WEBVTT - Fed Proposes Rule Rollback for All But Biggest Banks

0:00:03.480 --> 0:00:07.560
<v Speaker 1>Welcome to the Bloomberg Law Podcast. I'm June Grosso. Every

0:00:07.640 --> 0:00:10.440
<v Speaker 1>day we bring you insight and analysis into the most

0:00:10.480 --> 0:00:13.399
<v Speaker 1>important legal news of the day. You can find more

0:00:13.480 --> 0:00:18.040
<v Speaker 1>episodes of the Bloomberg Law Podcast on Apple Podcasts, SoundCloud,

0:00:18.320 --> 0:00:23.160
<v Speaker 1>and on Bloomberg dot com slash podcasts. Yesterday, the Federal

0:00:23.200 --> 0:00:26.960
<v Speaker 1>Reserve proposed new banking rules that reduced regulations for all

0:00:27.040 --> 0:00:30.600
<v Speaker 1>but America's biggest lenders in an effort to reduce regulatory

0:00:30.640 --> 0:00:34.280
<v Speaker 1>compliance requirements. In a speech in September, FED Chair J.

0:00:34.479 --> 0:00:39.839
<v Speaker 1>Powell discussed banking regulations. We want the strongest regulation, that

0:00:39.960 --> 0:00:42.480
<v Speaker 1>the highest standards to be applied to the very large

0:00:42.479 --> 0:00:46.560
<v Speaker 1>financial institutions that are systemically important. As we moved down

0:00:47.280 --> 0:00:50.600
<v Speaker 1>the food chain to the regionals and then the medium

0:00:50.600 --> 0:00:53.560
<v Speaker 1>sized banks, and then into the smaller community banks, we

0:00:53.600 --> 0:00:57.600
<v Speaker 1>want to make sure that we're tailoring regulation substantially at

0:00:57.640 --> 0:01:00.720
<v Speaker 1>each step of that. Joining me is Robert Howckety, professor

0:01:00.760 --> 0:01:04.200
<v Speaker 1>at Cornell University Law School. So, Bob, now, there will

0:01:04.240 --> 0:01:07.520
<v Speaker 1>be a tiered system for bank regulations that will depend

0:01:07.560 --> 0:01:10.920
<v Speaker 1>not only on total assets, but on other risk factors

0:01:11.000 --> 0:01:15.759
<v Speaker 1>as well. Will you explain how the system will work? Yeah?

0:01:15.800 --> 0:01:18.600
<v Speaker 1>So it's it's actually kind of surprising. I think Chairman

0:01:18.680 --> 0:01:22.840
<v Speaker 1>Powell has to some extent mischaracterized, UM, what the nature

0:01:22.840 --> 0:01:25.959
<v Speaker 1>of the proposal is that proposed rule change is that

0:01:26.040 --> 0:01:28.959
<v Speaker 1>was announced yesterday. Right. So originally what we were, what

0:01:29.040 --> 0:01:31.600
<v Speaker 1>we did after the crash, right with John Frank, was

0:01:31.640 --> 0:01:34.520
<v Speaker 1>we would say we said, basically, all banking institutions with

0:01:34.600 --> 0:01:38.160
<v Speaker 1>assets in excess of about fifty billion would be subject

0:01:38.240 --> 0:01:41.360
<v Speaker 1>to some heightened credential standards, in particular in the realm

0:01:41.360 --> 0:01:46.360
<v Speaker 1>of capital regulation UH and liquidity regulation. UM. Then, as

0:01:46.360 --> 0:01:50.400
<v Speaker 1>we talked about last spring, UM, the Congress UH and

0:01:50.480 --> 0:01:54.560
<v Speaker 1>Mr Trump changed the rules of their last spring by

0:01:54.640 --> 0:01:58.200
<v Speaker 1>raising that threshold to two d fifty billion, right from

0:01:58.240 --> 0:02:01.720
<v Speaker 1>fifty billion, So they quintupled it right now. UM. What

0:02:01.760 --> 0:02:04.320
<v Speaker 1>they did was and they gave the Fed UH sort

0:02:04.320 --> 0:02:08.280
<v Speaker 1>of instructions to UM sort of change the credential rules

0:02:08.320 --> 0:02:10.120
<v Speaker 1>that would apply sort of in light of that new

