Speaker 1: It's the big take from Bloomberg News and I Heart
Speaker 1: Radio and West Pasova today, how Iran and Russia are
Speaker 1: teaming up to evade Western sanctions. The tough sanctions the
Speaker 1: US and its European allies imposed on Iran and Russia
Speaker 1: have succeeded in cutting off those two countries from much
Speaker 1: of the world's economy. They're largely banished from the Western
Speaker 1: banking system, and the flow of goods and services to
Speaker 1: and from the West is dried up. Of course, that's
Speaker 1: the whole point to exert pressure on Iran to abandon
Speaker 1: its nuclear program, among other things, and on Russia to
Speaker 1: stop its war against Ukraine. But the sanctions also led
Speaker 1: to something else. Russia and Iran have now united to
Speaker 1: create a new eighteen hundred mile long trade route that
Speaker 1: lets them defy some of the sanctions by moving products
Speaker 1: over land and water that's beyond the reach of Western
Speaker 1: law enforcement. Since they're shunned by the West, the two
Speaker 1: countries are now looking to the East. They're spending billions
Speaker 1: of dollars to ease the delivery of cargo to quickly
Speaker 1: growing economies in Asia. My Bloomberg colleagues, Golnar Matavali in
Speaker 1: London and Jonathan Tyrone in Vienna have written a deeply
Speaker 1: reported story for Business Week about this new alliance of
Speaker 1: convenience between Russia in Iran, and they're here to help
Speaker 1: us understand what to make of it. Goldner and Jonathan,
Speaker 1: thanks for being here. Thank you, thanks for having me.
Speaker 1: You have written this fascinating story about how Iran and
Speaker 1: Russia have created this complicated new trade route to get
Speaker 1: around sanctions by the US in the EU. You, Jonathan,
Speaker 1: maybe I'll start with you. Can you describe this trade
Speaker 1: route and what it's trying to circumvent. We began noticing
Speaker 1: arise in trade between Iran and Russia to the most
Speaker 1: heaviest sanctioned countries on Earth, and started looking at how
Speaker 1: that trade is being conducted. And obviously there's a lot
Speaker 1: of moving boundaries right now because of Russia's invasion of Ukraine,
Speaker 1: including taking what's called the Sea of as of which
Speaker 1: is extension of the Black Sea located in between the
Speaker 1: Peninsul of Crimea, which Russia took over in the city
Speaker 1: of Maripol, which Russia took over in April May, and
Speaker 1: that creates new inland transport corridors for Russia to send
Speaker 1: goods to Iran and vice versa. Russia can ship goods
Speaker 1: down the Vulgar River, up the Don River, two rivers
Speaker 1: and southern Russia that lead into the Caspian Sea, which
Speaker 1: is shared with Iran. And so it's not just the
Speaker 1: traditional Russian deliveries of grain and energy flowing down this
Speaker 1: southern corridor. Suddenly now it's also Iranian products that are
Speaker 1: flowing north because Iran also wants to escape sanctions, and
Speaker 1: so we're they're signing deals to ship turbines and plastics,
Speaker 1: and of most concerned for Western policymakers, drones and other
Speaker 1: weapons that can go over the Caspian c into Russia
Speaker 1: directly without the possibility being interdicted on international waters. Golnar.
Speaker 1: It used to be that a lot of these goods
Speaker 1: could just travel on open waters and goods were delivered
Speaker 1: in this way. Of course, they are that way all
Speaker 1: around the world, but the sanctions cut them off, and
Speaker 1: so instead Iran and Russia have created a whole new
Speaker 1: overland trade route which is not subject to inspection or
Speaker 1: enforcement by U S sanctions. Can you describe that route?
Speaker 1: They've had this idea for a long time Russia and Iran.
