1 00:00:00,280 --> 00:00:02,920 Speaker 1: Brought to you by the reinvented two thousand twelve Camray. 2 00:00:03,160 --> 00:00:07,360 Speaker 1: It's ready. Are you welcome to you? Stuff you should 3 00:00:07,400 --> 00:00:16,239 Speaker 1: know from House Stuff Works dot com. Hey, welcome to 4 00:00:16,280 --> 00:00:18,800 Speaker 1: the podcast. I'm Josh Clark with me is always a 5 00:00:18,920 --> 00:00:23,040 Speaker 1: child to be Chuck Bryant. We call him an authority 6 00:00:23,320 --> 00:00:29,520 Speaker 1: on cyber security, the Internet, everything about it. An expert, 7 00:00:29,520 --> 00:00:32,440 Speaker 1: you would say, it's right. Hey, should we say hello 8 00:00:32,479 --> 00:00:37,240 Speaker 1: to our our latest celebrity fan who we just learned 9 00:00:37,240 --> 00:00:42,120 Speaker 1: today that miss Kristen Bell, the lovely and enchanting and 10 00:00:42,280 --> 00:00:46,320 Speaker 1: nerdy Kristen Bell. Is she nerdy, very nerdy, like prides 11 00:00:46,360 --> 00:00:48,600 Speaker 1: herself on. I mean, it doesn't surprise me that she 12 00:00:48,640 --> 00:00:51,080 Speaker 1: listens to the show. Yeah, because she's on record as 13 00:00:51,120 --> 00:00:53,600 Speaker 1: being a big nerd, which is one reason I like 14 00:00:53,640 --> 00:00:58,360 Speaker 1: her a lot. And she's curating um a newsweek page right, Yeah, 15 00:00:58,480 --> 00:01:01,480 Speaker 1: like things she likes her kind of one of those 16 00:01:01,480 --> 00:01:04,280 Speaker 1: deals that they do the magazines now and she listed us. 17 00:01:04,760 --> 00:01:07,399 Speaker 1: That's pretty how about that? Thank you very much for that. 18 00:01:07,720 --> 00:01:09,959 Speaker 1: I'm a huge fan of a party down when she 19 00:01:10,040 --> 00:01:12,600 Speaker 1: was in and other stuff that she's been in forgetting 20 00:01:12,600 --> 00:01:15,160 Speaker 1: Sarah Marshall, how's he going? And her you gotta see 21 00:01:15,200 --> 00:01:18,080 Speaker 1: her sloth video online that she dode the Ellen Show. 22 00:01:18,120 --> 00:01:21,880 Speaker 1: It's pretty funny, highly recommended. Okay, so that's all I got. 23 00:01:21,920 --> 00:01:25,080 Speaker 1: That's all the sucking up I'm gonna do. Should we 24 00:01:25,120 --> 00:01:30,839 Speaker 1: say hi to another fan, slightly less famous but pretty cool? Yes? Sam? 25 00:01:30,880 --> 00:01:32,800 Speaker 1: Do you want to give a little a little backstory 26 00:01:34,120 --> 00:01:37,240 Speaker 1: story here? Sure? We um. We had a live Um 27 00:01:37,400 --> 00:01:39,440 Speaker 1: tribute event here in Atlanta a couple of years ago, 28 00:01:39,760 --> 00:01:43,520 Speaker 1: and at the event was a little, uh teenage fan 29 00:01:43,760 --> 00:01:47,640 Speaker 1: named Sam teenage you mean, like just post tween. Yeah, 30 00:01:48,560 --> 00:01:50,400 Speaker 1: and his mom brought him and he's a big fan. 31 00:01:50,440 --> 00:01:52,800 Speaker 1: He's just like really sweet kid. Mom was very sweet sweet. Yeah, 32 00:01:53,000 --> 00:01:55,080 Speaker 1: very flash forward a couple of years we got to 33 00:01:55,120 --> 00:01:58,920 Speaker 1: south By Southwest there Sam again apparently mom drove him 34 00:01:58,960 --> 00:02:01,560 Speaker 1: to Austin to come see our life podcast. Yeah, they 35 00:02:01,560 --> 00:02:04,640 Speaker 1: weren't there to see I've spoke to mom afterwards and 36 00:02:04,800 --> 00:02:06,600 Speaker 1: was like, so, what else are you guys gonna see? 37 00:02:06,600 --> 00:02:08,680 Speaker 1: She's like nothing, We're going back crazy. I was like, 38 00:02:09,200 --> 00:02:11,880 Speaker 1: what else did you see? She's like nothing. They came 39 00:02:11,919 --> 00:02:13,680 Speaker 1: to see us. So then we were like, all right, 40 00:02:13,680 --> 00:02:15,320 Speaker 1: we gotta think of something for Sam to do, because 41 00:02:15,320 --> 00:02:18,000 Speaker 1: he's proved his metal and Sam wrote in and and 42 00:02:18,040 --> 00:02:20,640 Speaker 1: sent his resume and like all the reasons we should 43 00:02:20,680 --> 00:02:23,040 Speaker 1: put them to work, and it's just like, dude, if 44 00:02:23,040 --> 00:02:25,639 Speaker 1: the future is secure, if kids are like Sam, for sure, 45 00:02:25,760 --> 00:02:28,280 Speaker 1: I'm not worried about a thing anymore. Yeah, so we 46 00:02:28,280 --> 00:02:30,080 Speaker 1: we racked our brains and we found out there's like 47 00:02:30,120 --> 00:02:34,720 Speaker 1: a surprising amount of adult only tasks that we do 48 00:02:34,800 --> 00:02:37,480 Speaker 1: like at any given time, and we're like, all right, 49 00:02:37,520 --> 00:02:39,280 Speaker 1: we have to we have to figure out something that's 50 00:02:39,639 --> 00:02:42,880 Speaker 1: age appropriate for Sam. That's right. So, long story short, 51 00:02:42,960 --> 00:02:45,400 Speaker 1: I was getting kind of thin on podcast topics. I 52 00:02:45,440 --> 00:02:47,440 Speaker 1: put Sam on the case and he sent me like 53 00:02:47,760 --> 00:02:51,400 Speaker 1: a stellar, stellar list with reasons why we should do these, 54 00:02:51,520 --> 00:02:54,760 Speaker 1: and uh, this is the first one. And he had 55 00:02:54,800 --> 00:02:56,720 Speaker 1: a lot of overlap on once we had already recorded 56 00:02:56,720 --> 00:02:58,280 Speaker 1: that aren't out yet. So that just goes to show 57 00:02:58,280 --> 00:03:00,720 Speaker 1: you that Sam is like he gets the show right. 