Speaker 1: Brought to you by the reinvented two thousand twelve Camray.
Speaker 1: It's ready. Are you welcome to you? Stuff you should
Speaker 1: know from House Stuff Works dot com. Hey, welcome to
Speaker 1: the podcast. I'm Josh Clark with me is always a
Speaker 1: child to be Chuck Bryant. We call him an authority
Speaker 1: on cyber security, the Internet, everything about it. An expert,
Speaker 1: you would say, it's right. Hey, should we say hello
Speaker 1: to our our latest celebrity fan who we just learned
Speaker 1: today that miss Kristen Bell, the lovely and enchanting and
Speaker 1: nerdy Kristen Bell. Is she nerdy, very nerdy, like prides
Speaker 1: herself on. I mean, it doesn't surprise me that she
Speaker 1: listens to the show. Yeah, because she's on record as
Speaker 1: being a big nerd, which is one reason I like
Speaker 1: her a lot. And she's curating um a newsweek page right, Yeah,
Speaker 1: like things she likes her kind of one of those
Speaker 1: deals that they do the magazines now and she listed us.
Speaker 1: That's pretty how about that? Thank you very much for that.
Speaker 1: I'm a huge fan of a party down when she
Speaker 1: was in and other stuff that she's been in forgetting
Speaker 1: Sarah Marshall, how's he going? And her you gotta see
Speaker 1: her sloth video online that she dode the Ellen Show.
Speaker 1: It's pretty funny, highly recommended. Okay, so that's all I got.
Speaker 1: That's all the sucking up I'm gonna do. Should we
Speaker 1: say hi to another fan, slightly less famous but pretty cool? Yes? Sam?
Speaker 1: Do you want to give a little a little backstory
Speaker 1: story here? Sure? We um. We had a live Um
Speaker 1: tribute event here in Atlanta a couple of years ago,
Speaker 1: and at the event was a little, uh teenage fan
Speaker 1: named Sam teenage you mean, like just post tween. Yeah,
Speaker 1: and his mom brought him and he's a big fan.
Speaker 1: He's just like really sweet kid. Mom was very sweet sweet. Yeah,
Speaker 1: very flash forward a couple of years we got to
Speaker 1: south By Southwest there Sam again apparently mom drove him
Speaker 1: to Austin to come see our life podcast. Yeah, they
Speaker 1: weren't there to see I've spoke to mom afterwards and
Speaker 1: was like, so, what else are you guys gonna see?
Speaker 1: She's like nothing, We're going back crazy. I was like,
Speaker 1: what else did you see? She's like nothing. They came
Speaker 1: to see us. So then we were like, all right,
Speaker 1: we gotta think of something for Sam to do, because
Speaker 1: he's proved his metal and Sam wrote in and and
Speaker 1: sent his resume and like all the reasons we should
Speaker 1: put them to work, and it's just like, dude, if
Speaker 1: the future is secure, if kids are like Sam, for sure,
Speaker 1: I'm not worried about a thing anymore. Yeah, so we
Speaker 1: we racked our brains and we found out there's like
Speaker 1: a surprising amount of adult only tasks that we do
Speaker 1: like at any given time, and we're like, all right,
Speaker 1: we have to we have to figure out something that's
Speaker 1: age appropriate for Sam. That's right. So, long story short,
Speaker 1: I was getting kind of thin on podcast topics. I
Speaker 1: put Sam on the case and he sent me like
Speaker 1: a stellar, stellar list with reasons why we should do these,
Speaker 1: and uh, this is the first one. And he had
Speaker 1: a lot of overlap on once we had already recorded
Speaker 1: that aren't out yet. So that just goes to show
Speaker 1: you that Sam is like he gets the show right.
Speaker 1: And uh so, as Sam's picking these out, we're gonna
Speaker 1: let you know if this is a Sam one. But
Speaker 1: this is going down in the summer, We're gonna call
Speaker 1: this the Summer of Sam. That's right, Sam's choice. Alright,
Speaker 1: So that's the longest intro ever that wasn't even the
Speaker 1: intro man. Well, let's get to cyber worse than well,
Speaker 1: let's bossy. Well you know, Chuck, have you ever been
Speaker 1: to Bellingham, Washington? No? Okay, I have not. Have you
Speaker 1: been to Washington? Been Seattle? Isn't that where um Van
Speaker 1: Nostrin lives? Or is it Oregon? Now he's he's Washington.