Speaker 1: It's something that Iran has been really pushing for. It's
Speaker 1: always looking to circumvent sanctions and bypass sanctions and specifically
Speaker 1: US and EU penalties by using different pathways and roots
Speaker 1: and various different types of disguises to try and foil
Speaker 1: its trade with countries, particularly countries like China and other
Speaker 1: countries around the world. And so what they've wanted to
Speaker 1: do for a long time in Tehran is to link
Speaker 1: their ports in the Caspian Sea, which historically have always
Speaker 1: been very accessible to Russian markets, obviously to the Persian Gulf,
Speaker 1: because the Persian Golf, as we know, is kind of
Speaker 1: like it's the choke point for global energy supplies. It's
Speaker 1: a hugely significant for oil trade, and it's a massive,
Speaker 1: huge importance for Iran's economy. Making sure that the Persian
Speaker 1: Golf and the Strait of Horribles specifically is open and
Speaker 1: that Iran has ready access to that and that it
Speaker 1: can kind of bypass any perceived threats from the US,
Speaker 1: for instance, because of the U s military obviously has
Speaker 1: quite a strong presence also in the area, and Iran
Speaker 1: has difficult and tense relationships with its neighbors. And has
Speaker 1: had for the past ten years. Now the Russian leader
Speaker 1: wants to bypass the blockade with the help of new
Speaker 1: partner countries. Russia's answer is the new north south route
Speaker 1: from St. Petersburg, Moscow, Azerbaijan, Iran and to Mumbai. Russia
Speaker 1: hopes this new route could replace some of its last
Speaker 1: trade with the West. The idea is that using a
Speaker 1: land corridor, so going from the northern coast of Iran
Speaker 1: on the Caspian Sea, cutting through the country, using railway
Speaker 1: lines to link effectively these ports to the southern Persian
Speaker 1: Gulf coast where they have these major trade terminals like
Speaker 1: Bandar a Boss, which they're using now at the moment,
Speaker 1: and they've used Bandara Boss to pilot this corridor so
Speaker 1: far and send some goods to Russia, and more recently
Speaker 1: what they want to try and do is also used
Speaker 1: the port of Chabahar. Chabahar is much closer to Iran's
Speaker 1: border with Pakistan, and so the importance and significance of
Speaker 1: that is that it comes east of the Strait of Hormones.
Speaker 1: So if goods come from Bandarabos, they have to pass
Speaker 1: through the Strait of Hormones using a port like Chabahar
Speaker 1: as an alternative to Bandar a boss again bypasses that
Speaker 1: political risk as well, and it can get goods straight
Speaker 1: into the Indian Ocean and through to markets into Asia
Speaker 1: like India, for instance China. What's very unique by Chabahar
Speaker 1: is it's exempt for U S sanctions. It's speculated that
Speaker 1: it was originally granted a because the US wants to
Speaker 1: keep India on sides and be Chabahar was seen as
Speaker 1: a potentially strategic link to supply US troops in Afghanistan
Speaker 1: back when they were still there. And whether the sanctions
Speaker 1: exemption remains or not is one of those open questions.
Speaker 1: And this is also quite an expensive venture. What has
Speaker 1: it cost to expand this trade route so far? The
Speaker 1: headline numbers about twenty five billion dollars more or less
Speaker 1: evenly split them either side. The Russians are spending billions,
Speaker 1: have committed billions to dredge and expands river ways and
Speaker 1: lynn river ways so bigger and bigger ships are able
Speaker 1: to pass some of these narrow waterways exactly. The capacity
Speaker 1: constraint is the weather. Parts of it frees up right now,
Speaker 1: Parts of it are too shallow, so there needs to
Speaker 1: be significant investment to increase the capacity, to make it
Speaker 1: internationally competitive with longer routes. The bigger ships comply carrying
Speaker 1: bigger loads. Do the US and the EU have any
Speaker 1: way of limiting or enforcing sanctions in this route with
Speaker 1: the rail line, with the railroad, No, I don't see
Speaker 1: how they could possibly do that the Persian Golf, or
Speaker 1: we've seen how quickly crises can erupt in that waterway.
Speaker 1: We had it under Trump, we had effectively a second
Speaker 1: tank a war. If they choose to then swoop into
Speaker 1: the Persian Golf like a US vessel and wants to
Speaker 1: circumvent a ship which it suspects, for instance, of carrying
Speaker 1: maybe some some kind of goods from Russia that it's
Speaker 1: destined to go to China or India that's come bya
Speaker 1: Iran that is sanctioned, then that potentially can happen if
Speaker 1: they do it in international waters inside the Persian Gulf.
Speaker 1: But doing that obviously really elevates the kind of risk
Speaker 1: scenario in the Persian Golf. I'll continue my conversation with
Speaker 1: Goner and Jonathan in just to bit but to understand
Speaker 1: why Iran and Russia are going to such great lengths
Speaker 1: to avoid these Western sanctions is we're taking a moment
Speaker 1: to talk about the sanctions themselves and what it is
Speaker 1: that they do, or at least are supposed to do.
