1 00:00:00,400 --> 00:00:06,520 Speaker 1: The Michael Berry Show Space Shuttle Challenger disaster thirty eight 2 00:00:06,559 --> 00:00:09,600 Speaker 1: years ago this week, I remember where I was. Do 3 00:00:09,680 --> 00:00:15,120 Speaker 1: you for people my age and I'm fifty four. That 4 00:00:15,320 --> 00:00:18,680 Speaker 1: was kind of our John F. Kennedy assassination moment where 5 00:00:18,840 --> 00:00:22,880 Speaker 1: we remember where we were, at least I do. We 6 00:00:22,920 --> 00:00:29,120 Speaker 1: will all remember that day. It was a shattering of 7 00:00:29,160 --> 00:00:37,200 Speaker 1: a sense of innocence, especially because that particular mission had 8 00:00:37,320 --> 00:00:43,880 Speaker 1: accomplished its goal of getting young people reinspired by the 9 00:00:43,960 --> 00:00:48,200 Speaker 1: Space Shuttle, by space travel. You know, it had become commonplace. 10 00:00:48,240 --> 00:00:50,960 Speaker 1: It had become kind of boring, right, We'd been to 11 00:00:51,000 --> 00:00:54,440 Speaker 1: the Moon, We've done all these things. So they they 12 00:00:55,240 --> 00:00:59,600 Speaker 1: bring in this school teacher, Krista mccauliffe. And I loved 13 00:00:59,640 --> 00:01:03,240 Speaker 1: about to tea, and my teachers loved teaching, and they 14 00:01:03,280 --> 00:01:06,360 Speaker 1: loved Christa mccalliffe. So we all knew the story. So 15 00:01:07,080 --> 00:01:12,360 Speaker 1: if there's no other name you knew on that mission, 16 00:01:12,840 --> 00:01:15,880 Speaker 1: it was Krista mccalliffe. She was a common school teacher. 17 00:01:16,200 --> 00:01:19,000 Speaker 1: She was going into space. This was awesome. It was 18 00:01:19,040 --> 00:01:22,759 Speaker 1: a pr campaign that worked, and as you know, all 19 00:01:22,840 --> 00:01:31,200 Speaker 1: seven crew members perished. Gregory Jarvis, the captain, engineer and astronaut, 20 00:01:32,240 --> 00:01:35,600 Speaker 1: Christa mccauliffe of course, Ronald McNair who was a physicist 21 00:01:35,880 --> 00:01:42,000 Speaker 1: and astronaut, Ellison on Azuka, engineer and astronaut. They were 22 00:01:42,040 --> 00:01:47,120 Speaker 1: all Americans, by the way. Judith Resnik who was a colonel, 23 00:01:47,160 --> 00:01:51,600 Speaker 1: engineer and astronaut, Dick Goby who was a colonel, pilot 24 00:01:51,720 --> 00:01:53,800 Speaker 1: and astronaut. Was he the head of the mission? I 25 00:01:53,840 --> 00:01:56,080 Speaker 1: think he was the kind of the commanding officer I 26 00:01:56,160 --> 00:02:01,080 Speaker 1: remember correctly. And Michael J. Smith was a pilot, captain 27 00:02:01,640 --> 00:02:07,720 Speaker 1: and astronaut. This is a little documentary about the disaster 28 00:02:08,200 --> 00:02:12,120 Speaker 1: from a group called Free Documentaries. And by the way, 29 00:02:12,200 --> 00:02:14,840 Speaker 1: let me while I have your attention for a moment. 30 00:02:15,800 --> 00:02:19,000 Speaker 1: People send me stuff all the time of a subject 31 00:02:19,160 --> 00:02:23,200 Speaker 1: they care about, and I don't care if it's YouTube, rumble, 32 00:02:23,639 --> 00:02:25,960 Speaker 1: whatever your format is. However you want to do it. 33 00:02:27,200 --> 00:02:31,880 Speaker 1: If you have an interest in something, make little documentaries 34 00:02:31,880 --> 00:02:35,280 Speaker 1: about it, share that with other people. That's how knowledge 35 00:02:35,320 --> 00:02:37,680 Speaker 1: is shared. It's a beautiful thing. If you don't have 36 00:02:37,760 --> 00:02:40,600 Speaker 1: the video side of it, because I'm not a video guy, 37 00:02:40,919 --> 00:02:45,560 Speaker 1: just talk into a microphone and create a podcast. Share it. 38 00:02:45,560 --> 00:02:48,240 Speaker 1: It doesn't matter if ten million people listen to it 39 00:02:48,320 --> 00:02:52,360 Speaker 1: or you get rich listening to it. It's cathartic to 40 00:02:52,480 --> 00:02:56,640 Speaker 1: share the information you have. It's enjoyable, it's rewarding. Don't 41 00:02:56,680 --> 00:02:59,360 Speaker 1: worry how many people end up listening to it. That's 42 00:02:59,480 --> 00:03:05,000 Speaker 1: not the goal, this idea of going viral. Hemy People 43 00:03:05,040 --> 00:03:09,119 Speaker 1: send me stuff all the time. It's often wonderful. Yeah, 44 00:03:09,160 --> 00:03:11,960 Speaker 1: so I just thought it saying, all right, here's your documentary. 45 00:03:13,000 --> 00:03:13,280 Speaker 2: Dark. 46 00:03:17,320 --> 00:03:20,640 Speaker 3: On a cold January day in nineteen eighty six, the 47 00:03:20,760 --> 00:03:25,519 Speaker 3: Space Shuttle Challenger blew apart high above Kennedy Space Center 48 00:03:25,639 --> 00:03:31,040 Speaker 3: on Cape Canaveron just seventy three seconds after launch. A 49 00:03:31,120 --> 00:03:35,120 Speaker 3: rubber seal called an O ring had failed, and a 50 00:03:35,120 --> 00:03:38,080 Speaker 3: plume of fire leaked out of the solid fuel booster, 51 00:03:38,520 --> 00:03:45,200 Speaker 3: igniting the gigantic fuel tank. With millions of people tuned 52 00:03:45,240 --> 00:03:49,840 Speaker 3: in live on TV, Americans watched in disbelief as a 53 00:03:49,880 --> 00:03:55,200 Speaker 3: sinister white plume streaked across the sky and seven astronauts, 54 00:03:55,600 --> 00:04:00,960 Speaker 3: including New Hampshire High school teacher Christa McAuliffe, plummeted helplessly 55 00:04:01,360 --> 00:04:06,200 Speaker 3: twenty thousand meters to their deaths. America was plunged into 56 00:04:06,320 --> 00:04:11,000 Speaker 3: uncertainty and grief, and questioned NASA's ability to manage the 57 00:04:11,040 --> 00:04:14,160 Speaker 3: immensely complex space program effectively. 58 00:04:14,480 --> 00:04:17,400 Speaker 4: He said, I would not recommend that we launched below 59 00:04:17,600 --> 00:04:22,599 Speaker 4: fifty three degrees fahrenheit, and that was primarily based on 60 00:04:22,720 --> 00:04:26,440 Speaker 4: the experience we'd had one year earlier. That concerned us, 61 00:04:27,720 --> 00:04:30,720 Speaker 4: and frankly, I was shocked because I felt that that 62 00:04:30,880 --> 00:04:33,360 Speaker 4: was a slam dunk. They would accept that and just 63 00:04:33,760 --> 00:04:39,039 Speaker 4: postpone the launch. They immediately started questioning the basis for 64 00:04:39,160 --> 00:04:42,440 Speaker 4: making such a recommendation based on the material presented. 65 00:04:42,680 --> 00:04:47,200 Speaker 5: The single message that came out in a direct quote 66 00:04:47,200 --> 00:04:52,320 Speaker 5: to me from one of the most senior administrators in NASA, 67 00:04:52,400 --> 00:04:55,400 Speaker 5: when I said, we're going to lose one of these shuttles. 68 00:04:56,000 --> 00:05:00,200 Speaker 5: And I said that three months before. Challenger said to me, 69 00:05:01,480 --> 00:05:07,720 Speaker 5: our job is to launch on time every time. And 70 00:05:07,760 --> 00:05:09,120 Speaker 5: it was one of those hairs on the back of 71 00:05:09,160 --> 00:05:12,000 Speaker 5: the neck moment when I realized they're not listening. 72 00:05:14,120 --> 00:05:19,000 Speaker 3: When a chastened NASA emerged from the tragedy, Shuttle flights resumed. 73 00:05:20,279 --> 00:05:23,880 Speaker 3: The Shuttle pushed the frontiers of technology to the utter limits, 74 00:05:24,360 --> 00:05:28,760 Speaker 3: and this incredibly complex machine continued flying for another quarter 75 00:05:28,880 --> 00:05:33,159 Speaker 3: of a century, with astronauts from around the world aboard. 76 00:05:34,120 --> 00:05:35,160 Speaker 6: A quasi capito. 77 00:05:36,920 --> 00:05:41,120 Speaker 7: I almost thought I'm the weekly I was the one 78 00:05:41,120 --> 00:05:43,279 Speaker 7: who had to perform at the level needed to be 79 00:05:43,360 --> 00:05:45,880 Speaker 7: up to the standard of the others. My work was 80 00:05:46,000 --> 00:05:49,080 Speaker 7: as important as the others. I had to trust the others, 81 00:05:49,120 --> 00:05:52,799 Speaker 7: the astronauts who were with me, but also those setting 82 00:05:52,880 --> 00:05:56,240 Speaker 7: up the launch, those who followed the operations, and at 83 00:05:56,240 --> 00:05:59,880 Speaker 7: the same time they had to trust me. Jokingly, I 84 00:06:01,279 --> 00:06:04,120 Speaker 7: don't care if the Shuttle blows up, as long as 85 00:06:04,279 --> 00:06:05,200 Speaker 7: it's not my fault. 86 00:06:05,960 --> 00:06:13,039 Speaker 3: Past a small group of brave engineers, analysts and astronauts 87 00:06:13,279 --> 00:06:17,200 Speaker 3: risked their careers so that the managerial errors behind the 88 00:06:17,279 --> 00:06:22,320 Speaker 3: Challenger disaster never happened again. It took two years before 89 00:06:22,360 --> 00:06:43,880 Speaker 3: the problem was fixed and the next Shuttle launched. One 90 00:06:43,920 --> 00:06:47,080 Speaker 3: of the last Space Shuttle missions is about to launch. 91 00:06:48,240 --> 00:06:52,960 Speaker 3: This complex machine has completed one hundred and thirty five missions. 92 00:06:54,480 --> 00:06:59,000 Speaker 3: Italy's first astronaut, Paolo Nespoli, flew on the Shuttle Mission 93 00:06:59,040 --> 00:07:03,520 Speaker 3: one hundred and twenty in twenty oh seven. Like all 94 00:07:03,560 --> 00:07:07,560 Speaker 3: but two missions, it was a successful flight where nothing 95 00:07:07,640 --> 00:07:14,280 Speaker 3: went wrong, although he was trained to be prepared for anything. Literally, 96 00:07:14,520 --> 00:07:20,160 Speaker 3: the tiniest error could mean catastrophe. 