Speaker 1: Good morning, peeps, and welcome to WIKA F Daily with
Speaker 1: Meet your Girl Danielle Moody, recording from the Home Bunker. Folks,
Speaker 1: you know, I got to tell you that all of
Speaker 1: the news surrounding the Silicon Valley Bank failure and seizure
Speaker 1: by the federal government as well as now Signature Bank
Speaker 1: and the FDIC stating that all of the depositors will
Speaker 1: be insured, even those that exceeded the two hundred and
Speaker 1: fifty thousand dollar insurer limit will be insured, I got
Speaker 1: to tell you that I'm so disgusted by this entire situation.
Speaker 1: I'm disgusted because people like my upcoming guest Jennifer Tobb,
Speaker 1: predicted that this would happen. I'm disgusted by the fact that,
Speaker 1: you know, during the Obama administration, as we were watching
Speaker 1: banks being greedy as fuck, which predicated the foreclosure crisis,
Speaker 1: and none of those executives being held accountable any which
Speaker 1: way for ruining the American dream and the lives of
Speaker 1: millions of people. Fast forward to Peter Thiel, an ultrawealthy
Speaker 1: white man who via tweet, is able to destabilize the
Speaker 1: banking industry, and I think to myself, why the fuck
Speaker 1: do these people have so much fucking power. And it's
Speaker 1: because we've allowed for the rich to become ultrawealthy and
Speaker 1: that we have the regulators right, those that are supposed
Speaker 1: to regulate our institutions received donations from the very people
Speaker 1: that they are responsible for regulating. And then we wonder
Speaker 1: why shit like this happens because they just buide their
Speaker 1: time until their friends and cronies come into office, they
Speaker 1: get their ways so that they can buy their fifth
Speaker 1: house or their fifth fucking plane. You should not have
Speaker 1: that type of excessive wealth when there are people that
Speaker 1: are going hungry, where the federal government is totally fine
Speaker 1: to step in and bail out right these fucking banks.
Speaker 1: But when it comes to those that are accessing trying
Speaker 1: their damned this to access the American dream via student
Speaker 1: loans to go to college, Oh no, you see fights
Speaker 1: and lawsuits being waged to make sure that the middle
Speaker 1: class and the working class remain exactly in the place
Speaker 1: that they are. There won't be any fucking lawsuits that
Speaker 1: are waged and political fights that are fought over this.
Speaker 1: I'm just so sick of the shit, you know, I'm
Speaker 1: so sick of the shit, and I'm so sick of
Speaker 1: being lied to. It's greed, folks, And unlike Gordon Geko
Speaker 1: said back on Wall Street, greed is not good. Greed
Speaker 1: is actually fucking catastrophic. So coming up next my conversation
Speaker 1: with my friend Jennifer Tobb, the author of Big Dirty Money, Folks.
Speaker 1: I am always so thrilled when a friend of the
Speaker 1: show and friend of mine, the author of the Big
Speaker 1: Dirty Money, Jennifer Tobb, makes the time to join us
Speaker 1: on woke a f Because, folks, when there is capitalism
Speaker 1: and greed and finances a myths in this country, there's
Speaker 1: only one person that I go to to make sense
Speaker 1: of the nonsense, and that is you, Jen Tobb. So
Speaker 1: let's jump right in. All of the news. All the
Speaker 1: rage right now is a brown Silicon Valley Bank and
Speaker 1: the fact that the federal government has seized Silicon Valley
Speaker 1: Bank as well as I believe Signature Bank, another regional bank,
Speaker 1: that essentially there has been a run on these banks
Speaker 1: with depositors feeling uncertain that their deposits of over two
Speaker 1: hundred and fifty thousand dollars will be covered. When the
Speaker 1: federal government says we got you and we're not going
Speaker 1: to use taxpayer dollars in order to ensure your deposits.