0:02:10.120 --> 0:02:12.800
<v Speaker 1>set of standards. But we were given to think that

0:02:12.880 --> 0:02:16.160
<v Speaker 1>at least they would stay high, right, stay high for

0:02:16.320 --> 0:02:19.320
<v Speaker 1>the banks that were two hundred billion and larger. But

0:02:19.440 --> 0:02:22.079
<v Speaker 1>what's really quite most intriguing I think about the FED

0:02:22.120 --> 0:02:25.240
<v Speaker 1>proposal announced yesterday was that they're actually going to relax

0:02:25.280 --> 0:02:28.920
<v Speaker 1>the capital standards and liquidity standards even for the banks

0:02:29.240 --> 0:02:33.880
<v Speaker 1>with assets between two hundred fifty and seven hundred billion dollars. So,

0:02:34.000 --> 0:02:36.440
<v Speaker 1>in other words, the sort of tiered system that Mr

0:02:36.440 --> 0:02:39.000
<v Speaker 1>Powell was talking about is in a way a kind

0:02:39.000 --> 0:02:40.560
<v Speaker 1>of a distraction. In a way, it's a kind of

0:02:40.560 --> 0:02:42.800
<v Speaker 1>a side show, because the thing that's most remarkable and

0:02:42.800 --> 0:02:45.600
<v Speaker 1>surprising is the fact that they're relaxing the standards even

0:02:45.600 --> 0:02:49.200
<v Speaker 1>for the largest banks. So does we does weakening the

0:02:49.280 --> 0:02:53.799
<v Speaker 1>rules even for banks that are not considered systemically important

0:02:53.880 --> 0:02:56.120
<v Speaker 1>pose a risk to the system? And what about for

0:02:56.200 --> 0:03:00.640
<v Speaker 1>banks that are? Yeah, I think, uh, it only proposed

0:03:00.760 --> 0:03:03.280
<v Speaker 1>poses a significant risk to the system. Right to relax

0:03:03.360 --> 0:03:06.520
<v Speaker 1>the capital standards and the liquidity standards for the mega banks,

0:03:06.560 --> 0:03:09.200
<v Speaker 1>right the two hundred billion and larger um. I think

0:03:09.320 --> 0:03:13.240
<v Speaker 1>it also I think adds significant risk to the system. Uh,

0:03:13.280 --> 0:03:16.880
<v Speaker 1>to lighten the regulatory load for the institutions between fifty

0:03:16.919 --> 0:03:20.240
<v Speaker 1>and two hundred fifty billion as well. In other words,

0:03:20.360 --> 0:03:23.040
<v Speaker 1>I think that the legislation that was pasted last spring

0:03:23.360 --> 0:03:26.560
<v Speaker 1>that we talked about was itself also a move in

0:03:26.600 --> 0:03:28.560
<v Speaker 1>the wrong direction. I think it's a bit of a

0:03:28.560 --> 0:03:31.239
<v Speaker 1>mistake to describe banks that have a hundred billion or

0:03:31.240 --> 0:03:34.000
<v Speaker 1>a hundred fifty billion dollars in assets as being small

0:03:34.360 --> 0:03:37.880
<v Speaker 1>community banks. These are huge institutions. They're simply a bit

0:03:37.920 --> 0:03:42.640
<v Speaker 1>smaller than the two billion dollar institutions. So I think

0:03:42.640 --> 0:03:44.760
<v Speaker 1>you add risk of the system even by doing that.

0:03:45.000 --> 0:03:48.120
<v Speaker 1>And so we were moving in the wrong direction even

0:03:48.280 --> 0:03:52.080
<v Speaker 1>last spring. But again, the surprising thing about yesterday is

0:03:52.120 --> 0:03:55.000
<v Speaker 1>that we're learning the FED wants to go even further

0:03:55.360 --> 0:03:58.200
<v Speaker 1>in the wrong direction, even with respect to those mega

0:03:58.200 --> 0:04:02.200
<v Speaker 1>banks with assets under management of over two Well, there's

0:04:02.240 --> 0:04:07.240
<v Speaker 1>also apparently more streamlining and tweaking of regulations in the works.

