1 00:00:04,240 --> 00:00:07,920 Speaker 1: Get in touch with technology with text Stuff from Stuff stat. 2 00:00:12,080 --> 00:00:14,960 Speaker 1: Hey there, guys, it's Jonathan. This is Tech Stuff. It's 3 00:00:14,960 --> 00:00:18,800 Speaker 1: time for another classic episode. Yes, indeed, we are still 4 00:00:18,920 --> 00:00:22,040 Speaker 1: getting everything ready to go with our new studio. I'm 5 00:00:22,079 --> 00:00:24,400 Speaker 1: recording this in our old studio, so I'm just guessing 6 00:00:24,400 --> 00:00:26,960 Speaker 1: that that's true. At any rate, I wanted to talk 7 00:00:27,000 --> 00:00:31,319 Speaker 1: about a classic episode text Stuff withdraws from the a 8 00:00:31,480 --> 00:00:34,519 Speaker 1: t M. This one has my old buddy Chris Pallette 9 00:00:34,560 --> 00:00:36,800 Speaker 1: as the co host in this episode, and we talk 10 00:00:36,880 --> 00:00:39,480 Speaker 1: all about what a t M S are and I 11 00:00:39,479 --> 00:00:41,600 Speaker 1: think I say a t M machine and pen number 12 00:00:41,640 --> 00:00:48,440 Speaker 1: about a billion time. Enjoy. I'm talking about a t 13 00:00:48,640 --> 00:00:51,559 Speaker 1: M S today. And we've had a few people ask 14 00:00:51,680 --> 00:00:53,880 Speaker 1: us about how a t M S work. We assume 15 00:00:54,040 --> 00:00:57,880 Speaker 1: it was all on the up and up, not to 16 00:00:57,920 --> 00:01:00,720 Speaker 1: find out how they work so that you can exploit them. 17 00:01:01,280 --> 00:01:03,400 Speaker 1: I did find out an article about how to hack 18 00:01:03,440 --> 00:01:07,520 Speaker 1: into one. Wow. Well, and that gets a little complicated. 19 00:01:07,560 --> 00:01:10,360 Speaker 1: We'll talk about that. Why that is in the case, Yeah, 20 00:01:10,360 --> 00:01:13,440 Speaker 1: because it really does depend. But first let's talk about 21 00:01:13,520 --> 00:01:17,640 Speaker 1: how a t M S came to be. That's somewhat 22 00:01:17,640 --> 00:01:21,880 Speaker 1: in dispute. Yes, um, there there are multiple people who 23 00:01:21,959 --> 00:01:26,320 Speaker 1: were inventing things that resemble what a t M s 24 00:01:26,319 --> 00:01:29,720 Speaker 1: are today in different parts of the world around the 25 00:01:29,760 --> 00:01:33,200 Speaker 1: same time, although the earliest one I could find was 26 00:01:33,680 --> 00:01:37,520 Speaker 1: from a Mr. Luther sim Jean Yes who was born 27 00:01:37,560 --> 00:01:41,039 Speaker 1: in Turkey. It was the son of Armenians who were 28 00:01:41,480 --> 00:01:45,600 Speaker 1: sadly his family was was broken up during a genocide 29 00:01:45,680 --> 00:01:49,440 Speaker 1: in the early twentieth century, and he uh. He eventually 30 00:01:49,640 --> 00:01:54,160 Speaker 1: immigrated to the United States and he came up with 31 00:01:54,320 --> 00:01:57,880 Speaker 1: an idea that eventually he called the bank matic Automated 32 00:01:58,040 --> 00:02:01,160 Speaker 1: Teller machine. So that's where we get t M that's 33 00:02:01,400 --> 00:02:04,360 Speaker 1: he's the one who came up with the term. And 34 00:02:04,640 --> 00:02:09,640 Speaker 1: this was around nineteen nine. But this was doesn't really 35 00:02:09,639 --> 00:02:12,120 Speaker 1: resemble the way a t M s look and and 36 00:02:12,440 --> 00:02:15,440 Speaker 1: act now. But it was an idea of a of 37 00:02:15,520 --> 00:02:19,520 Speaker 1: an machine that would dispense money. And it was run 38 00:02:19,560 --> 00:02:23,800 Speaker 1: for a six month trial at the City Bank of 39 00:02:23,880 --> 00:02:28,000 Speaker 1: New York, which we now call City Bank. Yes uh. 40 00:02:28,040 --> 00:02:31,400 Speaker 1: And after the six months the trial ended and City 41 00:02:31,400 --> 00:02:35,760 Speaker 1: Bank decided not to extend the trial, not to implement it, 42 00:02:36,320 --> 00:02:39,080 Speaker 1: and um, at least according to one source I read, 43 00:02:39,520 --> 00:02:41,760 Speaker 1: the reason behind it was that it just didn't get 44 00:02:41,760 --> 00:02:45,400 Speaker 1: a lot of traction. The people people just didn't want 45 00:02:45,480 --> 00:02:49,440 Speaker 1: to use a machine to interact with their bank accounts. 46 00:02:49,480 --> 00:02:52,440 Speaker 1: They preferred to have a person to person interaction in 47 00:02:52,480 --> 00:02:55,480 Speaker 1: a bank. And apparently the people who were using it 48 00:02:55,520 --> 00:02:58,640 Speaker 1: were a bunch of air dwells. Yeah, I read about 49 00:02:58,639 --> 00:03:02,000 Speaker 1: that too. Basically, they they the idea of being that 50 00:03:02,280 --> 00:03:05,560 Speaker 1: the only people who would not want to talk to 51 00:03:05,600 --> 00:03:07,800 Speaker 1: a teller are the people who would prefer that you 52 00:03:07,800 --> 00:03:10,200 Speaker 1: didn't know they were depositing or withdrawing money in the 53 00:03:10,240 --> 00:03:12,440 Speaker 1: first place. Yea, so we're talking about people with ill 54 00:03:12,520 --> 00:03:18,239 Speaker 1: gotten game gamblers, for example, places where gambling was not legal, 55 00:03:18,880 --> 00:03:20,880 Speaker 1: and um, you know, you might not want to have 56 00:03:20,919 --> 00:03:23,520 Speaker 1: to answer tricky questions like how did you come upon 57 00:03:23,600 --> 00:03:28,600 Speaker 1: this sum of money, my good man? Yes, yes, exactly. So. Anyway, 58 00:03:28,639 --> 00:03:33,360 Speaker 1: that was the first recorded incidents I could find of 59 00:03:33,480 --> 00:03:36,600 Speaker 1: someone trying to create an a t M. Yes, and 60 00:03:36,680 --> 00:03:40,480 Speaker 1: again it was it was an interesting experiment that ultimately 61 00:03:41,120 --> 00:03:45,040 Speaker 1: failed at that time. Yeah. Now, a lot of what 62 00:03:45,120 --> 00:03:47,480 Speaker 1: I read about the early days of a t M 63 00:03:47,600 --> 00:03:51,360 Speaker 1: s UM, they weren't a t M s. They didn't 64 00:03:51,360 --> 00:03:56,520 Speaker 1: function like today's machines do. UM. In some cases, you 65 00:03:56,560 --> 00:03:59,720 Speaker 1: needed a special card that wasn't actually tied to your 66 00:03:59,760 --> 00:04:01,920 Speaker 1: your bank account. In fact, a lot of them used 67 00:04:01,920 --> 00:04:05,240 Speaker 1: credit cards instead UM. For a long time credit cards 68 00:04:05,280 --> 00:04:09,800 Speaker 1: will look down upon UM. But some of them use 69 00:04:09,880 --> 00:04:13,280 Speaker 1: special vouchers or coins, yes, and a token. Yeah. And 70 00:04:13,280 --> 00:04:15,600 Speaker 1: in Britain you had to UH on one of the 71 00:04:15,600 --> 00:04:18,240 Speaker 1: early trials, you had to go inside and get a voucher. 72 00:04:18,360 --> 00:04:20,560 Speaker 1: You would get a ten pound voucher. So if you 73 00:04:20,560 --> 00:04:23,080 Speaker 1: wanted fifty pounds, you have to get five vouchers. That 74 00:04:23,160 --> 00:04:25,200 Speaker 1: would you take outside of the machine, which raises the 75 00:04:25,320 --> 00:04:28,159 Speaker 1: question why would you not just go and withdraw the 76 00:04:28,200 --> 00:04:30,839 Speaker 1: money directly while you're there, unless, of course, you just 77 00:04:30,880 --> 00:04:34,160 Speaker 1: wanted the convenience of being able to get at ten 78 00:04:34,240 --> 00:04:36,479 Speaker 1: pounds at any given time in the future. And I 79 00:04:36,520 --> 00:04:39,360 Speaker 1: guess that's the argument you'd have to make, Like, instead 80 00:04:39,400 --> 00:04:42,479 Speaker 1: of walking out the bank with fifty pounds, which you 81 00:04:42,480 --> 00:04:44,479 Speaker 1: know you may or may not need at that time, 82 00:04:44,520 --> 00:04:48,320 Speaker 1: you could have uh five ten pound vouchers, and then 83 00:04:49,160 --> 00:04:51,719 Speaker 1: as the as you go about your business throughout the 84 00:04:51,760 --> 00:04:55,719 Speaker 1: coming days, you realize, oh, I need some more walking 85 00:04:55,760 --> 00:04:59,440 Speaker 1: around money or getting about money, as I like to say, 86 00:05:00,120 --> 00:05:01,600 Speaker 1: you would go and use one of those vouchers to 87 00:05:01,600 --> 00:05:04,279 Speaker 1: get some more money out, but it did seem to 88 00:05:04,839 --> 00:05:09,400 Speaker 1: decrease the convenience factor of the automated teller machine somewhat. 