97 00:07:20,360 --> 00:07:25,960 Speaker 6: No equal make with Bajo as. 98 00:07:24,000 --> 00:07:27,920 Speaker 7: Crew, we had serious problems. Our training was very tough, 99 00:07:28,080 --> 00:07:31,600 Speaker 7: very serious. For example, at the time of launch, there 100 00:07:31,640 --> 00:07:34,440 Speaker 7: were a number of malfunctions that could happen, and according 101 00:07:34,440 --> 00:07:37,880 Speaker 7: to how they interacted between each other, a simple and 102 00:07:37,960 --> 00:07:40,880 Speaker 7: a stupid thing could have a knock on effect and 103 00:07:41,000 --> 00:07:44,760 Speaker 7: lead to the destruction of the vehicle. As a member 104 00:07:44,760 --> 00:07:47,000 Speaker 7: of the crew, you had to understand all these things, 105 00:07:47,720 --> 00:07:50,160 Speaker 7: and there was this kind of game. Let's call it 106 00:07:50,240 --> 00:07:53,680 Speaker 7: a game between the instructors who wanted to kill you 107 00:07:54,000 --> 00:07:58,120 Speaker 7: and you who responded successfully to all these provocations. 108 00:07:58,480 --> 00:08:00,240 Speaker 6: Sponduchess to. 109 00:08:03,840 --> 00:08:09,360 Speaker 3: January nineteen eighty six. Space Shuttle Challenger was originally set 110 00:08:09,440 --> 00:08:13,280 Speaker 3: to launch from Kennedy Space Center on January the twenty second, 111 00:08:13,440 --> 00:08:18,880 Speaker 3: nineteen eighty six, but bad weather led to delays. The 112 00:08:18,960 --> 00:08:23,640 Speaker 3: launch slipped from January twenty third, then twenty fourth, and 113 00:08:23,680 --> 00:08:28,560 Speaker 3: then twenty fifth. Another weather delay and a technical problem 114 00:08:28,600 --> 00:08:31,360 Speaker 3: with one of the door hatchers pushed the launch back 115 00:08:31,440 --> 00:08:37,920 Speaker 3: another two days. On January the twenty eighth, the weather 116 00:08:38,040 --> 00:08:44,520 Speaker 3: was still colder than usual for launching the shuttle. Alan 117 00:08:44,640 --> 00:08:48,440 Speaker 3: MacDonald represented the Utah based builder of the solid fuel 118 00:08:48,520 --> 00:08:52,920 Speaker 3: rocket boosters, Morton thayercar on site. 119 00:08:53,240 --> 00:08:56,400 Speaker 4: I can remember walking out of the launch control center 120 00:08:56,480 --> 00:08:59,040 Speaker 4: to my car after that and aedber felt win so 121 00:08:59,120 --> 00:09:02,920 Speaker 4: strong and sand was blowing into my contact lenses and 122 00:09:02,920 --> 00:09:05,199 Speaker 4: it actually stopped me at times, and I have to 123 00:09:05,280 --> 00:09:08,480 Speaker 4: lean forward. I got to my car go to my 124 00:09:08,520 --> 00:09:11,040 Speaker 4: friend's house, and I wasn't there very long and I 125 00:09:11,040 --> 00:09:13,559 Speaker 4: got a phone call. The phone call was a fellow 126 00:09:13,559 --> 00:09:16,920 Speaker 4: the name of Bob Ebbling that worked for me, and 127 00:09:16,960 --> 00:09:19,360 Speaker 4: he said, Ali says, we've just been notified that some 128 00:09:19,840 --> 00:09:23,600 Speaker 4: meteorologist in Orlando said, you know the strong winds that 129 00:09:24,000 --> 00:09:27,320 Speaker 4: canceled their launch today, that there's a real coal front 130 00:09:27,400 --> 00:09:30,960 Speaker 4: behind that, and by tomorrow morning it may be down 131 00:09:31,040 --> 00:09:33,480 Speaker 4: as close as eighteen degrees fahrenheit. 132 00:09:33,600 --> 00:09:34,000 Speaker 5: Is cold. 133 00:09:34,520 --> 00:09:37,640 Speaker 4: I said, good grief. I'm really worried about where these 134 00:09:37,640 --> 00:09:39,800 Speaker 4: O rings seals are operated at all at those kind 135 00:09:39,840 --> 00:09:40,880 Speaker 4: of temperatures. 136 00:09:43,760 --> 00:09:46,640 Speaker 3: Back in Utah, the engineers were so worried about the 137 00:09:46,679 --> 00:09:49,480 Speaker 3: effect of the cold on the O rings that they 138 00:09:49,559 --> 00:09:53,280 Speaker 3: asked McDonald to get more detailed weather reports from NASA. 139 00:09:55,720 --> 00:09:59,280 Speaker 4: I said, fine, I'll get that information for you. But 140 00:09:59,360 --> 00:10:01,040 Speaker 4: when I get it, but here's what I want you 141 00:10:01,120 --> 00:10:04,600 Speaker 4: to do. I want you to provide that to the engineers. 142 00:10:05,000 --> 00:10:07,679 Speaker 4: I want them to put together a presentation of what 143 00:10:07,760 --> 00:10:11,200 Speaker 4: we know and don't know what our concerns are, and 144 00:10:11,320 --> 00:10:13,600 Speaker 4: at the end of that presentation, I want you to 145 00:10:13,640 --> 00:10:18,200 Speaker 4: make sure that the Vice present Engineering comes on and 146 00:10:18,320 --> 00:10:22,600 Speaker 4: makes a recommendation, what is the lowest temperature it is 147 00:10:22,679 --> 00:10:25,440 Speaker 4: safe to launch? We have to do that. 148 00:10:25,880 --> 00:10:28,680 Speaker 3: Alan MacDonald got all the parties on board for a 149 00:10:28,760 --> 00:10:33,319 Speaker 3: teleconference between engineers in Utah, those in Marshall Space Center 150 00:10:33,440 --> 00:10:38,400 Speaker 3: in Huntsville, Alabama, at NASA management at Cape Canaveral. More 151 00:10:38,440 --> 00:10:41,880 Speaker 3: than a dozen engineers faxed their charts and made a 152 00:10:41,920 --> 00:10:46,480 Speaker 3: clear and unanimous recommendation the shuttle should not be launched 153 00:10:46,640 --> 00:10:50,360 Speaker 3: if the temperature was below fifty three degrees fahrenheit or 154 00:10:50,400 --> 00:10:54,440 Speaker 3: eleven point six degrees celsius, due to concerns about how 155 00:10:54,480 --> 00:10:56,360 Speaker 3: the O rings would perform. 156 00:10:56,559 --> 00:10:59,400 Speaker 4: At the end of their presentation, the Vice President of Engineering, 157 00:10:59,440 --> 00:11:02,960 Speaker 4: Fellow and MS Bob Lonn got on the network and said, 158 00:11:02,960 --> 00:11:07,120 Speaker 4: based on what his engineers has have presented here this evening, 159 00:11:07,720 --> 00:11:11,160 Speaker 4: because they had to fax all those charts to both 160 00:11:11,320 --> 00:11:15,240 Speaker 4: Huntsville and also to the Cape, he said, I would 161 00:11:15,240 --> 00:11:19,160 Speaker 4: not recommend that we launch below fifty three degrees fahrenheit, 162 00:11:20,160 --> 00:11:23,680 Speaker 4: and that was primarily based on the experience we'd had 163 00:11:23,720 --> 00:11:28,560 Speaker 4: one year earlier. That concerned us, and frankly, I was 164 00:11:28,640 --> 00:11:31,440 Speaker 4: shocked because I felt that that was a slam dunk. 165 00:11:31,480 --> 00:11:35,840 Speaker 4: They would accept that and just postpone the launch. They 166 00:11:35,920 --> 00:11:40,280 Speaker 4: immediately started questioning the basis for making such a recommendation 167 00:11:40,800 --> 00:11:42,160 Speaker 4: based on the material presented. 168 00:11:43,360 --> 00:11:49,880 Speaker 3: Then the unthinkable happened. Several top executives vetoed the engineer's 169 00:11:49,920 --> 00:11:53,920 Speaker 3: recommendation in an offline caucus, giving NASA the green light 170 00:11:54,080 --> 00:11:57,760 Speaker 3: to launch Challenger at a temperature that was just thirty 171 00:11:57,800 --> 00:12:04,440 Speaker 3: eight degrees fahrenheit degrees celsius. A few engineers protested, but 172 00:12:04,559 --> 00:12:08,120 Speaker 3: were over ruined, due in part to concerns about losing 173 00:12:08,280 --> 00:12:12,319 Speaker 3: lucrative government contracts if the launch schedule were to fall 174 00:12:12,400 --> 00:12:17,720 Speaker 3: further behind. NASA wanted the recommendation facts to them in writing, 175 00:12:18,800 --> 00:12:20,040 Speaker 3: Allan refused. 176 00:12:24,400 --> 00:12:27,040 Speaker 4: I did the smartest thing I ever did in my life. 177 00:12:27,240 --> 00:12:31,640 Speaker 4: I told NASA I would not sign that recommendation. I 178 00:12:31,679 --> 00:12:35,160 Speaker 4: feel we're taking risks that we should not take. It'll 179 00:12:35,200 --> 00:12:38,640 Speaker 4: have to come from the plant if it comes from anybody, 180 00:12:38,720 --> 00:12:39,280 Speaker 4: but not me. 181 00:12:40,840 --> 00:12:44,679 Speaker 3: The o rings were not the only concern. Alan told 182 00:12:44,720 --> 00:12:48,360 Speaker 3: those gathered at the teleconference that high winds were gusting 183 00:12:48,480 --> 00:12:52,760 Speaker 3: up to seventy knots, and there was ice everywhere. All 184 00:12:52,880 --> 00:12:56,440 Speaker 3: the while, NASA officials were pressing for the facts from 185 00:12:56,480 --> 00:12:57,479 Speaker 3: Morton Thiokol. 186 00:12:58,160 --> 00:13:00,560 Speaker 4: At that point in time, they said, well, you've brought 187 00:13:00,600 --> 00:13:03,599 Speaker 4: up all these concerns that aren't really should be your concerns, 188 00:13:04,200 --> 00:13:08,440 Speaker 4: but we'll pass them on in an advisory capacity. Only 189 00:13:09,400 --> 00:13:11,800 Speaker 4: where is the facts from your boss? 190 00:13:13,280 --> 00:13:16,720 Speaker 3: The next day, the ice teams were busy knocking icicles 191 00:13:16,760 --> 00:13:20,520 Speaker 3: off the Shuttle and using an infrared pirometer gun to 192 00:13:20,600 --> 00:13:25,440 Speaker 3: get temperature readings that were entered into NASA logbooks. A 193 00:13:25,520 --> 00:13:28,640 Speaker 3: later review of those logs showed the temperature near the 194 00:13:28,679 --> 00:13:33,080 Speaker 3: failed solid rocket booster was below twenty eight degrees or 195 00:13:33,200 --> 00:13:37,200 Speaker 3: minus two degrees celsius, much colder than the ambient air 196 00:13:37,240 --> 00:13:42,000 Speaker 3: temperature of thirty one degrees fahrenheit, just below freezing point. 