1 00:00:04,160 --> 00:00:07,520 Speaker 1: Get in text with Technology with text Stuff from stuff 2 00:00:07,800 --> 00:00:14,440 Speaker 1: dot Com. Hey there, and welcome to Tech Stuff. I 3 00:00:14,480 --> 00:00:17,239 Speaker 1: am your host, Jonathan Strickland, and we pick up in 4 00:00:17,280 --> 00:00:19,760 Speaker 1: the middle of a conversation that I was having with 5 00:00:19,840 --> 00:00:23,080 Speaker 1: Shannon Morse. You heard the previous episode last week. If 6 00:00:23,079 --> 00:00:25,639 Speaker 1: you haven't, go back listen to that. It's all about 7 00:00:25,720 --> 00:00:30,520 Speaker 1: how Hollywood is really bad at portraying hackers and hacker 8 00:00:30,600 --> 00:00:33,920 Speaker 1: culture in a realistic way. And today we're going to 9 00:00:33,960 --> 00:00:37,120 Speaker 1: talk more about some of the embarrassing examples out there 10 00:00:37,159 --> 00:00:39,960 Speaker 1: in entertainment as well as some of the really good ones. 11 00:00:40,440 --> 00:00:43,159 Speaker 1: And we're gonna start off with a conversation about a 12 00:00:43,200 --> 00:00:47,080 Speaker 1: pair of movies that not only did a disservice to hackers, 13 00:00:47,560 --> 00:00:52,680 Speaker 1: but also virtual reality. We joined the conversation already in progress, 14 00:00:59,320 --> 00:01:03,760 Speaker 1: Lawnmower and and Lawnmower Man Too, Uh, inspired by the 15 00:01:03,800 --> 00:01:07,000 Speaker 1: work of Stephen King. So these movies are terrible, it 16 00:01:07,000 --> 00:01:08,320 Speaker 1: could be a lot of fun to watch with a 17 00:01:08,360 --> 00:01:11,280 Speaker 1: group of people who just want to see, like a 18 00:01:11,319 --> 00:01:12,920 Speaker 1: really bad movie and make fun of it, you know, 19 00:01:13,040 --> 00:01:16,039 Speaker 1: MST three case style. I included a couple of clips 20 00:01:16,040 --> 00:01:18,040 Speaker 1: and I showed them to Shannon. One of them was 21 00:01:19,040 --> 00:01:26,039 Speaker 1: a demonstration that hacking a system in this world isn't 22 00:01:26,120 --> 00:01:30,240 Speaker 1: just graphical but immersive. Uh So you're you're wearing like 23 00:01:30,640 --> 00:01:35,720 Speaker 1: a head mounted display and and you're wearing gloves that 24 00:01:35,800 --> 00:01:39,959 Speaker 1: allow you to interact with the virtual world. And so 25 00:01:40,040 --> 00:01:45,800 Speaker 1: they're showing a character getting backdoor access to a system 26 00:01:45,840 --> 00:01:51,800 Speaker 1: by slapping at hexagons inside this virtual space. So these 27 00:01:51,960 --> 00:01:54,840 Speaker 1: hexagons are popping up in front of him, and he's 28 00:01:54,840 --> 00:01:58,520 Speaker 1: slapping at them and eventually gets you know, access granted. 29 00:01:58,560 --> 00:02:01,640 Speaker 1: Mostly it's getting access to NIED. Eventually access granted pops up, 30 00:02:01,840 --> 00:02:03,520 Speaker 1: and it looks like the only thing that he did 31 00:02:03,560 --> 00:02:05,440 Speaker 1: differently was just that he hit it a little faster 32 00:02:05,560 --> 00:02:08,320 Speaker 1: that time. So, in other words, it would be equivalent 33 00:02:08,360 --> 00:02:11,079 Speaker 1: to that n C I S scene we talked about earlier, 34 00:02:11,080 --> 00:02:15,200 Speaker 1: where if you just tie fast enough, you either hack 35 00:02:15,240 --> 00:02:19,120 Speaker 1: in or you prevent a hack from happening. Obviously, this 36 00:02:19,200 --> 00:02:23,880 Speaker 1: is not at all remotely realistic, but it is one 37 00:02:23,880 --> 00:02:26,520 Speaker 1: of those where you you look at you your you 38 00:02:26,520 --> 00:02:28,440 Speaker 1: could tell the screenwriter was saying, well, I want to 39 00:02:28,480 --> 00:02:33,280 Speaker 1: show that this character who has has found that he's 40 00:02:33,360 --> 00:02:37,560 Speaker 1: very powerful in the virtual space, can access a system. 41 00:02:37,639 --> 00:02:39,160 Speaker 1: How can I do that in a way that's not 42 00:02:39,280 --> 00:02:43,320 Speaker 1: just you know, it's over in the blink of an eye, 43 00:02:43,400 --> 00:02:46,400 Speaker 1: and there's no way to show it visually, so they 44 00:02:46,440 --> 00:02:49,400 Speaker 1: created this sort of three D display. This is one 45 00:02:49,400 --> 00:02:51,160 Speaker 1: of those things we see in a lot of Hollywood 46 00:02:51,160 --> 00:02:55,720 Speaker 1: movies where they try and visualize the navigating a secure 47 00:02:55,800 --> 00:02:59,440 Speaker 1: system as like going through a maze. It happens a 48 00:02:59,440 --> 00:03:05,520 Speaker 1: ton and again, actually going through that maze of information 49 00:03:05,639 --> 00:03:08,960 Speaker 1: that's located on a network is actually quite boring looking 50 00:03:09,440 --> 00:03:13,920 Speaker 1: on camera. So they created this al bite terrible virtual 51 00:03:14,000 --> 00:03:20,640 Speaker 1: reality scene to to actually give some kind of uh implementation, 52 00:03:20,720 --> 00:03:23,040 Speaker 1: some kind of visual implementation to the people that are 53 00:03:23,040 --> 00:03:26,800 Speaker 1: watching this movie. And it's it's pretty terrible. It's definitely 54 00:03:26,840 --> 00:03:31,360 Speaker 1: not how gaining access to a network would work, but 55 00:03:31,520 --> 00:03:35,000 Speaker 1: I thought it was hilarious. Yeah. A Lawnmowerman two also 56 00:03:35,080 --> 00:03:37,880 Speaker 1: has a scene that's similar to that. The characters are 57 00:03:37,960 --> 00:03:43,440 Speaker 1: looking at what is just an equation on a computer screen. Um, 58 00:03:43,760 --> 00:03:45,880 Speaker 1: So they're looking at this equation and trying to figure 59 00:03:45,880 --> 00:03:50,840 Speaker 1: out how to get access and one of the character 60 00:03:50,960 --> 00:03:53,800 Speaker 1: says that she can't get past the memory lock to 61 00:03:53,920 --> 00:03:59,160 Speaker 1: access the chain. So the smarmie computer expert who's next 62 00:03:59,200 --> 00:04:01,680 Speaker 1: to her says, well, all you have to do is 63 00:04:01,720 --> 00:04:06,440 Speaker 1: just enhance the memory index, and which already none of 64 00:04:06,440 --> 00:04:09,160 Speaker 1: that makes any real sense. It's kind of like Star 65 00:04:09,200 --> 00:04:12,280 Speaker 1: Trek techno babble where they talk about reversing the polarity. 66 00:04:12,320 --> 00:04:16,000 Speaker 1: It really, it's just it's just there to say something 67 00:04:16,040 --> 00:04:19,039 Speaker 1: technical is happening, and you don't need to understand what 68 00:04:19,160 --> 00:04:23,520 Speaker 1: it is. It's kind of shorthand. So then a little 69 00:04:23,600 --> 00:04:28,640 Speaker 1: yellow ball appears on the screen and the equation they're 70 00:04:28,680 --> 00:04:33,279 Speaker 1: looking at it starts to rotate uh and starts to 71 00:04:33,360 --> 00:04:37,479 Speaker 1: turn on its side and become a three dimensional maze again, 72 00:04:37,960 --> 00:04:42,760 Speaker 1: so we get another example of accessing a system involves 73 00:04:42,920 --> 00:04:47,040 Speaker 1: navigating through an actual three dimensional maze. Uh. He uses 74 00:04:47,120 --> 00:04:50,920 Speaker 1: gesture controls to move this little yellow ball around until 75 00:04:51,120 --> 00:04:56,760 Speaker 1: finally getting to where the data is. The whole time 76 00:04:56,839 --> 00:05:01,880 Speaker 1: he's just using meaningless computer jargon and incorrectly. And then 77 00:05:01,880 --> 00:05:05,440 Speaker 1: at the very the cherry on top of the Sunday 78 00:05:05,520 --> 00:05:11,760 Speaker 1: is that he says toda. So if you really want 79 00:05:11,760 --> 00:05:16,440 Speaker 1: a good time, watch the hacking scene from lawnmower Man too. 80 00:05:16,240 --> 00:05:19,920 Speaker 1: Both of those, obviously are are in that same category 81 00:05:19,960 --> 00:05:24,640 Speaker 1: of trying to visualize what this this UH process would 82 00:05:24,680 --> 00:05:27,520 Speaker 1: be like In a way that is interesting. I said 83 00:05:27,520 --> 00:05:32,360 Speaker 1: that the worst a movie can do is not only 84 00:05:32,480 --> 00:05:35,600 Speaker 1: be incorrect, but also failed to be entertaining, And then 85 00:05:35,600 --> 00:05:38,279 Speaker 1: I would argue both of these fall into that category. 86 00:05:38,720 --> 00:05:41,479 Speaker 1: I feel like if hacking was as entertaining as it 87 00:05:41,560 --> 00:05:44,320 Speaker 1: is in lawnmower Man, I would have gotten gotten into 88 00:05:44,360 --> 00:05:47,440 Speaker 1: it at a much much younger age. Yea, it's not 89 00:05:47,920 --> 00:05:50,880 Speaker 1: I remember Lawn moore Man's one of the movies I 90 00:05:50,880 --> 00:05:54,240 Speaker 1: would often cite as being a real reason why virtual 91 00:05:54,320 --> 00:05:59,400 Speaker 1: reality died in the mid nineties. So sad because because 92 00:05:59,520 --> 00:06:01,880 Speaker 1: the stuff that was around in the mid nineties was 93 00:06:02,040 --> 00:06:05,239 Speaker 1: very very primitive, Right. You had like Dactyl Nightmare, these 94 00:06:05,360 --> 00:06:10,520 Speaker 1: these games that were just polygons, and they were very primitive. Uh. 95 00:06:10,640 --> 00:06:13,359 Speaker 1: The gameplay was limited, the headsets you war had to 96 00:06:13,400 --> 00:06:15,839 Speaker 1: be supported on cables because they were so heavy they 97 00:06:15,880 --> 00:06:19,719 Speaker 1: would really hurt your neck otherwise. Uh. And so when 98 00:06:19,720 --> 00:06:22,880 Speaker 1: people saw what the actual state of the art of 99 00:06:22,960 --> 00:06:25,920 Speaker 1: virtual reality was at the time compared to what they 100 00:06:25,920 --> 00:06:30,120 Speaker 1: were seeing in films, that that gap ended up making 101 00:06:30,120 --> 00:06:33,200 Speaker 1: people say, well, this is this isn't good at all. 102 00:06:33,240 --> 00:06:36,800 Speaker 1: I don't see any reason in in putting any money 103 00:06:36,880 --> 00:06:41,640 Speaker 1: towards this, and virtual reality died for about ten years, 104 00:06:42,279 --> 00:06:44,799 Speaker 1: and now we're starting to see it get back into 105 00:06:44,839 --> 00:06:49,280 Speaker 1: the consumer space with the success of Oculus Rift in 106 00:06:49,440 --> 00:06:53,720 Speaker 1: HTC Vibe, assuming you can get your hands on one. Uh, 107 00:06:53,880 --> 00:06:55,760 Speaker 1: we're starting to see it come back, but it took 108 00:06:55,839 --> 00:07:01,080 Speaker 1: almost twenty years for it to recover. So uh, thanks 109 00:07:01,160 --> 00:07:04,640 Speaker 1: lawnmore Man. The only were you a bad movie? But 110 00:07:04,720 --> 00:07:09,640 Speaker 1: you killed b R your fault. Yeah, I'm not bitter 111 00:07:09,720 --> 00:07:12,600 Speaker 1: or anything. Uh. There's a movie that we have to 112 00:07:12,640 --> 00:07:15,920 Speaker 1: mention everyone that I when I posted on Twitter that 113 00:07:15,920 --> 00:07:17,720 Speaker 1: I was going to do this, I had a lot 114 00:07:17,760 --> 00:07:20,600 Speaker 1: of people say the entire movie of Hackers should be 115 00:07:21,320 --> 00:07:24,120 Speaker 1: considered as part of this as a bad hacking scene. 