89 00:05:09,600 --> 00:05:12,920 Speaker 1: But yeah, in this case, you wouldn't need a card 90 00:05:13,080 --> 00:05:15,200 Speaker 1: with stuff and coded on it. You would just need 91 00:05:15,240 --> 00:05:17,640 Speaker 1: your voucher to put in and then it would spit 92 00:05:17,680 --> 00:05:21,080 Speaker 1: money out. It became like a money vending machine. Yeah. Yeah. 93 00:05:21,600 --> 00:05:24,520 Speaker 1: And uh in n in Britain there was a several 94 00:05:24,560 --> 00:05:28,120 Speaker 1: banks used a device UM that would use a card, 95 00:05:28,720 --> 00:05:31,840 Speaker 1: but not a card that you always carried with you. 96 00:05:32,080 --> 00:05:34,120 Speaker 1: It basically worked like the voucher. You'd stick the card 97 00:05:34,160 --> 00:05:36,560 Speaker 1: in the machine, you get your money out in the 98 00:05:36,600 --> 00:05:39,240 Speaker 1: machine would keep your card, which is kind of a 99 00:05:39,240 --> 00:05:42,279 Speaker 1: pain in the neck. Yeah, it's kind of what happens 100 00:05:42,320 --> 00:05:44,640 Speaker 1: to you now when your machine eats your card and 101 00:05:44,800 --> 00:05:47,800 Speaker 1: uh yeah, I've had that happen too. That's not a 102 00:05:47,839 --> 00:05:51,400 Speaker 1: good feeling, is it, um, Yeah, except this time in 103 00:05:51,440 --> 00:05:53,479 Speaker 1: this case we're talking about it doing it on purpose. 104 00:05:54,120 --> 00:05:57,080 Speaker 1: Uh yeah. So some of the other players in this space, 105 00:05:57,200 --> 00:05:59,800 Speaker 1: and this mainly the real development of a t M 106 00:05:59,839 --> 00:06:03,359 Speaker 1: S yawned. The early ninety nine example took place in 107 00:06:03,360 --> 00:06:07,880 Speaker 1: the sixties, so you had people like James Goodfellow who 108 00:06:08,160 --> 00:06:10,400 Speaker 1: he secured a patent on an A t M like 109 00:06:10,680 --> 00:06:13,080 Speaker 1: machine in nineteen sixty six. He also came up with 110 00:06:13,080 --> 00:06:16,200 Speaker 1: the idea of storing a personal identification number on a 111 00:06:16,279 --> 00:06:18,839 Speaker 1: magnetic strip that would be printed on the back of 112 00:06:18,880 --> 00:06:21,680 Speaker 1: a card, so that would become the A t M 113 00:06:21,720 --> 00:06:25,560 Speaker 1: card eventually. Uh. They had also John D. White who 114 00:06:25,680 --> 00:06:28,719 Speaker 1: invented a free standing automated teller machine. A lot of 115 00:06:28,720 --> 00:06:32,200 Speaker 1: these other machines were built into the corner of a building. 116 00:06:32,320 --> 00:06:35,600 Speaker 1: It was actually part of a larger structure. UM. This 117 00:06:35,720 --> 00:06:39,760 Speaker 1: was more of a free standing UM machine. Uh. And 118 00:06:39,800 --> 00:06:43,080 Speaker 1: then there's John Shepherd Baron, who I think I think 119 00:06:43,400 --> 00:06:46,599 Speaker 1: most sources I saw credited him as the true father 120 00:06:46,800 --> 00:06:49,880 Speaker 1: of the a t M. Yeah, John Shepherd Baron, because 121 00:06:50,480 --> 00:06:53,920 Speaker 1: he was the guy who created the first real fully 122 00:06:53,960 --> 00:06:59,400 Speaker 1: electronic automated teller machine and uh, and the very first 123 00:06:59,400 --> 00:07:03,120 Speaker 1: one wasn't stalled in Barclays Bank in London in nineteen 124 00:07:03,200 --> 00:07:09,280 Speaker 1: sixty seven. But you also had Don Wetzel. Now he 125 00:07:09,400 --> 00:07:12,720 Speaker 1: was working in America and his machines started coming out 126 00:07:12,760 --> 00:07:16,080 Speaker 1: around nineteen sixty eight, and he was known to have 127 00:07:16,560 --> 00:07:20,440 Speaker 1: worked at least in part on Shepherd Baron's work as well. 128 00:07:20,520 --> 00:07:23,840 Speaker 1: He kind of took Shepherd Baron's work and then uh 129 00:07:24,400 --> 00:07:27,280 Speaker 1: change things like enhanced things and drop some things and 130 00:07:27,520 --> 00:07:30,679 Speaker 1: included other things. So uh, Sora used as a launching 131 00:07:30,720 --> 00:07:33,320 Speaker 1: point for his own work. So you get a lot 132 00:07:33,360 --> 00:07:36,880 Speaker 1: of conflicting information about who is really the inventor of 133 00:07:36,920 --> 00:07:38,360 Speaker 1: the A t M. I think part of it depends 134 00:07:38,400 --> 00:07:41,040 Speaker 1: on where you're from. If you're from England, then it's 135 00:07:41,080 --> 00:07:46,640 Speaker 1: John Shepherd Baron, Yeah, and uh in UM, the National 136 00:07:46,720 --> 00:07:51,520 Speaker 1: Museum of American History, the Smithsonian recognized wet cell Um 137 00:07:51,600 --> 00:07:55,720 Speaker 1: and his company Docutel, which was a baggage handling company UM, 138 00:07:55,760 --> 00:07:59,440 Speaker 1: as the people who created the A t M. So 139 00:08:00,880 --> 00:08:02,720 Speaker 1: it's yeah, I guess. And like I said, it all 140 00:08:02,720 --> 00:08:05,880 Speaker 1: depends on who you ask, sort of like television, yeah, 141 00:08:06,000 --> 00:08:11,040 Speaker 1: or radio. Yeah, they're like many other inventions. There's uh 142 00:08:11,440 --> 00:08:14,000 Speaker 1: the story. The real story is far more complicated than 143 00:08:14,080 --> 00:08:18,080 Speaker 1: just a factoid that you'll find in a history book. Yeah. Now, 144 00:08:19,240 --> 00:08:22,720 Speaker 1: I was gonna say. Now, even though in the sixties, 145 00:08:23,240 --> 00:08:26,480 Speaker 1: UM A t m s became a lot more common, 146 00:08:26,640 --> 00:08:31,720 Speaker 1: banks started as uh including them as part of their services. UM. 147 00:08:31,960 --> 00:08:34,520 Speaker 1: As a matter of fact, Uh, the Fortune article I 148 00:08:34,559 --> 00:08:40,120 Speaker 1: read by Ellen Florian Um and uh. Doris Burke and 149 00:08:40,200 --> 00:08:44,560 Speaker 1: Jenny Merrow basically was saying that they quoted a chemical 150 00:08:44,640 --> 00:08:48,880 Speaker 1: bank advertisement and said, um, on September two, our bank 151 00:08:48,920 --> 00:08:51,200 Speaker 1: will open at nine o'clock and we'll never close again. 152 00:08:51,800 --> 00:08:54,160 Speaker 1: And that was the Rockville Center branch at ten North 153 00:08:54,240 --> 00:08:56,920 Speaker 1: Village Avenue on Long Island. Yeah. The idea being that, 154 00:08:57,040 --> 00:08:59,760 Speaker 1: of course, you could access your account at any time 155 00:08:59,760 --> 00:09:03,360 Speaker 1: in withdrawals or transfers or whatever without having to go 156 00:09:03,440 --> 00:09:07,199 Speaker 1: into the bank. Because of course, the reason why people 157 00:09:07,240 --> 00:09:09,720 Speaker 1: were coming up with this in the first place was 158 00:09:09,760 --> 00:09:16,679 Speaker 1: for convenience, because bank hours are notoriously um short. Yeah, 159 00:09:17,920 --> 00:09:21,520 Speaker 1: that will people talk about bankers hours, where you know, 160 00:09:21,760 --> 00:09:23,640 Speaker 1: in order to actually go and visit the bank, you 161 00:09:23,720 --> 00:09:26,679 Speaker 1: might have to take time of your work day in 162 00:09:26,760 --> 00:09:28,120 Speaker 1: order to you know, and then you have to go 163 00:09:28,240 --> 00:09:31,080 Speaker 1: inside a bank and stand in line. See for some 164 00:09:31,160 --> 00:09:33,440 Speaker 1: of our listeners, this is going to sound completely foreign 165 00:09:33,480 --> 00:09:36,840 Speaker 1: to them because apart from maybe opening up a bank 166 00:09:36,840 --> 00:09:39,320 Speaker 1: account or perhaps going in for a loan or something 167 00:09:39,360 --> 00:09:42,200 Speaker 1: like that, you just don't have to do that anymore. Yeah, 168 00:09:42,200 --> 00:09:43,439 Speaker 1: I mean, if you want to do the day to 169 00:09:43,520 --> 00:09:46,080 Speaker 1: day stuff, depositing a check, finding out how much money 170 00:09:46,120 --> 00:09:49,520 Speaker 1: you have in the bank making withdrawal, maybe even transferring 171 00:09:49,520 --> 00:09:51,360 Speaker 1: money between accounts. You can do all that