1 00:00:03,160 --> 00:00:06,440 Speaker 1: From the heart of where innovation, money and power CALLI 2 00:00:07,280 --> 00:00:11,799 Speaker 1: in Silicon Valley and beyond. This is Bloomberg Technology with 3 00:00:11,880 --> 00:00:29,000 Speaker 1: Emily Jay. I'm Caroline Hyde in New York in Family 4 00:00:29,080 --> 00:00:30,920 Speaker 1: chang and this is going to make technology coming up 5 00:00:30,960 --> 00:00:34,320 Speaker 1: in the next hour US equates rose for a second day. 6 00:00:34,360 --> 00:00:37,720 Speaker 1: That's his economic data and will actually some hopes surrounding 7 00:00:37,880 --> 00:00:41,199 Speaker 1: Russia's war with Ukraine started to impact investors choices. We'll 8 00:00:41,200 --> 00:00:43,520 Speaker 1: bring you the latest in terms of the market moves, 9 00:00:43,880 --> 00:00:47,120 Speaker 1: plus the growing cyber threat out of Russia after Ukraine's 10 00:00:47,159 --> 00:00:49,960 Speaker 1: institutions were attacked. How big of a risk is there 11 00:00:50,000 --> 00:00:52,760 Speaker 1: for the West as well? More than that later, and 12 00:00:52,760 --> 00:00:55,480 Speaker 1: the amount of misinformation spreading online in the wake of 13 00:00:55,520 --> 00:00:59,120 Speaker 1: Russia's invasion is growing. How platforms are handling their role 14 00:00:59,480 --> 00:01:02,720 Speaker 1: in urgeoning wall We'll get to all of that in 15 00:01:02,840 --> 00:01:05,640 Speaker 1: but a moment, But first, the prospect of talks between 16 00:01:05,720 --> 00:01:10,240 Speaker 1: Russia and Ukraine has been cast well hope, then doubt 17 00:01:10,440 --> 00:01:14,440 Speaker 1: the Kremlin saying Kiev stops responding after rejecting Moscow's initial 18 00:01:14,440 --> 00:01:17,840 Speaker 1: offer for a meeting in Minsk, Belarus. The most amory 19 00:01:17,920 --> 00:01:20,760 Speaker 1: hooden is here with more and in an odd way, 20 00:01:20,800 --> 00:01:23,640 Speaker 1: the market seemed to grasp on to this hope that 21 00:01:23,720 --> 00:01:27,039 Speaker 1: there could be talks between Ukraine and Russia. But tell 22 00:01:27,120 --> 00:01:30,280 Speaker 1: us about the real truth here. Well, if there were 23 00:01:30,319 --> 00:01:33,000 Speaker 1: to be, really the timing and the location would be 24 00:01:33,000 --> 00:01:36,399 Speaker 1: incredibly important. So Russia first decided that they would like 25 00:01:36,400 --> 00:01:38,679 Speaker 1: to hold these tasks in Minsk, Belarus, but that's not 26 00:01:38,720 --> 00:01:41,639 Speaker 1: going to happen given the fact that Lukoshenko has allowed 27 00:01:41,720 --> 00:01:44,920 Speaker 1: Russian troops to stay in Belarus and use that as 28 00:01:44,959 --> 00:01:48,160 Speaker 1: a base to then invade on Ukraine. From the northern 29 00:01:48,200 --> 00:01:51,400 Speaker 1: border and the Belarus border to the capital of Kiev 30 00:01:51,520 --> 00:01:53,960 Speaker 1: is about two and a half hours or three hours 31 00:01:53,960 --> 00:01:57,000 Speaker 1: spending on which side of that river you you drive upon. 32 00:01:57,200 --> 00:01:59,640 Speaker 1: So this is going to be incredibly interesting if these 33 00:01:59,640 --> 00:02:01,560 Speaker 1: talks or to happen. But of course, one thing on 34 00:02:01,600 --> 00:02:05,400 Speaker 1: the tables that President Putumont is a veto on Ukraine 35 00:02:05,480 --> 00:02:09,120 Speaker 1: joining NATO basically neutralize Ukraine in terms of whether or 36 00:02:09,160 --> 00:02:11,400 Speaker 1: not it will join NATO or not. And Ukraine has 37 00:02:11,440 --> 00:02:14,720 Speaker 1: constantly said they want to maintain that path to NATO 38 00:02:14,800 --> 00:02:18,040 Speaker 1: membership and keep that door open. Meanwhile, that for next 39 00:02:18,080 --> 00:02:19,880 Speaker 1: steps that you're going to be paying attention to, is 40 00:02:19,919 --> 00:02:21,959 Speaker 1: we head towards the weekend. We've had so much of 41 00:02:21,960 --> 00:02:24,560 Speaker 1: a global narrative China Wang and we've looked at other 42 00:02:24,639 --> 00:02:27,560 Speaker 1: key leaders in the UK and NATO leaders, what next 43 00:02:27,639 --> 00:02:30,919 Speaker 1: in terms of next steps for you? So today was 44 00:02:30,960 --> 00:02:35,440 Speaker 1: really about upping the sanctions against Russia. So we saw 45 00:02:35,520 --> 00:02:38,000 Speaker 1: that European capitals as well as the White House just 46 00:02:38,320 --> 00:02:41,840 Speaker 1: confirming about a hour ago at Press Secretary Jensaki talking 47 00:02:41,840 --> 00:02:44,160 Speaker 1: about the fact that they are going home with sanctioning 48 00:02:44,160 --> 00:02:47,000 Speaker 1: slav Roth, that Russian foreign minister, as well as President 49 00:02:47,040 --> 00:02:50,480 Speaker 1: Putin himself. But this is largely symbolic, giving most of 50 00:02:50,480 --> 00:02:54,720 Speaker 1: his assets are relatively skimmed, that's official assets. But what's 51 00:02:54,760 --> 00:02:56,840 Speaker 1: going to happen for the weekend, I think is really 52 00:02:56,840 --> 00:03:00,639 Speaker 1: going to depend on what happens on the ground in Ukrane. 53 00:03:00,960 --> 00:03:03,440 Speaker 1: I imagine if there's anything on the diplomacy front, it 54 00:03:03,440 --> 00:03:05,640 Speaker 1: will be a lot of phone calls, but they'll probably 55 00:03:05,639 --> 00:03:08,960 Speaker 1: wait until Monday. Caroline, is any more of this upping 56 00:03:09,040 --> 00:03:11,840 Speaker 1: of the risk or are the potential penalties for Russia 57 00:03:11,880 --> 00:03:14,959 Speaker 1: when it comes to sanctions? And Marie Horden, one of 58 00:03:15,000 --> 00:03:17,000 Speaker 1: the busiest women out there this week, We hope you 59 00:03:17,080 --> 00:03:20,240 Speaker 1: managed to get some rest. Thank you so much for that. Meanwhile, 60 00:03:20,280 --> 00:03:22,720 Speaker 1: of course the conflict in Ukraine has been tom of 61 00:03:22,760 --> 00:03:27,320 Speaker 1: mine all week, but investors maybe taking a breath ahead 62 00:03:27,320 --> 00:03:30,360 Speaker 1: of the weekend, maybe trying to reallocate, and men would 63 00:03:30,360 --> 00:03:33,359 Speaker 1: have been a significant sell off during Thursday's trade to 64 00:03:33,440 --> 00:03:36,280 Speaker 1: then rally higher. Ed Ludlow bring us the Friday big 65 00:03:36,320 --> 00:03:39,040 Speaker 1: moves for US. Yeah, yeah, I think you're right. Position 66 00:03:39,120 --> 00:03:42,520 Speaker 1: This is hope rather than substance on the talks between 67 00:03:42,640 --> 00:03:44,600 Speaker 1: Ukraine and Russia. But a lot of green on the screen. 68 00:03:44,640 --> 00:03:47,960 Speaker 1: You see the sp the main gage of US equities 69 00:03:48,040 --> 00:03:50,760 Speaker 1: up two point to is the biggest jump in a month, 70 00:03:50,800 --> 00:03:52,920 Speaker 1: and it almost makes you forget the volatility of the 71 00:03:52,920 --> 00:03:57,720 Speaker 1: week right such big declines over Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday sessions 72 00:03:57,760 --> 00:04:00,440 Speaker 1: because of what we saw in Ukraine. Then as that 73 00:04:00,520 --> 00:04:02,280 Speaker 1: one though very tech heavy and there it's kind of 74 00:04:02,360 --> 00:04:05,480 Speaker 1: underperforming because don't forget traders are trying to make up 75 00:04:05,520 --> 00:04:07,240 Speaker 1: their mind. Now where we stand with the Fed in 76 00:04:07,280 --> 00:04:09,680 Speaker 1: the outlook for rates, and note the US tenure yield 77 00:04:09,680 --> 00:04:12,960 Speaker 1: there at one had been a little higher earlier and 78 00:04:13,040 --> 00:04:15,840 Speaker 1: Friday were off by about a basis points softer by 79 00:04:15,840 --> 00:04:18,040 Speaker 1: a basis point, so a lot to consider going into 80 00:04:18,080 --> 00:04:21,359 Speaker 1: the weekend. But a sigh of relief, which is interesting. 81 00:04:22,279 --> 00:04:24,560 Speaker 1: I'm going to go ahead to semi conductor. Semi conductor 82 00:04:24,600 --> 00:04:27,520 Speaker 1: is really interesting one. A big focus on Thursday's sanctions 83 00:04:27,560 --> 00:04:32,680 Speaker 1: package was restricting access to technology for Russia, semi conductors 84 00:04:32,680 --> 00:04:34,680 Speaker 1: being a big part of that. You see the socks. Yes, 85 00:04:34,680 --> 00:04:37,240 Speaker 1: we underperform the SP five. We're still at one point 86 00:04:37,279 --> 00:04:42,640 Speaker 1: six percent UM. Well, those that are willing to discuss it, 87 00:04:43,160 --> 00:04:45,760 Speaker 1: semi conducts covering this is saying, well, if suppliesn't go 88 00:04:45,839 --> 00:04:47,719 Speaker 1: to Russia, we have a long list of customers waiting 89 00:04:47,760 --> 00:04:50,039 Speaker 1: for chips, will just send it somewhere else. Demand is 90 00:04:50,080 --> 00:04:53,040 Speaker 1: so great and video also interesting. They coming out with 91 00:04:53,120 --> 00:04:55,320 Speaker 1: statements saying that they have had some kind of hack 92 00:04:55,400 --> 00:04:57,760 Speaker 1: to their internal systems, not doing too much for the 93 00:04:57,760 --> 00:05:00,000 Speaker 1: stock actually rose and sort of late gain and Fridays 94 00:05:00,040 --> 00:05:04,120 Speaker 1: session up one and forward up four percent, despite idling 95 00:05:04,160 --> 00:05:06,520 Speaker 1: one of its most profitable lines in Kansas City for 96 00:05:06,560 --> 00:05:10,000 Speaker 1: the one ye Caroline shortage of semi conductors. Very quickly, 97 00:05:10,080 --> 00:05:12,240 Speaker 1: let me talk about Dell, because twenty four hours ago 98 00:05:12,520 --> 00:05:15,320 Speaker 1: you and I were so focused on Russia Ukraine. This 99 00:05:15,440 --> 00:05:18,200 Speaker 1: is Dell. Over the last six days, six straight days 100 00:05:18,240 --> 00:05:20,200 Speaker 1: of declined we had earnings for the fourth quarter of 101 00:05:20,240 --> 00:05:24,280 Speaker 1: Thursday night, a weak profit outlook. Why supply chain disruptions, 102 00:05:24,400 --> 00:05:27,440 Speaker 1: rising costs, they can't service demand. I'm going to be mean. 103 00:05:27,680 --> 00:05:29,240 Speaker 1: I know I shouldn't do this on a Friday, but 104 00:05:29,320 --> 00:05:32,600 Speaker 1: let me just read to you this long list of superlatives. 