116 00:07:24,680 --> 00:07:27,880 Speaker 1: And Hackers is a great example, uh, as another one 117 00:07:27,880 --> 00:07:30,720 Speaker 1: of those where it's a movie that was posing as 118 00:07:30,760 --> 00:07:34,880 Speaker 1: an anti authoritarian kind of film, but in the safest 119 00:07:34,920 --> 00:07:38,920 Speaker 1: way possible, like there's nothing really daring about it. Um. 120 00:07:39,080 --> 00:07:43,120 Speaker 1: And the opening sequence has a couple of characters trying 121 00:07:43,200 --> 00:07:46,440 Speaker 1: to battle it out over one another, and and one 122 00:07:46,440 --> 00:07:49,520 Speaker 1: of them isn't trying to create an intrusion into a system. 123 00:07:49,800 --> 00:07:52,800 Speaker 1: The other one detects it and then shuts everything down. 124 00:07:53,240 --> 00:07:57,880 Speaker 1: So Shannon, typically when you're talking about things like a 125 00:07:57,920 --> 00:08:02,120 Speaker 1: hacker intruding into a system, detecting that there's been an intrusion. 126 00:08:02,560 --> 00:08:07,200 Speaker 1: We're not normally seeing this happen on a one versus 127 00:08:07,280 --> 00:08:10,480 Speaker 1: one kind of basis in real time typically are we 128 00:08:11,520 --> 00:08:14,240 Speaker 1: not necessarily a lot of times what you'll see with 129 00:08:14,360 --> 00:08:18,119 Speaker 1: a hack intrusion into a system, like you said, uh, 130 00:08:18,240 --> 00:08:20,440 Speaker 1: is that they will sit and watch and they will 131 00:08:20,480 --> 00:08:22,559 Speaker 1: do a lot of recons so they'll try to figure 132 00:08:22,600 --> 00:08:26,280 Speaker 1: out what's available for them, what can they see, and 133 00:08:26,320 --> 00:08:29,040 Speaker 1: they'll wait for something to happen that will give them 134 00:08:29,080 --> 00:08:31,960 Speaker 1: even more access. Uh. And then if you have somebody 135 00:08:32,000 --> 00:08:35,480 Speaker 1: that's working inside of that company that's being intruded upon, uh, 136 00:08:35,720 --> 00:08:39,080 Speaker 1: usually the first action that you will see is them 137 00:08:39,120 --> 00:08:43,440 Speaker 1: trying to also collect information so they can find where 138 00:08:43,480 --> 00:08:46,679 Speaker 1: this open opening is, where this vulnerability is, and then 139 00:08:46,720 --> 00:08:49,600 Speaker 1: they'll shut it down. Uh. And then after that they'll 140 00:08:49,600 --> 00:08:53,880 Speaker 1: do a whole, uh whole research report on it and 141 00:08:53,920 --> 00:08:56,120 Speaker 1: try to figure out like who actually did it and 142 00:08:56,120 --> 00:08:59,760 Speaker 1: probably take to enforcement agencies so that they can get 143 00:08:59,760 --> 00:09:03,520 Speaker 1: the capture the person and hopefully get them charged, because 144 00:09:03,600 --> 00:09:05,840 Speaker 1: that's not a very good thing to do. Yeah, I mean, 145 00:09:05,840 --> 00:09:08,560 Speaker 1: you don't necessarily see people like duking it out like 146 00:09:08,600 --> 00:09:13,040 Speaker 1: they do. Yeah, it's usually you know, like your first 147 00:09:13,080 --> 00:09:15,840 Speaker 1: indication that something is wrong can often just be that 148 00:09:15,880 --> 00:09:19,440 Speaker 1: you've noticed there's unusual amounts of data traffic across your network, 149 00:09:19,960 --> 00:09:22,839 Speaker 1: and you might say, well, why why are we getting 150 00:09:22,880 --> 00:09:27,480 Speaker 1: these spikes? If you're a a savvy hacker, you're trying 151 00:09:27,520 --> 00:09:30,600 Speaker 1: to mask your activity. You're kind of like trying to 152 00:09:30,640 --> 00:09:33,240 Speaker 1: sneak in when a big crowd is going into a room. 153 00:09:33,320 --> 00:09:35,360 Speaker 1: It's kind of the same thing, right, Like you're waiting 154 00:09:35,400 --> 00:09:39,400 Speaker 1: for large transfers of data so that it masks what 155 00:09:39,480 --> 00:09:42,080 Speaker 1: you are doing. In a lot of cases, if you're 156 00:09:42,160 --> 00:09:44,600 Speaker 1: really really good at what you're doing, you're trying to 157 00:09:44,640 --> 00:09:46,720 Speaker 1: kind of go in that route because it means you 158 00:09:46,760 --> 00:09:50,679 Speaker 1: can stay hidden for longer and get more information. Information 159 00:09:50,760 --> 00:09:54,160 Speaker 1: is valuable. Therefore, you don't want to just you know, 160 00:09:54,720 --> 00:09:56,839 Speaker 1: you don't want to just break into a system and 161 00:09:56,840 --> 00:09:59,000 Speaker 1: then immediately get booted out. Then what was the point 162 00:09:59,040 --> 00:10:01,199 Speaker 1: of that other than to say, hey, I figured out 163 00:10:01,200 --> 00:10:04,000 Speaker 1: you have a vulnerability, And if that's your job, that's awesome. 164 00:10:04,600 --> 00:10:06,920 Speaker 1: If you're a white hat hacker and your job is 165 00:10:06,960 --> 00:10:10,040 Speaker 1: to hey, we've got the system, we think it's pretty secure, 166 00:10:10,080 --> 00:10:11,640 Speaker 1: but we would like you to really put to the 167 00:10:11,679 --> 00:10:14,080 Speaker 1: test and if you find any vulnerabilities, let us know 168 00:10:14,520 --> 00:10:16,439 Speaker 1: and then we can go and we can address that 169 00:10:16,520 --> 00:10:18,720 Speaker 1: and fix them so that the bad guys don't have 170 00:10:18,760 --> 00:10:21,679 Speaker 1: a chance to do it later. That's a legitimate job. 171 00:10:22,240 --> 00:10:24,600 Speaker 1: But but in the movies, that's not what you see. 172 00:10:24,640 --> 00:10:27,200 Speaker 1: You see a person going like, I've got access and 173 00:10:27,240 --> 00:10:32,120 Speaker 1: then almost immediately everything is uh gone pear shaped right, 174 00:10:32,200 --> 00:10:35,199 Speaker 1: like there's alarms going off, And that's just not how 175 00:10:35,280 --> 00:10:39,400 Speaker 1: it works, not if you're doing it correctly anyway. Yeah, 176 00:10:39,440 --> 00:10:42,960 Speaker 1: so these these movies, I mean, I I appreciate it. Again, 177 00:10:43,040 --> 00:10:47,320 Speaker 1: try to create dramatic tension, but not terribly accurate. Uh. 178 00:10:47,480 --> 00:10:50,000 Speaker 1: One thing that I did like about hackers is the 179 00:10:50,000 --> 00:10:53,680 Speaker 1: fact that he uses social engineering to first gain access 180 00:10:53,679 --> 00:10:57,079 Speaker 1: to this network, which is something that's very very common 181 00:10:57,120 --> 00:11:01,520 Speaker 1: with UM hackers in general, because he men's are the first, 182 00:11:02,679 --> 00:11:06,360 Speaker 1: the first failure in any network. They're the people, they're 183 00:11:06,440 --> 00:11:08,520 Speaker 1: the ones that you can generally go to and find 184 00:11:08,600 --> 00:11:12,640 Speaker 1: some kind of vulnerability because people inherently trust each other. 185 00:11:13,080 --> 00:11:16,520 Speaker 1: And that's just a thing that humans need to understand, 186 00:11:16,720 --> 00:11:19,440 Speaker 1: is if somebody is asking you questions that you shouldn't 187 00:11:19,600 --> 00:11:22,280 Speaker 1: necessarily give out. Don't give them out, because they might 188 00:11:22,280 --> 00:11:26,480 Speaker 1: be social engineering you into giving out those answers. Hackers 189 00:11:26,559 --> 00:11:30,440 Speaker 1: also does a good job of pinpointing people towards real 190 00:11:30,559 --> 00:11:34,280 Speaker 1: life hacker culture. For example, there is one scene in 191 00:11:34,360 --> 00:11:38,120 Speaker 1: Hackers where they read off the Hacker Manifesto, which was 192 00:11:38,160 --> 00:11:42,440 Speaker 1: originally found in a hacker magazine, which you can only 193 00:11:42,480 --> 00:11:45,200 Speaker 1: find if you were a part of that culture. And 194 00:11:45,240 --> 00:11:47,920 Speaker 1: then later on in the movie they also show a 195 00:11:48,000 --> 00:11:52,560 Speaker 1: real life booklet, a documentation book that shows that was 196 00:11:52,559 --> 00:11:57,560 Speaker 1: actually used by um By phone operations to you know, 197 00:11:57,600 --> 00:11:59,760 Speaker 1: put up new towers and things like that back in 198 00:11:59,800 --> 00:12:03,240 Speaker 1: the eighties and nineties. So it has these real life 199 00:12:03,280 --> 00:12:06,000 Speaker 1: parts of culture, but in reality the movie still has 200 00:12:06,040 --> 00:12:10,679 Speaker 1: that terrible Hollywood hockey uh parts of it as well. Yeah, 201 00:12:10,960 --> 00:12:13,600 Speaker 1: I'm glad you brought up the social engineering. I'm actually 202 00:12:13,600 --> 00:12:17,119 Speaker 1: going to do an episode about specifically about social engineering, 203 00:12:17,760 --> 00:12:21,679 Speaker 1: uh live at Dragon Con with our our mutual friend 204 00:12:21,720 --> 00:12:25,959 Speaker 1: Brian Brushwood. Um so Brushwood's gonna come on the show. 205 00:12:26,280 --> 00:12:28,840 Speaker 1: There's no one like a magician to tell you how 206 00:12:28,920 --> 00:12:32,480 Speaker 1: to fool people right, how to how to lie to 207 00:12:32,520 --> 00:12:34,400 Speaker 1: people and get them to do the things you want 208 00:12:34,440 --> 00:12:37,160 Speaker 1: them to do. So we're gonna we're gonna go into 209 00:12:37,200 --> 00:12:40,120 Speaker 1: social engineering big time on that episode. And I'm also 210 00:12:40,160 --> 00:12:43,760 Speaker 1: glad you mentioned that things like the manuals that definitely 211 00:12:43,800 --> 00:12:45,679 Speaker 1: is a big part of hacker culture, going all the 212 00:12:45,679 --> 00:12:48,920 Speaker 1: way back to those phone freak days, where again the 213 00:12:48,960 --> 00:12:52,280 Speaker 1: hackers were not necessarily trying to take advantage of a system. 