WEBVTT - Cryptically Quantum

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<v Speaker 1>Brought to you by Toyota. Let's go places. Welcome to

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<v Speaker 1>Forward Thinking either everyone, and welcome to Forward Digging, the

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<v Speaker 1>podcast that looks at the future and says you spend

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<v Speaker 1>me right round, baby, right round. I'm job in Strickland,

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<v Speaker 1>I'm Lauren, and I'm Joe McCormick. So, guys, have you

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<v Speaker 1>ever needed to, you know, have a nice, quiet, secure

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<v Speaker 1>communication with someone or something? Yeah, I might need to

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<v Speaker 1>have a secure communication. Let's say if I'm dealing with

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<v Speaker 1>an Internet seller, So maybe a seller on Etsy who

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<v Speaker 1>has created glass handcrafted Star Wars action figures with with

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<v Speaker 1>with stained tinted coloring and oddly specific. That sounds precarious

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<v Speaker 1>but beautiful. Yeah, it's also not what I thought you

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<v Speaker 1>were gonna say, because internet seller, I thought you were

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<v Speaker 1>either talking about someone who sells in nets or perhaps

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<v Speaker 1>or perhaps a dark basement of the Internet exactly. But

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<v Speaker 1>now I've got you all right, So a vendor, a

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<v Speaker 1>merchant on the Internet, and you want to make a transaction,

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<v Speaker 1>you will hear all my special numbers, right. You would

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<v Speaker 1>want those special numbers to say yeah, but you would

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<v Speaker 1>not want those special numbers to get out and about

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<v Speaker 1>to the general public, where they could all make their

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<v Speaker 1>own nefarious purchases using your hard earned money. Right, they

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<v Speaker 1>could go buy their own glass memorabilia or or let's

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<v Speaker 1>let's say that you are just trying to send a

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<v Speaker 1>message to someone and you don't necessarily want the entire

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<v Speaker 1>world to understand what exactly you are saying. You know, right,

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<v Speaker 1>like things right, right, Like if if I wanted to

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<v Speaker 1>send Lauren an email talking smack about a certain other

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<v Speaker 1>host of this show, um, and I didn't want that

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<v Speaker 1>host to be privy to all the things I had

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<v Speaker 1>to say about him. Sure, yeah, And of course no

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<v Speaker 1>one believes this because you just talked smack right out loud.

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<v Speaker 1>But alright, that's but hypothetically, if you didn't want me

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<v Speaker 1>to know, I'm sorry, you didn't want this other host

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<v Speaker 1>to know, then this would be important. You would want

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<v Speaker 1>to be able to hide the information. Thus, Uh, this

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<v Speaker 1>is of course not new to the internet. You know,

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<v Speaker 1>the idea of being able to hide information so that

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<v Speaker 1>you can send messages, uh, discreetly, secretly. This is not

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<v Speaker 1>something that's that's brand new. This is an ancient idea.

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<v Speaker 1>Oh no, of course, I mean secrets are power, it's

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<v Speaker 1>the it's one of the main things we've got going

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<v Speaker 1>for us as a species. We've learned how to leverage

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<v Speaker 1>privileged information. Yes, you know something they don't know. When

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<v Speaker 1>that gives you an advantage, right, Uh, you know obviously

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<v Speaker 1>if you are able to maintain that advantage, then that

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<v Speaker 1>gives you, uh well, prolonged advantage. You don't want that

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<v Speaker 1>to suddenly become common knowledge because then suddenly it's a

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<v Speaker 1>it's a level playing field again, and who knows, some bigger,

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<v Speaker 1>stronger person is going to come around and take all

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<v Speaker 1>your stuff. So in the in the ancient world, we

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<v Speaker 1>use things called ciphers, which allowed us to uh to

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<v Speaker 1>jumble up a message so that only the person who

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<v Speaker 1>sends it and and the person who receives it ideally

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<v Speaker 1>have any chance of figuring out what that messages. Now,

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<v Speaker 1>that just might mean that you have an agreed upon

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<v Speaker 1>set of rules, which means when you get a message,

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<v Speaker 1>you look at the message, the jumbled up message, and

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<v Speaker 1>you apply those set of rules to it to unscramble

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<v Speaker 1>it and see what the actual message is. Right. So

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<v Speaker 1>the dirt simplest version of this would be just say,

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<v Speaker 1>like an alpha numeric scramble, So you say A is

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<v Speaker 1>one and B is two, and you write, you translate

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<v Speaker 1>your message in whatever language you're writing into numbers. Right,

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<v Speaker 1>the same kind of thing that you probably did to

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<v Speaker 1>obscure notes when you were passing them in class when

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<v Speaker 1>you were in like elementary school. Right, And he's a

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<v Speaker 1>B and a besa C. No one's ever going to

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<v Speaker 1>figure it out. Yeah, Yeah, these are all very common,

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<v Speaker 1>very simple ciphers. Now in the world of the Internet,

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<v Speaker 1>in the world of computers, these sort of things don't

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<v Speaker 1>don't fly. It's not going to work anymore because it's

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<v Speaker 1>pretty easy to figure that one out. So we're talking

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<v Speaker 1>about specifically, uh, cryptography in general, which is the whole

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<v Speaker 1>science of making stuff secret, and then encryption in particular,

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<v Speaker 1>which is an implementation of cryptography. And the reason why

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<v Speaker 1>I say that is that frequently people will interchange these

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<v Speaker 1>two terms, but they do mean different things. We'll probably

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<v Speaker 1>do it on this podcast. Everybody uses encryption, cryptography, cryptology

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<v Speaker 1>that they'll get jumbled up, right, And and I admit,

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<v Speaker 1>I mean I do this all the time. I it's

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<v Speaker 1>not because I don't appreciate that there are differences. It's

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<v Speaker 1>just that my brain starts taking shortcuts and then I

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<v Speaker 1>get less accurate in my description. But yes, cryptography the

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<v Speaker 1>overall field encryption a specific implementation of cryptography where you

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<v Speaker 1>are encrypting a mess it's using some sort of cipher

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<v Speaker 1>or key, and then someone else has to use a

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<v Speaker 1>decoder key to get at the original message. And if

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<v Speaker 1>everything is cool, then you don't have to worry about

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<v Speaker 1>anyone else intercepting that message and knowing what's going on.

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<v Speaker 1>But the problem is, things aren't really cool in the

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<v Speaker 1>real world, are they not. When you send a message

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<v Speaker 1>to somebody, it's generally, I think assumed within the world

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<v Speaker 1>of cryptography that you should always just take as an

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<v Speaker 1>assumption that somebody's listening. Yes, I mean we're we're living

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<v Speaker 1>in a world now where it is incredibly easy for

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<v Speaker 1>people to listen in, whether on purpose or not. I

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<v Speaker 1>remember like this this applies to lots of different fields,

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<v Speaker 1>not just Internet communication. It could be a telephone, right,

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<v Speaker 1>I remember using wireless telephones where occasionally it would pick

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<v Speaker 1>up conversations other people were having that because the channel

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<v Speaker 1>as were close enough where I was getting interference and

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<v Speaker 1>I was so eventually one one part of one of

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<v Speaker 1>the conversations would kind of go like hello, right, is

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<v Speaker 1>that are we who else is here? Or I would

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<v Speaker 1>talk into it and then it would be clear that

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<v Speaker 1>the other parties on the line couldn't hear me. But

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<v Speaker 1>yet I was like, well, I don't want to listen

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<v Speaker 1>in uh, but I would like to make a phone call.

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<v Speaker 1>So I'm going to go and use one of the

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<v Speaker 1>hard lined phones that I have instead of one of

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<v Speaker 1>these super cheap early eighties wireless monstrosities. Of course, your

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<v Speaker 1>hardline phone can be tapped just as easily, or someone

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<v Speaker 1>in another branch of the house could pick up another

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<v Speaker 1>receiver of it. Right, So in this case, we are

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<v Speaker 1>going to be talking about some some famous people. Uh,

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<v Speaker 1>those famous people are not really people. There are actually

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<v Speaker 1>their names are placeholders for any two entities that wish

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<v Speaker 1>to exchange information. This would be Alice and Bob. You

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<v Speaker 1>may have heard of Alice and Bob. Alie and Bob. They're,

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<v Speaker 1>like I said, placeholders. You want you it's so that

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<v Speaker 1>you can give examples so people can wrap their heads

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<v Speaker 1>around the way this kind of secret communication works. So

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<v Speaker 1>it's not Alice in Wonderland and Bob Seeker. It's I mean,

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<v Speaker 1>it could be we might, sure, but we're talking about

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<v Speaker 1>a third person as well, we're talking also about Eve. Yes,

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<v Speaker 1>Eve would be a short for Eve's dropper clever huh

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<v Speaker 1>Sole See what they did there. Eve wants to listen

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<v Speaker 1>in on this conversation between Alis and Bob for whatever reason.

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<v Speaker 1>Doesn't matter. We're just talking about, you know again, concepts here. Eve. Also,

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<v Speaker 1>it does not necessarily have to be an actual conscious

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<v Speaker 1>person or entity. No, Eve could be a computer. Eve

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<v Speaker 1>could also just be an environment because in this case,

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<v Speaker 1>when we get into uh A later in the podcast,

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<v Speaker 1>we're gonna be talking about the type of cryptography that

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<v Speaker 1>um has some limitations around it, and the environment can

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<v Speaker 1>actually play a role in messing up that cryptography. But

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<v Speaker 1>in general, we think of Eve as some entity trying

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<v Speaker 1>to get intercept messages, usually in the middle between Alison Bob,

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<v Speaker 1>to try and decipher exactly what is going on. Okay, So,

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<v Speaker 1>in the world today, if Alison Bob want to have

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<v Speaker 1>a totally private conversation that nobody else can know about

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<v Speaker 1>over the Internet, what is the main way we're going

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<v Speaker 1>to use to communicate privately? Uh That would be using

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<v Speaker 1>key encryption, a public key and a private key. This

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<v Speaker 1>is based off something called r s A encryption. It's

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<v Speaker 1>actually uh, that named after the folks who came up

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<v Speaker 1>with it. But the idea here is that you have

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<v Speaker 1>a public key that allows people to encode messages that

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<v Speaker 1>are going to be sent to you, and then you

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<v Speaker 1>have a private key that allows you to decode those messages.