105 00:05:33,120 --> 00:05:36,000 Speaker 1: The biggest drop since April for the stock on Friday, 106 00:05:36,040 --> 00:05:39,120 Speaker 1: at one point it was facing the biggest drop on record. 107 00:05:39,200 --> 00:05:41,960 Speaker 1: The stock is at its lowest level since September of 108 00:05:42,400 --> 00:05:45,599 Speaker 1: six September, and this run of six days of declines 109 00:05:46,040 --> 00:05:49,840 Speaker 1: is the worst streak of declines since October twenties, so 110 00:05:50,000 --> 00:05:52,080 Speaker 1: something clearly not going right. For del of course, such 111 00:05:52,080 --> 00:05:54,640 Speaker 1: a legacy name in the world of technology, you might 112 00:05:54,680 --> 00:05:56,320 Speaker 1: have missed that one. For everything that's going on the 113 00:05:56,360 --> 00:05:58,520 Speaker 1: world in the last twenty four hours, well for shining 114 00:05:58,520 --> 00:06:01,400 Speaker 1: a light on it, because there's plenty where sing amid well, 115 00:06:01,440 --> 00:06:04,359 Speaker 1: what is a turbulent time in geopolitics, And indeed the 116 00:06:04,360 --> 00:06:06,840 Speaker 1: market said loudly, we thank you, let's get even more 117 00:06:06,880 --> 00:06:10,400 Speaker 1: insight on the tech sector. Is slightly remarkable moves don 118 00:06:10,480 --> 00:06:13,159 Speaker 1: ives a web Bush, who, of course, at the beginning 119 00:06:13,160 --> 00:06:15,360 Speaker 1: this week, had said that really the situation you were 120 00:06:15,360 --> 00:06:17,520 Speaker 1: playing couldn't have come at a worse time for tech. 121 00:06:17,720 --> 00:06:20,200 Speaker 1: And then the bounce back, what is this? Is this 122 00:06:20,360 --> 00:06:23,440 Speaker 1: that you know we've seen so many bear respects put on, 123 00:06:23,520 --> 00:06:26,120 Speaker 1: that we've seen so many shorts already that we sort 124 00:06:26,120 --> 00:06:29,240 Speaker 1: of see the bounce back. Now. Look, I think it's 125 00:06:29,240 --> 00:06:33,279 Speaker 1: the most oversold. It's the most oversold that I've seen 126 00:06:33,720 --> 00:06:37,000 Speaker 1: tech stocks in the last six years. And I think 127 00:06:37,120 --> 00:06:40,720 Speaker 1: that's essentially what's what's really playing out here. I think 128 00:06:40,720 --> 00:06:43,680 Speaker 1: it was oversold in terms of tech, and now you're 129 00:06:43,680 --> 00:06:45,480 Speaker 1: really starting to see a bounce, like especially with the 130 00:06:45,640 --> 00:06:48,159 Speaker 1: tap wind defend, it's gonna be a slower fed hike 131 00:06:48,600 --> 00:06:51,560 Speaker 1: that's starting to get factored in fifty bits off the table, 132 00:06:52,040 --> 00:06:54,480 Speaker 1: and it's oversold in terms of tech. That's where we 133 00:06:54,520 --> 00:06:58,560 Speaker 1: show the bounce back. Therefore, if we start to reassess 134 00:06:58,760 --> 00:07:01,160 Speaker 1: what happens mark six, because we don't think we're going 135 00:07:01,160 --> 00:07:03,320 Speaker 1: to get a double hiker fifty basis point move, but 136 00:07:03,400 --> 00:07:06,240 Speaker 1: we start to tamper down our expectations for six seven 137 00:07:06,320 --> 00:07:08,480 Speaker 1: right hikes over the course of the year, who wins 138 00:07:08,560 --> 00:07:15,360 Speaker 1: them in the tech sector. I think it's a combat. 139 00:07:15,400 --> 00:07:17,520 Speaker 1: I think you've got to look at this two large 140 00:07:17,600 --> 00:07:21,960 Speaker 1: traps are gonna be safe. The names like Microsoft, Apple, Intel, 141 00:07:22,160 --> 00:07:24,960 Speaker 1: Cisco safety blanket names, and you see more and more 142 00:07:25,080 --> 00:07:27,840 Speaker 1: rotation towards tech. I think you're starting to see a 143 00:07:27,840 --> 00:07:30,360 Speaker 1: little more of a risk on dipping the toe in 144 00:07:30,400 --> 00:07:33,760 Speaker 1: the water. And then you look at cybersecurity. I think 145 00:07:33,800 --> 00:07:37,200 Speaker 1: some of these cybersecurity names, I in my opinion it's 146 00:07:37,200 --> 00:07:39,560 Speaker 1: going to be the sector of tech that PIOUP performs 147 00:07:39,600 --> 00:07:42,920 Speaker 1: the most, not just because I think valuations to go 148 00:07:43,000 --> 00:07:45,440 Speaker 1: overall growth. And then you look at the Ukraine situation, 149 00:07:45,440 --> 00:07:48,960 Speaker 1: that's gonna be a potentially two to three tellent names 150 00:07:49,000 --> 00:07:52,960 Speaker 1: like pow out or CrowdStrike, z scale or ACT among others. 151 00:07:53,400 --> 00:07:55,120 Speaker 1: And then then that's why this is one you go 152 00:07:55,200 --> 00:07:59,200 Speaker 1: into the weekend, despite the horrific situation in Ukraine, at 153 00:07:59,280 --> 00:08:03,200 Speaker 1: least from a style market perspective, TEX feels like that 154 00:08:03,360 --> 00:08:05,560 Speaker 1: over sold and I think we we're starting to put 155 00:08:05,600 --> 00:08:09,520 Speaker 1: at some sort of bottom in here at with some untech. Okay, interesting, 156 00:08:09,560 --> 00:08:12,840 Speaker 1: And I'm your perspective in terms of you know, the 157 00:08:12,920 --> 00:08:16,120 Speaker 1: allocation to big tech has a haven or not. Do 158 00:08:16,160 --> 00:08:18,240 Speaker 1: you think that it rides that wave in some way 159 00:08:18,400 --> 00:08:21,960 Speaker 1: or is this really about trying to understand the valuation 160 00:08:22,480 --> 00:08:26,400 Speaker 1: element to it all. I think part of it valuations 161 00:08:26,440 --> 00:08:30,080 Speaker 1: are way over sold, you know, relative obviously, from the 162 00:08:30,120 --> 00:08:33,400 Speaker 1: beginning of the year, we've seen most techdown twenty percent. 163 00:08:33,440 --> 00:08:37,280 Speaker 1: Oh out of these down relative to growth, I think 164 00:08:37,320 --> 00:08:39,880 Speaker 1: it's some of the most attractive valuations we've seen going 165 00:08:39,880 --> 00:08:43,839 Speaker 1: back two thousand sixteen. But I think when you look 166 00:08:43,880 --> 00:08:48,640 Speaker 1: at overall growth, which is important, that's not changing because 167 00:08:48,679 --> 00:08:51,080 Speaker 1: of the situation here. And I think when you look 168 00:08:51,080 --> 00:08:54,680 Speaker 1: at overall tech that's really really what I think resoning 169 00:08:54,679 --> 00:08:58,520 Speaker 1: with investors in terms of some of these levels. And lastly, 170 00:08:58,559 --> 00:09:00,800 Speaker 1: it will sort of been over perhaps there's also some 171 00:09:00,840 --> 00:09:02,640 Speaker 1: of the A is syncratic news, some of the M 172 00:09:02,679 --> 00:09:07,040 Speaker 1: and A news, you know, zendesque and terminating deals. Are 173 00:09:07,080 --> 00:09:11,760 Speaker 1: we expecting fewer combinations here? Consolidation here is there's still 174 00:09:12,080 --> 00:09:15,640 Speaker 1: plenty of opportunity to be had when we're thinking of 175 00:09:15,800 --> 00:09:18,720 Speaker 1: those sorts of eventualities to make us want to get 176 00:09:18,760 --> 00:09:22,000 Speaker 1: into certain tech names. Oh, I think there's going to 177 00:09:22,120 --> 00:09:24,720 Speaker 1: be actually an acceleration M and A because of what 178 00:09:24,720 --> 00:09:28,400 Speaker 1: you're seeing on some of the oversawled names. From evaluation perspective, 179 00:09:28,880 --> 00:09:31,080 Speaker 1: I think names like Microsoft are going to be aggressive 180 00:09:31,080 --> 00:09:34,600 Speaker 1: when it comes to specifically areas like cybersecurity, I think 181 00:09:34,600 --> 00:09:38,000 Speaker 1: you'll see strategic eminate as well as financial And this 182 00:09:38,080 --> 00:09:39,839 Speaker 1: is something I think behind the scenes you have a 183 00:09:39,920 --> 00:09:43,640 Speaker 1: lot of investors really focused on which are some of 184 00:09:43,720 --> 00:09:46,160 Speaker 1: these oversawled names you'd be looking at. I think a 185 00:09:46,200 --> 00:09:48,800 Speaker 1: lot of PE names like cybersecurity and some of the 186 00:09:48,840 --> 00:09:53,440 Speaker 1: cloud names in particular, just way oversold. Don I's on 187 00:09:53,480 --> 00:09:55,800 Speaker 1: the technicals as well as some of the fundamentals at play. 188 00:09:55,880 --> 00:09:57,840 Speaker 1: We thank you so much of web Bush. He has 189 00:09:57,840 --> 00:09:59,680 Speaker 1: just been a fun of knowledge when it comes to 190 00:09:59,720 --> 00:10:02,320 Speaker 1: check out. Was on the Bloomberg terminal as well. Amid 191 00:10:02,400 --> 00:10:13,719 Speaker 1: these dramatic days, you don't have to move tanks, you 192 00:10:13,760 --> 00:10:16,200 Speaker 1: don't have to move armories. You can just use your 193 00:10:16,280 --> 00:10:19,840 Speaker 1: keyboard to get across, which you think as an active 194 00:10:20,679 --> 00:10:23,439 Speaker 1: art of war in an asymmetric manner. So it's also 195 00:10:23,520 --> 00:10:26,920 Speaker 1: something very difficult to move back against. So, for example, 196 00:10:26,960 --> 00:10:30,000 Speaker 1: and Fresher strikes us with a cyber blow, what is 197 00:10:30,040 --> 00:10:32,600 Speaker 1: the US going to do? And so that's definitely what 198 00:10:32,760 --> 00:10:38,079 Speaker 1: he conceives as an excellent use of his arsenal. That 199 00:10:38,480 --> 00:10:41,640 Speaker 1: was forming US Assistant Secretary for Homeland Security, Matt Hayden. 