WEBVTT - How easy is it to steal a nuclear bomb?

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<v Speaker 1>Brought to you by the reinvented two thousand twelve camera.

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<v Speaker 1>It's ready. Are you welcome to stuff? You should know

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<v Speaker 1>from how Stuff Works dot Com. Everybody loves Altoy. It's

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<v Speaker 1>little ments that come intense. Well, once the ments are gone,

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<v Speaker 1>you can do some really neat things with the leftover tens.

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<v Speaker 1>People have made MP three players, cameras, even stoves. Check

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<v Speaker 1>out how stuff works dot com slash tent evats to

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<v Speaker 1>find out more. Hey, and welcome to the podcast. I'm

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<v Speaker 1>Josh Clark. Sitting across from me is the always likable

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<v Speaker 1>Charles W. Chuck Bryant so not so Oh, It's treat Chuck.

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<v Speaker 1>Everybody likes you. You're the most affable fella. I know.

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<v Speaker 1>I used to think so you are. I believe you. Thanks. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>Chuck's a little down today, So we're gonna talk about

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<v Speaker 1>stealing nuclear bombs. Little pork me up Penal Bright in

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<v Speaker 1>your day, wont it? Chuck? Of course you've seen the

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<v Speaker 1>five Robert Zemecka's classic Back to the Few. Sure I

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<v Speaker 1>knew you were going to bring that up. Well, you

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<v Speaker 1>know me pretty well. I even wrote down Back to

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<v Speaker 1>the Future in here somewhere we're in sync my friend.

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<v Speaker 1>Arguably that was that was Thomas F. Wilson's greatest role. Um,

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<v Speaker 1>who was that the guy who played Biff? No, Actually,

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<v Speaker 1>I was looking at him on internet movie database. Guy

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<v Speaker 1>has been in a lot of stuff. Huh, Well he's Biff.

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<v Speaker 1>He was also an Ecttion Jackson. He had a cameos deff.

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<v Speaker 1>It's like Frank Oz and the Blues Brothers. Um. Well,

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<v Speaker 1>if you remember, as I'm sure you do, since you

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<v Speaker 1>wrote down Back to the Future on your notes, Um,

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<v Speaker 1>there was a kind of a subplot going on with

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<v Speaker 1>Doc and his dealings with Middle Eastern terrorists. I didn't

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<v Speaker 1>remember that. I thought this was a podcast on Jigawatts

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<v Speaker 1>get it? Yeah? Um, so, okay, well then you do

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<v Speaker 1>remember that Doc was he was selling some plutonium to

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<v Speaker 1>these terrorists, right, or they wanted plutoni him from it.

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<v Speaker 1>And the reason of course that they wanted plutonium, he

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<v Speaker 1>kept it for the dolorium by the way, of course. Okay,

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<v Speaker 1>but the reason they wanted plutonium is because ostensibly they

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<v Speaker 1>were going to manufacture a nuclear weapon, right, And that

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<v Speaker 1>is not outside the realm of possibilities. Scarily enough, it's

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<v Speaker 1>not Chuck. There was another movie too. They're back to

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<v Speaker 1>the future too yet know was a movie called The

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<v Speaker 1>Manhattan Project where a teenager steals enriched uranium to make

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<v Speaker 1>an atomic bomb for his science project. I remember that,

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<v Speaker 1>John Liftgal, Yes, bad movie. I haven't seen it, though

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<v Speaker 1>it wasn't bad, And if I remember correctly, everyone as

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<v Speaker 1>you would say, that was right in my wheelhouse. I

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<v Speaker 1>was ten at the time and thinking of making my

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<v Speaker 1>own nuclear weapons. Well, right, it's at the same time

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<v Speaker 1>as war games, which we'll get to in a minute.

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<v Speaker 1>Oh we will, yes, right, oh yeah. Seeing the agenda

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<v Speaker 1>that you have war games written down a well, this

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<v Speaker 1>one is rife with movie and TV references. So Chuck,

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<v Speaker 1>let's talk about stealing a nuclear weapon. Um, how easy

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<v Speaker 1>is it? Well, there's a first of all, we should

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<v Speaker 1>go ahead and say it's probably impossible to steal a

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<v Speaker 1>nuclear warhead. Okay, I'm not gonna go along with that. Really, yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>it would be really, really difficult. It would not be difficult.

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<v Speaker 1>Let's say you're Iran and uh it's and you're in

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<v Speaker 1>contact with a bunch of kb KGB officers or maybe

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<v Speaker 1>some Soviet military generals. The coups just happened. There's no

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<v Speaker 1>longer USS are maybe your friends with somebody in Kazakhstan.

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<v Speaker 1>All of these people had access to strategic and tactical

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<v Speaker 1>nuclear arms. Actually, there was a huge question over what

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<v Speaker 1>was going to happen with the former Soviet unions twenty

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<v Speaker 1>seven thousand tactical and strategic nuclear weapons when the when

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<v Speaker 1>the Soviet Union dissolved, what happened to him? Actually, there

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<v Speaker 1>was a really good effort that was made by the

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<v Speaker 1>former Soviet republics like Kazakhstan, UM and Ukraine and and

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<v Speaker 1>all of these groups that actually we're already in fighting

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<v Speaker 1>with Russia, UH and the Russian government to move all

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<v Speaker 1>of these nukes into Russia. And I think they did

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<v Speaker 1>it with pretty amazing speed. There were U n resolutions,

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<v Speaker 1>there were talks between UM, the U S and the

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<v Speaker 1>U and in Russia and these former Soviet republics, and

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<v Speaker 1>everybody got their nukes back into Russian borders in Russian control.

