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Speaker 1: Get in touch with technology with tex Stuff from Hey there,

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Speaker 1: and welcome to tex Stuff. I'm Jonathan Strickland and joining

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Speaker 1: me in the studio once again. My good buddy, my comrade,

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Speaker 1: compatriot man who what brights things sometimes, I say, Ben

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Speaker 1: Bolan from Various Shows. Yes, Jonathan, feels so good to

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Speaker 1: be back. Uh, We've got we've got a we've got

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Speaker 1: a pretty cool situation going on today. Uh. And and

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Speaker 1: this is a fascinating topic, so I'm really happy for

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Speaker 1: the opportunity to talk about it with you. Yeah. Once again.

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Speaker 1: I I opened up the opportunity for Ben to choose

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Speaker 1: whatever topic. I gave him a list of topics, and

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Speaker 1: he gave me a choice that wasn't on the list.

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Speaker 1: I'm sorry, No, that's good. Uh. But you came back

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Speaker 1: and said, how about we talk about the internet kill

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Speaker 1: switch or an internet kill switch? As it turns out,

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Speaker 1: there's not just one, although it's not exactly as simple.

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Speaker 1: In fact, it's nowhere near as simple as a physical

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Speaker 1: switch that you're like, hey, I can remember to turn

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Speaker 1: off the internet before you go out to right, like

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Speaker 1: before you leave the room, turn off the internet. That's

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Speaker 1: it's not like that. It's not I t crowd where

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Speaker 1: you've got a little box. Right, This gen is the Internet.

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Speaker 1: It's not that it's not that good, but I thank

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Speaker 1: you for your your kindness. Um. So, the so the

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Speaker 1: kill switch is, in general, it's a concept that a party,

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Speaker 1: most often a government, but not necessarily because we'll talk

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Speaker 1: about an example in the United States that did not

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Speaker 1: involve directly a government agency, but a Usually it's a

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Speaker 1: government alex to restrict or perhaps completely eliminate access to

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Speaker 1: the Internet in response to something. Right. Yes, So this

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Speaker 1: differs a little bit from filtering. Yeah, because filtering is

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Speaker 1: sort of a passive, continual process that uh, you know,

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Speaker 1: if it goes well in most countries but not all, Uh,

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Speaker 1: you won't really learn about it, just won't be able

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Speaker 1: to get to a certain website. So a great example

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Speaker 1: of that is China with a great firewall of China, right,

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Speaker 1: And they call it a firewall, but really it's a

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Speaker 1: web filter, and it's the whole idea is that it

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Speaker 1: filters out things that the Chinese government finds objectionable and

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Speaker 1: does not wish the Chinese citizenship to have access to.

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Speaker 1: And uh and in that case, that is an ongoing

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Speaker 1: situation and we're gonna talk a little bit about that,

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Speaker 1: and a little bit about a few others, as well

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Speaker 1: as the more, um you know, kind of temporary but

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Speaker 1: but equally terrifying uses of shutting down Internet access for

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Speaker 1: one reason or another. And generally speaking, the justifications for

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Speaker 1: this fall under various versions of national security, but there

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Speaker 1: are frequently and I would argue, uh, in most cases,

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Speaker 1: justifiably criticisms of that approach, that perhaps there are other

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Speaker 1: motivations at play besides trying to protect security, even if

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Speaker 1: they're not intended. They may be, they may there may

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Speaker 1: be undertones of that. Absolutely absolutely, because public safety would

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Speaker 1: be another uh, sort of umbrella term. And I don't

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Speaker 1: want to be too cynical with this, but I think

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Speaker 1: we can all be honest, ladies and gentlemen when we

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Speaker 1: say that national security has an increasingly vague definition depending

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Speaker 1: upon which state uses the phrase. Yeah, I would argue

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Speaker 1: that almost every state that uses the phrase national security

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Speaker 1: keeps it purposefully vay because you well, I mean, for

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Speaker 1: one thing, it's impossible to anticipate everything, So I can

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Speaker 1: feel some sympathy for that in that respect, and the

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Speaker 1: idea that if it's my job to ensure the protection

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Speaker 1: of a nation's people. I don't know how much sleep

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Speaker 1: I'm getting, but but then you know there it is

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Speaker 1: entirely possible because we've seen it time and again to

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Speaker 1: air too far on the side of uh, you know,

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Speaker 1: of of trying to protect people. And I would also

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Speaker 1: argue that eliminating a massive means of communication does far

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Speaker 1: worse to endanger people than uh than not doing that.

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Speaker 1: Like that that you're not really promoting public safety by

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Speaker 1: cutting off communication. Yeah, I really wanted to get your

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Speaker 1: thoughts on this because you're our tech expert or a texpert.

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Speaker 1: That's way easier to say it. Just so everyone knows.

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Speaker 1: Our producer hopefully cut out the four times I tried

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Speaker 1: to say expert, and we're not gonna if I had

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Speaker 1: bloopers on this show, that those would go at the

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Speaker 1: end of this episode. But I don't do that, all right,

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Speaker 1: So the reason that I want to hear about this

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Speaker 1: is because it sounds like almost this villainous James Bond

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Speaker 1: type of thing. You know, I'm going to shut down

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Speaker 1: the Internet unless you give me one billion dollars. But

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Speaker 1: but you raised a fantastic point um, which is that

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Speaker 1: this has not only been an idea. That's that's a

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Speaker 1: little older than a lot of people might think. Sure,

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Speaker 1: but it's by no means an uncommon thing. It's their

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Speaker 1: precedents for this, right, Oh, there's so many. So we're

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Speaker 1: gonna start with nations other than our own. But don't worry,

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Speaker 1: we will get to the United States because that you know,

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Speaker 1: I think in particular, you're talking about a country that

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Speaker 1: prides itself on certain principles, and it's very difficult to

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Speaker 1: UH to to take this idea and have it mesh

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Speaker 1: with those principles. Right. So, but before we get to that,

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Speaker 1: let's talk about some other countries where, at least from

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Speaker 1: the perspective of our position, we would say it's pretty

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Speaker 1: cut and dry that this is a draconian approach. So again,

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Speaker 1: this is from the perspective of two Americans. So we're

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Speaker 1: sitting we're sitting in a pretty big seat of privilege here.

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Speaker 1: But North Korea is the first example I was going

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Speaker 1: to point out. And North Korea, that is, if you

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Speaker 1: want to talk about a nation that is very much

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Speaker 1: concerned with the control of access to the Internet, it's

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Speaker 1: hard to find a better representative than North Korea, because,

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Speaker 1: first of all, UH let me, let me go through

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Speaker 1: what you have to be able to do in order

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Speaker 1: to have access to the internet in North Korea. Alright, alright,

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Speaker 1: walking through it. Okay, So yours is in the North

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Speaker 1: Korea and you're hoping at one point to connect to

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Speaker 1: the internet. Well, first, you have to obtain a license

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Speaker 1: to own a personal computer. It's like having a license

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Speaker 1: to own a weapon. You have to You can't you

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Speaker 1: can't go out and buy a computer on your own.

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Speaker 1: You have to get permission to own a computer first. Secondly,

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Speaker 1: you have to be lucky enough to be able to

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Speaker 1: buy one, because the only state sanctioned source for computers

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Speaker 1: is a company called Morning Panda, which is owned by

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Speaker 1: the government. Um. If, however, there's a caveat here, if

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Speaker 1: you're somehow fortunate enough to be one of the elite

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Speaker 1: in North Korea, you can skirt around this and you

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Speaker 1: could actually buy an unsanctioned computer like an like an

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Speaker 1: Apple computer, like a top of the line computer that

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Speaker 1: is essentially smuggled in for you. So these are rules

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Speaker 1: for the average joke, This is these are the rules

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Speaker 1: for for of the population in North Korea. So if

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Speaker 1: you're in that point zero zero one, then you're you,

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Speaker 1: you can ignore these other rules. Uh. But third is

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Speaker 1: that you would need to connect to that to a

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Speaker 1: network which is not the Internet. It's called the intra

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Speaker 1: neet or it's their internet called Kwangmyong which means bright Star.

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Speaker 1: So that's an intranet. It's internally based in North Korea

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Speaker 1: without connection to the outside Internet. But it looks kind

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Speaker 1: of like the Internet, particularly the Internet in the late nineties.

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Speaker 1: Um it's running on Microsoft software that had been pirated

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Speaker 1: from Japanese sources, so it's it's all like the servers

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Speaker 1: are all internal servers, not connecting outside um by. In

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Speaker 1: order to do that, you need to be probably either

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Speaker 1: in a major city or in a university. Those are

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Speaker 1: the only places to have Internet connectivity. And if you

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Speaker 1: aren't in either of those two places, you're probably out

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Speaker 1: of luck because internal travel in North Korea is not

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Speaker 1: permitted without a special dispensation. Yeah. So in other words,

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Speaker 1: if you're not, they're already you may be stuck. All right,

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Speaker 1: So we've got all that taken care of. Now, let's

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Speaker 1: say that you are one of the elite, and you

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Speaker 1: you you merit certain consideration because of whatever whatever your

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Speaker 1: position happens to me, maybe you're maybe you're like ahead

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Speaker 1: of a propaganda or something along those lines. If you

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Speaker 1: are one of those very few people you can access

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Speaker 1: the actual Internet with two other caveats. Well, first, first

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Speaker 1: of all, here's how few there are, right, So there's

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Speaker 1: twenty five million people living in North Korea. North Korea

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Speaker 1: has one thousand, twenty four I P addresses. In the

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Speaker 1: United States, where we have more than three million people,

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Speaker 1: we have more than a billion IP addresses. So that

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Speaker 1: tells you that we're talking about a tiny number of people.