in an 172 00:09:51,360 --> 00:09:53,040 Speaker 1: a t M. Yea. In some cases you can do 173 00:09:53,120 --> 00:09:56,319 Speaker 1: some of that through online banking as well. So we've 174 00:09:56,400 --> 00:09:59,800 Speaker 1: we've almost completely eliminated the need to go into a 175 00:10:00,000 --> 00:10:03,599 Speaker 1: pysical space. But back in the day, it used to 176 00:10:03,640 --> 00:10:05,680 Speaker 1: be that if you wanted to do anything to do 177 00:10:05,840 --> 00:10:08,320 Speaker 1: with your money, you had to go and stand in 178 00:10:08,400 --> 00:10:10,280 Speaker 1: line and wait to talk to a teller and then 179 00:10:10,360 --> 00:10:13,760 Speaker 1: they pull up your records and you do all that 180 00:10:13,840 --> 00:10:16,960 Speaker 1: in person, face to face. And actually in the sixties, 181 00:10:17,000 --> 00:10:22,160 Speaker 1: back when uh, back when these were launching again, the 182 00:10:22,200 --> 00:10:26,040 Speaker 1: people weren't flocking to them immediately. There were In fact, 183 00:10:26,080 --> 00:10:28,680 Speaker 1: some banks were a little skeptical that people would ever 184 00:10:29,120 --> 00:10:32,160 Speaker 1: want to interact with a machine as opposed to a human. 185 00:10:32,559 --> 00:10:35,640 Speaker 1: They thought that the human interaction was a key component 186 00:10:35,800 --> 00:10:39,280 Speaker 1: of the banking process. And it really wasn't until the 187 00:10:39,320 --> 00:10:43,520 Speaker 1: eighties that a t M s started to truly take off. Well, 188 00:10:44,480 --> 00:10:49,120 Speaker 1: the Fortune article actually has a particular event that they 189 00:10:49,160 --> 00:10:52,240 Speaker 1: credit with the takeoff of the a t M and 190 00:10:52,320 --> 00:10:55,000 Speaker 1: what might that be. Well, as it turns out, it 191 00:10:55,160 --> 00:10:59,679 Speaker 1: took Mother Nature's involvement to spur people to use the 192 00:10:59,720 --> 00:11:01,599 Speaker 1: A T M. According to them, it's not nice to 193 00:11:01,640 --> 00:11:05,360 Speaker 1: fool mother nature. No, we know what side of the 194 00:11:05,360 --> 00:11:12,079 Speaker 1: bread your butter. Never mind. Anyway, in January in New 195 00:11:12,120 --> 00:11:17,400 Speaker 1: York they got seventeen inches of snow, which slowed business 196 00:11:17,440 --> 00:11:19,800 Speaker 1: to a crawl because a lot of places couldn't open. 197 00:11:20,640 --> 00:11:25,239 Speaker 1: And they said, um, again this is citing the Fortune article. Um. 198 00:11:25,320 --> 00:11:30,000 Speaker 1: There was a commercial that City Bank released saying, um, 199 00:11:30,040 --> 00:11:33,360 Speaker 1: you know, hey, you can use these machines anytime, whether 200 00:11:33,400 --> 00:11:36,160 Speaker 1: the bank's open or not. Uh. And they had a 201 00:11:36,200 --> 00:11:41,640 Speaker 1: new tagline, the City Never sleeps um, and it said, um, 202 00:11:41,880 --> 00:11:46,040 Speaker 1: see what they did there. The machines used increased during 203 00:11:46,080 --> 00:11:51,040 Speaker 1: the storm, and uh. City banks market share in New 204 00:11:51,080 --> 00:11:54,880 Speaker 1: York City deposits had doubled, and so the rest of 205 00:11:54,920 --> 00:11:59,800 Speaker 1: the banks moved to catch up, and that basically started 206 00:11:59,800 --> 00:12:03,040 Speaker 1: to evolution, at least in New York. Um. Of course 207 00:12:03,080 --> 00:12:06,560 Speaker 1: that's a lot of people, so that that can affect things. 208 00:12:06,559 --> 00:12:08,400 Speaker 1: And people go in there and see how people are 209 00:12:08,480 --> 00:12:10,640 Speaker 1: using the A t M s and they go back home, 210 00:12:11,640 --> 00:12:15,199 Speaker 1: you know yep. Yeah, And like I said, in the eighties, 211 00:12:15,200 --> 00:12:17,520 Speaker 1: that really started to take off. So I guess now 212 00:12:17,559 --> 00:12:20,320 Speaker 1: we can finally start getting into what makes up an 213 00:12:20,320 --> 00:12:23,800 Speaker 1: A t M and how they how they actually work. Uh. Now, 214 00:12:23,880 --> 00:12:27,200 Speaker 1: part of this involves the way that we access the 215 00:12:27,280 --> 00:12:29,400 Speaker 1: A t M s uh. And and not just with 216 00:12:29,480 --> 00:12:32,840 Speaker 1: the key the keypad or the touch screen, depending upon 217 00:12:33,360 --> 00:12:36,959 Speaker 1: the model that you're using, but the card you have, 218 00:12:37,200 --> 00:12:40,120 Speaker 1: your A t M card, whatever you're using to access 219 00:12:40,160 --> 00:12:42,040 Speaker 1: the A t M. And there are variations on this, 220 00:12:42,160 --> 00:12:47,439 Speaker 1: but all of them have a magnetic stripe or mag 221 00:12:47,640 --> 00:12:51,920 Speaker 1: stripe on them. And uh, you might say, well, what 222 00:12:52,000 --> 00:12:54,280 Speaker 1: the heck is a magnetic stripe? Well, it's kind of 223 00:12:54,280 --> 00:12:57,960 Speaker 1: what sounds like it's a uh, it's it's a plastic 224 00:12:58,040 --> 00:13:01,000 Speaker 1: like film. It's on the back of your card that 225 00:13:01,280 --> 00:13:06,120 Speaker 1: has lots and lots and lots of tiny iron based 226 00:13:06,400 --> 00:13:11,000 Speaker 1: magnetic particles. Yes, as a matter of fact, it's very similar, 227 00:13:11,320 --> 00:13:15,079 Speaker 1: if not nearly identical to the material that they used 228 00:13:15,080 --> 00:13:19,520 Speaker 1: to use in recording tape cassette tape cassette tapes, real 229 00:13:19,559 --> 00:13:23,440 Speaker 1: to real tapes, eight track tapes, also floppy disks. Yeah, 230 00:13:23,559 --> 00:13:26,040 Speaker 1: the material inside there, I mean, that's even most of 231 00:13:26,040 --> 00:13:28,440 Speaker 1: them are even the same brownish color. Right. And the 232 00:13:28,480 --> 00:13:31,320 Speaker 1: way you right to this strip is that you you 233 00:13:31,440 --> 00:13:35,880 Speaker 1: magnetize these little particles. Each of the particles acts like 234 00:13:35,960 --> 00:13:39,400 Speaker 1: its own bar magnet, right, and you magnetize them to 235 00:13:39,440 --> 00:13:44,360 Speaker 1: either have a north or south pole direction on each particle, 236 00:13:44,720 --> 00:13:50,439 Speaker 1: and so that's like bits, zeros and ones. So by 237 00:13:50,720 --> 00:13:54,000 Speaker 1: creating them in either a north or south pole direction, 238 00:13:54,720 --> 00:13:57,679 Speaker 1: and then you you've got thousands of these, right, and 239 00:13:57,760 --> 00:14:01,520 Speaker 1: in one strip. You can in code information that way, 240 00:14:01,800 --> 00:14:05,280 Speaker 1: and that information is going to have things like the 241 00:14:05,280 --> 00:14:08,640 Speaker 1: the account number on it, so that it has you know, 242 00:14:08,640 --> 00:14:12,360 Speaker 1: it's able to say this card belongs to this account. Uh. 243 00:14:12,360 --> 00:14:15,240 Speaker 1: It may also have the pin on their the personal 244 00:14:15,280 --> 00:14:19,200 Speaker 1: identification number, so that you can have that as sort 245 00:14:19,240 --> 00:14:22,200 Speaker 1: of a key pass entrigue. You know, as long as 246 00:14:22,240 --> 00:14:26,240 Speaker 1: the pen that you enter into the a t M 247 00:14:26,400 --> 00:14:29,040 Speaker 1: matches the one that's on the card and in the account, 248 00:14:29,360 --> 00:14:32,000 Speaker 1: as long as all three of those are are the same, 249 00:14:32,640 --> 00:14:36,440 Speaker 1: then you'll be able to access your information. So that's 250 00:14:36,520 --> 00:14:39,440 Speaker 1: on your card, which means of course that the A 251 00:14:39,560 --> 00:14:43,880 Speaker 1: t M has to have some sort of card reader involved, 252 00:14:44,080 --> 00:14:46,640 Speaker 1: which you know, it's a magnetic stripe reader that you know, 253 00:14:47,040 --> 00:14:49,760 Speaker 1: depending on the style of the A t M, it 254 00:14:49,800 --> 00:14:52,160 Speaker 1: maybe one where you put your card in and it 255 00:14:52,280 --> 00:14:54,840 Speaker 1: sucks it into the machine. And you hope when your 256 00:14:54,840 --> 00:14:58,040 Speaker 1: transactions over it will spit it back out