Speaker 1: But we're going to use this quote unquote pot that
Speaker 1: all banks pay into when things like this happen. Jen,
Speaker 1: you give us your fifty thousand foot view of what
Speaker 1: happened with Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank and what
Speaker 1: is happening in banking right now. Well, I'm so glad
Speaker 1: you asked me, because I just finished working on a
Speaker 1: piece that when I have it, i'll share it. I'm
Speaker 1: writing an opinion piece for MSNBC, so it's fresh in
Speaker 1: my mind. So one thing before I kind of go
Speaker 1: through the really key details that I think are easy
Speaker 1: to understand if you actually pay attention, are not just
Speaker 1: spinning people for a living. You mentioned that there's this
Speaker 1: promise that taxpayers will never pay for these bailouts because
Speaker 1: it's going to come out of some fund banks pay into, well,
Speaker 1: the deposit Insurance fund that the FDIC has. If it
Speaker 1: runs dry, it gets refilled. But in these situations, yes,
Speaker 1: there will be a future assessment on banks. That's the promise.
Speaker 1: The problem is back during the Dodd Frank era, right
Speaker 1: after the two thousand and eight financial crisis, I was
Speaker 1: one of the people helping work and encourage stronger legislation
Speaker 1: than we actually got. And one thing we were arguing
Speaker 1: for was to pre fund that rescue fund. We were
Speaker 1: we were looking, we were actually looking for a special
Speaker 1: assessment of one hundred and fifty billion dollars to prefund,
Speaker 1: and that got shot down. People said it would encourage
Speaker 1: banks to fail. Not really. No one wanted to pay
Speaker 1: into the prefund. So that's one thing. But let's let's
Speaker 1: talk about what happened. And before I get the details,
Speaker 1: I want to make clear a couple of things. One,
Speaker 1: this is not the same thing as the global financial
Speaker 1: meltdown of two thousand and eight. There is going to
Speaker 1: be contagion, but it's not going to be as bad.
Speaker 1: That's one thing too, It's not no big deal. And three,
Speaker 1: I blame not just Congress, but I also blame the
Speaker 1: FED who made who took advantage of a giant rollback
Speaker 1: of the Dodd Frank Law in twenty eighteen and made
Speaker 1: it worse. And I don't want to be here saying
Speaker 1: I told you so, but I flip and a half
Speaker 1: to say, you know what I wrote about this in
Speaker 1: two thousand and eight, I told you so. You know,
Speaker 1: so whatever I mean, why wasn't the only one? It's
Speaker 1: not about that I did. What makes me the most
Speaker 1: angry about this situation is this would not have happened
Speaker 1: if Congress had not under roll back. Dodd Frank and
Speaker 1: Trump signed that law. But the problem is in this case, Daniel,
Speaker 1: are going to be perfectly Frank. It wasn't just the
Speaker 1: Republicans in Congress. There were big chunk of supporters at
Speaker 1: that time. The House was in Democratic control, and though
Speaker 1: the Senate wasn't. Mitch McConnell needed at least he needed
Speaker 1: sixty votes to get this through, and he didn't have them,
Speaker 1: but he got the votes he needed from Democrats. It's infuriating. Okay.
Speaker 1: One last thing is Silicon Valley Bank, which I'm sure
Speaker 1: you've heard this in the news. Silicon Valley Bank was
Speaker 1: one of the bank's lobbying for the rollback yep, okay,
Speaker 1: and in fact, they thought it was laughable that the
Speaker 1: kinds of restrictions and oversight on them should be should exist.
Speaker 1: They called them, you know, they called themselves a mid
Speaker 1: size bank, which at the time they were. And then
Speaker 1: once the ceiling for this special special heightened scrutiny, and
Speaker 1: stress tests and stuff was fifty billion dollars. As soon
Speaker 1: as that was lifted to two fifty low and behold,
Speaker 1: they did rapid growth. And they grew from a bank
Speaker 1: just at that level well above it until they failed
Speaker 1: two hundred billion. That never would have happened without this rollback.
