1 00:00:03,480 --> 00:00:07,560 Speaker 1: Welcome to the Bloomberg Law Podcast. I'm June Grosso. Every 2 00:00:07,640 --> 00:00:10,440 Speaker 1: day we bring you insight and analysis into the most 3 00:00:10,480 --> 00:00:13,399 Speaker 1: important legal news of the day. You can find more 4 00:00:13,480 --> 00:00:18,040 Speaker 1: episodes of the Bloomberg Law Podcast on Apple Podcasts, SoundCloud 5 00:00:18,320 --> 00:00:21,680 Speaker 1: and on Bloomberg dot com slash podcast. Why is the 6 00:00:21,720 --> 00:00:25,520 Speaker 1: front line to protect the integrity of the US presidential election? 7 00:00:25,720 --> 00:00:29,319 Speaker 1: In Springfield, Illinois in a strip mall right next to 8 00:00:29,360 --> 00:00:32,440 Speaker 1: a Chucky Cheats joining us with the answer is card 9 00:00:32,520 --> 00:00:35,440 Speaker 1: came a road trip Bloomberg News legal reporters, So carterke 10 00:00:35,680 --> 00:00:40,240 Speaker 1: what's located in that Illinois strip mall? The Illinois State 11 00:00:40,240 --> 00:00:44,680 Speaker 1: and Board of Elections. This is the agency that helps 12 00:00:45,080 --> 00:00:48,560 Speaker 1: counties run their elections in Illinois. And this is also 13 00:00:48,680 --> 00:00:52,560 Speaker 1: the agency that was hacked in June two thousand sixteen 14 00:00:52,840 --> 00:00:59,640 Speaker 1: ahead of the presidential election by Russian operatives seeking ways 15 00:00:59,800 --> 00:01:04,800 Speaker 1: to to UH infiltrate US election systems. They had access 16 00:01:04,800 --> 00:01:09,640 Speaker 1: to the state's voter registration database and downloaded at least 17 00:01:09,640 --> 00:01:14,600 Speaker 1: seventy two thousand UH files of Illinois voters. They were 18 00:01:14,680 --> 00:01:17,720 Speaker 1: unable to alter them, But the question going forward is 19 00:01:17,800 --> 00:01:20,560 Speaker 1: did they learn something while they were in there to 20 00:01:20,680 --> 00:01:25,880 Speaker 1: influence so what is Illinois trying to do to secure 21 00:01:25,920 --> 00:01:29,080 Speaker 1: the elections in the future. So the federal government gave 22 00:01:29,160 --> 00:01:32,679 Speaker 1: states their share of three d eighty million dollars in 23 00:01:32,720 --> 00:01:37,240 Speaker 1: two thousand eighteen, along with some of their own money. 24 00:01:37,280 --> 00:01:42,480 Speaker 1: They have acquired UH the censors and software from the 25 00:01:42,520 --> 00:01:47,319 Speaker 1: federal government to detect malicious intrusions. They have hired these 26 00:01:47,480 --> 00:01:51,800 Speaker 1: nine cyber navigators. These are UH tech experts who have 27 00:01:51,800 --> 00:01:55,000 Speaker 1: been deployed to different pockets of the state to ensure 28 00:01:55,080 --> 00:01:58,880 Speaker 1: that those counties without i T resources have some sort 29 00:01:58,920 --> 00:02:04,120 Speaker 1: of opportunity to check their systems. They also have the 30 00:02:04,200 --> 00:02:08,120 Speaker 1: National Guard on speed dial. The National Guard in the 31 00:02:08,160 --> 00:02:11,720 Speaker 1: state will descend on any counties on election night that 32 00:02:11,919 --> 00:02:15,840 Speaker 1: fear they have been hacked. That's that's their front line. 33 00:02:16,320 --> 00:02:20,600 Speaker 1: So election security is a state by state concern. Are 34 00:02:20,680 --> 00:02:25,559 Speaker 1: some states more concerned than others? All states are concerned. 