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<v Speaker 1>And then if you want to send a message back

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<v Speaker 1>to someone, you use their public key to encode it

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<v Speaker 1>and they'll use their own private key to decode it.

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<v Speaker 1>So the public key is something you can send out

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<v Speaker 1>to the world and it's fine because all it does

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<v Speaker 1>is in code messages. It doesn't decode anything um And

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<v Speaker 1>the private key you keep to yourself and you don't

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<v Speaker 1>let anyone get hold of it because obviously that would

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<v Speaker 1>mean they could decode any message meant for you. So

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<v Speaker 1>in this case, if Alice once said Bob a message,

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<v Speaker 1>Alice would use Bob's public key, Bob would use his

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<v Speaker 1>private key to decode it. Then if Bob wanted to respond,

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<v Speaker 1>he would use Alice's public key, Alice would use her

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<v Speaker 1>private key to decode it. Theoretically, everything should remain safe. Okay,

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<v Speaker 1>but wait a second, how do these keys actually work together?

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<v Speaker 1>Because I wonder if there's a way to exploit this process. Um,

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<v Speaker 1>it's it's interesting that you asked that question. So there

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<v Speaker 1>are different ways to create encryption keys, but one of

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<v Speaker 1>the most popular is prime factorization. Tell me how it works. Okay,

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<v Speaker 1>you know what a prime number is, right, It's a

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<v Speaker 1>number that is only divisible by itself and one. That's correct.

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<v Speaker 1>So if you were to take a two prime numbers,

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<v Speaker 1>So figure out two prime numbers, uh, three and seven?

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<v Speaker 1>All right, and then you multiply the two of those

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<v Speaker 1>together you get all right. So if I gave you

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<v Speaker 1>just the twenty one and I told you it's your

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<v Speaker 1>job to figure out which two prime numbers I used

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<v Speaker 1>to multiply together to get to twenty one, you would

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<v Speaker 1>have to start going through and looking at the divisors

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<v Speaker 1>for twenty one and figuring it out. Now, that one's

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<v Speaker 1>pretty easy, right, But when you get into very large numbers,

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<v Speaker 1>there's a lot of different possibilities. Yeah. Yeah, it might

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<v Speaker 1>be worth dwelling for a minute on why that's hard

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<v Speaker 1>to do. There's no just simple equation for how to

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<v Speaker 1>get those prime numbers. You have to try them one

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<v Speaker 1>at a time. So you have to take, okay, is

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<v Speaker 1>two times two, that's not twenty one? Okay, two times three,

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<v Speaker 1>that's not twenty. Really, you would just say to one,

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<v Speaker 1>is twenty one divisible divisible by two? And if so

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<v Speaker 1>is the other? Uh? Is the other number also a prime?

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<v Speaker 1>So you can do it that way. So you take

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<v Speaker 1>twenty one and you say, all right, let's go to

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<v Speaker 1>by two. All right, that's that doesn't work. Twenty one

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<v Speaker 1>divide by three. That gets seven. Wait a minute, three

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<v Speaker 1>and there are both prime numbers, so that'd be pretty easy.

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<v Speaker 1>But yeah, but if you if you're talking about enormous

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<v Speaker 1>prime numbers, and when I say enormous, I'm talking about

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<v Speaker 1>something that has maybe you know, forty digits or more

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<v Speaker 1>behind it. You know, that's a huge prime number or

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<v Speaker 1>you know, huge prime number, and you multiply it by

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<v Speaker 1>another huge prime number that has an equal number of

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<v Speaker 1>digits behind it. You get an incredibly enormous product. And

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<v Speaker 1>this is the basis of your encryption. Uh. Then working

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<v Speaker 1>backwards trying to figure out which two prime numbers made

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<v Speaker 1>that product is incredibly difficult. It would take a classical

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<v Speaker 1>computer working on a single core processor years, maybe centuries

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<v Speaker 1>to figure it out. I've heard it often expressed that

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<v Speaker 1>it would take more than a person's lifetime to solve

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<v Speaker 1>these on a classical machine. Yeah. So the three guys

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<v Speaker 1>that came up with this, their last names were Rivest

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<v Speaker 1>still are Rivest, Shamir, and Adelman. So you've got that, uh,

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<v Speaker 1>And they were the ones who who came up with

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<v Speaker 1>this this general idea which has been used extensively since then.

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<v Speaker 1>And um, basically that's the the idea you use. You've

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<v Speaker 1>got this product which you can then allow people to

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<v Speaker 1>encode things. Um using this, you know, it's kind of

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<v Speaker 1>like another mash up type deal. The coded message gets

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<v Speaker 1>sent to you. Because you have the the actual prime

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<v Speaker 1>numbers that were used to make that product, you can

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<v Speaker 1>decode the message. If you don't have those two prime numbers,

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<v Speaker 1>you can't decode it. So that's the general idea. And

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<v Speaker 1>because it's such a hard problem that computers normally would

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<v Speaker 1>take a very long time to solve, it was considered

0:12:38.559 --> 0:12:42.400
<v Speaker 1>extremely secure. Well but is it still extremely secure? If

0:12:42.400 --> 0:12:45.240
<v Speaker 1>if it's so difficult to crack, then well, how is

0:12:45.240 --> 0:12:48.720
<v Speaker 1>it vulnerable? It depends on It depends on the determination

0:12:48.800 --> 0:12:52.679
<v Speaker 1>and resources of your eve that that's exactly right. So

0:12:52.960 --> 0:12:58.120
<v Speaker 1>the reason it's secure is because of the limitations of computers.

0:12:58.679 --> 0:13:01.560
<v Speaker 1>But if you were just to say, imagine you had

0:13:01.600 --> 0:13:05.000
<v Speaker 1>a computer that was way, way, way, way way more

0:13:05.080 --> 0:13:09.880
<v Speaker 1>powerful than your standard computer today, this problem would start

0:13:10.000 --> 0:13:12.400
<v Speaker 1>becoming a lot less of a problem. And in fact,

0:13:12.480 --> 0:13:17.160
<v Speaker 1>we can sort of create these situations today by say,

0:13:17.200 --> 0:13:20.080
<v Speaker 1>teaming up a lot of computers together. Right, if you

0:13:20.120 --> 0:13:22.920
<v Speaker 1>either had a supercomputer that had lots and lots of

0:13:22.960 --> 0:13:27.080
<v Speaker 1>processing cores, and you created a program to look for

0:13:27.360 --> 0:13:34.200
<v Speaker 1>the prime, uh the factorization of any number, and you

0:13:34.280 --> 0:13:36.840
<v Speaker 1>allowed it so that it could take advantage of all

0:13:36.840 --> 0:13:40.320
<v Speaker 1>those processor course and start solving things in parallel, you

0:13:40.400 --> 0:13:42.079
<v Speaker 1>cut down on the amount of time it's going to

0:13:42.160 --> 0:13:44.800
<v Speaker 1>take to do the overall problem because you've got multiple

0:13:44.880 --> 0:13:48.200
<v Speaker 1>cores all working on this. Or if you are able

0:13:48.400 --> 0:13:51.480
<v Speaker 1>to link together a bunch of computers to essentially do

0:13:51.559 --> 0:13:53.720
<v Speaker 1>the same thing, where each computer is working on part

0:13:53.800 --> 0:13:57.000
<v Speaker 1>of this problem. Let's say that a computer just has

0:13:57.160 --> 0:14:00.480
<v Speaker 1>a a chunk of numbers that it's looking at as

0:14:00.520 --> 0:14:03.760
<v Speaker 1>it goes through. I'll take the first thousand prime numbers,

0:14:03.760 --> 0:14:07.760
<v Speaker 1>and Joe across the network. You take the next thousand, Yeah,

0:14:07.800 --> 0:14:10.720
<v Speaker 1>and you're you've got you know, maybe hundreds of computers

0:14:10.720 --> 0:14:12.720
<v Speaker 1>in this network. This is something that someone with a

0:14:12.840 --> 0:14:16.440
<v Speaker 1>zombie army, a botan net could do. They've infected a

0:14:16.440 --> 0:14:20.000
<v Speaker 1>bunch of computers. They're using their processors to do whatever

0:14:20.160 --> 0:14:21.800
<v Speaker 1>one of those things could be, to try and do

0:14:21.840 --> 0:14:24.240
<v Speaker 1>a brute force attack. That's what we call it, because

0:14:24.240 --> 0:14:27.600
<v Speaker 1>you're using just brute computing force to go through all

0:14:27.640 --> 0:14:31.840
<v Speaker 1>the potential possibilities to try and find the actual two

0:14:32.120 --> 0:14:35.760
<v Speaker 1>numbers that were used to multiply together and make that product. Yeah,

0:14:35.840 --> 0:14:39.520
<v Speaker 1>you're just doing trillions and trillions of calculations spread out.

0:14:39.960 --> 0:14:43.680
<v Speaker 1>But even with this approach, R s A is still

0:14:43.720 --> 0:14:46.800
<v Speaker 1>pretty secure. But just because of the scale of the

0:14:46.840 --> 0:14:50.240
<v Speaker 1>math involved, the kinds of computers we have today, even

0:14:50.280 --> 0:14:54.360
<v Speaker 1>if we imagine these brute force scenarios, it's still pretty secure.