again. Or 257 00:14:58,160 --> 00:15:00,760 Speaker 1: what I see most commonly now are the kinds where 258 00:15:00,760 --> 00:15:03,560 Speaker 1: you swipe it. You either have a vertical swipe where 259 00:15:03,560 --> 00:15:06,080 Speaker 1: you just swipe the card down the side of a 260 00:15:06,120 --> 00:15:08,840 Speaker 1: little reader, or you inserted into a slot and pull 261 00:15:08,880 --> 00:15:11,840 Speaker 1: it back out again quickly. And in either case, the 262 00:15:12,120 --> 00:15:15,000 Speaker 1: what happens is those little magnets go past a detector 263 00:15:15,880 --> 00:15:18,840 Speaker 1: because the magnets are in motion, and the detector detects 264 00:15:18,880 --> 00:15:21,640 Speaker 1: the difference of the magnetism on each of those little 265 00:15:21,640 --> 00:15:25,200 Speaker 1: bars and can read that as whatever the information is. Yeah, 266 00:15:25,280 --> 00:15:28,960 Speaker 1: so all the information that's printed on the card, um 267 00:15:29,000 --> 00:15:31,080 Speaker 1: the number that's embossed in the card in your name. 268 00:15:31,320 --> 00:15:33,440 Speaker 1: The machine is not reading or looking at any of 269 00:15:33,440 --> 00:15:37,160 Speaker 1: that stuff. It's taking everything from the magnetic stripe. Which 270 00:15:37,480 --> 00:15:42,160 Speaker 1: is why you should not put your your credit cards 271 00:15:42,240 --> 00:15:44,400 Speaker 1: or a T M S cards or anything like that 272 00:15:44,800 --> 00:15:49,600 Speaker 1: near powerful magnets, right because that could actually realign those 273 00:15:49,640 --> 00:15:53,240 Speaker 1: little magnetic particles inside the film. Some people call it 274 00:15:53,280 --> 00:15:56,200 Speaker 1: de magnetizing, but really it's just realigning those polls so 275 00:15:56,400 --> 00:15:59,400 Speaker 1: it no longer it might spout out gibberish. Now when 276 00:15:59,440 --> 00:16:02,400 Speaker 1: you when you swipe it or anyway it's not going 277 00:16:02,480 --> 00:16:05,640 Speaker 1: to correspond with your information and suddenly your card doesn't 278 00:16:05,640 --> 00:16:08,360 Speaker 1: work anymore. Yeah, you can also find the same thing 279 00:16:08,400 --> 00:16:10,240 Speaker 1: if you've used it too much or if the magnetic 280 00:16:10,240 --> 00:16:14,280 Speaker 1: stripe gets damaged in some way. Um. You know, some 281 00:16:14,280 --> 00:16:17,080 Speaker 1: people say the eel skin wallets. Yeah, I hear that 282 00:16:17,160 --> 00:16:18,760 Speaker 1: a lot, because you know, and there are a lot 283 00:16:18,760 --> 00:16:21,880 Speaker 1: of different theories about. Actually the theory I've heard that 284 00:16:22,160 --> 00:16:24,240 Speaker 1: seems to explain it the most, or it seems to 285 00:16:24,280 --> 00:16:27,880 Speaker 1: be the most logical to me. Eel skin wallets. Some 286 00:16:27,920 --> 00:16:30,800 Speaker 1: people claim came from electric eels and that it somehow 287 00:16:30,840 --> 00:16:33,720 Speaker 1: has some sort of electric impulse still stored in it 288 00:16:33,800 --> 00:16:37,800 Speaker 1: and that's what's screwing up the cards. Count me skeptical 289 00:16:37,840 --> 00:16:40,640 Speaker 1: on that one exactly. But a lot of these have 290 00:16:41,000 --> 00:16:44,680 Speaker 1: a magnetic clasp so that when you close it, it 291 00:16:45,320 --> 00:16:49,280 Speaker 1: remains closed. And the magnetic clasp depending on how your 292 00:16:49,320 --> 00:16:53,000 Speaker 1: card is, how you're storing your card in the wallet. Uh, 293 00:16:53,080 --> 00:16:55,200 Speaker 1: the stripe might be close enough to the magnetic class 294 00:16:55,240 --> 00:16:59,480 Speaker 1: that the magnetic class is is realigning those magnetic particles 295 00:16:59,480 --> 00:17:04,000 Speaker 1: in the film, So don't do that. Well. Yeah, so 296 00:17:04,119 --> 00:17:07,240 Speaker 1: once that, uh, you're you have the magnetic card reader. 297 00:17:07,400 --> 00:17:10,520 Speaker 1: We've talked about that and and basically the information is 298 00:17:11,000 --> 00:17:16,960 Speaker 1: going into a computer. Yeah, very basic CPU inside every 299 00:17:17,080 --> 00:17:18,679 Speaker 1: a t M and in fact a lot of them 300 00:17:18,760 --> 00:17:21,919 Speaker 1: run Windows. Yeah, which we'll get to. The earlier A 301 00:17:21,960 --> 00:17:25,320 Speaker 1: t M s were all proprietary. Oh yeah, Now that 302 00:17:25,400 --> 00:17:29,840 Speaker 1: was when if you had an account with UM Bank something, 303 00:17:30,040 --> 00:17:32,040 Speaker 1: you know, First National Bank, and you wanted to go 304 00:17:32,119 --> 00:17:35,239 Speaker 1: to Second National Bank, you were on your own. You 305 00:17:35,280 --> 00:17:36,920 Speaker 1: have to find an a t M for with First 306 00:17:37,000 --> 00:17:39,320 Speaker 1: National Bank or you are out of luck because your 307 00:17:39,320 --> 00:17:44,200 Speaker 1: card wouldn't work the system wasn't compatible. However, it also 308 00:17:44,320 --> 00:17:47,160 Speaker 1: meant that those A t M s had the benefit 309 00:17:47,240 --> 00:17:52,639 Speaker 1: of security through obscurity. That's true because would be thief 310 00:17:53,280 --> 00:17:56,480 Speaker 1: would have to focus on a particular type of a 311 00:17:56,600 --> 00:17:59,920 Speaker 1: t M, and the things that might work on the 312 00:18:00,000 --> 00:18:02,159 Speaker 1: A t M would not necessarily work on a t 313 00:18:02,320 --> 00:18:05,919 Speaker 1: M s for other banks, So it's somewhat limited the 314 00:18:06,000 --> 00:18:09,560 Speaker 1: liability and the vulnerability of those machines. Once the machine 315 00:18:09,600 --> 00:18:13,159 Speaker 1: started to move toward more computer based operating systems like 316 00:18:13,240 --> 00:18:17,080 Speaker 1: Lenox and Windows, then you opened up new opportunities for 317 00:18:17,160 --> 00:18:20,280 Speaker 1: thieves to target specific parts of the A t M 318 00:18:20,359 --> 00:18:23,800 Speaker 1: infrastructure and uh, and made it in some ways more 319 00:18:23,960 --> 00:18:28,280 Speaker 1: vulnerable than the older models. Now I say that, but 320 00:18:28,320 --> 00:18:31,520 Speaker 1: the truth is you can actually find these older model 321 00:18:31,560 --> 00:18:34,960 Speaker 1: A t M s on plenty of sites like eBay 322 00:18:35,359 --> 00:18:37,359 Speaker 1: where you could buy an A t M if you 323 00:18:37,400 --> 00:18:41,359 Speaker 1: wanted to, and if your goal was to deconstruct, to 324 00:18:41,520 --> 00:18:43,480 Speaker 1: hack this a t M so you would learn how 325 00:18:43,520 --> 00:18:47,040 Speaker 1: it works, you could potentially find vulnerabilities in that system 326 00:18:47,080 --> 00:18:51,480 Speaker 1: to exploit. Don't do that, it's illegal. You don't want 327 00:18:51,520 --> 00:18:55,240 Speaker 1: to do that, but there that That is one of 328 00:18:55,240 --> 00:18:58,040 Speaker 1: the downsides to the old systems too, is that you know, 329 00:18:58,280 --> 00:19:01,000 Speaker 1: it's not like these things or it's not like you 330 00:19:01,040 --> 00:19:03,320 Speaker 1: had to have a license to own one. You know, 331 00:19:03,840 --> 00:19:05,760 Speaker 1: you just had to buy one. So you just had 332 00:19:05,800 --> 00:19:07,800 Speaker 1: to find someone willing to sell one and then you 333 00:19:07,800 --> 00:19:11,320 Speaker 1: could buy it. So but yes, you've got your CPU 334 00:19:11,440 --> 00:19:14,159 Speaker 1: in there. Uh. However, the A t M is not 335 00:19:14,280 --> 00:19:19,400 Speaker 1: its own standalone UM machine. Like it's not that it's 336 00:19:19,560 --> 00:19:23,040 Speaker 1: it's disconnected from the outside world. No, but if you 337 00:19:23,119 --> 00:19:25,160 Speaker 1: if you think about it, it's it's very much like 338 00:19:25,400 --> 00:19:28,720 Speaker 1: the computer that sits on your desktop or laptop. So 339 00:19:28,960 --> 00:19:32,959 Speaker 1: you've got a screen for a customer, uh. For basically 340 00:19:33,040 --> 00:19:35,720 Speaker 1: is an output device. You've got a printer that prints, 341 00:19:37,040 --> 00:19:39,080 Speaker 1: you've got an input device or maybe two. You might 342 00:19:39,119 --> 00:19:40,840 Speaker 1: have a touch screen, you might have a key pad 343 00:19:41,720 --> 00:19:45,480 Speaker 1: to type in members or both, um and hopefully both 344 00:19:45,520 --> 00:19:49,520 Speaker 1: for those of people who have vision impairments, right, right. 