

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<v Speaker 1>I decide that I'm going to monitor those comments, and

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<v Speaker 1>anything I see that's left in those comments I don't like,

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<v Speaker 1>I decide I'm just gonna go ahead and delete it.

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<v Speaker 1>That's perfectly fine. It's not the government that's restricting anyone's

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<v Speaker 1>free speech. But if the government was forcing me to

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<v Speaker 1>erase comments for whatever reason. That would be a violation

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<v Speaker 1>of free speech from a legal standpoint. So I can

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<v Speaker 1>I can create a space, whether it's online or maybe

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<v Speaker 1>I'm hosting a party, and if someone says something I

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<v Speaker 1>don't like, I can tell them that they can't say

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<v Speaker 1>that in my space. Because I'm not the government, I'm

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<v Speaker 1>not violating their First Amendment rights. This is more about

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<v Speaker 1>them being in my space and not just a fundamental

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<v Speaker 1>right as a citizen of the country. Also another thing

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<v Speaker 1>that considers that freedom of speech does have limitations. I

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<v Speaker 1>cannot make false claims against others in an effort to

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<v Speaker 1>harm them in some way. For example, that would be

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<v Speaker 1>slander or libel. Both of those are referencing making these

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<v Speaker 1>untrue claims in an effort to cause harm to another individual.

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<v Speaker 1>That harm might be physical, it might be financial, it

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<v Speaker 1>might be harm to their reputation. Uh, that is not

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<v Speaker 1>a protected form of speech. I also have no legal

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<v Speaker 1>protection if I use my speech to incite others to violence.

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<v Speaker 1>But this gets to be a tricky area. So you

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<v Speaker 1>might find court cases where there's an argument about whether

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<v Speaker 1>or not someone was calling people to violence, and sometimes

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<v Speaker 1>there are specific criteria that must be met, such as

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<v Speaker 1>was there a sense that the call to violence was

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<v Speaker 1>for an immediate response or for some predetermined time. Because

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<v Speaker 1>if that's the case, absolutely not protected by freedom of speech.

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<v Speaker 1>If it's more of a general let's resist, then you

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<v Speaker 1>could argue that should be protected under freedom of speech.

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<v Speaker 1>So it's it's not so cut and dry, it's not

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<v Speaker 1>black and white. A lot of these subtle variations have

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<v Speaker 1>to be hashed out in court cases which can go

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<v Speaker 1>either way. Accords not automatically going to decide in favor

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<v Speaker 1>of one side versus the other, and sometimes they decisions

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<v Speaker 1>can actually be surprising. But speech is protected within certain limits. Now,

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<v Speaker 1>communication online gets to be pretty complicated because you've got

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<v Speaker 1>Internet service providers, you've got financial services, you've got lots

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<v Speaker 1>of different working parts to the Internet, and a government

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<v Speaker 1>can lean on any component within that infrastructure. Right, a

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<v Speaker 1>government agent might come to an Internet service provider and say, hey,

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<v Speaker 1>we're looking for any signs of of criticisms against this

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<v Speaker 1>specific person. We want to suppress that, uh, and we're

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<v Speaker 1>going to do it through your service. Well, that would

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<v Speaker 1>be a form of censorship, and it would be a

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<v Speaker 1>violation of First Amendment rights. Um Even though the actual

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<v Speaker 1>silencing would seem to come from the Internet service provider,

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<v Speaker 1>which you might be able to argue has that capac city.

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<v Speaker 1>It would be ultimately due to government interference or a

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<v Speaker 1>financial company saying, hey, don't allow for any transactions to

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<v Speaker 1>happen with this particular entity because some of the stuff

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<v Speaker 1>they do is illegal. Uh. Because unless everything is illegal

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<v Speaker 1>in that, you know, and unless you can prove that

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<v Speaker 1>all those transactions are illegal, that gets super tricky because

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<v Speaker 1>if there are legal transactions happening, you're preventing those legal

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<v Speaker 1>transactions from actually occurring. So it's a very complicated mess,

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<v Speaker 1>and that's part of the reason why the Electronic Frontier

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<v Speaker 1>Foundation is getting involved in these sort of discussions. It's

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<v Speaker 1>to try and make sure that the rights of citizens

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<v Speaker 1>remain protected. The e f F is also dedicated to

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<v Speaker 1>protecting creativity and innovation, and that's their words. That's a

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<v Speaker 1>big playing field there. Some of the ideas that the

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<v Speaker 1>FF have are pretty simple. So, for example, the e

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<v Speaker 1>f F views copy right law as being somewhat problematic,

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<v Speaker 1>particularly when the entities that own intellectual property overstepped their bounds.

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<v Speaker 1>Copyright definitely has a place. It exists to protect a

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<v Speaker 1>creator or in some cases an owner of intellectual property

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<v Speaker 1>who did not themselves create the content, but they own

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<v Speaker 1>the content. But it protects them from those who would

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<v Speaker 1>reproduce that intellectual property for their own profit. But it

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<v Speaker 1>can also lead to draconian practices and even abuse. Another

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<v Speaker 1>example of protecting creativity and innovation comes in the form

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<v Speaker 1>of fighting patent trolls. So, if you don't know what

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<v Speaker 1>a patentrol is, um, a patentrol is an entity that

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<v Speaker 1>purchases patents not for the purposes of creating or implementing

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<v Speaker 1>a particular technology, but rather withholding that design from other

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<v Speaker 1>entities that could actually put it to use. So it's

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<v Speaker 1>kind of like, let's say you've got an inventor and

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<v Speaker 1>the inventor has come up with a brilliant way of

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<v Speaker 1>create eating a very efficient solar panel, and you pay

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<v Speaker 1>the inventor for the rights to the inventor's patent, and

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<v Speaker 1>she hands the patent over to you, and you've got

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<v Speaker 1>the patent in your hands, and you're like, ha ha,

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<v Speaker 1>it's mine now. And instead of going forward and then

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<v Speaker 1>manufacturing these solar panels and trying to make a business

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<v Speaker 1>that way, you just sit on the patent and you

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<v Speaker 1>look around and you pay attention, and you try and

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<v Speaker 1>see if anyone out there is making solar panels using

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<v Speaker 1>the method that you talked about or that is talked

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<v Speaker 1>about within the patent that you own. Now, patents are

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<v Speaker 1>public documents. Anyone can read them, but you have to

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<v Speaker 1>get the permission of the patent holder in order to

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<v Speaker 1>use the technology, and typically this is done through licensing.

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<v Speaker 1>Some patentrols will license the the technology or processes that

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<v Speaker 1>are in patents. They might charge quite a bit of money,

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<v Speaker 1>but they'll license it. Others won't, and instead, what they

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<v Speaker 1>do is they look for instances of someone using that

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<v Speaker 1>technology or that process and then threaten them with lawsuits,

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<v Speaker 1>typically very hefty ones. And uh it usually is an

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<v Speaker 1>attempt to get the other entity to settle out of court.

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<v Speaker 1>And that's how the patentrol makes money. It's not making

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<v Speaker 1>money by creating technology. It's not even making money by

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<v Speaker 1>licensing technology. It's making money by waiting until someone else

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<v Speaker 1>has tried to use that idea and then pouncing on them,

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<v Speaker 1>which legally they are allowed to do because they own

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<v Speaker 1>the patent. But ethically you might argue, well, all they're

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<v Speaker 1>really doing is withholding something that could be of value

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<v Speaker 1>to people, and they're doing it just so that they

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<v Speaker 1>can jump on any company that has the the desire

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<v Speaker 1>to actually make that technology. So it's a sticky situation

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<v Speaker 1>because on the one hand, you don't want to get

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<v Speaker 1>a get away from the concept of protecting intellectual property.

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<v Speaker 1>You want people to have a reasonable expectation of protection

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<v Speaker 1>so that they can profit from ideas and the work

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<v Speaker 1>that they do. But on the other hand, you don't

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<v Speaker 1>want entities hoarding knowledge and not letting it out unless

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<v Speaker 1>companies are paying exorbitant fees, because that stifles innovation. So

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<v Speaker 1>e f F is very much against the whole patentrol approach.

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<v Speaker 1>One huge area of interest for the e f is privacy.

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<v Speaker 1>This is one of those topics that some people don't

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<v Speaker 1>really consider until the worst has already happened to them.

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<v Speaker 1>So we've been conditioned as citizens of the Internet to

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<v Speaker 1>surrender more and more of our privacy in our online interactions,

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<v Speaker 1>sometimes without knowingly doing so, and occasionally it's because we're

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<v Speaker 1>sharing stuff about ourselves with our friends. So interactions on

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<v Speaker 1>Facebook are a great example. We willingly share information about ourselves,

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<v Speaker 1>it's part of our socialization. But that information isn't just

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<v Speaker 1>going to our ends, it's going to Facebook, which is

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<v Speaker 1>making very good use of that information. They're profiting off

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<v Speaker 1>of it. That is their business, it's how they make money.

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<v Speaker 1>And if we didn't share all this information, then Facebook

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<v Speaker 1>would not have a huge revenue source. Uh, it's certainly

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<v Speaker 1>wouldn't be as successful as it is today. Other times

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<v Speaker 1>we're sharing information because it's a matter of convenience. So

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<v Speaker 1>for example, Amazon has algorithms that will present you with

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<v Speaker 1>suggested items that you might be interested in based upon

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<v Speaker 1>your past browsing and shopping sessions. But again, that means

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<v Speaker 1>that it's collecting information about you and about your habits

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<v Speaker 1>in order to make these kind of suggestions in the

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<v Speaker 1>first place. Now for some people that's not a big deal.