214 00:12:52,320 --> 00:12:54,000 Speaker 1: They just wanted to know how it worked. They were 215 00:12:54,040 --> 00:12:58,839 Speaker 1: fascinated by the way it actually performed. And so when 216 00:12:58,880 --> 00:13:02,320 Speaker 1: you got a manual's only you had the uh an 217 00:13:02,360 --> 00:13:05,480 Speaker 1: insight into it. Even if the manual didn't go into 218 00:13:05,679 --> 00:13:09,960 Speaker 1: deep detail about how the system as a whole operates 219 00:13:10,000 --> 00:13:12,200 Speaker 1: on the back end, it could give you enough insight 220 00:13:12,400 --> 00:13:15,400 Speaker 1: and then they start understanding like, oh wow, that's really 221 00:13:15,400 --> 00:13:18,120 Speaker 1: cool that they have this system set up in such 222 00:13:18,160 --> 00:13:20,000 Speaker 1: a way where they can route calls like this and 223 00:13:20,040 --> 00:13:23,760 Speaker 1: they can dynamically change things over. And I'm glad you 224 00:13:23,800 --> 00:13:27,600 Speaker 1: brought that up, because once again, being a hacker doesn't 225 00:13:27,640 --> 00:13:30,600 Speaker 1: necessarily mean you're a terrible person at all. It may 226 00:13:30,640 --> 00:13:33,800 Speaker 1: mean that you just have a deep curiosity that is 227 00:13:33,800 --> 00:13:36,280 Speaker 1: only satisfied by learning how this stuff works, and it's 228 00:13:36,360 --> 00:13:40,160 Speaker 1: not always easy to do that. Information is not always 229 00:13:40,920 --> 00:13:43,960 Speaker 1: publicly available at all times. There have been times where 230 00:13:43,960 --> 00:13:47,360 Speaker 1: it accidentally got publicly available. That's again going back to 231 00:13:47,400 --> 00:13:50,520 Speaker 1: the phone freaks. There were some phone manuals that kind 232 00:13:50,559 --> 00:13:54,440 Speaker 1: of were released to the public, not intentionally. It also 233 00:13:54,559 --> 00:13:58,040 Speaker 1: wasn't considered to be a huge problem until the phone 234 00:13:58,040 --> 00:14:00,400 Speaker 1: freakers got hold of it, and somedy, you had all 235 00:14:00,400 --> 00:14:04,120 Speaker 1: these people making weird calls long distance all over the place. 236 00:14:05,320 --> 00:14:09,040 Speaker 1: So yeah, our next one is is another case of 237 00:14:09,080 --> 00:14:12,120 Speaker 1: people just throwing out terms without really having any meaning 238 00:14:12,160 --> 00:14:14,160 Speaker 1: to them. I mean, the terms themselves have meaning, but 239 00:14:14,320 --> 00:14:16,719 Speaker 1: not in the context of the lines. And it was 240 00:14:16,760 --> 00:14:19,400 Speaker 1: from a c s I New York episode in which 241 00:14:19,560 --> 00:14:22,520 Speaker 1: a character says, and this is a quote, I'll create 242 00:14:22,560 --> 00:14:25,600 Speaker 1: a gooey interface using visual basics, see if I can 243 00:14:25,640 --> 00:14:31,360 Speaker 1: track an IP address. So, Shannon, you want to track 244 00:14:31,400 --> 00:14:33,560 Speaker 1: an IP address, Do you go to the trouble of 245 00:14:33,600 --> 00:14:38,040 Speaker 1: developing a graphical user interface? Uh? No. What I would 246 00:14:38,040 --> 00:14:41,760 Speaker 1: do is open up probably netcat in my terminals so 247 00:14:41,800 --> 00:14:44,000 Speaker 1: that I can gain access and see what the heck 248 00:14:44,080 --> 00:14:47,080 Speaker 1: is going on on that IP address. Right. If it 249 00:14:47,120 --> 00:14:50,480 Speaker 1: was wireless, uh, and I was on a nearby network, 250 00:14:50,520 --> 00:14:52,640 Speaker 1: I would I would probably use wire Shark and WiFi 251 00:14:52,640 --> 00:14:55,080 Speaker 1: Pie Apple like it's it's not. You don't have to 252 00:14:55,120 --> 00:14:59,200 Speaker 1: create an entirely new graphical user interface to able to 253 00:14:59,280 --> 00:15:01,960 Speaker 1: be able to access an IP address and see what 254 00:15:02,080 --> 00:15:05,960 Speaker 1: kind of traffic is happening to and from them. Yeah, 255 00:15:06,000 --> 00:15:10,360 Speaker 1: it doesn't. Creating a graphical user interface literally makes no sense. 256 00:15:10,840 --> 00:15:14,480 Speaker 1: I mean, it has nothing to do with your ability 257 00:15:14,520 --> 00:15:17,960 Speaker 1: to track an IP address, to identify an IP address, 258 00:15:18,520 --> 00:15:20,840 Speaker 1: It has nothing to do with A graphical user interface 259 00:15:21,040 --> 00:15:25,600 Speaker 1: is an interface in itself. Isn't a thing that performs 260 00:15:25,640 --> 00:15:28,680 Speaker 1: these functions. It's just a way to visualize data and 261 00:15:28,760 --> 00:15:32,360 Speaker 1: allow you to interact with it in some way. So 262 00:15:32,720 --> 00:15:37,400 Speaker 1: Windows is a graphical user interface. It's a googy. Any 263 00:15:37,440 --> 00:15:42,120 Speaker 1: any program that has a graphical representation of information that 264 00:15:42,160 --> 00:15:45,280 Speaker 1: allows you to move things around, that's a gooey. Has 265 00:15:45,320 --> 00:15:48,840 Speaker 1: nothing to do with the actual function. It is separate 266 00:15:48,960 --> 00:15:51,800 Speaker 1: from the function. It is just a way of, uh 267 00:15:52,040 --> 00:15:56,200 Speaker 1: manifesting what that data actually means. Now, you might go 268 00:15:56,320 --> 00:16:00,000 Speaker 1: through the trouble of creating some sort of visual day 269 00:16:00,640 --> 00:16:03,120 Speaker 1: if you wanted to explain it to someone else who 270 00:16:03,120 --> 00:16:06,880 Speaker 1: wouldn't understand if you just handed them lines of code 271 00:16:06,960 --> 00:16:09,880 Speaker 1: or whatever. But that's not what that That doesn't even 272 00:16:09,880 --> 00:16:11,960 Speaker 1: work in this case because we're talking about an IP address, 273 00:16:12,960 --> 00:16:14,680 Speaker 1: and I'd be as, you don't need like a pie 274 00:16:14,760 --> 00:16:18,360 Speaker 1: chart or you know, you don't need a graphical representation 275 00:16:18,440 --> 00:16:23,080 Speaker 1: of what an IP addresses. It's an IP address. Yeah, 276 00:16:23,080 --> 00:16:24,960 Speaker 1: this one, this one kind of broke my brain for 277 00:16:25,000 --> 00:16:28,000 Speaker 1: about twenty minutes when I when I watched it. The 278 00:16:28,080 --> 00:16:30,560 Speaker 1: next one I had on the list was another example 279 00:16:30,640 --> 00:16:34,000 Speaker 1: of of hackers battling it out in real time and 280 00:16:34,040 --> 00:16:36,800 Speaker 1: seeing who could type the fastest. This happens all the time. 281 00:16:36,840 --> 00:16:38,680 Speaker 1: There was also an episode of Chuck that did this 282 00:16:38,760 --> 00:16:41,560 Speaker 1: where the best part of that episode of Chuck was 283 00:16:41,600 --> 00:16:44,280 Speaker 1: that the guy that Chuck was facing against was played 284 00:16:44,280 --> 00:16:46,880 Speaker 1: by Freddie Wong and his character was named Freddie. So 285 00:16:47,320 --> 00:16:49,760 Speaker 1: I was like, oh my gosh, it's Freddie Wong, a 286 00:16:49,840 --> 00:16:54,360 Speaker 1: YouTube star. Done good. Um, it's fantastic, It's I think 287 00:16:54,360 --> 00:16:57,640 Speaker 1: it's uh, it's I can't remember. It's like Chuck versus 288 00:16:57,680 --> 00:17:00,000 Speaker 1: the Hackathon or something like that. It's along those line, 289 00:17:00,080 --> 00:17:02,800 Speaker 1: and Freddy Wong plays the leite hacker that he goes 290 00:17:02,880 --> 00:17:06,040 Speaker 1: up against. But in this case, I'm talking about Criminal Minds, 291 00:17:06,600 --> 00:17:09,240 Speaker 1: which has Nicholas Brendan did it who I will always 292 00:17:09,240 --> 00:17:14,800 Speaker 1: and forever think of as Zander from Buffy the Vampire Slayer. Yep. 293 00:17:14,920 --> 00:17:19,680 Speaker 1: And he's brought into to try and access a another 294 00:17:20,560 --> 00:17:24,480 Speaker 1: I think another employees system, but the employees kind of 295 00:17:25,040 --> 00:17:28,000 Speaker 1: on the lamb, and she's working with other folks who 296 00:17:28,040 --> 00:17:30,840 Speaker 1: are trying to do this quietly without the rest of 297 00:17:30,840 --> 00:17:34,560 Speaker 1: the organization taking any notice of them. And uh. And 298 00:17:34,680 --> 00:17:39,800 Speaker 1: so he ends up getting into her system and trying 299 00:17:39,800 --> 00:17:42,360 Speaker 1: to snoop around a bit she notices, and then they 300 00:17:42,400 --> 00:17:45,280 Speaker 1: have