0:14:54.680 --> 0:14:58.640
<v Speaker 1>It is pretty secure if you've got someone who's really,

0:14:58.760 --> 0:15:02.880
<v Speaker 1>really determined and they're using an advanced computer, especially one

0:15:02.920 --> 0:15:06.640
<v Speaker 1>that is able to take advantage of graphics processors, which

0:15:06.800 --> 0:15:10.160
<v Speaker 1>you know, graphics processors are meant to process graphics on

0:15:10.200 --> 0:15:12.720
<v Speaker 1>your computer. But a lot of hackers have been using

0:15:12.720 --> 0:15:15.800
<v Speaker 1>it as a way of creating another avenue for brute

0:15:15.840 --> 0:15:19.480
<v Speaker 1>force attacks. It's something that is possible to crack, it's

0:15:19.520 --> 0:15:21.640
<v Speaker 1>not easy to do, and it's still is going to

0:15:21.760 --> 0:15:25.440
<v Speaker 1>take time, depending upon you know, how resourceful that hacker is,

0:15:25.440 --> 0:15:28.040
<v Speaker 1>how many machines they might have at their disposal. But

0:15:28.160 --> 0:15:31.080
<v Speaker 1>it's it's one of those things where you know, the

0:15:31.440 --> 0:15:34.440
<v Speaker 1>more the larger year numbers that you're using in your encryption,

0:15:35.080 --> 0:15:38.520
<v Speaker 1>the more time is required or the more processing powers

0:15:38.560 --> 0:15:41.680
<v Speaker 1>required to break that encryption, and the less likely it's

0:15:41.680 --> 0:15:44.160
<v Speaker 1>going to happen because the number of people who have

0:15:44.280 --> 0:15:48.320
<v Speaker 1>that capability and that desire starts to shrink. You know,

0:15:48.360 --> 0:15:51.360
<v Speaker 1>the more complex it gets, the fewer people are going

0:15:51.400 --> 0:15:54.560
<v Speaker 1>to say, yeah, that's worth my time. Sure. But okay,

0:15:54.560 --> 0:15:57.800
<v Speaker 1>So we're living in the incredible future, right and we

0:15:58.240 --> 0:16:01.400
<v Speaker 1>we have or we are starting to develop, at any rate,

0:16:01.400 --> 0:16:04.240
<v Speaker 1>computers that are different from the classical computers that we

0:16:04.280 --> 0:16:07.480
<v Speaker 1>have been talking about. We've talked on this very show before,

0:16:07.480 --> 0:16:13.520
<v Speaker 1>in fact, about quantum computers computer so you know we

0:16:13.640 --> 0:16:15.880
<v Speaker 1>talked when we talked about quantum computers, one of the

0:16:15.960 --> 0:16:19.280
<v Speaker 1>things we discussed is how they might not really even

0:16:19.320 --> 0:16:21.960
<v Speaker 1>provide an advantage if you're just talking about wanting to

0:16:22.400 --> 0:16:25.560
<v Speaker 1>stream video and send emails and browse the web. So

0:16:25.640 --> 0:16:27.920
<v Speaker 1>why on earth would somebody want to build a quantum

0:16:27.960 --> 0:16:31.320
<v Speaker 1>computer if it doesn't provide an advantage of those things. Well, yeah,

0:16:31.360 --> 0:16:33.280
<v Speaker 1>I mean it's it's not necessarily going to help your

0:16:33.320 --> 0:16:36.320
<v Speaker 1>twitch skills at call of duty. But what it could

0:16:36.400 --> 0:16:39.200
<v Speaker 1>do is allow you to solve certain types of problems

0:16:39.360 --> 0:16:42.200
<v Speaker 1>much more quickly than you would with a classical computer.

0:16:42.280 --> 0:16:47.800
<v Speaker 1>But like these problems specific exactly because you've got cubits. Cubits, yeah,

0:16:48.000 --> 0:16:51.400
<v Speaker 1>as opposed to bits, right, So a bit is a

0:16:51.520 --> 0:16:54.240
<v Speaker 1>bit of data. It's a zero oral one. It's kind

0:16:54.240 --> 0:16:56.200
<v Speaker 1>of like an on or off switch or an often

0:16:56.320 --> 0:16:59.520
<v Speaker 1>on switch off your time zero and one. Uh. Cubits

0:17:00.040 --> 0:17:03.480
<v Speaker 1>are quantum bits, and one of the properties of the

0:17:03.560 --> 0:17:07.760
<v Speaker 1>quantum world is called superposition, where you can have a

0:17:07.840 --> 0:17:13.880
<v Speaker 1>quantum particle that can inhabit multiple states simultaneously. So, for example,

0:17:13.960 --> 0:17:16.640
<v Speaker 1>we talk about photons and their spin, and we'll talk

0:17:16.640 --> 0:17:19.840
<v Speaker 1>about them more in a minute, but photon can have

0:17:20.440 --> 0:17:25.480
<v Speaker 1>various types of spin, vertical, horizontal, diagonal. In the quantum state,

0:17:26.160 --> 0:17:30.680
<v Speaker 1>it can have all of these simultaneously in superposition. So

0:17:30.800 --> 0:17:33.480
<v Speaker 1>a cubit can be both a zero and the one

0:17:33.600 --> 0:17:36.280
<v Speaker 1>at the same time, and technically all values in between.

0:17:37.320 --> 0:17:40.160
<v Speaker 1>So if you have cubits and you have enough of them,

0:17:40.200 --> 0:17:42.800
<v Speaker 1>like you have a quantum computer that has a lot

0:17:42.840 --> 0:17:46.560
<v Speaker 1>of cubits, you can then solve certain really difficult problems

0:17:46.600 --> 0:17:51.239
<v Speaker 1>like prime factorization, all in parallel, because it's essentially this

0:17:51.320 --> 0:17:55.800
<v Speaker 1>is oversimplifying, but essentially doing all the calculations simultaneously. So

0:17:55.840 --> 0:17:57.960
<v Speaker 1>at any rate, if you've got a quantum computer that

0:17:58.000 --> 0:18:01.960
<v Speaker 1>has a significant enough number of cubits, then in theory,

0:18:02.119 --> 0:18:05.199
<v Speaker 1>you could break this kind of prime factorization problem in

0:18:05.640 --> 0:18:09.640
<v Speaker 1>no time. Okay, But but I mean quantum computers, although

0:18:10.000 --> 0:18:13.080
<v Speaker 1>they do exist. I mean, who has the time, or

0:18:13.080 --> 0:18:16.800
<v Speaker 1>the money, or the resources or the desire to possibly

0:18:16.960 --> 0:18:21.119
<v Speaker 1>own such a fascinating and and rare piece of machinery.

0:18:21.200 --> 0:18:24.000
<v Speaker 1>Who also wants to know all of our secrets? We've

0:18:24.119 --> 0:18:27.280
<v Speaker 1>now entered into the Jonathan Lauren and Joe get On

0:18:27.320 --> 0:18:32.280
<v Speaker 1>some more government lists part of the podcast. Uh yeah,

0:18:32.359 --> 0:18:35.440
<v Speaker 1>the n s A. Yeah. So it turns out, among

0:18:35.640 --> 0:18:38.800
<v Speaker 1>the many things we learned from the leaked documents that

0:18:38.920 --> 0:18:41.919
<v Speaker 1>Edward Snowden provided about the n s A, one of

0:18:41.960 --> 0:18:45.560
<v Speaker 1>the things was we discovered a seventy nine point seven

0:18:45.680 --> 0:18:51.320
<v Speaker 1>million dollar research project known as Penetrating Hard Targets of

0:18:51.400 --> 0:18:53.320
<v Speaker 1>the n s A, and it was very interested in

0:18:53.440 --> 0:18:58.640
<v Speaker 1>building quote a cryptologically useful quantum computer. So I hope

0:18:58.680 --> 0:19:01.639
<v Speaker 1>you like your email with the side of spying, because

0:19:01.760 --> 0:19:03.239
<v Speaker 1>this is on the way. The n s A has

0:19:03.280 --> 0:19:07.639
<v Speaker 1>specifically expressed interest in creating quantum computers that can do

0:19:07.840 --> 0:19:13.160
<v Speaker 1>that brute force mathematical attack to decode your encrypted messages. Right,

0:19:13.359 --> 0:19:16.240
<v Speaker 1>it's essentially going to sit there and make private keys.

0:19:16.359 --> 0:19:20.760
<v Speaker 1>The private public key encryption technique that we've really been

0:19:20.760 --> 0:19:24.240
<v Speaker 1>reliant upon for more than a couple of decades now

0:19:24.800 --> 0:19:28.320
<v Speaker 1>completely useless. It will essentially be one of those things

0:19:28.320 --> 0:19:30.480
<v Speaker 1>that if they direct their attention to you, they will

0:19:30.480 --> 0:19:33.400
<v Speaker 1>be able to break that key and read all everything

0:19:33.400 --> 0:19:35.760
<v Speaker 1>that's coming to you. Right. And so part of the

0:19:35.800 --> 0:19:39.439
<v Speaker 1>problem is, because all of this research is classified, we

0:19:39.480 --> 0:19:42.240
<v Speaker 1>don't know how far along they are on this path.

0:19:42.320 --> 0:19:45.040
<v Speaker 1>I mean, you might think that they're ahead of where

0:19:45.200 --> 0:19:48.040
<v Speaker 1>the private labs are today, or you might think they're

0:19:48.080 --> 0:19:50.320
<v Speaker 1>running neck and neck with them. We don't really know,

0:19:50.440 --> 0:19:53.040
<v Speaker 1>but we at least know that they are really interested

0:19:53.080 --> 0:19:55.800
<v Speaker 1>in this and are willing to spend money on it. Okay,

0:19:55.840 --> 0:19:57.919
<v Speaker 1>but part of part of the game here, you know,

0:19:57.960 --> 0:20:00.600
<v Speaker 1>you're always going to have people who are trying to

0:20:00.720 --> 0:20:03.040
<v Speaker 1>keep something secret and people who are trying to figure

0:20:03.040 --> 0:20:08.159
<v Speaker 1>those secrets out, and as the technology of of one increases,

0:20:08.280 --> 0:20:12.119
<v Speaker 1>the other has to in order to compete. So you know,

0:20:12.400 --> 0:20:16.480
<v Speaker 1>there are people who are working on creating quantum cryptography

0:20:16.560 --> 0:20:20.040
<v Speaker 1>to help solve this entire problem for us, right, Yeah,

0:20:20.119 --> 0:20:23.879
<v Speaker 1>So we go to another quantum technology basically to offset that.