345 00:19:49,920 --> 00:19:53,520 Speaker 1: And then you also have uh, basically an internet connection. 346 00:19:54,000 --> 00:19:56,800 Speaker 1: It may be on a private network. It might be 347 00:19:56,840 --> 00:20:01,680 Speaker 1: some kind yeah, very, it might be a closed private connection, 348 00:20:01,760 --> 00:20:06,639 Speaker 1: but it goes to a whatever bank is behind that 349 00:20:06,720 --> 00:20:10,000 Speaker 1: particular a t M. Yeah, it'll have a network connection 350 00:20:10,000 --> 00:20:13,600 Speaker 1: of some type to communicate with a server somewhere that 351 00:20:13,680 --> 00:20:16,919 Speaker 1: has account information on it. So if you have three 352 00:20:17,520 --> 00:20:20,679 Speaker 1: in your account you want to withdraw twenty dollars, it 353 00:20:20,720 --> 00:20:24,400 Speaker 1: will say, okay, well Jonathan's got three, so I can 354 00:20:24,440 --> 00:20:27,960 Speaker 1: give him twenty dollars. And he's withdrawn twenty dollars, so 355 00:20:28,240 --> 00:20:30,240 Speaker 1: it makes a note of that in the account, so 356 00:20:30,280 --> 00:20:33,000 Speaker 1: it says, now he has two left. Yeah. The way 357 00:20:33,040 --> 00:20:35,159 Speaker 1: this works is that so you could think of the 358 00:20:35,560 --> 00:20:38,160 Speaker 1: especially the older a t M s Um, we're really 359 00:20:38,200 --> 00:20:40,960 Speaker 1: thin clients. Yeah they were, they were. You know. The 360 00:20:40,960 --> 00:20:43,720 Speaker 1: the it had essentially enough power for it to read 361 00:20:43,800 --> 00:20:49,400 Speaker 1: the strip to uh uh two allow you to input 362 00:20:49,440 --> 00:20:53,480 Speaker 1: your pen and to display the information. But then what 363 00:20:53,520 --> 00:20:56,480 Speaker 1: it would do is the terminal that you're using would 364 00:20:56,600 --> 00:21:00,080 Speaker 1: connect to a host processor. Now this would be a 365 00:21:00,160 --> 00:21:05,560 Speaker 1: computer that belongs to whatever financial institution again is owns 366 00:21:05,640 --> 00:21:09,160 Speaker 1: that a t M. Now, if that's your bank, then 367 00:21:09,200 --> 00:21:11,680 Speaker 1: that's pretty much where this ends. It goes, it refers 368 00:21:11,720 --> 00:21:15,080 Speaker 1: to your account. Make it confirms that you that you 369 00:21:15,119 --> 00:21:16,840 Speaker 1: are who you say you are, and that at least 370 00:21:16,840 --> 00:21:19,920 Speaker 1: according to your pen and that you have the funds 371 00:21:19,960 --> 00:21:22,560 Speaker 1: that you require in order for you to get whatever 372 00:21:22,600 --> 00:21:24,560 Speaker 1: it is you're asking. So again like in your example, 373 00:21:24,600 --> 00:21:27,719 Speaker 1: that you have at least twenty dollars you can withdraw um. 374 00:21:28,800 --> 00:21:31,600 Speaker 1: And then it will send the information back to the 375 00:21:31,640 --> 00:21:35,080 Speaker 1: machine that you're at and either confirmed that it can 376 00:21:35,200 --> 00:21:38,880 Speaker 1: dispense the cash or deny it, and then the machine 377 00:21:38,960 --> 00:21:42,359 Speaker 1: does whatever it's supposed to do. Uh, if your bank 378 00:21:42,480 --> 00:21:44,960 Speaker 1: is a different bank, then what happens is the it 379 00:21:44,960 --> 00:21:47,320 Speaker 1: will go to the host processor. The host processor will 380 00:21:47,359 --> 00:21:52,160 Speaker 1: then route that request to the specific financial institution that 381 00:21:52,359 --> 00:21:56,359 Speaker 1: you belong to and get the permission there, and then 382 00:21:56,920 --> 00:22:01,919 Speaker 1: your bank essentially will wirelessly trays for funds to the 383 00:22:01,960 --> 00:22:05,439 Speaker 1: financial institution and charge of that a t M. And 384 00:22:05,480 --> 00:22:09,240 Speaker 1: then that financial institution will allow the a t M 385 00:22:09,280 --> 00:22:12,320 Speaker 1: to dispense cash because the money has been you know, 386 00:22:12,359 --> 00:22:15,119 Speaker 1: it's not losing money, it's had the wireless transfer from 387 00:22:15,240 --> 00:22:18,920 Speaker 1: your bank. This is also why you'll find a lot 388 00:22:18,920 --> 00:22:22,960 Speaker 1: of a t M s have those fees on them, Yes, 389 00:22:23,160 --> 00:22:27,480 Speaker 1: the usage fees, because otherwise, you know, it's just an 390 00:22:27,480 --> 00:22:29,879 Speaker 1: access thing that you know, banks are doing out of 391 00:22:29,920 --> 00:22:32,879 Speaker 1: the goodness of their hearts. But these are bankers. We 392 00:22:33,000 --> 00:22:36,800 Speaker 1: know they don't have that, right bankers and lawyers right, 393 00:22:37,800 --> 00:22:41,160 Speaker 1: So um, hey, I I watched the documentary Christmas Caroll. 394 00:22:41,320 --> 00:22:45,200 Speaker 1: I know how this works. Uh so, So in order 395 00:22:45,240 --> 00:22:47,280 Speaker 1: to make money off of these transactions, that's why you 396 00:22:47,280 --> 00:22:49,960 Speaker 1: have that usage fee, because you know it's going to 397 00:22:50,040 --> 00:22:53,000 Speaker 1: charge you for the whole process of having the money 398 00:22:53,000 --> 00:22:57,000 Speaker 1: transferred from your financial institution to the bank. And depending 399 00:22:57,040 --> 00:23:00,560 Speaker 1: upon the way that the different financial institution and operate, 400 00:23:00,640 --> 00:23:03,520 Speaker 1: you might actually have multiple fees on one transaction, which 401 00:23:03,560 --> 00:23:06,560 Speaker 1: is really irritating. Yeah, that's when you get the fee 402 00:23:06,680 --> 00:23:09,960 Speaker 1: from the second national bank from using it's a t M, 403 00:23:10,000 --> 00:23:11,800 Speaker 1: and then the fee from the first national bank for 404 00:23:11,920 --> 00:23:15,680 Speaker 1: wirelessly transferring the money to second national bank. You should 405 00:23:15,720 --> 00:23:19,280 Speaker 1: have used our a t M. Yeah, that's uh, that's terrible. However, 406 00:23:19,320 --> 00:23:21,119 Speaker 1: one of the bright sides of using a t M 407 00:23:21,160 --> 00:23:23,280 Speaker 1: S is that if you're in a foreign country and 408 00:23:23,359 --> 00:23:27,440 Speaker 1: you're using your card, it's automatically making the change exchange, 409 00:23:27,480 --> 00:23:30,680 Speaker 1: and it usually makes that exchange at a like you know, normally, 410 00:23:30,720 --> 00:23:33,119 Speaker 1: if you go into a financial institution to exchange currency 411 00:23:33,160 --> 00:23:36,040 Speaker 1: from one format to another, there's a fee placed on 412 00:23:36,119 --> 00:23:39,080 Speaker 1: top of that. So yes, so you're not going to 413 00:23:39,119 --> 00:23:42,720 Speaker 1: get a a perfect exchange from whatever currency you're using 414 00:23:42,760 --> 00:23:45,159 Speaker 1: to whatever you need. You're gonna have some of that 415 00:23:45,200 --> 00:23:47,520 Speaker 1: money taken out. But usually if you're using an a 416 00:23:47,640 --> 00:23:50,040 Speaker 1: t M in a foreign country, you tend to get 417 00:23:50,160 --> 00:23:53,440 Speaker 1: one of the You normally get a really favorable rate. 418 00:23:54,560 --> 00:23:56,640 Speaker 1: You know, it won't be as dramatic as it would 419 00:23:56,640 --> 00:23:58,240 Speaker 1: be if you were to go into some money changing 420 00:23:58,240 --> 00:24:03,600 Speaker 1: place anyway, getting off topic here, So, uh, that's the 421 00:24:03,600 --> 00:24:06,040 Speaker 1: process going on behind the scenes. Now, when the money 422 00:24:06,080 --> 00:24:09,320 Speaker 1: is actually coming out, how does the A t M 423 00:24:09,400 --> 00:24:13,480 Speaker 1: know that it's giving you the right amount of money? Well, 424 00:24:14,640 --> 00:24:17,000 Speaker 1: it has to. Basically, it has cassettes in there with 425 00:24:17,080 --> 00:24:21,080 Speaker 1: the different bills. So assuming that things are lined up correctly, 426 00:24:21,240 --> 00:24:23,200 Speaker 1: assuming that the person who's loaded the a t M 427 00:24:23,280 --> 00:24:26,200 Speaker 1: has done so in the proper way, then it should 428 00:24:26,200 --> 00:24:29,160 Speaker 1: be dispensing the right number of bills. Now it also 429 00:24:29,200 --> 00:24:33,200 Speaker 1: goes by thickness, so it should be able to tell um, 430 00:24:33,760 --> 00:24:37,240 Speaker 1: if you are getting say two bills out, let's say 431 00:24:37,240 --> 00:24:40,640 Speaker 1: two twenties you want, um, then it should be able 432 00:24:40,680 --> 00:24:43,560 Speaker 1: to go, okay, there are two, because I can tell 433 00:24:43,640 --> 00:24:46,800 Speaker 1: by the thickness of these bills. UM. So yeah, you've 434 00:24:46,800 --> 00:24:49,720 Speaker 1: got You've got a couple of different types of sensors 435 00:24:49,760 --> 00:24:52,800 Speaker 1: inside the A t M. There's usually an electrical eye sensor, 436 00:24:52,880 --> 00:24:56,359 Speaker 1: some sort of optical sensor that is optically verifying that 437 00:24:56,440 --> 00:25:00,560 Speaker 1: the the denominations that are being dispensed mat what you 438 00:25:00,640 --> 00:25:04,840 Speaker 1: asked for. And then there's also the thickness sensor, so 439 00:25:04,880 --> 00:25:07,280 Speaker 1: that if uh, if it's supposed to be doing it 440 00:25:07,400 --> 00:25:09,840 Speaker 1: one bill at a time, and the thickness censor says, 441 00:25:09,880 --> 00:25:11,639 Speaker 1: wait a minute, that's too thick for it to be 442 00:25:11,720 --> 00:25:16,240 Speaker 1: one bill, it will send that particular bill or pair 443 00:25:16,280 --> 00:25:18,639 Speaker 1: of bills, or whatever it happens to be to a 444 00:25:18,720 --> 00:25:22,399 Speaker 1: reject been inside the A t M. So the A 445 00:25:22,480 --> 00:25:25,399 Speaker 1: t M has has a bend that collects rejects, and 446 00:25:25,400 --> 00:25:28,760 Speaker 1: this can also be bills that are worn or torn. 447 00:25:29,359 --> 00:25:31,600 Speaker 1: If if it detects that, then's going to send it 448 00:25:31,640 --> 00:25:35,080 Speaker 1: to the reject ben. Uh. And so the ben's just 449 00:25:35,119 --> 00:25:39,160 Speaker 1: gonna keep collecting bills that get rejected through this process. 450 00:25:39,240 --> 00:25:43,560 Speaker 1: And it's all taking just a few seconds, so you know, 451 00:25:43,640 --> 00:25:47,639 Speaker 1: you might be waiting a little bit but thinking like whatever. What. Meanwhile, 452 00:25:47,640 --> 00:25:49,800 Speaker 1: the machine is making sure that it's dispensing the right 453 00:25:49,920 --> 00:25:53,800 Speaker 1: number and denomination of bills to you. Um. There's also 454 00:25:53,840 --> 00:25:57,080 Speaker 1: an electronic journal that's part of an a t M, 455 00:25:57,200 --> 00:26:02,040 Speaker 1: so that it's recording every transaction that's happening with that machine, 456 00:26:02,280 --> 00:26:05,040 Speaker 1: and it also records whenever any bill gets sent to 457 00:26:05,080 --> 00:26:08,840 Speaker 1: the reject ben. And that way, when someone comes into 458 00:26:08,840 --> 00:26:11,320 Speaker 1: service the machine, either to refill it or to fix 459 00:26:11,359 --> 00:26:13,280 Speaker 1: it or whatever, they can take a look at the 460 00:26:13,359 --> 00:26:18,000 Speaker 1: journal and see, uh, you know, how frequently are is 461 00:26:18,000 --> 00:26:20,680 Speaker 1: the reject been getting a bill sent to it and 462 00:26:20,760 --> 00:26:24,000 Speaker 1: it's happening a lot. That might mean that either the 463 00:26:24,040 --> 00:26:27,680 Speaker 1: sensors need to be adjusted, or that the feeding mechanism 464 00:26:27,920 --> 00:26:30,119 Speaker 1: needs to be adjusted so that it's no longer pulling 465 00:26:30,119 --> 00:26:33,280 Speaker 1: more than one bill at a time, or it might 466 00:26:33,359 --> 00:26:36,520 Speaker 1: mean that the actual bills that are being put into 467 00:26:36,560 --> 00:26:41,439 Speaker 1: the machine are of two. They're not they're not fresh 468 00:26:41,520 --> 00:26:44,639 Speaker 1: enough that you know that something needs to change. This 469 00:26:44,720 --> 00:26:47,720 Speaker 1: one's a little stale, Yeah, exactly, because too many of 470 00:26:47,760 --> 00:26:51,240 Speaker 1: them are going into the reject ben So, so it's 471 00:26:51,240 --> 00:26:54,000 Speaker 1: got built built in error correction if you will. Yeah, 472 00:26:54,080 --> 00:26:57,159 Speaker 1: it's and and some of that, again is mechanical, and 473 00:26:57,200 --> 00:27:00,359 Speaker 1: some of it's just saying, hey, stop putting crappy money 474 00:27:00,640 --> 00:27:04,359 Speaker 1: in me because I can't give it to anyone. And 475 00:27:04,400 --> 00:27:07,119 Speaker 1: the bank's like, but we don't want to give money 476 00:27:07,160 --> 00:27:10,600 Speaker 1: to anyone. Yes, And then they twirl their mustaches and 477 00:27:10,680 --> 00:27:14,200 Speaker 1: leap into a giant vault full of gold coins, which, 478 00:27:14,240 --> 00:27:17,520 Speaker 1: by the way, hurts. I don't know how Scrooge McDuck 479 00:27:17,560 --> 00:27:19,840 Speaker 1: did it, No, man, I I scratched that one off 480 00:27:19,840 --> 00:27:22,320 Speaker 1: my bucket list. And then I also broke an arm, 481 00:27:22,480 --> 00:27:27,440 Speaker 1: so not. I do not recommend it. However, if you 482 00:27:27,480 --> 00:27:35,320 Speaker 1: invest tuppens um so yeah, that birds um so Yeah. 483 00:27:35,320 --> 00:27:38,800 Speaker 1: I mean it is basically UM a computer with a 484 00:27:38,840 --> 00:27:44,400 Speaker 1: couple's special sophisticated UM ways to handle error correction. Oh 485 00:27:44,520 --> 00:27:46,920 Speaker 1: and I also wanted to mention that the journal. The 486 00:27:46,960 --> 00:27:49,720 Speaker 1: journal sort of serves two purposes. One, it helps keep 487 00:27:49,720 --> 00:27:51,480 Speaker 1: track of what's going on with a machine so that 488 00:27:51,880 --> 00:27:54,560 Speaker 1: you could see the machines working correctly. Also provides an 489 00:27:54,560 --> 00:27:58,880 Speaker 1: accounting UH in case there's ever any dispute about what 490 00:27:58,920 --> 00:28:01,240 Speaker 1: the machine was just bensing, or whether there was a 491 00:28:01,320 --> 00:28:04,679 Speaker 1: question about UM how the machine was used. And of 492 00:28:04,720 --> 00:28:07,439 Speaker 1: course now m A t M s also usually have 493 00:28:07,640 --> 00:28:12,320 Speaker 1: some kind of security camera UM nearby to watch that 494 00:28:13,040 --> 00:28:15,080 Speaker 1: people are who they say they are. Yeah, so you 495 00:28:15,080 --> 00:28:18,040 Speaker 1: can match up the the time on the security camera 496 00:28:18,119 --> 00:28:20,920 Speaker 1: with the time that was listed in the journal and 497 00:28:21,080 --> 00:28:24,880 Speaker 1: go back and review footage if someone has If any 498 00:28:24,920 --> 00:28:27,600 Speaker 1: of you out there have ever had your card number 499 00:28:28,040 --> 00:28:31,760 Speaker 1: and and penn stolen so that someone else has accessed 500 00:28:31,800 --> 00:28:34,199 Speaker 1: your account through an a t M, you realize, of 501 00:28:34,200 --> 00:28:36,880 Speaker 1: course this would be a really important feature. I'm one 502 00:28:36,880 --> 00:28:40,000 Speaker 1: of those people, by the way. Yeah, that's actually that 503 00:28:40,120 --> 00:28:42,719 Speaker 1: was But my bank was very good at letting me 504 00:28:42,760 --> 00:28:46,040 Speaker 1: know and was very proactive in making sure that that 505 00:28:46,120 --> 00:28:51,040 Speaker 1: got fixed. So yep, yep, now that's that's true. These uh, 506 00:28:51,080 --> 00:28:55,720 Speaker 1: these machines are sophisticated and and specialized, but they're also 507 00:28:56,600 --> 00:28:59,800 Speaker 1: uh in some ways not so sophisticated that they can't 508 00:28:59,800 --> 00:29:03,560 Speaker 1: be fooled or not not necessarily fooled. But UM also 509 00:29:03,640 --> 00:29:06,160 Speaker 1: that