0:04:07.760 --> 0:04:11.160
<v Speaker 1>Tell us about the momentum that financial regulators seem to

0:04:11.160 --> 0:04:16.560
<v Speaker 1>be gaining and the new what maybe happen next? Yeah, So,

0:04:16.640 --> 0:04:19.960
<v Speaker 1>I mean the trend is sort of predictable. Um, I

0:04:20.000 --> 0:04:22.000
<v Speaker 1>think the only thing that might not have been predicted

0:04:22.040 --> 0:04:26.000
<v Speaker 1>was just speed with which it has sort of commenced

0:04:26.120 --> 0:04:28.919
<v Speaker 1>and then with which it has been proceeding ever since.

0:04:28.960 --> 0:04:32.240
<v Speaker 1>It commands right, so we seem to be relaxing again

0:04:32.279 --> 0:04:34.920
<v Speaker 1>liquidity standards and capital standards, which are probably the most

0:04:34.920 --> 0:04:40.080
<v Speaker 1>important macroprudential regulatory tools that we have. In addition of course,

0:04:40.080 --> 0:04:42.560
<v Speaker 1>we're rolling back the regulations in the realm of consumer

0:04:42.600 --> 0:04:46.120
<v Speaker 1>financial protection, which not only is important, of course to

0:04:46.240 --> 0:04:49.000
<v Speaker 1>ordinary James and Joe's like you and me, but also

0:04:49.080 --> 0:04:51.479
<v Speaker 1>is systemically important because as we know, right the most

0:04:51.520 --> 0:04:55.200
<v Speaker 1>toxic assets that ultimately cause a financial system to implode

0:04:55.560 --> 0:04:58.960
<v Speaker 1>often are those that are extended in predatory ways that

0:04:59.000 --> 0:05:02.480
<v Speaker 1>would normally be prohibited if we had actual, you know,

0:05:02.520 --> 0:05:06.159
<v Speaker 1>strong consumer protection standards still in place. But as you

0:05:06.240 --> 0:05:09.560
<v Speaker 1>as you know, of course, Mr mulvaney effectively worked a

0:05:09.640 --> 0:05:13.720
<v Speaker 1>coup in taking over the CFPB about a year ago

0:05:14.240 --> 0:05:17.120
<v Speaker 1>and has basically dropped most of the enforcement actions that

0:05:17.200 --> 0:05:20.640
<v Speaker 1>it had underway. And now we have actual statutory changes

0:05:20.680 --> 0:05:25.080
<v Speaker 1>and regulatory changes a foot, essentially repealing or eliminating particular

0:05:25.120 --> 0:05:27.880
<v Speaker 1>regulations that the CFPB would have had the jurisdiction to

0:05:28.600 --> 0:05:32.080
<v Speaker 1>enforce in the first place. So that's yet another way

0:05:32.240 --> 0:05:34.760
<v Speaker 1>in which I think we're really heading in the wrong direction,

0:05:35.040 --> 0:05:38.680
<v Speaker 1>and at an accelerated pace that I think is quite ominous.

0:05:39.560 --> 0:05:42.279
<v Speaker 1>The Federal Reserve and the Office of the Control of

0:05:42.279 --> 0:05:46.120
<v Speaker 1>the Currency are independent bank regulators. How much of the

0:05:46.160 --> 0:05:49.680
<v Speaker 1>easing of regulations is coming from within those agencies, and

0:05:49.720 --> 0:05:54.800
<v Speaker 1>how much from pressure from without. So that's always a

0:05:54.800 --> 0:05:58.000
<v Speaker 1>somewhat tough call, because the the pressure from now without

0:05:58.120 --> 0:06:00.320
<v Speaker 1>is sort of hard to measure. As you had. These

0:06:00.320 --> 0:06:02.960
<v Speaker 1>are independent agencies, and so they are nominally or you know,

0:06:03.000 --> 0:06:07.159
<v Speaker 1>strictly speaking, uh, not subject to pressures that are imposed

0:06:07.160 --> 0:06:10.000
<v Speaker 1>by Congress or by the President once they're in office.