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<v Speaker 1>To see that. I read a Reuter's article when I

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<v Speaker 1>was researching this, and that is one of the scenarios

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<v Speaker 1>they pose as one way it could happen is during transport.

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<v Speaker 1>That's when they're probably most vulnerable. Yeah, you would think so,

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<v Speaker 1>intot but let's say you're in Iranian official, you got

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<v Speaker 1>the you got the money, you got the means, And

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<v Speaker 1>not to pick on Iran here, maybe we should go

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<v Speaker 1>with Jamaica. I don't want to take off anyone in Iran,

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<v Speaker 1>but let's say you know, you're a Jamaican official, You've

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<v Speaker 1>got tons of cash, and um, you want a nuke.

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<v Speaker 1>There's a huge coup going on, there's the dissolution of

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<v Speaker 1>a former superpower, and there's twenty seven thousand nukes out there.

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<v Speaker 1>If you got the money to to purchase one and

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<v Speaker 1>the means of getting it out of the country and

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<v Speaker 1>back to Jamaica, my friend, you have a nuke. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>I guess I was thinking in terms of these days,

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<v Speaker 1>it's a lot more difficult than it would have been

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<v Speaker 1>in so well, I think UH security has been tightened

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<v Speaker 1>down somewhat. Do you think since ninety you're about to

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<v Speaker 1>shoot me down? Right? You know not? From what I

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<v Speaker 1>could tell from reading up on this is that it's

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<v Speaker 1>more likely that someone could steal the components of a

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<v Speaker 1>nuclear weapon and resembol it themselves, rather than load you know,

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<v Speaker 1>thirty ft bomb on the back of their truck and

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<v Speaker 1>drive it through borders, right Chuck, Which makes people with

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<v Speaker 1>the information in their heads of how to assemble a

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<v Speaker 1>nuclear bomb from all these various parts or you know,

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<v Speaker 1>more to the point, what parts you'd need to make

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<v Speaker 1>a nuclear bomb incredibly valuable. Absolutely. Have you heard of

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<v Speaker 1>a q con? I have, but I know you're the man,

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<v Speaker 1>the con man, nice one. Uh. Well, Khan actually is

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<v Speaker 1>the father of Pakistani nuclear proliferation, which is a country's

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<v Speaker 1>program that we're pretty worried about. Well, yeah, they well

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<v Speaker 1>they have the bomb. India has the bomb. Uh. He

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<v Speaker 1>also was under house arrest for five years from two

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<v Speaker 1>thousand four until February two thou nine because he admitted

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<v Speaker 1>to being involved in nuclear pro proliferation. Illegal nuclear proliferation.

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<v Speaker 1>I can't say that, uh, in other countries like Libya, Iran,

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<v Speaker 1>he was basically selling his knowledge to the highest bidder

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<v Speaker 1>for their own nuclear program. Doesn't surprise me. So, I mean,

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<v Speaker 1>it may be hard to steal. Actually, it's incredibly hard

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<v Speaker 1>to put together a nuclear bomb. It's very hard to

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<v Speaker 1>steal one. But if you really look at it, using

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<v Speaker 1>maybe Akam's razor or something like that, it would actually

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<v Speaker 1>probably be the easiest thing to do, would be to

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<v Speaker 1>just go in and steal a nuclear bomb than stealing

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<v Speaker 1>the parts. What's the easiest part to steal too when

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<v Speaker 1>you want to assemble a nuclear bomb? Well, the easiest

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<v Speaker 1>part would be the explosive mechanism, the T and T,

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<v Speaker 1>which you need a lot of. You know, enrich uranium

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<v Speaker 1>doesn't do much on its own. You need to explode it, sure,

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<v Speaker 1>as they say, and that would be the easiest part.

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<v Speaker 1>Um you'd have to build a casing for it, which

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<v Speaker 1>wouldn't be super easy, but it's at least something you

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<v Speaker 1>can manufacture yourself. And the hardest thing would probably be

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<v Speaker 1>to get the enriched super enriched uranium plutonium if you

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<v Speaker 1>could find doc. Yeah, that that would be tough. Do

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<v Speaker 1>you know why you would want plutonium or highly enriched uranium?

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<v Speaker 1>What kind of bomb or why I would say to

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<v Speaker 1>go back to the future or to build a bomb? Yes,

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<v Speaker 1>specifically a fission bomb. Okay, Now what's the difference? I know,

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<v Speaker 1>you know the difference between FISSI and TU. You know that? Well,

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<v Speaker 1>I'm a smart guy, because I don't know, and I

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<v Speaker 1>hope one of us does, do would you like to know? Okay, So,

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<v Speaker 1>a fission bomb is where you're taking a really heavy,

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<v Speaker 1>dense material the nuclei are heavy, right, Uh, the atomic

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<v Speaker 1>weight is heavy. And what you're doing is you're stripping

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<v Speaker 1>the nuclei of neutrons, okay, which in turn releases more

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<v Speaker 1>neutrons and so on. Right, So you have a chain reaction,

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<v Speaker 1>and once it's highly sustained, it's called supercritical mass. You've

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<v Speaker 1>reached supercritical mass because neutron neutron is knocking neutrons from

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<v Speaker 1>nuclei and so on and so on and so on,

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<v Speaker 1>and it's happening really quickly and it raises this huge