58 00:03:00,960 --> 00:03:03,960 Speaker 1: And uh so, as Sam's picking these out, we're gonna 59 00:03:04,040 --> 00:03:05,840 Speaker 1: let you know if this is a Sam one. But 60 00:03:06,000 --> 00:03:07,920 Speaker 1: this is going down in the summer, We're gonna call 61 00:03:08,000 --> 00:03:11,680 Speaker 1: this the Summer of Sam. That's right, Sam's choice. Alright, 62 00:03:11,720 --> 00:03:14,040 Speaker 1: So that's the longest intro ever that wasn't even the 63 00:03:14,040 --> 00:03:16,600 Speaker 1: intro man. Well, let's get to cyber worse than well, 64 00:03:16,720 --> 00:03:21,359 Speaker 1: let's bossy. Well you know, Chuck, have you ever been 65 00:03:21,400 --> 00:03:27,120 Speaker 1: to Bellingham, Washington? No? Okay, I have not. Have you 66 00:03:27,160 --> 00:03:30,880 Speaker 1: been to Washington? Been Seattle? Isn't that where um Van 67 00:03:30,960 --> 00:03:34,160 Speaker 1: Nostrin lives? Or is it Oregon? Now he's he's Washington. 68 00:03:35,200 --> 00:03:40,320 Speaker 1: Um so uh in Bellingham, Washington on June at the 69 00:03:40,360 --> 00:03:46,640 Speaker 1: Olympic Pipeline Company a system's control and data acquisition system. 70 00:03:46,920 --> 00:03:50,960 Speaker 1: There's systems twice in there. UM, but a scatta or 71 00:03:51,040 --> 00:03:55,240 Speaker 1: skata system UM, which is basically like a computer program 72 00:03:55,320 --> 00:03:58,320 Speaker 1: that like can make a valve turn or turn something 73 00:03:58,360 --> 00:04:02,760 Speaker 1: off for just a mechanic right from from Digital binary 74 00:04:02,880 --> 00:04:08,800 Speaker 1: instructions right. UM. This Olympic Pipeline Company system was operating 75 00:04:08,800 --> 00:04:13,119 Speaker 1: on this this type of program, and UM, something went 76 00:04:13,200 --> 00:04:17,760 Speaker 1: wrong and one of their pipes started leaking a lot 77 00:04:17,839 --> 00:04:23,200 Speaker 1: like millions of gallons of gasoline UM, and part of 78 00:04:23,240 --> 00:04:26,359 Speaker 1: it erupted into a fireball and killed three people injured 79 00:04:26,360 --> 00:04:29,760 Speaker 1: many others. UM. And they went back and looked at it. 80 00:04:29,800 --> 00:04:33,960 Speaker 1: They think it was just a system malfunction. But the 81 00:04:34,000 --> 00:04:37,120 Speaker 1: fact that this came along, this happened because of this 82 00:04:37,200 --> 00:04:42,159 Speaker 1: system control, and it happened as the dot com bubble 83 00:04:42,200 --> 00:04:44,280 Speaker 1: was starting to grow and like the Internet was really 84 00:04:44,320 --> 00:04:49,440 Speaker 1: becoming a huge thing. UM. People who are into cybersecurity 85 00:04:49,440 --> 00:04:53,839 Speaker 1: now point to this as evidence of exactly what somebody 86 00:04:54,040 --> 00:04:58,279 Speaker 1: could do during a cyber attack, even though they think 87 00:04:58,320 --> 00:05:02,600 Speaker 1: this was just an accident, right, irrelevant, But they're they're 88 00:05:02,640 --> 00:05:04,880 Speaker 1: they weren't like pointing to that as well. Okay, no, 89 00:05:05,320 --> 00:05:08,039 Speaker 1: they don't think that had anything, but they were saying, 90 00:05:08,279 --> 00:05:10,400 Speaker 1: this is what it would look like if somebody had 91 00:05:10,440 --> 00:05:13,360 Speaker 1: wanted to attack, Like, this is what a cyber attack 92 00:05:13,400 --> 00:05:15,960 Speaker 1: would look like. That makes sense because it's not just 93 00:05:16,200 --> 00:05:21,240 Speaker 1: the Olympic pipeline company that's using these systems UM all 94 00:05:21,240 --> 00:05:29,200 Speaker 1: over the United States, companies, law enforcement agencies, military, thanks, UM, 95 00:05:29,440 --> 00:05:32,680 Speaker 1: public works. All of these things are all running on 96 00:05:33,000 --> 00:05:38,480 Speaker 1: what amounts to Windows. It's as simple as that. Yeah, 97 00:05:38,520 --> 00:05:43,039 Speaker 1: Microsoft systems many of them, and UM. As Jonathan Strickland 98 00:05:43,080 --> 00:05:45,839 Speaker 1: wrote this from tech Stuff the article, and as Strickland 99 00:05:45,880 --> 00:05:49,400 Speaker 1: points out, UM a couple of things. Microsoft has been 100 00:05:50,400 --> 00:05:53,280 Speaker 1: uh kind of chastise over the years for their security 101 00:05:53,320 --> 00:05:58,799 Speaker 1: or lack of security in some of their programs and UM. 102 00:05:58,920 --> 00:06:01,520 Speaker 1: The other thing he points out is internets grew so 103 00:06:01,600 --> 00:06:05,039 Speaker 1: fast and everyone got on board so quickly that it 104 00:06:05,120 --> 00:06:09,279 Speaker 1: kind of outpaced what we could even do security wise. 105 00:06:09,880 --> 00:06:12,960 Speaker 1: It was all of a sudden. Government agencies and power 106 00:06:13,000 --> 00:06:17,760 Speaker 1: grids and emergency services and weapons systems, water and fuel pipelines, 107 00:06:17,800 --> 00:06:21,200 Speaker 1: all this stuff is running on on computers and a 108 00:06:21,200 --> 00:06:24,200 Speaker 1: lot of it through the Internet, and we don't quite 109 00:06:24,240 --> 00:06:26,760 Speaker 1: know how to guard against a cyber attack. No, And 110 00:06:26,800 --> 00:06:29,800 Speaker 1: apparently even as far as like the knowledge of how 111 00:06:29,839 --> 00:06:33,080 Speaker 1: to guard against cyber attacks goes to the United States, 112 00:06:33,160 --> 00:06:39,000 Speaker 1: is is lacking, uh, compared to like China and Russia. Um, 113 00:06:39,160 --> 00:06:43,360 Speaker 1: so we're kind of in this really weird position right 114 00:06:43,400 --> 00:06:47,520 Speaker 1: now where we've realized that all of the ponies are 115 00:06:47,560 --> 00:06:51,040 Speaker 1: hooked to a single basket of eggs, and all it's 116 00:06:51,080 --> 00:06:54,440 Speaker 1: gonna take is a couple of black Cat firecrackers to 117 00:06:54,560 --> 00:06:58,320 Speaker 1: scare all the horses off. That's the best analogy I 118 00:06:58,320 --> 00:07:00,440 Speaker 1: can come up with. Did you just into that or 119 00:07:00,440 --> 00:07:04,359 Speaker 1: did you I just thought my imagination is back. I 