0:06:10.200 --> 0:06:12.159
<v Speaker 1>But I think it would be unrealistic to think that

0:06:12.160 --> 0:06:16.120
<v Speaker 1>they're not affected, um by say, constant hearings or constant

0:06:16.160 --> 0:06:19.479
<v Speaker 1>haranguing by a president or by members of Congress or

0:06:19.480 --> 0:06:22.880
<v Speaker 1>what have you. So it's possible that the pressure that's

0:06:22.880 --> 0:06:26.240
<v Speaker 1>being applied by by Republicans and Congress and by Mr

0:06:26.240 --> 0:06:29.719
<v Speaker 1>Trump himself and his Treasury departments are having some effect.

0:06:30.040 --> 0:06:32.880
<v Speaker 1>But it's also, of course possible that these people themselves, right,

0:06:32.920 --> 0:06:36.120
<v Speaker 1>the people in the agencies are a bit more of

0:06:36.240 --> 0:06:39.640
<v Speaker 1>a deregulatory persuasion, if for no other reason than that

0:06:39.839 --> 0:06:44.240
<v Speaker 1>a growing number of them are, of course appointees of Mr. Trump's.

0:06:44.240 --> 0:06:47.480
<v Speaker 1>So mid terms are coming up, Bob. If the Democrats

0:06:47.560 --> 0:06:50.560
<v Speaker 1>take the House or the Senate in the midterms, will

0:06:50.600 --> 0:06:57.120
<v Speaker 1>that stop or slow the deregulatory efforts. I think it will, uh,

0:06:57.120 --> 0:07:00.400
<v Speaker 1>And I have a somewhat idiosyncratic reason for thinking so

0:07:00.520 --> 0:07:02.440
<v Speaker 1>that I haven't seen out in the press yet, So

0:07:02.480 --> 0:07:05.400
<v Speaker 1>as you know, I'm sort of metabolically optimistic. UM, So

0:07:05.480 --> 0:07:06.880
<v Speaker 1>you might you might want to sort of take this

0:07:06.960 --> 0:07:08.920
<v Speaker 1>with a grain of salt. But I actually think we're

0:07:08.920 --> 0:07:10.360
<v Speaker 1>going to that the Dems are going to take the

0:07:10.400 --> 0:07:15.040
<v Speaker 1>House and the Senate. I think when that happens, Mr

0:07:15.080 --> 0:07:18.320
<v Speaker 1>Trump is going to become a kind of Democrat. We

0:07:18.360 --> 0:07:22.160
<v Speaker 1>know he doesn't have principles, right, He's a very pragmatic

0:07:22.160 --> 0:07:24.520
<v Speaker 1>would be the nice way of saying it. Opportunistic would

0:07:24.520 --> 0:07:26.680
<v Speaker 1>be the somewhat lass nice way of saying it. I

0:07:26.720 --> 0:07:30.600
<v Speaker 1>think Mr Trump, keen on leaving a legacy, UM, is

0:07:30.640 --> 0:07:33.840
<v Speaker 1>going to sound increasingly like a Democrat once the Congress

0:07:33.920 --> 0:07:37.120
<v Speaker 1>change his hands. And at that point, Um, the pressures

0:07:37.280 --> 0:07:40.520
<v Speaker 1>on the regulators will be of a decidedly different sort

0:07:40.560 --> 0:07:43.040
<v Speaker 1>than they've been over the last couple of years, and that,

0:07:43.160 --> 0:07:45.320
<v Speaker 1>at at least at the margin, I think, will slow

0:07:45.600 --> 0:07:48.800
<v Speaker 1>the rate of the regulatory momentum that we've seen gathering

0:07:48.840 --> 0:07:51.880
<v Speaker 1>steam over the last couple of years. I'm almost speechless, Bob,

0:07:51.920 --> 0:07:56.160
<v Speaker 1>but not quite so. So what about just we have

0:07:56.200 --> 0:07:59.720
<v Speaker 1>about forty five seconds here? Will will democrats. If they

0:07:59.720 --> 0:08:03.320
<v Speaker 1>take control and they start being in charge of the

0:08:03.320 --> 0:08:07.960
<v Speaker 1>banking committees, etcetera. Will that have any effect about thirty seconds? Yeah,

0:08:08.000 --> 0:08:10.480
<v Speaker 1>it does have an effect. Again, it's hard to measure it,

0:08:10.920 --> 0:08:13.760
<v Speaker 1>but you know, the regulators are not completely autistic, right.