0:20:24.040 --> 0:20:27.160
<v Speaker 1>So the secret breakers are going to get a big

0:20:27.200 --> 0:20:30.760
<v Speaker 1>advantage with quantum computers, but only because we are using

0:20:30.760 --> 0:20:34.000
<v Speaker 1>classical computers to set up our original encryption. If we

0:20:34.119 --> 0:20:38.000
<v Speaker 1>move to ye, a quantum system of of being able

0:20:38.040 --> 0:20:40.800
<v Speaker 1>to hide what we're saying. Actually, well, yeah, it's a

0:20:40.880 --> 0:20:44.240
<v Speaker 1>quantum framework. You can still use classical computers to to

0:20:44.320 --> 0:20:47.240
<v Speaker 1>do the communication. Yeah, you need you need a quantum

0:20:47.240 --> 0:20:50.520
<v Speaker 1>emitter is what you're gonna need. I can actually explain

0:20:50.600 --> 0:20:53.840
<v Speaker 1>what we're talking about here with quantum cryptography, at least

0:20:54.160 --> 0:20:57.200
<v Speaker 1>on a high level. When you get down to it,

0:20:57.560 --> 0:21:00.920
<v Speaker 1>you start getting into quantum weirdness that I know happens.

0:21:01.440 --> 0:21:05.840
<v Speaker 1>But that's different from saying I understand it, right, Okay,

0:21:05.920 --> 0:21:08.280
<v Speaker 1>So I have a pretty good way I think of

0:21:08.280 --> 0:21:12.440
<v Speaker 1>getting into how quantum cryptography works. And so it's this question,

0:21:13.080 --> 0:21:15.600
<v Speaker 1>why even use a public key in the first place,

0:21:16.000 --> 0:21:20.440
<v Speaker 1>Why can't you just share a private key between Alison Bob,

0:21:20.520 --> 0:21:25.199
<v Speaker 1>so they've got a a private uh decode or algorithm

0:21:25.200 --> 0:21:28.359
<v Speaker 1>known only to them, and then they just use that.

0:21:28.480 --> 0:21:31.080
<v Speaker 1>Why even put half of that key out there for

0:21:31.119 --> 0:21:33.600
<v Speaker 1>people to use in a brute force attack. Well, the

0:21:33.640 --> 0:21:36.439
<v Speaker 1>answer is kind of obvious because in order to do that,

0:21:36.480 --> 0:21:39.400
<v Speaker 1>they'd have to share the private key over the Internet.

0:21:39.480 --> 0:21:43.520
<v Speaker 1>If someone's eavesdropping like Eve, and Eve intercepts the private key,

0:21:43.560 --> 0:21:46.640
<v Speaker 1>then even you've just given Eve the magic decoder ring

0:21:46.800 --> 0:21:49.520
<v Speaker 1>to decode all the messages. Right, So ideally, the best

0:21:49.560 --> 0:21:52.199
<v Speaker 1>case scenario would be that Alison Bob have a private

0:21:52.240 --> 0:21:54.520
<v Speaker 1>key known only to them. But that really only works

0:21:54.560 --> 0:21:56.240
<v Speaker 1>in the real world if I don't know, if they

0:21:56.280 --> 0:22:00.600
<v Speaker 1>share it somehow physically in the same location, if they

0:22:00.640 --> 0:22:02.479
<v Speaker 1>go up to each other and whisper it to one

0:22:02.520 --> 0:22:06.720
<v Speaker 1>another in a completely darkened and sound proof room. If

0:22:06.720 --> 0:22:09.480
<v Speaker 1>perhaps at one thirty in the morning, Alice here's a

0:22:09.640 --> 0:22:14.320
<v Speaker 1>gentle scratching near the window, sees Bob outside whispering it's time.

0:22:14.720 --> 0:22:18.480
<v Speaker 1>Obviously that is not practical. If, say, the if you

0:22:18.520 --> 0:22:20.840
<v Speaker 1>are the Alice and the Bob you want to communicate with,

0:22:20.920 --> 0:22:23.159
<v Speaker 1>is some store online that you want to do business with.

0:22:23.200 --> 0:22:25.240
<v Speaker 1>You're not going to go meet up somewhere, you might

0:22:25.240 --> 0:22:27.680
<v Speaker 1>as well just do the transaction in the physical place.

0:22:28.000 --> 0:22:31.080
<v Speaker 1>I I sometimes do go up to brick and mortar

0:22:31.160 --> 0:22:34.720
<v Speaker 1>stores at one thirty in the morning and whisper into

0:22:34.800 --> 0:22:39.800
<v Speaker 1>their walls yes, and they say no, it's the secrets,

0:22:39.840 --> 0:22:43.320
<v Speaker 1>will be all right. So getting away from the creepy

0:22:43.359 --> 0:22:46.200
<v Speaker 1>and into the actual how does this work? But anyway,

0:22:46.320 --> 0:22:50.560
<v Speaker 1>so ideally you would have a private key. Well, quantum

0:22:50.960 --> 0:22:54.359
<v Speaker 1>key distribution is a way we have figured out to

0:22:54.600 --> 0:22:59.160
<v Speaker 1>do exactly that, to share a private key without Eve

0:22:59.280 --> 0:23:02.080
<v Speaker 1>being able to intercept it. And it's all because it

0:23:02.160 --> 0:23:06.280
<v Speaker 1>relies upon the laws of quantum physics, not on just

0:23:06.520 --> 0:23:09.960
<v Speaker 1>zeros and ones. Zeros and ones come into play because

0:23:10.040 --> 0:23:14.000
<v Speaker 1>that again is the basis for computing, and we haven't

0:23:14.320 --> 0:23:17.160
<v Speaker 1>created a new model of computing, so we're still reliant

0:23:17.240 --> 0:23:20.760
<v Speaker 1>upon that. But how do we generate a key that

0:23:20.760 --> 0:23:24.159
<v Speaker 1>would allow us to encode and decode messages based on

0:23:24.240 --> 0:23:26.640
<v Speaker 1>zeros and ones, but transmitted in such a way that

0:23:26.720 --> 0:23:29.119
<v Speaker 1>it is impossible for an eavesdropper to pick up on it.

0:23:29.359 --> 0:23:31.800
<v Speaker 1>And that's where we get this quantum key distribution. That's

0:23:31.840 --> 0:23:35.840
<v Speaker 1>really the other way of saying quantum cryptography. A lot

0:23:35.880 --> 0:23:38.040
<v Speaker 1>of people think of it as quantum encryption, which is

0:23:38.119 --> 0:23:41.719
<v Speaker 1>not what's going on. There's no quantum element to the

0:23:41.840 --> 0:23:45.320
<v Speaker 1>encryption because by the time you've gotten to the point

0:23:45.359 --> 0:23:48.280
<v Speaker 1>where you actually have a key, all the quantum stuff

0:23:48.320 --> 0:23:50.240
<v Speaker 1>is over. You're done with the quantum. Well, I'm sure

0:23:50.240 --> 0:23:53.760
<v Speaker 1>I've said quantum encryption a ton of times. That's why

0:23:53.800 --> 0:23:56.919
<v Speaker 1>I'm specifically addressing it now. But if we've said that

0:23:56.960 --> 0:23:59.399
<v Speaker 1>in the past, and specifically if I wrote those words

0:23:59.400 --> 0:24:01.719
<v Speaker 1>in the video, I don't know if I did, but well,

0:24:01.760 --> 0:24:04.320
<v Speaker 1>even if you didn't, I may have said them. Okay, Well,

0:24:04.400 --> 0:24:07.240
<v Speaker 1>in any case, what we mean there is quantum key

0:24:07.280 --> 0:24:11.120
<v Speaker 1>distribution using these quantum principles to create a private key.

0:24:11.359 --> 0:24:14.119
<v Speaker 1>So here's what's going on. Because we we've danced around

0:24:14.119 --> 0:24:17.960
<v Speaker 1>it enough and now now I get the the unenviable

0:24:18.040 --> 0:24:21.960
<v Speaker 1>task of trying to explain this. So all right, Alison Bob,

0:24:22.000 --> 0:24:24.399
<v Speaker 1>we still have Alison Bob. Alice wants to send Bob

0:24:24.480 --> 0:24:27.679
<v Speaker 1>a private message, but first she has to establish this

0:24:27.840 --> 0:24:31.000
<v Speaker 1>private key between the two of them, And like you said, Joe,

0:24:31.040 --> 0:24:33.440
<v Speaker 1>you can't just send a private key through classical channels

0:24:33.640 --> 0:24:36.800
<v Speaker 1>and expect it to get there without someone looking at it.

0:24:36.880 --> 0:24:40.760
<v Speaker 1>That always assume heve's listening, right, So how does Alice

0:24:40.800 --> 0:24:43.679
<v Speaker 1>do this? She ends up setting up two different channels

0:24:43.680 --> 0:24:46.600
<v Speaker 1>of communication. You have a quantum channel of communication and

0:24:46.640 --> 0:24:49.880
<v Speaker 1>a classical channel of communication. So in real life, this

0:24:49.960 --> 0:24:52.959
<v Speaker 1>quantum channel of communication would probably be some kind of

0:24:53.000 --> 0:24:58.680
<v Speaker 1>fiber optic transmission or a way of transmiss transmitting a photon. Yes, photons,

0:24:58.720 --> 0:25:01.560
<v Speaker 1>particles of light. Like we said, the particles of light

0:25:01.640 --> 0:25:05.040
<v Speaker 1>have this, uh, this this quality spin where they can

0:25:05.080 --> 0:25:09.919
<v Speaker 1>be spinning vertically, horizontally or diagonally. So beforehand, Alice and

0:25:09.920 --> 0:25:13.480
<v Speaker 1>Bob have determined which spins will mean a one versus

0:25:13.520 --> 0:25:16.920
<v Speaker 1>a zero, so you might say vertical spins, those are ones,

0:25:17.080 --> 0:25:20.280
<v Speaker 1>horizontal spins or zeros, diagonal spins one way or a one,

0:25:20.280 --> 0:25:23.720
<v Speaker 1>diagonal spins the other way, or a zero. So now

0:25:23.920 --> 0:25:26.560
<v Speaker 1>they know which one is gonna be a one or

0:25:26.560 --> 0:25:29.399
<v Speaker 1>a zero. Then what Alice does is she sets up

0:25:30.080 --> 0:25:33.240
<v Speaker 1>a photon emitter an l e ed would be a

0:25:33.240 --> 0:25:36.560
<v Speaker 1>good one, uh, and then starts to generate photons one

0:25:36.640 --> 0:25:40.360
<v Speaker 1>by one. Now when she generates them, they are they

0:25:40.359 --> 0:25:43.040
<v Speaker 1>have the superposition where they've got all spins at once.