Speaker 1: Um so uh in Bellingham, Washington on June at the
Speaker 1: Olympic Pipeline Company a system's control and data acquisition system.
Speaker 1: There's systems twice in there. UM, but a scatta or
Speaker 1: skata system UM, which is basically like a computer program
Speaker 1: that like can make a valve turn or turn something
Speaker 1: off for just a mechanic right from from Digital binary
Speaker 1: instructions right. UM. This Olympic Pipeline Company system was operating
Speaker 1: on this this type of program, and UM, something went
Speaker 1: wrong and one of their pipes started leaking a lot
Speaker 1: like millions of gallons of gasoline UM, and part of
Speaker 1: it erupted into a fireball and killed three people injured
Speaker 1: many others. UM. And they went back and looked at it.
Speaker 1: They think it was just a system malfunction. But the
Speaker 1: fact that this came along, this happened because of this
Speaker 1: system control, and it happened as the dot com bubble
Speaker 1: was starting to grow and like the Internet was really
Speaker 1: becoming a huge thing. UM. People who are into cybersecurity
Speaker 1: now point to this as evidence of exactly what somebody
Speaker 1: could do during a cyber attack, even though they think
Speaker 1: this was just an accident, right, irrelevant, But they're they're
Speaker 1: they weren't like pointing to that as well. Okay, no,
Speaker 1: they don't think that had anything, but they were saying,
Speaker 1: this is what it would look like if somebody had
Speaker 1: wanted to attack, Like, this is what a cyber attack
Speaker 1: would look like. That makes sense because it's not just
Speaker 1: the Olympic pipeline company that's using these systems UM all
Speaker 1: over the United States, companies, law enforcement agencies, military, thanks, UM,
Speaker 1: public works. All of these things are all running on
Speaker 1: what amounts to Windows. It's as simple as that. Yeah,
Speaker 1: Microsoft systems many of them, and UM. As Jonathan Strickland
Speaker 1: wrote this from tech Stuff the article, and as Strickland
Speaker 1: points out, UM a couple of things. Microsoft has been
Speaker 1: uh kind of chastise over the years for their security
Speaker 1: or lack of security in some of their programs and UM.
Speaker 1: The other thing he points out is internets grew so
Speaker 1: fast and everyone got on board so quickly that it
Speaker 1: kind of outpaced what we could even do security wise.
Speaker 1: It was all of a sudden. Government agencies and power
Speaker 1: grids and emergency services and weapons systems, water and fuel pipelines,
Speaker 1: all this stuff is running on on computers and a
Speaker 1: lot of it through the Internet, and we don't quite
Speaker 1: know how to guard against a cyber attack. No, And
Speaker 1: apparently even as far as like the knowledge of how
Speaker 1: to guard against cyber attacks goes to the United States,
Speaker 1: is is lacking, uh, compared to like China and Russia. Um,
Speaker 1: so we're kind of in this really weird position right
Speaker 1: now where we've realized that all of the ponies are
Speaker 1: hooked to a single basket of eggs, and all it's
Speaker 1: gonna take is a couple of black Cat firecrackers to
Speaker 1: scare all the horses off. That's the best analogy I
Speaker 1: can come up with. Did you just into that or
Speaker 1: did you I just thought my imagination is back. I
Speaker 1: can tell you where I time traveled to. Awesome where
Speaker 1: I can't think. Okay, um, all right, let's go back
Speaker 1: a little bit in time. I don't think we need
Speaker 1: the way back machine for this because we're just going
Speaker 1: to we can just like walk outside. Yeah, they'd be
Speaker 1: a waste of time for the way back machine. Um.
Speaker 1: Some pretty smart people caught on early that hey, we
Speaker 1: could be vulnerable to something like a cyber attack. So
Speaker 1: let's look into this. Let's put a red team on it.
Speaker 1: Red team is a our friends that act as enemies
Speaker 1: to try and you know how they hire these people
Speaker 1: to like break into your home. Yeah, those are red
Speaker 1: teams basically like um from Star Wars exactly. So let's
Speaker 1: get a red team. Let's let's uh name it this
Speaker 1: mission something really cool out of a football playbook. Let's
Speaker 1: name it Project Eligible Receiver. Do you know how many
Speaker 1: times I had to look at that before I finally
Speaker 1: sunk in what words I was looking at? Really it is.