200 00:10:41,679 --> 00:10:44,600 Speaker 1: They're talking about the threat of cyber attacks from Russia, 201 00:10:44,960 --> 00:10:47,040 Speaker 1: not just on Ukraine but also here in the West. 202 00:10:47,480 --> 00:10:51,080 Speaker 1: Let's begin Mandian's head of Global Intelligence, Sundra Joyce, to 203 00:10:51,120 --> 00:10:53,400 Speaker 1: talk a little bit more about that. The most phenomenal 204 00:10:53,559 --> 00:10:56,720 Speaker 1: resume in terms of the amount of well Master's degrees 205 00:10:56,720 --> 00:10:59,360 Speaker 1: that you hold in cyber policy and international affairs. Just 206 00:10:59,360 --> 00:11:01,760 Speaker 1: talk to us in here and now, Sandra. What you 207 00:11:01,960 --> 00:11:05,839 Speaker 1: are telling your clients, how would they need to be well, 208 00:11:05,880 --> 00:11:08,240 Speaker 1: what we're telling them is that they need to be prepared, 209 00:11:08,320 --> 00:11:11,040 Speaker 1: but not to panic. The fact of the matter is 210 00:11:11,160 --> 00:11:14,680 Speaker 1: that Russian cyber aggression has been going on for many years, 211 00:11:15,040 --> 00:11:17,960 Speaker 1: and a lot of the preparations that organizations are making 212 00:11:18,040 --> 00:11:21,960 Speaker 1: for ransomware and other attacks that are the same preparations 213 00:11:21,960 --> 00:11:25,040 Speaker 1: that we're asking them to make today. Any industry groups 214 00:11:25,040 --> 00:11:26,960 Speaker 1: that are more vulnerable than others, or indeed that you 215 00:11:27,000 --> 00:11:30,960 Speaker 1: feel could be undergreater threat than others, well, the risk 216 00:11:31,040 --> 00:11:36,000 Speaker 1: of of reciprocal action against or cyber action against US businesses. 217 00:11:36,040 --> 00:11:38,680 Speaker 1: The risk of that does go up with the application 218 00:11:38,760 --> 00:11:42,440 Speaker 1: of sanctions, and when we're looking at reciprocity, a lot 219 00:11:42,520 --> 00:11:46,080 Speaker 1: of the sanctions are based on financial effects. We might 220 00:11:46,160 --> 00:11:49,640 Speaker 1: expect to see some action against the financial sector, but 221 00:11:49,960 --> 00:11:52,640 Speaker 1: it wouldn't be just limited to the financial sector if 222 00:11:52,640 --> 00:11:56,040 Speaker 1: it were to happen. And that's because cyber attacks can 223 00:11:56,080 --> 00:12:00,240 Speaker 1: create effects across all industries, um and and that is 224 00:12:00,280 --> 00:12:03,400 Speaker 1: really what I believe the Russian aggression is about. It's 225 00:12:03,440 --> 00:12:08,880 Speaker 1: about creating fear, doubt, uncertainty, um and that's going to 226 00:12:08,920 --> 00:12:12,480 Speaker 1: be very powerful if they can actually get that done. 227 00:12:12,800 --> 00:12:15,839 Speaker 1: Feared doubt, uncertainty was certainly increased in Ukraine amid that 228 00:12:16,000 --> 00:12:18,120 Speaker 1: were not one but two cyber attacks. It seemed to 229 00:12:18,160 --> 00:12:21,840 Speaker 1: be more d d OS distributed denial of service attacks 230 00:12:22,200 --> 00:12:24,880 Speaker 1: and an inability to communicate, particularly with their front lines. 231 00:12:24,960 --> 00:12:27,679 Speaker 1: But I'm interested in what types of attacks you might 232 00:12:27,720 --> 00:12:31,640 Speaker 1: see in Ukraine would also perhaps close to home. Isn't 233 00:12:31,679 --> 00:12:33,480 Speaker 1: that sort of attack or is it more ransomware that 234 00:12:33,559 --> 00:12:36,400 Speaker 1: we need to fear? Well, what we should be thinking 235 00:12:36,440 --> 00:12:39,400 Speaker 1: about is what is the effect that the Russian government 236 00:12:39,440 --> 00:12:42,400 Speaker 1: would be trying to to get. So they could use 237 00:12:42,400 --> 00:12:46,360 Speaker 1: a very low sophistication technique like a DIDOS attack, but 238 00:12:46,480 --> 00:12:49,440 Speaker 1: what is accompanying with that or things like text messages. 239 00:12:49,480 --> 00:12:52,240 Speaker 1: We saw this in Ukraine, text messages going out to 240 00:12:52,320 --> 00:12:55,280 Speaker 1: banking customers telling them that the banks were down, that 241 00:12:55,320 --> 00:12:57,679 Speaker 1: they wouldn't be able to get their money. That is 242 00:12:57,720 --> 00:13:01,040 Speaker 1: an effect that's really cognitive, it's psychology iCal. I think 243 00:13:01,040 --> 00:13:02,880 Speaker 1: that what we're going to be seeing from that Russian 244 00:13:02,920 --> 00:13:07,480 Speaker 1: playbook is as psychological attachment to any of the cyber 245 00:13:07,520 --> 00:13:10,360 Speaker 1: actions that they're taking trying to drive down the resolve 246 00:13:10,520 --> 00:13:14,720 Speaker 1: the people. The application of sanctions and their effectiveness is 247 00:13:14,760 --> 00:13:18,240 Speaker 1: really driven by the willingness of the people to support them. 248 00:13:18,280 --> 00:13:22,160 Speaker 1: And if Russia can get uh, you know, their target population, 249 00:13:22,280 --> 00:13:25,120 Speaker 1: whether it's in Ukraine or elsewhere, to start doubting their 250 00:13:25,160 --> 00:13:28,000 Speaker 1: government to weaken their resolve, then they will have achieved 251 00:13:28,040 --> 00:13:30,719 Speaker 1: the effect that they're looking for. Okay, so give us 252 00:13:30,760 --> 00:13:33,200 Speaker 1: as a consumer, but also the clients that you speak 253 00:13:33,240 --> 00:13:36,400 Speaker 1: to as sort of quick one. I one of what 254 00:13:36,440 --> 00:13:38,880 Speaker 1: we should be looking for how we should be acting 255 00:13:38,920 --> 00:13:42,640 Speaker 1: in this carent environment. Well, really what we need to 256 00:13:42,679 --> 00:13:45,480 Speaker 1: be doing is looking for anomalies in our networks. We 257 00:13:45,480 --> 00:13:50,599 Speaker 1: should already be practicing cyber hygiene. Um, what run that playbook? 258 00:13:50,600 --> 00:13:52,679 Speaker 1: If you know that you're going to be taking actions 259 00:13:53,120 --> 00:13:57,719 Speaker 1: separating networks or segmenting them, who's responsible for that is 260 00:13:57,760 --> 00:14:00,960 Speaker 1: your general counsel part of your tabletop exercises. If not, 261 00:14:01,040 --> 00:14:03,040 Speaker 1: they should be. And a lot of this will also 262 00:14:03,160 --> 00:14:07,480 Speaker 1: require a connection to your your PR or media relations team, 263 00:14:07,520 --> 00:14:12,040 Speaker 1: because if you are a target of significance, there certainly 264 00:14:12,120 --> 00:14:14,000 Speaker 1: is going to be a lot of messaging around that. 265 00:14:14,280 --> 00:14:17,640 Speaker 1: In fact, you can expect things like defacements or a 266 00:14:17,760 --> 00:14:21,840 Speaker 1: narrative come out that could be completely fabricated. So really 267 00:14:21,920 --> 00:14:24,760 Speaker 1: what organizations need to be doing is to prepare in 268 00:14:24,800 --> 00:14:27,200 Speaker 1: the way that they would have been preparing for any 269 00:14:27,440 --> 00:14:30,760 Speaker 1: ransomware attack or any type of other breach of their network. 270 00:14:31,360 --> 00:14:34,560 Speaker 1: Get the playbook in place, and then remediate and press 271 00:14:34,640 --> 00:14:37,600 Speaker 1: on because our resilience is very important here. It's essential 272 00:14:37,640 --> 00:14:41,320 Speaker 1: not to panic. Companies get breached every day and they 273 00:14:41,360 --> 00:14:45,160 Speaker 1: do continue once the remediation is complete. We of course 274 00:14:45,200 --> 00:14:48,680 Speaker 1: talk a lot about defense, but we started for I 275 00:14:48,720 --> 00:14:51,120 Speaker 1: feel at the first time to hear from the potentially 276 00:14:51,160 --> 00:14:53,880 Speaker 1: the administration to talk about offense when it comes to 277 00:14:53,960 --> 00:14:58,240 Speaker 1: cyber well attack to ascent degree, what do you think 278 00:14:58,360 --> 00:15:01,280 Speaker 1: could be deployed to be a will to, you know, 279 00:15:01,640 --> 00:15:05,560 Speaker 1: take it back upon Russia in some way. Well, the U. 280 00:15:05,680 --> 00:15:08,760 Speaker 1: S Military of course has every option available to them, 281 00:15:08,960 --> 00:15:13,320 Speaker 1: and it doesn't need to be a cyber response. In fact, 282 00:15:13,600 --> 00:15:16,520 Speaker 1: if military action UM were to come, they would there 283 00:15:16,520 --> 00:15:19,080 Speaker 1: will be quite a few different options. But one thing 284 00:15:19,120 --> 00:15:22,120 Speaker 1: to remember here is there are multiple instruments of national power. 