120 00:07:04,400 --> 00:07:07,200 Speaker 1: can tell you where I time traveled to. Awesome where 121 00:07:07,960 --> 00:07:11,360 Speaker 1: I can't think. Okay, um, all right, let's go back 122 00:07:11,400 --> 00:07:13,240 Speaker 1: a little bit in time. I don't think we need 123 00:07:13,280 --> 00:07:15,040 Speaker 1: the way back machine for this because we're just going 124 00:07:15,080 --> 00:07:18,040 Speaker 1: to we can just like walk outside. Yeah, they'd be 125 00:07:18,240 --> 00:07:20,800 Speaker 1: a waste of time for the way back machine. Um. 126 00:07:22,040 --> 00:07:25,760 Speaker 1: Some pretty smart people caught on early that hey, we 127 00:07:25,800 --> 00:07:28,080 Speaker 1: could be vulnerable to something like a cyber attack. So 128 00:07:28,160 --> 00:07:30,320 Speaker 1: let's look into this. Let's put a red team on it. 129 00:07:30,880 --> 00:07:34,920 Speaker 1: Red team is a our friends that act as enemies 130 00:07:34,960 --> 00:07:36,520 Speaker 1: to try and you know how they hire these people 131 00:07:36,520 --> 00:07:39,120 Speaker 1: to like break into your home. Yeah, those are red 132 00:07:39,160 --> 00:07:44,320 Speaker 1: teams basically like um from Star Wars exactly. So let's 133 00:07:44,320 --> 00:07:47,840 Speaker 1: get a red team. Let's let's uh name it this 134 00:07:47,960 --> 00:07:51,400 Speaker 1: mission something really cool out of a football playbook. Let's 135 00:07:51,480 --> 00:07:54,600 Speaker 1: name it Project Eligible Receiver. Do you know how many 136 00:07:54,640 --> 00:07:56,400 Speaker 1: times I had to look at that before I finally 137 00:07:56,480 --> 00:08:00,120 Speaker 1: sunk in what words I was looking at? Really it is. 138 00:08:00,200 --> 00:08:02,280 Speaker 1: It does look kind of funny. It looks like eleanor 139 00:08:02,360 --> 00:08:06,920 Speaker 1: Rigby when you glance at it. At least I think, so, yeah, 140 00:08:07,240 --> 00:08:09,000 Speaker 1: it doesn't to me. I was thinking more of like 141 00:08:09,040 --> 00:08:11,880 Speaker 1: a radio receiver or something like. I think it just 142 00:08:11,920 --> 00:08:14,680 Speaker 1: means about football. No, it's totally just saying like I 143 00:08:14,760 --> 00:08:18,040 Speaker 1: read this many times before I was saying, oh, okay, 144 00:08:18,120 --> 00:08:19,720 Speaker 1: so a lot of this is still classified, so we 145 00:08:19,760 --> 00:08:23,240 Speaker 1: don't know everything. But basically they hired some hackers, which 146 00:08:23,280 --> 00:08:25,320 Speaker 1: is what you do to test your security, they being 147 00:08:25,400 --> 00:08:28,360 Speaker 1: the Department of Defense. Yeah, yeah, Department Defense saying hey, 148 00:08:28,400 --> 00:08:33,119 Speaker 1: can you nerds hack into the Pentagon system and afterwards 149 00:08:33,160 --> 00:08:38,120 Speaker 1: we won't assassinate exactly, And the nerds were like, just 150 00:08:38,160 --> 00:08:41,800 Speaker 1: watch this. And it took three days before the Pentagon 151 00:08:41,880 --> 00:08:44,920 Speaker 1: even knew that they were being cyber attacked by the 152 00:08:44,960 --> 00:08:48,880 Speaker 1: Red Team. Like pretty successful and very sobering. Yeah, so 153 00:08:49,000 --> 00:08:52,960 Speaker 1: um they they it was I guess kind of an 154 00:08:52,960 --> 00:08:56,240 Speaker 1: eye opener for the d O D and they I'm 155 00:08:56,280 --> 00:08:58,920 Speaker 1: sure you used it to step up security. Not fast 156 00:08:59,040 --> 00:09:03,640 Speaker 1: enough though, as after this Red Team attack UM operation 157 00:09:03,640 --> 00:09:07,760 Speaker 1: Knowledgeable Receiver an actual attack which they later came to 158 00:09:07,800 --> 00:09:10,640 Speaker 1: call what was at Moonlight Maze. Yeah, this is one 159 00:09:10,720 --> 00:09:14,760 Speaker 1: year after that the tests. A year after UM, somebody 160 00:09:14,840 --> 00:09:18,720 Speaker 1: launched an attack and it was a I guess, what's 161 00:09:18,760 --> 00:09:22,000 Speaker 1: probably the most typical kind of cyber attack where you 162 00:09:22,080 --> 00:09:25,839 Speaker 1: insert some sort of software to basically spy and get 163 00:09:25,880 --> 00:09:31,560 Speaker 1: files and gather data and download sensitive materials. Right, And 164 00:09:31,600 --> 00:09:37,440 Speaker 1: apparently took two years before NASA, the Pentagon, UM and 165 00:09:37,520 --> 00:09:43,000 Speaker 1: other agencies in the US government noticed that UM accidentally 166 00:09:43,120 --> 00:09:47,680 Speaker 1: noticed that this that they were being spied on cyber wise. Yeah, 167 00:09:47,720 --> 00:09:51,600 Speaker 1: they got data like strategic maps, troop assignments, and positions. 168 00:09:52,240 --> 00:09:56,000 Speaker 1: Not good, right, very scary. And they traced it back 169 00:09:56,040 --> 00:09:59,400 Speaker 1: to Russia. Doesn't necessarily mean that it came from Russia 170 00:09:59,760 --> 00:10:02,200 Speaker 1: and in its origin, but at least that's where they 171 00:10:02,200 --> 00:10:06,360 Speaker 1: traced it to. Uh. And this is cyber warfare, like 172 00:10:06,400 --> 00:10:10,400 Speaker 1: it's happening. It's been going on since the nineties pretty much. Yeah, 173 00:10:11,240 --> 00:10:14,079 Speaker 1: it's not is a cyber war coming. It's like, how 174 00:10:14,120 --> 00:10:16,960 Speaker 1: do we prevent like a cyber war from bringing us 175 00:10:16,960 --> 00:10:20,800 Speaker 1: all down? Pretty much? And it's apparently from looking into this, 176 00:10:20,880 --> 00:10:23,520 Speaker 1: there's like two camps. There's like a gloom and doom 177 00:10:23,559 --> 00:10:26,000 Speaker 1: camp where it's like, yeah, somebody really wants to mess 178 00:10:26,040 --> 00:10:27,839 Speaker 1: things up, they're gonna