0:08:13.800 --> 0:08:16.720
<v Speaker 1>They hear the pressures, they hear what people are saying,

0:08:16.720 --> 0:08:19.080
<v Speaker 1>what people are thinking. And if most of the pressures

0:08:19.080 --> 0:08:21.240
<v Speaker 1>and most of the thoughts that are being expressed come

0:08:21.280 --> 0:08:24.560
<v Speaker 1>from a pro regulatory angle, um, that can't help but

0:08:24.640 --> 0:08:27.160
<v Speaker 1>affect them. All right, Thanks so much, Bob. As always,

0:08:27.160 --> 0:08:30.320
<v Speaker 1>that's Robert Hockety. He is a professor at Cornell University

0:08:30.400 --> 0:08:39.679
<v Speaker 1>Law School. Robert Bauer is the man accused of killing

0:08:39.760 --> 0:08:43.160
<v Speaker 1>eleven people in a Pittsburgh synagogue, pleaded not guilty in

0:08:43.200 --> 0:08:46.840
<v Speaker 1>federal court today to forty four counts, including murder and

0:08:46.920 --> 0:08:50.520
<v Speaker 1>hate crimes. Joining me as former federal prosecutor Robert Mint's

0:08:50.559 --> 0:08:54.080
<v Speaker 1>a partner McCarter in English, Bob tell us about the

0:08:54.160 --> 0:08:58.040
<v Speaker 1>hate crimes he's charged with and what prosecutors will have

0:08:58.200 --> 0:09:02.560
<v Speaker 1>to prove to convict him of those, or well, the

0:09:02.800 --> 0:09:07.400
<v Speaker 1>history of hate crimes really starts in UH nineteen one

0:09:07.480 --> 0:09:10.960
<v Speaker 1>Congress past the first hate crime statute, and it basically

0:09:11.559 --> 0:09:14.839
<v Speaker 1>makes it a crime to use or threatened force to

0:09:14.960 --> 0:09:18.760
<v Speaker 1>wilthy interfere with any person because of their race, color, religion,

0:09:19.280 --> 0:09:23.440
<v Speaker 1>or national origin. So it's it's an interesting statute because

0:09:24.120 --> 0:09:29.520
<v Speaker 1>generally criminal statute don't look to the motive behind a

0:09:29.600 --> 0:09:33.160
<v Speaker 1>killing or an act, and they simply look to the conduct.

0:09:33.480 --> 0:09:36.680
<v Speaker 1>But in this case hate crimes, procecutes have to prove

0:09:37.240 --> 0:09:40.040
<v Speaker 1>that not only was somebody murdered, but they were murdered

0:09:40.520 --> 0:09:44.320
<v Speaker 1>um because of their their gender, because of their race,

0:09:44.440 --> 0:09:48.240
<v Speaker 1>because of their religion, and so it really goes to

0:09:48.360 --> 0:09:52.080
<v Speaker 1>the motive of the killing. And in this case, the motive,

0:09:52.320 --> 0:09:56.480
<v Speaker 1>according to procecures with anti Semitism. The um the gunmen

0:09:56.960 --> 0:10:00.160
<v Speaker 1>shouted out death to Jews or something to the out

0:10:00.160 --> 0:10:02.880
<v Speaker 1>of fact as he was shooting allegedly in the temple,

0:10:02.960 --> 0:10:04.559
<v Speaker 1>and that's what they will rely upon in order to

0:10:04.640 --> 0:10:08.320
<v Speaker 1>prove those charges. Death penalty cases are rare in federal court,

0:10:08.720 --> 0:10:12.640
<v Speaker 1>but here federal prosecutors say they are pursuing the death penalty,

0:10:12.679 --> 0:10:16.240
<v Speaker 1>explain how that affects the trial itself. For example, the

0:10:16.280 --> 0:10:21.800
<v Speaker 1>selection of a death penalty qualified jury. Sure, well, as

0:10:21.840 --> 0:10:24.839
<v Speaker 1>you said, June death penalty cases are relatively rare in

0:10:24.920 --> 0:10:28.360
<v Speaker 1>federal court. Only three people have been executed since the

0:10:28.440 --> 0:10:33.959
<v Speaker 1>federal death penalty was reinstated in UM And ultimately, it's

0:10:33.960 --> 0:10:37.480
<v Speaker 1>important for people to remember that the decision about whether