Speaker 1: So let's bring in someone who knows this subject. Cold.
Speaker 1: Dr Maria Shagana joins me now from Berlin. She's a
Speaker 1: senior fellow who studies economic sanctions at the International Institute
Speaker 1: for Strategic Studies, a British think tank. Maria, thanks for
Speaker 1: being here. Thank you for inviting me. Maria. The U
Speaker 1: S and the European Union have imposed a lot of
Speaker 1: sanctions on many individuals and companies and other entities. Exactly
Speaker 1: what did these sanctions cover? Indeed, there has been a
Speaker 1: truly a barrage of sanctions. We heard on a number
Speaker 1: of times that we see no unprecedented sanctions, not just
Speaker 1: in terms of their scope, but also in terms of
Speaker 1: how quick they have been imposed. And the main blocks
Speaker 1: of the sanctions boils down to the expert sanctions that
Speaker 1: nothing from the u US comes into Russia from strategic sectors.
Speaker 1: Then we have deal used technology such as semiconductors are
Speaker 1: no longer allowed to be exported to Russia. The recent
Speaker 1: development is the the oil embargo the price cap. On
Speaker 1: top of this, we have also unintended consequences which came
Speaker 1: was a positive impact is volunteerily that companies withdrew from
Speaker 1: Russia and that has amplified the impact of sanctions on
Speaker 1: the run. We have sanctions from two thousand and twelve
Speaker 1: early all as well, so it has been quite comprehensive
Speaker 1: as well. We have energy sector again do used technologies,
Speaker 1: also strategic sectors, aviation technology. So the two can trees,
Speaker 1: as they said, are naturally pivoting to each other because
Speaker 1: they are both isolating countries. More with Maria Shagina when
Speaker 1: we come back, Maria, you've spelled out what the Western
Speaker 1: sanctions and Russia in Iran are supposed to do it.
Speaker 1: They're supposed to isolate them and pressure them. How effective
Speaker 1: our sanctions are doing that. The g c po A deal,
Speaker 1: which is nuclear deal, which is linked to to the
Speaker 1: Iranian sanctions regime, is usually cited as this positive example
Speaker 1: where sanctions pressure was positive during the Obama administration. The
Speaker 1: Iranian elites were interested in signing that agreement and then
Speaker 1: lifting sanctions. Now we have to say there are not
Speaker 1: many positive examples like that. That agreement unfortunately has failed
Speaker 1: with the Trump administration withdrawing from unilaterally, and with Russia,
Speaker 1: we have sanctions from two thousand fourteen and we haven't
Speaker 1: had really a behavioral change. Now with the recent sanctions
Speaker 1: from twenty twenty two, the objective is rather moderates, not
Speaker 1: a behavioral change, but actually to curs Russia, to compel
Speaker 1: it to withdraw from Ukraine as much as possible to
Speaker 1: your road its ability to fund the work. So you
Speaker 1: can judge that effectiveness as you want. If you have
Speaker 1: the maximalist objective, the Russia has to withdraw from Ukraine,
Speaker 1: that is not happening at the moment. But if the
Speaker 1: objective is to road in the long term and to
Speaker 1: signal the norms to constrain Russia's ability, that part is unfolding.
Speaker 1: I suppose one measure of the success of sanctions is
Speaker 1: that it's squeezing around in Russia enough that they do
Speaker 1: wanting to embark on this very expensive arrangement to create
Speaker 1: an entirely new trade route to circumvent the sanctions. Indeed,
Speaker 1: so one side to look at the effectiveness of sanctions
Speaker 1: is to make it much more cumversome, much more expensive
Speaker 1: for these countries to circumvent them, and that's what's happened
Speaker 1: in both in Iran and in Russia. And we see
Speaker 1: that Iran and Russia are exchanging and goods that both
Speaker 1: can trade because they have achieved that some certain degree
Speaker 1: of self sufficiency due to sanctions circumvention. And here the
Speaker 1: story on chips, I think, is this exemplary that Russia
Speaker 1: is using Iranian drones. Russia attached the Ukrainian capital of
Speaker 1: Key with thirteen in Iranian made drones. Ukraine has it
Speaker 1: managed to shoot them down? Those several buildings were damaged.
