1 00:00:15,396 --> 00:00:23,556 Speaker 1: Pushkin from Pushkin Industries. This is Deep Background, the show 2 00:00:23,596 --> 00:00:26,916 Speaker 1: where we explore the stories behind the stories in the news. 3 00:00:27,436 --> 00:00:32,476 Speaker 1: I'm Noah Feldman. As the COVID nineteen pandemic continues, antibody 4 00:00:32,516 --> 00:00:37,636 Speaker 1: tests are gradually becoming increasingly available to ordinary people. You 5 00:00:37,676 --> 00:00:41,076 Speaker 1: can get one online, and some employers are even requiring 6 00:00:41,396 --> 00:00:43,756 Speaker 1: that people take them to go back to their jobs. 7 00:00:44,756 --> 00:00:48,756 Speaker 1: But how accurate are these tests really? And if it 8 00:00:48,756 --> 00:00:51,036 Speaker 1: turns out that you do have antibodies that show you've 9 00:00:51,036 --> 00:00:54,836 Speaker 1: been exposed to coronavirus, what does that actually mean about 10 00:00:54,876 --> 00:00:58,716 Speaker 1: what you should or shouldn't be doing. Next. Here to 11 00:00:58,756 --> 00:01:03,116 Speaker 1: answer these questions is doctor Alex Marson. He's a biologist 12 00:01:03,196 --> 00:01:06,436 Speaker 1: and an infectious disease doctor. He's a tenured professor of 13 00:01:06,476 --> 00:01:10,836 Speaker 1: microbiology and immunology at the University of California in San Francisco, 14 00:01:11,236 --> 00:01:14,876 Speaker 1: where he's the director of the Gladstone Institute of Genomic 15 00:01:14,916 --> 00:01:19,716 Speaker 1: Commune Knowledge. Alex, thank you so much for joining me. Alex, 16 00:01:19,756 --> 00:01:24,676 Speaker 1: your lab ordinarily does high throughput genomic engineering research, which 17 00:01:24,716 --> 00:01:28,316 Speaker 1: is very cutting it stuff. And then when the COVID 18 00:01:28,396 --> 00:01:32,196 Speaker 1: nineteen pandemic started, you went to your lab team and 19 00:01:32,236 --> 00:01:35,676 Speaker 1: you said, okay, we're completely changing course. We're going from 20 00:01:35,716 --> 00:01:39,036 Speaker 1: the highest tech to relatively lower tech, and we're going 21 00:01:39,076 --> 00:01:41,436 Speaker 1: to look at the antibody tests that are out there 22 00:01:41,436 --> 00:01:44,556 Speaker 1: and we're going to see if they work. So, first 23 00:01:44,596 --> 00:01:46,596 Speaker 1: of all, what gave you the idea to do this? 24 00:01:47,116 --> 00:01:49,996 Speaker 1: It's a great question, and looking back, it was really 25 00:01:50,556 --> 00:01:53,476 Speaker 1: it was a confluence of a few things. It was necessity, 26 00:01:54,276 --> 00:01:58,116 Speaker 1: and it was really in many ways motivated more by 27 00:01:58,116 --> 00:02:00,516 Speaker 1: the people in my lab, or equally by the people 28 00:02:00,516 --> 00:02:03,236 Speaker 1: in my lab as it was by me. Our lab 29 00:02:03,356 --> 00:02:06,356 Speaker 1: was shut down. People weren't able to go in and 30 00:02:06,436 --> 00:02:09,316 Speaker 1: work on their normal projects, but there was a real 31 00:02:09,356 --> 00:02:13,756 Speaker 1: feeling in the lab that people had expertise and motivation 32 00:02:14,396 --> 00:02:16,836 Speaker 1: to try to figure out what they could to be 33 00:02:16,916 --> 00:02:19,716 Speaker 1: useful in the midst of this pandemic. It was really 34 00:02:19,756 --> 00:02:23,516 Speaker 1: inspiring for me to see grad students and post docs 35 00:02:23,516 --> 00:02:27,756 Speaker 1: and technicians who were looking for ways to contribute, and 36 00:02:28,076 --> 00:02:30,796 Speaker 1: if anything, I was able to help channel and put 37 00:02:30,836 --> 00:02:35,236 Speaker 1: together collaborations to enable their desire to help out. And 38 00:02:35,316 --> 00:02:40,476 Speaker 1: so we saw a huge flood into the market of 39 00:02:40,956 --> 00:02:44,316 Speaker 1: antibody tests that were becoming available. And actually one of 40 00:02:44,316 --> 00:02:46,956 Speaker 1: the motivations for me was I got a text message 41 00:02:46,996 --> 00:02:49,236 Speaker 1: from a friend of mine not in science here in 42 00:02:49,276 --> 00:02:51,996 Speaker 1: the Bay Area, who showed me that she was testing 43 00:02:52,036 --> 00:02:55,476 Speaker 1: herself for antibodies on one of these home diagnostic kits, 44 00:02:55,876 --> 00:02:58,996 Speaker 1: And so I started wondering, what are the basic test 45 00:02:59,036 --> 00:03:01,636 Speaker 1: performance characteristics of these kits? There were so many that 46 00:03:01,676 --> 00:03:05,116 Speaker 1: were becoming available. We wanted to see could we assign 47 00:03:05,196 --> 00:03:08,716 Speaker 1: some rough numbers to how reliable these tests actually are? 48 00:03:09,396 --> 00:03:12,276 Speaker 1: And so that was really the fundamental goal of this 49 00:03:12,356 --> 00:03:14,876 Speaker 1: study was to say, could we get our hands on 50 00:03:14,996 --> 00:03:20,116 Speaker 1: as many of these test devices as possible and see 51 00:03:20,196 --> 00:03:23,676 Speaker 1: what kind of information they actually give and don't keep 52 00:03:23,716 --> 00:03:26,996 Speaker 1: us in suspensey longer? How were they so? There was 53 00:03:27,036 --> 00:03:31,796 Speaker 1: a range. They're so polite. This is the boring answer 54 00:03:31,876 --> 00:03:36,716 Speaker 1: that which was not totally unexpected. Some were reasonably good 55 00:03:36,756 --> 00:03:39,516 Speaker 1: and some were not going to be very useful in 56 00:03:39,596 --> 00:03:43,036 Speaker 1: this And one of the major determinants is how specific 57 00:03:43,076 --> 00:03:46,716 Speaker 1: they are. And especially in a disease like this, where 58 00:03:46,756 --> 00:03:49,676 Speaker 1: there's in many parts of the world is still relatively 59 00:03:49,756 --> 00:03:54,596 Speaker 1: low prevalence, the chance of misinterpreting these results due to 60 00:03:54,636 --> 00:03:58,116 Speaker 1: false positives is very high, and so one of the 61 00:03:58,156 --> 00:04:01,396 Speaker 1: major things that we wanted to check was are these 62 00:04:01,396 --> 00:04:04,516 Speaker 1: giving us results that are going to be confused by 63 00:04:04,636 --> 00:04:10,756 Speaker 1: false positives, perhaps because they're misinterpreting antibio against other viruses, 64 00:04:10,756 --> 00:04:15,116 Speaker 1: like other common coronaviruses that cause common colds. So we 65 00:04:15,156 --> 00:04:18,476 Speaker 1: wanted to see, in a population where we know there's 66 00:04:18,556 --> 00:04:22,636 Speaker 1: no Saris CoV two infection, how many people in that 67 00:04:22,796 --> 00:04:27,236 Speaker 1: negative population had antibodies on each of these devices, And 68 00:04:27,276 --> 00:04:29,116 Speaker 1: so this was really, in many ways the meat of 69 00:04:29,116 --> 00:04:32,596 Speaker 1: this study. We took one hundred and eight blood specimens 70 00:04:32,636 --> 00:04:36,196 Speaker 1: that had been frozen down well before the pandemic, going 71 00:04:36,236 --> 00:04:39,276 Speaker 1: back to twenty eighteen and before, and we asked how 72 00:04:39,276 --> 00:04:42,436 Speaker 1: many of those blood samples showed evidence of antibodies with 73 00:04:42,476 --> 00:04:45,836 Speaker 1: these commercial tests that were popping up, and we saw 74 00:04:45,876 --> 00:04:48,476 Speaker 1: a range. Many of them found a lot of evidence 75 00:04:48,516 --> 00:04:51,996 Speaker 1: of antibodies against saris CoV two in these samples where 76 00:04:52,036 --> 00:04:54,756 Speaker 1: we know that it shouldn't be there, and so those 77 00:04:54,796 --> 00:05:00,156 Speaker 1: results are really disabling for a proper interpretation of these tests. 