35 00:02:25,760 --> 00:02:28,840 Speaker 1: All states seem to be doing what they believe are 36 00:02:28,919 --> 00:02:33,359 Speaker 1: in their voters interests. The question is do all states 37 00:02:33,440 --> 00:02:39,239 Speaker 1: have comparable resources to rebuild their systems or ensure that 38 00:02:39,280 --> 00:02:44,760 Speaker 1: their vulnerabilities are patched ahead of UH And we know 39 00:02:44,880 --> 00:02:48,960 Speaker 1: that some of the poorest states are swing states. We 40 00:02:49,000 --> 00:02:51,960 Speaker 1: know that some of the least resource states are the 41 00:02:52,000 --> 00:02:56,600 Speaker 1: ones where if you are able to UM influence votes, 42 00:02:57,040 --> 00:03:01,680 Speaker 1: you can affect the outcome. And it seems like money 43 00:03:02,080 --> 00:03:05,600 Speaker 1: is a huge obstacle here for all the states because 44 00:03:05,600 --> 00:03:08,119 Speaker 1: in your story, I mean, the amounts of money needed 45 00:03:08,440 --> 00:03:12,720 Speaker 1: to secure these systems is it's a lot, that's right. 46 00:03:13,000 --> 00:03:16,679 Speaker 1: So the Brennan Center released a report right after the 47 00:03:16,720 --> 00:03:18,959 Speaker 1: story was published saying that states in the next five 48 00:03:19,000 --> 00:03:22,119 Speaker 1: years will need at least two point two billion dollars 49 00:03:22,160 --> 00:03:25,680 Speaker 1: to shore up their systems. They have way short of 50 00:03:25,840 --> 00:03:29,079 Speaker 1: that in in Illinois alone, the one of two states 51 00:03:29,120 --> 00:03:31,880 Speaker 1: that we know was hacked in sten they say they 52 00:03:31,919 --> 00:03:34,880 Speaker 1: need a hundred seventy five million dollars to prepare for 53 00:03:35,720 --> 00:03:38,760 Speaker 1: They've got thirteen from the federal government and five of 54 00:03:38,760 --> 00:03:42,440 Speaker 1: their own. Going forward, resources are a major issue. UH. 55 00:03:42,480 --> 00:03:46,400 Speaker 1: The amount of money necessary to buy new voting machines, 56 00:03:46,520 --> 00:03:50,600 Speaker 1: to rebuild registration networks, or just to shore them up 57 00:03:51,120 --> 00:03:55,280 Speaker 1: UM requires a large chunk of change, and then to 58 00:03:55,480 --> 00:03:59,640 Speaker 1: hire qualified UH tech experts. I mean, states are effectively 59 00:03:59,640 --> 00:04:02,800 Speaker 1: compete with Silicon Valley to to get the top minds 60 00:04:02,840 --> 00:04:06,760 Speaker 1: to come protect the central tenant of American democracy. With 61 00:04:06,840 --> 00:04:09,400 Speaker 1: both hands tied behind their back because they simply don't 62 00:04:09,400 --> 00:04:12,240 Speaker 1: have the resources to compete with Facebook and Twitter and 63 00:04:12,240 --> 00:04:15,000 Speaker 1: and Mitch McConnell sent a majority leader would not put 64 00:04:15,160 --> 00:04:19,200 Speaker 1: up for a vote any bills for more money for 65 00:04:19,240 --> 00:04:23,360 Speaker 1: the states or for election security Cardike, what's the greatest 66 00:04:23,440 --> 00:04:28,719 Speaker 1: concern of election security experts about? Is it software? Is 67 00:04:28,720 --> 00:04:34,400 Speaker 1: it old machines? Is there one huge concern? Yes, Uh, 68 00:04:34,440 --> 00:04:36,320 Speaker 1: you know you can. You can do everything you can 69 00:04:36,440 --> 00:04:39,880 Speaker 1: to shore up your back door and sure you know 70 00:04:39,920 --> 00:04:43,159 Speaker 1: who's in your system and responding to it. The biggest 71 00:04:43,200 --> 00:04:48,080 Speaker 1: issue for election security right now is actually disinformation. It's 72 00:04:48,120 --> 00:04:51,800 Speaker 1: the ability to not just change votes, but to change 73 00:04:51,839 --> 