other people can come along and take information by 510 00:29:06,240 --> 00:29:09,360 Speaker 1: using devices such as skimmers, which can be put over 511 00:29:09,480 --> 00:29:12,920 Speaker 1: the card reader UM. And basically it is usually a 512 00:29:13,000 --> 00:29:17,800 Speaker 1: very slim uh compact device that can read the magnetic 513 00:29:17,840 --> 00:29:21,080 Speaker 1: strip on there on the card. So basically what happens 514 00:29:21,160 --> 00:29:24,040 Speaker 1: is if if a scammer has installed a skimmer on 515 00:29:24,120 --> 00:29:26,800 Speaker 1: an A t M, when you put your card through it, 516 00:29:27,240 --> 00:29:29,400 Speaker 1: both the skimmer and the A t M are reading 517 00:29:29,600 --> 00:29:32,720 Speaker 1: the card number. Now the pin block them. In the 518 00:29:32,760 --> 00:29:35,760 Speaker 1: United States, federal regulations require that the pin block, which 519 00:29:35,800 --> 00:29:41,440 Speaker 1: is the four digit pin uh information UM, must be 520 00:29:41,520 --> 00:29:45,360 Speaker 1: encrypted when it's sent along. So UH to some degree, 521 00:29:46,320 --> 00:29:49,320 Speaker 1: you would be protected if just your number was going 522 00:29:49,360 --> 00:29:53,080 Speaker 1: through the skimmer, because you would need the pin block encrypted, 523 00:29:53,880 --> 00:29:56,520 Speaker 1: you know, and it's encrypted on the card, so it 524 00:29:56,600 --> 00:29:59,840 Speaker 1: can't the machine has to decipher that. The skimmer can't 525 00:29:59,840 --> 00:30:03,280 Speaker 1: do that. So what the scammers do. They will they 526 00:30:03,280 --> 00:30:06,040 Speaker 1: will install a very tiny camera. You know. Cameras are 527 00:30:06,240 --> 00:30:08,200 Speaker 1: teeny tiny these days. You know, we've got them in 528 00:30:08,200 --> 00:30:11,480 Speaker 1: our smartphones and other types of phones. UM, they're sitting 529 00:30:11,480 --> 00:30:14,440 Speaker 1: on top of our laptops and and and computers. Because 530 00:30:14,440 --> 00:30:18,160 Speaker 1: they're so small. UM, people can in small. In small, 531 00:30:18,560 --> 00:30:23,360 Speaker 1: install a small camera right above the area where the 532 00:30:23,680 --> 00:30:26,400 Speaker 1: you type in your number, and then they'll they'll record 533 00:30:26,800 --> 00:30:29,840 Speaker 1: your keypad punches. And then what they'll do is they'll 534 00:30:29,880 --> 00:30:33,440 Speaker 1: match the keypad punch to the information that they've skimmed 535 00:30:33,560 --> 00:30:36,800 Speaker 1: off your card, and then they've got essentially your card 536 00:30:37,360 --> 00:30:40,520 Speaker 1: number and your pen all in one place and can 537 00:30:40,600 --> 00:30:45,120 Speaker 1: then access money from your account at any a t M. 538 00:30:45,160 --> 00:30:47,280 Speaker 1: And a lot of cases too, they don't try to 539 00:30:47,320 --> 00:30:49,280 Speaker 1: take as much as they can get. A lot of cases, 540 00:30:49,760 --> 00:30:51,560 Speaker 1: banks that I know of here in the United States 541 00:30:51,760 --> 00:30:53,920 Speaker 1: will give you a maximum amount of day, usually something 542 00:30:53,920 --> 00:30:57,520 Speaker 1: like three dollars per day UM. A lot of times 543 00:30:57,520 --> 00:31:00,480 Speaker 1: these scammers won't do that. They'll take out twenty dollars, 544 00:31:00,920 --> 00:31:04,280 Speaker 1: and the idea being that be harder to detect. Yeah, 545 00:31:04,400 --> 00:31:06,080 Speaker 1: oh well I must have I must have taken out 546 00:31:06,080 --> 00:31:07,600 Speaker 1: I don't remember what I what that was. But it 547 00:31:07,640 --> 00:31:09,800 Speaker 1: wasn't that much. It wasn't like somebody was scamming me. 548 00:31:10,360 --> 00:31:13,240 Speaker 1: Although if you do, if you're which this, by the way, 549 00:31:13,320 --> 00:31:15,840 Speaker 1: is why it's important for you to review your your 550 00:31:15,880 --> 00:31:20,000 Speaker 1: bank statements on a regular basis, because you may notice 551 00:31:20,040 --> 00:31:22,640 Speaker 1: that you're withdrawing money from places that you are not 552 00:31:22,760 --> 00:31:27,680 Speaker 1: physically at like Los Angeles or something, when you're not 553 00:31:27,760 --> 00:31:29,160 Speaker 1: in l A. If you're in l A and you 554 00:31:29,160 --> 00:31:31,000 Speaker 1: see that you were drawn from l A, you may 555 00:31:31,080 --> 00:31:32,920 Speaker 1: very well have been the person to have done that. 556 00:31:33,240 --> 00:31:35,120 Speaker 1: I don't mean to say that any withdrawal from l 557 00:31:35,160 --> 00:31:41,560 Speaker 1: A is obviously fraudulent, right people who people everything's on it? 558 00:31:41,640 --> 00:31:43,400 Speaker 1: Does this mean I have to drive to San Jose 559 00:31:43,560 --> 00:31:45,760 Speaker 1: if I want to withdraw money, Yes, that is what 560 00:31:45,880 --> 00:31:49,000 Speaker 1: I meant. Um. There are some some people working on 561 00:31:49,240 --> 00:31:54,840 Speaker 1: newer types of verification technology. I saw one they're trying 562 00:31:54,840 --> 00:31:57,880 Speaker 1: out in Poland, which is using biometrics. They do a 563 00:31:57,920 --> 00:32:00,240 Speaker 1: scan of your finger and they don't use your finger print. 564 00:32:00,240 --> 00:32:02,800 Speaker 1: They're looking at the veins in your finger which is 565 00:32:03,160 --> 00:32:06,880 Speaker 1: pretty smart because again fingerprints, you can lift a fingerprint 566 00:32:07,000 --> 00:32:11,920 Speaker 1: and you can fake fingerprint readers. It. The more sophisticated 567 00:32:11,960 --> 00:32:15,600 Speaker 1: the detection device, the less likely someone's going to go 568 00:32:15,680 --> 00:32:19,200 Speaker 1: through all the trouble to um to fool it, because 569 00:32:19,320 --> 00:32:21,000 Speaker 1: it is a lot of I mean, it takes a 570 00:32:21,040 --> 00:32:23,560 Speaker 1: lot of investment just to get the stuff too to 571 00:32:23,640 --> 00:32:26,200 Speaker 1: be able to fool these devices. But yeah, if you wanna, 572 00:32:26,880 --> 00:32:29,760 Speaker 1: fingerprint is not full proof because you could lift a 573 00:32:30,000 --> 00:32:34,240 Speaker 1: print off of something and then create a latex print 574 00:32:35,080 --> 00:32:39,560 Speaker 1: and fool some machines using that. We've seen that happen before. UM. 575 00:32:39,680 --> 00:32:43,120 Speaker 1: There's also I know you mentioned the cameras, but we 576 00:32:43,120 --> 00:32:46,880 Speaker 1: should also mention some UH some skimmers will also use 577 00:32:46,880 --> 00:32:52,600 Speaker 1: a fake KEYPADAH, which is essentially a key logger that's 578 00:32:52,640 --> 00:32:56,840 Speaker 1: logging up pen entries. So if you ever walk up 579 00:32:56,840 --> 00:32:58,440 Speaker 1: to an a t M and and it looks like 580 00:32:58,760 --> 00:33:02,480 Speaker 1: parts of the machine don't match up exactly like the 581 00:33:02,640 --> 00:33:05,240 Speaker 1: it's just a different coloration or made out of a 582 00:33:05,280 --> 00:33:08,480 Speaker 1: different material, and it just looks a little odd, that's 583 00:33:08,480 --> 00:33:12,200 Speaker 1: a warning sign. Doesn't necessarily mean that a skimmer has 584 00:33:12,360 --> 00:33:14,720 Speaker 1: hit that machine. It may just be that that particular 585 00:33:14,760 --> 00:33:18,200 Speaker 1: machine was manufactured in an odd way. But anything that 586 00:33:18,600 --> 00:33:20,560 Speaker 1: looks a little out of place should be a big 587 00:33:20,600 --> 00:33:23,400 Speaker 1: red flag to you and UH and I would highly 588 00:33:23,440 --> 00:33:25,560 Speaker 1: recommend that if you do notice something when you walk 589 00:33:25,640 --> 00:33:28,360 Speaker 1: up to an a t M UH that's like that, 590 00:33:28,360 --> 00:33:32,880 Speaker 1: that you find a different one, don't use that one. Yeah, 591 00:33:33,120 --> 00:33:35,080 Speaker 1: and and keep in mind where it is to the 592 00:33:35,160 --> 00:33:38,240 Speaker 1: more isolated a t M s are more likely to 593 00:33:38,360 --> 00:33:41,920 Speaker 1: be the ones that UH scammers are going to target. 