be able to it's gonna be 179 00:10:27,840 --> 00:10:32,440 Speaker 1: pretty easy. And the sunny optimistic camp is kind of like, no, 180 00:10:33,200 --> 00:10:35,360 Speaker 1: you know, we know we're looking for now, like sure 181 00:10:35,440 --> 00:10:38,480 Speaker 1: they could launch an attack, but we'll we'll be able 182 00:10:38,480 --> 00:10:40,720 Speaker 1: to stop it in time for before we can do 183 00:10:41,000 --> 00:10:44,839 Speaker 1: like a lot of damage. So we'll see, we'll lay 184 00:10:44,880 --> 00:10:47,839 Speaker 1: out everything for you can decide who's right, that's right. Uh. 185 00:10:47,880 --> 00:10:50,480 Speaker 1: So we've already mentioned that on the defensive side of things, 186 00:10:50,520 --> 00:10:54,160 Speaker 1: the US is sorely lacking UM. But on the offensive 187 00:10:54,160 --> 00:10:57,160 Speaker 1: side of things, we've actually done this ourselves more than once. 188 00:10:57,720 --> 00:11:00,760 Speaker 1: UM during the Coast of a Wars Clint points out 189 00:11:01,640 --> 00:11:06,280 Speaker 1: we used computer attacks to compromise Serbian air defenses, basically 190 00:11:06,640 --> 00:11:10,360 Speaker 1: kind of scrambling their information so they had bad I 191 00:11:10,400 --> 00:11:19,680 Speaker 1: guess coordinates, wasn't wasn't apt okay or appropriate? Did you 192 00:11:19,720 --> 00:11:24,200 Speaker 1: see that one? So we did this, We launched it 193 00:11:24,240 --> 00:11:28,400 Speaker 1: and it and it worked. So, uh that's a good thing, 194 00:11:28,480 --> 00:11:31,120 Speaker 1: but it's also a bad thing if you're like, was 195 00:11:31,160 --> 00:11:34,440 Speaker 1: it Bush the first or Clinton? In Bush the second? 196 00:11:35,280 --> 00:11:38,800 Speaker 1: Bush the second in the rock and Clinton, Well, they 197 00:11:38,800 --> 00:11:40,640 Speaker 1: were both like, we don't think we should be doing 198 00:11:40,720 --> 00:11:44,360 Speaker 1: much of this because a couple of reasons. A basically 199 00:11:44,400 --> 00:11:46,560 Speaker 1: opens us up. It's like, hey, they did this, so 200 00:11:46,600 --> 00:11:49,839 Speaker 1: we can do it right back and be I think 201 00:11:49,880 --> 00:11:54,520 Speaker 1: they could have drained some banks of terrorist cells. And 202 00:11:54,559 --> 00:11:56,920 Speaker 1: they said, we kind of depend on the integrity of 203 00:11:56,960 --> 00:11:59,520 Speaker 1: the banking system worldwide, like we don't want to start 204 00:11:59,520 --> 00:12:03,439 Speaker 1: messing aroun with us. So apparently with with UM cyber warfare. 205 00:12:03,840 --> 00:12:08,720 Speaker 1: It's very much like UM. When you build that virus, 206 00:12:08,720 --> 00:12:11,920 Speaker 1: it's out there and it can be captured and studied 207 00:12:11,960 --> 00:12:16,320 Speaker 1: and redeployed against you. Yeah. So what they were saying 208 00:12:16,440 --> 00:12:19,520 Speaker 1: with Clinton and Bush who were saying like, no, we're 209 00:12:19,559 --> 00:12:22,200 Speaker 1: not going to use a virus to UM to drain 210 00:12:22,280 --> 00:12:25,760 Speaker 1: those bank accounts because they could be it will eventually 211 00:12:25,760 --> 00:12:28,120 Speaker 1: come back on us, and our banking industry is not 212 00:12:28,240 --> 00:12:32,640 Speaker 1: secure enough to withstand something that we ourselves make, because 213 00:12:32,640 --> 00:12:35,480 Speaker 1: apparently the US is pretty good at making viruses. I'm 214 00:12:35,520 --> 00:12:39,040 Speaker 1: sure should we talk about some of the different ways 215 00:12:39,120 --> 00:12:43,600 Speaker 1: that this can go down? Yeah, the Pearl Harbor attack, Yes, 216 00:12:44,640 --> 00:12:46,720 Speaker 1: I had the feeling strictly might A name this one himself, 217 00:12:46,720 --> 00:12:48,440 Speaker 1: but it's not true. He went to a lot of 218 00:12:48,440 --> 00:12:51,480 Speaker 1: trouble to explain why it's called the Pearl Harbor strategy, 219 00:12:51,520 --> 00:12:53,040 Speaker 1: and I think he could have just left at that. 220 00:12:53,840 --> 00:12:56,600 Speaker 1: The idea here is that it's it's pretty much in 221 00:12:56,600 --> 00:12:59,240 Speaker 1: your face. It's a massive cyber attack where they infiltrate 222 00:12:59,600 --> 00:13:03,400 Speaker 1: and then they sabotage systems. UM much like Pearl Harbor 223 00:13:03,679 --> 00:13:07,240 Speaker 1: was a big surprise and a big attack, wasn't I mean, 224 00:13:07,280 --> 00:13:09,679 Speaker 1: it was sneaky, but it wasn't quiet by any means, 225 00:13:10,040 --> 00:13:13,720 Speaker 1: right or stealthy. I guess the word um. The other 226 00:13:13,720 --> 00:13:18,200 Speaker 1: ones are pretty much stealthy. Part of a Pearl Harbor attack. 227 00:13:18,240 --> 00:13:21,480 Speaker 1: I believe UM could be a distributed denial of service attack, 228 00:13:22,040 --> 00:13:25,120 Speaker 1: which is basically, you know, like when you UM try 229 00:13:25,160 --> 00:13:28,040 Speaker 1: to get onto a website or whatever, you're sending a 230 00:13:28,160 --> 00:13:32,200 Speaker 1: request to the server to let you on ping right now. 231 00:13:32,240 --> 00:13:34,960 Speaker 1: If you assault that one server with millions of pings 232 00:13:35,520 --> 00:13:39,319 Speaker 1: and it's trying to accommodate everybody as is appropriate an 233 00:13:39,360 --> 00:13:45,760 Speaker 1: act um, it'll basically they crash. Is the point you 234 00:13:45,800 --> 00:13:48,160 Speaker 1: can crash a server by hitting it with millions of 235 00:13:48,160 --> 00:13:50,120 Speaker 1: pings all at once, just slows it down to the 236 00:13:50,120 --> 00:13:52,320 Speaker 1: point either where it doesn't work or it crashes. Yeah, 237 00:13:52,360 --> 00:13:54,400 Speaker 1: and that's that's what