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<v Speaker 1>amount of energy. And now going back at that point, No,

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<v Speaker 1>and like you're saying you need t N T to

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<v Speaker 1>start this chain reaction and um with a with a

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<v Speaker 1>fusion bomb, you're actually doing the opposite. You take a

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<v Speaker 1>very light substance like hydrogen, and you take a tremendous

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<v Speaker 1>amount of heat and you know from a explosion of

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<v Speaker 1>T N T and you smash the stuff together and

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<v Speaker 1>that creates another very big explosions. So which one is

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<v Speaker 1>more likely scenario for stealing one? I would imagine a

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<v Speaker 1>fission bomb because it's the easiest to make. But the

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<v Speaker 1>problem is is getting highly enriched uranium or plutonium is

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<v Speaker 1>very difficult, although you can find a lot of it

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<v Speaker 1>in Russia and the US. Right, Yeah, there's a lot

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<v Speaker 1>of it that's um un accounted for, which is kind

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<v Speaker 1>of scary. Yeah, or left over? Did you read that

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<v Speaker 1>thing about Robert Gates from two thousand and eight now

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<v Speaker 1>he uh, He basically came out and accused Moscow of

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<v Speaker 1>not knowing where a lot of their plutonium and highly

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<v Speaker 1>enriched uranium was. Well, I could see that because when

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<v Speaker 1>the Soviet Union dissolved, there was a lot of chaos

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<v Speaker 1>and disorganization going on and a lot of this excess

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<v Speaker 1>nuclear material floating around, right, So there's no way that

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<v Speaker 1>they could account for all of it. Well, he was saying, like,

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<v Speaker 1>we have no problem with the tactical nukes or the

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<v Speaker 1>strategic nukes. You want to know the difference between this two. Okay,

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<v Speaker 1>So a strategic nuke, this is right up my alley.

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<v Speaker 1>A strategic nuke is say, like a long range intercontinental

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<v Speaker 1>ballistic missile, right, um and uh. A tactical nuke would

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<v Speaker 1>be maybe attached to a missile on a bomber. And

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<v Speaker 1>the real distinction I read someone put it was a

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<v Speaker 1>strategic nuke is meant to prevent war. A tactical nuke

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<v Speaker 1>is meant to end a war, to win a war, right,

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<v Speaker 1>so you have mutual destruction. Those are strategic nukes. If

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<v Speaker 1>somebody goes in and drops the bomb in Hiroshima, that

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<v Speaker 1>would be a tactical nuke. Right, Look at you, you're

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<v Speaker 1>a regular Philip Oppenheimert Robert Oppenheimer. By the way, for

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<v Speaker 1>those of you who are paying attention, let's see father

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<v Speaker 1>of the Adam Bomb, not Philip. He was the director

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<v Speaker 1>of the Manhattan Project, right, And Philip was his brother

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<v Speaker 1>who was from what I understand, didn't do much with

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<v Speaker 1>his life. Philip was played by John Lithke. Okay, that's good. Uh,

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<v Speaker 1>you want to talk about security a little bit? I do.

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<v Speaker 1>The US says whenever there's a large arsenal weapons they

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<v Speaker 1>have barriers, guards, surveillance cameras, motion sensors, and of course

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<v Speaker 1>background checks. Seemed like enough to you, No, because at

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<v Speaker 1>Reuter's article I read was talking about. The other scenario

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<v Speaker 1>I talked about, besides being a hijacked and transport, was

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<v Speaker 1>that potentially a Taliban or al Qaeda member could gain

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<v Speaker 1>employment at a at a nuclear facility despite background checks. Sure, well,

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<v Speaker 1>very few of them have like a member of Taliban,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, two thousand two to present, and you would

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<v Speaker 1>think that someone could get in there. But you also

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<v Speaker 1>wouldn't think that someone could take lessons on how to

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<v Speaker 1>fly a plane uh here in the United States and

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<v Speaker 1>fly them into buildings. That didn't seem likely either. So

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<v Speaker 1>it is likely or not likely, but possible. It is possible, agreed, um.

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<v Speaker 1>And there's also another real threat that's probably the most prominent.

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<v Speaker 1>And I guess we should probably say here maybe a

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<v Speaker 1>little too late. We don't mean to stir up any

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<v Speaker 1>paranoia among anybody. It's just an interesting question. We meant

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<v Speaker 1>to stir up paranoia about Florid, but not this one. Um.

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<v Speaker 1>The probably the most realistic through it would be a

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<v Speaker 1>dirty bomb, right yeah, which is made from what they

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<v Speaker 1>call nuclear junk, which is not highly enriched uranium and plutonium. Correct,

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<v Speaker 1>it's a lesser quality, no, I think, Um, it's it's

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<v Speaker 1>a nuclear bomb lacking a device to properly detonate it.

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<v Speaker 1>It is so you don't have the material needed or

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<v Speaker 1>the energy needed to create like a supercritical mass. But

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<v Speaker 1>let's say you blew it up with a bunch of

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<v Speaker 1>TNT that was less than critical or super critical um.