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<v Speaker 1>For other people, they think it's super creepy. And in

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<v Speaker 1>many cases, there's another game going on that's going on

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<v Speaker 1>behind the scenes. That's where the information about us gets

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<v Speaker 1>collected into ever growing dos a's. It might be a

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<v Speaker 1>dossier that doesn't have your name on it, but it

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<v Speaker 1>has all the information that would anyone would need to

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<v Speaker 1>be able to identify you anyway. There's also this other

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<v Speaker 1>kind of slippery slope where companies will say, hey, we

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<v Speaker 1>we use anonymous data. We don't. We don't connect an

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<v Speaker 1>identity to the information we get. We want the information

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<v Speaker 1>so that we can run analyzes, but we don't want

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<v Speaker 1>to say, oh, well, that's that's Bob Smith. That's clearly

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<v Speaker 1>Bob Smith. The problem is the more points of data

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<v Speaker 1>you have about any individual person, the easier it is

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<v Speaker 1>to identify who that person is. And you could even

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<v Speaker 1>argue that the person's name is the least important thing

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<v Speaker 1>about that person from a certain perspective. Knowing all about

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<v Speaker 1>that person in their habits and what they want and

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<v Speaker 1>what they don't want, what they like, what they hate,

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<v Speaker 1>all that is valuable information. The name is superfluous at

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<v Speaker 1>that point, and we should still be concerned about all

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<v Speaker 1>that other information about us. That's the Electronic Frontier Foundation's

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<v Speaker 1>point is that we need to be cognizant that all

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<v Speaker 1>of this information about us is being shared and and

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<v Speaker 1>it's being h collected and stored and sold. There are

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<v Speaker 1>entire companies that exist just to buy and sell user information,

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<v Speaker 1>and that gets a little creepy. Beyond that, there are

0:14:23.840 --> 0:14:27.480
<v Speaker 1>also organizations that are actively spying on people. They're not

0:14:27.520 --> 0:14:31.360
<v Speaker 1>just passively collecting information or or building dossiers. There are

0:14:31.400 --> 0:14:37.720
<v Speaker 1>some that are really performing surveillance upon folks. Take the

0:14:37.840 --> 0:14:39.840
<v Speaker 1>n s A for example, and I don't mean the

0:14:39.920 --> 0:14:44.120
<v Speaker 1>National Scrabble Association, but I do mean the National Security Agency.

0:14:44.680 --> 0:14:46.840
<v Speaker 1>Over the last few years, details about the n S

0:14:46.880 --> 0:14:50.960
<v Speaker 1>AS various surveillance programs have raised lots of red flags

0:14:51.040 --> 0:14:55.560
<v Speaker 1>among numerous civil liberties organizations, including the e f F. Now,

0:14:55.600 --> 0:14:59.760
<v Speaker 1>another issue that the organization concerns itself with is online

0:14:59.800 --> 0:15:04.320
<v Speaker 1>s purity, which often goes hand in hand with privacy,

0:15:04.400 --> 0:15:07.880
<v Speaker 1>and this goes from supporting various encryption strategies to help

0:15:08.240 --> 0:15:13.560
<v Speaker 1>protecting communication from prying eyes to launching the Coders Rights

0:15:13.600 --> 0:15:16.120
<v Speaker 1>Project to protect programmers rights as they work on the

0:15:16.160 --> 0:15:19.800
<v Speaker 1>bleeding edge of technology. The FF advocates for a secure,

0:15:19.840 --> 0:15:25.600
<v Speaker 1>supportive online environment, and they also argue for transparency from

0:15:25.640 --> 0:15:28.320
<v Speaker 1>the various entities that either make up the infrastructure of

0:15:28.360 --> 0:15:31.240
<v Speaker 1>the Internet or use the Internet in some fundamental way,

0:15:31.560 --> 0:15:36.040
<v Speaker 1>which includes holding government agencies accountable and demanding that these

0:15:36.040 --> 0:15:40.680
<v Speaker 1>agencies are forthright about their online activities, which isn't always easy.

0:15:40.720 --> 0:15:43.720
<v Speaker 1>It can sometimes require extraordinary efforts to get the real

0:15:43.760 --> 0:15:46.680
<v Speaker 1>story out of various government agencies about what is actually

0:15:46.720 --> 0:15:50.400
<v Speaker 1>going on, and sometimes it even requires legal action to

0:15:50.520 --> 0:15:54.320
<v Speaker 1>force government offices to change their policies when those policies

0:15:54.360 --> 0:15:58.000
<v Speaker 1>aren't aligned with constitutional protections. That's a fancy way of saying.

0:15:58.040 --> 0:15:59.960
<v Speaker 1>The e f F is sort of a watch dot

0:16:00.360 --> 0:16:04.800
<v Speaker 1>and just making sure that governments are doing the right

0:16:04.840 --> 0:16:09.800
<v Speaker 1>thing for their citizens and they're not working against their citizens.

0:16:09.960 --> 0:16:13.040
<v Speaker 1>And transparency is absolutely important for that because if you

0:16:13.160 --> 0:16:17.480
<v Speaker 1>if you have a policy that's not transparent, that does

0:16:17.520 --> 0:16:20.640
<v Speaker 1>not tell the citizens, hey, this is what's really going on,

0:16:21.400 --> 0:16:26.480
<v Speaker 1>then you've introduced a reason to distrust the government. And

0:16:26.760 --> 0:16:28.520
<v Speaker 1>I would argue the e f F has got a

0:16:28.640 --> 0:16:33.080
<v Speaker 1>very healthy distrust of government and in many ways it's justified.

0:16:33.480 --> 0:16:35.720
<v Speaker 1>In some ways, it may be over zealous, but in

0:16:36.160 --> 0:16:39.560
<v Speaker 1>most ways, I think, uh, the government has given plenty

0:16:39.640 --> 0:16:43.840
<v Speaker 1>of of reasons why the FFS position is not unreasonable.

0:16:43.920 --> 0:16:46.640
<v Speaker 1>You may not agree with it, but you probably would

0:16:46.640 --> 0:16:49.400
<v Speaker 1>at least come to the conclusion that they have reason

0:16:49.600 --> 0:16:52.880
<v Speaker 1>for their behaviors. The e f F also works to

0:16:53.000 --> 0:16:56.840
<v Speaker 1>help free people who are held prisoner for speaking out online,

0:16:56.880 --> 0:17:01.600
<v Speaker 1>particularly people who are journalists or activists, and they also

0:17:01.640 --> 0:17:05.000
<v Speaker 1>try to raise awareness about potentially abusive policies, such as

0:17:05.000 --> 0:17:09.040
<v Speaker 1>electronic media searches conducted at border crossings. You may have

0:17:09.119 --> 0:17:12.080
<v Speaker 1>heard of this in the last several years, where people

0:17:12.320 --> 0:17:16.160
<v Speaker 1>who are crossing over the US border, whether on land

0:17:16.280 --> 0:17:20.199
<v Speaker 1>or by air by sea, will be greeted by border

0:17:21.040 --> 0:17:24.000
<v Speaker 1>officers or custom officials and they will say, hey, we

0:17:24.480 --> 0:17:26.920
<v Speaker 1>want to get hold of your mobile device or your

0:17:26.920 --> 0:17:29.919
<v Speaker 1>computer and make an electronic search of the materials to

0:17:29.920 --> 0:17:35.600
<v Speaker 1>make sure there's nothing questionable on there. And the FF

0:17:35.640 --> 0:17:38.400
<v Speaker 1>steps in and says, hey, unless you've got a warrant,

0:17:38.760 --> 0:17:41.240
<v Speaker 1>then you really can't do that would be unreasonable search

0:17:41.280 --> 0:17:47.640
<v Speaker 1>and seizure to just search somebody randomly like that. Um

0:17:47.680 --> 0:17:50.240
<v Speaker 1>so that that's another one of their big positions. Of course,

0:17:50.240 --> 0:17:52.280
<v Speaker 1>when the e f F first got its start, its

0:17:52.320 --> 0:17:55.679
<v Speaker 1>mission wasn't quite so methodically organized. It all began with

0:17:55.720 --> 0:17:59.120
<v Speaker 1>that court case with Steve Jackson Games bringing it against

0:17:59.119 --> 0:18:02.399
<v Speaker 1>the Secret Service, and that case was instrumental because it

0:18:02.560 --> 0:18:06.000
<v Speaker 1>established in a United States court of law that electronic

0:18:06.080 --> 0:18:10.720
<v Speaker 1>mail should receive the same protections and considerations as telephone communication,

0:18:11.080 --> 0:18:13.960
<v Speaker 1>which means that law enforcement does not have the authority

0:18:14.040 --> 0:18:18.760
<v Speaker 1>to intercept or otherwise read electronic communication without first securing

0:18:18.800 --> 0:18:21.399
<v Speaker 1>a warrant from a judge, and that was just the

0:18:21.400 --> 0:18:25.320
<v Speaker 1>beginning of the FF. The next big case that they

0:18:25.400 --> 0:18:29.120
<v Speaker 1>became involved in was Bernstein versus U S Department of Justice.