Speaker 1: I'm glad that you brought that up, because I was
Speaker 1: going to ask for an explanation for people to understand
Speaker 1: what the threshold was, what they had to have in
Speaker 1: holding when they needed to begin stress testing, and how
Speaker 1: that number was d billion. And at the time that
Speaker 1: Silicon Valley Bank was seized by the FEDS, they had
Speaker 1: a holding of two hundred and nine billion dollars. Right
Speaker 1: on paper, they're well with the wa wait wait wait
Speaker 1: wait on paper on paper, on paper, yeah, they're well
Speaker 1: within though. Right there, they were well within the new
Speaker 1: deregulation that Donald Trump signed into twenty eighteen because they
Speaker 1: didn't make it to two fifty. They got to two
Speaker 1: hundred and then their whole ship started to crumble. Explain
Speaker 1: to us what exactly happened jen with the they got
Speaker 1: to t hold, like, what exactly was happening? And also
Speaker 1: what do we think the executives were doing when they
Speaker 1: started to sell off their shares about a week or
Speaker 1: so before the actual lapse of the bank. Okay, so
Speaker 1: two things. One for those folks who are interested sort
Speaker 1: of generally in what is banking about and how banks fail,
Speaker 1: I have a new substack called Follow the Money, and
Speaker 1: I just put something up. My Monday column is always
Speaker 1: called on the Money, and I put an excerpt from
Speaker 1: testimony of mind before the Senate Banking Committee in twenty sixteen,
Speaker 1: and that testimony was about how these things called capital
Speaker 1: and liquidity should not be loosened up for banks. I'm
Speaker 1: not going to get into what that is, but if
Speaker 1: you read that, I think it will become clear. But
Speaker 1: the fundamentals there which are kind of necessary for talking
Speaker 1: about this is that, as everyone probably knows, banks take
Speaker 1: deposits and banks make loans. People know that, but banks
Speaker 1: don't just take deposits and make loans. They also they
Speaker 1: also take that deposit money and invest it in other
Speaker 1: things like treasury securities and mortgage backed securities and so on. Right.
Speaker 1: People also don't think if you have a deposits in
Speaker 1: a bank, you know, Daniel, you just mentioned that it's
Speaker 1: insured up to two hundred and fifty thousand. It used
Speaker 1: to be one hundred thousand. But you are essentially a
Speaker 1: lender to the bank right when you're a depository. At anytime,
Speaker 1: you can ask for your money back. Similarly, the loans.
Speaker 1: If the bank makes a loan, a mortgage loan, or
Speaker 1: a commercial loan to a business, those loans are the
Speaker 1: bank's assets. They make money because they pay an interest,
Speaker 1: and hopefully when you sell them, you sell them for
Speaker 1: a profit or at least break even, so you can
Speaker 1: sort of think of it that way. In traditional banking,
Speaker 1: the way the bank makes money is the amount of
Speaker 1: interest it's bringing in on its loans. Let's say it's
Speaker 1: bringing in you know, six This would be a dream,
Speaker 1: but this is the example people give. Historically, bank bank
Speaker 1: has loans at pay six percent. It pays depositors three percent,
Speaker 1: and it makes a difference the money on the spread.
Speaker 1: That's kind of the general idea of banking. Let's think
Speaker 1: of something a little bit different when you think about
Speaker 1: banking in reality, though, too. Have you ever noticed that
Speaker 1: if you want to get let's say you want to
Speaker 1: get a bank loan for a mortgage to buy a house,
Speaker 1: often the bank will say you know, we'll give you
Speaker 1: a cheaper rate if you if you bank with us,
Speaker 1: right if you keep them. Similarly, here, let's say you
Speaker 1: went to something like Silicon Valley Bank and you were
Speaker 1: a business that wanted to get a loan from them,
Speaker 1: and let's say they gave you a million you needed,
Speaker 1: like five million dollars or whatever. They want you to
Speaker 1: keep that money in their bank. So though on the
Speaker 1: one hand, the five million is showing up is a
Speaker 1: loan as an asset of theirs, on the other hand,
Speaker 1: you've now got five million on deposit with them. Well,
Speaker 1: some of it you're going to be using to buy stuff,
Speaker 1: but you're also going to be whenever you bring in
Speaker 1: money from customers, you're going to be depositing with them.
Speaker 1: So there's a little bit of an overlap relationship. Okay,
Speaker 1: so let's let's let's leave that. Let's leave that be
Speaker 1: so you understand how this works. Now, one of the
Speaker 1: biggest risk bank face is that this maturity transformation deposits
Speaker 1: can be taken out on demand. But the loan, that
Speaker 1: mortgage loan, it's thirty years, or that corporate loan it's
Speaker 1: ten years. So only if you get too many depositors
Speaker 1: saying I want my money. Now, how does the bank
Speaker 1: pay the depositors? They have to sell the loans. That's fine,
Speaker 1: you would think, except in a rising interest rate environment.