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Speaker 1: And the the line leading into North Korea comes from China,

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Speaker 1: so your feed of the Internet is also behind the firewall. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: so you are one of the few people who can

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Speaker 1: access it. You're accessing it through a line that has

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Speaker 1: passed through China. You might there may be a couple

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Speaker 1: of satellite sources of access which would not be limited

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Speaker 1: to the Chinese firewall. But uh yeah, And from what

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Speaker 1: I've heard, or at least from what people have been

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Speaker 1: able to suss out, the access is super slow. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: I've heard that too. Um, we're talking about the dial

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Speaker 1: up sound effect. Yeah, yeah, yeah. There have been like

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Speaker 1: cyber cafes, some of them are still using dial up modems,

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Speaker 1: so it's not it's not a cable or or fiber

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Speaker 1: optics system or anything like that. So that that's an

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Speaker 1: extreme example. And of course, obviously if the North Korean

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Speaker 1: government had decided that this is not a um, not

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Speaker 1: something they want anyone to have access to, it would

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Speaker 1: be relatively easy to shut it down because there's just

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Speaker 1: that one entry. Yeah, other than I guess mobile phones

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Speaker 1: that are smuggled in maybe yeah, but even then you

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Speaker 1: could as uh, you know, as a government shut down

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Speaker 1: the cellular systems. So in that case it's kind of

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Speaker 1: a scorched earth policy, but you can do it. So anyway,

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Speaker 1: that's that's probably the most extreme case, apart from maybe

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Speaker 1: countries that are so they're in such a developing stage

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Speaker 1: as far as the Internet is concerned, that they haven't

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Speaker 1: laid out an infrastructure fully yet. Those cases it may

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Speaker 1: be a little different. I'm looking mostly at at countries

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Speaker 1: that have had the opportunity to roll on and yeah,

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Speaker 1: so that that's an extreme example, but it also shows

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Speaker 1: how easily that could happen in that in that state,

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Speaker 1: in the DPRK or North Korea, just to cut off

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Speaker 1: that just that one point. Uh. Yeah. Now, whereas China

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Speaker 1: is another great example that we've already talked about the firewall.

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Speaker 1: So the Internet in China is is largely censored. Um,

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Speaker 1: there are ways for citizens who are savvy to get

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Speaker 1: around that, although it's not a safe thing to do necessarily.

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Speaker 1: We're talking about to or something. Yeah, and you can

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Speaker 1: um yeah, and lots of proxies. Yeah, you can. You

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Speaker 1: can potentially get around some of that, although the danger

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Speaker 1: of doing so is not is not insignificant. Uh. China

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Speaker 1: has also been known to use regionalized localized kill switches

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Speaker 1: in provinces where there is unrest, so, in other words,

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Speaker 1: shutting down the the infrastructure that allows for communication across

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Speaker 1: the Internet, but only in localized areas. We're not talking

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Speaker 1: like a countrywide blackout, so this would be like maybe

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Speaker 1: unrest and Tibet leads to us shut down. Yes, those

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Speaker 1: are good examples, Yeah, exactly. It's the sort of thing

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Speaker 1: where if the government wants to impede the ability of

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Speaker 1: any protesters or voices of opposition, they can shut down

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Speaker 1: the communication lines. Uh and then uh kind of kind

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Speaker 1: of squash that that way, or at least at least

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Speaker 1: decrease their impact. There are other example. I mean in

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Speaker 1: Egypt in two thousand eleven, there was a pretty infamous

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Speaker 1: result of of the the president or the outgoing president

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Speaker 1: of Egypt shutting down the various services or sharing on

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Speaker 1: access to various services as a means of trying to

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Speaker 1: to squash protests in opposition. Syria two thousand twelve. Now

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Speaker 1: this one's interesting. You know, I don't know much about

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Speaker 1: this one, all right, So this one's right up your alley, Ben,

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Speaker 1: this is the stuff they don't want you to know. Episode.

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Speaker 1: So Syria two thousand twelve, Syria is in the middle

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Speaker 1: of a civil war. Internet access in Syria blacks out.

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Speaker 1: It's knocked offline. So like it's like the entire country

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Speaker 1: just suddenly disappears from online. It's goes black. Both sides

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Speaker 1: accused the other side of sabotaging the systems so that

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Speaker 1: no one could use the Internet. However, according to one

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Speaker 1: Mr Snowdon, neither side was responsible, and in fact it

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Speaker 1: was the n ess A which was attempting to infiltrate

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Speaker 1: Syrian web servers to insert malware for surveillance purposes and

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Speaker 1: accidentally knock their servers offline. And then we're given just

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Speaker 1: enough authority to hide their tracks rather than actually help

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Speaker 1: Syria get back online. Wow, so that's a that's even more.

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Speaker 1: That's the states are so much higher. I'm sorry I'm stuttering,

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Speaker 1: but this is mind boggling to me. This is a

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Speaker 1: state shutting down another countries internet, not not on purpose,

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Speaker 1: but that's kind of not important. Really, That's kind of

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Speaker 1: the scariest part. It's actually really like because then you

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Speaker 1: start thinking, like, not only do you have amazing power,

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Speaker 1: but you're operating on a three stooge is level. You know,

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Speaker 1: your job is to install this one thing, and you've

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Speaker 1: you've not You've burnt the building down around you, right,

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Speaker 1: and like there's one wall standing and it's got the

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Speaker 1: thing you were supposed to install on it, but the

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Speaker 1: rest of the building is gone. The last the door

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Speaker 1: and the new door knob right exactly. That's it. And uh,

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Speaker 1: you know, this is obviously not the same sort of

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Speaker 1: thing as the kill switches we're talking about in other cases,

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Speaker 1: because again, that was not the intention at the time.

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Speaker 1: And this is again according to Snowdon, who gave an

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Speaker 1: interview with Wired and talked about this. So you know,

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Speaker 1: I haven't actually read any documents that directly link an

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Speaker 1: say to this event in Syria. But according to Snowdon,

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Speaker 1: that is what happened. So so that is something I

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Speaker 1: should stress. Yeah, so that that's a great example. Another

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Speaker 1: one Russia two thousand fourteen, so very recent. Uh, there

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Speaker 1: was a news story in which it was reported that quote,

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Speaker 1: Russian Internet service providers will be required to install equipment

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Speaker 1: that would make it possible to shut off Russia's access

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Speaker 1: to the global Internet in the event of an emergency.

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Speaker 1: And uh. Dmitri Peskov, who was press secretary to a

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Speaker 1: certain Vladimir Putin, said that there was no intention to

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Speaker 1: isolate Russian users from the global Internet. Uh. He explained

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Speaker 1: to the Interfax news agency that the discussions will focus

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Speaker 1: on the ways to protect it from possible external actions,

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Speaker 1: so essentially means of protecting Russia from cyber attacks. Okay,

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Speaker 1: whether from hacker groups or from dash. There's there's also

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Speaker 1: a possibility here that might be that that might be

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Speaker 1: apropos for this situation, which is uh, financial catastrophes which

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Speaker 1: you're shutting down an Internet connection is a great way

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Speaker 1: to shut down regular trade. I'm sure it's also a

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Speaker 1: criminal act. Yeah. Well, and the way I think of

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Speaker 1: it is and this also ties back. I'm sure we'll

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Speaker 1: stress this again at the end of the episode that

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Speaker 1: shutting down the internet. The Internet we depend so heavily

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Speaker 1: on it, not just for communications, but for uh for

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Speaker 1: for trade, you know, for finances, that doing doing something

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Speaker 1: as drastic as shutting it down would be disastrous, Even

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Speaker 1: if you could argue that it was justifiable, and even

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Speaker 1: if it was for a short amount of time, the

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Speaker 1: consequences of that action would be so tremendous as to

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Speaker 1: probably in hindsight say that was probably that was not

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Speaker 1: the right thing. Today there's a better way, Yeah, but

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Speaker 1: well we'll talk more about that. So so those are

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Speaker 1: some of the other countries we talk. There's also there's

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Speaker 1: ongoing issues with Burundi um where there have been some

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Speaker 1: discussions about using various means to shut down the ability

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Speaker 1: are people to use Twitter and other social media sites.

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Speaker 1: But there are a lot of different examples that there

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Speaker 1: were examples during the incidents with Russia and the Ukraine.

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Speaker 1: I mean, there's just tons of different examples around the world.

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Speaker 1: And meanwhile, here in the United States, we often think

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Speaker 1: of ourselves, We Americans often think of ourselves as sort

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Speaker 1: of the the paragons of free speech and our country

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Speaker 1: value that's what our country was founded on, one of

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Speaker 1: the principles we were founded on, and that therefore, you know,

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Speaker 1: we have a really good foundation for fair means of communication. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: but the right to a free speech, like I don't

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Speaker 1: agree with you, but I will defend to the death.

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Speaker 1: So it sounds like, you know, we would never mess

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Speaker 1: around with that sort of thing. However, Yeah, we've got

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Speaker 1: a nice long history of actually putting it into policy

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Speaker 1: that we can totally that by we, I mean the

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Speaker 1: president could totally mess with things. I mean, this goes

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Speaker 1: all the way back to the age of the telegraph

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Speaker 1: where the president, I think it was like nineteen eighteen,

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Speaker 1: where the president was given the authority in times of

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Speaker 1: war and other major catastrophes, be able to direct the

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Speaker 1: use of the telegraph systems so that essentially superseding any

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Speaker 1: other use of them and saying either they need to

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Speaker 1: be dedicated specifically for whatever or shut down so that

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Speaker 1: they can't be used for anything else. So yeah, so

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Speaker 1: that's that's a startling thing because we know that this

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Speaker 1: is the Communications Act, right, Well, that would bet that's

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Speaker 1: the next one. The next one is the Communications Act,

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Speaker 1: which goes even further, right, Yeah, which is says, uh,

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Speaker 1: this was by FDR, I believe, right, And this is

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Speaker 1: control over the media. Uh. This this gives like electronic

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Speaker 1: communication in any and all forms. Yeah. And this is

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Speaker 1: one where there was argument for a long time about

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Speaker 1: whether or not the Internet falls under this particular category.

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Speaker 1: It's kind of in a parallel argument to net neutrality,

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Speaker 1: whether you can qualify the Internet as a utility or

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Speaker 1: another a regulated uh entity, kind of like the the

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Speaker 1: telephone industry, that sort of stuff. Um, And it's it's

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Speaker 1: related but not identical to that. Obviously, there there are differences,

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Speaker 1: big differences between the two. But um. Nevertheless, some people

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Speaker 1: say that this act gives the president the explicit means

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Speaker 1: to be able to direct any kind of mass communication

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Speaker 1: within the United States for whatever purpose, if we're talking

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Speaker 1: about a time of war or other major event that

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Speaker 1: threatens national security. Right, And it's also illegal for anyone

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Speaker 1: to not help. Yes, that's one of the scary things.

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Speaker 1: And it also it also absolves any communications company of

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Speaker 1: any um legal proceedings to be pursued against it in

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Speaker 1: the wake of this. So, in other words, using modern examples,

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Speaker 1: if if the President of the United States goes to

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Speaker 1: A T and T and says, shut it all down,

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Speaker 1: you know, Walter Peck style, And they flipped the big

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Speaker 1: switch and all and all the A T and T

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Speaker 1: stuff goes offline. A T and T customers would not

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Speaker 1: be allowed to sue A. T and T for that

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Speaker 1: because under this Act, A T and T is not

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Speaker 1: held responsible. They were they were following the rules as

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Speaker 1: laid out by the Act, and uh, therefore they can't

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Speaker 1: be sued. Now, you might be able to bring some

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Speaker 1: sort of lawsuit against the government and try and have

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Speaker 1: the law changed, but you wouldn't, you know, under this law,

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Speaker 1: you they would. They're like, listen, you know, it is

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Speaker 1: the law that we were following. And again it's nineteen

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Speaker 1: thirty four. So uh. Meanwhile, so even if you, even

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Speaker 1: if you think the Internet is is, um not beholden

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Speaker 1: to the same set of rules. Uh. In two thousand

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Speaker 1: and six, that all became moot because that's when the

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Speaker 1: Department of Homeland Security adopted a policy that is called

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Speaker 1: Standing Operating Procedure three oh three or s o P.