197 00:13:43,080 --> 00:13:47,000 Speaker 3: It was shaded from the sun and exposed to westerly winds. 198 00:13:48,280 --> 00:13:52,120 Speaker 3: In the meantime, the astronauts were preparing for launch, a 199 00:13:52,120 --> 00:14:01,400 Speaker 3: complicated process with strict protocols to follow. Paulo Nespoli flew 200 00:14:01,400 --> 00:14:03,360 Speaker 3: on the Shuttle in twenty oh seven. 201 00:14:03,760 --> 00:14:06,760 Speaker 6: Qual Kiora Prima Delanchocho. 202 00:14:07,120 --> 00:14:10,480 Speaker 7: A few hours before the launch, five or six hours 203 00:14:10,520 --> 00:14:13,880 Speaker 7: before launch, it's time to get dressed. We launch or 204 00:14:14,000 --> 00:14:17,319 Speaker 7: launch with what is called a launch and entry suit, 205 00:14:17,559 --> 00:14:20,840 Speaker 7: which is a pressurized suit that allows the crew to 206 00:14:20,880 --> 00:14:24,600 Speaker 7: stay alive in case of loss of pressure inside the shuttle. 207 00:14:25,760 --> 00:14:28,480 Speaker 7: So it began to be complicated with gloves, a helmet. 208 00:14:28,960 --> 00:14:32,160 Speaker 7: To speak, you needed to use a communications system, which 209 00:14:32,200 --> 00:14:34,640 Speaker 7: means that if seven people all speak at the same time, 210 00:14:35,000 --> 00:14:39,560 Speaker 7: it becomes incomprehensible. So you need discipline in terms of 211 00:14:39,600 --> 00:14:43,400 Speaker 7: who speaks what they say. So we put on the 212 00:14:43,480 --> 00:14:47,200 Speaker 7: suit in the quarantine area. There are protocols to check 213 00:14:47,520 --> 00:14:50,720 Speaker 7: the resistance to pressure of the suit, and from there 214 00:14:51,160 --> 00:14:53,960 Speaker 7: you go to the launch trick using a special vehicle 215 00:14:54,480 --> 00:14:56,360 Speaker 7: Italici Coveico. 216 00:14:58,200 --> 00:15:00,880 Speaker 4: When I walked in a I heard the radio say 217 00:15:00,880 --> 00:15:03,760 Speaker 4: it was twenty two degrees fahrenheit. I was carrying my 218 00:15:03,760 --> 00:15:07,040 Speaker 4: briefcase in my headset because I was in the adjacent 219 00:15:07,360 --> 00:15:11,720 Speaker 4: contractors support area of the launch control center, and it 220 00:15:11,800 --> 00:15:16,640 Speaker 4: went up to my console computer console that monitors all 221 00:15:16,680 --> 00:15:18,840 Speaker 4: the data that comes from the solid rocket boosters, but 222 00:15:18,960 --> 00:15:22,600 Speaker 4: also has an inset of NASA select video of the launch, 223 00:15:24,040 --> 00:15:27,080 Speaker 4: but it also has several other options for cameras to 224 00:15:27,080 --> 00:15:29,200 Speaker 4: look at on the launch pat So I started looking 225 00:15:29,200 --> 00:15:32,560 Speaker 4: at these cameras and I saw this ice all over 226 00:15:32,600 --> 00:15:36,400 Speaker 4: the place. Well, then I launched this thing today, obviously. 227 00:15:39,280 --> 00:15:42,680 Speaker 3: But the comforting facts had arrived from Morton Thire goal 228 00:15:42,760 --> 00:15:48,040 Speaker 3: bosses recommending NASA to proceed with the launch. The countdown 229 00:15:48,160 --> 00:15:50,920 Speaker 3: was on. There was no turning back. 230 00:15:51,720 --> 00:15:54,400 Speaker 4: I was worried that it was cold, and I really 231 00:15:54,400 --> 00:15:59,720 Speaker 4: felt that if the boosters would fail because of that 232 00:15:59,800 --> 00:16:02,040 Speaker 4: ish shoe not seating in the joint because it was 233 00:16:02,080 --> 00:16:06,080 Speaker 4: too cold, that that would all happen in the first 234 00:16:06,120 --> 00:16:10,360 Speaker 4: six or seven tenths of a second, and we would 235 00:16:10,360 --> 00:16:13,640 Speaker 4: see it leak, sprung, and that the whole thing would 236 00:16:13,680 --> 00:16:17,080 Speaker 4: probably explode by the time it cleared the tower. 237 00:16:19,840 --> 00:16:23,480 Speaker 3: At eleven thirty eight, the shuttle lifted. 238 00:16:23,040 --> 00:16:26,880 Speaker 7: Off nine eight seven six. 239 00:16:27,440 --> 00:16:34,239 Speaker 2: We have main engines starts four three two one and lift. 240 00:16:34,040 --> 00:16:45,120 Speaker 8: Off Hellotthony twenty and fifty seven feet per second, altitude 241 00:16:45,120 --> 00:16:48,000 Speaker 8: four point three nautical mile, downrange distance three mile. 242 00:16:48,280 --> 00:16:50,800 Speaker 3: The relief at the successful and lift off of the 243 00:16:50,880 --> 00:16:55,080 Speaker 3: Challenger Space Shuttle in January nineteen eighty six was short lived. 244 00:16:55,120 --> 00:16:59,080 Speaker 4: However, it cleared the tower, I breathed a great sigh 245 00:16:59,120 --> 00:17:03,160 Speaker 4: of relief. And it wasn't until seventy three seconds later 246 00:17:03,840 --> 00:17:06,080 Speaker 4: that this big explosion occurred. 247 00:17:06,280 --> 00:17:08,080 Speaker 8: Trottling up three intres and now one hundred and four 248 00:17:08,119 --> 00:17:13,959 Speaker 8: percent of Challenger goh and throttle up. 249 00:17:16,920 --> 00:17:21,520 Speaker 4: And everyone in there was shocked, including me that I 250 00:17:21,600 --> 00:17:26,560 Speaker 4: knew that wasn't survivable. And I could hear people sobbing 251 00:17:26,600 --> 00:17:28,760 Speaker 4: actually in the background because I had my headset on, 252 00:17:28,880 --> 00:17:31,600 Speaker 4: and all I could hear from the network was rtls 253 00:17:31,720 --> 00:17:35,040 Speaker 4: rtls from the capcom, which meant returned the launch site 254 00:17:35,160 --> 00:17:36,160 Speaker 4: turned to launch site. 255 00:17:36,960 --> 00:17:42,199 Speaker 3: The seven Challenger astronauts, Commander Dick Scoby, pilot Michael Smith, 256 00:17:42,640 --> 00:17:48,640 Speaker 3: mission specialists Judy Resnik, Ellison Anizuka, Ronald McNair, and payload 257 00:17:48,720 --> 00:17:53,520 Speaker 3: specialists Krista mcaulith and Gregory Jarvis would never return to 258 00:17:53,600 --> 00:17:57,359 Speaker 3: the launch site. For two hours, mission control was in 259 00:17:57,520 --> 00:18:01,520 Speaker 3: top secret lockdown as NASA scrambled to set up a 260 00:18:01,560 --> 00:18:04,960 Speaker 3: failure team to find out what had gone wrong. At 261 00:18:05,000 --> 00:18:09,240 Speaker 3: fourteen thousand meters above the launch platform. 262 00:18:08,560 --> 00:18:11,919 Speaker 4: The Vice President Bush called and said that he was 263 00:18:11,960 --> 00:18:15,160 Speaker 4: getting on a plane and he was going to come 264 00:18:15,400 --> 00:18:20,479 Speaker 4: and talk to everyone in the control room that evening, 265 00:18:20,520 --> 00:18:23,840 Speaker 4: and he did, and he basically said that you know, 266 00:18:24,000 --> 00:18:27,520 Speaker 4: it's a horrible, tragic accident. We need to get to 267 00:18:27,560 --> 00:18:30,080 Speaker 4: the bottom of it, figure out what happens so it 268 00:18:30,119 --> 00:18:33,520 Speaker 4: doesn't happen again. But this is not going to stop 269 00:18:33,800 --> 00:18:36,080 Speaker 4: the stay Shuttle program. We're going to get back to 270 00:18:36,200 --> 00:18:39,399 Speaker 4: safe flight as soon as we can, and this is 271 00:18:39,440 --> 00:18:41,320 Speaker 4: the team that's going to have to do it. 272 00:18:41,560 --> 00:18:46,040 Speaker 5: The tragedy was that a whole structure was set up 273 00:18:46,080 --> 00:18:50,240 Speaker 5: in the United States whereby children sat and were assembled 274 00:18:50,760 --> 00:18:55,159 Speaker 5: before their television screens right across the United States to 275 00:18:55,240 --> 00:19:00,399 Speaker 5: watch the launch of Challenger. And Christo mccauliffe, that teacher 276 00:19:00,440 --> 00:19:04,600 Speaker 5: in space who was scheduled to carry out lessons from 277 00:19:04,720 --> 00:19:06,600 Speaker 5: orbit while she was in space. 278 00:19:06,840 --> 00:19:08,800 Speaker 2: And I want to say something to the school children 279 00:19:08,800 --> 00:19:11,160 Speaker 2: of America who were watching the live coverage of the 280 00:19:11,200 --> 00:19:15,600 Speaker 2: shuttles takeoff. I know it's hard to understand, but sometimes 281 00:19:15,640 --> 00:19:18,760 Speaker 2: painful things like this happen. It's all part of the 282 00:19:18,800 --> 00:19:23,520 Speaker 2: process of exploration and discovery. It's all part of taking 283 00:19:23,560 --> 00:19:28,200 Speaker 2: a chance in expanding man's horizons. The future doesn't belong 284 00:19:28,240 --> 00:19:31,000 Speaker 2: to the fainthearted, it belongs to the brave. 285 00:19:32,680 --> 00:19:35,879 Speaker 3: The next day, the failure team gathered at Marshall Space 286 00:19:35,960 --> 00:19:40,080 Speaker 3: Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama. Though he hoped it was 287 00:19:40,119 --> 00:19:46,240 Speaker 3: something else, MacDonald suspected O ring failure. The convincing and 288 00:19:46,320 --> 00:19:49,480 Speaker 3: critical piece of data was a few seconds of film 289 00:19:49,840 --> 00:19:52,720 Speaker 3: showing a puff of black smoke in the right booster 290 00:19:53,240 --> 00:19:55,640 Speaker 3: in one of the aft section field joints. 