Speaker 1: It does look kind of funny. It looks like eleanor
Speaker 1: Rigby when you glance at it. At least I think, so, yeah,
Speaker 1: it doesn't to me. I was thinking more of like
Speaker 1: a radio receiver or something like. I think it just
Speaker 1: means about football. No, it's totally just saying like I
Speaker 1: read this many times before I was saying, oh, okay,
Speaker 1: so a lot of this is still classified, so we
Speaker 1: don't know everything. But basically they hired some hackers, which
Speaker 1: is what you do to test your security, they being
Speaker 1: the Department of Defense. Yeah, yeah, Department Defense saying hey,
Speaker 1: can you nerds hack into the Pentagon system and afterwards
Speaker 1: we won't assassinate exactly, And the nerds were like, just
Speaker 1: watch this. And it took three days before the Pentagon
Speaker 1: even knew that they were being cyber attacked by the
Speaker 1: Red Team. Like pretty successful and very sobering. Yeah, so
Speaker 1: um they they it was I guess kind of an
Speaker 1: eye opener for the d O D and they I'm
Speaker 1: sure you used it to step up security. Not fast
Speaker 1: enough though, as after this Red Team attack UM operation
Speaker 1: Knowledgeable Receiver an actual attack which they later came to
Speaker 1: call what was at Moonlight Maze. Yeah, this is one
Speaker 1: year after that the tests. A year after UM, somebody
Speaker 1: launched an attack and it was a I guess, what's
Speaker 1: probably the most typical kind of cyber attack where you
Speaker 1: insert some sort of software to basically spy and get
Speaker 1: files and gather data and download sensitive materials. Right, And
Speaker 1: apparently took two years before NASA, the Pentagon, UM and
Speaker 1: other agencies in the US government noticed that UM accidentally
Speaker 1: noticed that this that they were being spied on cyber wise. Yeah,
Speaker 1: they got data like strategic maps, troop assignments, and positions.
Speaker 1: Not good, right, very scary. And they traced it back
Speaker 1: to Russia. Doesn't necessarily mean that it came from Russia
Speaker 1: and in its origin, but at least that's where they
Speaker 1: traced it to. Uh. And this is cyber warfare, like
Speaker 1: it's happening. It's been going on since the nineties pretty much. Yeah,
Speaker 1: it's not is a cyber war coming. It's like, how
Speaker 1: do we prevent like a cyber war from bringing us
Speaker 1: all down? Pretty much? And it's apparently from looking into this,
Speaker 1: there's like two camps. There's like a gloom and doom
Speaker 1: camp where it's like, yeah, somebody really wants to mess
Speaker 1: things up, they're gonna be able to it's gonna be
Speaker 1: pretty easy. And the sunny optimistic camp is kind of like, no,
Speaker 1: you know, we know we're looking for now, like sure
Speaker 1: they could launch an attack, but we'll we'll be able
Speaker 1: to stop it in time for before we can do
Speaker 1: like a lot of damage. So we'll see, we'll lay
Speaker 1: out everything for you can decide who's right, that's right. Uh.
Speaker 1: So we've already mentioned that on the defensive side of things,
Speaker 1: the US is sorely lacking UM. But on the offensive
Speaker 1: side of things, we've actually done this ourselves more than once.
Speaker 1: UM during the Coast of a Wars Clint points out
Speaker 1: we used computer attacks to compromise Serbian air defenses, basically
Speaker 1: kind of scrambling their information so they had bad I
Speaker 1: guess coordinates, wasn't wasn't apt okay or appropriate? Did you
Speaker 1: see that one? So we did this, We launched it
Speaker 1: and it and it worked. So, uh that's a good thing,
Speaker 1: but it's also a bad thing if you're like, was
Speaker 1: it Bush the first or Clinton? In Bush the second?
Speaker 1: Bush the second in the rock and Clinton, Well, they
Speaker 1: were both like, we don't think we should be doing
Speaker 1: much of this because a couple of reasons. A basically
Speaker 1: opens us up. It's like, hey, they did this, so
Speaker 1: we can do it right back and be I think
Speaker 1: they could have drained some banks of terrorist cells. And
Speaker 1: they said, we kind of depend on the integrity of
Speaker 1: the banking system worldwide, like we don't want to start
Speaker 1: messing aroun with us. So apparently with with UM cyber warfare.