Anonymous likes to do with like 238 00:13:54,559 --> 00:13:56,920 Speaker 1: master Card during the whole wiki leaks thing when they 239 00:13:57,440 --> 00:14:00,599 Speaker 1: was a master Card Vista crash. Cannot remember, um, I 240 00:14:00,600 --> 00:14:03,000 Speaker 1: remember when that happened. Though. It's basically just launching a 241 00:14:03,040 --> 00:14:05,520 Speaker 1: bunch of server requests at a specific server in the 242 00:14:05,559 --> 00:14:08,880 Speaker 1: service like no, no, and this falls over? Is that 243 00:14:08,960 --> 00:14:13,960 Speaker 1: why people say ping by the way, say let him? Yeah, 244 00:14:14,320 --> 00:14:18,920 Speaker 1: I hate that it's better than java storm. I don't 245 00:14:18,920 --> 00:14:21,120 Speaker 1: even know what that is, drinking coffee while you're having 246 00:14:21,120 --> 00:14:24,240 Speaker 1: a brainstorm, Like, let's go get coffee and brainstorm something 247 00:14:24,360 --> 00:14:28,760 Speaker 1: javas to people say that, Yeah, I don't say it. 248 00:14:29,400 --> 00:14:33,840 Speaker 1: I've never heard of that. That ping and meta or 249 00:14:33,880 --> 00:14:36,920 Speaker 1: the three things that I will never say maybe the 250 00:14:36,960 --> 00:14:41,440 Speaker 1: worst to call something epic. I don't mind epic. Oh man, 251 00:14:41,480 --> 00:14:44,200 Speaker 1: I hate epics. At least it's a real word, especially 252 00:14:44,440 --> 00:14:53,320 Speaker 1: epic fail. Well yeah, sure, okay, back to it. Viruses uh, code, red, Slammer, NIMDA. 253 00:14:53,760 --> 00:14:57,680 Speaker 1: These are viruses that Strickland has mentioned that spread very 254 00:14:57,720 --> 00:15:00,640 Speaker 1: quickly across the Internet. And there's a up low ways 255 00:15:00,760 --> 00:15:06,000 Speaker 1: this can go down. You can either um, you can 256 00:15:06,040 --> 00:15:08,920 Speaker 1: set up you can do it immediately and release a virus. 257 00:15:09,240 --> 00:15:12,600 Speaker 1: You can have all these other computers deliver the virus. 258 00:15:12,800 --> 00:15:15,880 Speaker 1: You can put sort of like a delay timer on 259 00:15:15,920 --> 00:15:18,760 Speaker 1: your virus for it to go off in two years 260 00:15:18,800 --> 00:15:22,480 Speaker 1: automatically or manually whenever you want to. It can be 261 00:15:22,520 --> 00:15:25,600 Speaker 1: waiting for you to hit the button and then launch 262 00:15:25,640 --> 00:15:28,840 Speaker 1: the virus that way, or I think, um for the 263 00:15:28,960 --> 00:15:32,360 Speaker 1: user of that computer to do like say control all delete, 264 00:15:32,920 --> 00:15:36,960 Speaker 1: well we'll trigger it or something. Yeah, that's pretty scary. Yeah, 265 00:15:36,960 --> 00:15:40,400 Speaker 1: I don't don't press those three puts all the time. 266 00:15:40,400 --> 00:15:43,720 Speaker 1: I'm my PC. Oh my god, chuck. I think we 267 00:15:43,760 --> 00:15:46,600 Speaker 1: should talk about right about here is I think we're stucks. 268 00:15:46,680 --> 00:15:52,400 Speaker 1: That fits in. Who stucks net? Say it stucks? I 269 00:15:52,440 --> 00:15:55,800 Speaker 1: don't know what that is. You know it's stuck in. Yeah, 270 00:15:55,840 --> 00:15:59,280 Speaker 1: it's the Iranian um. It's the virus that the US 271 00:15:59,320 --> 00:16:02,960 Speaker 1: and Israel leashed on Iran. It's a perfect example of 272 00:16:03,000 --> 00:16:06,240 Speaker 1: this it is. You're right, So let's talk about stuck 273 00:16:06,320 --> 00:16:11,280 Speaker 1: s net. Stuck snet. It's a great name. It was offensive, 274 00:16:11,280 --> 00:16:13,360 Speaker 1: a cyber attack. Offensive in two thousand and ten, they 275 00:16:13,360 --> 00:16:15,520 Speaker 1: thinking maybe it was the first one ever, the US 276 00:16:15,640 --> 00:16:20,400 Speaker 1: launched like a strictly for sabotage attack. Basically, they wanted 277 00:16:20,440 --> 00:16:26,360 Speaker 1: to disable Iran uh Iran's UH centrifuges so they could 278 00:16:26,440 --> 00:16:29,480 Speaker 1: not enrich uranium. And they did this through the UH 279 00:16:29,800 --> 00:16:34,240 Speaker 1: the new Air Force based out of Texas, right, Texas 280 00:16:34,280 --> 00:16:41,400 Speaker 1: and Georgia. Yeah, what's the Warner Robbins Robin's Air Force space. Yeah, 281 00:16:41,480 --> 00:16:43,640 Speaker 1: Robin's Air Force Space. Yeah. Those two places are where 282 00:16:43,640 --> 00:16:45,960 Speaker 1: the twenty four station. Yeah, and this is the first 283 00:16:46,000 --> 00:16:51,280 Speaker 1: all cyber unit. Pretty much pretty cool, right. Their whole is, 284 00:16:51,520 --> 00:16:55,320 Speaker 1: their whole task is to wage cyber warfare, and I 285 00:16:55,320 --> 00:17:01,640 Speaker 1: imagined to be defensive against cyber attacks, but I don't. 286 00:17:01,760 --> 00:17:04,160 Speaker 1: I don't know if they had to do with stuck stent, 287 00:17:04,680 --> 00:17:07,639 Speaker 1: but they probably would have. Um. I think it was 288 00:17:07,720 --> 00:17:12,280 Speaker 1: being developed before was ordained in two thousand nine. I 289 00:17:12,280 --> 00:17:14,080 Speaker 1: think it went back to two thousand seven when it 290 00:17:14,119 --> 00:17:19,960 Speaker 1: was started. But basically, the they the CIA got their 291 00:17:20,000 --> 00:17:24,080 Speaker 1: hands on centrifuges that they knew Iran was using, and 292 00:17:24,119 --> 00:17:27,600 Speaker 1: they had just as many as Iran did of the 293 00:17:27,680 --> 00:17:31,480 Speaker 1: same kind, and they studied it and they built this 294 00:17:31,640 --> 00:17:37,159 Speaker 1: virus based on this configuration of centrifuges running windows and 295 00:17:37,240 --> 00:17:41,359 Speaker 1: semens switches right, and then they built a virus to 296 00:17:41,400 --> 00:17:44,320 Speaker 1: go infiltrate it. I thought it was called Operation Olympic Games. 