this duel and as Shannon has already said, this 301 00:17:45,359 --> 00:17:47,600 Speaker 1: is not really how we see things play out, but 302 00:17:47,760 --> 00:17:50,240 Speaker 1: does have the best line I think out of all 303 00:17:50,280 --> 00:17:53,159 Speaker 1: the examples we have here, which is her gooey is 304 00:17:53,280 --> 00:18:00,239 Speaker 1: mind blowing and would actually see a hacker say, is 305 00:18:00,359 --> 00:18:04,000 Speaker 1: whoa check out this code? Yeah yeah, instead of all 306 00:18:04,040 --> 00:18:06,479 Speaker 1: these little uh these little windows pop up. Also, it's 307 00:18:06,480 --> 00:18:09,960 Speaker 1: funny because in the sequence as they're typing uh, there's 308 00:18:10,000 --> 00:18:13,479 Speaker 1: like one point where the Zander I'll always call him Xander, 309 00:18:13,880 --> 00:18:16,360 Speaker 1: is saying, well, here, see what you think about this, 310 00:18:16,960 --> 00:18:19,400 Speaker 1: and all that you see on the screen is that 311 00:18:19,720 --> 00:18:23,240 Speaker 1: one of the windows on the screen is dragged down 312 00:18:23,280 --> 00:18:27,679 Speaker 1: to like the lower right corner. Yes, and you're thinking, wow, 313 00:18:27,880 --> 00:18:32,680 Speaker 1: you have a mouse, but they're they're actually not even 314 00:18:32,760 --> 00:18:35,399 Speaker 1: using computer mice. They're just typing on the keyboard. And 315 00:18:35,760 --> 00:18:38,600 Speaker 1: so really all you're seeing are all these little windows 316 00:18:38,640 --> 00:18:41,320 Speaker 1: being dragged around the screen and and no real way 317 00:18:41,320 --> 00:18:44,320 Speaker 1: of doing that easily. If you're just if you're using 318 00:18:44,320 --> 00:18:47,760 Speaker 1: a keyboard, you're making it too hard on yourself. Honestly, 319 00:18:49,480 --> 00:18:52,080 Speaker 1: the thing is about hackers that I have noticed. Um, 320 00:18:52,280 --> 00:18:54,600 Speaker 1: I am not as good as a lot of my 321 00:18:54,640 --> 00:19:00,400 Speaker 1: friends are, but keyboard shortcuts are huge, culture huge. Well yeah, 322 00:19:00,400 --> 00:19:03,920 Speaker 1: I mean, especially if you're doing the same sort of 323 00:19:03,960 --> 00:19:06,359 Speaker 1: code over and over, if you're gonna be using the 324 00:19:06,359 --> 00:19:10,879 Speaker 1: same sort of strings repeatedly, having like various shortcuts and 325 00:19:10,960 --> 00:19:14,920 Speaker 1: macro set up saves you so much time. Uh, it's 326 00:19:15,080 --> 00:19:20,280 Speaker 1: way more efficient. And you know, I totally get that. 327 00:19:20,320 --> 00:19:23,120 Speaker 1: I've worked on documents where that sort of thing made 328 00:19:23,119 --> 00:19:25,280 Speaker 1: a lot of sense. And I don't even do coding 329 00:19:25,720 --> 00:19:28,480 Speaker 1: right I'm doing I'm talking about working mostly in the 330 00:19:28,560 --> 00:19:30,800 Speaker 1: legal world. I don't like to talk about it. It 331 00:19:30,880 --> 00:19:32,679 Speaker 1: was a long time ago, and I really like to 332 00:19:32,720 --> 00:19:37,119 Speaker 1: leave that chapter behind. Uh, I was working for law years. 333 00:19:37,720 --> 00:19:42,080 Speaker 1: I wasn't being pursued by them. Um. Another great example 334 00:19:42,200 --> 00:19:44,720 Speaker 1: weird science. This one. This one sort of gets a 335 00:19:44,760 --> 00:19:47,000 Speaker 1: pass from me too, because it's such a goofy movie. 336 00:19:47,119 --> 00:19:50,280 Speaker 1: It's uh, it's one of those films from the eighties 337 00:19:50,320 --> 00:19:53,560 Speaker 1: where you kind of the the basic premise is kind 338 00:19:53,560 --> 00:19:56,119 Speaker 1: of squeaky, well more than kind of squeaky, because you've 339 00:19:56,160 --> 00:19:59,919 Speaker 1: got too high school males who decide to try and 340 00:20:00,080 --> 00:20:05,640 Speaker 1: create a girl so that they can do various sexual 341 00:20:05,760 --> 00:20:08,760 Speaker 1: things with her, which is pretty awful. But it turns 342 00:20:08,760 --> 00:20:10,800 Speaker 1: out that she ends up having a way more intelligence 343 00:20:10,800 --> 00:20:13,160 Speaker 1: than either of them and a lot more agency than 344 00:20:13,200 --> 00:20:16,280 Speaker 1: either of them. So it's okay because it could have 345 00:20:16,320 --> 00:20:18,680 Speaker 1: gone way worse than that. I know because I've watched 346 00:20:18,680 --> 00:20:21,439 Speaker 1: a movie recently that took the other path and it 347 00:20:21,480 --> 00:20:25,760 Speaker 1: was terrible. That was for a different podcast. Uh So. 348 00:20:26,640 --> 00:20:30,240 Speaker 1: This one also has another depiction of characters trying to 349 00:20:30,359 --> 00:20:34,879 Speaker 1: navigate through a three dimensional virtual environment in order to 350 00:20:35,040 --> 00:20:39,159 Speaker 1: access a secure system. In this case, they're trying to 351 00:20:39,359 --> 00:20:44,439 Speaker 1: create a simulated brain for their they're created female, but 352 00:20:45,000 --> 00:20:48,720 Speaker 1: the computer that Wyatt has is only capable of getting 353 00:20:48,760 --> 00:20:51,000 Speaker 1: her intelligence up to fifth grade level, and they need 354 00:20:51,000 --> 00:20:54,760 Speaker 1: more than that, so they tap into some as far 355 00:20:54,800 --> 00:20:58,840 Speaker 1: as I can tell unidentified government agency to get more 356 00:20:58,880 --> 00:21:04,040 Speaker 1: computing power, which in this film is equated to electricity. 357 00:21:04,080 --> 00:21:08,280 Speaker 1: I guess because if you watch the sequence when they 358 00:21:08,359 --> 00:21:12,600 Speaker 1: get access to the computers, everything at the government center 359 00:21:12,640 --> 00:21:14,840 Speaker 1: is going crazy. You're seeing these real, too real tapes 360 00:21:14,920 --> 00:21:18,720 Speaker 1: that are spinning super fast. Uh. You see lights flashing, 361 00:21:19,119 --> 00:21:22,439 Speaker 1: and then a power surge ends up blasting all of 362 00:21:22,440 --> 00:21:25,760 Speaker 1: the electronics at why it's home like the microwave, and 363 00:21:25,960 --> 00:21:29,840 Speaker 1: there's like a a smoke detector. I think that explodes, 364 00:21:30,640 --> 00:21:34,280 Speaker 1: and so that's what zooms in enough power to not 365 00:21:34,400 --> 00:21:37,960 Speaker 1: only boost the intelligence of the character up to uh 366 00:21:38,160 --> 00:21:45,920 Speaker 1: superhuman levels, but also somehow magically brings to life this woman. Um, 367 00:21:46,040 --> 00:21:53,200 Speaker 1: i'd say accurate. Let's take a quick break to thank 368 00:21:53,240 --> 00:21:56,560 Speaker 1: our sponsor. Are you hiring? Do you know where to 369 00:21:56,640 --> 00:22:00,119 Speaker 1: post your job to find the best candidates? Posting your 370 00:22:00,200 --> 00:22:03,840 Speaker 1: job in one place isn't enough to find quality candidates. 371 00:22:03,880 --> 00:22:06,159 Speaker 1: If you want to find the perfect higher, you need 372 00:22:06,240 --> 00:22:09,000 Speaker 1: to post your job on all the top job sites, 373 00:22:09,080 --> 00:22:12,480 Speaker 1: and now you can. With zip recruiter dot com. 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Find out 381 00:22:41,080 --> 00:22:43,920 Speaker 1: today why zip recruiter has been used by over one 382 00:22:44,080 --> 00:22:47,919 Speaker 1: million businesses and right now listeners of tech stuff can 383 00:22:47,960 --> 00:22:51,280 Speaker 1: post jobs on zip recruiter for free by going to 384 00:22:51,440 --> 00:22:56,720 Speaker 1: zip recruiter dot com slash first. That's zip recruiter dot 385 00:22:56,760 --> 00:23:01,160 Speaker 1: com slash first, f I r ST one more time. 386 00:23:01,320 --> 00:23:04,280 Speaker 1: Try it for free, go to zip recruiter dot com 387 00:23:04,320 --> 00:23:10,360 Speaker 1: slash first. So this is a great example the Weird 388 00:23:10,400 --> 00:23:15,000 Speaker 1: Science series. Your segment is a great example of what 389 00:23:15,080 --> 00:23:17,800 Speaker 1: you can actually do with more computing power. So in 390 00:23:17,840 --> 00:23:21,399 Speaker 1: the real life, we have quantum computing, which people are 391 00:23:21,440 --> 00:23:24,920 Speaker 1: currently working on to be able to d decrypt encryption 392 00:23:25,040 --> 00:23:30,639 Speaker 1: that is not currently vulnerable, but that requires more computing power. 393 00:23:30,760 --> 00:23:36,240 Speaker 1: That's what quantum computing is all about, not necessarily more electricity, right, yeah, 394 00:23:36,320 --> 00:23:39,800 Speaker 1: quantum computing, you know using cubits where you have quantum 395 00:23:39,800 --> 00:23:43,080 Speaker 1: bits that represent not just a zero, not just a one, 396 00:23:43,160 --> 00:23:47,040 Speaker 1: but both and technically all values in between. I mean 397 00:23:47,080 --> 00:23:51,439 Speaker 1: that you can complete calculations in parallel, and this is 398 00:23:51,480 --> 00:23:54,560 Speaker 1: great for certain types of computing problems where you can 399 00:23:54,680 --> 00:23:58,440 Speaker 1: have those parallel computing problems that are easily solved this way. 400 00:23:58,720 --> 00:24:02,200 Speaker 1: Other computing problems are not parallel, and in those cases, 401 00:24:02,520 --> 00:24:04,840 Speaker 1: a quantum computer is not necessarily going to be any 402 00:24:04,920 --> 00:24:06,920 Speaker 1: better than a classical computer. In fact, it may be 403 00:24:07,040 --> 00:24:10,840 Speaker 1: worse depending upon how many cubits the quantum computer has. 404 00:24:10,880 --> 00:24:14,040 Speaker 1: If it has enough, then it'll chug along. But for 405 00:24:14,119 --> 00:24:19,600 Speaker 1: those parallel problems, including encryption, quantum computers will transform our world. 