0:18:29.600 --> 0:18:31.639
<v Speaker 1>And you might have heard the phrase the pen is

0:18:31.720 --> 0:18:35.440
<v Speaker 1>mightier than the sword. Well, Daniel J. Bernstein's pen must

0:18:35.440 --> 0:18:39.280
<v Speaker 1>have been a real whopper. The US government identified Bernstein's

0:18:39.320 --> 0:18:41.880
<v Speaker 1>work as so dangerous that he was told he need

0:18:41.880 --> 0:18:45.639
<v Speaker 1>to secure an arms dealer license to talk about it

0:18:45.800 --> 0:18:49.560
<v Speaker 1>or to publish his work outside the United States. What

0:18:50.240 --> 0:18:52.680
<v Speaker 1>you might be saying, I know I did. Well, let's

0:18:52.720 --> 0:18:56.240
<v Speaker 1>backtrack a bit. In fact, we're gonna backtrack a lot,

0:18:56.280 --> 0:18:58.720
<v Speaker 1>because that's what I do on this show. So we're

0:18:58.760 --> 0:19:02.560
<v Speaker 1>gonna talk about cryptography. The cryptography branches off of an

0:19:02.600 --> 0:19:06.280
<v Speaker 1>ancient strategy of hiding messages in some way so that

0:19:06.320 --> 0:19:09.520
<v Speaker 1>the person or persons you are contacting are the only

0:19:09.600 --> 0:19:13.119
<v Speaker 1>ones who get the information you're actually sending. And there

0:19:13.160 --> 0:19:16.600
<v Speaker 1>are lots of different ways to do this. There's steganography

0:19:16.960 --> 0:19:20.840
<v Speaker 1>that involves hiding data within some other non secret formats,

0:19:20.880 --> 0:19:23.760
<v Speaker 1>such as inside the code of an MP three file

0:19:24.160 --> 0:19:27.280
<v Speaker 1>or inside of an image. Uh, you could hide it

0:19:27.320 --> 0:19:30.680
<v Speaker 1>with tiny little micro dots on microfilm, which would be

0:19:30.800 --> 0:19:32.840
<v Speaker 1>very difficult to detect unless you knew what you were

0:19:32.880 --> 0:19:36.000
<v Speaker 1>looking for. Or there's encryption in which you take a

0:19:36.000 --> 0:19:39.240
<v Speaker 1>message in one format, you apply some sort of process

0:19:39.359 --> 0:19:42.520
<v Speaker 1>to the message to transform it in some way, and

0:19:42.520 --> 0:19:46.280
<v Speaker 1>then you send that transformed message to the recipient, who

0:19:46.280 --> 0:19:49.280
<v Speaker 1>presumably has a method for reversing this process and gaining

0:19:49.320 --> 0:19:52.919
<v Speaker 1>access to the original message. So a simple version of

0:19:52.960 --> 0:19:55.520
<v Speaker 1>this is just a cipher where you have a set

0:19:55.520 --> 0:19:58.639
<v Speaker 1>of rules, and the simplest of all ciphers would be

0:19:58.680 --> 0:20:03.040
<v Speaker 1>just shifting all the letters down by a slot, so

0:20:03.119 --> 0:20:05.520
<v Speaker 1>A is B B, S C, C is D, that

0:20:05.600 --> 0:20:07.280
<v Speaker 1>kind of thing, and then writing it all out, and

0:20:07.320 --> 0:20:10.000
<v Speaker 1>because the person you're sending it to knows the rules,

0:20:10.080 --> 0:20:15.440
<v Speaker 1>they can reverse that and they can then decipher the message. Obviously,

0:20:15.440 --> 0:20:18.080
<v Speaker 1>cryptography tends to be a little more complicated than that,

0:20:18.160 --> 0:20:21.800
<v Speaker 1>because people are onto us. They figured out the whole

0:20:21.840 --> 0:20:25.200
<v Speaker 1>A S, B, B is C thing, the clever clever people.

0:20:25.640 --> 0:20:30.399
<v Speaker 1>According to the site tech Target, cryptography has four objectives.

0:20:31.160 --> 0:20:33.960
<v Speaker 1>The first is secrecy, which means only the person with

0:20:34.000 --> 0:20:37.920
<v Speaker 1>the proper key, as in the intended recipient, can read

0:20:37.960 --> 0:20:42.040
<v Speaker 1>the original message. The second is integrity, which means the

0:20:42.080 --> 0:20:45.119
<v Speaker 1>message cannot be changed in any way between the sender

0:20:45.200 --> 0:20:49.960
<v Speaker 1>and the recipient without being detected. Next is non repudiation,

0:20:50.080 --> 0:20:52.640
<v Speaker 1>which means that there's no plausible deniability on the part

0:20:52.640 --> 0:20:55.359
<v Speaker 1>of the sender. Uh This is to remove the possibility

0:20:55.400 --> 0:20:58.480
<v Speaker 1>the sender could leave a recipient out to hang by

0:20:58.520 --> 0:21:02.080
<v Speaker 1>denying they ever intended to create or send the message.

0:21:02.160 --> 0:21:05.240
<v Speaker 1>And fourth is authentication, which means that both the sender

0:21:05.320 --> 0:21:08.280
<v Speaker 1>and the recipient can be assured of each other's identities.

0:21:08.760 --> 0:21:11.760
<v Speaker 1>Now that does not mean that all cryptographic systems meet

0:21:11.840 --> 0:21:16.320
<v Speaker 1>all four of those objectives, but a good cryptographic system

0:21:16.400 --> 0:21:19.840
<v Speaker 1>should meet at least most of them, and an ideal

0:21:19.880 --> 0:21:22.919
<v Speaker 1>system would meet all four criteria. So with such a system,

0:21:22.960 --> 0:21:25.359
<v Speaker 1>you can be sure that any message you sent would

0:21:25.400 --> 0:21:28.119
<v Speaker 1>be secure until it got to the right person, and

0:21:28.200 --> 0:21:31.439
<v Speaker 1>that only that right person would be able to decrypt it.

0:21:31.560 --> 0:21:33.640
<v Speaker 1>And further, both of you could be sure the message

0:21:33.720 --> 0:21:37.000
<v Speaker 1>came from and went to the right people. Cryptography is

0:21:37.080 --> 0:21:39.600
<v Speaker 1>used for all sorts of communication, but it's clearly of

0:21:39.600 --> 0:21:43.120
<v Speaker 1>critical importance if you want to send someone information that

0:21:43.200 --> 0:21:46.560
<v Speaker 1>other people absolutely should not see. For this reason, it's

0:21:46.600 --> 0:21:50.680
<v Speaker 1>a big part of diplomacy. For espionage for financial operations

0:21:50.680 --> 0:21:54.600
<v Speaker 1>and other supersensitive activities, and the United States, like many

0:21:54.640 --> 0:21:58.600
<v Speaker 1>other countries, places a very high value on cryptographic strategies,

0:21:58.800 --> 0:22:02.200
<v Speaker 1>which is why the US government decided to include cryptographic

0:22:02.240 --> 0:22:08.560
<v Speaker 1>systems in its documentation for International Traffic in Arms Regulations. Now,

0:22:08.600 --> 0:22:12.119
<v Speaker 1>this is a document that effectively defined cryptography as a

0:22:12.119 --> 0:22:16.280
<v Speaker 1>weapon itself under a category thirteen of Title twenty two,

0:22:16.600 --> 0:22:21.359
<v Speaker 1>Chapter one, sub Chapter M of the Code of Federal Regulations.

0:22:21.720 --> 0:22:25.840
<v Speaker 1>You'll see the title Auxiliary Military Equipment. And here's an

0:22:25.920 --> 0:22:31.080
<v Speaker 1>excerpt from that section. Information Security systems and Equipment, cryptographic devices,

0:22:31.200 --> 0:22:36.400
<v Speaker 1>software and components specifically designed or modified therefore including cryptographic

0:22:36.480 --> 0:22:42.080
<v Speaker 1>including key management systems, equipment assemblies, modules, integrated circuits, components,

0:22:42.160 --> 0:22:45.840
<v Speaker 1>or software with the capability of maintaining secrecy or confidentiality

0:22:45.880 --> 0:22:49.720
<v Speaker 1>of information or information systems. Now, the reason why I

0:22:49.960 --> 0:22:52.040
<v Speaker 1>just give the whole list is to show that the

0:22:52.160 --> 0:22:55.800
<v Speaker 1>United States government to find cryptographic systems as a weapon

0:22:56.400 --> 0:23:00.359
<v Speaker 1>under the official United States Munitions List, and as such,

0:23:00.520 --> 0:23:04.120
<v Speaker 1>only a licensed authority would be allowed to export such

0:23:04.160 --> 0:23:07.000
<v Speaker 1>a weapon. In the case of cryptographic systems, that meant

0:23:07.040 --> 0:23:09.359
<v Speaker 1>you would need a license to either distribute the code

0:23:09.440 --> 0:23:12.760
<v Speaker 1>or publish the information. Now, Daniel Bernstein wanted to do

0:23:12.840 --> 0:23:14.919
<v Speaker 1>both of those things. He actually wanted to talk about

0:23:15.000 --> 0:23:19.560
<v Speaker 1>this cryptographic approach he had developed and to distribute electronic

0:23:20.119 --> 0:23:24.800
<v Speaker 1>programs that could create these sort of cryptographic messages themselves,

0:23:25.320 --> 0:23:29.200
<v Speaker 1>and he called it Snuffle. She's pretty harmless. And we'll

0:23:29.280 --> 0:23:32.359
<v Speaker 1>learn more about Snuffle and his legal battles in just

0:23:32.440 --> 0:23:36.399
<v Speaker 1>a second, but first let's take a quick break to

0:23:36.520 --> 0:23:48.639
<v Speaker 1>thank our sponsor. So Bernstein developed a pretty straightforward system

0:23:48.680 --> 0:23:51.480
<v Speaker 1>as a grad student at the University of California at

0:23:51.480 --> 0:23:57.400
<v Speaker 1>Berkeley in ninet for cryptographic systems. It used an encryption

0:23:57.480 --> 0:24:01.359
<v Speaker 1>key to generate some seemingly random tech XT, which then

0:24:01.400 --> 0:24:04.399
<v Speaker 1>could be run in an x or process against a

0:24:04.480 --> 0:24:08.400
<v Speaker 1>message you intended to incipher. This inciphered text could then

0:24:08.440 --> 0:24:11.440
<v Speaker 1>be sent to your recipient and they would use their

0:24:11.480 --> 0:24:15.120
<v Speaker 1>copy of the encryption key to essentially reverse the process

0:24:15.160 --> 0:24:17.159
<v Speaker 1>and read the original message. It gets a little more

0:24:17.160 --> 0:24:19.520
<v Speaker 1>technical than that, but that's really the key of it.