297 00:17:44,600 --> 00:17:48,960 Speaker 1: It was, but the malware, the virus itself. Okay, that's 298 00:17:49,000 --> 00:17:51,480 Speaker 1: what I couldn't but you're right. It was called Operation 299 00:17:51,560 --> 00:17:57,320 Speaker 1: Olympic Games. And this whole operation was this huge, sweeping, awesome, 300 00:17:57,520 --> 00:18:02,520 Speaker 1: massive secretive but basically imagine like the CIA. Do you 301 00:18:02,520 --> 00:18:06,240 Speaker 1: remember uncommon valor? Oh yeah, okay, do you remember when 302 00:18:06,440 --> 00:18:10,240 Speaker 1: like they're training at that replica of the camp. Yeah, okay, 303 00:18:10,400 --> 00:18:15,320 Speaker 1: the CIA did that with Iran's centrifuges in the nuclear program, 304 00:18:15,359 --> 00:18:17,000 Speaker 1: and they figured out exactly how it worked, and then 305 00:18:17,000 --> 00:18:18,680 Speaker 1: they figured out the best way to break it. Was 306 00:18:18,760 --> 00:18:20,760 Speaker 1: Gene Hackman bank rolling the whole thing. Oh yeah, he 307 00:18:20,840 --> 00:18:22,800 Speaker 1: was there to get his son out. He he was 308 00:18:22,880 --> 00:18:25,680 Speaker 1: just staring at this menu of guns and silhouette that 309 00:18:25,720 --> 00:18:28,080 Speaker 1: he wanted to order. Remember that. Oh yeah, dude that 310 00:18:28,080 --> 00:18:30,199 Speaker 1: I thought that was so bad. That. Yeah, but that 311 00:18:30,280 --> 00:18:33,000 Speaker 1: was a huge, huge movie for like dudes, our age. No, 312 00:18:33,160 --> 00:18:37,680 Speaker 1: I'm saying bad isn't like good? Okay, Yeah, gotcha. UM 313 00:18:37,720 --> 00:18:40,560 Speaker 1: so stucks and at Olympic Games happened, and like you said, 314 00:18:40,600 --> 00:18:44,840 Speaker 1: it was the first offensive cyber attack. Most of the 315 00:18:44,840 --> 00:18:48,440 Speaker 1: other ones have come in the form of UM sneaking 316 00:18:48,480 --> 00:18:52,320 Speaker 1: in and lying around and watching and waiting and spying. Well, 317 00:18:52,359 --> 00:18:55,080 Speaker 1: stuck and had that too. That the initial There was 318 00:18:55,119 --> 00:18:59,080 Speaker 1: a companion program called Flame that somehow. This is the 319 00:18:59,119 --> 00:19:02,760 Speaker 1: part that's the biggest mystery. The m Iran's nuclear program 320 00:19:02,880 --> 00:19:05,560 Speaker 1: is not connected to the Internet, so somebody got that 321 00:19:05,640 --> 00:19:11,159 Speaker 1: in on thumb drive, infected their local system. UM and 322 00:19:11,359 --> 00:19:15,479 Speaker 1: Flames set there and basically just studied everything, told the 323 00:19:15,600 --> 00:19:19,080 Speaker 1: US how the configuration was set up, and then they 324 00:19:19,119 --> 00:19:22,719 Speaker 1: built it, and then they inserted stucks net and basically 325 00:19:23,000 --> 00:19:26,800 Speaker 1: it made all of their data look like everything was 326 00:19:26,840 --> 00:19:30,760 Speaker 1: operating normally, but it was telling their centrifuges to spin 327 00:19:30,800 --> 00:19:34,080 Speaker 1: out of control and basically break themselves, like Oceans eleven 328 00:19:34,119 --> 00:19:37,520 Speaker 1: when they built the replica Bault exactly the replica video. 329 00:19:38,119 --> 00:19:41,320 Speaker 1: There's nothing going on. So basically the Pentagon has been 330 00:19:41,320 --> 00:19:44,639 Speaker 1: watching a lot of movies. But this is a hugely 331 00:19:44,680 --> 00:19:47,800 Speaker 1: successful attack um, if not at the very least for 332 00:19:48,040 --> 00:19:53,719 Speaker 1: American cyber warfare UM because it's supposedly set Iran's nuclear 333 00:19:53,760 --> 00:19:56,280 Speaker 1: program back by at least a year, if not more. 334 00:19:56,800 --> 00:19:59,800 Speaker 1: That hopes that this would let us continue talks and 335 00:19:59,800 --> 00:20:01,639 Speaker 1: if think it said one of the aims was to 336 00:20:01,720 --> 00:20:05,719 Speaker 1: make them feel stupid, and they said it worked like 337 00:20:05,800 --> 00:20:09,159 Speaker 1: they that they've done something wrong and that's why this 338 00:20:09,320 --> 00:20:12,720 Speaker 1: these systems were failing. It's pretty scary, man. But the 339 00:20:12,800 --> 00:20:16,000 Speaker 1: point is now is Okay, that's out there. Stuck Snut 340 00:20:16,040 --> 00:20:17,960 Speaker 1: is out there for anybody who can get their hands 341 00:20:17,960 --> 00:20:21,720 Speaker 1: on it. And that's the name of it. It's a 342 00:20:21,760 --> 00:20:25,800 Speaker 1: great name, alright, stuck Snut within with an X with 343 00:20:25,880 --> 00:20:30,280 Speaker 1: the new Gutas Center. But it's out there and the 344 00:20:30,400 --> 00:20:35,480 Speaker 1: US is now basically just the the computer equivalent of 345 00:20:36,320 --> 00:20:40,400 Speaker 1: Hiroshima was just launched by the United States. Yeah, and 346 00:20:41,160 --> 00:20:43,280 Speaker 1: nice little set up there. A lot of people are 347 00:20:43,280 --> 00:20:47,240 Speaker 1: comparing these days of the early days of cyber warring 348 00:20:47,359 --> 00:20:50,600 Speaker 1: to the early days of of nuclear bombs, and that 349 00:20:51,880 --> 00:20:54,720 Speaker 1: there's not a ton of defense. Not anyone really knows 350 00:20:54,760 --> 00:20:57,199 Speaker 1: what they're doing. It's sort of a chaotic mess that 351 00:20:57,240 --> 00:21:00,280 Speaker 1: everyone's trying to get their finger in the pie though. Yeah, 352 00:21:00,520 --> 00:21:04,080 Speaker 1: and the other countries like China believe Russia, who are 353 00:21:04,080 --> 00:21:08,719 Speaker 1: apparently better equipped to defend against a cyber attack than 354 00:21:08,760 --> 00:21:14,200 Speaker 1: the US. So basically the US is really playing with fire. Well, 355 00:21:14,200 --> 00:21:17,080 Speaker 1: and that's why Clinton and Bush we're declining to use 356 00:21:17,119 --> 00:21:18,520 Speaker 1: these is one of the reasons where like, you know, 357 00:21:18,600 --> 00:21:22,240 Speaker 1: this opens us up to counterattacks and just may not 358 00:21:22,320 --> 00:21:25,600 Speaker 1: be the smartest way to like we wouldn't go out 359 00:21:25,600 --> 00:21:28,040 Speaker 1: and just drop a nuclear bomb on a country, right, 360 00:21:28,119 --> 00:21:32,640 Speaker 1: Oh did all? Right? Oops? Twice? What else you got? 361 00:21:32,720 --> 00:21:35,840 Speaker 1: Let's see, yuh. We talked about the system controls and 362 00:21:36,400 --> 00:21:41,960 Speaker 1: um that acquisition systems. Yeah, that was um. Basically that 363 00:21:42,160 --> 00:21:46,960 Speaker 1: is the Achilles Heel of Infrastructure and the United States. 364 00:21:47,040 --> 00:21:49,800 Speaker 1: One of the reasons why we're not set up to 365 00:21:49,840 --> 00:21:53,880 Speaker 1: defend against um a cyber attack is because we are 366 00:21:54,200 --> 00:22:01,800 Speaker 1: so connected to the internet. Everything is Iran North Korea. Yeah, 367 00:22:01,960 --> 00:22:04,359 Speaker 1: not quite as bot because a lot of their stuff 368 00:22:04,400 --> 00:22:08,120 Speaker 1: is off the grid just by default because they don't 369 00:22:08,160 --> 00:22:12,040 Speaker 1: have the infrastructure that we have. So just the robustness 370 00:22:12,080 --> 00:22:14,560 Speaker 1: of our own infrastructure is one of the one of 371 00:22:14,560 --> 00:22:18,359 Speaker 1: its vulnerabilities as well. Yeah, that's a good point as 372 00:22:18,400 --> 00:22:20,479 Speaker 1: far as defense goes to I forgot about this stuff. 373 00:22:21,119 --> 00:22:25,520 Speaker 1: Um Strickland says that, like the first step is education, 374 00:22:27,119 --> 00:22:32,040 Speaker 1: as far as educating consumers over you know, antivirus software 375 00:22:32,040 --> 00:22:34,280 Speaker 1: and how they search the Internet and stuff like that. 376 00:22:35,160 --> 00:22:38,640 Speaker 1: So I give that a medium. But uh, this guy 377 00:22:38,720 --> 00:22:42,480 Speaker 1: Richard Clarke, he's a security expert. He blames things on 378 00:22:43,000 --> 00:22:47,560 Speaker 1: companies like Microsoft too. He feels like rushes through programs 379 00:22:48,480 --> 00:22:52,800 Speaker 1: before they are fully security tested because they want to 380 00:22:52,840 --> 00:22:55,040 Speaker 1: make you know, they want a few coins to rub 381 00:22:55,080 --> 00:22:58,240 Speaker 1: together by selling this stuff, and the consumer doesn't want 382 00:22:58,240 --> 00:23:01,280 Speaker 1: to wait, and the stockholder don't want lots of testing 383 00:23:01,560 --> 00:23:04,160 Speaker 1: because they want those new products on the market. So 384 00:23:04,240 --> 00:23:07,760 Speaker 1: it's a bit of a rough position, and um, you know, 385 00:23:07,840 --> 00:23:10,400 Speaker 1: private companies run most of the net, you know, it's 386 00:23:10,440 --> 00:23:15,480 Speaker 1: not like this big government thing. So he contends Clark 387 00:23:15,560 --> 00:23:19,200 Speaker 1: does that it's up to these private companies who own 388 00:23:19,240 --> 00:23:22,600 Speaker 1: the Internet's infrastructure to really make it more robust in 389 00:23:22,640 --> 00:23:25,040 Speaker 1: a defensive sense, right, Which is good in one sense, 390 00:23:25,080 --> 00:23:28,120 Speaker 1: because then you have a dollar amount in the form 391 00:23:28,200 --> 00:23:32,720 Speaker 1: of lost profits attached to UM a security breach, right, 392 00:23:33,040 --> 00:23:36,000 Speaker 1: so company is going to try to protect it UM, 393 00:23:36,040 --> 00:23:40,040 Speaker 1: which is good. Yeah, But at the same time, it's like, yeah, 394 00:23:40,040 --> 00:23:43,119 Speaker 1: if you're putting out products though, and you have competition, 395 00:23:43,320 --> 00:23:47,080 Speaker 1: and your competitors products are safer UM, and you're just 396 00:23:47,200 --> 00:23:51,560 Speaker 1: rushing stuff to market, then you're gonna lose out ultimately 397 00:23:51,840 --> 00:23:56,320 Speaker 1: the same economic forces. And Jonathan also points out to that, 398 00:23:57,040 --> 00:23:59,439 Speaker 1: you know, a scary way that can be implemented is 399 00:23:59,800 --> 00:24:02,920 Speaker 1: a a one two punch with a physical attack. So, 400 00:24:03,840 --> 00:24:05,080 Speaker 1: I mean, this is the one that wakes me up 401 00:24:05,080 --> 00:24:07,439 Speaker 1: in the middle of the night. Is a cyber attack 402 00:24:07,520 --> 00:24:11,920 Speaker 1: is launched and the electric power grid is shut down, 403 00:24:12,320 --> 00:24:15,800 Speaker 1: and gas lines and waterlines start going haywire, and then 404 00:24:15,840 --> 00:24:19,520 Speaker 1: all of a sudden incomes the Red Dawn team parachuting 405 00:24:19,520 --> 00:24:21,399 Speaker 1: in well that's what we did to a rock in 406 00:24:21,480 --> 00:24:25,000 Speaker 1: two thou three. We sent a cyber attack that messed 407 00:24:25,000 --> 00:24:28,320 Speaker 1: with their UM I guess their air defense systems, and 408 00:24:28,359 --> 00:24:32,800 Speaker 1: then we invaded. So that's happened before we've done it, 409 00:24:32,840 --> 00:24:36,600 Speaker 1: doesn't surprise me. Yeah, cyber war, we're in the midst 410 00:24:36,640 --> 00:24:38,760 Speaker 1: of it. We're in the midst of it. Pretty crazy stuff. 