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<v Speaker 1>You're still spreading radioactivity. Okay, I didn't know if you're

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<v Speaker 1>talking about depleted uranium. Did you hear about the Russian

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<v Speaker 1>guy that was caught who the guy who poisoned Lucchenko

0:12:39.600 --> 0:12:41.920
<v Speaker 1>or No? This is in two thousand two, and this

0:12:42.040 --> 0:12:43.760
<v Speaker 1>is one of those deals where I couldn't find a

0:12:43.760 --> 0:12:47.160
<v Speaker 1>lot following up. In two thousand two, a Russian man

0:12:47.200 --> 0:12:51.880
<v Speaker 1>was busted smuggling twenty seven tons of enriched uranium at

0:12:51.880 --> 0:12:55.360
<v Speaker 1>a Siberian border checkpoint. I did a little follow up

0:12:55.360 --> 0:12:57.560
<v Speaker 1>and they said it first, oh, no, this was just

0:12:57.600 --> 0:13:01.800
<v Speaker 1>a regular shipment because we send um depleted uranium to

0:13:02.160 --> 0:13:05.959
<v Speaker 1>UH to Kazakhstan so it can be made into nuclear

0:13:06.040 --> 0:13:08.480
<v Speaker 1>fuel to be sent back to Russia. That's all it was.

0:13:08.760 --> 0:13:11.600
<v Speaker 1>And then they came out with a second UH statement

0:13:11.640 --> 0:13:15.920
<v Speaker 1>that said, oh, I'm sorry, it wasn't enriched exactly depleted uranium,

0:13:15.960 --> 0:13:18.320
<v Speaker 1>and so it wasn't really a big deal. And I

0:13:18.320 --> 0:13:21.600
<v Speaker 1>couldn't find anything else after that. Twenty seven tons, though,

0:13:21.840 --> 0:13:25.239
<v Speaker 1>that's scary. Well, this proves there's a black market for it. Oh, definitely.

0:13:25.720 --> 0:13:29.360
<v Speaker 1>You know we're using a depleted uranium is tank piercing

0:13:30.240 --> 0:13:33.840
<v Speaker 1>bullets or artillery, right, and apparently there's a real growing

0:13:33.880 --> 0:13:38.000
<v Speaker 1>concern among Iraq veterans in Afghanistan veterans that they're around

0:13:38.000 --> 0:13:41.440
<v Speaker 1>this and handling this this ammunition, right, like, what's going

0:13:41.480 --> 0:13:44.000
<v Speaker 1>to happen? You know? And I radioactive and we're gonna

0:13:44.000 --> 0:13:46.560
<v Speaker 1>be able to have kids. It's probably going to be

0:13:46.600 --> 0:13:50.920
<v Speaker 1>the next agent Orange is depleted depleted uranium shells. Yeah,

0:13:50.960 --> 0:13:54.280
<v Speaker 1>but apparently they go right through a tank. Well, I

0:13:54.320 --> 0:13:57.760
<v Speaker 1>would imagine. So, yeah, you want to talk about Los Alamos, Sure,

0:13:57.920 --> 0:14:02.000
<v Speaker 1>go ahead, you go ahead. November two thousand six, Los

0:14:02.040 --> 0:14:06.920
<v Speaker 1>Alamos National Laboratory there was a security breach and officials

0:14:06.920 --> 0:14:10.920
<v Speaker 1>were worried that an employee past information concerning special access

0:14:11.000 --> 0:14:15.440
<v Speaker 1>controls that would detonate a bomb. So uh, it wasn't

0:14:15.440 --> 0:14:18.480
<v Speaker 1>a whole device, but important and valuable information and secrets

0:14:18.480 --> 0:14:22.720
<v Speaker 1>were being sold. Yeah these pals right, Yes, Okay, so

0:14:22.920 --> 0:14:26.120
<v Speaker 1>pal I checked out there. It can be what what

0:14:26.280 --> 0:14:29.320
<v Speaker 1>John Fuller, who wrote this fine article, mentions is that

0:14:29.360 --> 0:14:31.240
<v Speaker 1>you know it takes two people to enter a code

0:14:31.240 --> 0:14:35.040
<v Speaker 1>at the same time war games exactly. Go ahead. Well

0:14:35.080 --> 0:14:38.120
<v Speaker 1>what's that called. It's called permissive action link. Yes, and

0:14:38.160 --> 0:14:40.400
<v Speaker 1>if you remember the very first scene of the movie Wargames,

0:14:41.200 --> 0:14:44.600
<v Speaker 1>A young Michael Madison was actually one of the security guards.

0:14:44.680 --> 0:14:49.160
<v Speaker 1>You can buckle dal little dog. That was excellent. Wow.

0:14:49.840 --> 0:14:52.200
<v Speaker 1>Uh yeah, young Michael Madison was one of the two

0:14:52.320 --> 0:14:55.720
<v Speaker 1>uh security personnel and the silo that was supposed to

0:14:55.760 --> 0:14:57.640
<v Speaker 1>turn the key at the same time. So it's a

0:14:57.640 --> 0:15:00.840
<v Speaker 1>two man operation. One person cannot set off the bomb.

0:15:01.040 --> 0:15:03.080
<v Speaker 1>So it's a pretty good measure. That's well, that's one.