0:24:19.760 --> 0:24:23.720
<v Speaker 1>Bernstein's method was called a zero delay private key encryption system,

0:24:23.720 --> 0:24:25.320
<v Speaker 1>which I mean it could be used in real time

0:24:25.359 --> 0:24:29.000
<v Speaker 1>communication between two individuals who are sharing a common private

0:24:29.400 --> 0:24:33.880
<v Speaker 1>encryption key. Bernstein's approach relied on that cryptographic hash function,

0:24:34.440 --> 0:24:37.080
<v Speaker 1>which in itself was a perfectly legal approach, should have

0:24:37.119 --> 0:24:41.600
<v Speaker 1>been upheld as being not that's not a munition, it's

0:24:41.600 --> 0:24:46.880
<v Speaker 1>not a weapon. But Bernstein's implementation created a strong encryption system,

0:24:47.240 --> 0:24:50.480
<v Speaker 1>and that was what the United States government had determined

0:24:50.560 --> 0:24:53.359
<v Speaker 1>was illegal to distribute. So it wasn't so much the

0:24:53.440 --> 0:24:56.520
<v Speaker 1>encryption approach, but rather the description of how to use

0:24:56.600 --> 0:24:59.960
<v Speaker 1>it that was deemed to be illegal for export. Bernstein

0:25:00.160 --> 0:25:03.159
<v Speaker 1>sought out permission to publish his algorithm. He wanted to

0:25:03.200 --> 0:25:06.640
<v Speaker 1>also publish a paper to describe the algorithm, and also

0:25:06.760 --> 0:25:09.800
<v Speaker 1>a computer program that could run the algorithm, and he

0:25:09.840 --> 0:25:12.800
<v Speaker 1>wanted to present all of them in an electronic conference.

0:25:13.280 --> 0:25:15.760
<v Speaker 1>So he petitioned the State Department. Even though his own

0:25:15.760 --> 0:25:21.440
<v Speaker 1>work had no connection to government funding, uh or anything

0:25:21.600 --> 0:25:24.600
<v Speaker 1>any state funding. There's nothing that was coming through too

0:25:25.240 --> 0:25:30.280
<v Speaker 1>to connect his work with any sort of official government process.

0:25:30.320 --> 0:25:32.800
<v Speaker 1>So what would happen if he had skipped this permission

0:25:32.840 --> 0:25:34.840
<v Speaker 1>step and if he had just gone ahead and done

0:25:34.840 --> 0:25:38.800
<v Speaker 1>it well? According to US law, exporting a weapon to

0:25:38.920 --> 0:25:42.080
<v Speaker 1>a foreign agent could result in a ten year jail

0:25:42.119 --> 0:25:45.679
<v Speaker 1>sentence and a million dollar criminal fine, and that's just

0:25:45.920 --> 0:25:49.760
<v Speaker 1>for start. So that would mean because the government classified

0:25:49.760 --> 0:25:53.200
<v Speaker 1>cryptographic systems as a type of weapon. In his petition,

0:25:53.280 --> 0:25:57.119
<v Speaker 1>Bernstein wrote, quote and effect, what I want to export

0:25:57.320 --> 0:26:00.840
<v Speaker 1>is a description of a way to use existing technology

0:26:00.880 --> 0:26:04.679
<v Speaker 1>in a more effective manner. I do not foresee military

0:26:04.800 --> 0:26:07.639
<v Speaker 1>or commercial use of Snuffle by anyone who does not

0:26:07.880 --> 0:26:12.600
<v Speaker 1>already have access to the cryptographic technology contained in I

0:26:12.720 --> 0:26:15.720
<v Speaker 1>do foresee practical use of Snuffle by those who do

0:26:15.840 --> 0:26:19.720
<v Speaker 1>have such access, in particular for the purpose of interactively

0:26:19.840 --> 0:26:25.000
<v Speaker 1>exchanging encrypted text end quote. The State Department rejected his

0:26:25.080 --> 0:26:28.400
<v Speaker 1>request and said that he would have to obtain a license.

0:26:29.040 --> 0:26:34.240
<v Speaker 1>The response said, this commodity is a standalone cryptographic algorithm

0:26:34.240 --> 0:26:38.000
<v Speaker 1>which is not incorporated into a finished software product, which

0:26:38.040 --> 0:26:43.960
<v Speaker 1>meant that unlike various copyright protection schemes and other implementations

0:26:44.040 --> 0:26:49.320
<v Speaker 1>that included encryption, Bernstein's approach was just the method of

0:26:49.400 --> 0:26:52.240
<v Speaker 1>encrypting data, and therefore that's what made it subject to

0:26:52.280 --> 0:26:55.160
<v Speaker 1>these rules, which is kind of crazy when you think

0:26:55.200 --> 0:26:58.920
<v Speaker 1>about it. It's essentially saying, hey, if if your approach

0:26:59.000 --> 0:27:01.840
<v Speaker 1>was actually part of a piece of software, you might

0:27:01.880 --> 0:27:04.000
<v Speaker 1>not even be running into these issues. But you're just

0:27:04.040 --> 0:27:09.200
<v Speaker 1>specifically talking about how to encrypt data. So Bernstein submitted

0:27:09.240 --> 0:27:13.400
<v Speaker 1>five separate requests to publish the source code for encryption,

0:27:13.880 --> 0:27:17.399
<v Speaker 1>the source code for decryption and English explanation of how

0:27:17.440 --> 0:27:21.160
<v Speaker 1>to encrypt data and English description of how to decrypt data,

0:27:21.400 --> 0:27:24.440
<v Speaker 1>and the original paper. The State Department would lump all

0:27:24.480 --> 0:27:27.640
<v Speaker 1>of those requests together in a single one and denied

0:27:27.720 --> 0:27:33.040
<v Speaker 1>them unilaterally. Bernstein then contacted the Electronic Frontier Foundation as

0:27:33.040 --> 0:27:36.080
<v Speaker 1>he felt his First Amendment rights were being violated. Now

0:27:36.080 --> 0:27:39.840
<v Speaker 1>this was in This was years after his initial attempts,

0:27:40.320 --> 0:27:43.679
<v Speaker 1>as the wheels of government do not turn quickly, and

0:27:43.760 --> 0:27:46.760
<v Speaker 1>the e f F agreed to support his case and

0:27:46.800 --> 0:27:49.399
<v Speaker 1>they brought a lawsuit against the government, stating that the

0:27:49.480 --> 0:27:53.040
<v Speaker 1>law was unconstitutional and that the State Department had overstepped

0:27:53.040 --> 0:27:57.400
<v Speaker 1>its authority. Now, the legal proceedings lasted four more years,

0:27:58.000 --> 0:28:01.400
<v Speaker 1>so this is a decade out of Bernstein's life that's

0:28:01.440 --> 0:28:06.600
<v Speaker 1>just dedicated just getting this cryptographic software published. The court

0:28:06.680 --> 0:28:10.000
<v Speaker 1>ultimately decided that software code is a type of speech

0:28:10.040 --> 0:28:12.760
<v Speaker 1>and therefore is covered by the protections of the First Amendment,

0:28:13.160 --> 0:28:15.320
<v Speaker 1>which meant the court agreed with the e f F

0:28:15.640 --> 0:28:20.120
<v Speaker 1>that the State Department's actions were unconstitutional. As such, the

0:28:20.240 --> 0:28:24.120
<v Speaker 1>United States coders can now create encryption software and publish

0:28:24.160 --> 0:28:27.359
<v Speaker 1>it or export it without first securing permission from the

0:28:27.440 --> 0:28:30.760
<v Speaker 1>US government, which is a pretty huge deal. Several of

0:28:30.800 --> 0:28:33.480
<v Speaker 1>the cases that the e f has participated in have

0:28:33.600 --> 0:28:37.679
<v Speaker 1>set important precedents in law. It's not just that the

0:28:37.760 --> 0:28:39.880
<v Speaker 1>e f F has helped the tech sector, but that

0:28:40.040 --> 0:28:43.120
<v Speaker 1>is played an instrumental role in extending the protections that

0:28:43.200 --> 0:28:46.920
<v Speaker 1>exist for one type of expression to the technological realm.