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Speaker 1: Three oh three. And before we came in here, Ben

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Speaker 1: and I had had a brief little exchange, where I said,

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Speaker 1: how terrifying is it to think of this as standard

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Speaker 1: operating procedure? Right? Yes? Yeah? And and furthermore, how terrifying

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Speaker 1: is it to wonder about the other three hundreds something?

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Speaker 1: That's yeah, and that's assuming there weren't more after three

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Speaker 1: oh three? Right? What else are we in violation of

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Speaker 1: s OP for nineteen or something. It's just a small tangent.

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Speaker 1: This reminds me of when I was in London with

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Speaker 1: my wife and we saw a sign that said no

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Speaker 1: busking in the London underground, which will come back to

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Speaker 1: in just a second, but in the London underground, And

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Speaker 1: I turned to my wife and said, what is it?

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Speaker 1: And she said, I don't know. Are we doing it?

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Speaker 1: Like I sure hope not, because there's because it's apparently

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Speaker 1: against the law and we could get fine. So and obviously,

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Speaker 1: I mean, for those who don't know, busking is is

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Speaker 1: public performance of various types of asking for money in

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Speaker 1: return for public performance. But at the time we had

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Speaker 1: no idea. So it's like that sort of thing, like

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Speaker 1: are we violating something? And and here's the deal. This

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Speaker 1: particular standard operating procedure was adopted pretty much in secrecy right, Like,

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Speaker 1: there's there's no there's no publicly available record of exactly

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Speaker 1: what what what sort of UM situation has to be

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Speaker 1: in place in order for the Department of Homeland Security

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Speaker 1: to execute s OP three oh three, right, or what

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Speaker 1: s sort of oversight governed it? Yeah, yeah, there's there's

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Speaker 1: no there's no way for us to know because it's

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Speaker 1: not published publicly. Uh, and that that is a real

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Speaker 1: issue of of some concern. Now, Um, one thing I

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Speaker 1: should say said, s OP three oh three is not

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Speaker 1: an Internet kill switch in the same sense as you know,

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Speaker 1: something that you would see in North Korea or or whatever.

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Speaker 1: It's Um, it's meant to be localized, very much so,

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Speaker 1: to the point where the most of the language talks

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Speaker 1: about using it to cut off cellular service, mobile service,

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Speaker 1: and wireless service within specific areas like a tunnel or

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Speaker 1: a bridge or maybe a municipality. Yeah, yeah, maybe. And this, uh,

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Speaker 1: this is strange because we know that something like this

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Speaker 1: has occurred right in San Francisco, right, and before I

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Speaker 1: talk about the San Francisco one, which is extremely problematic. Um.

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Speaker 1: The whole reason why this was adopted in two thousand

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Speaker 1: six stems from some attacks in London that happened in

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Speaker 1: two thousand five. So in July of two thousand five,

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Speaker 1: there were the London underground bombings on July seven, about

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Speaker 1: eight fifty in the morning in London time. UH. Three

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Speaker 1: bombs in three different locations in the London London underground

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Speaker 1: system UH exploded within a minute of each other, like

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Speaker 1: within fifty seconds, all three had exploded. UH. Fifty two

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Speaker 1: civilians were well. There was a fourth one that exploded

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Speaker 1: an hour later on a double decker bus. So three

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Speaker 1: were untrained. One was on a double decker bus and

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Speaker 1: happened an hour later. Fifty two people were fifty two

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Speaker 1: civilians were killed, UH seven people were injured, and the

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Speaker 1: four suicide bombers died as as well. I mean, UM.

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Speaker 1: So the United States looked at this, and I also

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Speaker 1: remember of obviously this is also after eleven and two

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Speaker 1: thousand one, So the United States looks at this, and

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Speaker 1: they the Department of Homeland Security started looking into the

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Speaker 1: possibility of creating a system to shut down mobile and

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Speaker 1: wireless service in in the case that perhaps there was

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Speaker 1: good reason to suspect a coordinated terrorist attack on a

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Speaker 1: system or a municipality. The idea being that the bombers

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Speaker 1: were using cell phones to activate the bombs, to to

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Speaker 1: detonate the bombs possible, It is possible. I could not

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Speaker 1: find anything official in the investigation of the London attacks

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Speaker 1: that definitively found that the attackers use their mobile phones.

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Speaker 1: It's just as possible, or at least it is possible.

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Speaker 1: Maybe not just as possible. It is possible that they

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Speaker 1: all had their cell phones on an alarm system to

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Speaker 1: alert them of when they needed to detonate, and then

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Speaker 1: they use some other system because you know, if they're

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Speaker 1: all using cell phones, it's all it's all keyed into

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Speaker 1: the satellites anyway, or the cell the cell towers rather

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Speaker 1: the cell tower service, so um, you know, it's their time.

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Speaker 1: Their clocks would have all been synchronized already, so that's

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Speaker 1: a possibility to But assuming that they did use their

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Speaker 1: mobile phones, then the United States Department of Homeland Security

429
00:27:30,520 --> 00:27:33,119
Speaker 1: was saying, well, how can we create a system where

430
00:27:33,520 --> 00:27:36,840
Speaker 1: we shut down the ability for anyone to send a

431
00:27:36,880 --> 00:27:41,840
Speaker 1: signal through these wireless or mobile services, and that way

432
00:27:42,240 --> 00:27:45,920
Speaker 1: we can prevent any kind of attack of this nature

433
00:27:46,400 --> 00:27:49,960
Speaker 1: from being carried out the way it was intended. So

434
00:27:50,000 --> 00:27:52,679
Speaker 1: that's kind of the justification, or at least that's the

435
00:27:52,720 --> 00:28:00,640
Speaker 1: justification that has been alluded to by various parties involved. Now, yeah,

436
00:28:00,680 --> 00:28:03,720
Speaker 1: you know you were alluding to something that happened in

437
00:28:03,720 --> 00:28:07,399
Speaker 1: San Francisco. Oh yes, yeah, so that's uh, that was

438
00:28:07,440 --> 00:28:13,240
Speaker 1: around two thousand and eleven. Uh. In two thousand eleven,

439
00:28:14,800 --> 00:28:19,240
Speaker 1: a group named EPIC. You might recognize that the Electronic

440
00:28:19,280 --> 00:28:25,480
Speaker 1: Privacy Information Center began pursuing this DHS. Well, for the

441
00:28:25,560 --> 00:28:27,840
Speaker 1: sake of coolness, i'll call it a kill switch. But

442
00:28:27,840 --> 00:28:30,000
Speaker 1: I think you did an excellent job showing how it

443
00:28:30,359 --> 00:28:34,600
Speaker 1: is a little different. Because government officials in San Francisco

444
00:28:34,840 --> 00:28:38,760
Speaker 1: disabled the cell phone system during a protest. Yeah, it's

445
00:28:38,760 --> 00:28:42,320
Speaker 1: a protest that happened on the Bay Area Rapid Transitor

446
00:28:42,400 --> 00:28:47,120
Speaker 1: BART in San Francisco. And what had happened was UM.

447
00:28:47,200 --> 00:28:50,120
Speaker 1: There there were protests that were related to an incident

448
00:28:50,120 --> 00:28:53,800
Speaker 1: in which a BART officer, so a law enforcement officer

449
00:28:53,880 --> 00:28:59,160
Speaker 1: working with BART four BART UM had shot and killed

450
00:28:59,200 --> 00:29:04,480
Speaker 1: a homeless man. And so there the the BART operators

451
00:29:05,360 --> 00:29:09,680
Speaker 1: essentially shut down cell service in certain areas of the

452
00:29:09,720 --> 00:29:13,360
Speaker 1: BART system. So think of like cell tower repeaters that

453
00:29:13,400 --> 00:29:16,240
Speaker 1: are in various areas. They shut those down, They turned

454
00:29:16,280 --> 00:29:19,840
Speaker 1: them off killing cell service in those areas. Uh. And

455
00:29:20,760 --> 00:29:25,080
Speaker 1: the essentially they were doing so to prevent the organization

456
00:29:25,400 --> 00:29:31,720
Speaker 1: of spontaneous protests on the BART system. And they justified

457
00:29:32,400 --> 00:29:36,240
Speaker 1: their decision by saying that they were afraid that any

458
00:29:36,320 --> 00:29:41,360
Speaker 1: kind of organized, organized protest would uh bring the safety

459
00:29:41,400 --> 00:29:44,040
Speaker 1: of other people into question, that it would be too dangerous.