285 00:15:22,520 --> 00:15:25,200 Speaker 1: If the United States decides that it's going to go 286 00:15:25,280 --> 00:15:30,520 Speaker 1: on offense, it can go on offense in many ways, diplomatically, economically, UM. 287 00:15:30,960 --> 00:15:34,200 Speaker 1: Even in within the breadth of military tools. There are 288 00:15:34,640 --> 00:15:37,840 Speaker 1: low level UM you know, things that can be done 289 00:15:37,880 --> 00:15:41,840 Speaker 1: all the way to some of the more sophisticated UM 290 00:15:42,200 --> 00:15:45,200 Speaker 1: attacks that could happen. But really it's not about the 291 00:15:45,240 --> 00:15:47,120 Speaker 1: mode and mean of it what it is. It's about 292 00:15:47,160 --> 00:15:49,920 Speaker 1: the effect. What effect do you want to reach and 293 00:15:50,040 --> 00:15:52,960 Speaker 1: how is the most efficient application UM that you can 294 00:15:53,000 --> 00:15:57,040 Speaker 1: put out there to gain that effect? And quickly, Sandra, 295 00:15:57,680 --> 00:16:02,440 Speaker 1: the people, Well, the places these attacks coming from is 296 00:16:02,560 --> 00:16:05,400 Speaker 1: becoming easier and easier to identify very quickly, because that 297 00:16:05,440 --> 00:16:06,800 Speaker 1: seemed to have been one of the case, was to 298 00:16:06,920 --> 00:16:08,840 Speaker 1: ensure that we knew that these are coming from Russia, 299 00:16:08,880 --> 00:16:12,360 Speaker 1: even if it wasn't exactly from the government itself. Well, 300 00:16:12,400 --> 00:16:14,960 Speaker 1: we do know quite a bit about the Russian threat 301 00:16:15,680 --> 00:16:18,720 Speaker 1: is cyber threat apparatus over this several years that they 302 00:16:18,760 --> 00:16:22,960 Speaker 1: have been conducting attacks UM. Not only the governments, but 303 00:16:23,040 --> 00:16:26,560 Speaker 1: also commercial companies like my own have enumerated a lot 304 00:16:26,600 --> 00:16:29,240 Speaker 1: of their capabilities, and so we know quite a bit 305 00:16:29,280 --> 00:16:33,160 Speaker 1: about them. They've been operating in safe harbor in Russia 306 00:16:33,280 --> 00:16:36,480 Speaker 1: or in adjacent areas for quite a number of years, 307 00:16:36,680 --> 00:16:40,240 Speaker 1: so a lot is known about them. Uh. The the 308 00:16:40,280 --> 00:16:43,520 Speaker 1: thing that gets tricky is that it is they've been 309 00:16:43,560 --> 00:16:46,360 Speaker 1: operating in an area where we have thus far not 310 00:16:46,480 --> 00:16:49,840 Speaker 1: had jurisdiction or a lot of options in order to 311 00:16:50,000 --> 00:16:54,000 Speaker 1: stop the activity. Really great to get your expertise amid 312 00:16:54,000 --> 00:16:57,080 Speaker 1: this current environment. Sandra Joyous many and executive vice president 313 00:16:57,120 --> 00:17:00,400 Speaker 1: and had a global intelligence Pretty busy women, I think. 314 00:17:00,520 --> 00:17:03,720 Speaker 1: Meanwhile coming up, YouTube massively popular in Russia, and now 315 00:17:03,800 --> 00:17:06,440 Speaker 1: Google is facing pressure to cut back on ties to 316 00:17:06,560 --> 00:17:10,400 Speaker 1: pro Russian channels sase countries continue to sanction Russia. Will 317 00:17:10,400 --> 00:17:13,400 Speaker 1: discuss the knock on effect for some US based businesses. 318 00:17:14,119 --> 00:17:41,439 Speaker 1: This is Bloomberg. So with sanctions on Russia ramping up 319 00:17:41,520 --> 00:17:45,840 Speaker 1: following its invasion of Ukraine, certain companies like well Google's 320 00:17:45,880 --> 00:17:49,280 Speaker 1: YouTube are under pressure to remove or cut commercial ties 321 00:17:49,320 --> 00:17:52,800 Speaker 1: with some of its most prolific pro Russian channels. For 322 00:17:52,880 --> 00:17:55,359 Speaker 1: more on this story, I'm joined by Bloomberg's Mark Bergen, 323 00:17:55,440 --> 00:17:58,600 Speaker 1: who covers Google of course Alphabet the parent company, and 324 00:17:58,680 --> 00:18:01,200 Speaker 1: done a great deep dive on this just how deep 325 00:18:01,280 --> 00:18:04,680 Speaker 1: do these relationships run? Mark, You know, that's that's hard 326 00:18:04,720 --> 00:18:07,080 Speaker 1: to say. It's kind of a repeat of seventeen. If 327 00:18:07,119 --> 00:18:09,919 Speaker 1: you remember, there was a lot of criticism around Russia 328 00:18:09,960 --> 00:18:13,720 Speaker 1: Today and Russian influence after the sixteen election that clearly 329 00:18:13,720 --> 00:18:15,640 Speaker 1: a lot of that was around some of the bought 330 00:18:15,680 --> 00:18:18,480 Speaker 1: networks that hit Facebook and Twitter. But on YouTube, you know, 331 00:18:18,560 --> 00:18:20,920 Speaker 1: Russia Today advertiser itself. You can go look at their 332 00:18:20,920 --> 00:18:25,080 Speaker 1: English page as the world's most popular news channel on YouTube. 333 00:18:25,440 --> 00:18:29,479 Speaker 1: They're tremendously successful for formula subscribers. They've built up UH 334 00:18:29,720 --> 00:18:32,080 Speaker 1: in part with the very aggressive digital strategy, and they're 335 00:18:32,119 --> 00:18:35,760 Speaker 1: part of a network. There's some analysts that estimate close 336 00:18:35,840 --> 00:18:39,440 Speaker 1: to a hundred channels that have commercial ties to entities 337 00:18:39,480 --> 00:18:43,719 Speaker 1: that are under the under lesser sanctions prior to this 338 00:18:43,800 --> 00:18:46,520 Speaker 1: past week UH, and now there are you know, the 339 00:18:46,560 --> 00:18:49,560 Speaker 1: EU and the UK and the US are introducing new 340 00:18:49,600 --> 00:18:54,639 Speaker 1: section sanctions that impact individuals either prominent TV journalists that 341 00:18:54,680 --> 00:18:57,920 Speaker 1: have YouTube channels or members of the close to the 342 00:18:58,000 --> 00:19:01,240 Speaker 1: Kremlin that have connections with media, and a lot of 343 00:19:01,320 --> 00:19:05,800 Speaker 1: Russian media is very popular on YouTube. Interesting, So how 344 00:19:05,880 --> 00:19:08,119 Speaker 1: does one go about cutting it? I mean before we 345 00:19:08,240 --> 00:19:11,640 Speaker 1: see them label indeed sort of some of these sorts 346 00:19:11,640 --> 00:19:14,719 Speaker 1: of state funded videos and channels. But do you just 347 00:19:14,760 --> 00:19:18,200 Speaker 1: cut it off in tally? How how do you control it? Uh? So, 348 00:19:18,359 --> 00:19:19,720 Speaker 1: you know, at this point, YouTube has only kind of 349 00:19:19,720 --> 00:19:21,639 Speaker 1: come out and said that they're looking, they're paying a 350 00:19:21,680 --> 00:19:24,159 Speaker 1: lot of attention to misinformation, and that's been something we 351 00:19:24,200 --> 00:19:26,520 Speaker 1: saw Senator Warner kind of call it out his his 352 00:19:26,560 --> 00:19:30,959 Speaker 1: turn with propaganda. The clearer I think commercial ties with 353 00:19:30,960 --> 00:19:33,040 Speaker 1: with YouTube is they run ads, right, they have a 354 00:19:33,080 --> 00:19:35,920 Speaker 1: revenue split with all their YouTube channels, and so every 355 00:19:35,960 --> 00:19:37,679 Speaker 1: ad you go and see, you know, I was just 356 00:19:37,720 --> 00:19:40,320 Speaker 1: looking earlier this morning. You know a lot of these, 357 00:19:40,320 --> 00:19:43,000 Speaker 1: at least in the US there they had they run commercials. 358 00:19:43,080 --> 00:19:46,159 Speaker 1: That's a split with with YouTube. YouTube could decide to 359 00:19:47,080 --> 00:19:50,480 Speaker 1: demonetize and no longer run ads on those channels which 360 00:19:50,520 --> 00:19:54,240 Speaker 1: they have on in some cases. Uh, they're clear list 361 00:19:54,320 --> 00:19:56,480 Speaker 1: even some former Google lawyers that are sort of calling 362 00:19:56,480 --> 00:19:58,520 Speaker 1: for them to make more drastic measures and actually cut 363 00:19:58,560 --> 00:20:02,280 Speaker 1: those channels off Entirely interesting. Once again, very difficult conversations 364 00:20:02,320 --> 00:20:05,280 Speaker 1: I'm sure being having at an executive level. Marked is 365 00:20:05,320 --> 00:20:09,760 Speaker 1: the response. Also, though, if it's not on Alphabet's own YouTube, 366 00:20:09,880 --> 00:20:13,440 Speaker 1: it's being forced elsewhere. How much are we seeing still 367 00:20:13,760 --> 00:20:18,680 Speaker 1: YouTube being used by such news organizations or indeed state 368 00:20:18,720 --> 00:20:23,159 Speaker 1: funded organizations, or are they going on to other parts 369 00:20:23,200 --> 00:20:26,840 Speaker 1: of the internet. It's a YouTube and prominent What the 370 00:20:26,880 --> 00:20:28,960 Speaker 1: interesting thing about YouTube is that it's both popular in 371 00:20:29,200 --> 00:20:32,199 Speaker 1: Russia for a lot of the state backed media and 372 00:20:32,240 --> 00:20:34,720 Speaker 1: sort of pro Kremlin media. It's also been a huge 373 00:20:35,040 --> 00:20:38,760 Speaker 1: asset for the opposition. Uh naval one whose opposist and 374 00:20:38,840 --> 00:20:42,120 Speaker 1: leader has a massively popular YouTube channel. YouTube Boston likes 375 00:20:42,119 --> 00:20:45,720 Speaker 1: to point out that in a country with take controls 376 00:20:45,760 --> 00:20:50,400 Speaker 1: of state media and broadcast, YouTube does offer avenues for criticism, 377 00:20:50,920 --> 00:20:53,640 Speaker 1: and I think that's a fair and valid point. What's 378 00:20:53,640 --> 00:20:56,399 Speaker 1: also happening is that they are under incredible amount of pressure, 379 00:20:56,400 --> 00:20:59,440 Speaker 1: even prior to this past week from the Russian government 380 00:21:00,160 --> 00:21:03,439 Speaker 1: around there's been this contention around a particular YouTube channel 381 00:21:03,440 --> 00:21:06,159 Speaker 1: that that YouTube blocked. That was and then there was 382 00:21:06,160 --> 00:21:08,960 Speaker 1: a court fine, and now they're paying a regular daily fine. 383 00:21:09,040 --> 00:21:12,920 Speaker 1: Google is um they're under increasing pressure along with Facebook 384 00:21:13,000 --> 00:21:16,440 Speaker 1: and Twitter to take down accounts that the Russian government 385 00:21:16,480 --> 00:21:20,760 Speaker 1: has has told them or either extremist or or using 386 00:21:20,760 --> 00:21:24,879 Speaker 1: the guys of misinformation Mark Bergen, It's a great story, 387 00:21:25,040 --> 00:21:27,440 Speaker 1: Go and read it. Google faces sanctions dilemma with pro 388 00:21:27,520 --> 00:21:29,960 Speaker 1: Russia YouTube channels. We thank you so much breaking all 389 00:21:30,000 --> 00:21:41,320 Speaker 1: down for us. Stay well, this is technology. I'm