0:25:43.119 --> 0:25:46.920
<v Speaker 1>This is unpolarized light. She then puts it through a

0:25:47.000 --> 0:25:51.000
<v Speaker 1>filter which polarizes the light, either a vertical, horizontal, or

0:25:51.000 --> 0:25:54.720
<v Speaker 1>diagonal filter. This gives the photon a specific spin. It

0:25:54.760 --> 0:25:58.760
<v Speaker 1>eliminates all the other possibilities. She then starts to transmit

0:25:58.800 --> 0:26:02.640
<v Speaker 1>these photons one by one to Bob, changing filters as

0:26:02.680 --> 0:26:07.960
<v Speaker 1>she's going to whatever pattern or random group she wants. Now,

0:26:08.000 --> 0:26:11.240
<v Speaker 1>Bob is receiving these photons and he's passing them through

0:26:11.320 --> 0:26:14.719
<v Speaker 1>filters of his own. His filters come in two flavors.

0:26:14.920 --> 0:26:17.840
<v Speaker 1>He's got a filter that will allow either vertical or

0:26:17.840 --> 0:26:21.320
<v Speaker 1>horizontal uh spin to come through, and he has another

0:26:21.359 --> 0:26:24.320
<v Speaker 1>filter that will allow diagonal spin to come through either

0:26:24.640 --> 0:26:27.800
<v Speaker 1>direction of diagonal spin. So what happens if the wrong

0:26:28.040 --> 0:26:31.880
<v Speaker 1>type of polarized photon hit If a polarized photon hits

0:26:31.880 --> 0:26:34.280
<v Speaker 1>the opposite type of so filter. If he has a

0:26:34.320 --> 0:26:38.399
<v Speaker 1>diagonal filter and a either horizontal or vertical spin photon comes,

0:26:38.800 --> 0:26:41.240
<v Speaker 1>it will not pass through that filter and he'll get

0:26:41.320 --> 0:26:44.320
<v Speaker 1>a a fail. Essentially, he will say that he does

0:26:44.359 --> 0:26:47.119
<v Speaker 1>not know what that particular number will be, but that's okay,

0:26:47.200 --> 0:26:50.080
<v Speaker 1>that's fine. In fact, he just keeps on going and

0:26:50.200 --> 0:26:53.560
<v Speaker 1>just the random chance fifty of the time he's going

0:26:53.600 --> 0:26:56.600
<v Speaker 1>to end up getting a filter that works properly with

0:26:56.680 --> 0:27:00.280
<v Speaker 1>this uh, with this this one that Alice sent. That's

0:27:00.359 --> 0:27:04.240
<v Speaker 1>just based upon you know, a long enough string and probability,

0:27:04.800 --> 0:27:07.239
<v Speaker 1>because he's you know, he's he can get half of

0:27:07.280 --> 0:27:10.120
<v Speaker 1>what is sent on the other half he wouldn't. So

0:27:10.280 --> 0:27:13.680
<v Speaker 1>over a long enough string, you're gonna see success rate.

0:27:14.440 --> 0:27:17.520
<v Speaker 1>So then at that point Alison Bob through their classical

0:27:17.600 --> 0:27:20.800
<v Speaker 1>channels start to go through, and Bob says, all right, here,

0:27:20.840 --> 0:27:23.679
<v Speaker 1>here are the filters that I used in order, and

0:27:23.720 --> 0:27:27.320
<v Speaker 1>then Alice will say yes or no, as in, yes,

0:27:27.359 --> 0:27:29.639
<v Speaker 1>that's the right kind of filter for you to have used,

0:27:29.960 --> 0:27:32.560
<v Speaker 1>or no it is not. And then by that way

0:27:32.359 --> 0:27:36.520
<v Speaker 1>they established which bits made it through, because again they've

0:27:36.520 --> 0:27:39.080
<v Speaker 1>already agreed if a vertical spin is a one and

0:27:39.119 --> 0:27:41.840
<v Speaker 1>horizontal spin is a zero. So once they have enough

0:27:41.880 --> 0:27:45.080
<v Speaker 1>information about which ones passed through, they have a string

0:27:45.119 --> 0:27:47.080
<v Speaker 1>of ones and zeros. You eliminate all the x is,

0:27:47.119 --> 0:27:50.719
<v Speaker 1>all the ones where Bob used the wrong filter, and

0:27:50.760 --> 0:27:53.840
<v Speaker 1>then you would you should have enough information there to

0:27:53.920 --> 0:27:58.560
<v Speaker 1>create a key to encrypt things. However, if during this

0:27:58.680 --> 0:28:02.879
<v Speaker 1>classical communication, Alice starts to say, you know what, Bob,

0:28:03.440 --> 0:28:06.600
<v Speaker 1>you haven't gotten any right at all, and that's really weird.

0:28:06.960 --> 0:28:10.200
<v Speaker 1>That's an indication that someone has been snooping. Because one

0:28:10.240 --> 0:28:13.960
<v Speaker 1>of the facets of quantum, the quantum world, is that

0:28:14.680 --> 0:28:18.600
<v Speaker 1>by observing, you change the observed right. So if Eve

0:28:18.720 --> 0:28:22.080
<v Speaker 1>is trying to intercept this private key between Alice and Bob,

0:28:22.440 --> 0:28:27.600
<v Speaker 1>Eve is actually changing that photon spin and creating a

0:28:27.680 --> 0:28:30.720
<v Speaker 1>string of photons have exactly the right spin to send

0:28:30.760 --> 0:28:34.040
<v Speaker 1>it onto Bob. Is not a practical solution. So in

0:28:34.040 --> 0:28:37.440
<v Speaker 1>other words, Eve ends up changing the key before he

0:28:37.480 --> 0:28:40.480
<v Speaker 1>can get to Bob. And but because the key, because

0:28:40.520 --> 0:28:44.680
<v Speaker 1>those changes are detectable, Alison Bob would know if someone's

0:28:44.720 --> 0:28:46.520
<v Speaker 1>been listening, and if they know that, they know to

0:28:46.720 --> 0:28:49.840
<v Speaker 1>abandon that key and to start over, right. So the

0:28:49.880 --> 0:28:53.400
<v Speaker 1>safety comes in, uh, the awareness of Alice and Bob.

0:28:53.440 --> 0:28:56.800
<v Speaker 1>It's not that Eve couldn't tap this line. It's that

0:28:56.880 --> 0:28:59.560
<v Speaker 1>Alie and Bob will always, because of the laws of

0:28:59.640 --> 0:29:04.080
<v Speaker 1>quantum mechanics, be able to tell if you taped. And

0:29:04.120 --> 0:29:06.560
<v Speaker 1>this is just to make that key right. There's no

0:29:06.640 --> 0:29:09.920
<v Speaker 1>information that's going across yet. Alice hasn't said, hey, Bob,

0:29:10.000 --> 0:29:12.680
<v Speaker 1>what's for dinner? She hasn't written any kind of message.

0:29:12.720 --> 0:29:14.920
<v Speaker 1>They're just trying to establish what is the key they're

0:29:14.920 --> 0:29:17.960
<v Speaker 1>going to use to encode and decode messages. And because

0:29:18.080 --> 0:29:22.440
<v Speaker 1>once they established that they have completely symmetrical keys, they're

0:29:22.480 --> 0:29:25.760
<v Speaker 1>identical keys, I shouldn't say symmetrical, they're identical, then they

0:29:25.760 --> 0:29:28.920
<v Speaker 1>know that they can encode and decode perfectly, and then

0:29:28.960 --> 0:29:32.200
<v Speaker 1>they can send over classical channels using that private key.

0:29:32.240 --> 0:29:34.720
<v Speaker 1>I mean, it's almost as if they had met up

0:29:34.720 --> 0:29:36.960
<v Speaker 1>and agreed on a key and then went back their

0:29:36.960 --> 0:29:40.680
<v Speaker 1>separate ways, right, because they're establishing a key safely over

0:29:41.000 --> 0:29:43.800
<v Speaker 1>this classical channel of communication, and there's there's no way

0:29:43.800 --> 0:29:46.760
<v Speaker 1>to determine what that key was because in order to

0:29:46.800 --> 0:29:49.720
<v Speaker 1>know what the key was, you had to have received

0:29:49.760 --> 0:29:52.400
<v Speaker 1>those photons. But if you receive the photons, you changed

0:29:52.440 --> 0:29:55.920
<v Speaker 1>the photons. So that means that the other recipient, the

0:29:55.960 --> 0:29:59.760
<v Speaker 1>actual intended recipient would have been, would have caught onto it,

0:30:00.000 --> 0:30:01.880
<v Speaker 1>and again they would have abandoned it and started again.

0:30:01.920 --> 0:30:05.200
<v Speaker 1>So Eve would eventually either frustrate Alison Bob to the

0:30:05.200 --> 0:30:08.080
<v Speaker 1>point where Alison Bob, well, we're just not going to communicate,

0:30:08.560 --> 0:30:11.680
<v Speaker 1>or Eve would get frustrated and quit trying to eavesdrop

0:30:11.720 --> 0:30:15.560
<v Speaker 1>because it wasn't productive. She's never going to get anything

0:30:15.640 --> 0:30:19.600
<v Speaker 1>other than the attempts to create a secure private key, Right,

0:30:19.640 --> 0:30:22.920
<v Speaker 1>it's pointless on eves Park. Yes, there's another approach though, right,

0:30:23.480 --> 0:30:25.920
<v Speaker 1>which has to do with spooky action at a distance.