0:15:03.160 --> 0:15:06.720
<v Speaker 1>That's one type of pal. There's also um quantum encryption

0:15:07.600 --> 0:15:11.400
<v Speaker 1>UM to create all sorts of different UM codes. And

0:15:11.520 --> 0:15:15.560
<v Speaker 1>he basically, if you can't just press a button, any

0:15:15.600 --> 0:15:18.120
<v Speaker 1>barrier between you and pressing that button, any step you

0:15:18.200 --> 0:15:21.360
<v Speaker 1>have to take to launch a nuclear weapon is a

0:15:21.400 --> 0:15:24.840
<v Speaker 1>permissive action link. So when you hear the fingers on

0:15:24.880 --> 0:15:27.240
<v Speaker 1>the button, that's really two fingers on two buttons. And

0:15:27.280 --> 0:15:30.920
<v Speaker 1>it took at least several steps to get to that point. Thankfully, Um,

0:15:30.960 --> 0:15:34.840
<v Speaker 1>there's another way you can get a bomb. And I realized, Chuck,

0:15:34.880 --> 0:15:38.240
<v Speaker 1>I never um, I never finished a sentence. Earlier, I

0:15:38.240 --> 0:15:41.120
<v Speaker 1>went off on a tangent about the difference between tactical

0:15:41.200 --> 0:15:46.120
<v Speaker 1>and strategic right. Um, the the what Gates was talking

0:15:46.120 --> 0:15:48.920
<v Speaker 1>about when he said that he was accusing Moscow of

0:15:49.000 --> 0:15:51.480
<v Speaker 1>not knowing where all their stuff was. Um, there's a

0:15:51.520 --> 0:15:57.000
<v Speaker 1>whole bunch of nuclear minds, nuclear artillery shells, basically nuclear junk.

0:15:57.880 --> 0:16:01.200
<v Speaker 1>Um that he suspects Mosque has no idea where it is.

0:16:01.480 --> 0:16:03.640
<v Speaker 1>That's the stuff that would likely it make its way

0:16:03.640 --> 0:16:06.080
<v Speaker 1>into a dirty bomb, which is why it's a bigger threat.

0:16:06.160 --> 0:16:07.840
<v Speaker 1>I could see that for sure. I'm glad I got

0:16:07.840 --> 0:16:10.520
<v Speaker 1>that off my chest. You know, one official we're talking

0:16:10.520 --> 0:16:13.320
<v Speaker 1>about Pakistan earlier, one US officials said that if they

0:16:13.320 --> 0:16:16.600
<v Speaker 1>can smuggle out the amount of heroin that they smuggle out,

0:16:16.800 --> 0:16:20.160
<v Speaker 1>then they could smuggle out nuclear materials pretty much. Although

0:16:20.200 --> 0:16:24.920
<v Speaker 1>I suspect that, Um, there is tested approval of heroin

0:16:25.000 --> 0:16:29.880
<v Speaker 1>smuggling in Afghanistan as far as the US goes. Yeah,

0:16:30.040 --> 0:16:32.440
<v Speaker 1>I've read articles on it. US generals are just like,

0:16:32.480 --> 0:16:34.800
<v Speaker 1>we're not even paying attention to that. There's nothing to

0:16:34.840 --> 0:16:36.680
<v Speaker 1>do with what we're here for. Right, I could the

0:16:36.760 --> 0:16:39.800
<v Speaker 1>d A's over there like pulling out their hair, right, Yeah,

0:16:39.920 --> 0:16:43.280
<v Speaker 1>thanks a lot. Sure. Well. One thing I was going

0:16:43.320 --> 0:16:46.680
<v Speaker 1>to mention too is if this weren't a concern, legitimate concern,

0:16:46.720 --> 0:16:50.080
<v Speaker 1>then there probably wouldn't be an official name for this. Yeah,

0:16:50.200 --> 0:16:53.160
<v Speaker 1>by the US the Navy. Right, Yeah, the Navy um

0:16:53.200 --> 0:16:55.440
<v Speaker 1>calls it a broken arrow, which is from the John

0:16:55.480 --> 0:16:58.000
<v Speaker 1>Well not from the John Wu Move John Move. I

0:16:58.000 --> 0:17:00.160
<v Speaker 1>think got it from the Navy. But that is the

0:17:00.240 --> 0:17:03.320
<v Speaker 1>name for the seizure, theft, loss or loss of a

0:17:03.400 --> 0:17:06.879
<v Speaker 1>nuclear weapon or component. So component is kind of the

0:17:06.960 --> 0:17:10.120
<v Speaker 1>key component. Yeah, or if you steal the whole thing.

0:17:10.320 --> 0:17:14.040
<v Speaker 1>If Jamaicas stole one or bought one, that would be bad. Right.

0:17:14.280 --> 0:17:15.959
<v Speaker 1>I love your idea here. I want to see this

0:17:16.000 --> 0:17:18.359
<v Speaker 1>like a Jamaican guy on a flatbed with a nuclear

0:17:18.359 --> 0:17:20.320
<v Speaker 1>bomb in the back of it. So, Chuck, there's another

0:17:20.400 --> 0:17:23.040
<v Speaker 1>way you could get a nuclear weapon if you wanted to.

0:17:23.840 --> 0:17:29.040
<v Speaker 1>You could travel to Tybee Island, Georgia. Yeah, there is

0:17:29.080 --> 0:17:32.960
<v Speaker 1>a fifty one year old nuclear bomb, Thermo nuclear weapon

0:17:33.240 --> 0:17:35.400
<v Speaker 1>somewhere off the coast of Tybee and not too far

0:17:35.440 --> 0:17:38.200
<v Speaker 1>off of it. They could get right off of the coast.