291 00:19:56,440 --> 00:20:04,960 Speaker 4: My heart abouts sank and I'll never forget calling home 292 00:20:05,240 --> 00:20:09,960 Speaker 4: that evening, telling my wife that canceled plans. I wasn't 293 00:20:09,960 --> 00:20:12,239 Speaker 4: going to be there and how long it was going 294 00:20:12,320 --> 00:20:16,960 Speaker 4: to be. And I knew I needed to do that. 295 00:20:17,240 --> 00:20:21,840 Speaker 4: But my three year old daughter answered the telephone, Megan, 296 00:20:22,680 --> 00:20:25,560 Speaker 4: and her says, Daddy, when are you coming home? And 297 00:20:25,640 --> 00:20:29,200 Speaker 4: I says pretty soon, Megan, pretty soon. She says, Daddy, 298 00:20:29,240 --> 00:20:32,159 Speaker 4: when is a space shuttle going to go up? I 299 00:20:32,160 --> 00:20:36,000 Speaker 4: couldn't answer because she knew Daddy always came home after 300 00:20:35,960 --> 00:20:42,159 Speaker 4: the space shuddle went up. And I said pretty soon, Megan, 301 00:20:42,359 --> 00:20:42,920 Speaker 4: pretty soon. 302 00:20:43,680 --> 00:20:46,359 Speaker 3: But how did NASA get to this low point in 303 00:20:46,400 --> 00:20:50,320 Speaker 3: its history after the glory years of Apollo, and why 304 00:20:50,320 --> 00:20:55,159 Speaker 3: did it take so many risks with the shuttle. NASA 305 00:20:55,280 --> 00:20:59,280 Speaker 3: scientists were already studying plans to build a reusable space 306 00:20:59,320 --> 00:21:02,200 Speaker 3: shuttle at the time. The planning for the Apollo Moon 307 00:21:02,240 --> 00:21:07,120 Speaker 3: mission was in full swing. The goal was to drastically 308 00:21:07,200 --> 00:21:11,680 Speaker 3: lower the cost of spaceflight. A program to build it 309 00:21:12,000 --> 00:21:15,240 Speaker 3: was formerly launched on January the fifth, nineteen seventy two, 310 00:21:15,720 --> 00:21:16,880 Speaker 3: by President Nixon. 311 00:21:17,680 --> 00:21:22,320 Speaker 5: When the Shuttle was initially approved by Congress, NASA wanted 312 00:21:22,320 --> 00:21:24,720 Speaker 5: as many users to get on board to justify it, 313 00:21:25,280 --> 00:21:28,000 Speaker 5: and the Air Force was a big, powerful lobby in 314 00:21:28,080 --> 00:21:30,840 Speaker 5: any space project, and so NASA went to the Air 315 00:21:30,880 --> 00:21:33,880 Speaker 5: Force and said, you can use the Shuttle. We can 316 00:21:33,960 --> 00:21:38,800 Speaker 5: replace all your conventional ballistic rockets for launching your military payloads, 317 00:21:38,800 --> 00:21:42,760 Speaker 5: your spy satellites, your military weather satellites, or navigation satellites, 318 00:21:43,359 --> 00:21:46,760 Speaker 5: and so on. The Air Force signed into this and said, 319 00:21:47,240 --> 00:21:50,240 Speaker 5: we can do amazing things if we have this enormous 320 00:21:50,320 --> 00:21:55,760 Speaker 5: vehicle that can fly to any landing site across the 321 00:21:55,840 --> 00:21:59,280 Speaker 5: United States on any orbit that it comes back from. 322 00:22:00,440 --> 00:22:03,680 Speaker 3: In the four decades of the United States Space Shuttle program, 323 00:22:04,200 --> 00:22:07,159 Speaker 3: three hundred and fifty five men and women flew on 324 00:22:07,359 --> 00:22:11,000 Speaker 3: five space shuttles in one hundred and thirty five missions. 325 00:22:11,840 --> 00:22:17,440 Speaker 3: They launched cutting edge satellites, sent spacecraft to explore Venus, Jupiter, 326 00:22:17,760 --> 00:22:21,720 Speaker 3: and other far reaches of outer space, and contributed to 327 00:22:21,800 --> 00:22:28,080 Speaker 3: building the International Space Station. Paulon Nespulli flew on the 328 00:22:28,119 --> 00:22:32,000 Speaker 3: Shuttle in twenty o seven to deliver the Harmony Utility Hub, 329 00:22:32,480 --> 00:22:35,879 Speaker 3: the station's permanent living headquarters for astronauts. 330 00:22:37,240 --> 00:22:40,520 Speaker 6: Lushtl Aeron vehicle Istra the Shuttle. 331 00:22:40,680 --> 00:22:44,639 Speaker 7: Was an extremely complex vehicle. As an engineer, as I 332 00:22:44,720 --> 00:22:49,240 Speaker 7: began studying the Shuttle systems to become mission specialist, I 333 00:22:49,280 --> 00:22:54,080 Speaker 7: thought to myself, goodness, this is an extremely advanced vehicle. 334 00:22:54,720 --> 00:22:57,480 Speaker 7: It was designed in the nineteen seventies, that it is 335 00:22:57,640 --> 00:23:00,159 Speaker 7: extremely complex. It looks as though it was designed and 336 00:23:00,200 --> 00:23:03,680 Speaker 7: to be complex. They couldn't design something simple. They designed 337 00:23:03,680 --> 00:23:06,719 Speaker 7: it to use the full range of the engineer's imagination, 338 00:23:07,119 --> 00:23:08,720 Speaker 7: using all their capacity. 339 00:23:08,920 --> 00:23:11,720 Speaker 9: But at the end of the day, they didn't realize 340 00:23:11,760 --> 00:23:14,879 Speaker 9: that they built such a complex machine with such complex 341 00:23:14,920 --> 00:23:19,040 Speaker 9: interactions between systems, that they were impossible to manage. 342 00:23:20,560 --> 00:23:27,159 Speaker 3: Regis building the Shuttle proved more complex and expensive than expected. 343 00:23:28,080 --> 00:23:32,199 Speaker 3: The US Air Force, now NASA's main client, required a 344 00:23:32,240 --> 00:23:36,520 Speaker 3: winged aircraft that a pilot could maneuver, protected by heat 345 00:23:36,600 --> 00:23:39,879 Speaker 3: absorbent tiles that did not have to be replaced for 346 00:23:40,000 --> 00:23:44,480 Speaker 3: every mission. To launch satellites. The Air Force also demanded 347 00:23:44,480 --> 00:23:48,439 Speaker 3: a huge cargo bay. The end result was a space 348 00:23:48,480 --> 00:23:53,480 Speaker 3: plane that weighed more than twenty thousand metric tons. The 349 00:23:53,560 --> 00:23:57,680 Speaker 3: three main engines located after the cargo bay, were fueled 350 00:23:57,720 --> 00:24:01,879 Speaker 3: by a mix of liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen. Each 351 00:24:01,960 --> 00:24:07,120 Speaker 3: produced two hundred thousand kilos of thrust. They were ginbond 352 00:24:07,160 --> 00:24:09,360 Speaker 3: to control pitch, u're and roll. 353 00:24:11,840 --> 00:24:14,840 Speaker 7: The liquid fuel engines were soft engines. In fact, they 354 00:24:14,840 --> 00:24:18,600 Speaker 7: were ignited six or seven seconds before launch because they 355 00:24:18,600 --> 00:24:21,879 Speaker 7: had to gain pressure. There were these turbine turbopumps that 356 00:24:21,960 --> 00:24:27,159 Speaker 7: went and when these started, you'd feel the shuttle alive. 357 00:24:27,359 --> 00:24:30,560 Speaker 7: It moved and inside the cabin you'd feel this movement 358 00:24:30,720 --> 00:24:34,000 Speaker 7: because the engines had enough power to move the shuttle, 359 00:24:34,000 --> 00:24:36,960 Speaker 7: but not to lift it off. At T zero the 360 00:24:37,000 --> 00:24:40,840 Speaker 7: moment of launch, explosive bolts were ignited that kept the 361 00:24:40,880 --> 00:24:46,600 Speaker 7: shuttle attached to the launch platform. They were ignited the madilla. 362 00:24:48,000 --> 00:24:52,200 Speaker 7: The solid fuel boosters were ignited that are incredibly powerful 363 00:24:52,280 --> 00:24:55,639 Speaker 7: with such thrust that they give all their power in 364 00:24:55,720 --> 00:24:58,480 Speaker 7: a millisecond, and at that moment you feel a train 365 00:24:58,640 --> 00:25:01,520 Speaker 7: hit your back and suddenly you are thrown upwards. 366 00:25:02,359 --> 00:25:09,280 Speaker 6: Sintivi utreno Gitarivava soulas Kila in Provisamente tibutaa vesolalto. 367 00:25:09,840 --> 00:25:13,600 Speaker 3: The largest solid propellant motors ever built and the first 368 00:25:13,760 --> 00:25:16,959 Speaker 3: to ever be used on a manned spacecraft, with a 369 00:25:17,000 --> 00:25:21,880 Speaker 3: power pack that kicked the shuttle into space. Each booster 370 00:25:22,240 --> 00:25:26,920 Speaker 3: was made of eleven individual weld free steel segments joined 371 00:25:26,960 --> 00:25:33,199 Speaker 3: together with steel pins. Once assembled, each booster measured thirty 372 00:25:33,240 --> 00:25:36,760 Speaker 3: five meters long and three and a half metres in diameter. 373 00:25:38,040 --> 00:25:40,919 Speaker 3: The more than four hundred and fifty thousand kilos of 374 00:25:41,000 --> 00:25:45,320 Speaker 3: propellant inside burned at a temperature of three thousand, two 375 00:25:45,400 --> 00:25:49,679 Speaker 3: hundred degrees celsius and generated a lift off thrust of 376 00:25:49,760 --> 00:25:54,400 Speaker 3: one point two million kilos. The boosters burned for two 377 00:25:54,520 --> 00:25:57,879 Speaker 3: minutes in parallel with the main engines during the initial ascent, 378 00:25:58,960 --> 00:26:03,000 Speaker 3: pushing the shuttle out of the atmosphere, but then, at 379 00:26:03,040 --> 00:26:06,760 Speaker 3: about thirty nine thousand meters above the Earth, the boosters 380 00:26:06,840 --> 00:26:10,400 Speaker 3: separated from the external tank and fell into the Atlantic 381 00:26:10,440 --> 00:26:14,760 Speaker 3: Ocean and the huge parachutes to be recovered and returned 382 00:26:14,800 --> 00:26:15,520 Speaker 3: for reuse. 