0:30:26.400 --> 0:30:29.160
<v Speaker 1>I hadn't even heard about this one, so I'm intrigued

0:30:29.280 --> 0:30:31.720
<v Speaker 1>to see what you're gonna say. So, Yeah, the other

0:30:31.840 --> 0:30:35.400
<v Speaker 1>spooky action is called quantum entanglement. This is where you

0:30:35.440 --> 0:30:39.400
<v Speaker 1>can create a pair of quantum particles like photons, and

0:30:39.440 --> 0:30:44.640
<v Speaker 1>they will have identical um identical features in some way,

0:30:44.880 --> 0:30:47.920
<v Speaker 1>and when you measure one, you will know exactly what

0:30:48.000 --> 0:30:50.800
<v Speaker 1>the state is of the other particle at the moment

0:30:50.840 --> 0:30:53.800
<v Speaker 1>that it was measured. Right, So they're entangled. And then

0:30:53.840 --> 0:30:56.360
<v Speaker 1>you can take them to opposite ends of the galaxy

0:30:56.800 --> 0:30:59.640
<v Speaker 1>and you look at one, and by looking at at

0:30:59.680 --> 0:31:02.880
<v Speaker 1>that one, you will immediately know something about the other

0:31:02.920 --> 0:31:04.760
<v Speaker 1>one at the other end of the galaxy. Now, from

0:31:04.800 --> 0:31:08.760
<v Speaker 1>that point on you can't determine anything, right, because you've

0:31:08.840 --> 0:31:11.520
<v Speaker 1>changed the system by looking at it. Yeah, they're unentangled,

0:31:11.800 --> 0:31:16.080
<v Speaker 1>wrecked everything. Yes, everything you touch you destroy, which pretty

0:31:16.120 --> 0:31:18.800
<v Speaker 1>much true in the quantum world. So um, So the

0:31:18.840 --> 0:31:21.240
<v Speaker 1>idea I saw, and this was more of a hypothetical.

0:31:21.320 --> 0:31:24.960
<v Speaker 1>This is not typically how it's more typical that's done

0:31:24.960 --> 0:31:26.920
<v Speaker 1>in that filtering system that I had just talked about.

0:31:27.720 --> 0:31:32.280
<v Speaker 1>But hypothetically you could create a set of entangled photons.

0:31:33.000 --> 0:31:36.160
<v Speaker 1>I believe you would have to measure them exactly at

0:31:36.160 --> 0:31:38.840
<v Speaker 1>the right time to be able to determine what that

0:31:39.000 --> 0:31:43.240
<v Speaker 1>sequence was, so that Alice and Bob would have identical

0:31:43.440 --> 0:31:46.560
<v Speaker 1>private keys. Because here's the thing is, if you observe one,

0:31:47.000 --> 0:31:50.280
<v Speaker 1>then they become unentangled. So let's say Alice goes ahead

0:31:50.280 --> 0:31:54.800
<v Speaker 1>and observes her string of photons. Bob has not looked

0:31:54.800 --> 0:31:57.920
<v Speaker 1>at his string of photons, but once Alice does, then

0:31:58.120 --> 0:32:01.760
<v Speaker 1>they become unentangled, and whatever Bob says won't match what

0:32:01.800 --> 0:32:04.920
<v Speaker 1>Alice has anyway, So I'm not sure exactly how the

0:32:05.000 --> 0:32:08.680
<v Speaker 1>implementation would work, but hypothetically they have talked about using

0:32:08.800 --> 0:32:12.560
<v Speaker 1>they being quantum scientists talked about using these strings of

0:32:12.760 --> 0:32:17.760
<v Speaker 1>entangled particles in order to create identical private keys. That again,

0:32:17.880 --> 0:32:20.800
<v Speaker 1>if an eavesdropper gets hold of one of them just

0:32:20.840 --> 0:32:24.360
<v Speaker 1>by looking at them, they become unentangled and they are

0:32:24.400 --> 0:32:26.560
<v Speaker 1>no longer useful as a private key. In the first place,

0:32:27.240 --> 0:32:30.480
<v Speaker 1>so fascinating. Don't know what the implementation would be yet.

0:32:30.560 --> 0:32:33.640
<v Speaker 1>I I understand the filtering one more than I understand

0:32:33.680 --> 0:32:37.560
<v Speaker 1>this one. Both of them are pretty dense. Once you

0:32:37.600 --> 0:32:39.960
<v Speaker 1>get down to the technical level. Oh yeah, No, once

0:32:39.960 --> 0:32:41.760
<v Speaker 1>you get down to like, all right, well, why is

0:32:41.800 --> 0:32:45.640
<v Speaker 1>this happening, you get a lot of I'm always I'm

0:32:45.640 --> 0:32:49.600
<v Speaker 1>always comforted that quantum physicists themselves usually kind of go

0:32:49.760 --> 0:32:52.680
<v Speaker 1>like yeah, you get to a point where they're like, yeah, okay,

0:32:52.680 --> 0:32:54.840
<v Speaker 1>I don't know anymore, Well, there's gonna be. They're really

0:32:54.840 --> 0:32:58.520
<v Speaker 1>smart people. They can describe what's happening really well. Yeah.

0:32:58.600 --> 0:33:00.840
<v Speaker 1>When when you start asking them why, either like, well

0:33:00.880 --> 0:33:06.720
<v Speaker 1>that's a great question. Why not? Okay? But I wanted

0:33:06.760 --> 0:33:10.920
<v Speaker 1>to point out something that's really cool about quantum cryptography,

0:33:11.000 --> 0:33:13.560
<v Speaker 1>which is that this is not some far future, pie

0:33:13.640 --> 0:33:18.320
<v Speaker 1>in the sky fantasy, is it. No, the idea was today. Yeah,

0:33:18.360 --> 0:33:21.280
<v Speaker 1>the ideas were mentioned back in the eighties. I mean this,

0:33:21.400 --> 0:33:24.000
<v Speaker 1>this idea has been around for for like twenty five

0:33:24.120 --> 0:33:29.840
<v Speaker 1>years um in some form or another. It's not used widely, no, yeah,

0:33:29.880 --> 0:33:32.680
<v Speaker 1>because it does have some pretty tough limitations. Obviously, we're

0:33:32.680 --> 0:33:36.080
<v Speaker 1>talking about these quantum states. They are very delicate. Uh,

0:33:36.120 --> 0:33:39.280
<v Speaker 1>and again, any kind of disturbance of that state is

0:33:39.320 --> 0:33:43.000
<v Speaker 1>going to have an effect and thus make this private

0:33:43.080 --> 0:33:48.040
<v Speaker 1>key sharing um an impossibility. So yeah, you're limited by

0:33:48.080 --> 0:33:51.280
<v Speaker 1>how far you can transmit this information without danger of

0:33:51.320 --> 0:33:54.479
<v Speaker 1>the photons getting quote unquote lost along the way. So

0:33:54.920 --> 0:33:58.400
<v Speaker 1>it's a matter of kilometers, right, and maybe a few

0:33:58.400 --> 0:34:01.880
<v Speaker 1>dozen kilometers. But it's not like coast to coast. You

0:34:01.920 --> 0:34:04.280
<v Speaker 1>could not have a coast to coast fiber optic cable

0:34:04.440 --> 0:34:07.200
<v Speaker 1>as of right now and expect that quantum state to

0:34:07.200 --> 0:34:09.960
<v Speaker 1>be preserved for the entire length of that that cable,

0:34:10.280 --> 0:34:12.560
<v Speaker 1>and so it would be really difficult to share a

0:34:12.560 --> 0:34:15.560
<v Speaker 1>private key across that way. Yeah. I also want to

0:34:15.600 --> 0:34:19.640
<v Speaker 1>introduce some other considerations that we should take into account

0:34:19.680 --> 0:34:22.400
<v Speaker 1>because a lot of people are are looking at quantum

0:34:22.480 --> 0:34:26.520
<v Speaker 1>cryptography and they're saying, amazing, it's unhackable. And I actually

0:34:26.560 --> 0:34:29.520
<v Speaker 1>do agree with them in theory because because of the

0:34:29.560 --> 0:34:33.320
<v Speaker 1>way it's constructed based on the laws of quantum physics,

0:34:33.440 --> 0:34:37.920
<v Speaker 1>it is in theory unhackable. The principle is completely sound.

0:34:38.600 --> 0:34:43.000
<v Speaker 1>The implementation, on the other hand, we don't know. I mean,

0:34:43.280 --> 0:34:47.640
<v Speaker 1>because that's a problem that's often come up in cryptography before.

0:34:47.880 --> 0:34:52.080
<v Speaker 1>For example, we've had major uh security scares on the

0:34:52.080 --> 0:34:55.920
<v Speaker 1>Internet that had nothing to do with the soundness of

0:34:56.040 --> 0:35:00.000
<v Speaker 1>public key encryption. Oh sure, so you're talking specifically about

0:35:00.040 --> 0:35:02.680
<v Speaker 1>heart bleed, right, So yeah, looking at the heart bleed bug.

0:35:03.040 --> 0:35:06.480
<v Speaker 1>Oh man, everybody had to change their passwords. It was panic.