0:28:47.360 --> 0:28:50.760
<v Speaker 1>So one of the big arguments the e f makes

0:28:50.840 --> 0:28:53.240
<v Speaker 1>over and over again is that if this were any

0:28:53.240 --> 0:28:56.640
<v Speaker 1>other form of communication, there would be no question that

0:28:56.760 --> 0:29:00.480
<v Speaker 1>the First Amendment protection extends to it, because, as there's

0:29:00.520 --> 0:29:05.800
<v Speaker 1>plenty of precedent to show, so what makes technology technological

0:29:05.840 --> 0:29:09.440
<v Speaker 1>expression so much different than these other formats? And the

0:29:09.560 --> 0:29:12.160
<v Speaker 1>response over and over again has been, well, there really

0:29:12.360 --> 0:29:17.880
<v Speaker 1>is no important distinction between them, and therefore those First

0:29:17.880 --> 0:29:23.120
<v Speaker 1>Amendment rights should absolutely extend to electronic communication. So the

0:29:23.160 --> 0:29:24.760
<v Speaker 1>e f F has played a big role in just

0:29:24.960 --> 0:29:29.160
<v Speaker 1>making sure that this kind of of technology and this

0:29:29.320 --> 0:29:33.680
<v Speaker 1>kind of expression receives that same protection one of those cases,

0:29:33.880 --> 0:29:36.200
<v Speaker 1>uh or really to go through all of the cases

0:29:36.400 --> 0:29:39.520
<v Speaker 1>the ff has been part of, would be ridiculous. It

0:29:39.520 --> 0:29:43.479
<v Speaker 1>would require many many many more episodes, and I'm not

0:29:43.520 --> 0:29:45.840
<v Speaker 1>going to do that, will do an overview of a

0:29:45.880 --> 0:29:50.240
<v Speaker 1>few cases and kind of explain how the outcomes were important.

0:29:50.560 --> 0:29:55.160
<v Speaker 1>So one of those cases helped differentiate protection against piracy

0:29:55.360 --> 0:29:59.960
<v Speaker 1>versus establishing an anti competitive practice. And this is kind

0:30:00.000 --> 0:30:03.560
<v Speaker 1>of interesting because it doesn't involve communication over the Internet,

0:30:03.600 --> 0:30:06.920
<v Speaker 1>but it does involve technology. The case was called lex

0:30:07.000 --> 0:30:10.080
<v Speaker 1>Mark versus Static Control, and it all had to do

0:30:10.120 --> 0:30:16.440
<v Speaker 1>with toner cartridges, like printer cartridges. Lex Mark makes laser

0:30:16.480 --> 0:30:22.719
<v Speaker 1>printers and Static Control would sell remanufactured, refilled toner cartridges. Now,

0:30:22.760 --> 0:30:26.200
<v Speaker 1>in case you're not aware, toner cartridges are where the

0:30:26.240 --> 0:30:29.160
<v Speaker 1>real money is at. With printers. There are a lot

0:30:29.160 --> 0:30:31.440
<v Speaker 1>of companies that will sell their printers at a loss

0:30:31.720 --> 0:30:34.959
<v Speaker 1>and make up for it in toner sales. After all,

0:30:35.040 --> 0:30:37.719
<v Speaker 1>if you don't have toner printers, not very much good

0:30:37.760 --> 0:30:41.240
<v Speaker 1>to you. So Static Control would compete with lex Mark

0:30:41.400 --> 0:30:45.520
<v Speaker 1>by offering compatible toner cartridges at a lower cost. Lex

0:30:45.560 --> 0:30:49.880
<v Speaker 1>Mark in turn sued Seatic Control, claiming that this amounted

0:30:49.880 --> 0:30:52.920
<v Speaker 1>to piracy, but the e f F and Static Control

0:30:52.960 --> 0:30:55.240
<v Speaker 1>were able to argue that this was not a valid

0:30:55.280 --> 0:30:58.240
<v Speaker 1>claim and that what lex Mark was really trying to

0:30:58.320 --> 0:31:03.240
<v Speaker 1>do was force customers into lex Marks ecosystem and only

0:31:03.320 --> 0:31:07.760
<v Speaker 1>purchase lex Marks products, So their actions were meant to

0:31:07.840 --> 0:31:13.240
<v Speaker 1>suppress legitimate competition. Now, not all victories are so straightforward.

0:31:13.560 --> 0:31:16.440
<v Speaker 1>In the mid two thousand's, the Supreme Court heard a

0:31:16.480 --> 0:31:19.600
<v Speaker 1>case in which twenty eight companies that were led by

0:31:19.760 --> 0:31:26.080
<v Speaker 1>MGM Studios sued Groster as well as Streamcast for copyright infringement.

0:31:26.880 --> 0:31:29.760
<v Speaker 1>Roxter was built on top of the Morpheus peer to

0:31:29.880 --> 0:31:34.120
<v Speaker 1>peer file sharing software. File sharing software allows users to

0:31:34.160 --> 0:31:37.560
<v Speaker 1>connect in sort of an ad hoc network and share

0:31:37.600 --> 0:31:41.040
<v Speaker 1>files with one another. So think of it as you

0:31:41.200 --> 0:31:44.960
<v Speaker 1>download some software that allows you to log into a

0:31:45.240 --> 0:31:48.480
<v Speaker 1>service that connects you with other users that are using

0:31:48.520 --> 0:31:53.040
<v Speaker 1>that same software, and you can share files that you've

0:31:53.040 --> 0:31:55.960
<v Speaker 1>stored in a specific folder with anyone else that's on

0:31:55.960 --> 0:31:58.920
<v Speaker 1>that network. They can share files that they've stored in

0:31:59.080 --> 0:32:03.200
<v Speaker 1>folders on their machine that have been designated as valid

0:32:03.240 --> 0:32:08.040
<v Speaker 1>folders with you, and you can download these files, and

0:32:08.080 --> 0:32:09.960
<v Speaker 1>if there are multiple people who have that file on

0:32:10.000 --> 0:32:13.120
<v Speaker 1>their machines, your downloads go much more quickly because it

0:32:13.200 --> 0:32:17.080
<v Speaker 1>can pull information from any or all of those machines simultaneously.

0:32:17.920 --> 0:32:20.960
<v Speaker 1>So even if a connection between you and computer A

0:32:21.800 --> 0:32:24.760
<v Speaker 1>is bad. It can still pull data from computers B

0:32:24.960 --> 0:32:28.040
<v Speaker 1>through Z as long as they all have instances of

0:32:28.080 --> 0:32:32.560
<v Speaker 1>a file of that specific file, so there's nothing illegal

0:32:32.600 --> 0:32:37.040
<v Speaker 1>about that. Peer to peer sharing is perfectly legitimate as

0:32:37.040 --> 0:32:41.880
<v Speaker 1>a means of distributing data. However, the Supreme Court found

0:32:41.880 --> 0:32:45.040
<v Speaker 1>that roxter had effectively promoted the use of its service

0:32:45.120 --> 0:32:48.760
<v Speaker 1>to engage in copyright infringement, and as such was responsible

0:32:48.800 --> 0:32:52.160
<v Speaker 1>for the acts that happened on its service. However, there's

0:32:52.160 --> 0:32:54.480
<v Speaker 1>a previous decision that was made by the Supreme Court

0:32:54.680 --> 0:33:00.520
<v Speaker 1>involving Sony Corporation versus the Universal City Studios are University

0:33:00.560 --> 0:33:03.240
<v Speaker 1>Cities do. Is also known as the Beta Max case.

0:33:03.840 --> 0:33:10.720
<v Speaker 1>Beta max being a a magnetic tape format kind of

0:33:10.760 --> 0:33:16.000
<v Speaker 1>like VCRs the old VHS versus Beta Max wars. But

0:33:16.280 --> 0:33:20.680
<v Speaker 1>that particular case established the technologies manufacturer is not responsible

0:33:20.720 --> 0:33:24.480
<v Speaker 1>for the way it's customers use that technology if it's

0:33:24.480 --> 0:33:28.680
<v Speaker 1>outside the stated purpose of said technology. So if I

0:33:28.800 --> 0:33:33.840
<v Speaker 1>make a type of tech that allows you to record

0:33:33.920 --> 0:33:36.840
<v Speaker 1>stuff on it, and I say the reason for this

0:33:37.040 --> 0:33:39.600
<v Speaker 1>is so that you can make a backup recording of

0:33:39.760 --> 0:33:43.800
<v Speaker 1>media that you already own, backup recordings are perfectly legal.

0:33:43.880 --> 0:33:47.440
<v Speaker 1>It's a type of fair use in the United States.

0:33:47.480 --> 0:33:51.200
<v Speaker 1>So assuming that's what you're using the thing I made,

0:33:51.840 --> 0:33:53.760
<v Speaker 1>that's why you're using it, and how you're using it,

0:33:53.840 --> 0:33:57.240
<v Speaker 1>everything's fine. You're using it legally. But then let's say

0:33:57.240 --> 0:34:00.920
<v Speaker 1>that you use that same technology to record something that

0:34:00.960 --> 0:34:04.560
<v Speaker 1>you do not own, and then maybe even record copies

0:34:04.560 --> 0:34:08.359
<v Speaker 1>of that and distribute it. That would be outside of

0:34:08.400 --> 0:34:11.440
<v Speaker 1>what I stated the technology was for. And by this

0:34:11.560 --> 0:34:15.000
<v Speaker 1>argument of safe harbor, I could perhaps get out of

0:34:15.040 --> 0:34:18.200
<v Speaker 1>any liability for the way that you are using my

0:34:18.239 --> 0:34:20.279
<v Speaker 1>technology because you're using it in a way that I

0:34:20.280 --> 0:34:22.799
<v Speaker 1>did not intend, and it's not my fault if you

0:34:23.000 --> 0:34:28.520
<v Speaker 1>use the technology poorly. Just like if I am selling

0:34:28.560 --> 0:34:32.600
<v Speaker 1>pies and you buy a pie, I'm not responsible if

0:34:32.600 --> 0:34:34.799
<v Speaker 1>you throw that pie in someone's face instead of just

0:34:34.800 --> 0:34:38.000
<v Speaker 1>sitting down to have a delicious slice of pie. It's

0:34:38.000 --> 0:34:42.080
<v Speaker 1>not my fault. I just made the pie. I still

0:34:42.120 --> 0:34:44.799
<v Speaker 1>want pie right now. You guys who are long time

0:34:44.880 --> 0:34:49.560
<v Speaker 1>listeners of tech stuff, you know that's my secret. I

0:34:49.600 --> 0:34:55.200
<v Speaker 1>always want pie, like the Incredible Hulk. Anyway, in Groxter's case,

0:34:55.239 --> 0:34:58.040
<v Speaker 1>the court decided that the service had encouraged users to

0:34:58.120 --> 0:35:01.480
<v Speaker 1>engage in unlawful activity, but Court was also very careful

0:35:01.520 --> 0:35:04.560
<v Speaker 1>not to tread too far and negate those safe harbor

0:35:04.640 --> 0:35:09.120
<v Speaker 1>aspects that were established during Sony and University University City studios.