594 00:33:41,960 --> 00:33:45,560 Speaker 1: Because they will be easier to modify. Um, because this 595 00:33:45,600 --> 00:33:47,760 Speaker 1: stuff takes a little bit of time and effort, and 596 00:33:48,000 --> 00:33:49,880 Speaker 1: if you're doing it in a high traffic area, someone's 597 00:33:49,880 --> 00:33:52,760 Speaker 1: gonna notice. Yeah. Like, for example, the the a t 598 00:33:52,960 --> 00:33:55,880 Speaker 1: m s that you might see in a popular gas station, 599 00:33:56,680 --> 00:33:59,600 Speaker 1: UM are a whole lot likely a whole lot more 600 00:33:59,640 --> 00:34:02,880 Speaker 1: likely to be okay, because if a cashier is standing 601 00:34:02,960 --> 00:34:05,880 Speaker 1: right across from it all day long, it's unlikely that 602 00:34:06,360 --> 00:34:10,839 Speaker 1: a scammer is going to have the time to install 603 00:34:11,440 --> 00:34:14,920 Speaker 1: those devices without getting caught doing what are you doing? 604 00:34:15,120 --> 00:34:17,480 Speaker 1: Or something like a busy airport, Yeah, where there's a 605 00:34:17,560 --> 00:34:19,839 Speaker 1: lot of security already there. I mean, it's just it's 606 00:34:19,880 --> 00:34:21,960 Speaker 1: such a it would be such a high risk endeavor 607 00:34:22,040 --> 00:34:24,440 Speaker 1: that it would you know, you look at risk versus 608 00:34:24,440 --> 00:34:27,480 Speaker 1: reward from a thief standpoint, it could be less likely 609 00:34:27,560 --> 00:34:30,120 Speaker 1: to be hit. That's not saying that some enterprising thief 610 00:34:30,160 --> 00:34:34,000 Speaker 1: hasn't tried it, but but it's less likely. Yeah. Well, 611 00:34:34,000 --> 00:34:36,120 Speaker 1: in fact, we've had a we had a rash here 612 00:34:36,160 --> 00:34:39,520 Speaker 1: in the Atlanta area not terribly long ago where people 613 00:34:39,560 --> 00:34:43,200 Speaker 1: were knocking over a t M s with their cars 614 00:34:43,400 --> 00:34:48,120 Speaker 1: and just taking the alif or bulldozers. Yeah, yeah, basically 615 00:34:48,160 --> 00:34:50,960 Speaker 1: because it's easier to crow bar your way into one 616 00:34:51,040 --> 00:34:54,360 Speaker 1: than bother trying to because we didn't mention the code. 617 00:34:54,360 --> 00:34:56,200 Speaker 1: This soft part of the a t M is it's 618 00:34:56,200 --> 00:34:58,960 Speaker 1: a safe. Yeah, you know it's there's a safe that's 619 00:34:59,000 --> 00:35:00,839 Speaker 1: inside these machines. That's where all the money is kept 620 00:35:00,840 --> 00:35:03,480 Speaker 1: in a vault, in a safe in the machine. So 621 00:35:03,520 --> 00:35:05,680 Speaker 1: if you were to take the whole machine, you're taking 622 00:35:05,719 --> 00:35:09,440 Speaker 1: the vault. Now before before any of you say, hey, 623 00:35:09,520 --> 00:35:11,800 Speaker 1: I'm going to go on a life of crime and 624 00:35:11,840 --> 00:35:14,360 Speaker 1: start knocking over a t M machines, a t M 625 00:35:14,440 --> 00:35:16,840 Speaker 1: S I knew. I told you at the beginning of 626 00:35:16,840 --> 00:35:18,799 Speaker 1: the show that it was going to happen. I caught 627 00:35:18,840 --> 00:35:21,560 Speaker 1: myself that I told you it was gonna happen. Um. 628 00:35:21,600 --> 00:35:24,960 Speaker 1: A lot of these have things inside the vault that 629 00:35:25,040 --> 00:35:28,919 Speaker 1: if if stuff goes wrong, it will ruin the money 630 00:35:28,960 --> 00:35:33,480 Speaker 1: inside there, like essentially a little little explosive charges. Usually 631 00:35:33,840 --> 00:35:37,880 Speaker 1: some of them have um explosive charges full of gas, 632 00:35:38,640 --> 00:35:41,000 Speaker 1: so that if if a thief is trying to use 633 00:35:41,040 --> 00:35:45,200 Speaker 1: a gas explosion to uh to open the vault, that 634 00:35:45,400 --> 00:35:50,200 Speaker 1: it actually has gas that counteracts the explosive gas, rendering 635 00:35:50,200 --> 00:35:53,239 Speaker 1: in inert so and that in that case, it's not 636 00:35:53,280 --> 00:35:55,840 Speaker 1: necessarily destroying the money inside, it's just trying to destroy 637 00:35:55,960 --> 00:35:58,879 Speaker 1: the the methodology that the thief is using to get 638 00:35:58,960 --> 00:36:02,360 Speaker 1: the vault open. So yeah, there's some other tech involved 639 00:36:02,360 --> 00:36:07,160 Speaker 1: here that's kind of interesting. Um. Now I use a 640 00:36:07,239 --> 00:36:09,880 Speaker 1: t M S. I mean, I try to be careful 641 00:36:09,880 --> 00:36:11,600 Speaker 1: about and I try to keep a good eye on 642 00:36:11,680 --> 00:36:14,160 Speaker 1: making sure that whatever device I'm using looks you know, 643 00:36:14,200 --> 00:36:18,600 Speaker 1: totally legit and everything. Uh it's it's says. So I'm 644 00:36:18,640 --> 00:36:20,840 Speaker 1: not saying that a t M s are so dangerous 645 00:36:20,880 --> 00:36:23,840 Speaker 1: that no one should use them, but it does bear 646 00:36:24,080 --> 00:36:27,120 Speaker 1: repeating that you should be vigilant and pay attention when 647 00:36:27,200 --> 00:36:28,520 Speaker 1: you come up to an a t M don't just 648 00:36:28,600 --> 00:36:33,880 Speaker 1: you know, walk up and ignore all uh all safety 649 00:36:34,239 --> 00:36:37,000 Speaker 1: especially you know, not just the machine itself, but you know, 650 00:36:37,320 --> 00:36:39,160 Speaker 1: it's always good to take a quick look around you 651 00:36:39,200 --> 00:36:43,439 Speaker 1: to make sure you're not going to be mugged. I've 652 00:36:43,480 --> 00:36:46,439 Speaker 1: never been mugged. I don't want it to happen. I'm 653 00:36:46,600 --> 00:36:49,839 Speaker 1: going to try and keep that street going. But yeah, 654 00:36:49,840 --> 00:36:51,759 Speaker 1: that's that's one of those things is that you know, 655 00:36:51,840 --> 00:36:56,440 Speaker 1: banks often would tell customers to you know, certain follow 656 00:36:56,480 --> 00:36:59,840 Speaker 1: certain safety guidelines and be alert when you're using those machines, 657 00:36:59,840 --> 00:37:01,800 Speaker 1: and you know, make sure you have your card ready 658 00:37:01,880 --> 00:37:05,520 Speaker 1: before you go up to one. And uh and and uh, 659 00:37:05,680 --> 00:37:09,120 Speaker 1: you know, don't don't linger. Don't count your money as 660 00:37:09,200 --> 00:37:12,880 Speaker 1: your until the dealing is done, I guess um, But 661 00:37:12,880 --> 00:37:14,600 Speaker 1: don't count your money right there at the machine. You know, 662 00:37:14,840 --> 00:37:19,200 Speaker 1: don't give thieves the opportunity to pounce on you in that. 663 00:37:19,400 --> 00:37:21,680 Speaker 1: In those cases. Now, of course, if you're in a nice, 664 00:37:21,680 --> 00:37:24,200 Speaker 1: busy street and there's a lot of people around, you're 665 00:37:24,200 --> 00:37:26,839 Speaker 1: probably in better shape than uh, you know, talk about 666 00:37:26,840 --> 00:37:29,440 Speaker 1: in the middle of the night, after you've gone clubbing 667 00:37:29,480 --> 00:37:31,440 Speaker 1: all night long and you need that cash because you're 668 00:37:31,440 --> 00:37:36,040 Speaker 1: about to go to that all night pancake house that 669 00:37:36,120 --> 00:37:39,879 Speaker 1: only accepts cash. You know, just bear in mind your 670 00:37:39,880 --> 00:37:48,759 Speaker 1: surroundings in the situation and be careful. I hope you 671 00:37:48,880 --> 00:37:51,600 Speaker 1: enjoyed that look back at tech Stuff and remember, if 672 00:37:51,640 --> 00:37:53,239 Speaker 1: you want to get in touch with us, you can 673 00:37:53,280 --> 00:37:55,760 Speaker 1: send me an email. The other address is tech Stuff 674 00:37:55,920 --> 00:37:58,799 Speaker 1: at house stuff works dot com, or drop me a 675 00:37:58,840 --> 00:38:02,080 Speaker 1: line on Facebook, Twitter or Tumbler. The handle of all 676 00:38:02,200 --> 00:38:05,120 Speaker 1: three is tech Stuff H s W. And I'll talk 677 00:38:05,160 --> 00:38:10,600 Speaker 1: to you again really soon for more on this and 678 00:38:10,680 --> 00:38:13,239 Speaker 1: thousands of other topics because it has stuff work dot 679 00:38:13,239 --> 00:38:19,359 Speaker 1: com