406 00:24:19,880 --> 00:24:23,000 Speaker 1: The encryption that we rely upon today will be trivial 407 00:24:23,440 --> 00:24:26,960 Speaker 1: if you have a significantly powerful quantum computer, because it 408 00:24:27,000 --> 00:24:30,520 Speaker 1: will be able to go through all the possible answers 409 00:24:30,560 --> 00:24:34,200 Speaker 1: that are the basis for your encryption. Typically we're talking 410 00:24:34,240 --> 00:24:39,400 Speaker 1: about um you know, very large hash numbers and assigned 411 00:24:39,400 --> 00:24:42,240 Speaker 1: probabilities to them and figure out things like your encryption 412 00:24:42,320 --> 00:24:46,160 Speaker 1: keys very very quickly. So that is interesting, But as 413 00:24:46,240 --> 00:24:50,640 Speaker 1: you say, not just by it's not something that's done 414 00:24:50,640 --> 00:24:55,400 Speaker 1: by pumping more electricity through a power line. That would 415 00:24:55,440 --> 00:24:58,800 Speaker 1: be a little little simplistic. Our next example is, of course, 416 00:24:58,840 --> 00:25:01,240 Speaker 1: the most famous one in my mind, it's the one 417 00:25:01,240 --> 00:25:04,880 Speaker 1: that I spent an episode ranting about previously on text Ups, 418 00:25:04,880 --> 00:25:06,840 Speaker 1: So I won't go into too much detail. It is 419 00:25:06,960 --> 00:25:14,480 Speaker 1: Independence Day. It's like, yeah, I gotta tell you, if 420 00:25:14,520 --> 00:25:17,560 Speaker 1: an alien race ever attacks us, I I want Jeff 421 00:25:17,560 --> 00:25:20,600 Speaker 1: Goldbloom to develop the computer virus that we're going to 422 00:25:20,640 --> 00:25:23,320 Speaker 1: put on their on their ships so that they can't 423 00:25:23,320 --> 00:25:27,719 Speaker 1: attack us. So this is a great example because he 424 00:25:27,760 --> 00:25:31,280 Speaker 1: was without about any prior knowledge, he was able to 425 00:25:31,720 --> 00:25:34,680 Speaker 1: get a computer virus from his Mac laptop onto an 426 00:25:34,680 --> 00:25:37,680 Speaker 1: alien spacecraft and be able to basically take him over 427 00:25:37,680 --> 00:25:41,480 Speaker 1: and shut them down. Yeah. So there's so many things 428 00:25:41,480 --> 00:25:45,879 Speaker 1: wrong with this one. One. We cannot be certain that 429 00:25:46,000 --> 00:25:51,919 Speaker 1: any alien, intelligent alien civilization out there uses computers that 430 00:25:52,000 --> 00:25:55,360 Speaker 1: remotely resemble the way our computers work. That's problem one. 431 00:25:56,280 --> 00:25:59,560 Speaker 1: Problem too, We can't be certain that a virus that 432 00:25:59,680 --> 00:26:03,159 Speaker 1: we would create for Earth based computers would ever be 433 00:26:03,280 --> 00:26:06,719 Speaker 1: transferable onto an alien craft. From three we don't even 434 00:26:06,760 --> 00:26:09,639 Speaker 1: know how we would do that, right, Like, it's do 435 00:26:09,760 --> 00:26:14,240 Speaker 1: they have universal serial ports or something? What's how how 436 00:26:14,280 --> 00:26:20,480 Speaker 1: do you get your stuff, your your program into alien technology, 437 00:26:20,960 --> 00:26:25,920 Speaker 1: even if it's wireless. The wireless protocols. Those are things. 438 00:26:26,320 --> 00:26:30,880 Speaker 1: We don't just have computers shooting off random radio waves. 439 00:26:32,040 --> 00:26:35,040 Speaker 1: They have to follow very specific rules for computers to 440 00:26:35,040 --> 00:26:39,240 Speaker 1: communicate with each other. Everything about this is wrong, And 441 00:26:39,280 --> 00:26:42,600 Speaker 1: given the premise of this movie, I highly doubt that 442 00:26:42,640 --> 00:26:47,399 Speaker 1: their alien technology would even remotely compare to ours. M 443 00:26:47,520 --> 00:26:49,919 Speaker 1: I'm sure that they would be much much stronger and 444 00:26:50,000 --> 00:26:54,560 Speaker 1: much more, much more advanced than our own. Yeah, and 445 00:26:54,640 --> 00:26:56,840 Speaker 1: some of the arguments are that, oh, but see, the 446 00:26:56,880 --> 00:27:00,120 Speaker 1: whole point of the movie is that the United States 447 00:27:00,160 --> 00:27:03,639 Speaker 1: took technology from the Aliens and use that to boost 448 00:27:03,680 --> 00:27:06,600 Speaker 1: our own technology so that we would advance faster. And 449 00:27:06,960 --> 00:27:12,400 Speaker 1: my thought to that is, how that considering that all 450 00:27:12,440 --> 00:27:15,359 Speaker 1: the technology that we rely upon today is based off 451 00:27:15,400 --> 00:27:21,160 Speaker 1: of very very very well documented advances in engineering, none 452 00:27:21,160 --> 00:27:24,680 Speaker 1: of which are so dramatic as to say, oh, that's 453 00:27:24,680 --> 00:27:30,280 Speaker 1: what the aliens arrived that one. Now, I included this 454 00:27:30,359 --> 00:27:33,040 Speaker 1: next one just for you, Shannon, because I know that 455 00:27:33,160 --> 00:27:37,399 Speaker 1: you are a lover of Japanese culture, and so I 456 00:27:37,600 --> 00:27:44,000 Speaker 1: found a great eneme scene from Tangan Toppa Guran Lagan 457 00:27:44,480 --> 00:27:50,119 Speaker 1: Guran hen and Uh. It involves a character going into 458 00:27:50,160 --> 00:27:54,199 Speaker 1: a virtual world as a virtual avatar runs through a 459 00:27:54,240 --> 00:27:58,240 Speaker 1: maze as we've seen before, finds a lock box that 460 00:27:58,840 --> 00:28:01,160 Speaker 1: apparently has the day that he wants to get at, 461 00:28:02,080 --> 00:28:04,760 Speaker 1: takes out a green glowing key, puts it in the 462 00:28:04,760 --> 00:28:08,560 Speaker 1: locked box, tries to unlock. It doesn't work, so does 463 00:28:08,640 --> 00:28:13,000 Speaker 1: he do His virtual avatar head butts the box repeatedly 464 00:28:13,080 --> 00:28:16,360 Speaker 1: till it breaks open. He grabs hold of a red sphere, 465 00:28:16,400 --> 00:28:19,560 Speaker 1: which represents the data he wants, and then his character 466 00:28:19,760 --> 00:28:22,879 Speaker 1: eats the data and that's how they analyze it. And 467 00:28:23,000 --> 00:28:26,480 Speaker 1: boy do I wish that's the way it worked. Oh 468 00:28:26,560 --> 00:28:30,280 Speaker 1: that's hilarious. I just I hope that it tasted good. Yeah, 469 00:28:30,400 --> 00:28:32,439 Speaker 1: I mean, I mean it is a virtual character, so 470 00:28:32,480 --> 00:28:36,000 Speaker 1: I guess you could technically assume it tasted anyway you 471 00:28:36,080 --> 00:28:39,760 Speaker 1: like it to taste. Uh. I watched this and I thought, well, 472 00:28:39,760 --> 00:28:44,280 Speaker 1: this is delightful, but it's it's also again not trying 473 00:28:44,320 --> 00:28:46,320 Speaker 1: to play this as this is how real hackers are. 474 00:28:46,400 --> 00:28:50,400 Speaker 1: This is obviously a fantasy sci fi world that we're 475 00:28:50,400 --> 00:28:54,880 Speaker 1: looking at, but one of the most entertaining versions of 476 00:28:54,920 --> 00:28:58,360 Speaker 1: that mean that I've ever seen. I just love it, 477 00:28:58,480 --> 00:29:00,840 Speaker 1: and like, just watching that tea makes me want to 478 00:29:00,880 --> 00:29:07,920 Speaker 1: watch the entire UH anime because it's just so ridiculous. Yeah, yeah, works. 479 00:29:07,960 --> 00:29:11,680 Speaker 1: It's like somebody trying to brute force, but their implementation 480 00:29:11,720 --> 00:29:16,080 Speaker 1: of brute forcing is headbuts. Yeah, literal brute force, like 481 00:29:16,200 --> 00:29:22,360 Speaker 1: not not putting password after password attempt through a password manager, 482 00:29:22,520 --> 00:29:27,280 Speaker 1: nothing like that. It's literally attacking a virtual box with 483 00:29:27,360 --> 00:29:31,360 Speaker 1: a virtual head butt. It's wonderful. The last little bit 484 00:29:31,400 --> 00:29:33,440 Speaker 1: I have on here, this one, This one doesn't really 485 00:29:33,480 --> 00:29:36,000 Speaker 1: count because it was done on purpose. But there was 486 00:29:36,160 --> 00:29:39,040 Speaker 1: a segment on The Late Show with Stephen Colbert who 487 00:29:39,080 --> 00:29:42,240 Speaker 1: had Michael Ian Black on Michael Ian Black who uh 488 00:29:42,560 --> 00:29:45,800 Speaker 1: was in the state and tons of other stuff, and 489 00:29:45,840 --> 00:29:51,840 Speaker 1: Michael Iam Black explained that he had dramatic acting chops 490 00:29:52,240 --> 00:29:54,280 Speaker 1: that he felt he never got a chance to really 491 00:29:54,320 --> 00:29:57,440 Speaker 1: exercise he's known as a comedic actor, and that he 492 00:29:57,480 --> 00:30:01,320 Speaker 1: always wanted his dream role is that of a hacker 493 00:30:02,040 --> 00:30:05,600 Speaker 1: on a police procedural show, because it meant that he 494 00:30:05,640 --> 00:30:09,200 Speaker 1: could dress in nice clothes, sit down behind a desk, 495 00:30:09,800 --> 00:30:12,600 Speaker 1: and everything he would do would seem really important, he says, 496 00:30:12,680 --> 00:30:15,920 Speaker 1: is a dream job. And so then they do a 497 00:30:15,960 --> 00:30:19,600 Speaker 1: segment where Stephen Colbert's show gets hacked and Mike William 498 00:30:19,640 --> 00:30:22,960 Speaker 1: Black comes back out to fight off against the hack. 499 00:30:23,480 --> 00:30:26,520 Speaker 1: It is a send up of all the tropes we've 500 00:30:26,560 --> 00:30:29,240 Speaker 1: been mentioning so far in this episode, and if you 501 00:30:29,320 --> 00:30:31,959 Speaker 1: have not seen it, I recommend going out and watching 502 00:30:31,960 --> 00:30:35,840 Speaker 1: it because it's hilarious. My favorite part is the fact 503 00:30:35,840 --> 00:30:38,840 Speaker 1: that he comes out with black lipstick on and these 