Speaker 1: It's very much like UM. When you build that virus,
Speaker 1: it's out there and it can be captured and studied
Speaker 1: and redeployed against you. Yeah. So what they were saying
Speaker 1: with Clinton and Bush who were saying like, no, we're
Speaker 1: not going to use a virus to UM to drain
Speaker 1: those bank accounts because they could be it will eventually
Speaker 1: come back on us, and our banking industry is not
Speaker 1: secure enough to withstand something that we ourselves make, because
Speaker 1: apparently the US is pretty good at making viruses. I'm
Speaker 1: sure should we talk about some of the different ways
Speaker 1: that this can go down? Yeah, the Pearl Harbor attack, Yes,
Speaker 1: I had the feeling strictly might A name this one himself,
Speaker 1: but it's not true. He went to a lot of
Speaker 1: trouble to explain why it's called the Pearl Harbor strategy,
Speaker 1: and I think he could have just left at that.
Speaker 1: The idea here is that it's it's pretty much in
Speaker 1: your face. It's a massive cyber attack where they infiltrate
Speaker 1: and then they sabotage systems. UM much like Pearl Harbor
Speaker 1: was a big surprise and a big attack, wasn't I mean,
Speaker 1: it was sneaky, but it wasn't quiet by any means,
Speaker 1: right or stealthy. I guess the word um. The other
Speaker 1: ones are pretty much stealthy. Part of a Pearl Harbor attack.
Speaker 1: I believe UM could be a distributed denial of service attack,
Speaker 1: which is basically, you know, like when you UM try
Speaker 1: to get onto a website or whatever, you're sending a
Speaker 1: request to the server to let you on ping right now.
Speaker 1: If you assault that one server with millions of pings
Speaker 1: and it's trying to accommodate everybody as is appropriate an
Speaker 1: act um, it'll basically they crash. Is the point you
Speaker 1: can crash a server by hitting it with millions of
Speaker 1: pings all at once, just slows it down to the
Speaker 1: point either where it doesn't work or it crashes. Yeah,
Speaker 1: and that's that's what Anonymous likes to do with like
Speaker 1: master Card during the whole wiki leaks thing when they
Speaker 1: was a master Card Vista crash. Cannot remember, um, I
Speaker 1: remember when that happened. Though. It's basically just launching a
Speaker 1: bunch of server requests at a specific server in the
Speaker 1: service like no, no, and this falls over? Is that
Speaker 1: why people say ping by the way, say let him? Yeah,
Speaker 1: I hate that it's better than java storm. I don't
Speaker 1: even know what that is, drinking coffee while you're having
Speaker 1: a brainstorm, Like, let's go get coffee and brainstorm something
Speaker 1: javas to people say that, Yeah, I don't say it.
Speaker 1: I've never heard of that. That ping and meta or
Speaker 1: the three things that I will never say maybe the
Speaker 1: worst to call something epic. I don't mind epic. Oh man,
Speaker 1: I hate epics. At least it's a real word, especially
Speaker 1: epic fail. Well yeah, sure, okay, back to it. Viruses uh, code, red, Slammer, NIMDA.
Speaker 1: These are viruses that Strickland has mentioned that spread very
Speaker 1: quickly across the Internet. And there's a up low ways
Speaker 1: this can go down. You can either um, you can
Speaker 1: set up you can do it immediately and release a virus.
Speaker 1: You can have all these other computers deliver the virus.
Speaker 1: You can put sort of like a delay timer on
Speaker 1: your virus for it to go off in two years
Speaker 1: automatically or manually whenever you want to. It can be
Speaker 1: waiting for you to hit the button and then launch
Speaker 1: the virus that way, or I think, um for the
Speaker 1: user of that computer to do like say control all delete,
Speaker 1: well we'll trigger it or something. Yeah, that's pretty scary. Yeah,
Speaker 1: I don't don't press those three puts all the time.
Speaker 1: I'm my PC. Oh my god, chuck. I think we
Speaker 1: should talk about right about here is I think we're stucks.