Caroline 390 00:21:41,359 --> 00:21:43,320 Speaker 1: Hyde in New York. Now, as we headed into the 391 00:21:43,400 --> 00:21:45,760 Speaker 1: end of what was a pretty tense week, to say 392 00:21:45,800 --> 00:21:48,440 Speaker 1: the least, investors still making sense of how to navigate 393 00:21:48,440 --> 00:21:51,720 Speaker 1: the situation of course between Russia and Ukraine, and Ludlow 394 00:21:51,880 --> 00:21:55,520 Speaker 1: is here with what has been a remarkable rally actually 395 00:21:55,560 --> 00:21:57,800 Speaker 1: into the end of the week. Yeah, has and you're 396 00:21:57,800 --> 00:21:59,520 Speaker 1: you're trying to work out what your exposure is in 397 00:21:59,560 --> 00:22:02,120 Speaker 1: financial markets. You're also trying to work out which companies 398 00:22:02,119 --> 00:22:04,200 Speaker 1: and stocks are going to be impacted in the short 399 00:22:04,240 --> 00:22:06,239 Speaker 1: and long term. And this is a discussion we've got 400 00:22:06,240 --> 00:22:09,080 Speaker 1: to have around social media, Meta, parent company of Facebook 401 00:22:09,280 --> 00:22:12,040 Speaker 1: and also Twitter, of course, you know Meta coming out 402 00:22:12,040 --> 00:22:15,800 Speaker 1: saying that Russian authorities ordered them to stop fact checking 403 00:22:16,080 --> 00:22:20,280 Speaker 1: and labeling posts on the Facebook platform by state run media, 404 00:22:20,359 --> 00:22:22,600 Speaker 1: to which Facebook declined to do so. An interesting and 405 00:22:22,640 --> 00:22:26,000 Speaker 1: list at Bloomberg Intelligence jumped on this really quickly, saying 406 00:22:26,000 --> 00:22:28,320 Speaker 1: that in the case of Meta, you could see one 407 00:22:28,400 --> 00:22:31,679 Speaker 1: or two percentage points of a hit to daily active users. 408 00:22:31,880 --> 00:22:35,040 Speaker 1: But which company might benefit here? Twitter really interesting? We 409 00:22:35,080 --> 00:22:37,080 Speaker 1: know this from the Olympics, right, we know this from 410 00:22:37,119 --> 00:22:40,159 Speaker 1: the Super Bowl. Twitter is an event driven platform and 411 00:22:40,359 --> 00:22:43,200 Speaker 1: Bloomberg Intelligence estimating they could actually get a short term 412 00:22:43,280 --> 00:22:46,040 Speaker 1: boost for their active users from what's going on on 413 00:22:46,080 --> 00:22:48,399 Speaker 1: the ground in the Russian Ukraine. No matter how tense 414 00:22:48,600 --> 00:22:50,639 Speaker 1: and difficult it is to see for a far, it's 415 00:22:50,640 --> 00:22:52,800 Speaker 1: also interesting to see where capital is flowing. We look 416 00:22:52,800 --> 00:22:53,879 Speaker 1: at some of the e t F, so I love 417 00:22:53,920 --> 00:22:55,600 Speaker 1: to take a look at the ETS space on a Friday. 418 00:22:55,640 --> 00:22:58,679 Speaker 1: Caroline arcis a name so familiar to us, right, this 419 00:22:58,760 --> 00:23:01,800 Speaker 1: is the big fund, Kathy word and Arc money has 420 00:23:01,800 --> 00:23:04,040 Speaker 1: been going into this fund the last couple of days. 421 00:23:04,080 --> 00:23:05,960 Speaker 1: Big gains over a two day based I think ten 422 00:23:06,000 --> 00:23:08,000 Speaker 1: and a half percent over the last for the eight 423 00:23:08,000 --> 00:23:10,520 Speaker 1: hours or so. But if you compare that to the 424 00:23:10,600 --> 00:23:14,040 Speaker 1: Van Eck Russia ETF, which also saw a big rebound 425 00:23:14,040 --> 00:23:16,480 Speaker 1: on Friday and saw influence, you have to ask about 426 00:23:16,480 --> 00:23:19,560 Speaker 1: what the psychology of investors is here, because this was 427 00:23:19,600 --> 00:23:21,760 Speaker 1: a big rebound right in the van k ETF that 428 00:23:21,840 --> 00:23:24,399 Speaker 1: was a massive drop Wednesday Thursday. This is an e 429 00:23:24,480 --> 00:23:27,399 Speaker 1: t F that tracks Russian equities. Now you have people 430 00:23:27,440 --> 00:23:30,200 Speaker 1: coming in. Are these bottom feeders? Are these guys coming 431 00:23:30,200 --> 00:23:32,680 Speaker 1: in trying to buy the bottom or are they looking 432 00:23:32,680 --> 00:23:35,679 Speaker 1: at shorting Russian equity? Short interest in that et F 433 00:23:35,720 --> 00:23:37,920 Speaker 1: gaining as well. But what's the rationale is going into 434 00:23:38,040 --> 00:23:40,360 Speaker 1: arc if you look at the performance of these ets 435 00:23:40,640 --> 00:23:42,960 Speaker 1: relative to their fifty two week highs all over the 436 00:23:43,040 --> 00:23:44,720 Speaker 1: last twelve months. In other words, we bring up the 437 00:23:44,760 --> 00:23:48,040 Speaker 1: next board. There's a real difference in what's going on here. 438 00:23:48,280 --> 00:23:52,400 Speaker 1: These are two very different e t s tracking very 439 00:23:52,440 --> 00:23:55,640 Speaker 1: different basket of stocks, but on a fifty two week 440 00:23:55,680 --> 00:23:58,000 Speaker 1: basis or a draw down from a fifty two week high, 441 00:23:58,520 --> 00:24:00,639 Speaker 1: we are in pretty much the same place. So the 442 00:24:00,640 --> 00:24:03,320 Speaker 1: point I'm making his investors seemed to take stock on 443 00:24:03,359 --> 00:24:06,080 Speaker 1: Friday and say, I'm going to go back into technology stocks. 444 00:24:06,119 --> 00:24:07,879 Speaker 1: I'm going to go back a little bit into this 445 00:24:08,000 --> 00:24:11,000 Speaker 1: e t F that's tracking Russian equities and see what 446 00:24:11,119 --> 00:24:14,480 Speaker 1: my exposure is going forward. And Ludlowe, great way to 447 00:24:14,480 --> 00:24:17,280 Speaker 1: wrap up an extraordinary We thank you so much. Now 448 00:24:17,680 --> 00:24:19,320 Speaker 1: we want to turn our attention to the role of 449 00:24:19,359 --> 00:24:22,520 Speaker 1: social media and what's currently occurring in Ukraine. Russia, of 450 00:24:22,560 --> 00:24:26,600 Speaker 1: course no stranger to peddling this and disinformation, especially now 451 00:24:26,640 --> 00:24:28,960 Speaker 1: as it tries to shape the narrative of the war 452 00:24:29,040 --> 00:24:32,720 Speaker 1: it created, announced that it was restricting use of Facebook 453 00:24:32,800 --> 00:24:35,920 Speaker 1: due to the company fact checking content posted by state 454 00:24:36,000 --> 00:24:39,480 Speaker 1: run media. In a statement Metters, Nick Clegg wrote in part, 455 00:24:39,880 --> 00:24:43,320 Speaker 1: ordinary Russians are using Matters apps to express themselves and 456 00:24:43,440 --> 00:24:46,000 Speaker 1: organize for action. We want them to continue to make 457 00:24:46,040 --> 00:24:49,960 Speaker 1: their voices heard, share what's happening, and organize for more 458 00:24:50,000 --> 00:24:51,960 Speaker 1: on all of this, and very pleased to be joined 459 00:24:51,960 --> 00:24:54,840 Speaker 1: by Margherita Kniev, which is the Associate director for the 460 00:24:54,880 --> 00:24:58,800 Speaker 1: Center of Security and Emerging Technology, along with Brett Schaffers, 461 00:24:58,840 --> 00:25:02,639 Speaker 1: a senior fellow at the Allie and the Securing Democracy Waits. 462 00:25:02,680 --> 00:25:06,040 Speaker 1: The first and foremost, what's the playbook we're currently seeing 463 00:25:06,080 --> 00:25:09,800 Speaker 1: out of Russia at the moment. I think it's been 464 00:25:09,840 --> 00:25:12,320 Speaker 1: a standard combination of things that we've seen before with 465 00:25:12,440 --> 00:25:17,240 Speaker 1: an influx of some new messaging. It is a reiteration 466 00:25:17,680 --> 00:25:23,359 Speaker 1: of the narrative that NATO expansion has driven Russia to 467 00:25:23,680 --> 00:25:28,199 Speaker 1: defend itself, which is obviously a disinformation taxing designed to 468 00:25:28,480 --> 00:25:33,000 Speaker 1: justify the current attacks and a lot of the probably 469 00:25:33,320 --> 00:25:37,879 Speaker 1: atrocities that will be seeing increasingly. So another emphasis is 470 00:25:37,960 --> 00:25:42,760 Speaker 1: being put at dissuading raordinary Russians from taking a stand 471 00:25:42,840 --> 00:25:46,520 Speaker 1: against the conflict and against the war. And I think 472 00:25:46,560 --> 00:25:49,640 Speaker 1: we're soon are also going to be seeing an argument 473 00:25:49,680 --> 00:25:54,240 Speaker 1: that those domestic protests are being driven by external uh 474 00:25:54,400 --> 00:25:59,439 Speaker 1: CI A fermented uh those points that we've seen before, 475 00:26:00,080 --> 00:26:04,480 Speaker 1: So in combination of targeting domestic audiences as well as 476 00:26:04,520 --> 00:26:10,520 Speaker 1: looking externally, it's tools that Russia as honed in its 477 00:26:10,560 --> 00:26:14,440 Speaker 1: previous disc information and disupervision compans in Ukraine and then 478 00:26:14,440 --> 00:26:17,439 Speaker 1: in Sey area, and now we're seeing it repeated again 479 00:26:17,560 --> 00:26:20,440 Speaker 1: in a way that it's been difficult to tackle for 480 00:26:20,480 --> 00:26:23,640 Speaker 1: those media companies that you discussed Everlire, Yeah, Brett, difficult 481 00:26:23,680 --> 00:26:27,000 Speaker 1: to tackle, and particularly when Russia's sort of saying no 482 00:26:27,040 --> 00:26:31,000 Speaker 1: longer wants to be using the metal platform in that respect. 