460
00:29:44,240 --> 00:29:46,800
Speaker 1: Overcrowding was one of the things that listed in their

461
00:29:46,800 --> 00:29:51,200
Speaker 1: official response statement, right, and they and also you'll see

462
00:29:51,240 --> 00:29:55,840
Speaker 1: some differences in the language they're choosing because Epic and

463
00:29:56,000 --> 00:29:58,880
Speaker 1: the protesters themselves, So this was a this was going

464
00:29:58,920 --> 00:30:02,680
Speaker 1: to be a peaceful pro test, whereas BART says this

465
00:30:02,760 --> 00:30:05,840
Speaker 1: was going to be a disruptive activity, right that it

466
00:30:06,120 --> 00:30:10,920
Speaker 1: leads unsafe conditions. So so essentially you could say, well,

467
00:30:11,200 --> 00:30:14,760
Speaker 1: what happened, and BART pretty much disable to continue doing

468
00:30:14,800 --> 00:30:19,000
Speaker 1: what it's doing for the time being. Anyway. Uh, there's

469
00:30:19,040 --> 00:30:21,840
Speaker 1: nothing that came out of that as far as you know,

470
00:30:21,960 --> 00:30:23,960
Speaker 1: a like a slap on the wrist or anything. It

471
00:30:24,040 --> 00:30:27,320
Speaker 1: was it was essentially considered justified and uh, and it's

472
00:30:27,680 --> 00:30:32,800
Speaker 1: particularly worrisome because it was in response to a protest,

473
00:30:33,680 --> 00:30:36,920
Speaker 1: not some sort of terrorist attack, but actual citizens of

474
00:30:36,960 --> 00:30:41,400
Speaker 1: the United States protesting something and again, the First Amendment

475
00:30:41,440 --> 00:30:44,680
Speaker 1: gives us rights of free speech and assembly, and and

476
00:30:44,680 --> 00:30:47,920
Speaker 1: and you could argue that this is a violation of

477
00:30:47,960 --> 00:30:52,200
Speaker 1: those rights. Um. And so this was definitely one of

478
00:30:52,200 --> 00:30:54,120
Speaker 1: those things that has been continuing to play out, and

479
00:30:54,160 --> 00:30:59,840
Speaker 1: that really gave EPIC the the the need to go

480
00:31:00,080 --> 00:31:03,360
Speaker 1: after Department of Homeland Security to say, all right, listen,

481
00:31:03,720 --> 00:31:08,080
Speaker 1: we need to know what are what are the guidelines

482
00:31:08,360 --> 00:31:11,880
Speaker 1: for s Op three oh three? What in what case

483
00:31:12,480 --> 00:31:17,840
Speaker 1: is it legal for the United States government to shut

484
00:31:17,840 --> 00:31:22,040
Speaker 1: off wireless or cellular service within an area? What? We

485
00:31:22,080 --> 00:31:24,840
Speaker 1: don't even know what the guidelines are, right, because we

486
00:31:25,320 --> 00:31:27,640
Speaker 1: the people, as corney as is to say, it's true,

487
00:31:28,040 --> 00:31:31,160
Speaker 1: the citizenry of the US, as well as people visiting

488
00:31:31,160 --> 00:31:34,000
Speaker 1: because of course it affects them to never had the

489
00:31:34,120 --> 00:31:37,800
Speaker 1: chance to find out what this was, what what this

490
00:31:37,840 --> 00:31:40,760
Speaker 1: actually is happening. I think a lot of people here

491
00:31:40,760 --> 00:31:44,200
Speaker 1: in this country did not know that it could even

492
00:31:44,280 --> 00:31:47,560
Speaker 1: be a thing. Yeah, I mean, there was no public debate,

493
00:31:47,600 --> 00:31:51,160
Speaker 1: There was no public revelation of this. It was essentially

494
00:31:51,200 --> 00:31:55,200
Speaker 1: one of those behind closed doors deals, Uh, which sounds

495
00:31:55,520 --> 00:31:58,480
Speaker 1: it's probably gonna sound pretty familiar to folks because we've

496
00:31:58,520 --> 00:32:00,680
Speaker 1: talked a lot you and I partink literally get talked

497
00:32:00,680 --> 00:32:03,720
Speaker 1: a lot about, uh, a lot of a lot of

498
00:32:03,720 --> 00:32:06,200
Speaker 1: things that are done in the name of national security

499
00:32:06,280 --> 00:32:11,920
Speaker 1: that get very much obvious skated, And the people who

500
00:32:12,000 --> 00:32:16,320
Speaker 1: are behind the policies argue that the obvious scation is

501
00:32:16,400 --> 00:32:21,680
Speaker 1: necessary to preserve the national security. And meanwhile, people who

502
00:32:21,800 --> 00:32:24,880
Speaker 1: find it to be an infringement upon liberties are saying,

503
00:32:26,400 --> 00:32:29,440
Speaker 1: so you're telling me you can't even tell me what

504
00:32:29,480 --> 00:32:33,479
Speaker 1: the what the parameters are, because that in itself is

505
00:32:33,960 --> 00:32:37,720
Speaker 1: somehow endangering people. How can knowing when you are allowed

506
00:32:37,760 --> 00:32:41,320
Speaker 1: to do this be a danger to anyone? And in fact,

507
00:32:41,360 --> 00:32:44,120
Speaker 1: that's the that's the key to the current argument, right.

508
00:32:44,160 --> 00:32:48,760
Speaker 1: So EPIC essentially sues the Department of Homeland Security. First,

509
00:32:48,840 --> 00:32:52,440
Speaker 1: there's a Freedom of Information Act request, which Department of

510
00:32:52,440 --> 00:32:54,840
Speaker 1: Homeland Security is no, I'm not gonna We're not gonna

511
00:32:55,120 --> 00:32:57,120
Speaker 1: tell you what or we're going to tell you so

512
00:32:57,200 --> 00:33:00,880
Speaker 1: little that it means nothing anyway. Yeah, And so there

513
00:33:00,920 --> 00:33:04,160
Speaker 1: was a series of lawsuits, or our court cases rather,

514
00:33:05,160 --> 00:33:08,520
Speaker 1: and in one the courts found in favor of EPIC,

515
00:33:09,040 --> 00:33:12,719
Speaker 1: and they said, excellent, DHS, you've got to tell us,

516
00:33:12,920 --> 00:33:15,840
Speaker 1: you gotta tell us by this date. What the guidelines

517
00:33:15,880 --> 00:33:17,840
Speaker 1: are for you to be able to use this. This,

518
00:33:17,960 --> 00:33:20,760
Speaker 1: by the way, isn't about repealing s o P. Three

519
00:33:20,760 --> 00:33:23,840
Speaker 1: oh three. This is just telling us when it is allowed,

520
00:33:23,920 --> 00:33:25,800
Speaker 1: when the government is allowed to use s o P.

521
00:33:25,920 --> 00:33:30,920
Speaker 1: Three oh three. So, uh, DHS appeals like you said,

522
00:33:31,120 --> 00:33:34,520
Speaker 1: and the d C District Court of Appeals found in

523
00:33:34,600 --> 00:33:38,880
Speaker 1: favor of the Department of Homeland Security. So now there's

524
00:33:38,920 --> 00:33:43,560
Speaker 1: no longer this mandate that the DHS has to give

525
00:33:43,640 --> 00:33:45,920
Speaker 1: over all the guidelines. Although there was some time in

526
00:33:45,960 --> 00:33:48,080
Speaker 1: April where it was going to be said, Oh, the

527
00:33:48,160 --> 00:33:51,600
Speaker 1: DHS is totally gonna talk about at least give some

528
00:33:51,760 --> 00:33:56,720
Speaker 1: information about when s OP three oh three can be

529
00:33:57,200 --> 00:34:00,480
Speaker 1: instituted and what it means, what are the parameters, Hope

530
00:34:00,480 --> 00:34:03,760
Speaker 1: Springs eternal right. Still haven't heard it yet, No, we

531
00:34:03,840 --> 00:34:07,000
Speaker 1: still haven't. We still haven't heard it. And it's it's

532
00:34:07,040 --> 00:34:11,399
Speaker 1: fascinating because the things that we don't know, it's kind

533
00:34:11,400 --> 00:34:13,719
Speaker 1: of like a monster in a Hitchcock film. The things

534
00:34:13,719 --> 00:34:17,160
Speaker 1: that we don't know, uh, may well be far more

535
00:34:17,200 --> 00:34:20,200
Speaker 1: monstrous than what's actually going on. You and I have

536
00:34:20,239 --> 00:34:26,160
Speaker 1: talked a lot about how unnecessary secrecy or obstucation breeds

537
00:34:26,440 --> 00:34:30,680
Speaker 1: speculation and really crazy stuff. Yeah, and it's and it

538
00:34:30,800 --> 00:34:36,400
Speaker 1: ends up breeding distrust in in authority, and that is

539
00:34:36,400 --> 00:34:39,200
Speaker 1: not good either. So there comes a point where you

540
00:34:39,280 --> 00:34:43,279
Speaker 1: have to really weigh this and say, all right, is

541
00:34:43,360 --> 00:34:45,840
Speaker 1: it really I mean because because the argument that the

542
00:34:45,880 --> 00:34:48,960
Speaker 1: Department of Homeland Security has been making is that the

543
00:34:49,040 --> 00:34:53,920
Speaker 1: revelation of this information could potentially put a human life

544
00:34:54,360 --> 00:35:00,440
Speaker 1: at risk in danger. And the EPICS response was, how

545
00:35:00,680 --> 00:35:03,479
Speaker 1: in the Department Homeland Security that's saying that would put

546
00:35:03,560 --> 00:35:05,960
Speaker 1: a person's life in danger. So you're saying, so you're

547
00:35:06,040 --> 00:35:07,919
Speaker 1: centially saying you've got to get out of jail free

548
00:35:07,960 --> 00:35:11,880
Speaker 1: card here that if you play this trumps everything else.

549
00:35:12,320 --> 00:35:16,000
Speaker 1: That if you say that it could potentially put some

550
00:35:16,160 --> 00:35:20,640
Speaker 1: hypothetical person's life and danger, then you have a way

551
00:35:20,640 --> 00:35:25,120
Speaker 1: of getting out of any request for justification, and that

552
00:35:25,360 --> 00:35:30,839
Speaker 1: breeds even more contempt. Right, So it and it could

553
00:35:30,920 --> 00:35:34,560
Speaker 1: very well be that if there were some disclosure of

554
00:35:34,560 --> 00:35:39,040
Speaker 1: this information, we would say, I now understand your justifications.

555
00:35:39,040 --> 00:35:40,920
Speaker 1: Whether I agree with it or not as another matter,

556
00:35:40,960 --> 00:35:43,680
Speaker 1: but I understand them, and I understand how you could

557
00:35:43,800 --> 00:35:46,640
Speaker 1: argue that it would potentially put someone's life in danger.