Speaker 1: Uranian drones eight to five dependent on Western semiconductors. So
Speaker 1: we have that exchange of convenience, that partnership of convenience,
Speaker 1: but it has its limits. In order for this new
Speaker 1: trading route to work, it depends on the cooperation of
Speaker 1: a lot of other countries, including India, including other countries
Speaker 1: in Asia and in the Middle East, which puts them
Speaker 1: in an uncomfortable position. Do you anticipate that these countries,
Speaker 1: some of them, will be willing to fly out the
Speaker 1: United States and all of Europe in order to accommodate
Speaker 1: Russia and Iran. So when it comes to sanctions their convention,
Speaker 1: we have to distinguish between these heavily sanctioned countries like Iran,
Speaker 1: North Korea, Venezuela, and also the Black Nights. This is
Speaker 1: the academic term that is used to describe thoad countries
Speaker 1: like China, India or Haven't the lined with sanctions. They
Speaker 1: don't want to violate sanctions outright, but they are willing
Speaker 1: to capitalize to exploit the loopholes. So the access to
Speaker 1: this Black Nights, to China, to Turkey, to India is
Speaker 1: key for they have a lest sanctions countries because as
Speaker 1: I said, by default, they're very much limited and what
Speaker 1: they can exchange, how they can conduct their financial transactions.
Speaker 1: So they're very much dependent on access and willingness of
Speaker 1: the third countries, these Black Knights to engage with them.
Speaker 1: China is surprisingly not very much eager to violate the
Speaker 1: Western sanctions outright again, but we see that Turkey is
Speaker 1: more willing to maybe step in in some areas and
Speaker 1: to help Russia to re explore deal used technology that
Speaker 1: is no longer accessible when it comes to India, also
Speaker 1: similar to China, that they're again using that cheap Russian
Speaker 1: commodities and particularly in the oil sector. So each country
Speaker 1: in this Black night category has its own motivation to
Speaker 1: engage with those countries. The US and the EU are
Speaker 1: much more able to police shipping lanes when it goes
Speaker 1: into the traditional trade routes. Russian around have created these
Speaker 1: alternative trade routes that are in sort of friendlier waters
Speaker 1: but also rely on over land routes. What ability does
Speaker 1: the West have to control or limit the transport of
Speaker 1: goods over these new routes. I think it depends on
Speaker 1: the commodity. So when we talk about oil, the sanctions
Speaker 1: the oil embargo only concerned seaboard and oil shipments, so
Speaker 1: they don't talk about anything that goes through landline routes.
Speaker 1: So here, by default it's not part of that design.
Speaker 1: When it comes to seaboard shipments. Here the asymmetrical dependence
Speaker 1: of Russia on Western insurance comes in because about of
Speaker 1: insurance on for big oil tankers come from places like London.
Speaker 1: So it's relatively easy to implement because you have these
Speaker 1: nodes of dependence that you can exercise. You can leverage
Speaker 1: against Russia and you can police it in coordination with
Speaker 1: those insurance companies who have been heavily engaged in the
Speaker 1: design of that oil embargo and the price gap. Overall,
Speaker 1: we have to say that there are clear limitations when
Speaker 1: it comes to enforcement. The US is obviously a big
Speaker 1: elephant here. It has much more capacity, expertise and experience
Speaker 1: with that. Us IS is tracing that that development. It
Speaker 1: has backed up its capacity information sharing. They have also
Speaker 1: now created sanctions Envoy who would police all of the
Speaker 1: sanctions or convention. So a lot has changed in the
Speaker 1: EU when it comes to sanctions enforcement, because that's really
Speaker 1: the do main, big game now for Brussels to enforce.
Speaker 1: But ultimately we have to keep our expectations throughout the
Speaker 1: modest because it's impossible to track all sanctions or convention.
Speaker 1: We're already seeing a big increase in the number of
Speaker 1: ships and number of training shipments going along these new routes.
Speaker 1: Is there a danger that the sanctions could work a
Speaker 1: little too well, that Russia and run other countries create
Speaker 1: an entirely new trading arrangement that cuts out the West
Speaker 1: and therefore they no longer fear being cut out by
Speaker 1: the West. So these countries again they are dependent on
Speaker 1: stood countries. So a large majority of these stood countries
Speaker 1: has now been excluded with sanctions. So what they can
Speaker 1: do together is rather limited. They can't substitute that loss,
Speaker 1: that trade that has been lost with being decoupling from
Speaker 1: the West. So we're talking about some smaller percentage of
Speaker 1: what can be substitute, what can be alleviated, but they
Speaker 1: will never be hundred two. Is there a game of survival.