Speaker 1: We are in a rising interest rate environment. And here's why.
Speaker 1: I remember how I told you, Okay, what if you
Speaker 1: have some loans on the books. Let's say your loans
Speaker 1: in the books are only paying two percent interest. But
Speaker 1: let's say the Fed is raised rates and now it's
Speaker 1: four percent. That means no one wants to buy your
Speaker 1: dumb two percent paying loan. If you're trying to sell
Speaker 1: that loan and you keep it on the books at
Speaker 1: the price you bought it at, Let's say that you
Speaker 1: bought the loan for one hundred thousand dollars, it's not
Speaker 1: worth as much anymore because someone can go out there
Speaker 1: and buy another bank could buy a loan from someone
Speaker 1: else that's paying in four percent interest. This is a
Speaker 1: lower yielding loan. So the problem here is this banks
Speaker 1: like SVB when it grew, remember I told you it
Speaker 1: was below fifty billion, yep, it grew super fast, and
Speaker 1: the way it grew super fast between twenty eighteen and
Speaker 1: twenty twenty one, like huge, huge, growth is it bought
Speaker 1: a lot of treasury bonds and mortgage backed securities in
Speaker 1: that era, but those were very very low interest rates.
Speaker 1: They didn't manage their interest rate risk and they didn't
Speaker 1: have to write down those loans. So those loans that
Speaker 1: they had, you know, you know, let's say you have
Speaker 1: one hundred billion dollars worth of loans that are not
Speaker 1: worth one hundred billion anymore because the interest rates are
Speaker 1: so low and people want to buy higher yielding loans.
Speaker 1: The way the county rules work is the Fed doesn't
Speaker 1: require the bank even as the interest rates up go
Speaker 1: up to realize Those are called unrealized losses. So it's
Speaker 1: a big it's a big landmine on the balance sheet.
Speaker 1: Everything is fine until depositors want their money out. And
Speaker 1: if they want their money out and you go to
Speaker 1: sell it a firesale those loans, you're to have a loss.
Speaker 1: That's exactly what happened to SVB last week. So SVB,
Speaker 1: which grew really rapidly, didn't manage its interest rate risk
Speaker 1: over the years, didn't hedge it properly, and frankly didn't
Speaker 1: have to GM right because in terms of what is
Speaker 1: required right, they didn't break the law yes, right, No,
Speaker 1: they didn't break the law. And what's even worse about this,
Speaker 1: I remember, I'm talking about these these assets that they have.
Speaker 1: What I didn't mention that's really important that you alluded
Speaker 1: to at the beginning, is it has all these depositors. Right,
Speaker 1: so it had two hundred nine billion in assets, it
Speaker 1: only had one hundred and seventy five billion in customer deposits.
Speaker 1: The problem was these were not normal customer deposits. It
Speaker 1: is very unusual if you look at a chart of
Speaker 1: these the nature of these deposits. Over ninety percent of
Speaker 1: those deposits were uninsured businesses who put their money there
Speaker 1: above the two hundred and fifty thousand dollars per account.
Speaker 1: Some of those businesses were businesses that were startups or
Speaker 1: in the crypto space. Those these are very runnable assets
Speaker 1: which specialized in runnable liabilities. Remember, and I think what
Speaker 1: SVB often did as they said, if you want to
Speaker 1: us to give you a loan, you have to put
Speaker 1: your deposits with us. I'm not sure if they always
Speaker 1: said that, but I get the sense that that might
Speaker 1: have been a goodie that they wanted or they asked for. Okay,
Speaker 1: so these are highly runnable deposits. We call this hot money,
Speaker 1: so hotter than most because it's it's businesses that are
Speaker 1: more likely to take their money in and out for payroll.
Speaker 1: But also in this case, whenever they had the money
Speaker 1: over two hundred and fifty thousand, they knew if this
Speaker 1: bank failed, they didn't want to be last in line,
Speaker 1: and they knew that the FDIC didn't ensure this. They
Speaker 1: could have had to take haircuts or lost a good
Speaker 1: chunk of their deposit. So what happens is like a
Speaker 1: few days before the run fda C Chairman Martin Gruenberg,
Speaker 1: and the FDAC is the one that runs this deposit
Speaker 1: insurance fund. He mentioned that across the banking sector there
Speaker 1: were substantial unrealized losses. These are the holes in the
Speaker 1: balance sheet where almost like you've got two set of books.