558
00:35:47,200 --> 00:35:50,240
Speaker 1: But seems kind of I mean without knowing, it's impossible

559
00:35:50,280 --> 00:35:53,080
Speaker 1: to say for sure, but it seems to me, based

560
00:35:53,120 --> 00:35:57,560
Speaker 1: upon my limited perspective, that's very difficult to justify. I

561
00:35:57,600 --> 00:36:01,080
Speaker 1: can't tell you when we can put this into place

562
00:36:01,760 --> 00:36:05,640
Speaker 1: because that could potentially put someone's life in danger, because

563
00:36:05,800 --> 00:36:07,640
Speaker 1: it's either going to be in place or it's not

564
00:36:07,719 --> 00:36:10,440
Speaker 1: gonna be emblazing. Right. This is not a matter of

565
00:36:10,719 --> 00:36:14,760
Speaker 1: degree so much as it is a matter of pretty

566
00:36:14,880 --> 00:36:20,400
Speaker 1: concrete facts, like likes you know, what are you saying

567
00:36:20,480 --> 00:36:24,399
Speaker 1: that that potential attacker would look at the guidelines and say,

568
00:36:24,400 --> 00:36:27,080
Speaker 1: all right, guys, as long as we stay just within this,

569
00:36:27,560 --> 00:36:30,760
Speaker 1: you can't shut down the communications. Is that the argument

570
00:36:31,640 --> 00:36:35,959
Speaker 1: which is weird, right because like, well, so you can't

571
00:36:35,960 --> 00:36:40,360
Speaker 1: even explain what the because I'm sure it's vaguely worded

572
00:36:41,360 --> 00:36:45,520
Speaker 1: everything is, so it can't be something so specific that

573
00:36:45,960 --> 00:36:51,719
Speaker 1: you know, a determined person could calculating lee approach this

574
00:36:51,800 --> 00:36:54,240
Speaker 1: in such a way where they almost but don't quite

575
00:36:54,239 --> 00:36:56,560
Speaker 1: trigger s op three oh three. Guys, as long as

576
00:36:56,600 --> 00:37:02,879
Speaker 1: we're there before seven thirty, right, yeah, because after that

577
00:37:03,800 --> 00:37:06,640
Speaker 1: the switches all come on so really quickly. To talk

578
00:37:06,680 --> 00:37:08,879
Speaker 1: about the whole kill switch idea, like we said, it's

579
00:37:08,920 --> 00:37:11,640
Speaker 1: not a physical switch, right, This is a policy that

580
00:37:11,680 --> 00:37:15,160
Speaker 1: the government has and they went to the telecom companies

581
00:37:15,719 --> 00:37:19,640
Speaker 1: and said, this is what our policy is. In the

582
00:37:19,760 --> 00:37:22,920
Speaker 1: case of enacting s Op three oh three. We are

583
00:37:22,960 --> 00:37:26,960
Speaker 1: going to ask you the telecom companies to shut down

584
00:37:27,000 --> 00:37:31,480
Speaker 1: your service. And the telecom companies have agreed to do this. So,

585
00:37:31,520 --> 00:37:34,279
Speaker 1: in other words, again not not a button that the

586
00:37:34,280 --> 00:37:36,879
Speaker 1: government pushes. But if the government puts the call out

587
00:37:36,960 --> 00:37:41,120
Speaker 1: to a specific municipality, let's say Dallas, Texas, and they

588
00:37:41,120 --> 00:37:45,880
Speaker 1: say to all the different carriers wire wireless and cellular carriers,

589
00:37:46,480 --> 00:37:51,000
Speaker 1: shut off your service for this duration, then, assuming that

590
00:37:51,040 --> 00:37:55,120
Speaker 1: they've all agreed to do so, they'll all do that individually. Now,

591
00:37:55,160 --> 00:37:58,600
Speaker 1: this is where it gets complicated because for for cellular service,

592
00:37:58,640 --> 00:38:01,560
Speaker 1: it's not too hard because there's so many limited players.

593
00:38:01,600 --> 00:38:05,359
Speaker 1: There's just a limited number of players, right, So with

594
00:38:05,400 --> 00:38:08,560
Speaker 1: a limited number of players, the government doesn't have to

595
00:38:08,680 --> 00:38:12,480
Speaker 1: make a thousand phone calls to get this happen. When

596
00:38:12,480 --> 00:38:16,839
Speaker 1: you get into terrestrial internet service providers, it gets a

597
00:38:16,840 --> 00:38:19,680
Speaker 1: lot more complicated. Even though most of us have access

598
00:38:19,719 --> 00:38:23,160
Speaker 1: to you know, a couple of major ones, um, there

599
00:38:23,160 --> 00:38:25,879
Speaker 1: are smaller ones. That's a smaller one, and there, there,

600
00:38:26,000 --> 00:38:30,439
Speaker 1: and some of them are cooperatives too. So uh yeah,

601
00:38:30,480 --> 00:38:32,320
Speaker 1: I could see that you have to all of a sudden,

602
00:38:32,360 --> 00:38:35,560
Speaker 1: those thousand calls you talked about earlier are are coming

603
00:38:35,600 --> 00:38:38,399
Speaker 1: into play. Yeah. And from what I understand, SP three

604
00:38:38,400 --> 00:38:40,680
Speaker 1: O three does not cover landlines, So if you have

605
00:38:40,719 --> 00:38:43,600
Speaker 1: a landline, that's not going to get shut off. Uh.

606
00:38:43,640 --> 00:38:47,600
Speaker 1: And it probably would have some difficulties shutting down any

607
00:38:47,680 --> 00:38:52,800
Speaker 1: kind of of Internet service that was not wireless or cellular,

608
00:38:53,840 --> 00:38:56,000
Speaker 1: although I imagine that you know, some of the big

609
00:38:56,040 --> 00:38:59,799
Speaker 1: players may already have agreements, like you know, I can't

610
00:38:59,800 --> 00:39:02,239
Speaker 1: even I won't name them. But let's say that a

611
00:39:02,280 --> 00:39:07,000
Speaker 1: major internet service provider has that that could effectively silence

612
00:39:07,040 --> 00:39:09,400
Speaker 1: at least a large enough percentage of the population to

613
00:39:09,600 --> 00:39:13,760
Speaker 1: get through whatever the problem happened, the perceived problem happens

614
00:39:13,800 --> 00:39:16,520
Speaker 1: to be right. Yeah, And and again like another thing

615
00:39:16,560 --> 00:39:20,520
Speaker 1: that kill switch is not is a permanent kill switch.

616
00:39:20,680 --> 00:39:23,400
Speaker 1: This is just for a little this at least in

617
00:39:23,440 --> 00:39:26,200
Speaker 1: the US. UM you said you had a great way

618
00:39:26,200 --> 00:39:28,400
Speaker 1: of seeing it when we were off their earlier. Um,

619
00:39:28,520 --> 00:39:32,640
Speaker 1: you said, it's not a literal switch. It is a policy. Yeah,

620
00:39:32,880 --> 00:39:37,359
Speaker 1: and it's and it's a policy that is meant to

621
00:39:37,360 --> 00:39:40,600
Speaker 1: to endure as long as that state of emergency does

622
00:39:40,680 --> 00:39:43,359
Speaker 1: whatever what however that is defined, which again we don't

623
00:39:43,360 --> 00:39:45,279
Speaker 1: know because we haven't been able to read s Op.

624
00:39:45,320 --> 00:39:50,080
Speaker 1: Three oh three, But um, you know it's it's it's

625
00:39:50,160 --> 00:39:53,719
Speaker 1: meant to be temporary. The problem is the Bart example

626
00:39:54,400 --> 00:39:57,600
Speaker 1: is very troubling because of it being in response to

627
00:39:57,640 --> 00:40:00,320
Speaker 1: a protest. Even if you can argue convincing that no,

628
00:40:00,520 --> 00:40:02,840
Speaker 1: it was meant because we didn't want the overcrowding and

629
00:40:03,440 --> 00:40:07,120
Speaker 1: endangerment of lives, the at least, the perception is that

630
00:40:07,160 --> 00:40:12,160
Speaker 1: you're trying to stop people from actually expressing uh, their

631
00:40:12,239 --> 00:40:17,240
Speaker 1: their displeasure with authority. And that's not what the United

632
00:40:17,280 --> 00:40:20,439
Speaker 1: States is supposed to be about. It's it's in fact

633
00:40:20,520 --> 00:40:24,040
Speaker 1: antithetical to what our our founding principles are supposed to be.

634
00:40:24,480 --> 00:40:28,600
Speaker 1: And on top of that, there's another sort of kill

635
00:40:28,640 --> 00:40:31,239
Speaker 1: switch I want to talk about very briefly. This one

636
00:40:31,400 --> 00:40:37,120
Speaker 1: is one that's installed directly into smartphones. So in California

637
00:40:37,160 --> 00:40:38,920
Speaker 1: in two thousand fourteen, there was a law that was

638
00:40:38,960 --> 00:40:44,960
Speaker 1: passed that requires uh smartphone uh smartphones being sold in

639
00:40:45,000 --> 00:40:48,000
Speaker 1: the state to have some form of kill switch that

640
00:40:48,000 --> 00:40:54,760
Speaker 1: would allow the remote deactivation and wiping of that phone. Yeah,

641
00:40:54,920 --> 00:40:57,520
Speaker 1: the thought being that this is meant to help prevent,

642
00:40:58,040 --> 00:41:04,440
Speaker 1: to help incentivize people from stealing smartphones, because they being

643
00:41:04,440 --> 00:41:06,360
Speaker 1: that if you've had your smartphone stolen, you can have

644
00:41:06,400 --> 00:41:08,439
Speaker 1: it bricked so that you don't have to worry about

645
00:41:08,440 --> 00:41:10,880
Speaker 1: someone getting access to your data. They can't use your

646
00:41:10,880 --> 00:41:14,080
Speaker 1: phone anymore. And the idea being that if this is,

647
00:41:14,120 --> 00:41:17,200
Speaker 1: if this is mandated, then stealing a smartphone makes no

648
00:41:17,239 --> 00:41:21,600
Speaker 1: sense in California anyway, because the chances are it's going

649
00:41:21,640 --> 00:41:24,880
Speaker 1: to be turned into a useless piece of plastic in

650
00:41:24,880 --> 00:41:29,880
Speaker 1: your hands. Um. But the fear is that it allows

651
00:41:30,400 --> 00:41:35,480
Speaker 1: other entities remote access to your phone, to turn it off,

652
00:41:36,080 --> 00:41:40,520
Speaker 1: to wipe the stuff, so that what if it were

653
00:41:40,680 --> 00:41:48,439
Speaker 1: a case of um, you know, citywide riots and there

654
00:41:48,560 --> 00:41:51,480
Speaker 1: was the call to all right, let's you know, we're

655
00:41:51,480 --> 00:41:53,720
Speaker 1: not just shutting down the system, we're wiping the phones,

656
00:41:54,239 --> 00:42:01,120
Speaker 1: which sounds like it's a truly ridiculous overstepping abound. But

657
00:42:01,320 --> 00:42:05,400
Speaker 1: the point is that organizations like the Electronic Frontier Foundation

658
00:42:05,440 --> 00:42:09,680
Speaker 1: have said this opens the door to that possibility. Any

659
00:42:09,719 --> 00:42:13,640
Speaker 1: time you have the opportunity for another entity to have

660
00:42:13,760 --> 00:42:16,000
Speaker 1: some form of access to your phone. That's a problem

661
00:42:16,000 --> 00:42:18,040
Speaker 1: with security, it's a problem with privacy, it's a problem

662
00:42:18,120 --> 00:42:23,759
Speaker 1: with individual liberties. And you're you are arguing for the

663
00:42:23,800 --> 00:42:26,480
Speaker 1: safety of a system as opposed to the safety of

664
00:42:26,480 --> 00:42:30,360
Speaker 1: the person. That's a very that's a very good distinction.