0:17:38.480 --> 0:17:40.600
<v Speaker 1>You have no idea where it is. Yeah, so close

0:17:40.640 --> 0:17:43.359
<v Speaker 1>that they can't find it. Yeah, distressing. You know what

0:17:43.480 --> 0:17:47.360
<v Speaker 1>else is distressing? What? The Department of Defense recognizes that

0:17:47.680 --> 0:17:50.879
<v Speaker 1>at least one serious nuclear accident has occurred every single

0:17:50.960 --> 0:17:54.520
<v Speaker 1>year since the atomic age began. Distressing, I don't know

0:17:54.560 --> 0:17:57.879
<v Speaker 1>what's more unsettling that once happened every year they qualified

0:17:57.880 --> 0:18:01.600
<v Speaker 1>it with at least, right, you know, one or more. Yeah,

0:18:02.119 --> 0:18:04.840
<v Speaker 1>should we talk about some of these accidents, Yeah, totally

0:18:04.880 --> 0:18:08.080
<v Speaker 1>reported accidents. Yeah, there's been a bunch of them. There have. Uh,

0:18:08.440 --> 0:18:12.399
<v Speaker 1>this one's good. Um in n B forty seven bomber

0:18:12.480 --> 0:18:16.480
<v Speaker 1>flying over Mars Bluff, South Carolina, accidentally dropped an atomic

0:18:16.520 --> 0:18:20.160
<v Speaker 1>bomb which left a crater st wide and thirty five

0:18:20.240 --> 0:18:22.520
<v Speaker 1>ft deep, And we've talked about that one. That was

0:18:22.560 --> 0:18:25.840
<v Speaker 1>the one that, um, they abandoned searching for that nuke

0:18:25.880 --> 0:18:28.600
<v Speaker 1>in off the coast of Savannah to go deal with

0:18:28.800 --> 0:18:31.040
<v Speaker 1>Oh is that what happened? Yeah? Okay, Yeah, So they

0:18:31.040 --> 0:18:33.320
<v Speaker 1>were looking for this nuke for about a month, couldn't

0:18:33.359 --> 0:18:35.600
<v Speaker 1>find it, and then one goes off for the the

0:18:35.680 --> 0:18:39.160
<v Speaker 1>TNT went a bigger problem and they all evacuated over

0:18:39.200 --> 0:18:41.479
<v Speaker 1>to South Carolina. Yeah, that's a good one. You want

0:18:41.520 --> 0:18:43.680
<v Speaker 1>you got another one for me? Yeah, this one is

0:18:43.760 --> 0:18:48.639
<v Speaker 1>kind of unsettling. In nineteen sixty, some guys were basically,

0:18:49.160 --> 0:18:52.920
<v Speaker 1>I guess, docking an airplane that had nuclear weapons aboard

0:18:53.280 --> 0:18:55.679
<v Speaker 1>on the U S S. Takondo Roga. I guess they

0:18:55.720 --> 0:18:58.640
<v Speaker 1>hit a wave and the airplane and its nukes rolled

0:18:58.680 --> 0:19:04.960
<v Speaker 1>off into the Sea of Japan. Transport, dude, Luckily, it

0:19:04.960 --> 0:19:07.439
<v Speaker 1>seems like all the accidents and and security threats to

0:19:07.440 --> 0:19:11.159
<v Speaker 1>deal with transport. Yeah, or what about the transfer from

0:19:11.200 --> 0:19:15.400
<v Speaker 1>a submarine onto the USS halland yeah, go ahead. Well

0:19:15.400 --> 0:19:18.040
<v Speaker 1>that's pretty much it, except for while they were while

0:19:18.080 --> 0:19:20.280
<v Speaker 1>they were moving the nuke from the submarine to the

0:19:20.359 --> 0:19:24.280
<v Speaker 1>USS halland uh, it started to fall seventeen feet and

0:19:24.480 --> 0:19:27.640
<v Speaker 1>somebody very quickly pulled an emergency brake and it stopped

0:19:27.760 --> 0:19:32.440
<v Speaker 1>right above the deck that was close a handbrake. Yes,

0:19:32.640 --> 0:19:34.760
<v Speaker 1>I'd like to see that. Yeah. Did the guy literally

0:19:34.760 --> 0:19:37.280
<v Speaker 1>like yank it up? Yeah? And I'll bet he was

0:19:37.320 --> 0:19:41.200
<v Speaker 1>treated two around that night. Yeah, but more than one. Uh.

0:19:41.280 --> 0:19:44.320
<v Speaker 1>You know, there's a U. N agency that is entrusted

0:19:44.320 --> 0:19:48.680
<v Speaker 1>with preempting this kind of thing, illegal proliferation, and they

0:19:48.720 --> 0:19:52.040
<v Speaker 1>said in two thousand seven they said that the theft

0:19:52.080 --> 0:19:55.480
<v Speaker 1>and loss of nuclear and radio material the radioactive materials

0:19:55.480 --> 0:19:58.919
<v Speaker 1>remains a persistent problem that the I A E. A. Yeah,

0:19:59.040 --> 0:20:02.159
<v Speaker 1>So they're every one is on record basically saying this,

0:20:02.160 --> 0:20:04.320
<v Speaker 1>this happens all the time. There are hundreds of cases

0:20:04.960 --> 0:20:08.439
<v Speaker 1>in Russia of people stealing or trying to steal this stuff?

0:20:09.800 --> 0:20:13.360
<v Speaker 1>What was it? J Philip Oppenheimer said when he saw

0:20:13.359 --> 0:20:17.760
<v Speaker 1>the first nuclear bomb explode, I have become death destroy

0:20:17.840 --> 0:20:21.680
<v Speaker 1>of world, world talk about Pandora's box, man, No kidding.