Speaker 1: That fits in. Who stucks net? Say it stucks? I
Speaker 1: don't know what that is. You know it's stuck in. Yeah,
Speaker 1: it's the Iranian um. It's the virus that the US
Speaker 1: and Israel leashed on Iran. It's a perfect example of
Speaker 1: this it is. You're right, So let's talk about stuck
Speaker 1: s net. Stuck snet. It's a great name. It was offensive,
Speaker 1: a cyber attack. Offensive in two thousand and ten, they
Speaker 1: thinking maybe it was the first one ever, the US
Speaker 1: launched like a strictly for sabotage attack. Basically, they wanted
Speaker 1: to disable Iran uh Iran's UH centrifuges so they could
Speaker 1: not enrich uranium. And they did this through the UH
Speaker 1: the new Air Force based out of Texas, right, Texas
Speaker 1: and Georgia. Yeah, what's the Warner Robbins Robin's Air Force space. Yeah,
Speaker 1: Robin's Air Force Space. Yeah. Those two places are where
Speaker 1: the twenty four station. Yeah, and this is the first
Speaker 1: all cyber unit. Pretty much pretty cool, right. Their whole is,
Speaker 1: their whole task is to wage cyber warfare, and I
Speaker 1: imagined to be defensive against cyber attacks, but I don't.
Speaker 1: I don't know if they had to do with stuck stent,
Speaker 1: but they probably would have. Um. I think it was
Speaker 1: being developed before was ordained in two thousand nine. I
Speaker 1: think it went back to two thousand seven when it
Speaker 1: was started. But basically, the they the CIA got their
Speaker 1: hands on centrifuges that they knew Iran was using, and
Speaker 1: they had just as many as Iran did of the
Speaker 1: same kind, and they studied it and they built this
Speaker 1: virus based on this configuration of centrifuges running windows and
Speaker 1: semens switches right, and then they built a virus to
Speaker 1: go infiltrate it. I thought it was called Operation Olympic Games.
Speaker 1: It was, but the malware, the virus itself. Okay, that's
Speaker 1: what I couldn't but you're right. It was called Operation
Speaker 1: Olympic Games. And this whole operation was this huge, sweeping, awesome,
Speaker 1: massive secretive but basically imagine like the CIA. Do you
Speaker 1: remember uncommon valor? Oh yeah, okay, do you remember when
Speaker 1: like they're training at that replica of the camp. Yeah, okay,
Speaker 1: the CIA did that with Iran's centrifuges in the nuclear program,
Speaker 1: and they figured out exactly how it worked, and then
Speaker 1: they figured out the best way to break it. Was
Speaker 1: Gene Hackman bank rolling the whole thing. Oh yeah, he
Speaker 1: was there to get his son out. He he was
Speaker 1: just staring at this menu of guns and silhouette that
Speaker 1: he wanted to order. Remember that. Oh yeah, dude that
Speaker 1: I thought that was so bad. That. Yeah, but that
Speaker 1: was a huge, huge movie for like dudes, our age. No,
Speaker 1: I'm saying bad isn't like good? Okay, Yeah, gotcha. UM
Speaker 1: so stucks and at Olympic Games happened, and like you said,
Speaker 1: it was the first offensive cyber attack. Most of the
Speaker 1: other ones have come in the form of UM sneaking
Speaker 1: in and lying around and watching and waiting and spying. Well,
Speaker 1: stuck and had that too. That the initial There was
Speaker 1: a companion program called Flame that somehow. This is the
Speaker 1: part that's the biggest mystery. The m Iran's nuclear program
Speaker 1: is not connected to the Internet, so somebody got that
Speaker 1: in on thumb drive, infected their local system. UM and
Speaker 1: Flames set there and basically just studied everything, told the
Speaker 1: US how the configuration was set up, and then they
Speaker 1: built it, and then they inserted stucks net and basically
Speaker 1: it made all of their data look like everything was
Speaker 1: operating normally, but it was telling their centrifuges to spin
Speaker 1: out of control and basically break themselves, like Oceans eleven
Speaker 1: when they built the replica Bault exactly the replica video.
Speaker 1: There's nothing going on. So basically the Pentagon has been
Speaker 1: watching a lot of movies. But this is a hugely
Speaker 1: successful attack um, if not at the very least for
Speaker 1: American cyber warfare UM because it's supposedly set Iran's nuclear
Speaker 1: program back by at least a year, if not more.