0:35:07.040 --> 0:35:10.400
<v Speaker 1>But the problem wasn't that somebody had found a way

0:35:10.440 --> 0:35:13.279
<v Speaker 1>to decode all of your public key encryption. No, it

0:35:13.320 --> 0:35:17.160
<v Speaker 1>was a bug. It was it was a vulnerability um

0:35:17.680 --> 0:35:21.799
<v Speaker 1>in in open SSL. That's secure socket layer, which is

0:35:22.280 --> 0:35:25.640
<v Speaker 1>a type of security measure that's in place over a

0:35:25.680 --> 0:35:31.040
<v Speaker 1>great deal of Internet websites, like many many servers, not

0:35:31.040 --> 0:35:33.759
<v Speaker 1>not all, but yeah, something like six that we're using

0:35:33.800 --> 0:35:37.359
<v Speaker 1>that form of security. We're using that specific, specific type. Now,

0:35:37.360 --> 0:35:39.799
<v Speaker 1>open SSL had several versions. You know, it's kind of

0:35:39.800 --> 0:35:43.960
<v Speaker 1>like any other software where you get generations of the software,

0:35:44.000 --> 0:35:45.920
<v Speaker 1>you know, one point oh one point oh one, one

0:35:45.920 --> 0:35:49.000
<v Speaker 1>point two, that kind of thing, unless you're Mac and

0:35:49.000 --> 0:35:51.200
<v Speaker 1>then it's ten point ten for reasons that never mind,

0:35:51.239 --> 0:35:53.759
<v Speaker 1>I'm going to go off on a tangent. So at

0:35:53.760 --> 0:35:58.000
<v Speaker 1>any rate, the problem in certain versions of open SSL

0:35:58.800 --> 0:36:01.000
<v Speaker 1>was in something that they called a heartbeat, and the

0:36:01.000 --> 0:36:03.200
<v Speaker 1>purpose of the heartbeat was really just to say hey,

0:36:03.280 --> 0:36:05.839
<v Speaker 1>are you still there? And the other services yeah, and

0:36:05.840 --> 0:36:09.000
<v Speaker 1>then everything's fine. Except instead of just saying hey, are

0:36:09.040 --> 0:36:12.160
<v Speaker 1>you still there and the services yeah, the server responds

0:36:12.160 --> 0:36:14.839
<v Speaker 1>with whatever the original message was going to be, right,

0:36:14.880 --> 0:36:17.000
<v Speaker 1>It's it's sort of like asking hey, Jonathan, if you're

0:36:17.000 --> 0:36:19.840
<v Speaker 1>still there, say yes, and then I would say yes,

0:36:20.440 --> 0:36:23.280
<v Speaker 1>but but but if you but if instead a tricksy

0:36:23.400 --> 0:36:27.360
<v Speaker 1>person gets in there and says, hey, Jonathan, I'm tots

0:36:27.440 --> 0:36:30.200
<v Speaker 1>the server. Are you still there? If so, say yes,

0:36:30.280 --> 0:36:33.439
<v Speaker 1>but say it in characters. Yeah. So in this case,

0:36:33.480 --> 0:36:36.040
<v Speaker 1>what was going on was that the message going out

0:36:36.080 --> 0:36:40.560
<v Speaker 1>to the server was uh, was short. The actual message

0:36:40.600 --> 0:36:43.560
<v Speaker 1>was short, but the meta data about the message said

0:36:43.560 --> 0:36:45.920
<v Speaker 1>it was much longer. So, in other words, if I

0:36:46.000 --> 0:36:49.319
<v Speaker 1>send out a request to a server and say hit

0:36:49.360 --> 0:36:51.800
<v Speaker 1>me back to let me know you're still there, Um,

0:36:51.840 --> 0:36:53.799
<v Speaker 1>this is the message, and the message is only three

0:36:53.880 --> 0:36:57.440
<v Speaker 1>characters along, but it says it's five characters long, then

0:36:57.480 --> 0:36:59.680
<v Speaker 1>the server is going to say, all right, I'm still here.

0:36:59.760 --> 0:37:02.000
<v Speaker 1>Here your message, but then says, wait a minute, the

0:37:02.080 --> 0:37:05.759
<v Speaker 1>number of characters I put in here is four short

0:37:05.800 --> 0:37:08.279
<v Speaker 1>of what it should be. Oh, I'll just fill it up.

0:37:08.320 --> 0:37:10.840
<v Speaker 1>With whatever random stuff happens to be in my memory

0:37:10.960 --> 0:37:13.160
<v Speaker 1>to pad it out. It's kind of like it's it's

0:37:13.200 --> 0:37:16.000
<v Speaker 1>kind of like cheating, right, You're like, like, oh, they

0:37:16.040 --> 0:37:18.879
<v Speaker 1>expect to have a thick envelope back, I'm just gonna

0:37:18.920 --> 0:37:20.920
<v Speaker 1>shove a whole bunch of blank pieces of paper or

0:37:21.000 --> 0:37:24.760
<v Speaker 1>random things. But yeah, and and so sometimes those random

0:37:24.840 --> 0:37:28.720
<v Speaker 1>things would be people's passwords or private keys, or private

0:37:28.800 --> 0:37:31.560
<v Speaker 1>keys or lots of other wacky information. Yeah. So if

0:37:31.600 --> 0:37:35.080
<v Speaker 1>you targeted a server that, for instance, handled email exchanges,

0:37:35.640 --> 0:37:39.560
<v Speaker 1>and you got a bunch of random information in from

0:37:39.600 --> 0:37:42.799
<v Speaker 1>the server's memory, some of that random information could be

0:37:42.920 --> 0:37:45.560
<v Speaker 1>private keys that would allow you to decrypt things as

0:37:45.640 --> 0:37:49.400
<v Speaker 1>if you were that person. Right, it's not like you

0:37:49.440 --> 0:37:51.680
<v Speaker 1>were using a hack. You were just using that person's key.

0:37:51.719 --> 0:37:53.120
<v Speaker 1>It's like you had found a key and made a

0:37:53.160 --> 0:37:55.279
<v Speaker 1>copy of it yourself, and you're using that key to

0:37:55.280 --> 0:37:57.680
<v Speaker 1>get in and out of that person's house. Same sort

0:37:57.719 --> 0:38:01.319
<v Speaker 1>of thing. So you could do it completely undetectable by

0:38:01.320 --> 0:38:05.640
<v Speaker 1>anybody else. And uh, people began to panic by changing

0:38:05.640 --> 0:38:09.080
<v Speaker 1>their passwords. But the problem was changing your password doesn't

0:38:09.080 --> 0:38:12.359
<v Speaker 1>solve that problem. You would have to have the the

0:38:12.600 --> 0:38:15.520
<v Speaker 1>on the server side you would have to have administrators

0:38:15.560 --> 0:38:19.920
<v Speaker 1>patched the server open SSL approach to to a version

0:38:19.960 --> 0:38:23.880
<v Speaker 1>that did not contain that that that bug, and then

0:38:24.000 --> 0:38:26.520
<v Speaker 1>change your password. Yes, it was only after it had

0:38:26.560 --> 0:38:29.680
<v Speaker 1>been patched that changing your password would matter at all. Right,

0:38:29.719 --> 0:38:33.520
<v Speaker 1>So the analogy of all this to quantum cryptography is

0:38:33.600 --> 0:38:36.920
<v Speaker 1>that even though the principle might be completely sound, you

0:38:36.960 --> 0:38:40.399
<v Speaker 1>can always have something like the heart bleed bug. Well,

0:38:40.440 --> 0:38:43.520
<v Speaker 1>you can always have a problem with the specific way

0:38:43.560 --> 0:38:46.920
<v Speaker 1>you designed this system. It might be a hardware problem.

0:38:46.960 --> 0:38:50.440
<v Speaker 1>Maybe the way you're using uh, the way you're emitting

0:38:50.480 --> 0:38:54.200
<v Speaker 1>photons or something is vulnerable to detection. Here's an easy way,

0:38:54.320 --> 0:38:57.279
<v Speaker 1>here's an easy way that would that would totally ruin it. So,

0:38:57.480 --> 0:38:59.080
<v Speaker 1>you know, we talked about Alice and Bob, and we're

0:38:59.080 --> 0:39:01.760
<v Speaker 1>talking about them comparing filters. All of that would obviously

0:39:01.800 --> 0:39:05.920
<v Speaker 1>be automated. You wouldn't actually have two people physically putting

0:39:05.960 --> 0:39:10.000
<v Speaker 1>filters in place and physically checking that that system. So

0:39:10.239 --> 0:39:11.799
<v Speaker 1>I think, I see where you're going. Are you talking

0:39:11.800 --> 0:39:15.240
<v Speaker 1>about if you could control the filters they use, or

0:39:15.680 --> 0:39:17.480
<v Speaker 1>you don't have to control the filters they use, what

0:39:17.640 --> 0:39:19.840
<v Speaker 1>you because even that would be a little weird. But

0:39:19.880 --> 0:39:23.200
<v Speaker 1>what you could do is if you were not careful

0:39:23.239 --> 0:39:26.360
<v Speaker 1>in the way you designed the software, you could have

0:39:26.440 --> 0:39:30.200
<v Speaker 1>it where Alice and Bob are exchanging in order to

0:39:30.400 --> 0:39:33.840
<v Speaker 1>confirm that the message has gone over, exchanging too much information,

0:39:33.880 --> 0:39:37.239
<v Speaker 1>revealing what that string of numbers actually is. You know

0:39:37.320 --> 0:39:41.440
<v Speaker 1>what the idea is that you're sharing information about the process,

0:39:41.520 --> 0:39:45.040
<v Speaker 1>but not about the actual zeros and ones. Right, You're

0:39:45.080 --> 0:39:47.120
<v Speaker 1>you're kind of talking around the problem so that you

0:39:47.120 --> 0:39:50.160
<v Speaker 1>can both figure out which ones and which zeros came

0:39:50.200 --> 0:39:54.799
<v Speaker 1>through without actually saying, oh, it's one zero zero one one,

0:39:54.840 --> 0:39:57.200
<v Speaker 1>because that would be useless. You would essentially be doing

0:39:57.239 --> 0:39:59.480
<v Speaker 1>the same thing as sending the private key. But it

0:39:59.520 --> 0:40:02.200
<v Speaker 1>could be eas lee be where someone creates this this

0:40:02.280 --> 0:40:05.600
<v Speaker 1>sort of approach and has an implementation that reveals too

0:40:05.680 --> 0:40:09.680
<v Speaker 1>much about the actual key and gives people enough of

0:40:09.719 --> 0:40:12.480
<v Speaker 1>a hint to make it useless. Yeah, I've seen some

0:40:12.520 --> 0:40:15.319
<v Speaker 1>people say also that the process, the security of the

0:40:15.360 --> 0:40:18.360
<v Speaker 1>process in the long term, will depend on our ability

0:40:18.400 --> 0:40:22.799
<v Speaker 1>to create truly random numbers. Uh. And so if you

0:40:22.960 --> 0:40:25.600
<v Speaker 1>have a number that's supposed to be random, but it's

0:40:25.680 --> 0:40:31.200
<v Speaker 1>actually not random, right, because folks, random number generators usually

0:40:31.320 --> 0:40:35.600
<v Speaker 1>are not actually random. No, it's they're they're random ish.

0:40:35.640 --> 0:40:39.239
<v Speaker 1>They're so complexly derived that they seem random to us.