0:20:22.720 --> 0:20:27.120
<v Speaker 1>I've got some more stats if you're in need. There

0:20:27.119 --> 0:20:31.080
<v Speaker 1>were a hundred and fifty incidents of such such action

0:20:31.160 --> 0:20:33.840
<v Speaker 1>of of loss or theft in two thousand six alone,

0:20:34.119 --> 0:20:37.640
<v Speaker 1>And Josh, the majority of these involved sealed radioactive sources,

0:20:38.080 --> 0:20:41.320
<v Speaker 1>and in seventy three per cent of these cases, the

0:20:41.400 --> 0:20:45.320
<v Speaker 1>lost or stolen materials have not been recovered. That's fantastic.

0:20:45.640 --> 0:20:49.359
<v Speaker 1>So basically what you're finding, what you're saying here is

0:20:49.400 --> 0:20:52.960
<v Speaker 1>that there is a lot of unaccounted for nuclear material

0:20:53.520 --> 0:20:56.320
<v Speaker 1>on the world market. Right. Well, there's no international treaty

0:20:56.320 --> 0:20:58.800
<v Speaker 1>for this. I found out. Oh yeah, yeah, they're there.

0:20:59.000 --> 0:21:03.680
<v Speaker 1>Um their treaties. There's the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

0:21:03.800 --> 0:21:07.919
<v Speaker 1>Treaty of nineteen, but it's all for domestic use, storage,

0:21:07.920 --> 0:21:11.600
<v Speaker 1>and transport. There's no international uh work going on here. Well,

0:21:11.600 --> 0:21:14.200
<v Speaker 1>the problem is in the post nine eleven world as well, Chuck.

0:21:14.240 --> 0:21:16.639
<v Speaker 1>I mean, we're not fighting people who honor treaties like

0:21:16.680 --> 0:21:21.840
<v Speaker 1>we're still looking at nuclear um nuclear non proliferation through

0:21:21.840 --> 0:21:24.440
<v Speaker 1>the paradigm of the Cold War, which is long over.

0:21:24.520 --> 0:21:26.240
<v Speaker 1>You know, it used to be we had, like I

0:21:26.280 --> 0:21:30.320
<v Speaker 1>said earlier, mutual a sure destruction where the USSR in

0:21:30.320 --> 0:21:33.480
<v Speaker 1>the US had so many nukes that they could wipe

0:21:33.480 --> 0:21:37.479
<v Speaker 1>out the world within seconds of one another launching, and

0:21:37.520 --> 0:21:44.240
<v Speaker 1>it kept anybody from doing anything about exactly. There's no

0:21:45.760 --> 0:21:48.720
<v Speaker 1>that that doesn't exist anymore. There's no polarization, and we

0:21:48.920 --> 0:21:53.000
<v Speaker 1>have to rethink this, especially if there's no accountability or

0:21:53.040 --> 0:21:55.840
<v Speaker 1>not enough accountability. It's almost less safe now than during

0:21:55.880 --> 0:21:58.640
<v Speaker 1>the arms race. And how do you get something how

0:21:58.640 --> 0:22:01.960
<v Speaker 1>do you take something out of existence when it when,

0:22:02.000 --> 0:22:05.680
<v Speaker 1>when it's already been created. I don't know, can it happen?

0:22:06.119 --> 0:22:10.080
<v Speaker 1>I it would take I don't think it can happen.

0:22:10.080 --> 0:22:11.760
<v Speaker 1>I think it could happen, but you'd have to be

0:22:13.000 --> 0:22:16.359
<v Speaker 1>really dedicated, and you would also have to be pretty

0:22:16.359 --> 0:22:18.679
<v Speaker 1>cool blooded because guy's like a q con would have

0:22:18.680 --> 0:22:21.040
<v Speaker 1>to get shot in the back of the head, and

0:22:21.119 --> 0:22:22.920
<v Speaker 1>not just a q com but all of our guys

0:22:22.960 --> 0:22:25.600
<v Speaker 1>to basically anybody who knows how to make a nuclear

0:22:25.600 --> 0:22:29.760
<v Speaker 1>bomb would have to be executed. So thanks for joining us.

0:22:29.840 --> 0:22:32.800
<v Speaker 1>If you want to know more, about nuclear anything. We've

0:22:32.840 --> 0:22:34.600
<v Speaker 1>got a bunch of it on the site. That's how

0:22:34.640 --> 0:22:36.840
<v Speaker 1>stuff works dot com. We are a handy search bar

0:22:36.920 --> 0:22:38.719
<v Speaker 1>for your convenience, so you don't have to troll from

0:22:38.760 --> 0:22:42.320
<v Speaker 1>the channel the channel page by page. Uh. And since

0:22:42.359 --> 0:22:44.960
<v Speaker 1>I said that and Jerry's eyes are crossed because she's

0:22:45.000 --> 0:22:48.119
<v Speaker 1>so bored, I think that means it's time for the

0:22:48.119 --> 0:22:54.800
<v Speaker 1>listener mail. Josh, I'm just gonna call this an eerie

0:22:55.720 --> 0:23:01.439
<v Speaker 1>Pennsylvania email. Get get it. This from Sarah. She's a

0:23:01.560 --> 0:23:06.480
<v Speaker 1>student there at Collegiate High School. I guess Collegiate Academy.