411 00:24:38,880 --> 00:24:46,639 Speaker 1: Get your to what Norton anti virus. That'll just solve everything. Yeah. Education, education, 412 00:24:47,200 --> 00:24:49,119 Speaker 1: that's all. That's the only thing. That's all we can 413 00:24:49,160 --> 00:24:52,159 Speaker 1: do to prevent cyber war. Um. If you want to 414 00:24:52,240 --> 00:24:54,720 Speaker 1: learn more about cyber war and read this article by 415 00:24:55,160 --> 00:24:58,919 Speaker 1: Jonathan Strickland, you can type cyber war one word in 416 00:24:59,119 --> 00:25:01,560 Speaker 1: the search bar stuff works dot com and will bring 417 00:25:01,560 --> 00:25:04,920 Speaker 1: it up. I said Jonathan strick clam which means it's 418 00:25:04,920 --> 00:25:08,880 Speaker 1: time for a listener. Mayo, he's started for a lot 419 00:25:09,119 --> 00:25:16,320 Speaker 1: more than that. Uh, I'm gonna call this beer and fire. Hi, guys. 420 00:25:16,359 --> 00:25:18,680 Speaker 1: I'm a professor of history and a long time act 421 00:25:18,680 --> 00:25:21,000 Speaker 1: of your show. I use a podcast in my college 422 00:25:21,000 --> 00:25:23,639 Speaker 1: classes to talk about how we use history and entertainment. 423 00:25:24,320 --> 00:25:26,840 Speaker 1: I'm writing about the Great Chicago Fire podcast, especially as 424 00:25:26,880 --> 00:25:29,840 Speaker 1: it relates to my research. See I study the history 425 00:25:29,880 --> 00:25:32,080 Speaker 1: of alcohol, and I teach a class on the history 426 00:25:32,119 --> 00:25:36,240 Speaker 1: of beer. Uh, that's pretty cool. We study the economic, social, 427 00:25:36,240 --> 00:25:38,240 Speaker 1: and cultural history of beer, and we make beer in 428 00:25:38,320 --> 00:25:44,920 Speaker 1: class into weekly beer tastings. What anyway, Aside from the 429 00:25:44,960 --> 00:25:47,159 Speaker 1: stuff you mentioned the show, the Chicago fire is important 430 00:25:47,160 --> 00:25:50,760 Speaker 1: because it wiped out about three quarters Chicago's breweries. Uh. 431 00:25:50,880 --> 00:25:53,720 Speaker 1: Something like eighteen breweries were destroyed by the fire. Of course, 432 00:25:54,119 --> 00:25:58,920 Speaker 1: people still want a beer, uh, Chicago and Upper Midwest, 433 00:25:59,080 --> 00:26:01,199 Speaker 1: as was pot wait about a lot of Germans at 434 00:26:01,200 --> 00:26:04,440 Speaker 1: the time. This gave birth to the beer industry in Milwaukee. 435 00:26:04,920 --> 00:26:07,199 Speaker 1: Before the Great Fire, Milwaukee was a beer town, but 436 00:26:07,240 --> 00:26:10,560 Speaker 1: not a major supply center. Schlitz, especially as a good 437 00:26:10,560 --> 00:26:13,960 Speaker 1: example of called the Milwaukee beer industry, reacted to the fire. 438 00:26:14,680 --> 00:26:18,840 Speaker 1: Joseph Schlitz, the founder it, first, donated thousands of barrels 439 00:26:18,880 --> 00:26:21,560 Speaker 1: of beer to Chicagoans and the weeks after the fire. 440 00:26:22,000 --> 00:26:25,800 Speaker 1: Been Sensing an opportunity, he then opened a distribution point 441 00:26:25,840 --> 00:26:28,760 Speaker 1: in the city. After all, there were still hundreds of 442 00:26:28,800 --> 00:26:33,399 Speaker 1: thousands of thirsty Chicagoans. He opened Schlitz Tiede Saloons. By 443 00:26:33,440 --> 00:26:36,119 Speaker 1: the eighteen eighties he was selling about fifty thousand barrels 444 00:26:36,160 --> 00:26:39,520 Speaker 1: of beer in Chicago alone, which is about seventeen percent 445 00:26:39,520 --> 00:26:44,840 Speaker 1: of their total. And the slogan, yeah, the slogan for Schlitz, 446 00:26:45,560 --> 00:26:48,960 Speaker 1: the beer that made Milwaukee famous, came out of this period, 447 00:26:49,240 --> 00:26:52,040 Speaker 1: and it is because of the beer sold after the fire, 448 00:26:52,680 --> 00:26:55,400 Speaker 1: So that's where they got the name. By nineteen o two, 449 00:26:55,400 --> 00:26:57,879 Speaker 1: Schlitz was the largest brew in the world, a title 450 00:26:57,920 --> 00:27:00,600 Speaker 1: it would trade back and forth with Budweiser until the 451 00:27:00,640 --> 00:27:03,280 Speaker 1: nineteen fifties. And he goes on to point out that 452 00:27:03,440 --> 00:27:09,399 Speaker 1: blats and passed while with similar trajectories, stucks that stuck 453 00:27:09,440 --> 00:27:13,000 Speaker 1: to that, and uh, the Chicago brewing industry sadly never 454 00:27:13,040 --> 00:27:17,119 Speaker 1: recovered from the fire, although beer drinking remains steady. And 455 00:27:17,320 --> 00:27:22,479 Speaker 1: I don't have Professor Beer's name, so we'll just call 456 00:27:22,520 --> 00:27:26,720 Speaker 1: him Professor Beer. Oh, I'm sure he'd appreciate that. Yeah, 457 00:27:26,960 --> 00:27:30,960 Speaker 1: I'm sure that's what the students call him. Thanks, Professor Beer. Yeah, 458 00:27:31,160 --> 00:27:32,520 Speaker 1: And if you want to write it, I'll say your 459 00:27:32,560 --> 00:27:35,200 Speaker 1: name on one a later show. Okay. Um. And if 460 00:27:35,200 --> 00:27:39,800 Speaker 1: you teach, especially something interesting or you stuff you should 461 00:27:39,800 --> 00:27:42,320 Speaker 1: know to help you teach, We're always interested in hearing that. 462 00:27:42,600 --> 00:27:45,560 Speaker 1: We want to know about it. Okay, You can tweet 463 00:27:45,600 --> 00:27:48,040 Speaker 1: it to us at s y s K podcast and 464 00:27:48,119 --> 00:27:50,679 Speaker 1: put it on Facebook dot com slash stuff you Should Know, 465 00:27:51,119 --> 00:27:54,560 Speaker 1: or you can send us an email like Professor Beer 466 00:27:54,640 --> 00:28:04,120 Speaker 1: did to Stuff podcast at Discovery dot com. For more 467 00:28:04,160 --> 00:28:06,800 Speaker 1: on this and thousands of other topics, visit how stuff 468 00:28:06,800 --> 00:28:16,359 Speaker 1: works dot com. MHM brought to you by the reinvented 469 00:28:16,400 --> 00:28:19,040 Speaker 1: two thousand twelve camera. It's ready, are you