Speaker 1: The official set of books are holding them at purchase value,
Speaker 1: but the actual reality is they're really not worth that
Speaker 1: if they had to be sold. He said, the banking
Speaker 1: system has over six hundred and twenty billion dollars and
Speaker 1: unrealized losses. He says this there are folks that are
Speaker 1: sniffing around like Peter Teal and other people in Silicon Valley,
Speaker 1: and they put out the bat signal. First Peter Teal
Speaker 1: sells all of his cells, He withdraws all of his
Speaker 1: money he has on deposit. He has something called a
Speaker 1: founder's fund. He said, he put withdraws all of his
Speaker 1: money with SVB. And then someone else puts out a
Speaker 1: bad signal and they said get your money out. I
Speaker 1: mean think he did too. And so there's a run.
Speaker 1: Everyone wants their money. So what does the CEO of
Speaker 1: SVB have to do. They have to sell. And when
Speaker 1: they went and sold around twenty billion dollars of securities,
Speaker 1: they had a loss of one point eight billion. So
Speaker 1: you know when we're talking about yeah, in theory, they
Speaker 1: had a capital cushion in there. You know, they had
Speaker 1: two hundred and nine in assets in one hundred and
Speaker 1: seventy five in deposits. And really, really that two hundred
Speaker 1: and nine wasn't We're gonna bear that out. So this
Speaker 1: run continues. This is on Wednesday. On Thursday, they said
Speaker 1: they had to raise they want to raise capital, No one,
Speaker 1: They couldn't find many takers to raise capital. Um you know,
Speaker 1: there was new new stock in new preferred stock, and
Speaker 1: so basically the stock price plummets on Thursday, literally the
Speaker 1: day after they announced they need to raise more money
Speaker 1: because of that, you know, fire sale, and then fear
Speaker 1: spreads and the regulators in California sees the bank put
Speaker 1: it under FDIC control. This is on on Thursday. On Friday,
Speaker 1: UM on Friday the then I think I'm getting to Friday.
Speaker 1: But anyway, at some point we have the FDIC announcing
Speaker 1: that anyone who was insured will be be fine. We covered,
Speaker 1: but not that people who were uninsure might get less.
Speaker 1: And then then you know, everyone goes whining. You know,
Speaker 1: all these uninsured depositors, which are largely businesses who knew
Speaker 1: the risk, who knew they should have spread that money
Speaker 1: across many banks and bank accounts. They complained enough that
Speaker 1: that the regulators decided on Sunday. This is the FED,
Speaker 1: the FDIC and Treasury, they decided that they would cover
Speaker 1: all depositors, including including the uninsured. So they said that
Speaker 1: on Sunday. And that's at the same time they did
Speaker 1: the same thing for Signature Bank. In addition to this,
Speaker 1: though besides that, showing that it's not just these two banks,
Speaker 1: the FED announced us I knew what they call it
Speaker 1: it's like a bailout facility. It's basically a fund to
Speaker 1: bail out any other banks. And this reminds me the
Speaker 1: Financial Crisis two thousand and eight because they basically said,
Speaker 1: we will buy at par value, at face value, any securities,
Speaker 1: like any of these low interest rate securities at other
Speaker 1: banks have on their books, will pay the fake value
Speaker 1: for them so that you don't have to experience these
Speaker 1: unrealized losses. So, Jim, I know you're gonna lose your
Speaker 1: mind right now. And are you thinking about student loans
Speaker 1: right now? Because I know I'm thinking. I'm thinking about
Speaker 1: a couple of things. And so I want to start
Speaker 1: with Peter Deal. I want to start with him because
Speaker 1: this goes to my belief in the fact that the
Speaker 1: American all a dark system is out of fucking control.
Speaker 1: That I want people to understand and all of the
Speaker 1: rundown and economics one oh one and one oh two
Speaker 1: that you gave us that it was one person that
Speaker 1: started via tweet a run on Silicon Valley Bank, right,
Speaker 1: this is and it was not the resident of the
Speaker 1: United States, It was not the head of the Federal Reserve.