Speaker 1: It's not a game of thriving, right, They're not going
Speaker 1: to thrive on that. There won't be much economic growth
Speaker 1: and that, but they will survive. Their economy will be smaller,
Speaker 1: the economic pie will be much narrower, and that will
Speaker 1: be maybe fine. There will be aligned with the overall decoupling,
Speaker 1: with overall isolation of their economies, but that's not the
Speaker 1: striving economies we're talking about. Dr Maria Shagina, thanks so
Speaker 1: much for taking the time to talk to me. Thank
Speaker 1: you very much. We'll be right back after the break.
Speaker 1: I'm back now with my colleagues Goldar Mota Ali and
Speaker 1: Jonathan Tyrone. Gonner and Jonathan. We spoke earlier about some
Speaker 1: of the goods that are moving along this trade route,
Speaker 1: things like microchips on one hand, and drones and the
Speaker 1: other obviously two very different kinds of products, but products
Speaker 1: that couldn't move if this new trade route weren't in place.
Speaker 1: What are some of the other goods that are now
Speaker 1: being redirected along this new trade route. There's been a
Speaker 1: radget deal signed in the last you know, six months.
Speaker 1: There's been a medical products, pharmaceuticals, turbines, industrial products. Another
Speaker 1: big one is food and agricultural products wheat, barley, other grains, cooking, oils.
Speaker 1: These all commodities have obviously been heavily affected by Russia's
Speaker 1: invasion of Ukraine, and Iranian ships are some of the
Speaker 1: most kind of prolific taking up Russian wheat and grains
Speaker 1: in the Black Sea, and some of that is finding
Speaker 1: its way already over that trade route. So part of
Speaker 1: this is run getting goods into Russian, Russia getting into around.
Speaker 1: But the larger desire is also to move goods from
Speaker 1: both of these countries and sell to other nations. What
Speaker 1: are the country's buying because they need buyers for this
Speaker 1: in each of the buyers for these goods risk incurring
Speaker 1: the wrath of the EU and the US on their own.
Speaker 1: So how is that working well? India designed a deal
Speaker 1: to transport twelve million tons of green over this route,
Speaker 1: and obviously India has a strategic interest in Chabahar because
Speaker 1: they were one of the principal financiers on India and Chabahar.
Speaker 1: I think, you know, it's worth also pointing out that
Speaker 1: that investment plan has lagged behind quite a lot. It's
Speaker 1: been delayed by a good few years, and that's partly
Speaker 1: because of again sanctions. And even though Jonathan mentioned this
Speaker 1: very important point that Chabahar Port is exempt from U
Speaker 1: S sanctions, India has still been very reluctant to kind
Speaker 1: of roll up its sleeves and really get started on
Speaker 1: that investment. And one of the reasons is because there
Speaker 1: are other sanctions that it can't violate. So there are
Speaker 1: financial sanctions that affect Iran's financial and banking sector, which
Speaker 1: means that it's very difficult for countries to try for money. So,
Speaker 1: for instance, if India wants to make this investment and
Speaker 1: it needs to kind of like needs to move money
Speaker 1: from India to Iran, it's very very difficult to do
Speaker 1: that while sanctions are still in place. Those sanctions on
Speaker 1: Iran's access to banking facilities and financial transactions internationally are
Speaker 1: still in place. The government of the Islamic Republic has
Speaker 1: always wanted to kind of maintain a very pragmatic approach
Speaker 1: to who it trades with because it has no trade
Speaker 1: relationship with the United States. It's trade relationship with Europe
Speaker 1: and the EU specifically, you know, has been very healthy
Speaker 1: and strong at times, but obviously in the past few
Speaker 1: years it's been pretty bad. And now there's been a
Speaker 1: very deliberate, concerted effort by the hardline administration that's run
Speaker 1: by Ibrahim Race, who's this very ultra conservative cleric, to
Speaker 1: to kind of turn east in Iran. In parlance, that means,
Speaker 1: let's work with China and Russia and countries in the region,
Speaker 1: like smaller countries and smaller markets in the region that
Speaker 1: they have easy geographic access to where they can easily
Speaker 1: circumvent sanctions. This administration, led by Race seems much more
Speaker 1: content to kind of focus on Moscow and even to
Speaker 1: in a lesser extent, Beijing. I mean, you know, Iran
Speaker 1: had this big twenty five year, multibillion dollar long term
Speaker 1: strategic investment plan with China, which was a big story
Speaker 1: at the time. We don't hear anything about that anymore.