383 00:26:17,359 --> 00:26:21,000 Speaker 7: Equivalent, the equivalent of the energy contained in a shuttle 384 00:26:21,320 --> 00:26:24,840 Speaker 7: is equivalent to a small atom bob, so much so 385 00:26:25,040 --> 00:26:28,879 Speaker 7: that they cleared that area for kilometers and kilometers around 386 00:26:28,920 --> 00:26:32,520 Speaker 7: the launch pad, because if anything happens, everything is raised 387 00:26:32,520 --> 00:26:36,600 Speaker 7: to the ground. Where are you sitting on the atom 388 00:26:36,640 --> 00:26:40,000 Speaker 7: bomb that is about to explode in a controlled fashion, 389 00:26:40,400 --> 00:26:45,080 Speaker 7: shooting all this energy downwards and pushing launching the shuttle 390 00:26:45,359 --> 00:26:46,120 Speaker 7: into space. 391 00:26:47,280 --> 00:26:51,640 Speaker 3: The external tank weighed thirty five thousand kilos and contained 392 00:26:51,760 --> 00:26:55,280 Speaker 3: seven hundred and twenty five thousand kilos of liquid oxygen 393 00:26:55,640 --> 00:26:58,760 Speaker 3: and one hundred and two thousand kilos of liquid hydrogen. 394 00:26:59,720 --> 00:27:02,719 Speaker 3: It is the only part of the shuttle not reused 395 00:27:02,760 --> 00:27:06,960 Speaker 3: after each flight. Thrusters were located in the nose and 396 00:27:07,040 --> 00:27:11,520 Speaker 3: tail segments, while orbiter maneuver pods, located in blisters on 397 00:27:11,640 --> 00:27:15,399 Speaker 3: either side of the vertical tail surface, provided power to 398 00:27:15,440 --> 00:27:19,000 Speaker 3: get the shuttle to rendezvous and onto the re entry path. 399 00:27:24,440 --> 00:27:27,600 Speaker 3: There was space for seven to eight crew members, the 400 00:27:27,640 --> 00:27:31,520 Speaker 3: most ever to travel in space, housed in the pressurized 401 00:27:31,560 --> 00:27:35,560 Speaker 3: nose section that combined oxygen and nitrogen to create a 402 00:27:35,640 --> 00:27:39,119 Speaker 3: shirt sleeve environment for the two week average duration of 403 00:27:39,160 --> 00:27:48,640 Speaker 3: the mission. As NASA entered the digital era, avionics changed radically, 404 00:27:49,040 --> 00:27:52,439 Speaker 3: with computers managing data from dozens of sensors in the 405 00:27:52,480 --> 00:28:02,840 Speaker 3: fuselage and wings. The NASA Space Shuttle program was well 406 00:28:02,920 --> 00:28:06,240 Speaker 3: under way by the nineteen seventies and bringing thousands of 407 00:28:06,320 --> 00:28:11,320 Speaker 3: jobs to communities across the country. Tenders went out, and 408 00:28:11,400 --> 00:28:14,240 Speaker 3: the winning contractor for the solid fuel boosters of the 409 00:28:14,280 --> 00:28:18,560 Speaker 3: Shuttle was Morton Thiacore, based just north of the small 410 00:28:18,600 --> 00:28:22,840 Speaker 3: town of Ogden, Utah. Much of the research and development 411 00:28:23,160 --> 00:28:27,200 Speaker 3: behind the United states most advanced weapons and satellite delivery 412 00:28:27,240 --> 00:28:31,640 Speaker 3: systems and rocket research was happening here in the remote 413 00:28:31,960 --> 00:28:36,280 Speaker 3: sage covered hills along Highway eighty three near the salt 414 00:28:36,359 --> 00:28:41,719 Speaker 3: encrusted edges of the Great Salt Lake. Today, near the 415 00:28:41,760 --> 00:28:46,680 Speaker 3: sprawling former Morton Thiacal production site, a road sign points 416 00:28:46,760 --> 00:28:51,720 Speaker 3: visitors to a rocket garden outside the plant. For twenty 417 00:28:51,760 --> 00:28:56,480 Speaker 3: six years, portions of the Shuttle's solid fuel rockets were researched, 418 00:28:56,720 --> 00:29:04,880 Speaker 3: developed and constructed here under the oversight of Alan McDonald well. 419 00:29:04,920 --> 00:29:09,280 Speaker 4: The Shuttle boosters were so large that we had to 420 00:29:09,320 --> 00:29:13,320 Speaker 4: make them into segments and send the pieces as a 421 00:29:13,360 --> 00:29:17,960 Speaker 4: segment to the Cape in Florida on a railcar. And 422 00:29:18,000 --> 00:29:21,560 Speaker 4: there's only a couple of lines that you can get 423 00:29:21,600 --> 00:29:24,640 Speaker 4: to the Kennedy without hitting bridges. Because they're about the 424 00:29:24,760 --> 00:29:26,800 Speaker 4: largest thing you can put on a train. They're over 425 00:29:26,840 --> 00:29:30,600 Speaker 4: twelve feet in diameter each the sections, and there's four 426 00:29:30,640 --> 00:29:32,960 Speaker 4: of them you have to put together and you just 427 00:29:33,040 --> 00:29:36,200 Speaker 4: kind of stack them up like bearcans on the mobile 428 00:29:36,240 --> 00:29:40,720 Speaker 4: launch platform. They're sent down by rail and when they 429 00:29:40,840 --> 00:29:44,320 Speaker 4: are received down there and ready for assembly on the 430 00:29:44,320 --> 00:29:47,040 Speaker 4: mobile lunch platform, because they're stacking. On top of that, 431 00:29:47,120 --> 00:29:53,719 Speaker 4: there's a joint that is made to assemble the entire 432 00:29:54,320 --> 00:29:57,600 Speaker 4: rocket booster. But in that joint we have to make 433 00:29:57,640 --> 00:29:59,680 Speaker 4: sure that the gases can escape. 434 00:30:00,360 --> 00:30:03,440 Speaker 5: These enormous shock waves that go through the booster cause 435 00:30:03,480 --> 00:30:06,760 Speaker 5: it to expand and then to pounce back, so they 436 00:30:06,840 --> 00:30:10,040 Speaker 5: bow out and then bounce and you cannot see this. 437 00:30:10,760 --> 00:30:16,120 Speaker 5: It's fractional, but it's very meaningful inside those giants. They 438 00:30:16,200 --> 00:30:19,240 Speaker 5: realized that they could be flexing and movement inside those 439 00:30:19,320 --> 00:30:24,840 Speaker 5: giants that would cause gas to escape in the between 440 00:30:25,000 --> 00:30:29,680 Speaker 5: the sections in the field giants that the propellant was burning. 441 00:30:30,280 --> 00:30:33,960 Speaker 5: So a t ignition, you get this great convulsion of 442 00:30:33,960 --> 00:30:37,120 Speaker 5: a great enormous button. It would literally push like pushing 443 00:30:37,120 --> 00:30:39,840 Speaker 5: your elbows out on balloons. It would cause it, and 444 00:30:39,880 --> 00:30:43,920 Speaker 5: then the balloons pushed back. So the sheer strength of 445 00:30:43,960 --> 00:30:47,160 Speaker 5: the steel casing caused it to hold up and stabilize 446 00:30:47,200 --> 00:30:51,320 Speaker 5: at that point, but in the critical area where the 447 00:30:51,360 --> 00:30:54,920 Speaker 5: gas is shooting through the gap, you need to have 448 00:30:55,480 --> 00:30:58,719 Speaker 5: two O rings that go right around the giant to 449 00:30:58,760 --> 00:31:00,560 Speaker 5: seal it launch. 450 00:31:00,840 --> 00:31:03,920 Speaker 3: The joint had to withstand pressures of more than sixty 451 00:31:03,920 --> 00:31:08,240 Speaker 3: three kilos per square centimeter and temperatures of more than 452 00:31:08,280 --> 00:31:12,800 Speaker 3: five hundred and thirty degrees celsius. The O ring provided 453 00:31:12,840 --> 00:31:17,560 Speaker 3: the pressure resistance, while a zinc chromate putty applied to 454 00:31:17,600 --> 00:31:21,120 Speaker 3: the interior of the joint provided the temperature resistance. 455 00:31:22,240 --> 00:31:25,520 Speaker 4: And it's what we call a tang in clevis joint, 456 00:31:26,000 --> 00:31:28,960 Speaker 4: much like a tongue in group in a hardword floor. 457 00:31:30,240 --> 00:31:33,200 Speaker 4: And because of that, we have to put something to 458 00:31:33,280 --> 00:31:36,560 Speaker 4: seal the gases in. And the way we do that 459 00:31:36,960 --> 00:31:40,200 Speaker 4: we have two O ring seals, much like you have 460 00:31:40,560 --> 00:31:44,080 Speaker 4: washers in your hose or in your sink to prevent 461 00:31:44,120 --> 00:31:48,320 Speaker 4: the water from leaking. This prevents the gases from getting out. 462 00:31:48,600 --> 00:31:50,520 Speaker 4: And the reason there's two of them is that this 463 00:31:50,720 --> 00:31:52,720 Speaker 4: was considered such a critical function. 464 00:31:53,560 --> 00:31:54,200 Speaker 6: We had to. 465 00:31:54,080 --> 00:31:57,719 Speaker 4: Provide redundancy wherever it was possible to do that in 466 00:31:57,760 --> 00:32:00,560 Speaker 4: case one of them failed, the other one that acted 467 00:32:00,600 --> 00:32:03,680 Speaker 4: as a backup to prevent failure. Because it was well 468 00:32:03,720 --> 00:32:06,120 Speaker 4: known that any gas leak out of one of these 469 00:32:06,160 --> 00:32:07,480 Speaker 4: joints would be catastrophic. 470 00:32:09,160 --> 00:32:11,800 Speaker 3: The O rings that sealed the joints were made of 471 00:32:11,800 --> 00:32:16,840 Speaker 3: a vulcanized rubber substance called viton, but from the very 472 00:32:16,840 --> 00:32:20,560 Speaker 3: beginning of the Shuttle program, engineers were concerned about the 473 00:32:20,600 --> 00:32:23,760 Speaker 3: performance of the O rings and their ability to seal 474 00:32:23,880 --> 00:32:26,320 Speaker 3: properly in cold temperatures. 475 00:32:27,240 --> 00:32:30,600 Speaker 4: The Viton O ring is a fluorocarbon rubber, and one 476 00:32:30,640 --> 00:32:34,240 Speaker 4: of its primary characteristics why it was selected for this 477 00:32:34,640 --> 00:32:38,280 Speaker 4: type of an application, is that it is very tough. 