Speaker 1: One ulture wealthy white man via tweet started a run
Speaker 1: on this back. Yeah. Yeah, so here we are in
Speaker 1: this to by the way, please it makes sense for him,
Speaker 1: right because he apparently he I think he's that's the
Speaker 1: bank aware to start us bank at and he's told
Speaker 1: people to do it, and I think he has people
Speaker 1: in My understanding is you know, his people investing his
Speaker 1: funds go there. His doing that and getting the bad
Speaker 1: signal out resulted in everyone organizing doing this run. And
Speaker 1: then it resulted in these uninsured depositors being covered, I understand,
Speaker 1: and covered because they organized. You should say, right, so
Speaker 1: you're saying is this broken? Oh no, it's functioning how
Speaker 1: they want it to function. No, it's functioning how they
Speaker 1: want it to function. And when you say, oh, are
Speaker 1: you thinking about student loans? Of course I am right,
Speaker 1: of course I am, because again we are functioning inside
Speaker 1: of a system that is built to make sure that
Speaker 1: wealthy people remain whole. I mean where this is. You know,
Speaker 1: when I listened to the oral argument at the Supreme
Speaker 1: Court on the student loans and I wrote about this
Speaker 1: for my substackt. The key thing, as you know, is
Speaker 1: not the key reason why this is being attacked, but
Speaker 1: the legal arguments are that the Department, that the Secretary
Speaker 1: of Education didn't have the authority even though Congress gave
Speaker 1: him emergency authority, including to cancel old student loans. They
Speaker 1: didn't have the authority to do this even though he
Speaker 1: did it, and that the Supreme Courts is second cast them.
Speaker 1: Here we have the FED creating one of these facilities
Speaker 1: to bail out the entire banking system using their authority
Speaker 1: under thirteen three of the Federal Reserve Act, which is
Speaker 1: less flip in clear than the Department of Educations authority was.
Speaker 1: And you're not going to see I'll tell you, I
Speaker 1: don't think we're going to see a challenge win at
Speaker 1: the Supreme Court on this. I'm trying to remember, because
Speaker 1: why would wealthy people challenge themselves? Well, there might have.
Speaker 1: People are only going to challenge the poor, right that,
Speaker 1: and challenge the less advantaged. What I need to go
Speaker 1: back and look is I'm trying. I'm remembering that there
Speaker 1: might have been back in twenty fifteen or sixteen, some
Speaker 1: kind of challenge to this. I need to go back
Speaker 1: and look. But I know it all the bailouts held up.
Speaker 1: Maybe there's a challenge. I can't I actually go back
Speaker 1: and look and see how it was treated at the time.
Speaker 1: But fundamentally, um, you know, fundamentally, this is it's it's
Speaker 1: it's not even about the law. It's a deeply unfair way.
Speaker 1: These narratives are spies. You see all these people saying, oh,
Speaker 1: don't think of it as these stupid bankers, think about
Speaker 1: these poor depositors who are no better. And no, it's
Speaker 1: not all Silicon Valley chieftains. This little lady you know who,
Speaker 1: from wherever she's from. I saw this thing. I started
Speaker 1: my own startup, and it's not just the big businesses.
Speaker 1: It's me and you know, it's me and my five people.
Speaker 1: And like their American dream, well, you know what, a
Speaker 1: lot of us have an American dream. A lot of
Speaker 1: students have American dreams, and they are just the I
Speaker 1: even see there's some good people on the news talking
Speaker 1: about this, but there's some people that I have seen,
Speaker 1: some talking heads who keep emphasizing that, you know, it's
Speaker 1: not just big businesses. You know what, Listen, anyone who
Speaker 1: has more than two hundred and fifty thousand dollars in
Speaker 1: a single account knew what they were getting themselves into. Period.
Speaker 1: And I've seen people argue with me on Twitter saying, yeah,
Speaker 1: but they couldn't have gotten as good of a rate
Speaker 1: if they hadn't gone to this bank, and that's what
Speaker 1: the bank probably required. I'm like, that's their choice. I
Speaker 1: shouldn't have to bail out them for making that choice.