Speaker 1: That hopes that this would let us continue talks and
Speaker 1: if think it said one of the aims was to
Speaker 1: make them feel stupid, and they said it worked like
Speaker 1: they that they've done something wrong and that's why this
Speaker 1: these systems were failing. It's pretty scary, man. But the
Speaker 1: point is now is Okay, that's out there. Stuck Snut
Speaker 1: is out there for anybody who can get their hands
Speaker 1: on it. And that's the name of it. It's a
Speaker 1: great name, alright, stuck Snut within with an X with
Speaker 1: the new Gutas Center. But it's out there and the
Speaker 1: US is now basically just the the computer equivalent of
Speaker 1: Hiroshima was just launched by the United States. Yeah, and
Speaker 1: nice little set up there. A lot of people are
Speaker 1: comparing these days of the early days of cyber warring
Speaker 1: to the early days of of nuclear bombs, and that
Speaker 1: there's not a ton of defense. Not anyone really knows
Speaker 1: what they're doing. It's sort of a chaotic mess that
Speaker 1: everyone's trying to get their finger in the pie though. Yeah,
Speaker 1: and the other countries like China believe Russia, who are
Speaker 1: apparently better equipped to defend against a cyber attack than
Speaker 1: the US. So basically the US is really playing with fire. Well,
Speaker 1: and that's why Clinton and Bush we're declining to use
Speaker 1: these is one of the reasons where like, you know,
Speaker 1: this opens us up to counterattacks and just may not
Speaker 1: be the smartest way to like we wouldn't go out
Speaker 1: and just drop a nuclear bomb on a country, right,
Speaker 1: Oh did all? Right? Oops? Twice? What else you got?
Speaker 1: Let's see, yuh. We talked about the system controls and
Speaker 1: um that acquisition systems. Yeah, that was um. Basically that
Speaker 1: is the Achilles Heel of Infrastructure and the United States.
Speaker 1: One of the reasons why we're not set up to
Speaker 1: defend against um a cyber attack is because we are
Speaker 1: so connected to the internet. Everything is Iran North Korea. Yeah,
Speaker 1: not quite as bot because a lot of their stuff
Speaker 1: is off the grid just by default because they don't
Speaker 1: have the infrastructure that we have. So just the robustness
Speaker 1: of our own infrastructure is one of the one of
Speaker 1: its vulnerabilities as well. Yeah, that's a good point as
Speaker 1: far as defense goes to I forgot about this stuff.
Speaker 1: Um Strickland says that, like the first step is education,
Speaker 1: as far as educating consumers over you know, antivirus software
Speaker 1: and how they search the Internet and stuff like that.
Speaker 1: So I give that a medium. But uh, this guy
Speaker 1: Richard Clarke, he's a security expert. He blames things on
Speaker 1: companies like Microsoft too. He feels like rushes through programs
Speaker 1: before they are fully security tested because they want to
Speaker 1: make you know, they want a few coins to rub
Speaker 1: together by selling this stuff, and the consumer doesn't want
Speaker 1: to wait, and the stockholder don't want lots of testing
Speaker 1: because they want those new products on the market. So
Speaker 1: it's a bit of a rough position, and um, you know,
Speaker 1: private companies run most of the net, you know, it's
Speaker 1: not like this big government thing. So he contends Clark
Speaker 1: does that it's up to these private companies who own
Speaker 1: the Internet's infrastructure to really make it more robust in
Speaker 1: a defensive sense, right, Which is good in one sense,
Speaker 1: because then you have a dollar amount in the form
Speaker 1: of lost profits attached to UM a security breach, right,
Speaker 1: so company is going to try to protect it UM,
Speaker 1: which is good. Yeah, But at the same time, it's like, yeah,
Speaker 1: if you're putting out products though, and you have competition,
Speaker 1: and your competitors products are safer UM, and you're just
Speaker 1: rushing stuff to market, then you're gonna lose out ultimately
Speaker 1: the same economic forces. And Jonathan also points out to that,
Speaker 1: you know, a scary way that can be implemented is
Speaker 1: a a one two punch with a physical attack. So,
Speaker 1: I mean, this is the one that wakes me up
Speaker 1: in the middle of the night. Is a cyber attack
Speaker 1: is launched and the electric power grid is shut down,
Speaker 1: and gas lines and waterlines start going haywire, and then
Speaker 1: all of a sudden incomes the Red Dawn team parachuting
Speaker 1: in well that's what we did to a rock in
Speaker 1: two thou three. We sent a cyber attack that messed
Speaker 1: with their UM I guess their air defense systems, and
Speaker 1: then we invaded. So that's happened before we've done it,
Speaker 1: doesn't surprise me. Yeah, cyber war, we're in the midst
Speaker 1: of it. We're in the midst of it. Pretty crazy stuff.