478 00:32:39,200 --> 00:32:41,840 Speaker 4: It was really worried that these huge segments the weigh 479 00:32:41,880 --> 00:32:44,640 Speaker 4: over three hundred thousand pounds each and they're pulled together, 480 00:32:45,360 --> 00:32:48,680 Speaker 4: that if they were not quite lined up properly, it 481 00:32:48,720 --> 00:32:52,480 Speaker 4: may cut the O ring during the assembly, and we 482 00:32:52,600 --> 00:32:55,479 Speaker 4: found that this material was by far the best to 483 00:32:55,560 --> 00:33:00,640 Speaker 4: resist that from ever happening. So it was auber material, 484 00:33:00,720 --> 00:33:02,760 Speaker 4: but it was a fairly hard rubber material. 485 00:33:03,680 --> 00:33:06,600 Speaker 3: It was vital that the seal remain efficient for the 486 00:33:06,640 --> 00:33:11,360 Speaker 3: whole of the flight, but temperature could change the behavior 487 00:33:11,560 --> 00:33:15,960 Speaker 3: of this basic material, which worried engineers early on. 488 00:33:15,960 --> 00:33:19,360 Speaker 4: One of the characteristics of any rubber material is is 489 00:33:19,440 --> 00:33:23,080 Speaker 4: that since we're using them in a compressed state, or 490 00:33:23,120 --> 00:33:26,480 Speaker 4: squeezing them into these joints in a compressed state. And 491 00:33:26,560 --> 00:33:30,320 Speaker 4: we do that because we knew that that joint opened 492 00:33:30,320 --> 00:33:33,560 Speaker 4: a little bit when it pressurized. There was enough compression 493 00:33:33,720 --> 00:33:36,560 Speaker 4: in the old ring squeezed in there that when it 494 00:33:36,640 --> 00:33:41,040 Speaker 4: did open, it would maintain contact with the other surface 495 00:33:41,560 --> 00:33:45,160 Speaker 4: as it was opened. Now, the characteristic of doing that 496 00:33:45,320 --> 00:33:48,960 Speaker 4: is called resiliency of material. It's kind of like a 497 00:33:49,440 --> 00:33:52,400 Speaker 4: wet sponge. You take a wet sponge and you put 498 00:33:52,440 --> 00:33:55,600 Speaker 4: your finger on it and you start to release it. 499 00:33:55,600 --> 00:33:57,960 Speaker 4: You'll know your finger stays right with a sponge. But 500 00:33:58,000 --> 00:34:00,000 Speaker 4: you take that sponge and throw it into the fret 501 00:34:00,880 --> 00:34:03,360 Speaker 4: and take it out and push your finger on it, 502 00:34:03,360 --> 00:34:06,760 Speaker 4: it leaves a dad and it won't recover until it 503 00:34:06,800 --> 00:34:07,960 Speaker 4: finally warms up. 504 00:34:08,360 --> 00:34:12,480 Speaker 3: Engineers analyzing the Shuttle and its boosters upon each return 505 00:34:12,560 --> 00:34:17,239 Speaker 3: from space had noticed erosion of some O rings and 506 00:34:17,800 --> 00:34:21,680 Speaker 3: menacing black soot around the O rings, a phenomenon they 507 00:34:21,719 --> 00:34:25,960 Speaker 3: called blow by because it meant hot gases were leaking 508 00:34:26,040 --> 00:34:27,600 Speaker 3: and blowing by the joint. 509 00:34:29,760 --> 00:34:34,360 Speaker 5: In that final year full year of Shuttle, five of 510 00:34:34,400 --> 00:34:39,160 Speaker 5: the seven Shuttle flights demonstrated blowthroughs on these boosters. We'd 511 00:34:39,160 --> 00:34:42,520 Speaker 5: never have known this if those boosters hadn't been recovered 512 00:34:42,560 --> 00:34:47,359 Speaker 5: and inspected in detail for post flight analysis. But the engineers, 513 00:34:47,400 --> 00:34:51,360 Speaker 5: to a man, said, we are playing with dice, and 514 00:34:51,400 --> 00:34:56,120 Speaker 5: we're running across a freeway blindfold in Russia, and we're 515 00:34:56,160 --> 00:34:57,000 Speaker 5: going to lose some cruis. 516 00:34:57,160 --> 00:35:00,959 Speaker 4: It actually was noted a problem with the joints way 517 00:35:01,000 --> 00:35:05,160 Speaker 4: back into the second flight of the Shadowless two, where 518 00:35:05,520 --> 00:35:08,200 Speaker 4: in disassembly of one of the field joints they noted 519 00:35:08,239 --> 00:35:11,480 Speaker 4: some erosion on the O ring, which meant that gas 520 00:35:11,520 --> 00:35:15,640 Speaker 4: got down there to burn it, and the way the 521 00:35:15,719 --> 00:35:19,480 Speaker 4: joint was designed, we actually had material ahead of the 522 00:35:19,880 --> 00:35:24,400 Speaker 4: joint in that gap. It was really a zinc chromate 523 00:35:24,480 --> 00:35:29,600 Speaker 4: puddy loaded with asbestos to pry to thermally isolate the ring, 524 00:35:29,719 --> 00:35:31,160 Speaker 4: so we'd never see gas. 525 00:35:32,400 --> 00:35:36,040 Speaker 3: A launch during a record cold snap in January nineteen 526 00:35:36,080 --> 00:35:39,080 Speaker 3: eighty five gave engineers a scare. 527 00:35:42,040 --> 00:35:45,560 Speaker 4: Just a year before the Challenger launch in January nineteen 528 00:35:45,600 --> 00:35:49,680 Speaker 4: eighty five, when we recovered these boosters, we always pull 529 00:35:49,719 --> 00:35:53,640 Speaker 4: them apart and examine these joints, and this was the 530 00:35:53,640 --> 00:35:57,440 Speaker 4: first time we noticed that we actually had this condition 531 00:35:57,680 --> 00:36:01,880 Speaker 4: of blowby in the field joint that we observe. In fact, 532 00:36:01,960 --> 00:36:04,600 Speaker 4: we saw it in a joint one joint in each 533 00:36:04,640 --> 00:36:07,920 Speaker 4: booster the left hand rights. There was two joints very 534 00:36:07,960 --> 00:36:12,120 Speaker 4: similar that indicated that some gas actually got past the 535 00:36:12,160 --> 00:36:15,719 Speaker 4: first dole ring but stopped for the second one. That 536 00:36:15,719 --> 00:36:18,280 Speaker 4: that happened because at that time, that was the coldest 537 00:36:18,360 --> 00:36:22,480 Speaker 4: launch we had ever experienced, and we determined that the 538 00:36:22,480 --> 00:36:26,160 Speaker 4: O ring temperature was about fifty three degrees fahrenheit on 539 00:36:26,239 --> 00:36:27,640 Speaker 4: that particular launch. 540 00:36:28,600 --> 00:36:32,719 Speaker 3: Then in April of nineteen eighty five, NASA executed two 541 00:36:32,760 --> 00:36:35,640 Speaker 3: launches in the same month for the first time ever, 542 00:36:37,080 --> 00:36:41,160 Speaker 3: again engineers saw that O rings had burned and eroded. 543 00:36:42,160 --> 00:36:46,600 Speaker 3: It was an alarming trend. 544 00:36:46,480 --> 00:36:50,120 Speaker 4: Because we were lucky in that we had seen this 545 00:36:50,320 --> 00:36:54,840 Speaker 4: behavior in the nozzle joint, not the field joint. Because 546 00:36:54,960 --> 00:36:58,200 Speaker 4: had we seen something similar in the field joint, we 547 00:36:58,239 --> 00:37:01,759 Speaker 4: all felt very uncomfortable that it would e leaked all 548 00:37:01,800 --> 00:37:05,400 Speaker 4: the way out and caused a catastrophic failure. So we 549 00:37:05,520 --> 00:37:09,840 Speaker 4: formed an owring Seal task force right after observing this 550 00:37:10,000 --> 00:37:15,560 Speaker 4: nozzle problem to look at all the ceiling mechanisms, every 551 00:37:15,600 --> 00:37:17,879 Speaker 4: one of them in the SOD rocket booster and see 552 00:37:17,880 --> 00:37:19,399 Speaker 4: what we'd recommend to do. 553 00:37:21,120 --> 00:37:24,440 Speaker 7: They often ask me if I ever felt in danger, 554 00:37:24,600 --> 00:37:27,440 Speaker 7: if I was afraid of getting aboard this atom bomb 555 00:37:27,440 --> 00:37:30,520 Speaker 7: that was about to explode, given the accidents that had 556 00:37:30,600 --> 00:37:35,200 Speaker 7: happened in the past, And my answer is absolutely not, 557 00:37:36,480 --> 00:37:39,399 Speaker 7: And I don't think I'm an exceptional. No one who 558 00:37:39,440 --> 00:37:43,759 Speaker 7: worked on the Shuttle felt in danger. On the one hand, 559 00:37:43,760 --> 00:37:46,319 Speaker 7: because we had been trained by NASA that took us 560 00:37:46,360 --> 00:37:49,920 Speaker 7: every place where every part was built, allowed us to 561 00:37:50,000 --> 00:37:53,360 Speaker 7: speak with every technician, and we realized that the system 562 00:37:53,480 --> 00:37:58,799 Speaker 7: was incredibly strong, incredibly careful. Things were done with great care, 563 00:37:59,400 --> 00:38:02,160 Speaker 7: and as far as I'm concerned, I almost came to 564 00:38:02,200 --> 00:38:04,360 Speaker 7: feel that I was the weak link. 565 00:38:06,120 --> 00:38:09,799 Speaker 3: As NASA prepared to launch at top secret payload from 566 00:38:09,840 --> 00:38:12,080 Speaker 3: the Shuttle for the Air Force in the summer of 567 00:38:12,160 --> 00:38:16,440 Speaker 3: nineteen eighty five, the team redesigned the rocket boosters to 568 00:38:16,480 --> 00:38:20,160 Speaker 3: make them lighter and reduce the risk of o ring failure, 569 00:38:20,880 --> 00:38:23,720 Speaker 3: and made a proposal to NASA to fund the same 570 00:38:23,800 --> 00:38:27,719 Speaker 3: changes to all rocket boosters used on the shuttles, but 571 00:38:27,840 --> 00:38:33,319 Speaker 3: NASA rejected it. Seven of the nine Shuttle flights in 572 00:38:33,360 --> 00:38:37,200 Speaker 3: the year prior to the Challenger explosion had shown warning 573 00:38:37,320 --> 00:38:41,440 Speaker 3: signs that concerned engineers enough to write the memo to NASA, 574 00:38:42,719 --> 00:38:48,960 Speaker 3: but their proposals were rejected. Few in NASA management wanted 575 00:38:49,000 --> 00:38:53,839 Speaker 3: to slow the ambitious launch schedule. On the twenty eighth 576 00:38:53,920 --> 00:38:57,560 Speaker 3: of January nineteen eighty six, one of the many complex 577 00:38:57,600 --> 00:39:05,600 Speaker 3: systems failed, with catastrophic consequences for the crew and for NASA. 578 00:39:10,680 --> 00:39:13,840 Speaker 3: Seventy three seconds into the flight, just when the shuttle 579 00:39:13,920 --> 00:39:18,080 Speaker 3: was vibrating and flexing at its maximum, the flame broke 580 00:39:18,160 --> 00:39:20,960 Speaker 3: through the seal and blew a huge hole in the 581 00:39:21,000 --> 00:39:26,640 Speaker 3: external tank. Aided by wind shear, The disintegrating external tank 582 00:39:26,880 --> 00:39:30,359 Speaker 3: caused the shuttle to veer from its altitude, increasing the 583 00:39:30,400 --> 00:39:35,160 Speaker 3: aerodynamic forces that ripped the shuttle apart. The boosters were 584 00:39:35,200 --> 00:39:42,080 Speaker 3: thrown off and the crew capsule catapulted toward the sea 585 00:39:42,600 --> 00:39:46,560 Speaker 3: based on emergency oxygen supplies used on board and other 586 00:39:46,719 --> 00:39:50,759 Speaker 3: manual switches turned on and off during their descent. The 587 00:39:50,840 --> 00:39:54,879 Speaker 3: crew were likely alive and perhaps conscious for over two 588 00:39:54,960 --> 00:39:59,200 Speaker 3: minutes until their craft tore apart upon hitting the Atlantic 589 00:39:59,200 --> 00:40:02,239 Speaker 3: Ocean at time three hundred and thirty kilometers per hour. 590 00:40:04,880 --> 00:40:07,920 Speaker 3: Alan McDonald was on the failure team that sought to 591 00:40:08,040 --> 00:40:09,640 Speaker 3: understand what went wrong. 