483 00:26:31,040 --> 00:26:35,280 Speaker 1: How do you see social media companies such as YouTube 484 00:26:35,400 --> 00:26:38,720 Speaker 1: by Google, Alphabet Matters, Facebook and Instagram, how do you 485 00:26:38,920 --> 00:26:40,840 Speaker 1: how do you see them being able to respond to 486 00:26:40,880 --> 00:26:43,960 Speaker 1: this in the real time? Yeah, I think it's going 487 00:26:44,000 --> 00:26:46,040 Speaker 1: to be a real moment of reckoning for the US 488 00:26:46,080 --> 00:26:48,840 Speaker 1: social media companies. I mean, for years they have tried 489 00:26:48,880 --> 00:26:53,280 Speaker 1: to be neutral platforms where they have allowed different perspectives 490 00:26:53,320 --> 00:26:56,600 Speaker 1: to exist. Yes, they have labeled Russian state media outlets 491 00:26:56,640 --> 00:26:59,040 Speaker 1: as being Russian state media outlets, but they've also labeled 492 00:26:59,200 --> 00:27:02,160 Speaker 1: US government the state media outlets. I think at some 493 00:27:02,200 --> 00:27:05,560 Speaker 1: point they may be forced into taking sides here, and frankly, 494 00:27:05,880 --> 00:27:08,200 Speaker 1: that choice may not be theirs, because I think the 495 00:27:08,280 --> 00:27:10,639 Speaker 1: Russian government is going to continue to crack down on 496 00:27:10,680 --> 00:27:13,600 Speaker 1: Western social media companies. Of course we saw that today, 497 00:27:13,640 --> 00:27:16,160 Speaker 1: but I think it's it's possible, if not likely, at 498 00:27:16,200 --> 00:27:19,000 Speaker 1: some point that the Russian government, if this content, if 499 00:27:19,040 --> 00:27:21,760 Speaker 1: this conflict continues to escalate, that they will just cut 500 00:27:21,800 --> 00:27:25,200 Speaker 1: off access to Twitter, Facebook, Google for their own domestic population. 501 00:27:26,320 --> 00:27:30,119 Speaker 1: And to that end we to how effective would that be. 502 00:27:30,440 --> 00:27:32,280 Speaker 1: Of course, we will know a VPN when we want 503 00:27:32,320 --> 00:27:34,800 Speaker 1: to use one, But I'm interested is to what outlets 504 00:27:34,840 --> 00:27:39,040 Speaker 1: already people are using. How much perhaps Ukraine Russian people 505 00:27:39,080 --> 00:27:41,239 Speaker 1: have preempted the fact that it might be hard to 506 00:27:41,240 --> 00:27:45,400 Speaker 1: to access set in Western providers. Absolutely, and I think 507 00:27:45,400 --> 00:27:48,960 Speaker 1: in modern society you can never really hermetically seal a 508 00:27:48,960 --> 00:27:52,680 Speaker 1: country anymore, especially a country that has already been integrated 509 00:27:52,720 --> 00:27:56,360 Speaker 1: into um the outside world, We're not talking about North 510 00:27:56,440 --> 00:27:59,720 Speaker 1: Korea here or even China. We're talking about a country 511 00:28:00,160 --> 00:28:04,199 Speaker 1: has been Ukraine itself has been fully integrated into Europe, 512 00:28:04,240 --> 00:28:08,800 Speaker 1: and even the great parts of Russia are been European facing. 513 00:28:09,359 --> 00:28:12,520 Speaker 1: So the apps that even if we're seeing, you know, 514 00:28:13,040 --> 00:28:18,040 Speaker 1: reduced access to Facebook, we just talked about YouTube being 515 00:28:18,400 --> 00:28:22,680 Speaker 1: a meaningful platform that regular Russians follow. They're also use 516 00:28:22,880 --> 00:28:27,360 Speaker 1: WhatsApp and Telegram, and those are apps that will continue 517 00:28:27,400 --> 00:28:29,679 Speaker 1: to be a way for people to communicate. In the 518 00:28:29,680 --> 00:28:33,440 Speaker 1: same time imlently, we're also seeing the spread of disinformation there. 519 00:28:33,760 --> 00:28:36,040 Speaker 1: So I don't think Russia will be able to gramatically 520 00:28:36,160 --> 00:28:39,880 Speaker 1: seal um the internet as we know here, but there's 521 00:28:39,920 --> 00:28:42,880 Speaker 1: no argument that they will try to control the information 522 00:28:42,920 --> 00:28:46,840 Speaker 1: that is reaching Russian citizens much more tightly. And Brett 523 00:28:47,240 --> 00:28:50,840 Speaker 1: to that point, you know, how, how is it a 524 00:28:50,920 --> 00:28:55,120 Speaker 1: good way of layman terms to be ensuring that you're 525 00:28:55,160 --> 00:28:58,239 Speaker 1: not being targeted by misinformation that we're not. I mean, 526 00:28:58,280 --> 00:28:59,960 Speaker 1: we just heard of the cyber attacks that could have 527 00:29:00,280 --> 00:29:02,520 Speaker 1: the ways in which they're sending text messages to people 528 00:29:02,920 --> 00:29:05,040 Speaker 1: and there like, how do you feel that from a 529 00:29:05,080 --> 00:29:07,479 Speaker 1: social media despite if people couldn't really try to with 530 00:29:07,600 --> 00:29:13,920 Speaker 1: rigor understand what's true what's not. Russia has significant information capabilities, 531 00:29:14,280 --> 00:29:16,720 Speaker 1: and that starts, of course, with their state media outlets 532 00:29:16,800 --> 00:29:20,080 Speaker 1: that are very active. They're very successful across multiple social 533 00:29:20,080 --> 00:29:22,760 Speaker 1: media platforms. Those are the easy ones to deal with 534 00:29:22,840 --> 00:29:25,560 Speaker 1: because we know what they are. They're attributable, so they 535 00:29:25,560 --> 00:29:29,760 Speaker 1: can be labeled. UH information consumers understand where the information 536 00:29:29,840 --> 00:29:32,760 Speaker 1: is coming from and the intent behind it. What gets 537 00:29:32,760 --> 00:29:35,760 Speaker 1: a little bit trickier is Russia also has significant capabilities 538 00:29:35,800 --> 00:29:37,960 Speaker 1: in the covert space. So we know that they've run 539 00:29:38,080 --> 00:29:41,840 Speaker 1: troll farms, They've run pages presenting themselves as being sort 540 00:29:41,840 --> 00:29:45,640 Speaker 1: of genuine American political opinion of pages, but of course 541 00:29:45,640 --> 00:29:48,240 Speaker 1: have been connected back to Russia, so they have ways 542 00:29:48,280 --> 00:29:53,120 Speaker 1: of messaging and capability that doesn't make it entirely clear 543 00:29:53,440 --> 00:29:55,600 Speaker 1: where the information is coming from. This is even very 544 00:29:55,680 --> 00:29:59,000 Speaker 1: difficult for the social media companies to ferret out, so 545 00:29:59,040 --> 00:30:01,160 Speaker 1: it's information can humors. I think we just have to 546 00:30:01,200 --> 00:30:05,000 Speaker 1: remain vigilant and very skeptical because Russia has ways of 547 00:30:05,120 --> 00:30:09,240 Speaker 1: reaching us that don't necessarily come through outlets that identify 548 00:30:09,360 --> 00:30:11,680 Speaker 1: themselves as having a connection to the Russian government and 549 00:30:11,720 --> 00:30:14,840 Speaker 1: reached it very briefly. The amount that's been spent by 550 00:30:14,880 --> 00:30:17,400 Speaker 1: certain companies to beef up the AI to ensure they 551 00:30:17,400 --> 00:30:19,760 Speaker 1: can take down volts too, you know, to be a 552 00:30:19,760 --> 00:30:22,080 Speaker 1: fact checker of choice. Do you think that's enough? Is 553 00:30:22,080 --> 00:30:23,880 Speaker 1: there still so much work to be done? Or have 554 00:30:24,000 --> 00:30:25,960 Speaker 1: they manage done on they can to a stain extent. 555 00:30:27,320 --> 00:30:29,240 Speaker 1: I think there's a lot more to be done, and 556 00:30:29,320 --> 00:30:36,280 Speaker 1: not just in the that automatic uh false actor bot space. 557 00:30:36,760 --> 00:30:39,080 Speaker 1: There's a lot to be done in an area that 558 00:30:39,120 --> 00:30:41,360 Speaker 1: we're uncomfortable to deal with. And it is the fact 559 00:30:41,440 --> 00:30:45,480 Speaker 1: that you know, like Bread mentioned, there are what appears 560 00:30:45,520 --> 00:30:49,840 Speaker 1: to be legitimate Western political obinionformers that are then later 561 00:30:49,920 --> 00:30:55,080 Speaker 1: discovered to be Russian boats or Russian influencers masquerading somebody else. 562 00:30:55,680 --> 00:30:58,640 Speaker 1: At the same time, we are also dealing with actual, 563 00:30:58,840 --> 00:31:03,560 Speaker 1: real people in the West who are of political influence 564 00:31:04,120 --> 00:31:09,520 Speaker 1: one way or another, who are, whether intentionally or unintentionally, 565 00:31:10,120 --> 00:31:13,280 Speaker 1: end up amplifying a lot of the Russian messaging. And 566 00:31:13,320 --> 00:31:16,480 Speaker 1: there is something that I think Americans and people throughout 567 00:31:16,960 --> 00:31:22,080 Speaker 1: Europe should be much more cargnizant of hold ourselves to 568 00:31:22,120 --> 00:31:24,640 Speaker 1: account to Margarita, can I if we thank you so much, 569 00:31:24,840 --> 00:31:27,560 Speaker 1: Brett Shaefer, We expertise from you both. We thank you 570 00:31:27,600 --> 00:31:29,920 Speaker 1: for it. Have a good weekend. Meanwhile, coming up the 571 00:31:29,920 --> 00:31:32,400 Speaker 1: fight of a control for information in the conflict between 572 00:31:32,440 --> 00:31:36,160 Speaker 1: Russia and Ukraine, we're talking with are We've, decentralized storage 573 00:31:36,200 --> 00:31:39,160 Speaker 1: network built on a blockchain like data structure, and it's 574 00:31:39,160 --> 00:31:43,040 Speaker 1: designed to provide permanent data storage saved from state censorship. 575 00:31:43,880 --> 00:31:51,880 Speaker 1: We'll discuss this is bring back now. Of course, crypto 576 00:31:51,920 --> 00:31:55,520 Speaker 1: has been a focus throughout the Ukraine Russia attention, in 577 00:31:55,600 --> 00:31:57,760 Speaker 1: large part because of the price moves, but also because 578 00:31:57,800 --> 00:32:00,240 Speaker 1: of the ways in which maybe some oligarchs could or 579 00:32:00,280 --> 00:32:03,320 Speaker 1: could not be using the technology. But also let's talk 580 00:32:03,360 --> 00:32:05,640 Speaker 1: a little bit about how we could use the technology 581 00:32:05,760 --> 00:32:09,400 Speaker 1: underlying technology, not in nearly ideally blockchain per se, but 582 00:32:09,640 --> 00:32:12,280 Speaker 1: this time block We've is something that we could be 583 00:32:12,280 --> 00:32:15,640 Speaker 1: looking at. Are Weave as a Berlin based blockchain startup 584 00:32:15,680 --> 00:32:19,920 Speaker 1: that built an archival platform for permanent data storage as 585 00:32:19,920 --> 00:32:23,440 Speaker 1: a means to actually counter state censorship of online information sources. 