665
00:42:30,400 --> 00:42:33,280
Speaker 1: I'm glad you made it, because when we talked about

666
00:42:33,280 --> 00:42:34,960
Speaker 1: some of this stuff, this is just a brief tangent.

667
00:42:35,320 --> 00:42:38,960
Speaker 1: You remember when, um, do you remember when there was

668
00:42:39,000 --> 00:42:44,080
Speaker 1: the big hubbub about having uh having e books from Amazon?

669
00:42:44,680 --> 00:42:48,000
Speaker 1: How Amazon can control them remotely? Yeah, because they they

670
00:42:48,480 --> 00:42:52,839
Speaker 1: had a particular copy I can't remember what well, oh, yeah,

671
00:42:53,239 --> 00:42:57,759
Speaker 1: it was so ironic copy of and then they remotely

672
00:42:57,840 --> 00:43:01,600
Speaker 1: wiped that copy from anyone who bought, which which just

673
00:43:02,280 --> 00:43:06,200
Speaker 1: I'm sorry, how many how many slightly paranoid people just

674
00:43:06,320 --> 00:43:09,280
Speaker 1: locked themselves in their house and started nailing up planks

675
00:43:09,280 --> 00:43:11,480
Speaker 1: along the door. And the only book I can think

676
00:43:11,520 --> 00:43:13,640
Speaker 1: of that would have been equally ironic would have been

677
00:43:13,680 --> 00:43:20,120
Speaker 1: Fair Knight. Yeah, be virtually burning the book. So so this,

678
00:43:20,280 --> 00:43:22,959
Speaker 1: of course, this gives us, um, you know, this gives

679
00:43:22,960 --> 00:43:26,520
Speaker 1: anybody concern, and it's not it's not necessarily crazy or

680
00:43:26,600 --> 00:43:30,200
Speaker 1: paranoid to say that if this access occurs, I love

681
00:43:30,280 --> 00:43:33,680
Speaker 1: that against safety of the system over the safety of

682
00:43:33,719 --> 00:43:36,600
Speaker 1: the individual. But I bring the Amazon thing up because

683
00:43:36,640 --> 00:43:39,080
Speaker 1: I wanted to get to a point you had said

684
00:43:39,200 --> 00:43:45,200
Speaker 1: it wasn't just a state sponsored thing all the time. Yeah, No,

685
00:43:45,480 --> 00:43:47,920
Speaker 1: it's like, well, I mean, like looking at something like

686
00:43:47,960 --> 00:43:51,680
Speaker 1: bart you know, or if you could, you know that

687
00:43:51,880 --> 00:43:56,440
Speaker 1: that's a that's the transportation system in San Francisco. That

688
00:43:56,560 --> 00:43:58,960
Speaker 1: wasn't like the state of California. So I see what

689
00:43:59,040 --> 00:44:03,640
Speaker 1: you're saying. Yeah, so that was a problem. But okay, yeah,

690
00:44:03,680 --> 00:44:07,640
Speaker 1: you know, yeah, because it's it's and and apparently it's

691
00:44:07,640 --> 00:44:13,040
Speaker 1: fine drivers. Man. Yeah, I mean, I'm not saying that's

692
00:44:13,080 --> 00:44:17,759
Speaker 1: why I walk to work, but I'm not not saying no,

693
00:44:17,800 --> 00:44:20,920
Speaker 1: I'm not I'm being ridiculous. But the other thing I

694
00:44:20,960 --> 00:44:24,480
Speaker 1: wanted to mention is that Ben and I are of

695
00:44:24,520 --> 00:44:28,920
Speaker 1: a very particular opinion obviously about this. We are not

696
00:44:29,040 --> 00:44:31,440
Speaker 1: coming at this from an unbiased point of view. But

697
00:44:31,480 --> 00:44:33,560
Speaker 1: I should also point out that the United Nations is

698
00:44:33,560 --> 00:44:37,440
Speaker 1: on our side of this argument. The UN, or at

699
00:44:37,520 --> 00:44:40,480
Speaker 1: least a group of experts within the United Nations. So

700
00:44:40,480 --> 00:44:43,480
Speaker 1: I shouldn't say the whole organization collectively have said this,

701
00:44:43,680 --> 00:44:47,120
Speaker 1: but uh, experts within the UN have come out to

702
00:44:47,160 --> 00:44:50,480
Speaker 1: say that the use of any sort of communications kill

703
00:44:50,520 --> 00:44:54,760
Speaker 1: switches a violation of human rights, even in a time

704
00:44:54,880 --> 00:44:59,840
Speaker 1: of war or or strife. Yeah, that it is imper

705
00:45:00,040 --> 00:45:06,839
Speaker 1: missible under international human rights law. Really, So that's first off,

706
00:45:06,840 --> 00:45:11,480
Speaker 1: I'm startled that that is not what I was expecting,

707
00:45:11,600 --> 00:45:14,960
Speaker 1: especially that kind of language, the severity of that language.

708
00:45:15,640 --> 00:45:20,399
Speaker 1: But I you know, okay, I keep thinking about when

709
00:45:20,440 --> 00:45:24,279
Speaker 1: we did our Area fifty one podcast, right, and we

710
00:45:24,400 --> 00:45:27,400
Speaker 1: had I think one of the best uh we have,

711
00:45:27,520 --> 00:45:30,360
Speaker 1: We have one of the best cases where national security,

712
00:45:30,360 --> 00:45:32,440
Speaker 1: as vague as it may be, as a real and

713
00:45:32,520 --> 00:45:36,879
Speaker 1: present thing like it could have led to it could

714
00:45:36,880 --> 00:45:39,280
Speaker 1: have maybe led to a nuclear war at some point,

715
00:45:39,320 --> 00:45:41,920
Speaker 1: you know, had the secret stopping kept. But this is

716
00:45:42,040 --> 00:45:46,040
Speaker 1: very this is very different. Um. I just I want

717
00:45:46,040 --> 00:45:50,719
Speaker 1: to be careful to acknowledge both sides. Like, is is

718
00:45:50,760 --> 00:45:55,560
Speaker 1: it possible that there would be a situation where shutting

719
00:45:55,560 --> 00:46:00,399
Speaker 1: off regional cells systems or internet access is the best

720
00:46:00,400 --> 00:46:03,920
Speaker 1: thing to do? It's hard to imagine. I can't because

721
00:46:04,080 --> 00:46:08,240
Speaker 1: because the again, the consequences of that are so severe

722
00:46:08,840 --> 00:46:13,719
Speaker 1: and the immediate consequences involved panic, because now you no

723
00:46:13,760 --> 00:46:17,279
Speaker 1: longer have your we take it for granted that we

724
00:46:17,360 --> 00:46:22,360
Speaker 1: have these phones that allow us an incredible access to

725
00:46:22,440 --> 00:46:26,359
Speaker 1: the Internet and to various forms of communication. Even if

726
00:46:26,360 --> 00:46:29,720
Speaker 1: most of us just use it for texting, we still

727
00:46:29,760 --> 00:46:32,719
Speaker 1: we take that for granted. So imagine that that has

728
00:46:32,760 --> 00:46:36,320
Speaker 1: been completely taken away. Imagine that it's during a time

729
00:46:36,640 --> 00:46:40,320
Speaker 1: of of unease for whatever you know. However that's defined.

730
00:46:40,880 --> 00:46:44,200
Speaker 1: So if you are in the middle of that situation

731
00:46:44,880 --> 00:46:49,400
Speaker 1: and you know, one of your earliest uh impulses is

732
00:46:49,440 --> 00:46:52,680
Speaker 1: probably going to be to touch base with somebody else

733
00:46:53,120 --> 00:46:55,640
Speaker 1: to either find out what's going on or make sure

734
00:46:55,680 --> 00:46:59,120
Speaker 1: they're okay or both right, and then you have no

735
00:46:59,280 --> 00:47:03,480
Speaker 1: means of doing that because the system has been shut down,

736
00:47:03,600 --> 00:47:05,880
Speaker 1: and you don't even know if the system has been

737
00:47:05,920 --> 00:47:09,360
Speaker 1: shut down or if something else has happened to cause

738
00:47:09,400 --> 00:47:12,360
Speaker 1: it to not work. You can't know. There's no way

739
00:47:12,400 --> 00:47:14,920
Speaker 1: to know when you are in the middle of that situation.

740
00:47:16,000 --> 00:47:20,640
Speaker 1: That would incite panic, right, It seems like it would

741
00:47:20,680 --> 00:47:24,200
Speaker 1: make the situation worse. I can't imagine it making it better.

742
00:47:24,800 --> 00:47:27,319
Speaker 1: If you're not aware of what is happening, it makes

743
00:47:27,360 --> 00:47:30,440
Speaker 1: it far more terrifying. If you are aware of what's

744
00:47:30,760 --> 00:47:36,080
Speaker 1: what is happening, it's going to very much change your

745
00:47:36,120 --> 00:47:40,360
Speaker 1: perception of authority if it wasn't already one of suspicion,

746
00:47:40,760 --> 00:47:45,600
Speaker 1: because now you're you're thinking your decision to shut this

747
00:47:45,760 --> 00:47:48,560
Speaker 1: down in order to potentially save people. First of all,

748
00:47:48,640 --> 00:47:52,520
Speaker 1: you can't without something horrible happening, You can't say that

749
00:47:52,560 --> 00:47:56,600
Speaker 1: you necessarily saved anyone. Right. This is the worst part

750
00:47:56,600 --> 00:47:58,720
Speaker 1: of the world here. The worst part of the world

751
00:47:58,760 --> 00:48:03,239
Speaker 1: is saying if it works. The reason why. The only

752
00:48:03,239 --> 00:48:04,880
Speaker 1: thing we have to show that it works is that

753
00:48:05,000 --> 00:48:10,080
Speaker 1: nothing awful happened, right, And if nothing awful happened, then

754
00:48:10,080 --> 00:48:12,440
Speaker 1: you have the question of, well, was it necessary to

755
00:48:12,520 --> 00:48:16,839
Speaker 1: do this drastic step to make sure nothing awful happen

756
00:48:16,960 --> 00:48:20,640
Speaker 1: or would nothing awful have happened anyway? Right? Yeah, It's

757
00:48:20,760 --> 00:48:23,520
Speaker 1: very very difficult to prove that kind of thing. And

758
00:48:24,000 --> 00:48:28,920
Speaker 1: even if we were in some sort of hyper hypothetical

759
00:48:29,080 --> 00:48:33,280
Speaker 1: excuse me, hypothetical nonlinear time space where we could see