Speaker 1: That's not or we need to have a different system
Speaker 1: where we decide if the government's going to backstop this,
Speaker 1: if the government's going to pay for a military, the
Speaker 1: government should pay for school, should pay for It's just
Speaker 1: amazing to me that when there's this thing that I
Speaker 1: wrote in the piece, I don't make it through the edit.
Speaker 1: But they're just like, there are no atheists, foxholes, there
Speaker 1: are no capitalists and bank failures. No, because they're all
Speaker 1: socialists at that point, right they were before. I mean, yeah,
Speaker 1: it becomes so stark, Jim. I guess is the injustices,
Speaker 1: the inequities, the fact that the ultrawealthy are just going
Speaker 1: to continue to get wealthy, are going to continue to
Speaker 1: be made whole, and they are made whole by causing
Speaker 1: holes in the middle class and in the working class.
Speaker 1: And until we actually have a government that sees the
Speaker 1: needs of the middle class and the working class and
Speaker 1: the poor above the ultrawealthy. Nothing is ever going to change.
Speaker 1: And the fact is is that, you know, much in
Speaker 1: the same way that we look to the police to
Speaker 1: write police reports with accuracy about their own wrongdoing, we
Speaker 1: look to the federal government, which is filled with people
Speaker 1: who receive donations from the very people who they are
Speaker 1: in charge of regulating. And until that actually stops, which
Speaker 1: it won't, this will continue over and over and over again.
Speaker 1: Every five, ten, fifteen, twenty fucking years, this will be
Speaker 1: the headline. People will say, we'll need more regulation, a
Speaker 1: Republican will get in office, well, you know, and then fascism.
Speaker 1: We'll just rain down because we won't have democracy to
Speaker 1: move forward. So what happens, Well, what I'm hoping for
Speaker 1: is something I saw my friend Dennis Kelleher suggest. He
Speaker 1: runs Better Markets, which is a nonprofit, nonpartisan kind of
Speaker 1: think tank around market functioning. He's a good guy and
Speaker 1: he wants there to be an independent investigation of what
Speaker 1: went down at the FED. Right now, someone it inside
Speaker 1: the FED is said, we're going to do this thing
Speaker 1: and ourselves and put out a report by May and
Speaker 1: it is like, no, and it shouldn't even be. The
Speaker 1: Inspector General for the Fedruyu have some independent other inspector
Speaker 1: general look at what happened, because this was a tremendous
Speaker 1: failure of supervision. Even though this bank managed to get
Speaker 1: out of some of the more serious oversight, there's no
Speaker 1: reason why it should have been taking on this kind
Speaker 1: of interest rate risk or having such a non diversified
Speaker 1: funding on its liability side. And the San Francisco FED
Speaker 1: as well as the FED um, you know, the central
Speaker 1: Bank itself needs to be investigated. Yeah. Yeah, and of
Speaker 1: course you just saw that. But but the biggest the
Speaker 1: other thing is, you know, we need to as you
Speaker 1: know Label Warren said last night, you know, we need
Speaker 1: to and Katie Porter, we need to roll back the word.
Speaker 1: We need to cancel the law that roll back Dodd Frank,
Speaker 1: and we need to actually reopen the debates around Dodd
Speaker 1: Frank and put back in the stuff that we were
Speaker 1: arguing for that we didn't get into the final legislation. Yeah,
Speaker 1: like the prefund also, Yeah, yeah, good luck with that.
Speaker 1: I'm just saying, yeah, I'm just saying good luck with that.
Speaker 1: And I won't hold my breath because I'd rather not
Speaker 1: pass out and hit my head on my computer Jennifer Tobb.
Speaker 1: We will have you back again as this continues to unfold,
Speaker 1: but to have more conversations about immense greed and the
Speaker 1: American oligarch that we don't talk about. We're all about
Speaker 1: seizing yachts and private planes and multiple homes of Russian oligarchs,
Speaker 1: but we speak nothing on the technocrats and the American
Speaker 1: oligarchs that run everything in our lives. So as always,
Speaker 1: dear friend, we appreciate you, so good to see you.
Speaker 1: That is it for me today. Hear friends on woke
Speaker 1: app as always, power to the people and to all
Speaker 1: the people. Power, get woke and stay woke as fuck.