0:10:37.920 --> 0:10:41.599
<v Speaker 1>a defendant will receive death or life in prison is

0:10:41.720 --> 0:10:44.360
<v Speaker 1>up to the jury. Uh So that means that when

0:10:44.360 --> 0:10:47.920
<v Speaker 1>the jury is impaneled UM their additional questions that have

0:10:48.040 --> 0:10:50.160
<v Speaker 1>to be asked to those jurors to make sure that

0:10:50.280 --> 0:10:53.720
<v Speaker 1>jurors can approach that decision with an open mind, and

0:10:53.960 --> 0:10:57.840
<v Speaker 1>jurors who have a moral aversion to the death penalty

0:10:58.200 --> 0:11:01.200
<v Speaker 1>regardless of the facts of a case UM will not

0:11:01.360 --> 0:11:04.080
<v Speaker 1>be permitted to sit on that jury. So it takes

0:11:04.120 --> 0:11:07.800
<v Speaker 1>time for both the defense and prosecutors to arrive with

0:11:07.840 --> 0:11:10.679
<v Speaker 1>the jury that they think can be fair. And if

0:11:10.679 --> 0:11:13.000
<v Speaker 1>you're the prosecutor, you want to make sure it's somebody

0:11:13.040 --> 0:11:16.880
<v Speaker 1>who is willing to apply the death penalty if they

0:11:16.880 --> 0:11:19.520
<v Speaker 1>believe it's warranted under the facts of the case. So

0:11:19.679 --> 0:11:22.240
<v Speaker 1>if he's found guilty of the crimes that carry the

0:11:22.280 --> 0:11:26.120
<v Speaker 1>death penalty, there will be a death penalty phase and

0:11:26.320 --> 0:11:29.880
<v Speaker 1>the jury will hear from witnesses, including the victims. The

0:11:29.960 --> 0:11:33.400
<v Speaker 1>Washington Boast has a story out today that some rabbis

0:11:33.520 --> 0:11:37.320
<v Speaker 1>oppose the death penalties even in this case. How might

0:11:37.440 --> 0:11:43.400
<v Speaker 1>that way into the jury's decision into the presentation, Well,

0:11:43.440 --> 0:11:46.680
<v Speaker 1>it does weigh in. Prosecutors are always going to listen

0:11:46.760 --> 0:11:49.520
<v Speaker 1>to victims as they put their case together, and on

0:11:49.559 --> 0:11:52.719
<v Speaker 1>a question of whether to seek the death penalty, the

0:11:53.080 --> 0:11:57.160
<v Speaker 1>victims will be considered, but ultimately the decision is with

0:11:57.280 --> 0:12:01.160
<v Speaker 1>the Department of Justice and with prosecutors, because prosecutors are

0:12:01.160 --> 0:12:04.520
<v Speaker 1>of course representing the entire country, not only the victims

0:12:04.559 --> 0:12:07.360
<v Speaker 1>of the crime. But for example, in the Dylan Roof

0:12:07.440 --> 0:12:10.800
<v Speaker 1>case where the white supremacist was sentenced to death last

0:12:10.880 --> 0:12:14.480
<v Speaker 1>year for hate driven crimes, that was a case where

0:12:14.520 --> 0:12:17.320
<v Speaker 1>families of those victims also did not want them to

0:12:17.320 --> 0:12:20.320
<v Speaker 1>be executed because of their Christian beliefs. So it's something

0:12:20.320 --> 0:12:23.360
<v Speaker 1>prosecutes will have to consider. But ultimately the decision about

0:12:23.360 --> 0:12:26.720
<v Speaker 1>whether the charge and seek the death penalty will be

0:12:26.760 --> 0:12:29.360
<v Speaker 1>with prosecutors and of course jury. The jury will ultimately

0:12:29.400 --> 0:12:34.200
<v Speaker 1>make that determination, but the state is also charging him,

0:12:34.400 --> 0:12:37.839
<v Speaker 1>and the Allegheny County District Attorney has also said he

0:12:37.880 --> 0:12:41.360
<v Speaker 1>will seek the death penalty. What's the point of having

0:12:41.400 --> 0:12:46.520
<v Speaker 1>a state trial after a federal trial. That's a good question.

0:12:46.520 --> 0:12:49.520
<v Speaker 1>A lot of people are are perplexed by that. Um.