504 00:30:38,880 --> 00:30:43,360 Speaker 1: like biker gloves, which first off, would be incredibly hard 505 00:30:43,400 --> 00:30:46,760 Speaker 1: to type in wearing those gloves, and second off, like 506 00:30:47,240 --> 00:30:49,680 Speaker 1: the hackers, I know, do you not wear black lipstick, 507 00:30:49,880 --> 00:30:53,760 Speaker 1: especially if they're male? Yeah, yeah, he The first one 508 00:30:53,760 --> 00:30:55,840 Speaker 1: of the first things he says is talking about how 509 00:30:55,880 --> 00:30:57,960 Speaker 1: he's gonna be typing, and then it's typing will in 510 00:30:58,040 --> 00:31:01,440 Speaker 1: no way be uh hampered by the fact he's wearing 511 00:31:01,480 --> 00:31:05,720 Speaker 1: fingerless microgloves, so he's actually he actually brings attention to that, 512 00:31:06,000 --> 00:31:08,040 Speaker 1: and there is a funny there's a funny moment he's 513 00:31:08,080 --> 00:31:11,440 Speaker 1: bent over Stephen Colbert's desk and he's typing furiously, not 514 00:31:11,480 --> 00:31:14,960 Speaker 1: really typing, he's just slapping at the keyboard furiously. And 515 00:31:15,000 --> 00:31:17,480 Speaker 1: then it becomes clear that his lines are on the 516 00:31:17,520 --> 00:31:22,200 Speaker 1: screen and and he scrolled past them, and so he's like, 517 00:31:22,560 --> 00:31:27,160 Speaker 1: I'm trying to find my line. So there's but it's 518 00:31:27,200 --> 00:31:29,680 Speaker 1: great because they just roll with it. They just keep 519 00:31:29,720 --> 00:31:33,240 Speaker 1: on going. So uh, it's fantastic to see that kind 520 00:31:33,280 --> 00:31:38,280 Speaker 1: of self aware um uh take. On the way hackers 521 00:31:38,360 --> 00:31:42,720 Speaker 1: and hacking culture has been portrayed in the popular media, 522 00:31:43,080 --> 00:31:45,480 Speaker 1: there are you know, we've we've harped on a lot 523 00:31:45,520 --> 00:31:48,680 Speaker 1: of different shows and movies about being terrible or being 524 00:31:48,920 --> 00:31:52,360 Speaker 1: uh inaccurate, But there are some examples out there that 525 00:31:52,480 --> 00:31:57,719 Speaker 1: are trying really hard to be respectful and realistic when 526 00:31:57,800 --> 00:32:00,920 Speaker 1: it comes to hacker culture. One of the ones that 527 00:32:01,040 --> 00:32:07,200 Speaker 1: leaps to mind is Mr Robot, a series where hacking 528 00:32:07,240 --> 00:32:10,360 Speaker 1: plays a very important part. It's not like it's all 529 00:32:10,400 --> 00:32:13,880 Speaker 1: about hacking, but that's an important plot device in several episodes. 530 00:32:14,600 --> 00:32:19,760 Speaker 1: And they they name real security firms, they name real 531 00:32:20,160 --> 00:32:23,680 Speaker 1: penetration teams that actually go and do this sort of testing. 532 00:32:24,040 --> 00:32:27,920 Speaker 1: They name real software packages that are meant to either 533 00:32:29,360 --> 00:32:33,600 Speaker 1: help someone commit one of these attacks or defend against them. 534 00:32:33,640 --> 00:32:36,440 Speaker 1: They use real products, they're not so it's clear the 535 00:32:36,440 --> 00:32:41,560 Speaker 1: people who are working on the show do their research. Yes, 536 00:32:41,680 --> 00:32:44,200 Speaker 1: it's very clear, And in fact, I have a very 537 00:32:44,240 --> 00:32:47,920 Speaker 1: close working relationship with the team over at Mr Robot 538 00:32:48,440 --> 00:32:51,080 Speaker 1: to make sure that they get our products right because 539 00:32:51,080 --> 00:32:55,120 Speaker 1: they have shown very recently one of hack fives products 540 00:32:55,200 --> 00:32:57,960 Speaker 1: called the USB rubber Ducky. They have a team over 541 00:32:58,000 --> 00:33:01,720 Speaker 1: there that that include Lude, somebody he used to work 542 00:33:01,760 --> 00:33:04,960 Speaker 1: for the FBI, So they have actual people who have 543 00:33:05,080 --> 00:33:08,760 Speaker 1: worked with security and with privacy and they have a 544 00:33:08,960 --> 00:33:11,720 Speaker 1: general understanding. But they still like to talk to real 545 00:33:11,760 --> 00:33:13,920 Speaker 1: life hackers to make sure that everything that they show 546 00:33:13,960 --> 00:33:18,160 Speaker 1: on the show is legit and is an actual hack. Um. 547 00:33:18,520 --> 00:33:20,760 Speaker 1: Mr Robot is such a great example because it gives 548 00:33:20,760 --> 00:33:25,520 Speaker 1: a perfect, uh, real life scenario where you have people 549 00:33:25,520 --> 00:33:27,640 Speaker 1: that are fighting back. You have people that are fighting 550 00:33:27,680 --> 00:33:30,040 Speaker 1: back against you know, the big corps and trying to 551 00:33:30,120 --> 00:33:33,240 Speaker 1: do something that's right for the little guy. Um, which 552 00:33:33,360 --> 00:33:37,520 Speaker 1: you do see a lot in real life hacking cases. 553 00:33:38,280 --> 00:33:40,840 Speaker 1: A lot of times people will go after large corporations 554 00:33:40,880 --> 00:33:43,400 Speaker 1: because they don't necessarily agree with their tactics, or they 555 00:33:43,440 --> 00:33:45,920 Speaker 1: don't agree with how much they're paying their employees or 556 00:33:45,920 --> 00:33:49,040 Speaker 1: something like that. UM. So, I just I love watching 557 00:33:49,080 --> 00:33:51,280 Speaker 1: Mr Robot because it gives me the chance to look 558 00:33:51,320 --> 00:33:53,800 Speaker 1: at it and be like like, oh, what they're showing 559 00:33:53,880 --> 00:33:56,160 Speaker 1: right now is a real it's a real hack. Like 560 00:33:56,200 --> 00:33:59,480 Speaker 1: they're actually showing this to a huge fan base of 561 00:33:59,560 --> 00:34:04,680 Speaker 1: people wouldn't necessarily be uh interested in this kind of 562 00:34:04,720 --> 00:34:09,000 Speaker 1: stuff unless they were watching a show. So I just 563 00:34:09,120 --> 00:34:12,440 Speaker 1: love that they're bringing so such a huge fan base 564 00:34:12,680 --> 00:34:16,600 Speaker 1: into what we do on a day to day basis. 565 00:34:16,920 --> 00:34:18,759 Speaker 1: And I like that not only are they taking these 566 00:34:18,760 --> 00:34:22,719 Speaker 1: steps to make sure that the stuff they portray is accurate, 567 00:34:23,560 --> 00:34:27,399 Speaker 1: but they're even going so far as certain aspects that 568 00:34:27,800 --> 00:34:30,080 Speaker 1: we do see reflected in the news. You were mentioning 569 00:34:30,080 --> 00:34:33,160 Speaker 1: this ship and things like someone being on the inside 570 00:34:33,280 --> 00:34:36,719 Speaker 1: of a company and for one reason or another, they 571 00:34:36,760 --> 00:34:42,759 Speaker 1: decide to aid someone who wants to access that company's information, 572 00:34:42,800 --> 00:34:44,759 Speaker 1: and they're doing so knowingly. It's not that they've been 573 00:34:44,760 --> 00:34:48,759 Speaker 1: tricked into it. We see this where we have their 574 00:34:48,840 --> 00:34:52,040 Speaker 1: their hackers who one of the best things, one of 575 00:34:52,040 --> 00:34:54,120 Speaker 1: the best tools you can have is making friends with 576 00:34:54,160 --> 00:34:57,239 Speaker 1: someone who's works for the company that you want to 577 00:34:57,280 --> 00:34:59,919 Speaker 1: try and uh access, like you want to get into 578 00:34:59,920 --> 00:35:02,920 Speaker 1: the their system. And if it's someone who's disgruntled for 579 00:35:03,040 --> 00:35:06,600 Speaker 1: whatever reason, maybe they were looked over for a promotion, 580 00:35:06,760 --> 00:35:09,520 Speaker 1: maybe they don't like what the company is doing, maybe 581 00:35:09,760 --> 00:35:13,480 Speaker 1: that what the company's purposes conflicts with their own ethical code. 582 00:35:13,920 --> 00:35:18,680 Speaker 1: They might feel like helping someone out is the right choice. Um, 583 00:35:18,719 --> 00:35:21,960 Speaker 1: and even if they themselves are not the ones doing 584 00:35:22,000 --> 00:35:25,440 Speaker 1: the programming or whatever, when it comes to it, they 585 00:35:25,520 --> 00:35:27,960 Speaker 1: might be the ones who allow the access in the 586 00:35:28,040 --> 00:35:31,160 Speaker 1: first place. We do see that in real life, and 587 00:35:31,200 --> 00:35:33,640 Speaker 1: there are sometimes where we have to ask the question 588 00:35:33,680 --> 00:35:36,440 Speaker 1: like was this someone from the inside or was this 589 00:35:36,560 --> 00:35:41,319 Speaker 1: someone who attacked from an external site. Again, going back 590 00:35:41,360 --> 00:35:45,440 Speaker 1: to Sony, there was there's still a lot of argument 591 00:35:45,480 --> 00:35:49,600 Speaker 1: about who ultimately was responsible for that. At the time, 592 00:35:49,800 --> 00:35:52,279 Speaker 1: the two big arguments that were coming out was that 593 00:35:53,120 --> 00:35:56,960 Speaker 1: it was either someone in North Korea who had done this, 594 00:35:57,160 --> 00:35:59,840 Speaker 1: or someone who was in the pay of North Korea 595 00:36:00,120 --> 00:36:03,799 Speaker 1: like a state agent in other words, or it was 596 00:36:03,880 --> 00:36:06,320 Speaker 1: someone who used to work for Sony or was currently 597 00:36:06,320 --> 00:36:10,440 Speaker 1: working for Sony and they did not like something that 598 00:36:10,520 --> 00:36:13,480 Speaker 1: happened and so as a result ended up stealing a 599 00:36:13,520 --> 00:36:18,040 Speaker 1: ton of information and dumping it online for public review. Uh. 600 00:36:18,080 --> 00:36:21,840 Speaker 1: And then the North Korea part just became a great 601 00:36:21,880 --> 00:36:25,640 Speaker 1: smoke screen for that person. I saw that A lot 602 00:36:25,640 --> 00:36:29,280 Speaker 1: of security experts, at least at the time, I felt 603 00:36:29,400 --> 00:36:32,080 Speaker 1: more inclined to believe it was the second possibility, that 604 00:36:32,160 --> 00:36:36,239 Speaker 1: it was someone from the inside and not necessarily a 605 00:36:36,360 --> 00:36:41,360 Speaker 1: state sponsored attack. I don't know of that opinion ultimately changed. 