0:23:06.920 --> 0:23:10.320
<v Speaker 1>And you're stupid? Are stupid? People Happier? Podcast? You talked

0:23:10.320 --> 0:23:13.639
<v Speaker 1>a lot about the subjectiveness of happiness, as well as

0:23:13.680 --> 0:23:15.960
<v Speaker 1>all the references you made to your super Stuff Guide

0:23:15.960 --> 0:23:19.600
<v Speaker 1>to the Economy, now on sale and iTunes. It reminded

0:23:19.640 --> 0:23:23.439
<v Speaker 1>me of a project my AP macro economics class conducted

0:23:23.480 --> 0:23:26.160
<v Speaker 1>at the end of last year. Most nations measure their

0:23:26.160 --> 0:23:29.840
<v Speaker 1>economic success and increments of GDP and the like, but

0:23:29.880 --> 0:23:32.880
<v Speaker 1>the nation of Bhutan created a similar scale called gross

0:23:32.960 --> 0:23:37.359
<v Speaker 1>National Happiness. I've written on that. Really, Yeah, okay, I

0:23:37.400 --> 0:23:40.960
<v Speaker 1>believe you. Basically, it's an extensive survey that they did

0:23:41.080 --> 0:23:44.960
<v Speaker 1>and she and her classmates decided to for a project

0:23:44.960 --> 0:23:46.320
<v Speaker 1>to do the same thing at her high school to

0:23:46.320 --> 0:23:49.679
<v Speaker 1>find out what the happiness scale was at a collegiate academy.

0:23:50.080 --> 0:23:51.680
<v Speaker 1>So she wrote in and told me this, and I

0:23:51.720 --> 0:23:53.359
<v Speaker 1>was like, that's cool. I was like, but you didn't

0:23:53.400 --> 0:23:55.520
<v Speaker 1>tell me any of the results or anything, so how

0:23:55.520 --> 0:23:57.679
<v Speaker 1>about it? So she emailed me back and said, all right,

0:23:57.720 --> 0:24:01.199
<v Speaker 1>here we go. Twelve statements in four categories is what

0:24:01.320 --> 0:24:04.480
<v Speaker 1>they were rating, as well as male and female and

0:24:04.520 --> 0:24:08.360
<v Speaker 1>grade level to define the gross collegiate happiness scale. Each

0:24:08.440 --> 0:24:10.440
<v Speaker 1>was rated on a scale of one zero to five,

0:24:11.200 --> 0:24:13.560
<v Speaker 1>with one being the least agreeable to our statement I

0:24:13.560 --> 0:24:16.600
<v Speaker 1>guess zero. I predicted that we would have achieved an

0:24:16.640 --> 0:24:20.000
<v Speaker 1>overall happiness index of about two five, but surprisingly we

0:24:20.080 --> 0:24:23.360
<v Speaker 1>scored significantly higher, and our happiness scale is at three

0:24:23.400 --> 0:24:26.360
<v Speaker 1>point five eight out of five, which is pretty good

0:24:27.240 --> 0:24:30.400
<v Speaker 1>on an economic scale, and including outliers is pretty great.

0:24:30.440 --> 0:24:33.560
<v Speaker 1>She says. The most agreeable statement and positive quality that

0:24:33.560 --> 0:24:35.760
<v Speaker 1>made students feel happy. It was a statement I feel

0:24:35.800 --> 0:24:39.320
<v Speaker 1>accepted at collegiate academy, which received an average of four

0:24:39.400 --> 0:24:42.359
<v Speaker 1>point two nine, and the principle was satisfied with it.

0:24:42.400 --> 0:24:44.560
<v Speaker 1>Although you could tell she wanted a perfect five point. Oh,

0:24:45.000 --> 0:24:48.840
<v Speaker 1>she obviously hasn't studied economics or statistics recently. So that

0:24:48.880 --> 0:24:52.080
<v Speaker 1>was from Sarah and Erie Pennsylvania. Why Sarah is headed

0:24:52.119 --> 0:24:54.679
<v Speaker 1>to Yale as well? Yeah, Sarah's ary bright student and

0:24:54.800 --> 0:24:57.840
<v Speaker 1>sounds like her classmates are pretty happy there collegiate academy. Yeah,

0:24:57.840 --> 0:25:00.240
<v Speaker 1>it's good for them. Yeah, the gross national up and

0:25:00.240 --> 0:25:02.679
<v Speaker 1>it's pretty cool. Yeah, Bhutan is very serious about it.

0:25:02.720 --> 0:25:07.159
<v Speaker 1>The king abdicated his throne to establish a democracy because

0:25:07.200 --> 0:25:11.280
<v Speaker 1>it was they determined that democracy made for happier people. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>that's pretty cool. Yeah, Well, thanks a lot, Sarah. Well,

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<v Speaker 1>if you're Yale bound like Sarah, or don't know where

0:25:17.000 --> 0:25:19.520
<v Speaker 1>you're headed yet, you can send us an email like

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<v Speaker 1>us detailing anything you like. Do we have anything we

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<v Speaker 1>want to ask for Chuck? Uh No, we've been getting

0:25:25.080 --> 0:25:28.240
<v Speaker 1>good feedback lately. Thanks, thanks for that, So if you

0:25:28.240 --> 0:25:29.960
<v Speaker 1>want to just send us an email, I guess is

0:25:29.960 --> 0:25:32.080
<v Speaker 1>what we're trying to say, right, you can send that

0:25:32.160 --> 0:25:39.679
<v Speaker 1>to stuff podcast at how stuff works dot com for

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<v Speaker 1>more on this and thousands of other topics. Does it

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<v Speaker 1>how stuff works dot com. Want more house stuff Works,

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<v Speaker 1>to you by the reinvented two thousand twelve Camray. It's ready,

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<v Speaker 1>are you