592 00:40:12,160 --> 00:40:14,640 Speaker 4: Where I was in the failure team at NASA, and 593 00:40:14,680 --> 00:40:19,560 Speaker 4: I found the data that indicator was had a problem 594 00:40:19,640 --> 00:40:21,880 Speaker 4: with cold temperatures in the very joint that fail That 595 00:40:22,239 --> 00:40:26,280 Speaker 4: kind of fit this puzzle. And the next question is, well, 596 00:40:26,880 --> 00:40:29,239 Speaker 4: but even then, it doesn't explain why I didn't blow 597 00:40:29,320 --> 00:40:32,240 Speaker 4: up when I would expect it to blow up between 598 00:40:32,280 --> 00:40:36,319 Speaker 4: six and seven tenths of a second. And so I 599 00:40:36,480 --> 00:40:39,600 Speaker 4: asked immediately at that point in time, as anybody ever 600 00:40:39,680 --> 00:40:45,960 Speaker 4: looked at the cameras of liftoff, not flight. And so 601 00:40:46,000 --> 00:40:48,359 Speaker 4: they called down to the cape and the guy told 602 00:40:48,360 --> 00:40:50,160 Speaker 4: me they'll pull one of those, and they pulled it. 603 00:40:50,280 --> 00:40:52,399 Speaker 4: I says, make sure it's looking exactly where you see 604 00:40:52,400 --> 00:40:55,279 Speaker 4: this fire coming out in flight. So I said, go 605 00:40:55,320 --> 00:40:57,520 Speaker 4: find the one that's closest, and they did, and about 606 00:40:57,560 --> 00:40:59,600 Speaker 4: ten minutes later they came back to say, oh my god, 607 00:40:59,680 --> 00:41:02,400 Speaker 4: we a puff of smoke. 608 00:41:03,800 --> 00:41:06,719 Speaker 3: But if the O ring failure was to blame, why 609 00:41:06,760 --> 00:41:10,719 Speaker 3: did the shuttle not explode immediately as engineers had predicted. 610 00:41:11,280 --> 00:41:14,719 Speaker 3: They would later discover that after the O rings vaporized, 611 00:41:15,080 --> 00:41:18,799 Speaker 3: the hot gas of the burning aluminium oxide hit the 612 00:41:18,840 --> 00:41:22,800 Speaker 3: cold steel and solidified right where the O rings had burned, 613 00:41:23,480 --> 00:41:27,840 Speaker 3: creating a fragile ceramic seal, which held right up until 614 00:41:27,840 --> 00:41:29,200 Speaker 3: the order to throttle up. 615 00:41:30,080 --> 00:41:35,279 Speaker 5: The winds aloft were so high that as the bracing 616 00:41:35,440 --> 00:41:37,920 Speaker 5: strut that held the booster to the side of the 617 00:41:37,960 --> 00:41:43,040 Speaker 5: tank became weaker, it tore the booster around on a 618 00:41:43,400 --> 00:41:47,200 Speaker 5: pivoting arc and pushed the nose of the booster into 619 00:41:47,280 --> 00:41:51,719 Speaker 5: the top of the two tanks. The oxygen tank already 620 00:41:51,800 --> 00:41:55,799 Speaker 5: the flame coming through from one of the punctured segments 621 00:41:55,880 --> 00:41:58,920 Speaker 5: that had overwhelmed the o rings was operating like a 622 00:41:58,920 --> 00:42:02,439 Speaker 5: blow torch to open up the side of the very 623 00:42:02,480 --> 00:42:07,200 Speaker 5: thin aluminium hydrogen tank. But when the booster pivoted and 624 00:42:07,360 --> 00:42:12,440 Speaker 5: pushed in the nose into the oxygen tank, that caused 625 00:42:12,600 --> 00:42:16,920 Speaker 5: a Roman Candle effect, which was a great convulsive It 626 00:42:17,040 --> 00:42:19,640 Speaker 5: wasn't an actual explosion, not like a bomb going off. 627 00:42:19,960 --> 00:42:23,440 Speaker 5: There was a great convulsive release of energy which punched 628 00:42:23,440 --> 00:42:26,480 Speaker 5: the boosters off from the side of the tank and 629 00:42:27,120 --> 00:42:32,640 Speaker 5: ripped apart components of the orbiter. The strongest part is 630 00:42:32,640 --> 00:42:37,280 Speaker 5: the pressurized compartment, and that pressurized compartment remained intact. 631 00:42:39,520 --> 00:42:42,839 Speaker 3: McDonald and engineers poured over the log books from the 632 00:42:42,840 --> 00:42:46,960 Speaker 3: ice teams, but NASA managers said that the instruments had 633 00:42:47,000 --> 00:42:50,839 Speaker 3: not been properly calibrated and increased all the temperatures they 634 00:42:50,880 --> 00:42:56,960 Speaker 3: submitted to the Presidential Commission. Something was a miss. 635 00:43:00,040 --> 00:43:02,319 Speaker 4: Well, there's no doubt in my mind it was a 636 00:43:02,400 --> 00:43:08,080 Speaker 4: cover up. They covered up the low temperature data. They 637 00:43:08,120 --> 00:43:12,759 Speaker 4: had tremendous pressures on their launch schedule, both from a 638 00:43:12,760 --> 00:43:17,120 Speaker 4: political standpoint to support their out your budget and immediate 639 00:43:17,160 --> 00:43:19,680 Speaker 4: ones to do what they already had on their plate, 640 00:43:20,000 --> 00:43:23,640 Speaker 4: which was nearly impossible, and I think because of that, 641 00:43:24,200 --> 00:43:26,360 Speaker 4: they did as much as they could to try to 642 00:43:26,440 --> 00:43:30,520 Speaker 4: cloud this issue and make it sound more difficult and 643 00:43:30,560 --> 00:43:33,319 Speaker 4: technical and hard to understand that it really should have been. 644 00:43:33,760 --> 00:43:37,680 Speaker 3: As NASA officials from Marshall Space Center were preparing their 645 00:43:37,680 --> 00:43:42,879 Speaker 3: presentation for the Commission, Allan raised objections and eventually put 646 00:43:42,920 --> 00:43:45,760 Speaker 3: together a separate presentation of his own. 647 00:43:47,080 --> 00:43:49,719 Speaker 4: As part of the Failure Team. I started mentioning and 648 00:43:49,840 --> 00:43:53,879 Speaker 4: questioning some of their conclusions and data, especially the cold 649 00:43:53,880 --> 00:43:58,000 Speaker 4: tempture stuff, and that they were still looking at things 650 00:43:58,000 --> 00:44:01,239 Speaker 4: that I thought were not only impossible ridiculous. I said, 651 00:44:01,400 --> 00:44:03,600 Speaker 4: if you look at the films until that can't possibly be, 652 00:44:04,080 --> 00:44:07,120 Speaker 4: like lightning strikes and all kinds of funny things and 653 00:44:07,160 --> 00:44:09,000 Speaker 4: so I raised my hand and said, well, I made 654 00:44:09,040 --> 00:44:13,359 Speaker 4: an assessment. I'd be willing to present something, and even 655 00:44:13,400 --> 00:44:17,640 Speaker 4: stated that I really believe that a major contributor was 656 00:44:17,680 --> 00:44:22,040 Speaker 4: whatever caused this cold temperature on this one joint, and 657 00:44:22,080 --> 00:44:25,160 Speaker 4: that's why that joint failed in the other five did not. 658 00:44:25,400 --> 00:44:29,239 Speaker 4: And I'm not a big believer of coincidences. And you 659 00:44:29,280 --> 00:44:32,120 Speaker 4: could have heard a pin drop. There wasn't a single 660 00:44:32,160 --> 00:44:36,200 Speaker 4: person supported me. There wasn't a single person that challenged me, 661 00:44:36,800 --> 00:44:41,480 Speaker 4: or a single person that offered another possible scenario what 662 00:44:41,719 --> 00:44:42,160 Speaker 4: caused it. 663 00:44:43,680 --> 00:44:48,960 Speaker 3: A presidential commission, the Rodgers Commission, was tasked with investigating 664 00:44:49,040 --> 00:44:54,040 Speaker 3: how the disaster happened. Just weeks into the commission's inquiry, 665 00:44:54,920 --> 00:44:59,239 Speaker 3: there were suspicions that NASA officials and contractors were not 666 00:44:59,440 --> 00:45:05,120 Speaker 3: telling the wh truth. Commission member and famed theoretical physicist 667 00:45:05,400 --> 00:45:09,120 Speaker 3: Richard Feynman turned their focus to the resiliency of the 668 00:45:09,120 --> 00:45:11,480 Speaker 3: O rings. 669 00:45:11,640 --> 00:45:13,799 Speaker 10: Well, I took the stuff that I got out of 670 00:45:13,840 --> 00:45:17,719 Speaker 10: your seal, and I put it in ice water, and 671 00:45:17,800 --> 00:45:20,279 Speaker 10: I discovered that when you put some pressure on it 672 00:45:20,320 --> 00:45:23,719 Speaker 10: for a while and then undo it, it doesn't stretch back. 673 00:45:23,800 --> 00:45:25,200 Speaker 6: It stays the same dimension. 