0:40:40.080 --> 0:40:43.040
<v Speaker 1>Uh yeah, because I mean it's hard to program a

0:40:43.040 --> 0:40:45.799
<v Speaker 1>computer to say, make up a number without telling the

0:40:45.800 --> 0:40:47.480
<v Speaker 1>computer how does it make up a number? It usually

0:40:47.480 --> 0:40:50.120
<v Speaker 1>has to pull information from something. There's some really cool

0:40:50.120 --> 0:40:53.680
<v Speaker 1>examples of doing that by using things like environmental factors,

0:40:53.719 --> 0:40:56.560
<v Speaker 1>like well, the barometric pressure is such, and the wind

0:40:56.600 --> 0:40:58.759
<v Speaker 1>direction as such, and so those things are going to

0:40:58.800 --> 0:41:00.839
<v Speaker 1>mean that I multiply these two umbers together to get

0:41:00.880 --> 0:41:03.399
<v Speaker 1>your random number, which is kind of cool because it's

0:41:03.400 --> 0:41:06.439
<v Speaker 1>based on a chaotic system, but still still not still

0:41:06.480 --> 0:41:09.719
<v Speaker 1>an algorithm and not actually right. Yeah. I want to

0:41:09.760 --> 0:41:12.560
<v Speaker 1>introduce another concern on top of that, which is that

0:41:12.719 --> 0:41:16.400
<v Speaker 1>so there may be design flaws, but we'll trust that, Okay,

0:41:16.440 --> 0:41:19.120
<v Speaker 1>the people designing these systems are probably very, very smart,

0:41:19.239 --> 0:41:21.359
<v Speaker 1>and they're taking a lot of precautions. And let's say

0:41:21.400 --> 0:41:24.799
<v Speaker 1>they do design a foolproof system. You know what they

0:41:24.840 --> 0:41:28.759
<v Speaker 1>can't do. They can't design foolproof users. Yeah. Now, this

0:41:28.840 --> 0:41:31.160
<v Speaker 1>is always going to be a problem. So one of

0:41:31.200 --> 0:41:34.000
<v Speaker 1>the things that we see over and over again is

0:41:34.040 --> 0:41:37.279
<v Speaker 1>that a lot of systems they're supposedly secure, end up

0:41:37.280 --> 0:41:41.440
<v Speaker 1>becoming vulnerable, not because of some inherent flaw or because

0:41:41.480 --> 0:41:44.799
<v Speaker 1>a hacker was able to crunch numbers enough times to

0:41:44.920 --> 0:41:49.400
<v Speaker 1>get into a system, or that someone has created a

0:41:49.440 --> 0:41:51.640
<v Speaker 1>weird program where you type in three guesses on a

0:41:51.680 --> 0:41:54.960
<v Speaker 1>password and the third one is always right Hollywood, But

0:41:54.960 --> 0:41:57.960
<v Speaker 1>but rather because you know that guy from Seinfeld has

0:41:57.960 --> 0:42:00.279
<v Speaker 1>created a backdoor that's going to let all of the

0:42:00.320 --> 0:42:03.279
<v Speaker 1>dinosaurs eventually run a buck on the island. Kind of Yeah,

0:42:03.080 --> 0:42:07.160
<v Speaker 1>the more like more like the idea of, Hey, I

0:42:07.200 --> 0:42:09.920
<v Speaker 1>wonder what Lawrences password is. Let me pick up this

0:42:09.920 --> 0:42:12.439
<v Speaker 1>this keyboard. Oh, sure enough, there's a post it note

0:42:12.480 --> 0:42:15.080
<v Speaker 1>with a password on it, or a much easier one, say,

0:42:15.120 --> 0:42:18.440
<v Speaker 1>if you're not in the same office, is I send

0:42:18.560 --> 0:42:21.920
<v Speaker 1>Jonathan and email saying Hey, I'm the new assistant to

0:42:21.960 --> 0:42:25.200
<v Speaker 1>your system administrator and I need your password in order

0:42:25.280 --> 0:42:27.440
<v Speaker 1>to do some maintenance on your computer. Yeah. This is

0:42:27.480 --> 0:42:31.400
<v Speaker 1>called social engineering. It's manipulating the people in a system

0:42:31.520 --> 0:42:34.839
<v Speaker 1>rather than the technology, and often it ends up being

0:42:34.880 --> 0:42:38.760
<v Speaker 1>the most effective way of getting access to any secure system.

0:42:39.000 --> 0:42:42.480
<v Speaker 1>If you read any reports about some of the famous hackers,

0:42:43.040 --> 0:42:46.200
<v Speaker 1>a lot of their exploits involved not to use a

0:42:46.239 --> 0:42:50.160
<v Speaker 1>pun A lot of their exploits involve manipulating people not

0:42:50.520 --> 0:42:52.840
<v Speaker 1>sitting down at a computer and typing in zeros and

0:42:52.880 --> 0:42:56.000
<v Speaker 1>ones until things magically happened. Right. Well, typically the people

0:42:56.040 --> 0:42:58.879
<v Speaker 1>are the weakest part of the whole process. Yeah, that's

0:42:58.880 --> 0:43:03.080
<v Speaker 1>why I I I anticipate wiping them all out and

0:43:03.160 --> 0:43:06.200
<v Speaker 1>making a perfect, clean future where I don't have to

0:43:06.200 --> 0:43:10.319
<v Speaker 1>worry about these weaknesses, where dinosaurs rule the earth. All right,

0:43:10.360 --> 0:43:14.719
<v Speaker 1>well this got dark fast. No, obviously I'm not going

0:43:14.760 --> 0:43:19.319
<v Speaker 1>to wipe out people. Who's who's going to carry all

0:43:19.320 --> 0:43:24.200
<v Speaker 1>my stuff? What would you eat? It would be really

0:43:24.239 --> 0:43:26.359
<v Speaker 1>lonely going to the same restaurants over and over again,

0:43:26.400 --> 0:43:30.160
<v Speaker 1>all by myself and robot waiters saying table for one again. Yeah,

0:43:30.280 --> 0:43:33.279
<v Speaker 1>so yeah, I probably won't do that. No, it's not

0:43:33.320 --> 0:43:35.839
<v Speaker 1>putting it on the back burner, but anyway, Yeah, it's

0:43:35.960 --> 0:43:38.799
<v Speaker 1>it's true. Any system, any secure system, you need to

0:43:38.800 --> 0:43:41.200
<v Speaker 1>look at the people as well as the technology and

0:43:41.239 --> 0:43:45.040
<v Speaker 1>make sure the people know the best practices for remaining

0:43:45.040 --> 0:43:48.880
<v Speaker 1>secure and private so that other people who want to

0:43:48.920 --> 0:43:51.520
<v Speaker 1>get access to that stuff don't have as easy a

0:43:51.600 --> 0:43:54.560
<v Speaker 1>time about it. The harder we make it, the less

0:43:54.600 --> 0:43:57.839
<v Speaker 1>likely it'll happen. It doesn't mean that someone who's really

0:43:57.840 --> 0:44:01.200
<v Speaker 1>determined won't find a way. Now, the quantum cryptography approach

0:44:01.680 --> 0:44:04.920
<v Speaker 1>is really darn secure because that's basic laws of physics that,

0:44:05.080 --> 0:44:09.440
<v Speaker 1>as far as we know, are unbreakable. So if we

0:44:09.480 --> 0:44:13.360
<v Speaker 1>can get the physical systems to take advantage of those

0:44:13.480 --> 0:44:16.920
<v Speaker 1>laws of quantum physics, we got it made. But we

0:44:16.960 --> 0:44:20.359
<v Speaker 1>already are seeing limitations right now, and it's just, you know,

0:44:20.480 --> 0:44:22.799
<v Speaker 1>there's still questions about whether or not this could ever

0:44:22.880 --> 0:44:26.160
<v Speaker 1>be a widely implemented security feature. You know, it might

0:44:26.160 --> 0:44:29.200
<v Speaker 1>be something that we see in something like a military

0:44:29.239 --> 0:44:32.680
<v Speaker 1>installation where the different machines on that installation use quantum

0:44:32.680 --> 0:44:36.640
<v Speaker 1>cryptography to communicate with each other. But if I'm sending

0:44:36.680 --> 0:44:38.399
<v Speaker 1>an email to a buddy of mine who lives out

0:44:38.400 --> 0:44:41.319
<v Speaker 1>in California, there may not be a physical system that

0:44:41.320 --> 0:44:43.960
<v Speaker 1>can take advantage of this, but just because the very

0:44:44.120 --> 0:44:48.439
<v Speaker 1>nature of the quantum world. So there, you know, things

0:44:48.480 --> 0:44:50.879
<v Speaker 1>to think about. But I really think this was an

0:44:50.880 --> 0:44:54.279
<v Speaker 1>interesting topic. It's great to UH to kind of explore it,

0:44:54.440 --> 0:44:57.760
<v Speaker 1>especially since we always love looking at the quantum world

0:44:57.800 --> 0:45:01.520
<v Speaker 1>and marveling at how unusual it is, how how alien

0:45:01.600 --> 0:45:04.080
<v Speaker 1>it is to us on the macro level. So we

0:45:04.200 --> 0:45:07.640
<v Speaker 1>love those kind of topics, and this is where I

0:45:07.719 --> 0:45:11.560
<v Speaker 1>invite you, our listener, if you have any interesting topics

0:45:11.560 --> 0:45:14.920
<v Speaker 1>that are future oriented, whether it is a technology you

0:45:14.920 --> 0:45:17.839
<v Speaker 1>want to know about, or some development in science, or

0:45:18.400 --> 0:45:22.800
<v Speaker 1>some big question about what what is culture and society

0:45:22.800 --> 0:45:24.600
<v Speaker 1>gonna be like in a hundred and fifty years, or

0:45:24.880 --> 0:45:28.120
<v Speaker 1>even hey, there's this other thing that science fiction films

0:45:28.280 --> 0:45:30.799
<v Speaker 1>never address and I really want to know about it.

0:45:31.120 --> 0:45:32.960
<v Speaker 1>You should let us know send us a message. You

0:45:33.000 --> 0:45:36.200
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0:45:36.239 --> 0:45:39.239
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0:45:39.320 --> 0:45:47.080
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0:45:47.080 --> 0:45:50.120
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0:45:50.120 --> 0:46:04.760
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