Speaker 1: It's totally kind of just sort of disappeared off the radar,
Speaker 1: and Russia has kind of come to replace China. Having
Speaker 1: said that, obviously China, for anyone that produces oil, is
Speaker 1: a big deal. Like, you know, China is the one
Speaker 1: country that's always going to be there for you, that's
Speaker 1: always going to be hungry for crude oil. And another
Speaker 1: weird and kind of interesting aspect to this whole relationship
Speaker 1: is that since Russia was sanctioned by the US and
Speaker 1: the EU to the extent that it has been, it's
Speaker 1: kind of now entered this market that Iran sort of
Speaker 1: dominated and monopolized, which was a market for sanctioned oil,
Speaker 1: and the only customer in that market is China officially,
Speaker 1: And now Iran finds itself in this position where it
Speaker 1: both wants to kind of totally kind of thrown its
Speaker 1: a lot with Russia economically, but it's also aware of
Speaker 1: the fact that Russia is now moving into this market
Speaker 1: that it's kind of like had to itself. I spoke
Speaker 1: earlier with Dr Maria sha you know, who said that
Speaker 1: despite all the efforts to build this alternative trade route
Speaker 1: to essentially replace trade with the West, it won't be
Speaker 1: enough that they can subsist on it. That in a crisis,
Speaker 1: it's enough to just get them through. But it's enough too,
Speaker 1: as she put it, survive but not thrive. When you
Speaker 1: look down the road in this agreement five years, ten
Speaker 1: years from now, what do you see. Do you see
Speaker 1: this as something that becomes durable or something that is
Speaker 1: a relationship of convenience that dissolves when things change? Well,
Speaker 1: I mean, I guess you can never have enough redundancy
Speaker 1: in international trade, and so you want to build redundant
Speaker 1: trade routes, particularly if you're a sanctioned country, And the
Speaker 1: fact that you can ship then prohibited material like drones,
Speaker 1: like missiles, like explosives without being detected makes this particularly
Speaker 1: convenient in time of war. It's not gonna replace the
Speaker 1: workhorse trade routes going through the Black Sea and down
Speaker 1: the Suez Canal with massive grain ship mints to you know,
Speaker 1: the Middle East, But in a pinch, when India wants
Speaker 1: that twelve million tons of grain and has booked capacity
Speaker 1: across Iranian railways might come in handy. I'm kind of
Speaker 1: quite pessimistic actually in the long term, I think because
Speaker 1: Iran and Russia don't have a great track record when
Speaker 1: it comes to kind of long term agreements. My sense
Speaker 1: and perception is this is much more of a relationship
Speaker 1: of convenience for Russia, and it's a relationship of absolute
Speaker 1: necessity for Iran, and I think that's where there's an
Speaker 1: essential imbalance. Iran doesn't have the kind of investment clout
Speaker 1: and capital needed to fund these massive infrastructure projects nowhere
Speaker 1: near as much as Russia still has. Politically, the Islamic
Speaker 1: Republic is under a huge amount of pressure right now
Speaker 1: at home, and the more it seems to come under
Speaker 1: that kind of pressure, the safer it seems to feel
Speaker 1: floating closer or just drifting much closer towards Moscow, because
Speaker 1: Putin is in a similar situation. But my question is
Speaker 1: how long is PU seeming to be in that situation?
Speaker 1: For how much longer is Russia generally going to be
Speaker 1: in this situation given the way that the war and
Speaker 1: their invasion of Ukraine is going Goldermata Valley, Jonathan Tyrone,
Speaker 1: thanks so much for talking to me you today, Thanks
Speaker 1: for the invitation. Thank you very much. You can read
Speaker 1: more from Golder, Matta Vali and Jonathan Tyrone at bloomberg
Speaker 1: dot com. Thanks for listening to us here at the
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