00:04:55,520 Speaker 1: minds on social media and and solutions to that are 74 00:04:56,120 --> 00:04:59,039 Speaker 1: uh still being debated, and I think they're working with 75 00:04:59,080 --> 00:05:01,440 Speaker 1: social media companies to try to find a remedy. But 76 00:05:02,760 --> 00:05:06,520 Speaker 1: the hardware issue is one that if there was enough money, 77 00:05:06,800 --> 00:05:10,360 Speaker 1: you could try to start solving. The question of disinformation 78 00:05:10,440 --> 00:05:13,120 Speaker 1: is another one that, uh that folks are very much 79 00:05:13,120 --> 00:05:17,080 Speaker 1: concerned about. And as far as Illinois, I understand from 80 00:05:17,120 --> 00:05:21,720 Speaker 1: your story that there were at odds with DHS over 81 00:05:21,800 --> 00:05:26,160 Speaker 1: how successful Russian hackers actually were. When about a minute 82 00:05:26,200 --> 00:05:29,120 Speaker 1: and a half explained the problems there sure. So what 83 00:05:29,160 --> 00:05:31,599 Speaker 1: Illinois has happened is that in the middle of June 84 00:05:31,680 --> 00:05:34,960 Speaker 1: of two thousand and sixteen, Russian hackers accessed their voter 85 00:05:35,040 --> 00:05:38,800 Speaker 1: registration database because of a vulnerability in that system. They 86 00:05:38,800 --> 00:05:41,520 Speaker 1: found a backdoor that was unlocked. They got in and 87 00:05:41,560 --> 00:05:45,320 Speaker 1: they started downloading files. UH and over the course of 88 00:05:45,480 --> 00:05:50,520 Speaker 1: three weeks, they did it quietly and accessed a major 89 00:05:50,640 --> 00:05:54,080 Speaker 1: major section of the voter registration database. Once they had 90 00:05:54,120 --> 00:05:57,880 Speaker 1: accomplished what they sought to accomplish, says the state, they 91 00:05:58,120 --> 00:06:00,960 Speaker 1: inundated the system. They basically wigh their hand up and 92 00:06:00,960 --> 00:06:03,320 Speaker 1: said we're here, We've been here, we want you to 93 00:06:03,400 --> 00:06:06,080 Speaker 1: know we're here, and now we're shutting down the voter 94 00:06:06,160 --> 00:06:09,919 Speaker 1: registration database. And in Illinois then took action to patch 95 00:06:10,040 --> 00:06:15,080 Speaker 1: up the vulnerability and UH and said that look, Russia 96 00:06:15,240 --> 00:06:19,520 Speaker 1: didn't have permission to actually change anything. They didn't acquire 97 00:06:19,960 --> 00:06:23,240 Speaker 1: the rights to write over the files. They could only 98 00:06:23,320 --> 00:06:27,719 Speaker 1: read them. The Senate Intelligence report a couple of weeks 99 00:06:27,720 --> 00:06:31,440 Speaker 1: ago said that they could have done a lot more. 100 00:06:31,560 --> 00:06:34,760 Speaker 1: They didn't and we don't know why. And that remains 101 00:06:34,839 --> 00:06:38,440 Speaker 1: sort of the um discrepancy between the federal government and 102 00:06:38,480 --> 00:06:41,520 Speaker 1: the state and to the extent that Illinois knows exactly 103 00:06:41,560 --> 00:06:43,320 Speaker 1: what happened is a question. There's so much more to 104 00:06:43,360 --> 00:06:45,600 Speaker 1: talk about here. Thanks so much. That's car Kaine morocha 105 00:06:45,640 --> 00:06:51,479 Speaker 1: Bloomberg News legal reporter. Thanks for listening to the Bloomberg 106 00:06:51,560 --> 00:06:54,640 Speaker 1: Law Podcast. You can subscribe and listen to the show 107 00:06:54,680 --> 00:06:59,400 Speaker 1: on Apple Podcasts, SoundCloud, and on Bloomberg dot com slash podcast. 108 00:06:59,800 --> 00:07:08,520 Speaker 1: I June Grasso, This is Bloomberg. M HM.