78 00:05:00,476 --> 00:05:02,836 Speaker 1: If we want to use these antibody tests to measure 79 00:05:03,036 --> 00:05:06,116 Speaker 1: in a population how many people have actually been infected, 80 00:05:06,516 --> 00:05:09,596 Speaker 1: they would cloud that picture strongly, and many of the 81 00:05:09,676 --> 00:05:12,356 Speaker 1: cases detected would actually be false positives. And if we 82 00:05:12,396 --> 00:05:15,556 Speaker 1: wanted to give an individual patient information. We could give 83 00:05:15,596 --> 00:05:18,516 Speaker 1: them very misleading information if we gave them false positives 84 00:05:18,716 --> 00:05:20,836 Speaker 1: and said that they had been infected with stars Cove 85 00:05:20,996 --> 00:05:23,516 Speaker 1: two when in fact they had it. But I want 86 00:05:23,516 --> 00:05:26,276 Speaker 1: to caveat that there were a handful that seemed reasonable, 87 00:05:26,396 --> 00:05:30,076 Speaker 1: and even one test showed one hundred percent specificity, meaning 88 00:05:30,116 --> 00:05:32,756 Speaker 1: no false positives at all, meaning no false positives in 89 00:05:32,836 --> 00:05:36,716 Speaker 1: the limited number that we tested. I've been thinking about 90 00:05:36,716 --> 00:05:38,716 Speaker 1: the fact that in many ways, the way that people 91 00:05:38,796 --> 00:05:41,916 Speaker 1: responded to our results was a Rorschach test of how 92 00:05:41,956 --> 00:05:44,276 Speaker 1: they wanted to see these results or how they were 93 00:05:44,276 --> 00:05:48,036 Speaker 1: predisposed to see these results. And I've been struck by 94 00:05:48,196 --> 00:05:50,676 Speaker 1: some of the news coverage, which really ranged from saying 95 00:05:50,876 --> 00:05:56,636 Speaker 1: antibody tests show great promise to these are complete hooks. 96 00:05:56,716 --> 00:06:00,116 Speaker 1: And my true interpretation is actually somewhere in between that 97 00:06:00,356 --> 00:06:02,796 Speaker 1: in some ways we got out in front of ourselves 98 00:06:03,116 --> 00:06:07,316 Speaker 1: where in response to a pandemic, many many suppliers started 99 00:06:07,396 --> 00:06:11,396 Speaker 1: racing into this market, and it wasn't a total shock 100 00:06:11,476 --> 00:06:14,756 Speaker 1: to me that we saw arrange. I think what was 101 00:06:14,756 --> 00:06:17,556 Speaker 1: a bit surprising was that these tests were becoming available 102 00:06:17,636 --> 00:06:22,396 Speaker 1: to individuals in some cases before this basic information was available, 103 00:06:22,716 --> 00:06:24,316 Speaker 1: and so we felt like we were just building in 104 00:06:24,356 --> 00:06:27,836 Speaker 1: that gap. One thing I've been sensing a lot of 105 00:06:27,916 --> 00:06:30,956 Speaker 1: recently is that as more and more states begin gradual 106 00:06:31,076 --> 00:06:36,036 Speaker 1: kinds of opening, lots of people are now saying, gee, 107 00:06:36,076 --> 00:06:39,036 Speaker 1: you know I was sick in March at one point, 108 00:06:39,556 --> 00:06:41,436 Speaker 1: or I had a long lunch with someone whom I 109 00:06:41,596 --> 00:06:44,436 Speaker 1: found out later turns out to have had it. Maybe 110 00:06:44,436 --> 00:06:48,396 Speaker 1: I should look into having an antibody test now. And 111 00:06:48,956 --> 00:06:51,236 Speaker 1: one question that they asked me, probably because they have 112 00:06:51,356 --> 00:06:56,076 Speaker 1: heard me talking about your results, is how reliable are 113 00:06:56,156 --> 00:06:59,356 Speaker 1: these tests now? I don't know what to tell them, 114 00:06:59,396 --> 00:07:02,316 Speaker 1: So I'm asking you, what would you say under these circumstances. 115 00:07:02,356 --> 00:07:04,836 Speaker 1: I have companies on the whole taken the lessons of 116 00:07:04,876 --> 00:07:07,636 Speaker 1: your research and figured out so that more of the 117 00:07:07,636 --> 00:07:09,556 Speaker 1: tests that are available now are like the better ones 118 00:07:09,596 --> 00:07:13,036 Speaker 1: that you saw. So there were probably at least one 119 00:07:13,116 --> 00:07:16,076 Speaker 1: hundred different companies that are offering different tests, and these 120 00:07:16,116 --> 00:07:19,476 Speaker 1: will pop up in different in different settings. We tested 121 00:07:19,916 --> 00:07:24,556 Speaker 1: sampling of these. We tested about twelve of these different tests, 122 00:07:25,236 --> 00:07:28,796 Speaker 1: and we have a website available so that people could 123 00:07:28,956 --> 00:07:33,196 Speaker 1: compare our results to whatever test information may be becoming available. 