0:35:09.400 --> 0:35:13.000
<v Speaker 1>Those safe harbor protections now extend to software, though again

0:35:13.040 --> 0:35:15.600
<v Speaker 1>with the caveat that there must be legitimate use for

0:35:15.640 --> 0:35:19.799
<v Speaker 1>the technology that does not require unlawful behavior. So again,

0:35:19.880 --> 0:35:22.600
<v Speaker 1>peer to peer networking is by itself a perfectly reasonable

0:35:22.640 --> 0:35:25.600
<v Speaker 1>means to distribute information across the network of computers. There's

0:35:25.640 --> 0:35:30.960
<v Speaker 1>nothing illegal inherently about it. That people use that technology

0:35:31.000 --> 0:35:34.799
<v Speaker 1>for piracy is not necessarily surprising, but at the same time,

0:35:34.800 --> 0:35:38.440
<v Speaker 1>it's not the only or even intended purpose of that tech.

0:35:39.000 --> 0:35:42.360
<v Speaker 1>Another case I have referenced on this show involved Sony's

0:35:42.440 --> 0:35:46.160
<v Speaker 1>use of DRM measures on their music CDs. It used

0:35:46.160 --> 0:35:48.359
<v Speaker 1>to be a thing music CDs. I don't know how

0:35:48.360 --> 0:35:52.040
<v Speaker 1>many of you out there still listened to CDs, But

0:35:52.160 --> 0:35:55.480
<v Speaker 1>Sony had this bright idea, why not include some software

0:35:55.640 --> 0:35:59.120
<v Speaker 1>on music CDs that could prevent people from ripping those

0:35:59.160 --> 0:36:02.960
<v Speaker 1>tracks on to a computer and then distributing them willy nilly,

0:36:03.040 --> 0:36:07.640
<v Speaker 1>hither thither and yawn across the Internet. And boy did

0:36:07.880 --> 0:36:12.399
<v Speaker 1>things go wrong from there because Sony's approach introduced an

0:36:12.440 --> 0:36:17.799
<v Speaker 1>incredible vulnerability onto customer computers. Back in two thousand five,

0:36:18.280 --> 0:36:22.080
<v Speaker 1>Sony Music Entertainment, which in those days was actually known

0:36:22.120 --> 0:36:26.279
<v Speaker 1>as Sony b MG, included what they called an extended

0:36:26.400 --> 0:36:30.520
<v Speaker 1>copy protection feature on music CDs and and all. That

0:36:30.600 --> 0:36:33.960
<v Speaker 1>also included a copy of some software called Media Max

0:36:34.080 --> 0:36:37.240
<v Speaker 1>c D three, And if a customer were to put

0:36:37.360 --> 0:36:41.440
<v Speaker 1>their brand new Sony b MG manufactured music CD into

0:36:41.480 --> 0:36:46.160
<v Speaker 1>a computer, the computer would auto install the software on

0:36:46.239 --> 0:36:48.359
<v Speaker 1>the c D and that would give Sony a heads

0:36:48.440 --> 0:36:50.839
<v Speaker 1>up as to what was going on. So, in other words,

0:36:50.840 --> 0:36:52.680
<v Speaker 1>Sony could keep track of what you were doing with

0:36:52.719 --> 0:36:55.920
<v Speaker 1>your computer. And the whole justification here was that Sony

0:36:55.960 --> 0:36:58.760
<v Speaker 1>wanted to be on alert in case people were ripping

0:36:58.760 --> 0:37:01.520
<v Speaker 1>those c ds in or to burn pirated copies for

0:37:01.560 --> 0:37:06.239
<v Speaker 1>other people, or otherwise distribute the music illegally. The software

0:37:06.360 --> 0:37:10.920
<v Speaker 1>coasted under the noses of anti virus and anti spyware programs.

0:37:11.200 --> 0:37:14.120
<v Speaker 1>They just didn't detect it, and it created a backdoor

0:37:14.239 --> 0:37:18.440
<v Speaker 1>vulnerability for infected systems, which allowed the potential for hackers

0:37:18.440 --> 0:37:23.680
<v Speaker 1>to leverage those vulnerabilities and install malware on affected computers. So,

0:37:23.760 --> 0:37:26.319
<v Speaker 1>if you'd like an analogy, it would sort of be

0:37:26.440 --> 0:37:29.880
<v Speaker 1>like if Sony showed up at your house, got a

0:37:29.920 --> 0:37:32.960
<v Speaker 1>hold of your keys, made a copy of your house keys,

0:37:33.680 --> 0:37:38.160
<v Speaker 1>and then they just left those key copies laying around

0:37:38.160 --> 0:37:40.440
<v Speaker 1>where anyone could grab them and walts into your home

0:37:40.480 --> 0:37:44.800
<v Speaker 1>and take whatever they wanted. It was not good. Now

0:37:45.680 --> 0:37:48.400
<v Speaker 1>we call this the Sony root Kit because it gave

0:37:48.560 --> 0:37:53.239
<v Speaker 1>rude access to affected machines and it was distributed by Sony.

0:37:53.480 --> 0:37:56.400
<v Speaker 1>When news got out of what had happened, Sony b

0:37:56.560 --> 0:37:59.920
<v Speaker 1>MGS president of Global Digital Business, a guy named Thomas

0:38:00.040 --> 0:38:02.840
<v Speaker 1>Us said the wrong thing at the wrong time. He

0:38:02.920 --> 0:38:06.000
<v Speaker 1>specifically said, most people don't even know what a root

0:38:06.080 --> 0:38:10.520
<v Speaker 1>kit is, so why should they care about it. Yikes.

0:38:11.160 --> 0:38:13.480
<v Speaker 1>That's like saying most people don't realize that their back

0:38:13.520 --> 0:38:17.160
<v Speaker 1>door is unlock, so why should they care. It's It's

0:38:17.160 --> 0:38:20.800
<v Speaker 1>patently ridiculous. The e f F filed a class action

0:38:20.880 --> 0:38:24.120
<v Speaker 1>lawsuit against Sony to force the company to make amends

0:38:24.360 --> 0:38:27.640
<v Speaker 1>for the choices they made, and ultimately Sony was able

0:38:27.680 --> 0:38:29.880
<v Speaker 1>to settle out of court with the e f F.

0:38:30.520 --> 0:38:34.440
<v Speaker 1>The organization also pressured sun Calm, which was responsible for

0:38:34.480 --> 0:38:36.600
<v Speaker 1>one of the elements that created the root kit in

0:38:36.640 --> 0:38:39.400
<v Speaker 1>the first place, and Suncolm was forced to patch its

0:38:39.440 --> 0:38:42.759
<v Speaker 1>software and remove security flaws. Now the e f f's

0:38:42.800 --> 0:38:46.640
<v Speaker 1>work also reminds me what a strange and amazing thing

0:38:46.680 --> 0:38:49.319
<v Speaker 1>the Internet is. The Internet allows people to find others

0:38:49.320 --> 0:38:51.839
<v Speaker 1>who share their own interests and hobbies, and to find

0:38:52.000 --> 0:38:56.360
<v Speaker 1>enrichment through sharing with those people. One such group would

0:38:56.360 --> 0:39:00.680
<v Speaker 1>be embroidery fans, as in people who enjoy embroidering stuff,

0:39:00.719 --> 0:39:02.960
<v Speaker 1>which seems like a pretty harmless group of people, and

0:39:03.000 --> 0:39:05.520
<v Speaker 1>it's easy to imagine them using the Internet because they

0:39:05.560 --> 0:39:07.920
<v Speaker 1>might want to form some clubs to chat about projects

0:39:08.000 --> 0:39:11.560
<v Speaker 1>or share patterns, and that's actually where the problems began.