760
00:48:33,320 --> 00:48:36,640
Speaker 1: both both effects at once, it sounds like it comes

761
00:48:36,680 --> 00:48:40,759
Speaker 1: down to, um, you know, the only really compelling explanation

762
00:48:40,800 --> 00:48:46,279
Speaker 1: would be the idea of remote detonated bombs the original justification,

763
00:48:48,200 --> 00:48:50,239
Speaker 1: and then we're giving that the idea being that we're

764
00:48:50,280 --> 00:48:54,400
Speaker 1: taking the trigger mechanism away, and that is you know,

765
00:48:54,800 --> 00:48:59,600
Speaker 1: it's it's an instantaneous decision, it's an emergency situation. We

766
00:48:59,640 --> 00:49:02,160
Speaker 1: are doing it so that we can save lives in

767
00:49:02,200 --> 00:49:04,920
Speaker 1: that instant It is not meant to be any kind

768
00:49:04,960 --> 00:49:07,839
Speaker 1: of ongoing situation, is not meant to be a means

769
00:49:07,880 --> 00:49:11,920
Speaker 1: of silencing people. It's literally meant to save lives. I

770
00:49:11,960 --> 00:49:15,600
Speaker 1: can kind of understand that, but again, I mean why

771
00:49:15,640 --> 00:49:20,600
Speaker 1: can I could certainly understand the motivation, particularly in the

772
00:49:20,640 --> 00:49:25,520
Speaker 1: post nine eleven, post London bombing's world, but I'm not

773
00:49:25,960 --> 00:49:32,000
Speaker 1: entirely certain that that execution would prevent the misuse of

774
00:49:32,040 --> 00:49:35,960
Speaker 1: that system. As the Snowdon leaks have shown us, These

775
00:49:36,000 --> 00:49:40,120
Speaker 1: systems that were put in place, arguably for noble reasons,

776
00:49:40,400 --> 00:49:45,840
Speaker 1: have already been subjugated to incredible misuse. Right Yeah, and

777
00:49:45,880 --> 00:49:49,600
Speaker 1: even at its best, you're not really removing the trigger.

778
00:49:49,880 --> 00:49:53,880
Speaker 1: You're trading an explosion for a possible riot, yeah, you know,

779
00:49:54,000 --> 00:49:58,640
Speaker 1: which which can have effects that maybe as devastating. And

780
00:49:59,040 --> 00:50:01,239
Speaker 1: really this is all I mean, the Snowden leaks, this

781
00:50:01,360 --> 00:50:04,440
Speaker 1: is all kind of round wound up together. This this

782
00:50:04,520 --> 00:50:08,880
Speaker 1: world we live in that is largely a response to

783
00:50:09,360 --> 00:50:13,000
Speaker 1: a horrible terrorist attack that took place in our past

784
00:50:13,840 --> 00:50:18,040
Speaker 1: and is now defining our present. So it's it's I

785
00:50:18,040 --> 00:50:20,879
Speaker 1: mean again, it's it's the sort of stuff you read

786
00:50:20,880 --> 00:50:24,400
Speaker 1: in those science fiction dystopias where you realize that the

787
00:50:24,440 --> 00:50:27,400
Speaker 1: horrible world that the characters live in probably did not

788
00:50:27,560 --> 00:50:33,279
Speaker 1: spontaneously turn into this totalitarian dystopia. It was something that

789
00:50:33,400 --> 00:50:38,520
Speaker 1: happened by degrees because of well meaning but misled people

790
00:50:38,600 --> 00:50:43,239
Speaker 1: putting in policies in place that ultimately did not do

791
00:50:43,320 --> 00:50:45,759
Speaker 1: what they were intended to do or did more than

792
00:50:45,800 --> 00:50:49,200
Speaker 1: what they were intended to do. So, um, you know,

793
00:50:49,320 --> 00:50:52,759
Speaker 1: I am totally in favor of learning more about s

794
00:50:52,800 --> 00:50:57,360
Speaker 1: Op three oh three and finding out what what actually

795
00:50:57,480 --> 00:51:02,680
Speaker 1: is allowed versus not allowed, and maybe get some more

796
00:51:02,719 --> 00:51:05,960
Speaker 1: information of how this bart use of turning off cell

797
00:51:06,360 --> 00:51:11,200
Speaker 1: systems was truly justified. That to me is still very problematic.

798
00:51:12,200 --> 00:51:15,200
Speaker 1: I mean, having been on Martha during some of the

799
00:51:15,239 --> 00:51:19,520
Speaker 1: worst busiest moments, I can understand a need to try

800
00:51:19,560 --> 00:51:21,960
Speaker 1: and do some crowd control, but I don't think that's

801
00:51:21,960 --> 00:51:25,520
Speaker 1: the right way to do it. Yeah. Yeah. Also, also,

802
00:51:25,640 --> 00:51:27,480
Speaker 1: to be fair, I'd love to hear that stuff too,

803
00:51:27,600 --> 00:51:31,799
Speaker 1: because if we don't, we're speculating, which is fun. But

804
00:51:31,880 --> 00:51:35,040
Speaker 1: it's not. It's not you know, you're not You're nowhere

805
00:51:35,040 --> 00:51:38,439
Speaker 1: closer necessarily to the truth. You could be going down

806
00:51:38,480 --> 00:51:41,239
Speaker 1: the wrong pathway you're assumed. You could be assuming the

807
00:51:41,280 --> 00:51:44,799
Speaker 1: absolute worst, and it could turn out that you are

808
00:51:44,920 --> 00:51:48,279
Speaker 1: completely off base. But if if you act upon those assumptions,

809
00:51:48,320 --> 00:51:50,279
Speaker 1: it doesn't really matter if you're off base or not.

810
00:51:50,400 --> 00:51:54,680
Speaker 1: You're still doing something that is probably pretty drastic and terrible.

811
00:51:54,760 --> 00:51:59,160
Speaker 1: So if we're speculating, then I think let's go big

812
00:51:59,320 --> 00:52:02,520
Speaker 1: man Elder. I was going. I was going with the

813
00:52:02,640 --> 00:52:06,120
Speaker 1: n w O. Not not the New World Order as

814
00:52:06,200 --> 00:52:09,400
Speaker 1: in the actual like like kind of like the the

815
00:52:09,400 --> 00:52:12,480
Speaker 1: the supposed New World Order that's controlling the whole world.

816
00:52:12,480 --> 00:52:16,560
Speaker 1: I'm talking about the w c W Wrestling faction, you know,

817
00:52:16,640 --> 00:52:20,239
Speaker 1: Scott Hall, Kevin Nash, and Hull Cogan, the n w O.

818
00:52:20,920 --> 00:52:24,200
Speaker 1: L Hogan, I think, uh little known fact, the inventor

819
00:52:24,280 --> 00:52:26,879
Speaker 1: of the SIMSIP. Yeah, yeah, it is a very little

820
00:52:26,880 --> 00:52:30,080
Speaker 1: known fact because because we made it up. Yeah you

821
00:52:30,120 --> 00:52:34,680
Speaker 1: heard it here first. But anyway, so you know the

822
00:52:34,719 --> 00:52:37,719
Speaker 1: reason why I love to have this discussion and I

823
00:52:37,760 --> 00:52:41,360
Speaker 1: was very very happy to see your suggestion of it, Ben,

824
00:52:41,880 --> 00:52:45,320
Speaker 1: is because I think it does raise some very important

825
00:52:45,400 --> 00:52:49,960
Speaker 1: questions about one, our dependence upon technology, and that's our

826
00:52:50,280 --> 00:52:53,480
Speaker 1: you know, become our primary means of communication, to a

827
00:52:53,560 --> 00:52:56,120
Speaker 1: point where sometimes you can make jokes about a couple

828
00:52:56,239 --> 00:52:58,920
Speaker 1: texting each other across from a table from one another,

829
00:52:59,600 --> 00:53:03,680
Speaker 1: you know, uh too. It raises the the question of

830
00:53:05,000 --> 00:53:08,839
Speaker 1: how do you balance security versus liberty, which has been

831
00:53:08,880 --> 00:53:11,759
Speaker 1: a question throughout the history of the world, not just

832
00:53:11,840 --> 00:53:15,640
Speaker 1: the United States, um, and and where's that balance? Some

833
00:53:15,680 --> 00:53:19,680
Speaker 1: people would argue that liberty is the most important, and

834
00:53:19,719 --> 00:53:21,759
Speaker 1: some people would argue, well, you know, you've got to

835
00:53:21,800 --> 00:53:24,520
Speaker 1: really consider security because we're in a much much more

836
00:53:24,560 --> 00:53:27,160
Speaker 1: complicated world now than we were two hundred years ago.

837
00:53:28,360 --> 00:53:32,520
Speaker 1: That's a valid point. And also just that it was

838
00:53:32,560 --> 00:53:34,640
Speaker 1: good to be able to sit down and talk about

839
00:53:34,719 --> 00:53:38,520
Speaker 1: how a kill switch is really an an agreement among

840
00:53:38,640 --> 00:53:42,799
Speaker 1: multiple parties and not not a big red button or

841
00:53:42,840 --> 00:53:49,000
Speaker 1: a physical switch as much fun slash horror, horrific reality

842
00:53:49,040 --> 00:53:51,720
Speaker 1: that would be right. I hope it's made by ACME.

843
00:53:51,960 --> 00:53:54,319
Speaker 1: I hope, while Coyote has one. I think, you know,

844
00:53:54,719 --> 00:53:56,920
Speaker 1: like if we were writing an SNL skit at this

845
00:53:56,960 --> 00:53:58,879
Speaker 1: point and we would just we would have the point

846
00:53:58,880 --> 00:54:01,239
Speaker 1: where President Obama had had switched it over to the

847
00:54:01,239 --> 00:54:04,560
Speaker 1: clapper or something like that, like I want to show

848
00:54:04,600 --> 00:54:06,840
Speaker 1: you that I'm gonna turn off all the internet in Kansas.