674 00:45:25,239 --> 00:45:28,719 Speaker 10: In other words, for a few seconds, at least in 675 00:45:28,719 --> 00:45:32,239 Speaker 10: more seconds than that, there's no resilience in this particular 676 00:45:32,280 --> 00:45:35,600 Speaker 10: material when it's at a temperature of thirty two degrees. 677 00:45:36,680 --> 00:45:42,320 Speaker 10: I believe that has some significance for our problem. 678 00:45:42,400 --> 00:45:46,759 Speaker 3: At multiple hearings, McDonald raised his hand and told the 679 00:45:46,760 --> 00:45:51,319 Speaker 3: commission exactly what had transpired about how the decision not 680 00:45:51,440 --> 00:45:53,240 Speaker 3: to launch got changed. 681 00:45:55,320 --> 00:45:58,400 Speaker 4: Can I remember? Neil Armstrong says, yeah, I think we 682 00:45:58,520 --> 00:46:00,920 Speaker 4: need to hear from miss McDonald this meeting. To be 683 00:46:01,520 --> 00:46:04,439 Speaker 4: here in the first place, he says, he has more 684 00:46:04,800 --> 00:46:07,480 Speaker 4: to talk about. And I told him about all that 685 00:46:07,560 --> 00:46:15,040 Speaker 4: transpired after it changed, and I'll never forget. I could 686 00:46:15,040 --> 00:46:18,759 Speaker 4: hardly keep composed. I had done it. Doctor Sally right 687 00:46:18,840 --> 00:46:21,920 Speaker 4: got up out of the bench, come running over to me, 688 00:46:22,080 --> 00:46:24,880 Speaker 4: give me a big hug, and said, God, I'm glad 689 00:46:24,920 --> 00:46:28,319 Speaker 4: somebody finally leveled with this commission. That took a hell 690 00:46:28,320 --> 00:46:29,320 Speaker 4: of a lot of guts. 691 00:46:29,719 --> 00:46:32,960 Speaker 3: Upon return to work, however, McDonald found he had been 692 00:46:33,000 --> 00:46:36,920 Speaker 3: moved out of his prestigious engineering job, and so. 693 00:46:37,000 --> 00:46:39,239 Speaker 4: What's my job? And he said, well, we're forming this 694 00:46:39,360 --> 00:46:43,400 Speaker 4: new group on program planning, and your job's going to 695 00:46:43,440 --> 00:46:47,359 Speaker 4: be head of scheduling. I said, scheduling. What the hell 696 00:46:47,400 --> 00:46:50,080 Speaker 4: does schedule? I'll build anything. Oh we build, isn't what 697 00:46:50,120 --> 00:46:52,279 Speaker 4: we have now? Yes, well that's for you to figure out. 698 00:46:53,000 --> 00:46:56,000 Speaker 4: It was clearly a non job, hoping I would quit. 699 00:46:56,880 --> 00:47:00,160 Speaker 3: With time on his hands, Alan went to conferences in 700 00:47:00,200 --> 00:47:03,279 Speaker 3: the field. At one event, one of the generals, who 701 00:47:03,320 --> 00:47:06,480 Speaker 3: was head of Air Force Space Command was surprised to 702 00:47:06,520 --> 00:47:08,840 Speaker 3: see him and found out what had happened. 703 00:47:09,160 --> 00:47:11,319 Speaker 4: He said, you ought to be spending all of your 704 00:47:11,360 --> 00:47:15,040 Speaker 4: time figuring out why the Shuttle failed the way it did. 705 00:47:15,960 --> 00:47:18,520 Speaker 4: I said, I'm not doing that anymore. You are You 706 00:47:18,600 --> 00:47:20,680 Speaker 4: mean anymore? You remember the failure team? 707 00:47:20,719 --> 00:47:20,960 Speaker 2: Are you? 708 00:47:21,480 --> 00:47:24,719 Speaker 4: I said I was. But I got taken off. You 709 00:47:24,800 --> 00:47:28,120 Speaker 4: got taken off. When the hell did that happen? I said, 710 00:47:28,160 --> 00:47:31,000 Speaker 4: I think it was exactly one day after I testified 711 00:47:31,000 --> 00:47:35,040 Speaker 4: before you people. He said, you're kidding me. I says, no, 712 00:47:35,160 --> 00:47:40,279 Speaker 4: I'm not. He said, well, that's bullshit. We'll fix that problem. 713 00:47:40,440 --> 00:47:43,520 Speaker 3: Alan MacDonald went on to join a super task force 714 00:47:43,840 --> 00:47:47,520 Speaker 3: aimed at redesigning the Shuttle to restore it to safe flight. 715 00:47:49,360 --> 00:47:52,960 Speaker 3: The Shuttle flew more than one hundred successful flights after 716 00:47:53,040 --> 00:47:58,239 Speaker 3: the redesign. The failure to stop the Challenger launch has 717 00:47:58,320 --> 00:48:02,880 Speaker 3: become a case study for the dangers of groupthink, desensitization 718 00:48:03,040 --> 00:48:06,319 Speaker 3: to risk, and the danger of putting cost cutting and 719 00:48:06,400 --> 00:48:09,399 Speaker 3: scheduled deadlines over safety. 720 00:48:10,080 --> 00:48:15,320 Speaker 4: People that have to make good decision managers, and they're 721 00:48:15,600 --> 00:48:20,360 Speaker 4: sometimes very tough decisions to make, should never feel comfortable 722 00:48:20,440 --> 00:48:24,120 Speaker 4: that they've made the best decision unless they have used 723 00:48:24,160 --> 00:48:27,680 Speaker 4: every tool in their toolkit, and the biggest tool they 724 00:48:27,719 --> 00:48:30,320 Speaker 4: have in the toolkit is the brain power the people 725 00:48:30,400 --> 00:48:33,719 Speaker 4: they work with and work for them. And if they 726 00:48:33,760 --> 00:48:38,160 Speaker 4: don't create an atmosphere where those people feel very comfortable 727 00:48:38,719 --> 00:48:42,000 Speaker 4: to tell them issues or concerns that they may have, 728 00:48:42,760 --> 00:48:46,239 Speaker 4: they've lost the most valuable data they can to make 729 00:48:46,280 --> 00:48:47,680 Speaker 4: these tough decisions. 730 00:48:49,560 --> 00:48:53,400 Speaker 3: The failure of NASA to redesign or fix engineering problems 731 00:48:53,440 --> 00:48:56,840 Speaker 3: when they were first raised led to a rationalization of 732 00:48:56,920 --> 00:49:01,760 Speaker 3: grave risk as acceptable, especially when lawn schedules and cost 733 00:49:01,800 --> 00:49:03,800 Speaker 3: cutting measures were bearing down. 734 00:49:04,640 --> 00:49:08,560 Speaker 5: That we were charging a fraction of what it was costing, 735 00:49:08,640 --> 00:49:13,600 Speaker 5: and that was driving the upward momentum of launching every 736 00:49:13,640 --> 00:49:21,759 Speaker 5: time on time, and that was the structural political beginning 737 00:49:22,480 --> 00:49:28,080 Speaker 5: of the inevitable reduction of safety criteria. That's when we 738 00:49:28,200 --> 00:49:33,520 Speaker 5: began to eat away at the edges of safety and risk. 739 00:49:33,560 --> 00:49:43,520 Speaker 5: Aversion became risk acceptability, and there were technical lessons and 740 00:49:43,719 --> 00:49:47,480 Speaker 5: signs that were coming from even the very second Shuttle 741 00:49:47,520 --> 00:49:53,120 Speaker 5: mission that we could lose a crew on those boosters. 742 00:49:54,800 --> 00:49:58,200 Speaker 3: Managers have to be receptive to the concerns of engineers, 743 00:49:58,600 --> 00:50:03,239 Speaker 3: who must be clear and courageous about reporting them. The 744 00:50:03,280 --> 00:50:07,560 Speaker 3: pressure on the workforce to save money, time and contracts 745 00:50:08,040 --> 00:50:13,200 Speaker 3: ultimately cost seven astronauts lives and hastened the demise of 746 00:50:13,239 --> 00:50:21,000 Speaker 3: America's Space Shuttle, which was retired in twenty eleven. It 747 00:50:21,040 --> 00:50:24,359 Speaker 3: remains to be seen if the US can overcome aerospace 748 00:50:24,440 --> 00:50:28,520 Speaker 3: design challengers and political feuding to put women and men 749 00:50:28,640 --> 00:50:32,759 Speaker 3: back into space from US soil once again, never forgetting 750 00:50:33,000 --> 00:50:37,880 Speaker 3: the crucial engineering lessons learned from the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster. 751 00:50:39,160 --> 00:50:42,200 Speaker 1: If you like the Michael Berry Show in podcast, please 752 00:50:42,400 --> 00:50:46,520 Speaker 1: tell one friend in If you're so inclined, write a 753 00:50:46,600 --> 00:50:51,680 Speaker 1: nice review of our podcast. Comments, suggestions, questions, an interest 754 00:50:51,760 --> 00:50:55,640 Speaker 1: in being a corporate sponsor and partner can be communicated 755 00:50:55,680 --> 00:51:00,120 Speaker 1: directly to the show at our email address, Michael at 756 00:51:00,280 --> 00:51:04,120 Speaker 1: Michael Berryshow dot com, or simply by clicking on our 757 00:51:04,120 --> 00:51:08,920 Speaker 1: website Michael Berryshow dot com The Michael Berry Show and 758 00:51:09,080 --> 00:51:13,040 Speaker 1: Podcast is produced by Ramon Roeblis, The King of Ding. 759 00:51:14,480 --> 00:51:23,960 Speaker 1: Executive producer is Chad Knakanishi. Jim Mudd is the creative director. 760 00:51:24,800 --> 00:51:30,360 Speaker 1: Voices Jingles, Tomfoolery and Shenanigans are provided by Chance McLean. 761 00:51:31,200 --> 00:51:35,680 Speaker 1: Director of Research is Sandy Peterson. Emily Bull is our 762 00:51:35,719 --> 00:51:43,160 Speaker 1: assistant listener and superfan. Contributions are appreciated and often incorporated 763 00:51:43,360 --> 00:51:46,920 Speaker 1: into our production. Where possible, we give credit, where not, 764 00:51:47,440 --> 00:51:50,640 Speaker 1: we take all the credit for ourselves. God bless the 765 00:51:50,680 --> 00:51:56,320 Speaker 1: memory of Rush Limbaugh. Long live Elvis, be a simple 766 00:51:56,400 --> 00:52:02,200 Speaker 1: man like Leonard Skinnard told you, and God bless America. Finally, 767 00:52:02,960 --> 00:52:06,720 Speaker 1: if you know a veteran suffering from PTSD, call Camp 768 00:52:06,760 --> 00:52:12,640 Speaker 1: Hope at eight seven seven seven one seven PTSD and 769 00:52:12,719 --> 00:52:17,040 Speaker 1: a combat veteran will answer the phone to provide free counseling.