0:39:12.600 --> 0:39:16.080
<v Speaker 1>There was a group of embroidery pattern publishers and vendors

0:39:16.239 --> 0:39:18.759
<v Speaker 1>who banded together to form a new group called the

0:39:18.800 --> 0:39:24.680
<v Speaker 1>Embroidery Software Protection Coalition or e SPC. They were concerned

0:39:24.680 --> 0:39:29.080
<v Speaker 1>with preventing piracy of various embroidery patterns and programs, and

0:39:29.120 --> 0:39:34.000
<v Speaker 1>their target was an online community of embroiderers. Like many

0:39:34.080 --> 0:39:37.600
<v Speaker 1>such communities, the members on this online discussion group use

0:39:37.719 --> 0:39:41.200
<v Speaker 1>nicknames or handles on their profiles. So the e s

0:39:41.239 --> 0:39:46.080
<v Speaker 1>PC wanted to file defamation claims against some of the

0:39:46.120 --> 0:39:49.000
<v Speaker 1>members of that discussion group. So what they did is

0:39:49.040 --> 0:39:53.480
<v Speaker 1>they issued a subpoena demanding that the organization received detailed

0:39:53.480 --> 0:39:56.919
<v Speaker 1>personal information about everyone who was part of that discussion group,

0:39:57.280 --> 0:40:00.480
<v Speaker 1>regardless of whether or not they had ever even posted

0:40:00.520 --> 0:40:03.359
<v Speaker 1>a message to the group. So, in other words, if

0:40:03.400 --> 0:40:05.239
<v Speaker 1>you belong to this group, even if you had never

0:40:05.280 --> 0:40:07.960
<v Speaker 1>said anything one way or the other, you'd never engaged

0:40:08.000 --> 0:40:13.719
<v Speaker 1>in any kind of of copyright infringement. They wanted all

0:40:13.800 --> 0:40:17.000
<v Speaker 1>your personal information so they could make a decision about

0:40:17.000 --> 0:40:18.960
<v Speaker 1>whether or not to sue you. Now, the e F

0:40:19.080 --> 0:40:22.279
<v Speaker 1>got involved and argue that this was an unreasonable and

0:40:22.360 --> 0:40:25.200
<v Speaker 1>unlawful tactic. And after the e F made it clear

0:40:25.239 --> 0:40:28.360
<v Speaker 1>that it would provide legal support for the embroiderers, the

0:40:28.440 --> 0:40:32.920
<v Speaker 1>e s PC withdrew its subpoena. E F State Attorney

0:40:32.960 --> 0:40:36.239
<v Speaker 1>Core and McSherry issued a statement that read quote, E

0:40:36.520 --> 0:40:39.600
<v Speaker 1>s PC should have never filed this frivolous case in

0:40:39.600 --> 0:40:42.239
<v Speaker 1>the first place, but where pleased that E s PC

0:40:42.440 --> 0:40:45.799
<v Speaker 1>now understands that it can't use the courts to intimidate

0:40:45.840 --> 0:40:48.160
<v Speaker 1>those who who want to talk about E s p

0:40:48.320 --> 0:40:52.439
<v Speaker 1>C s ham Thisted tactics. The First Amendment forbids such

0:40:52.480 --> 0:40:56.000
<v Speaker 1>abusive use of the discovery process. So what they're saying

0:40:56.080 --> 0:40:58.560
<v Speaker 1>is all these embroiderers who are on this online discussion

0:40:58.640 --> 0:41:02.040
<v Speaker 1>group and saying, well, this this group over here is

0:41:02.080 --> 0:41:07.240
<v Speaker 1>being really unreasonable. The actions that group took was way

0:41:07.280 --> 0:41:10.919
<v Speaker 1>more unreasonable, you know, saying, Hey, they're saying nasty things

0:41:10.920 --> 0:41:14.320
<v Speaker 1>about us, so we want to know who they are. Yikes.

0:41:15.480 --> 0:41:17.560
<v Speaker 1>There are dozens of other cases we could look at,

0:41:18.000 --> 0:41:20.120
<v Speaker 1>but I think after we come back from the next break,

0:41:20.160 --> 0:41:22.480
<v Speaker 1>will focus instead on some of the other work the

0:41:22.560 --> 0:41:25.680
<v Speaker 1>e f F has been involved with outside of legal cases,

0:41:26.120 --> 0:41:28.480
<v Speaker 1>So we'll talk about that after this quick break to

0:41:28.560 --> 0:41:39.879
<v Speaker 1>thank our sponsor. Now, the Electronic Frontier Foundation does more

0:41:39.920 --> 0:41:42.720
<v Speaker 1>than just jump into legal battles. It also helps develop

0:41:42.760 --> 0:41:46.480
<v Speaker 1>and distribute various tools to make the use of the

0:41:46.520 --> 0:41:49.839
<v Speaker 1>Internet more secure and protect the privacy of folks when

0:41:49.840 --> 0:41:54.040
<v Speaker 1>they're online. One of those tools is a browser extension

0:41:54.080 --> 0:41:59.960
<v Speaker 1>called Privacy Badger. This extension blocks websites from using brows

0:42:00.200 --> 0:42:04.600
<v Speaker 1>trackers on you without your permission. Now, those trackers could

0:42:04.640 --> 0:42:07.600
<v Speaker 1>otherwise keep tabs on which sites you are visiting and

0:42:07.920 --> 0:42:10.879
<v Speaker 1>your browsing behaviors in general, and as e f says

0:42:10.880 --> 0:42:14.680
<v Speaker 1>in their page on the tool, quote, if an advertiser

0:42:14.719 --> 0:42:18.400
<v Speaker 1>seems to be tracking you across multiple websites without your permission.

0:42:18.719 --> 0:42:22.560
<v Speaker 1>Privacy badger automatically blocks that advertiser from loading any more

0:42:22.600 --> 0:42:25.640
<v Speaker 1>content in your browser. To the advertiser, it's like you

0:42:25.719 --> 0:42:29.799
<v Speaker 1>suddenly disappeared. End quote. Another extension that they offer is

0:42:30.000 --> 0:42:34.400
<v Speaker 1>HTTPS Everywhere, which is an encryption tool. This extension can

0:42:34.480 --> 0:42:38.160
<v Speaker 1>encrypt communications with many different websites to help improve the

0:42:38.200 --> 0:42:41.880
<v Speaker 1>security of your web browsing. So some websites have pages

0:42:41.920 --> 0:42:46.000
<v Speaker 1>that support HTTPS encryption you see that little lock that

0:42:46.120 --> 0:42:49.360
<v Speaker 1>shows up in your address bar, but some websites have

0:42:50.080 --> 0:42:53.920
<v Speaker 1>certain pages that are still over unencrypted h T t P.

0:42:54.920 --> 0:42:59.960
<v Speaker 1>The extension that the f F offers rewrites all require

0:43:00.320 --> 0:43:04.280
<v Speaker 1>to go through HTTPS and keep everything nice and jumbled

0:43:04.360 --> 0:43:06.160
<v Speaker 1>up for any snoops that happened to be out there.

0:43:06.920 --> 0:43:09.080
<v Speaker 1>And there are other tools that you can learn about

0:43:09.120 --> 0:43:11.279
<v Speaker 1>over at the e f F website to help keep

0:43:11.320 --> 0:43:14.160
<v Speaker 1>you and your browsing safe. And part of what the

0:43:14.239 --> 0:43:17.960
<v Speaker 1>organization does is raise awareness of potential threats to civil

0:43:17.960 --> 0:43:22.160
<v Speaker 1>liberties in proposed legislation or corporate practices, which is not

0:43:22.280 --> 0:43:26.280
<v Speaker 1>always about filing a court case, though that does sometimes

0:43:26.320 --> 0:43:29.480
<v Speaker 1>end up being part of it. If it goes far enough.

0:43:29.880 --> 0:43:33.080
<v Speaker 1>On the e f site, you can find numerous articles,

0:43:33.360 --> 0:43:37.920
<v Speaker 1>blog posts, and white papers about important civil liberties issues,

0:43:37.960 --> 0:43:40.920
<v Speaker 1>and some of them deal with pretty thorny subjects and

0:43:41.000 --> 0:43:44.359
<v Speaker 1>some require you to really keep control of your emotions.

0:43:44.960 --> 0:43:50.320
<v Speaker 1>For example, on January three, the e f F submitted

0:43:50.360 --> 0:43:54.320
<v Speaker 1>a letter opposing a proposed act in South Carolina called

0:43:54.520 --> 0:43:58.440
<v Speaker 1>H three zero zero three, also known as the Human

0:43:58.600 --> 0:44:04.080
<v Speaker 1>Trafficking Prevention Act. Now, immediately, that's an incredibly charged topic. Clearly,

0:44:04.840 --> 0:44:08.600
<v Speaker 1>human trafficking is an evil act and any decent person

0:44:08.640 --> 0:44:11.799
<v Speaker 1>would oppose it. So why would the e f F

0:44:12.040 --> 0:44:18.000
<v Speaker 1>come out against legislation meant to prevent occurrences of human trafficking? Well,

0:44:18.040 --> 0:44:21.480
<v Speaker 1>the key here is the language inside the act itself.