124 00:07:33,276 --> 00:07:34,996 Speaker 1: How would people find that website? What should they be 125 00:07:34,996 --> 00:07:39,956 Speaker 1: looking for the COVID Testing Project dot org. Now, keep 126 00:07:39,956 --> 00:07:41,876 Speaker 1: in mind it's a preprint, it has not yet been 127 00:07:41,916 --> 00:07:44,516 Speaker 1: peer reviewed, and it's a small sample, and so it's 128 00:07:44,516 --> 00:07:47,716 Speaker 1: not intended to guide any kinds of clinical interpretation, but 129 00:07:47,796 --> 00:07:51,716 Speaker 1: it provides some basic information. We've been in conversation with 130 00:07:52,076 --> 00:07:54,716 Speaker 1: a larger testing effort that has now come up as 131 00:07:54,756 --> 00:07:58,276 Speaker 1: part of a governmental effort. The National Cancer Institute is 132 00:07:58,316 --> 00:08:02,076 Speaker 1: now doing a large test in concert with the FDA, 133 00:08:02,156 --> 00:08:05,796 Speaker 1: where FDA is going to be assessing tests for antibodies 134 00:08:05,796 --> 00:08:09,556 Speaker 1: going forward with the National Cancer Institute. And there's another 135 00:08:09,596 --> 00:08:12,276 Speaker 1: website on the National Cancer as website and on the 136 00:08:12,276 --> 00:08:15,676 Speaker 1: FDA website that you can look and find information about 137 00:08:15,836 --> 00:08:19,356 Speaker 1: commercial tests that are now undergoing evaluation by the FDA. 138 00:08:19,476 --> 00:08:21,836 Speaker 1: So the short answer is, let the buyer beware. Right, 139 00:08:21,996 --> 00:08:24,356 Speaker 1: you may not even be able to find reliable information 140 00:08:24,396 --> 00:08:27,676 Speaker 1: online about whether a given test you're taking is reliable 141 00:08:27,756 --> 00:08:30,796 Speaker 1: or not. That's true. I think we're starting to see 142 00:08:30,836 --> 00:08:34,196 Speaker 1: now some of the larger commercial vendors that have traditionally 143 00:08:34,196 --> 00:08:37,796 Speaker 1: been major suppliers of lab diagnostics entering into this field 144 00:08:37,836 --> 00:08:40,476 Speaker 1: and playing a bigger role. That these large vendors get 145 00:08:40,476 --> 00:08:43,516 Speaker 1: into it. There's a hope that there's more consistency and 146 00:08:43,876 --> 00:08:48,156 Speaker 1: more quantitative information on the levels of antibodies and also 147 00:08:48,236 --> 00:08:52,596 Speaker 1: on the test performance characteristics. With the rapid diagnostics, not 148 00:08:52,676 --> 00:08:56,556 Speaker 1: only is there variation among the different vendors, but there's 149 00:08:56,596 --> 00:09:00,076 Speaker 1: some anecdotal reports that even within something bearing a label 150 00:09:00,116 --> 00:09:03,956 Speaker 1: of one particular vendor, there may be batch variation, and 151 00:09:03,996 --> 00:09:07,316 Speaker 1: so the picture is even more clouded with these rapid diagnostics. 