0:12:49.600 --> 0:12:52.000
<v Speaker 1>The reason that there is a state trial as well

0:12:52.120 --> 0:12:55.600
<v Speaker 1>is because these crimes uh constitute violations of both state

0:12:55.679 --> 0:12:58.920
<v Speaker 1>and federal law. So the state has a basis to

0:12:58.960 --> 0:13:01.880
<v Speaker 1>bring these charges as well, and often those charges are

0:13:01.920 --> 0:13:05.120
<v Speaker 1>brought in the state after the federal charges, just to

0:13:05.280 --> 0:13:08.520
<v Speaker 1>ensure that if ultimately the federal charges are overturned for

0:13:08.600 --> 0:13:11.560
<v Speaker 1>any reason, that there are these other charges out there

0:13:11.800 --> 0:13:15.640
<v Speaker 1>that will ensure that the defendant remains in jail, and

0:13:15.720 --> 0:13:19.000
<v Speaker 1>ultimately it maybe the state charges on which he is

0:13:19.480 --> 0:13:22.640
<v Speaker 1>um sentenced instead of the federal charges. But it's important

0:13:22.679 --> 0:13:25.400
<v Speaker 1>to also note that under the death penalty process, the

0:13:25.480 --> 0:13:29.760
<v Speaker 1>federal system is more will move more expeditiously, because a

0:13:29.840 --> 0:13:32.520
<v Speaker 1>death penalty conviction on the state level runs through the

0:13:32.559 --> 0:13:35.559
<v Speaker 1>appeals process on the state level and then has a

0:13:35.600 --> 0:13:39.040
<v Speaker 1>complete second layer of appeals through the federal system. Through

0:13:39.040 --> 0:13:42.079
<v Speaker 1>convicted of only the federal death penalty, it only goes

0:13:42.080 --> 0:13:44.800
<v Speaker 1>through one layer of appellate review and moves a little

0:13:44.800 --> 0:13:47.360
<v Speaker 1>bit quicker, but in either case the process is slow.

0:13:48.559 --> 0:13:53.760
<v Speaker 1>Question about the proceeding this morning, his federal public defender said,

0:13:53.760 --> 0:13:57.000
<v Speaker 1>he pleaded not guilty quote as is typical at this

0:13:57.080 --> 0:14:00.160
<v Speaker 1>stage of the preceding. It is typical, but stay think

0:14:00.200 --> 0:14:02.840
<v Speaker 1>it is not so typical. Was that just information or

0:14:02.880 --> 0:14:05.920
<v Speaker 1>was he signaling a change of plea pros possibly we

0:14:05.960 --> 0:14:09.720
<v Speaker 1>have about forty seconds here. Well, you're right, Jim is

0:14:09.720 --> 0:14:12.040
<v Speaker 1>not typical. Uh, it may be that he's trying to

0:14:12.080 --> 0:14:14.319
<v Speaker 1>signal the prosecutors that he's looking to cut some kind

0:14:14.320 --> 0:14:16.880
<v Speaker 1>of a deal. Often in those cases, the role of

0:14:16.880 --> 0:14:19.760
<v Speaker 1>the public defender or the defense lawyer is simply to

0:14:19.800 --> 0:14:22.200
<v Speaker 1>try to save his client's life and try to see

0:14:22.200 --> 0:14:24.840
<v Speaker 1>whether he can convince prosecutors to accept the guilty plea

0:14:25.080 --> 0:14:27.560
<v Speaker 1>that will only result in life in prison as opposed

0:14:27.560 --> 0:14:30.280
<v Speaker 1>to the death penalty. Thanks so much, Bob. That's Robert Mens.

0:14:30.320 --> 0:14:33.120
<v Speaker 1>He's a partner McCarter and English, a former federal prosecutor.

0:14:33.560 --> 0:14:36.520
<v Speaker 1>Thanks for listening to the Bloomberg Law Podcast. You can

0:14:36.560 --> 0:14:40.320
<v Speaker 1>subscribe and listen to the show on Apple podcast, SoundCloud,

0:14:40.360 --> 0:14:44.280
<v Speaker 1>and on Bloomberg dot com slash podcast. I'm June Brosso.

0:14:44.760 --> 0:14:46.040
<v Speaker 1>This is Bloomberg