0:44:21.920 --> 0:44:25.800
<v Speaker 1>As their letter would state, the Act requires any entity

0:44:25.880 --> 0:44:29.960
<v Speaker 1>wishing to conduct business in South Carolina quote that manufacturers,

0:44:30.120 --> 0:44:33.759
<v Speaker 1>distributes or sells a product that makes content accessible on

0:44:33.840 --> 0:44:37.640
<v Speaker 1>the Internet. End quote to include in the product a

0:44:37.680 --> 0:44:43.200
<v Speaker 1>digital blocking capability that blocks online access to quote obscenity,

0:44:43.360 --> 0:44:48.480
<v Speaker 1>child pornography, revenge pornography, or any hub that facilitates prostitution,

0:44:48.640 --> 0:44:51.719
<v Speaker 1>and websites that are known to facilitate any trafficking of

0:44:51.880 --> 0:44:55.879
<v Speaker 1>persons end quote Well, the e f F maintains that

0:44:56.280 --> 0:44:59.640
<v Speaker 1>the proposed legislation is and this is, from their letter,

0:45:00.120 --> 0:45:03.920
<v Speaker 1>a gross violation of the free speech rights of Internet users,

0:45:03.960 --> 0:45:09.120
<v Speaker 1>particularly given that content filtering technology is inaccurate. The bill

0:45:09.200 --> 0:45:12.440
<v Speaker 1>also violates the privacy of consumers by requiring them to

0:45:12.520 --> 0:45:16.680
<v Speaker 1>engage in invasive interactions with companies in order to deactivate

0:45:16.719 --> 0:45:20.440
<v Speaker 1>the blocking feature. The bill creates an exorbitant new tax

0:45:20.560 --> 0:45:23.600
<v Speaker 1>for both Internet users and companies wishing to opt out

0:45:23.640 --> 0:45:26.920
<v Speaker 1>of the regulatory regime. The bill violates the rights of

0:45:27.000 --> 0:45:30.640
<v Speaker 1>online service providers by penalizing them for content created by

0:45:30.680 --> 0:45:35.120
<v Speaker 1>their users. The bill further hurts companies by requiring costly

0:45:35.160 --> 0:45:38.960
<v Speaker 1>technical features that may ultimately discourage business in the state

0:45:39.080 --> 0:45:42.120
<v Speaker 1>of South Carolina. End quote now. The e f F

0:45:42.239 --> 0:45:46.320
<v Speaker 1>points out that in the effort to filter out illegal material,

0:45:46.920 --> 0:45:50.680
<v Speaker 1>the enforcement of this act would undoubtedly sweep up legal

0:45:50.719 --> 0:45:54.120
<v Speaker 1>stuff as well, so you would get both illegal and

0:45:54.239 --> 0:45:57.520
<v Speaker 1>legal things filtered out of your view. And while the

0:45:57.560 --> 0:46:01.960
<v Speaker 1>Act does contain some language in that it requires entities

0:46:01.960 --> 0:46:05.400
<v Speaker 1>to restore access to legal material if you file acclaim

0:46:05.440 --> 0:46:09.160
<v Speaker 1>against it, this still represents a First Amendment harm and

0:46:09.200 --> 0:46:11.440
<v Speaker 1>the e f also states that the language is so

0:46:11.560 --> 0:46:14.680
<v Speaker 1>broad that it could encompass any company that makes any

0:46:14.719 --> 0:46:17.600
<v Speaker 1>device that allows access to the Internet, so that could

0:46:17.600 --> 0:46:23.320
<v Speaker 1>include computers, smartphones, tablets, set top boxes, WiFi routers, modems,

0:46:23.320 --> 0:46:27.280
<v Speaker 1>and more. Every single type of technology would be required

0:46:27.280 --> 0:46:30.360
<v Speaker 1>to have some sort of filter on it. The FFS

0:46:30.480 --> 0:46:33.960
<v Speaker 1>argument is not that human trafficking isn't a problem or

0:46:34.000 --> 0:46:37.319
<v Speaker 1>that it shouldn't be taken seriously. Their argument is that

0:46:37.400 --> 0:46:42.640
<v Speaker 1>the proposed act fails to address that problem while simultaneously

0:46:42.760 --> 0:46:47.920
<v Speaker 1>courts unconstitutional implementations. So, as of the recording of this podcast,

0:46:47.960 --> 0:46:51.600
<v Speaker 1>that act is currently still in committee in the South

0:46:51.600 --> 0:46:54.879
<v Speaker 1>Carolina House of Representatives, and it has been there since

0:46:54.960 --> 0:46:59.040
<v Speaker 1>January two thousand seventeen. The f F also offers up

0:46:59.080 --> 0:47:02.400
<v Speaker 1>helpful papers the all sorts of topics from the Internet

0:47:02.440 --> 0:47:05.200
<v Speaker 1>registries that are least likely to give up details on

0:47:05.280 --> 0:47:08.440
<v Speaker 1>domain owners, to a list of government data requests and

0:47:08.440 --> 0:47:12.400
<v Speaker 1>how various Internet service providers and other companies responded to

0:47:12.440 --> 0:47:15.080
<v Speaker 1>those requests. So, in other words, it tells you these

0:47:15.120 --> 0:47:17.520
<v Speaker 1>are the partners that aren't going to give you up

0:47:18.280 --> 0:47:22.120
<v Speaker 1>under just a casual request from the government. The e

0:47:22.280 --> 0:47:25.279
<v Speaker 1>f F also provides information on civil liberties, the best

0:47:25.280 --> 0:47:28.279
<v Speaker 1>practices to follow to ensure your rights are protected, and

0:47:28.360 --> 0:47:30.800
<v Speaker 1>also deep dives on the areas of focus I mentioned

0:47:30.800 --> 0:47:33.360
<v Speaker 1>at the top of this episode. Now, you may not

0:47:33.440 --> 0:47:36.080
<v Speaker 1>agree with every stance the e f F takes. I

0:47:36.120 --> 0:47:39.880
<v Speaker 1>know there are some that I personally find a little problematic,

0:47:40.480 --> 0:47:43.520
<v Speaker 1>though I also admit that I sighed more often with

0:47:43.680 --> 0:47:48.359
<v Speaker 1>the e f than otherwise. As a nonprofit organization, they

0:47:48.400 --> 0:47:52.000
<v Speaker 1>depend upon donations in order to fund their work, and

0:47:52.040 --> 0:47:54.160
<v Speaker 1>there's also a shop where you can buy products and

0:47:54.200 --> 0:47:57.040
<v Speaker 1>the money goes to support e f f's efforts. Some

0:47:57.120 --> 0:47:59.719
<v Speaker 1>of the examples of merchandise you could purchase include things

0:47:59.719 --> 0:48:02.640
<v Speaker 1>like kickers or r f I D blocking wallets were

0:48:02.680 --> 0:48:06.360
<v Speaker 1>temporary tattoos if you really want to, you know, sport

0:48:06.440 --> 0:48:10.480
<v Speaker 1>the e f F logo on your bicep. But that's it.

0:48:11.040 --> 0:48:13.520
<v Speaker 1>On the e f F, the organization continues to play

0:48:13.560 --> 0:48:16.760
<v Speaker 1>an important role to make sure that corporations and governments

0:48:16.800 --> 0:48:20.040
<v Speaker 1>don't compromise our civil liberties in the online space. I

0:48:20.120 --> 0:48:22.799
<v Speaker 1>suspect that we're gonna have a need for the e

0:48:23.000 --> 0:48:26.840
<v Speaker 1>f F for many years to come, as online technology

0:48:26.880 --> 0:48:30.640
<v Speaker 1>continues to insinuates itself into all aspects of our lives.

0:48:31.080 --> 0:48:35.279
<v Speaker 1>As that happens, those protections are going to become more

0:48:35.280 --> 0:48:39.000
<v Speaker 1>and more important. So that wraps up this episode. If

0:48:39.040 --> 0:48:41.879
<v Speaker 1>you guys have suggestions for future topics I could cover

0:48:42.000 --> 0:48:44.640
<v Speaker 1>on episodes of tech Stuff, why don't you send me

0:48:44.640 --> 0:48:46.960
<v Speaker 1>a message and tell me about your big old ideas.

0:48:47.040 --> 0:48:52.720
<v Speaker 1>Smart guy, smart lady, smart people. I'm I'm being serious,

0:48:52.760 --> 0:48:54.560
<v Speaker 1>I'm not being sarcastic. I really would love to hear

0:48:54.600 --> 0:48:56.759
<v Speaker 1>your ideas. You can get in touch with me using

0:48:56.760 --> 0:49:00.880
<v Speaker 1>the email address tech Stuff at how stuff works dot com,

0:49:01.040 --> 0:49:05.400
<v Speaker 1>or if you prefer to communicate via Twitter or Facebook,

0:49:05.760 --> 0:49:09.000
<v Speaker 1>you can find the text stuff handle at either of

0:49:09.000 --> 0:49:13.080
<v Speaker 1>those locations. It is text stuff h s W. And remember,

0:49:13.120 --> 0:49:15.800
<v Speaker 1>you can go to twitch dot tv slash tech stuff

0:49:15.800 --> 0:49:18.839
<v Speaker 1>to watch me record these shows live. You can watch

0:49:18.840 --> 0:49:22.640
<v Speaker 1>as I make mistakes or occasionally curse into the microphone.

0:49:23.320 --> 0:49:27.680
<v Speaker 1>Sometimes that happens like today, but the only way you

0:49:27.719 --> 0:49:29.640
<v Speaker 1>ever get to see it is if you go to

0:49:29.640 --> 0:49:33.880
<v Speaker 1>twitch dot tv slash tech stuff because the wonder producer

0:49:34.000 --> 0:49:36.840
<v Speaker 1>Ramsey is very good at taking those things out before

0:49:36.920 --> 0:49:41.319
<v Speaker 1>the show goes live. So come and see me record live.

0:49:41.320 --> 0:49:43.360
<v Speaker 1>I do it on Wednesdays and Fridays. The schedule is

0:49:43.400 --> 0:49:45.839
<v Speaker 1>up at twitch dot tv slash tech stuff, and I'll

0:49:45.840 --> 0:49:55.759
<v Speaker 1>talk to you again really soon for more on this

0:49:55.920 --> 0:49:58.399
<v Speaker 1>and thousands of other topics. Because it has stop works

0:49:58.440 --> 0:50:03.160
<v Speaker 1>dot com wh wh