606 00:36:41,440 --> 00:36:44,000 Speaker 1: I've honestly lost track of the Sony story at this 607 00:36:44,080 --> 00:36:47,000 Speaker 1: point because it kind of died down after that initial 608 00:36:47,560 --> 00:36:52,239 Speaker 1: um flare of of controversy around all the different elements. Yeah. 609 00:36:52,280 --> 00:36:55,319 Speaker 1: The interesting thing that I found about that is a 610 00:36:55,400 --> 00:36:58,880 Speaker 1: lot of the friends that I have in hacker culture, 611 00:36:59,520 --> 00:37:02,640 Speaker 1: um just move on because there are so many different 612 00:37:02,640 --> 00:37:05,160 Speaker 1: hacks that you see in our day and age that 613 00:37:05,480 --> 00:37:08,279 Speaker 1: they don't have time to go back and discuss the 614 00:37:08,360 --> 00:37:11,480 Speaker 1: Sony hack. And disclaimer, I did do a bunch of 615 00:37:11,560 --> 00:37:14,760 Speaker 1: videos for Signal by Sony, which was a different, um, 616 00:37:15,040 --> 00:37:19,600 Speaker 1: different core company inside of Sony that was doing these 617 00:37:19,600 --> 00:37:22,320 Speaker 1: shows that I was working with. It wasn't the entertainment 618 00:37:22,320 --> 00:37:25,400 Speaker 1: one that got hacked, but um, I definitely went to 619 00:37:25,440 --> 00:37:26,719 Speaker 1: them when I got that job, and I was like, 620 00:37:26,760 --> 00:37:30,120 Speaker 1: you sure you want to hire because um, that thing 621 00:37:30,239 --> 00:37:32,680 Speaker 1: happened to you guys, and I'm kind of a hackers, 622 00:37:32,719 --> 00:37:39,320 Speaker 1: so yeah, okay with Yeah, So I'm I'm pleased that 623 00:37:39,440 --> 00:37:42,080 Speaker 1: Mr Robot is out there. You were mentioning before we 624 00:37:42,120 --> 00:37:46,200 Speaker 1: went on on the recording, before we started recording that 625 00:37:46,200 --> 00:37:49,760 Speaker 1: that Silicon Valley also typically does a pretty good job 626 00:37:50,239 --> 00:37:54,080 Speaker 1: of portraying hacking in a in a realistic way. They 627 00:37:54,120 --> 00:37:57,600 Speaker 1: do so Silicon Valley I actually hired one of my friends, 628 00:37:57,680 --> 00:38:00,359 Speaker 1: Rob Fuller, who you can see in the credits of 629 00:38:00,400 --> 00:38:04,160 Speaker 1: several of their episodes, to give them a good overview, 630 00:38:04,560 --> 00:38:07,279 Speaker 1: a good synopsis of what they should be showing on 631 00:38:07,320 --> 00:38:10,440 Speaker 1: their show and what would be fake, what would be 632 00:38:10,480 --> 00:38:14,080 Speaker 1: called out. So he helped, and he's actually a penetration tester. 633 00:38:14,360 --> 00:38:16,239 Speaker 1: He does this as his day job, and he's been 634 00:38:16,280 --> 00:38:19,200 Speaker 1: doing it for you know, a couple of decades, I believe, 635 00:38:19,640 --> 00:38:22,000 Speaker 1: uh So, he was the perfect person for them to 636 00:38:22,040 --> 00:38:25,560 Speaker 1: go to to say, you know, is this right? Is 637 00:38:25,560 --> 00:38:28,480 Speaker 1: this correct? Can you can you actually build a script 638 00:38:28,520 --> 00:38:31,960 Speaker 1: for us to show on on camera so that we 639 00:38:32,040 --> 00:38:34,160 Speaker 1: don't get called out by our fan base, a lot 640 00:38:34,200 --> 00:38:36,840 Speaker 1: of which is going to be the Silicon Valley you know, 641 00:38:36,920 --> 00:38:40,000 Speaker 1: gurus that actually do coding on a day day and 642 00:38:40,080 --> 00:38:44,360 Speaker 1: day out basis. Uh So, Mr Robot and siliconbat Valley 643 00:38:44,400 --> 00:38:48,160 Speaker 1: both have hired on um several people who have worked 644 00:38:48,200 --> 00:38:52,279 Speaker 1: in security and penetration testing, information technology, things of that 645 00:38:52,400 --> 00:38:54,720 Speaker 1: nature so that they can get it right on camera. 646 00:38:55,000 --> 00:38:58,440 Speaker 1: And I think that's very important because what we're finding 647 00:38:58,640 --> 00:39:02,240 Speaker 1: in this in this genre, in this career career path 648 00:39:02,400 --> 00:39:05,360 Speaker 1: is that where there's a lot of people who lose 649 00:39:05,440 --> 00:39:08,160 Speaker 1: interest very very quickly in it because it is hard, 650 00:39:08,239 --> 00:39:11,799 Speaker 1: it is ever changing, and it's complicated, uh, and you 651 00:39:11,840 --> 00:39:13,279 Speaker 1: have to go to school for it, and you have 652 00:39:13,320 --> 00:39:17,400 Speaker 1: to get certificates uh that increase your knowledge, and you 653 00:39:17,480 --> 00:39:20,080 Speaker 1: have to renew those certificates day in and day out 654 00:39:20,160 --> 00:39:23,839 Speaker 1: every year. So it's expensive to stay in this career too. 655 00:39:23,920 --> 00:39:25,920 Speaker 1: Hopefully you get a company or get a job with 656 00:39:25,960 --> 00:39:28,359 Speaker 1: a company that you know will pay for those certificates 657 00:39:28,400 --> 00:39:33,160 Speaker 1: for you. So the fact that they're showing these real 658 00:39:33,280 --> 00:39:37,840 Speaker 1: life scenarios on camera, I'm hoping that it will increase 659 00:39:37,880 --> 00:39:41,840 Speaker 1: more interests in this in this genre of work, because 660 00:39:41,880 --> 00:39:44,520 Speaker 1: we really need more people to be interested in in 661 00:39:44,600 --> 00:39:46,839 Speaker 1: it in in the long term, because it is so 662 00:39:46,840 --> 00:39:50,440 Speaker 1: so important for companies as a whole, especially if they're 663 00:39:50,480 --> 00:39:53,280 Speaker 1: holding user data, to be secure and to be private 664 00:39:53,360 --> 00:39:56,320 Speaker 1: and to be very conscious of what they're doing behind 665 00:39:56,360 --> 00:39:59,799 Speaker 1: the scenes as opposed to just making a website pretty Uh. 666 00:40:00,000 --> 00:40:01,960 Speaker 1: The things that are most important to me are security 667 00:40:01,960 --> 00:40:05,279 Speaker 1: and privacy, and it's it's very important to me that 668 00:40:05,320 --> 00:40:08,600 Speaker 1: more and more companies get involved with this information and 669 00:40:08,840 --> 00:40:12,759 Speaker 1: get a much broader understanding of how important it is 670 00:40:12,800 --> 00:40:15,480 Speaker 1: to actually pay money to make sure that you have 671 00:40:15,560 --> 00:40:18,919 Speaker 1: good security. And uh to that end, I mean, there's 672 00:40:18,920 --> 00:40:22,120 Speaker 1: a there's a movie that's coming out later on this year, 673 00:40:22,120 --> 00:40:26,240 Speaker 1: I believe called I T. It's got pierced broadening in it. Uh. 674 00:40:26,280 --> 00:40:30,920 Speaker 1: And in that film there's, uh this idea of privacy 675 00:40:30,920 --> 00:40:33,080 Speaker 1: and security plays of a huge part of it, as 676 00:40:33,120 --> 00:40:35,640 Speaker 1: well as the Internet of Things, which again is a 677 00:40:35,680 --> 00:40:38,920 Speaker 1: great illustration of why security is so important. We have 678 00:40:39,040 --> 00:40:43,440 Speaker 1: more and more devices that are are opening up opportunities 679 00:40:43,960 --> 00:40:46,920 Speaker 1: to be a point of entry for a hacker, right 680 00:40:47,000 --> 00:40:49,399 Speaker 1: Like if you have not, if you haven't designed your 681 00:40:49,960 --> 00:40:54,440 Speaker 1: IoT device to also be secure and encrypted, that's a 682 00:40:54,480 --> 00:40:58,439 Speaker 1: potential in depending upon how it how it communicates with 683 00:40:58,640 --> 00:41:01,800 Speaker 1: the rest of your device aces. Uh. So this movie 684 00:41:01,800 --> 00:41:05,600 Speaker 1: I T that's coming out, there's a Pierce Brosiden's playing 685 00:41:05,640 --> 00:41:10,560 Speaker 1: like a Tony Stark like business guy who ends up 686 00:41:10,600 --> 00:41:13,239 Speaker 1: having a an I T guy come in and help 687 00:41:13,320 --> 00:41:16,880 Speaker 1: him out when he's giving a presentation and the technology 688 00:41:16,960 --> 00:41:19,320 Speaker 1: is failing. The I T guy gets it turned around, 689 00:41:19,520 --> 00:41:22,360 Speaker 1: and so Pierce President says, Hey, come back to my house. 