586 00:32:23,480 --> 00:32:25,560 Speaker 1: Are we founder Sam Williams joins us now and very 587 00:32:25,560 --> 00:32:27,400 Speaker 1: pleased to say so do does our lead in our 588 00:32:27,560 --> 00:32:31,160 Speaker 1: crypto discussions. But mentionality back second, Galie, I want you 589 00:32:31,240 --> 00:32:33,920 Speaker 1: to take it away first with Sam yes, Sam, you know, 590 00:32:33,960 --> 00:32:37,480 Speaker 1: I think this situation Ukraine is such an interesting example 591 00:32:37,600 --> 00:32:41,560 Speaker 1: of where storage decentralized could be applicable. Or can you 592 00:32:41,600 --> 00:32:44,680 Speaker 1: explain what's happening when it comes to Ukraine and the 593 00:32:44,720 --> 00:32:50,240 Speaker 1: types of information you're able to store in a decentralized way. Yes, well, 594 00:32:50,680 --> 00:32:54,360 Speaker 1: we think that in order to learn from the past effectively, 595 00:32:54,400 --> 00:32:56,440 Speaker 1: we need to store the past in such a way 596 00:32:56,480 --> 00:32:58,320 Speaker 1: that it's not going to be altered over time. So 597 00:32:58,360 --> 00:33:01,800 Speaker 1: we've built a ledger. It is decentralized in natures throws 598 00:33:01,800 --> 00:33:04,440 Speaker 1: this information in hundreds, if not thousands of places across 599 00:33:04,440 --> 00:33:07,320 Speaker 1: the world um and then back to that storage where 600 00:33:07,360 --> 00:33:11,080 Speaker 1: the sustainable endowment UM And essentially what our community has 601 00:33:11,120 --> 00:33:14,640 Speaker 1: done has created archiving box that are putting approximately a 602 00:33:14,680 --> 00:33:17,360 Speaker 1: million pieces of data a day into this system and 603 00:33:17,400 --> 00:33:19,760 Speaker 1: replicating it around the world such they can't be altered 604 00:33:20,240 --> 00:33:24,479 Speaker 1: in essentially forever. Can you tell us a little bit 605 00:33:24,480 --> 00:33:29,240 Speaker 1: about whether or not we're already seeing your technology being used. 606 00:33:29,320 --> 00:33:33,560 Speaker 1: How are you deploying effectively an ability to ensure that 607 00:33:33,640 --> 00:33:37,440 Speaker 1: what is currently being written in history remains so well, 608 00:33:37,440 --> 00:33:40,080 Speaker 1: we use cryptography to back the system in to make 609 00:33:40,120 --> 00:33:43,120 Speaker 1: sure that information can be changed once is put inside 610 00:33:43,120 --> 00:33:46,000 Speaker 1: the network and then we have a system similar to 611 00:33:46,080 --> 00:33:50,560 Speaker 1: proof of work with bitcoin, except we use storage essentially 612 00:33:50,600 --> 00:33:53,160 Speaker 1: story and the data set as the work in the system, 613 00:33:53,160 --> 00:33:55,720 Speaker 1: and that proves that the data has not changed over 614 00:33:55,720 --> 00:33:59,120 Speaker 1: a large period of time. I'm wondering how people use 615 00:33:59,200 --> 00:34:02,200 Speaker 1: the data after its stored. You have this instance, for example, 616 00:34:02,280 --> 00:34:05,720 Speaker 1: where Senator pat to Me had talked about are weaves 617 00:34:05,800 --> 00:34:10,040 Speaker 1: use of the technology in order to store work when 618 00:34:10,080 --> 00:34:13,400 Speaker 1: it comes to Apple Daily in China and the inability 619 00:34:13,480 --> 00:34:18,640 Speaker 1: for the government to erase the information that surrounded Apple Daily. 620 00:34:19,000 --> 00:34:22,360 Speaker 1: So how then does the US or other people and 621 00:34:22,480 --> 00:34:24,800 Speaker 1: actors and governments start to take a look at the 622 00:34:24,880 --> 00:34:28,319 Speaker 1: data that is being stored. Well, I think the key 623 00:34:28,360 --> 00:34:31,080 Speaker 1: thing is that that information is available all across the 624 00:34:31,239 --> 00:34:33,160 Speaker 1: not just from the US. So when a piece of 625 00:34:33,239 --> 00:34:35,279 Speaker 1: data is stored inside are we, you can collect that 626 00:34:35,400 --> 00:34:38,399 Speaker 1: data from hundreds, if not thousands, of different places. So 627 00:34:38,560 --> 00:34:43,479 Speaker 1: while China may have successfully unfortunately removed the stand or 628 00:34:43,600 --> 00:34:47,440 Speaker 1: or Apple Daily from the Internet, they really can't remove 629 00:34:47,520 --> 00:34:50,560 Speaker 1: access to are we even any serious fashion. And that 630 00:34:50,600 --> 00:34:53,200 Speaker 1: means that information is still available to local populists if 631 00:34:53,200 --> 00:34:56,280 Speaker 1: they want to access. Just remind us of of course, 632 00:34:56,280 --> 00:34:59,040 Speaker 1: with every of the protocol tends to come and token 633 00:34:59,040 --> 00:35:00,880 Speaker 1: and the all we've token And in particular, how's it 634 00:35:00,920 --> 00:35:05,080 Speaker 1: as incentivizing people to be using your your particular provision. 635 00:35:05,120 --> 00:35:10,480 Speaker 1: How many people are using it on the UH story 636 00:35:10,560 --> 00:35:15,080 Speaker 1: side or on the posting side? If so? Well, either 637 00:35:15,080 --> 00:35:17,400 Speaker 1: way it's it's about hundreds of thousands, if not millions 638 00:35:17,400 --> 00:35:20,120 Speaker 1: of people on the story side, UM, and then there's 639 00:35:20,440 --> 00:35:23,120 Speaker 1: hundreds of two thousands depending on the time, about nine 640 00:35:23,200 --> 00:35:26,520 Speaker 1: hundred right now, I think data stories that are replicating 641 00:35:26,560 --> 00:35:30,399 Speaker 1: their information around the world. Well, speaking of funds, and 642 00:35:30,640 --> 00:35:34,319 Speaker 1: you're announcing fundraise, right, so what will you do with 643 00:35:34,360 --> 00:35:36,760 Speaker 1: the funds? You know, you have some really interesting large 644 00:35:36,760 --> 00:35:41,239 Speaker 1: backers and recent Heroitz blockchain capital coin based ventures. To 645 00:35:41,440 --> 00:35:45,160 Speaker 1: what degree can you grow using the new funds? Well, 646 00:35:45,160 --> 00:35:48,000 Speaker 1: I mean we've we've taken the destent from many a 647 00:35:48,000 --> 00:35:49,799 Speaker 1: few people over over the years, and also many of 648 00:35:49,840 --> 00:35:52,240 Speaker 1: those people that you just mentioned will support the tokens 649 00:35:52,320 --> 00:35:55,359 Speaker 1: just from the open market. But UM, the key thing 650 00:35:55,360 --> 00:35:59,000 Speaker 1: for us, they think is backing the new founders UM 651 00:35:59,040 --> 00:36:02,520 Speaker 1: in the ecosystem. They using the technology that we've created 652 00:36:02,880 --> 00:36:07,040 Speaker 1: two new use cases. So for example, our drive producing 653 00:36:07,040 --> 00:36:09,799 Speaker 1: the rub Ecosystem just raates eighteen million dollars in order 654 00:36:09,840 --> 00:36:14,320 Speaker 1: to create enterprise solutions on top of the system that 655 00:36:14,360 --> 00:36:17,879 Speaker 1: allow businesses to store their data into vacuity as well, 656 00:36:17,880 --> 00:36:20,680 Speaker 1: which of course it's very important for compliance reasons. Sometimes 657 00:36:22,640 --> 00:36:24,920 Speaker 1: we want to be thanking you for your time. Sam Williams, 658 00:36:24,960 --> 00:36:27,040 Speaker 1: of course are we founder, and we want to thank 659 00:36:27,120 --> 00:36:30,200 Speaker 1: Shanelli Bassa for bringing having us bring that interview. And 660 00:36:30,320 --> 00:36:33,399 Speaker 1: clearly some use cases currently being evolved as we look 661 00:36:33,480 --> 00:36:46,760 Speaker 1: between the Russia and Ukraine invasion. With Russia's invasion of Ukraine, 662 00:36:46,960 --> 00:36:49,799 Speaker 1: it's been of course accompanied by cyber attacks actually pre 663 00:36:49,920 --> 00:36:52,920 Speaker 1: emptying it to a certain extent, and now the question arises, 664 00:36:52,960 --> 00:36:55,760 Speaker 1: how do you prepare for cyber conflict? Can you glean 665 00:36:55,880 --> 00:36:59,279 Speaker 1: hints from history? Our next guest has some insights into 666 00:36:59,360 --> 00:37:03,839 Speaker 1: just that. Znowski is a threat hunter of sorts as 667 00:37:03,880 --> 00:37:07,200 Speaker 1: security software companies so farce it's great to have some 668 00:37:07,360 --> 00:37:10,879 Speaker 1: time with you and talk to us about what we've 669 00:37:10,960 --> 00:37:13,719 Speaker 1: learned in previous years and previous I mean we've learned 670 00:37:13,760 --> 00:37:17,799 Speaker 1: what perhaps sanctions due to Russia in their response, what 671 00:37:17,960 --> 00:37:22,960 Speaker 1: has their response been in terms of cyber well, it's 672 00:37:22,960 --> 00:37:26,479 Speaker 1: been quite a history, you know, most nation states haven't 673 00:37:26,480 --> 00:37:28,640 Speaker 1: really been caught doing too much, but with Russia there 674 00:37:28,680 --> 00:37:31,480 Speaker 1: was a lot of information to mine. There were you know, 675 00:37:31,480 --> 00:37:34,439 Speaker 1: they started doing cyber attacks against Estonia back in two 676 00:37:34,440 --> 00:37:38,239 Speaker 1: thousand seven and followed that with attacks against Georgia a 677 00:37:38,280 --> 00:37:41,040 Speaker 1: little after that. Of course, there were attacks during the 678 00:37:41,120 --> 00:37:46,279 Speaker 1: Crimean invasion U we've even seen them mess with Kurzakhstan 679 00:37:46,320 --> 00:37:49,799 Speaker 1: and other countries as well, and so we were kind 680 00:37:49,800 --> 00:37:51,239 Speaker 1: of able to kind of put together a bit of 681 00:37:51,280 --> 00:37:53,800 Speaker 1: a map of things as you see there on the screen, 682 00:37:54,040 --> 00:37:57,160 Speaker 1: and depending on the types of attacks, there's always a 683 00:37:57,160 --> 00:37:59,040 Speaker 1: bit of a pattern to it, which is what we 684 00:37:59,080 --> 00:38:01,480 Speaker 1: call denial of certain risk, but in essence taking down 685 00:38:02,040 --> 00:38:04,000 Speaker 1: you know, news and government websites, that kind of thing 686 00:38:04,000 --> 00:38:06,879 Speaker 1: to create confusion, followed by a lot of other types 687 00:38:06,880 --> 00:38:09,440 Speaker 1: of attacks told to us about the other types because 688 00:38:09,520 --> 00:38:14,320 Speaker 1: we've seen the DIDs attacks so far, in particular affecting Ukraine. 