152 00:09:07,636 --> 00:09:10,316 Speaker 1: So the one takeaway there would be, if you really 153 00:09:10,316 --> 00:09:12,876 Speaker 1: really feel like you have to get the test, send 154 00:09:12,916 --> 00:09:16,036 Speaker 1: it away. Don't do one of these rapid diagnostic tests 155 00:09:16,036 --> 00:09:18,276 Speaker 1: at home. If it looks like a pregnancy test, probablesion 156 00:09:18,356 --> 00:09:21,076 Speaker 1: rely on it. So we've been thinking a lot about 157 00:09:21,116 --> 00:09:24,076 Speaker 1: this going forward, about what are the possible ways that 158 00:09:24,116 --> 00:09:28,716 Speaker 1: you could have an efficient testing algorithm. So if someone 159 00:09:28,796 --> 00:09:32,076 Speaker 1: does a home pregnancy test, what's the first thing they 160 00:09:32,076 --> 00:09:34,396 Speaker 1: do with that information. If it's a positive, well, they 161 00:09:34,396 --> 00:09:36,436 Speaker 1: go to their doctor and they get a lab based test. 162 00:09:36,956 --> 00:09:39,836 Speaker 1: And so maybe there's some opportunity to do something like 163 00:09:39,876 --> 00:09:43,356 Speaker 1: that where there's a more complex algorithm that could be devised, 164 00:09:43,636 --> 00:09:46,956 Speaker 1: where there's multiple tests that are used for confirmatory testing, 165 00:09:47,196 --> 00:09:50,236 Speaker 1: where it's either a combination of home diagnostics or a 166 00:09:50,236 --> 00:09:54,036 Speaker 1: combination of home diagnostics and lab based to expand the 167 00:09:54,076 --> 00:09:59,516 Speaker 1: testing infrastructure without sacrificing sensitivity or specificity. That requires some 168 00:09:59,596 --> 00:10:02,276 Speaker 1: more thought about exactly how that algorithm is designed, but 169 00:10:02,316 --> 00:10:05,276 Speaker 1: I think these types of test performance numbers are the 170 00:10:05,316 --> 00:10:07,756 Speaker 1: basic building block that you would use to design an 171 00:10:07,756 --> 00:10:12,036 Speaker 1: algorithm like that. Going forward, let's talk about what someone 172 00:10:12,036 --> 00:10:14,876 Speaker 1: could actually do if they did one of these tests 173 00:10:14,876 --> 00:10:18,396 Speaker 1: it was reasonably reliable and they got a positive. Given 174 00:10:18,436 --> 00:10:21,556 Speaker 1: the relative uncertainty that's out there, what would it mean 175 00:10:21,596 --> 00:10:25,076 Speaker 1: for someone who said, well, I've tested positive. If anything. 176 00:10:25,636 --> 00:10:29,756 Speaker 1: I think that there's really two measurements of what it means. 177 00:10:30,276 --> 00:10:33,156 Speaker 1: One is how likely is it that it's actually giving 178 00:10:33,156 --> 00:10:36,956 Speaker 1: reliable information about whether or not you've been infected? And 179 00:10:37,076 --> 00:10:40,076 Speaker 1: the other implicit question, which I think is what people 180 00:10:40,156 --> 00:10:42,756 Speaker 1: really care about, is what information is it giving you 181 00:10:42,796 --> 00:10:45,716 Speaker 1: about how likely you are to get reinfected in the future. 182 00:10:46,636 --> 00:10:49,876 Speaker 1: And so let me tackle both of those. The first 183 00:10:50,076 --> 00:10:52,516 Speaker 1: is we are getting to a point where some of 184 00:10:52,516 --> 00:10:56,996 Speaker 1: these better tests, especially the lab based diagnostics, are starting 185 00:10:56,996 --> 00:11:00,916 Speaker 1: to give reasonably reliable information about whether or not there 186 00:11:00,956 --> 00:11:05,836 Speaker 1: are in fact antibodies present in an individual's blood. The 187 00:11:05,916 --> 00:11:08,876 Speaker 1: second piece is much more complicated, What do we actually 188 00:11:09,196 --> 00:11:13,436 Speaker 1: hell someone who has a positive antibody test. I think 189 00:11:13,996 --> 00:11:16,876 Speaker 1: no matter how many times we say in the news 190 00:11:17,316 --> 00:11:20,356 Speaker 1: that we can't yet tell someone if they have a 191 00:11:20,396 --> 00:11:24,196 Speaker 1: positive antibody test, they're actually protected from future infection. People 192 00:11:24,276 --> 00:11:28,716 Speaker 1: have such a strong intuition and desire for antibodies to 193 00:11:28,876 --> 00:11:33,156 Speaker 1: mean immunity that I'm concerned that there will be an 194 00:11:33,196 --> 00:11:37,076 Speaker 1: implicit behavioral message that people are safe from prior infection 195 00:11:37,396 --> 00:11:40,956 Speaker 1: and should take on risks and go into the community 