690 00:41:22,640 --> 00:41:24,360 Speaker 1: I'd like you to help me out with some stuff, 691 00:41:24,400 --> 00:41:26,640 Speaker 1: and the guy's like, okay, sure, and he comes by 692 00:41:26,760 --> 00:41:29,560 Speaker 1: and the guy's house has got all this high tech equipment, 693 00:41:29,600 --> 00:41:32,920 Speaker 1: most of which is not really working up to the 694 00:41:32,960 --> 00:41:36,920 Speaker 1: possibility that could. But he also has a young like 695 00:41:36,960 --> 00:41:40,279 Speaker 1: a teenage daughter that the I T guy ends up 696 00:41:40,320 --> 00:41:43,120 Speaker 1: becoming fixated with. So then it becomes a psychological thriller 697 00:41:43,560 --> 00:41:46,160 Speaker 1: where the I T guy who was upgrading all the 698 00:41:46,160 --> 00:41:49,279 Speaker 1: systems is really using them to spy on people, and 699 00:41:49,320 --> 00:41:52,160 Speaker 1: too when he when he's rebuffed, he uses them to 700 00:41:52,440 --> 00:41:55,760 Speaker 1: terrorize people. So it becomes kind of a psychological thriller 701 00:41:55,840 --> 00:41:59,360 Speaker 1: slash horror movie that's I T based uh an Internet 702 00:41:59,360 --> 00:42:01,799 Speaker 1: of Things based, And while that is going to be 703 00:42:02,600 --> 00:42:07,640 Speaker 1: pushed to the limit for drama, for dramatic purposes, there's 704 00:42:07,640 --> 00:42:11,680 Speaker 1: a lot there that you could say, like, you know, um, yeah, 705 00:42:11,840 --> 00:42:14,040 Speaker 1: it went to extremes for the purposes of this movie, 706 00:42:14,200 --> 00:42:17,520 Speaker 1: but it does drive home certain things you should be 707 00:42:17,520 --> 00:42:20,239 Speaker 1: aware of, like how many devices do you own to 708 00:42:20,360 --> 00:42:22,640 Speaker 1: have microphones in them? How many do you own that 709 00:42:22,760 --> 00:42:26,440 Speaker 1: have cameras in them? What what are they connected to? 710 00:42:26,719 --> 00:42:30,000 Speaker 1: And is it secure? Is your router secure? Did you 711 00:42:30,560 --> 00:42:36,080 Speaker 1: buy any chance not change the the default identifier and 712 00:42:36,120 --> 00:42:39,040 Speaker 1: password to your router because you might want to do 713 00:42:39,120 --> 00:42:43,239 Speaker 1: that that kind of stuff. So I'm so grateful that 714 00:42:43,400 --> 00:42:47,000 Speaker 1: I got into this early, so like before Internet of 715 00:42:47,040 --> 00:42:50,160 Speaker 1: Things became a thing, because now I can go home, 716 00:42:50,400 --> 00:42:52,880 Speaker 1: like right at this minute, pull up a program on 717 00:42:52,920 --> 00:42:55,279 Speaker 1: my computer, sit down on the same network as my 718 00:42:55,520 --> 00:42:58,440 Speaker 1: as my camera, and make sure that it's not open 719 00:42:58,600 --> 00:43:01,960 Speaker 1: to the World Wide Web, because it's it's entirely possible 720 00:43:02,000 --> 00:43:06,239 Speaker 1: that those things can happen. They have happened, and it's 721 00:43:06,280 --> 00:43:10,440 Speaker 1: oh man, consumers, just I wish more consumers were interested 722 00:43:10,440 --> 00:43:12,120 Speaker 1: in this kind of thing because it would make them 723 00:43:12,160 --> 00:43:15,280 Speaker 1: so much safer. Yeah. Yeah, it's the sort of stuff 724 00:43:15,280 --> 00:43:17,800 Speaker 1: no one wants to really think about. The The convenience 725 00:43:18,080 --> 00:43:22,960 Speaker 1: of the technology is so great that it people don't 726 00:43:23,040 --> 00:43:26,960 Speaker 1: feel comfortable thinking about the other side of it because 727 00:43:27,080 --> 00:43:30,080 Speaker 1: the technology they rely so heavily on it, it does 728 00:43:30,120 --> 00:43:33,279 Speaker 1: so many useful things for them that I think that 729 00:43:33,440 --> 00:43:37,240 Speaker 1: ends up making them kind of ignore the possible security 730 00:43:37,239 --> 00:43:40,520 Speaker 1: problems because if they paid attention to it, they would 731 00:43:40,520 --> 00:43:42,239 Speaker 1: feel that they would either need to take a lot 732 00:43:42,239 --> 00:43:44,960 Speaker 1: of effort to fix those security issues, at least the 733 00:43:45,480 --> 00:43:48,040 Speaker 1: ones they can fix from a consumer side of things, 734 00:43:48,680 --> 00:43:51,080 Speaker 1: or they would have to abandon the technology which is 735 00:43:51,120 --> 00:43:54,360 Speaker 1: so incredibly useful and convenient, and neither of those seem 736 00:43:54,480 --> 00:43:58,560 Speaker 1: particularly interesting. It's way better to just, you know, just 737 00:43:58,840 --> 00:44:01,839 Speaker 1: pretend like it doesn't have been and keep using your 738 00:44:02,239 --> 00:44:06,879 Speaker 1: unsecured WiFi. And yeah, absolutely, I mean there. I've made 739 00:44:06,920 --> 00:44:10,120 Speaker 1: some sacrifices in my life to be more secure. For example, 740 00:44:10,200 --> 00:44:13,080 Speaker 1: I don't use Facebook Messenger on my phone because I 741 00:44:13,160 --> 00:44:15,359 Speaker 1: don't I don't trust that feature. I don't even use 742 00:44:15,400 --> 00:44:17,840 Speaker 1: the Facebook app on my phone because I don't trust 743 00:44:17,880 --> 00:44:20,719 Speaker 1: the app. And I noticed that when I when I 744 00:44:20,760 --> 00:44:23,080 Speaker 1: abandoned the Facebook app, you gave me a big thumbs 745 00:44:23,160 --> 00:44:26,479 Speaker 1: up on that day. Oh yes I did. And there's 746 00:44:26,480 --> 00:44:30,879 Speaker 1: other things that I've chosen convenience over security, even though 747 00:44:30,920 --> 00:44:35,360 Speaker 1: I understand what what I might what might happen to 748 00:44:35,400 --> 00:44:38,600 Speaker 1: me if I because I chose that convenience. For example, 749 00:44:38,640 --> 00:44:40,959 Speaker 1: I use a thumb print to unlock my phone, even 750 00:44:41,000 --> 00:44:44,440 Speaker 1: though you are basically forced to give away a thumbprint 751 00:44:44,520 --> 00:44:47,040 Speaker 1: if you are ever um, if there is a warrant 752 00:44:47,080 --> 00:44:49,279 Speaker 1: on your phone, as opposed to if you have a 753 00:44:49,280 --> 00:44:51,200 Speaker 1: pin code or a password, you don't have to give 754 00:44:51,239 --> 00:44:54,400 Speaker 1: those aways. So that's like those kind of things you 755 00:44:54,440 --> 00:44:57,840 Speaker 1: really have to think about it, especially if you know 756 00:44:57,920 --> 00:45:01,480 Speaker 1: you're going into this with the with the thought, you know, 757 00:45:01,560 --> 00:45:04,600 Speaker 1: I have to better my security and privacy. Yeah. And 758 00:45:04,600 --> 00:45:07,919 Speaker 1: and see it's different for you too, Shannon, because you're 759 00:45:08,040 --> 00:45:11,240 Speaker 1: you are aware of all the potential or at least 760 00:45:11,400 --> 00:45:15,200 Speaker 1: a large majority of the potential bad things that can happen. 761 00:45:15,239 --> 00:45:18,080 Speaker 1: So you can make an informed decision, and you can 762 00:45:18,160 --> 00:45:22,000 Speaker 1: you can measure that risk versus the reward you get 763 00:45:22,600 --> 00:45:25,600 Speaker 1: based upon whatever choice you make. A lot of people 764 00:45:25,640 --> 00:45:29,600 Speaker 1: out there they aren't. I think the problem is so 765 00:45:29,680 --> 00:45:32,359 Speaker 1: scary they don't even want to look at it. And 766 00:45:32,400 --> 00:45:36,680 Speaker 1: that's and that means that they're making uninformed, uneducated decisions. 767 00:45:37,600 --> 00:45:39,960 Speaker 1: And I know that. I know the problem is scary, guys, 768 00:45:40,040 --> 00:45:42,879 Speaker 1: but that's why you've gotta look at it. You can't. 769 00:45:42,920 --> 00:45:45,680 Speaker 1: That's why we're here so that we can inform everybody, 770 00:45:45,719 --> 00:45:48,640 Speaker 1: and we can educate everyone right on the proper uses 771 00:45:48,640 --> 00:45:51,240 Speaker 1: of the security and privacy. So if if you guys 772 00:45:51,400 --> 00:45:54,560 Speaker 1: out there take anything at all away from this episode, 773 00:45:54,920 --> 00:45:56,600 Speaker 1: I want you to take a well, really there's two 774 00:45:56,640 --> 00:45:59,960 Speaker 1: things I want you to take away. One is really 775 00:46:00,040 --> 00:46:02,160 Speaker 1: give it some serious thought. If you have it before, 776 00:46:02,280 --> 00:46:05,840 Speaker 1: because it's it's something that could save you tons of 777 00:46:05,960 --> 00:46:09,160 Speaker 1: heartache down the line, and it can protect you and 778 00:46:09,200 --> 00:46:12,400 Speaker 1: those who are close to you from attacks. And the 779 00:46:12,440 --> 00:46:15,520 Speaker 1: second thing I want you to remember is if aliens attack, 780 00:46:15,680 --> 00:46:18,720 Speaker 1: get Jeff goldblooma Mac because that guy can do anything. 781 00:46:19,719 --> 00:46:24,040 Speaker 1: Ah So, Shannon, thank you so much for joining this episode. 782 00:46:24,040 --> 00:46:27,759 Speaker 1: Help everyone where they can find your work. Sure, so, 783 00:46:27,920 --> 00:46:30,840 Speaker 1: you can find me on Twitter. I'm at snubs s 784 00:46:30,920 --> 00:46:33,640 Speaker 1: and uvs and I promise I will not snubs you 785 00:46:33,719 --> 00:46:36,160 Speaker 1: unless you're mean to me. Uh. And you can also 786 00:46:36,200 --> 00:46:38,920 Speaker 1: find me on Hack five and tech Thing, both of 787 00:46:38,960 --> 00:46:42,200 Speaker 1: which are over at h K five dot org. And 788 00:46:42,400 --> 00:46:45,400 Speaker 1: we talk about the simplest of simple hacks and we 789 00:46:45,560 --> 00:46:47,360 Speaker 1: go all the way up to the hardest of the 790 00:46:47,360 --> 00:46:50,080 Speaker 1: hardest hacks. So there's something there for everybody, and I 791 00:46:50,120 --> 00:46:52,759 Speaker 1: hope that you guys will enjoy it. Awesome, Shannon, thank 792 00:46:52,800 --> 00:46:55,120 Speaker 1: you so much. And guys, if you want to get 793 00:46:55,160 --> 00:46:57,000 Speaker 1: in touch with me and talk about some of the 794 00:46:57,000 --> 00:46:59,279 Speaker 1: stuff we chatted about on this episode, maybe there's a 795 00:46:59,440 --> 00:47:03,000 Speaker 1: television or film that you know we didn't touch that 796 00:47:03,080 --> 00:47:05,480 Speaker 1: you think absolutely needs to be on this list. Let 797 00:47:05,520 --> 00:47:08,240 Speaker 1: me know if you have a suggestion for anything else, 798 00:47:08,280 --> 00:47:10,719 Speaker 1: like whether you know, maybe it's another guest I could 799 00:47:10,760 --> 00:47:13,399 Speaker 1: have on the show. Let me know the addresses tech 800 00:47:13,480 --> 00:47:16,000 Speaker 1: stuff at how stuff works dot com or drop me 801 00:47:16,040 --> 00:47:18,680 Speaker 1: a line on Facebook or Twitter. The handle of both 802 00:47:18,680 --> 00:47:22,239 Speaker 1: of those is text stuff H s W. And I 803 00:47:22,280 --> 00:47:30,759 Speaker 1: will talk to you guys again really soon. For more 804 00:47:30,800 --> 00:47:33,040 Speaker 1: on this and bathrooms of other topics. Is it how 805 00:47:33,120 --> 00:47:43,920 Speaker 1: stuff works dot com.