Speaker 1: Get your to what Norton anti virus. That'll just solve everything. Yeah. Education, education,
Speaker 1: that's all. That's the only thing. That's all we can
Speaker 1: do to prevent cyber war. Um. If you want to
Speaker 1: learn more about cyber war and read this article by
Speaker 1: Jonathan Strickland, you can type cyber war one word in
Speaker 1: the search bar stuff works dot com and will bring
Speaker 1: it up. I said Jonathan strick clam which means it's
Speaker 1: time for a listener. Mayo, he's started for a lot
Speaker 1: more than that. Uh, I'm gonna call this beer and fire. Hi, guys.
Speaker 1: I'm a professor of history and a long time act
Speaker 1: of your show. I use a podcast in my college
Speaker 1: classes to talk about how we use history and entertainment.
Speaker 1: I'm writing about the Great Chicago Fire podcast, especially as
Speaker 1: it relates to my research. See I study the history
Speaker 1: of alcohol, and I teach a class on the history
Speaker 1: of beer. Uh, that's pretty cool. We study the economic, social,
Speaker 1: and cultural history of beer, and we make beer in
Speaker 1: class into weekly beer tastings. What anyway, Aside from the
Speaker 1: stuff you mentioned the show, the Chicago fire is important
Speaker 1: because it wiped out about three quarters Chicago's breweries. Uh.
Speaker 1: Something like eighteen breweries were destroyed by the fire. Of course,
Speaker 1: people still want a beer, uh, Chicago and Upper Midwest,
Speaker 1: as was pot wait about a lot of Germans at
Speaker 1: the time. This gave birth to the beer industry in Milwaukee.
Speaker 1: Before the Great Fire, Milwaukee was a beer town, but
Speaker 1: not a major supply center. Schlitz, especially as a good
Speaker 1: example of called the Milwaukee beer industry, reacted to the fire.
Speaker 1: Joseph Schlitz, the founder it, first, donated thousands of barrels
Speaker 1: of beer to Chicagoans and the weeks after the fire.
Speaker 1: Been Sensing an opportunity, he then opened a distribution point
Speaker 1: in the city. After all, there were still hundreds of
Speaker 1: thousands of thirsty Chicagoans. He opened Schlitz Tiede Saloons. By
Speaker 1: the eighteen eighties he was selling about fifty thousand barrels
Speaker 1: of beer in Chicago alone, which is about seventeen percent
Speaker 1: of their total. And the slogan, yeah, the slogan for Schlitz,
Speaker 1: the beer that made Milwaukee famous, came out of this period,
Speaker 1: and it is because of the beer sold after the fire,
Speaker 1: So that's where they got the name. By nineteen o two,
Speaker 1: Schlitz was the largest brew in the world, a title
Speaker 1: it would trade back and forth with Budweiser until the
Speaker 1: nineteen fifties. And he goes on to point out that
Speaker 1: blats and passed while with similar trajectories, stucks that stuck
Speaker 1: to that, and uh, the Chicago brewing industry sadly never
Speaker 1: recovered from the fire, although beer drinking remains steady. And
Speaker 1: I don't have Professor Beer's name, so we'll just call
Speaker 1: him Professor Beer. Oh, I'm sure he'd appreciate that. Yeah,
Speaker 1: I'm sure that's what the students call him. Thanks, Professor Beer. Yeah,
Speaker 1: And if you want to write it, I'll say your
Speaker 1: name on one a later show. Okay. Um. And if
Speaker 1: you teach, especially something interesting or you stuff you should
Speaker 1: know to help you teach, We're always interested in hearing that.
Speaker 1: We want to know about it. Okay, You can tweet
Speaker 1: it to us at s y s K podcast and
Speaker 1: put it on Facebook dot com slash stuff you Should Know,
Speaker 1: or you can send us an email like Professor Beer
Speaker 1: did to Stuff podcast at Discovery dot com. For more
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