689 00:38:14,400 --> 00:38:18,080 Speaker 1: But what next, Well, you know, we we saw a 690 00:38:18,120 --> 00:38:20,239 Speaker 1: little bit of activity earlier this week, just before the 691 00:38:20,320 --> 00:38:22,759 Speaker 1: land invasion, which is again something we've seen before in 692 00:38:22,800 --> 00:38:26,879 Speaker 1: Russian operations, which are not attributed to Russia yet by 693 00:38:26,920 --> 00:38:30,480 Speaker 1: any government agency, but it's suspected these white so called 694 00:38:30,520 --> 00:38:33,640 Speaker 1: wiper attacks, which in essence is a computer virus that 695 00:38:33,680 --> 00:38:36,920 Speaker 1: gets on your computer and instead of stealing information or 696 00:38:37,040 --> 00:38:39,560 Speaker 1: things like that, it simply wipes the hard disks so 697 00:38:39,560 --> 00:38:43,000 Speaker 1: the computer is inoperable to sort of disrupt things. Uh, 698 00:38:43,040 --> 00:38:45,239 Speaker 1: and we did see some of that on Wednesday this week, 699 00:38:45,320 --> 00:38:47,919 Speaker 1: right before the land invasion. Interesting and we're just talking 700 00:38:47,960 --> 00:38:50,000 Speaker 1: to Sam Williams. Well, we've about how to be protecting 701 00:38:50,000 --> 00:38:52,960 Speaker 1: your data and enshowing it can be stored for longer 702 00:38:52,960 --> 00:38:57,400 Speaker 1: periods of time, and what about people in terms of 703 00:38:57,640 --> 00:38:59,719 Speaker 1: how stress the systems already are by the fact that 704 00:38:59,719 --> 00:39:01,400 Speaker 1: many of it are working from home at the moment. 705 00:39:01,520 --> 00:39:04,200 Speaker 1: Is that I haven't got the level of cybersecurity that 706 00:39:04,320 --> 00:39:07,200 Speaker 1: we should have. Have we learned the lessons of past. 707 00:39:08,440 --> 00:39:12,520 Speaker 1: Unfortunately we're our cybersecurity is not in good shape anywhere globally, 708 00:39:12,600 --> 00:39:16,640 Speaker 1: and particularly in Ukraine where resources were more limited than 709 00:39:16,680 --> 00:39:20,000 Speaker 1: perhaps we have in the West as financially. But the 710 00:39:20,000 --> 00:39:22,760 Speaker 1: pandemic has not helped this either. Right, We've we've opened 711 00:39:22,800 --> 00:39:26,000 Speaker 1: more remote doors to provide access to our networks and 712 00:39:26,000 --> 00:39:29,880 Speaker 1: our information then we normally would have, say publicly facing 713 00:39:30,040 --> 00:39:32,799 Speaker 1: and as a result that is that many more opportunities 714 00:39:32,840 --> 00:39:36,120 Speaker 1: for criminals or nation states to exploit that that openness. 715 00:39:36,680 --> 00:39:40,360 Speaker 1: And in past we've of course talked about the vulnerability 716 00:39:40,360 --> 00:39:42,880 Speaker 1: of infrastructure, in particular power of structure and the like. 717 00:39:43,000 --> 00:39:44,719 Speaker 1: Is that what we should be suspecting this time? What 718 00:39:44,760 --> 00:39:47,399 Speaker 1: does history tell us about where we should look vulnerabilities 719 00:39:47,400 --> 00:39:50,920 Speaker 1: going forward? It's really hard to say. I mean, I'm 720 00:39:50,920 --> 00:39:52,840 Speaker 1: not a political scientist, so I don't want to comment 721 00:39:52,880 --> 00:39:55,640 Speaker 1: too much on the politics of it, but it would 722 00:39:55,719 --> 00:39:59,160 Speaker 1: certainly seem at this point we've moved into a phase 723 00:39:59,239 --> 00:40:02,359 Speaker 1: where sort of nonstate actors are taking over as sort 724 00:40:02,400 --> 00:40:06,120 Speaker 1: of patriotic hackers, if you will. Um, the Ukrainian president 725 00:40:06,200 --> 00:40:10,080 Speaker 1: Zelinsky called on Ukrainian patriots to try to hack back 726 00:40:10,080 --> 00:40:13,319 Speaker 1: at Russia. UM, we've already throughout the day today, it's 727 00:40:13,320 --> 00:40:16,720 Speaker 1: been evolving. We've seen several criminal groups that are largely 728 00:40:16,760 --> 00:40:20,640 Speaker 1: believed to be based in Russia make probably public proclamations 729 00:40:20,719 --> 00:40:23,160 Speaker 1: that they're going to come after US and Western assets 730 00:40:23,160 --> 00:40:27,680 Speaker 1: and retribution uh for the sanctions or whatever other penalties 731 00:40:27,680 --> 00:40:31,160 Speaker 1: were imposing on Russia. And so that's ransomware? Is it 732 00:40:31,160 --> 00:40:34,000 Speaker 1: that they'll be coming off? Do do do you think certainly 733 00:40:34,520 --> 00:40:36,719 Speaker 1: ransomware groups of the ones that have been chattering, that's 734 00:40:36,760 --> 00:40:40,319 Speaker 1: for sure. They're not limited to ransomware necessarily. The one 735 00:40:40,360 --> 00:40:44,600 Speaker 1: particular ransomware group known as Kanti has, in our experience 736 00:40:44,800 --> 00:40:47,800 Speaker 1: uh performed some of these wiping attacks when they weren't 737 00:40:47,800 --> 00:40:51,160 Speaker 1: paid the ransom in a previous ransom attempts. So they 738 00:40:51,200 --> 00:40:53,759 Speaker 1: could certainly get even nastier than taking our data and 739 00:40:53,800 --> 00:40:57,239 Speaker 1: simply abuse access. They may have already footholds that they 740 00:40:57,239 --> 00:41:00,279 Speaker 1: have inside of Western assets and just delete things to 741 00:41:00,320 --> 00:41:03,000 Speaker 1: be disruptive. Chat. How many cools are you getting at 742 00:41:03,040 --> 00:41:07,480 Speaker 1: the moment? So what are you doing to help your clients? Uh, Well, 743 00:41:07,520 --> 00:41:09,759 Speaker 1: it's it's a busy time, and you know, the the 744 00:41:09,840 --> 00:41:14,600 Speaker 1: challenge for each individual organization is identifying what their weaknesses 745 00:41:14,640 --> 00:41:17,239 Speaker 1: are and on short notice, what they may be able 746 00:41:17,280 --> 00:41:19,440 Speaker 1: to do to try to mitigate some of the risk 747 00:41:19,520 --> 00:41:23,000 Speaker 1: of being victimized. And so there's been a lot of long, 748 00:41:23,120 --> 00:41:25,680 Speaker 1: well thought conversations with some of the larger clients, just 749 00:41:25,760 --> 00:41:29,080 Speaker 1: having conversations about what can you do right now to 750 00:41:29,160 --> 00:41:31,680 Speaker 1: make the best of the situation. What do you watch 751 00:41:31,719 --> 00:41:33,799 Speaker 1: for to know that something may be underway where you 752 00:41:33,800 --> 00:41:35,960 Speaker 1: may want to batten down the hatches. One thing that 753 00:41:36,000 --> 00:41:40,960 Speaker 1: we should look for. Well, certainly, um, we've seen a 754 00:41:41,000 --> 00:41:43,880 Speaker 1: lot of abuse of unpatched networking equipment. So back to 755 00:41:43,960 --> 00:41:46,399 Speaker 1: that COVID pandemic question. All of us working from home 756 00:41:46,440 --> 00:41:51,840 Speaker 1: with VPNs and things, the Russians have persistently abused those 757 00:41:51,880 --> 00:41:54,480 Speaker 1: flaws when they're not fixed, and so certainly making sure 758 00:41:54,480 --> 00:41:57,840 Speaker 1: those fixes are applied, and monitoring the network very careful 759 00:41:57,880 --> 00:42:01,640 Speaker 1: for unusual activity, especially things that may involve the you know, 760 00:42:01,719 --> 00:42:05,359 Speaker 1: large quantities of data being transported at off hours are 761 00:42:05,400 --> 00:42:09,000 Speaker 1: often signs of an extortion or ransomware attack. Chat. Really 762 00:42:09,000 --> 00:42:11,680 Speaker 1: good to speak with you, Thank you so much, checks 763 00:42:12,200 --> 00:42:16,480 Speaker 1: very much, principal research scientist at so Fast. Meanwhile, that 764 00:42:16,640 --> 00:42:18,759 Speaker 1: does it for this edition of Bloomberg Technology. You want 765 00:42:18,760 --> 00:42:20,680 Speaker 1: to stick around though all Street Week. It's up next 766 00:42:20,960 --> 00:42:24,000 Speaker 1: my colleague David Weston of course leading that as always 767 00:42:24,080 --> 00:42:27,080 Speaker 1: Larry Summers there to discuss and a real deep dive 768 00:42:27,160 --> 00:42:30,120 Speaker 1: into an extraordinary week and when we actually saw us 769 00:42:30,200 --> 00:42:33,960 Speaker 1: benchmarks closed them week higher. He's going to be joined 770 00:42:34,000 --> 00:42:37,160 Speaker 1: by Jane Harmon, president of the Wilson Center, alongside Kate Morricy, 771 00:42:37,280 --> 00:42:40,320 Speaker 1: a black Rock Global Allocation team and former Trasury sectary. 772 00:42:40,360 --> 00:42:44,360 Speaker 1: As I mentioned, Larry Summers stay with him From a 773 00:42:44,480 --> 00:42:47,799 Speaker 1: clearer New York, wishing you all a well weekend. This 774 00:42:47,920 --> 00:42:48,560 Speaker 1: is Bloomberg