849
00:54:06,960 --> 00:54:10,799
Speaker 1: Black clap and that's it, you know, Yeah, that would

850
00:54:10,840 --> 00:54:13,000
Speaker 1: be uh, that would be my SNL skit right there,

851
00:54:13,800 --> 00:54:16,200
Speaker 1: which which like five people would be like that's brilliant

852
00:54:16,200 --> 00:54:17,959
Speaker 1: and everyone else is like wow, I was really waiting

853
00:54:18,040 --> 00:54:20,160
Speaker 1: until the musical guests came on. That's how bad that

854
00:54:20,200 --> 00:54:24,560
Speaker 1: sketch was. Lord, if you're listening, we have a couple

855
00:54:24,600 --> 00:54:27,799
Speaker 1: of sketches of our sleeve. Yeah. Sure, you're a big

856
00:54:27,840 --> 00:54:30,799
Speaker 1: fan of our shows. And I realized, you know, I'm

857
00:54:30,840 --> 00:54:33,880
Speaker 1: absolutely certain that the competition to get sketches on the

858
00:54:33,920 --> 00:54:38,160
Speaker 1: air and the SNL writer's room is probably pretty low key,

859
00:54:38,239 --> 00:54:41,560
Speaker 1: right Yeah, yeah, I think it's I mean, you just

860
00:54:41,960 --> 00:54:45,040
Speaker 1: you just have to like mail them. Yeah, so uh so, yeah,

861
00:54:45,080 --> 00:54:48,960
Speaker 1: call us, we're available. We're in the book. Uh, anything

862
00:54:48,960 --> 00:54:51,680
Speaker 1: else you wanted to say about about kill Switches SP

863
00:54:51,840 --> 00:54:54,760
Speaker 1: three oh three? I mean I realized that this also

864
00:54:55,040 --> 00:54:57,000
Speaker 1: this conversation has also been filled with a lot of

865
00:54:57,000 --> 00:55:00,880
Speaker 1: the triol on my part. Well, but to it is

866
00:55:00,880 --> 00:55:04,319
Speaker 1: a it is a troubling thing, and I really appreciate

867
00:55:04,760 --> 00:55:08,359
Speaker 1: talking about it, because again, you are our texpert, and

868
00:55:09,040 --> 00:55:11,759
Speaker 1: you're the person I think who is most likely to

869
00:55:11,840 --> 00:55:16,080
Speaker 1: have like you have. You definitely are opinionated, but you

870
00:55:16,239 --> 00:55:21,440
Speaker 1: take great pains to separate what is what your opinion is, uh,

871
00:55:21,719 --> 00:55:25,440
Speaker 1: from what the facts are, right, and I appreciate that.

872
00:55:25,719 --> 00:55:30,000
Speaker 1: I think the listeners do to um. But but I'm

873
00:55:30,040 --> 00:55:33,080
Speaker 1: on the same page with you here, man, because it

874
00:55:33,239 --> 00:55:35,799
Speaker 1: is a troubling thing. And oh M, full disclosure. Ladies

875
00:55:35,800 --> 00:55:38,840
Speaker 1: and gentlemen, don't forget that Jonathan and I both work

876
00:55:39,440 --> 00:55:42,919
Speaker 1: in an Internet related field, so of course we want,

877
00:55:43,000 --> 00:55:45,759
Speaker 1: we have we have a vested interest in this thing

878
00:55:46,000 --> 00:55:49,879
Speaker 1: called the Internet still being readily available. I mean, if

879
00:55:49,880 --> 00:55:52,319
Speaker 1: it's not, then we're out of a job. But I mean,

880
00:55:52,440 --> 00:55:54,719
Speaker 1: you know, it's it has become such a centralized point

881
00:55:54,719 --> 00:55:57,120
Speaker 1: in our life that it is it is very difficult

882
00:55:57,160 --> 00:56:03,279
Speaker 1: to imagine a worthy justification of shutting it off, um,

883
00:56:03,320 --> 00:56:07,759
Speaker 1: apart from the possibility of preventing an immediate disaster from

884
00:56:07,760 --> 00:56:13,280
Speaker 1: happening and having it last a relatively short time. However

885
00:56:13,360 --> 00:56:15,920
Speaker 1: short that might be. It might it might be several hours,

886
00:56:15,960 --> 00:56:18,920
Speaker 1: depending upon what's going on and how to stop it. UM.

887
00:56:19,040 --> 00:56:22,000
Speaker 1: But apart from that extraordinary set of circumstances, which again

888
00:56:22,040 --> 00:56:24,960
Speaker 1: we don't know necessarily is all that s OP three

889
00:56:25,000 --> 00:56:28,439
Speaker 1: or three covers. Um. Yeah, it's it's hard to it's

890
00:56:28,440 --> 00:56:31,200
Speaker 1: hard to even wrap my mind around when you would

891
00:56:31,239 --> 00:56:35,319
Speaker 1: make that call, because again, the consequences are just so devastating.

892
00:56:35,360 --> 00:56:40,840
Speaker 1: I mean, if nothing else, you really invite the the

893
00:56:40,880 --> 00:56:44,720
Speaker 1: real possibility that voters are not going to be happy.

894
00:56:45,000 --> 00:56:47,840
Speaker 1: So I mean, if if you are, if you're serving

895
00:56:48,040 --> 00:56:51,560
Speaker 1: in some you know position where you are going to

896
00:56:51,600 --> 00:56:55,040
Speaker 1: be re elected or not re elected, making that call

897
00:56:55,080 --> 00:56:58,160
Speaker 1: as a tough one, right, you're going to take people off,

898
00:56:58,200 --> 00:57:02,400
Speaker 1: all right. So anyway, I should also point out that

899
00:57:02,680 --> 00:57:07,120
Speaker 1: very recently our Little Sister podcast Stuff you Should Know,

900
00:57:07,840 --> 00:57:12,200
Speaker 1: uh did an episode on internet internet censorship and also

901
00:57:12,280 --> 00:57:15,160
Speaker 1: covered s OP three oh three. So if you want

902
00:57:15,200 --> 00:57:17,480
Speaker 1: to hear their take on it, go listen to Stuff

903
00:57:17,520 --> 00:57:19,320
Speaker 1: you Should Know. I can't imagine that any of you

904
00:57:19,360 --> 00:57:22,240
Speaker 1: guys out there listening to this don't already also listen

905
00:57:22,280 --> 00:57:25,000
Speaker 1: to Stuff you Should Know if you don't check it out.

906
00:57:25,120 --> 00:57:27,960
Speaker 1: It is our flagship podcast. I call it Little Sister

907
00:57:28,040 --> 00:57:33,120
Speaker 1: as a joke. It's actually overwhelmingly our most popular podcast

908
00:57:33,200 --> 00:57:36,040
Speaker 1: and Josh and Chuck are phenomenal on it, and I

909
00:57:36,040 --> 00:57:38,680
Speaker 1: imagine stuff they don't want you to know has covered,

910
00:57:38,920 --> 00:57:42,280
Speaker 1: if not s Op three oh three, specifically a lot

911
00:57:42,320 --> 00:57:46,640
Speaker 1: of related topics. We can neither confirm nor deny these allegations,

912
00:57:47,520 --> 00:57:50,600
Speaker 1: but the but we we do. Um, we are all

913
00:57:50,760 --> 00:57:54,160
Speaker 1: actually big fans of each other in these shows, So

914
00:57:54,160 --> 00:57:56,600
Speaker 1: so do check it out. I would say also, and

915
00:57:56,640 --> 00:57:58,520
Speaker 1: I know I do this every show. You guys, you

916
00:57:58,560 --> 00:58:01,120
Speaker 1: know what I'm about to say, forward thinking. Check out

917
00:58:01,200 --> 00:58:05,560
Speaker 1: forward Thinking if you want to know more about the

918
00:58:05,880 --> 00:58:10,360
Speaker 1: future of technology and if if that's if that's not

919
00:58:10,400 --> 00:58:13,440
Speaker 1: your speed, then uh you should all you should also

920
00:58:13,680 --> 00:58:19,400
Speaker 1: then consider Jonathan's appearances on brain Stuff. UM, I already

921
00:58:19,480 --> 00:58:21,560
Speaker 1: named like my two favorites, but you've got some other

922
00:58:21,560 --> 00:58:24,400
Speaker 1: ones coming up. Yeah, yeah, I've got some some fun

923
00:58:24,440 --> 00:58:27,640
Speaker 1: ones coming up to We we shot the best little

924
00:58:27,680 --> 00:58:31,200
Speaker 1: behind the scenes thing. We shot outside of our office building,

925
00:58:31,520 --> 00:58:33,880
Speaker 1: and our office building is great and the surrounding area

926
00:58:33,960 --> 00:58:38,160
Speaker 1: is gorgeous. But in each episode you'll be able to

927
00:58:38,200 --> 00:58:40,400
Speaker 1: tell which ones were shot on the same day because

928
00:58:40,400 --> 00:58:43,040
Speaker 1: if you listen carefully in the background of one, you

929
00:58:43,040 --> 00:58:45,880
Speaker 1: will hear a jackhammer in the background of another, you

930
00:58:45,880 --> 00:58:48,400
Speaker 1: will hear a leafblower, and then the background of the third.

931
00:58:48,440 --> 00:58:51,920
Speaker 1: If you listen really carefully, you'll hear bullfrogs. And if

932
00:58:51,960 --> 00:58:54,920
Speaker 1: you assemble these three together and play them backwards, they

933
00:58:55,280 --> 00:58:58,760
Speaker 1: play a secret message that gives the guidelines to SP three.

934
00:58:58,760 --> 00:59:02,760
Speaker 1: Oh three. Yeah, it's it's it's my little gift to

935
00:59:02,880 --> 00:59:05,640
Speaker 1: the world. Uh No, but thank you very much. Ben,

936
00:59:05,800 --> 00:59:08,680
Speaker 1: and guys, if you have any suggestions for future episodes

937
00:59:08,720 --> 00:59:10,640
Speaker 1: of tech Stuff, you should write in and let me

938
00:59:10,720 --> 00:59:14,120
Speaker 1: know whether it is a topic or a guest host

939
00:59:14,240 --> 00:59:17,040
Speaker 1: or an interview, anything like that, or maybe just a comment.

940
00:59:17,120 --> 00:59:20,120
Speaker 1: Maybe you have your own thoughts. Maybe you have a

941
00:59:20,240 --> 00:59:22,919
Speaker 1: very different opinion about s Op three or three something

942
00:59:22,920 --> 00:59:25,800
Speaker 1: that Ben and I haven't thought about, which is entirely possible,

943
00:59:25,800 --> 00:59:28,640
Speaker 1: and I want to hear your thoughts. Send me that

944
00:59:28,680 --> 00:59:32,720
Speaker 1: message text stuff at how stuff works dot com, or

945
00:59:32,800 --> 00:59:36,400
Speaker 1: drop me a line on Facebook, Twitter or tumbler. At

946
00:59:36,440 --> 00:59:39,520
Speaker 1: all three we use the handle text stuff h s

947
00:59:39,760 --> 00:59:47,360
Speaker 1: W and we'll talk to you again really soon for

948
00:59:47,520 --> 00:59:50,840
Speaker 1: more on this and bathands of other topics Works dot

949
00:59:50,840 --> 01:00:00,440
Speaker 1: Com