196 00:11:41,076 --> 00:11:44,076 Speaker 1: and do things that they wouldn't otherwise do without real 197 00:11:44,116 --> 00:11:47,076 Speaker 1: science to back up to that behavior. So I think 198 00:11:47,196 --> 00:11:51,156 Speaker 1: right now we're starting the next round as a community 199 00:11:51,476 --> 00:11:55,076 Speaker 1: of scientific fact finding to start saying how can we 200 00:11:55,116 --> 00:11:58,236 Speaker 1: advise people about risk of future infection if they do 201 00:11:58,276 --> 00:12:01,556 Speaker 1: test positive for antibodies. There's really a big range of 202 00:12:01,596 --> 00:12:05,236 Speaker 1: what infectious disease doctors can come to expect from what 203 00:12:05,436 --> 00:12:09,396 Speaker 1: antibodies and prior infection mean for the prospects of symptoms 204 00:12:09,436 --> 00:12:14,076 Speaker 1: and contagion on reinfection, there's a few lines of evidence 205 00:12:14,156 --> 00:12:17,436 Speaker 1: that we as scientists are really looking for that will 206 00:12:17,596 --> 00:12:19,876 Speaker 1: firmly tell us that we can give the recommendation to 207 00:12:19,916 --> 00:12:23,636 Speaker 1: someone that they will be protected. The first are starting 208 00:12:23,676 --> 00:12:26,676 Speaker 1: to emerge now, and these are animal studies. There have 209 00:12:26,756 --> 00:12:30,196 Speaker 1: now been a few animal studies, including one published just 210 00:12:30,316 --> 00:12:33,916 Speaker 1: recently in Science by Dan Baruk's group that looked at 211 00:12:33,956 --> 00:12:39,476 Speaker 1: Reese's macaques infected with SARS CoV two and then reinfected 212 00:12:40,356 --> 00:12:45,996 Speaker 1: upon infection, The monkeys developed signs of immunity and reinfection 213 00:12:46,116 --> 00:12:48,716 Speaker 1: was far less severe. There might be small amounts of 214 00:12:48,796 --> 00:12:51,796 Speaker 1: virus that actually infected the monkeys, but they seem to 215 00:12:51,796 --> 00:12:54,636 Speaker 1: clear it relatively and quickly and didn't have signs of 216 00:12:54,676 --> 00:12:58,156 Speaker 1: infection similar to the first infection, So that's highly promising. 217 00:12:58,436 --> 00:13:00,676 Speaker 1: How that will translate to humans remains to be seen, 218 00:13:00,996 --> 00:13:03,756 Speaker 1: and there's two levels of questions. One is will people 219 00:13:03,916 --> 00:13:06,596 Speaker 1: clear the virus and not have severe symptoms and will 220 00:13:06,636 --> 00:13:09,596 Speaker 1: they be contagious because that's also something people care about. 221 00:13:09,796 --> 00:13:11,636 Speaker 1: Can you go back to work and not worry about 222 00:13:11,636 --> 00:13:14,396 Speaker 1: spreading it to more vulnerable people that you also come 223 00:13:14,396 --> 00:13:17,516 Speaker 1: in contact with, and that will require time. We'll be 224 00:13:17,636 --> 00:13:29,396 Speaker 1: right back in the monkey studies. Were they able to 225 00:13:29,436 --> 00:13:31,916 Speaker 1: determine whether they were infectious to others or were they 226 00:13:31,996 --> 00:13:34,076 Speaker 1: only able to determine how much they showed symptoms or 227 00:13:34,076 --> 00:13:36,436 Speaker 1: clear the virus. It looked like they were really only 228 00:13:36,436 --> 00:13:40,396 Speaker 1: able to see evidence of symptoms and quick viral clearance 229 00:13:40,436 --> 00:13:43,676 Speaker 1: and really pretty limited levels of virus infection, if any. 230 00:13:43,756 --> 00:13:45,836 Speaker 1: Because that seems hugely significant, right, I mean, if it 231 00:13:45,876 --> 00:13:47,836 Speaker 1: were to turn out that what was observed in monkeys 232 00:13:47,916 --> 00:13:50,756 Speaker 1: was also replicated in humans, so that you would get 233 00:13:50,756 --> 00:13:54,516 Speaker 1: a much milder case the next time around, that would 234 00:13:54,556 --> 00:13:56,836 Speaker 1: be very reassuring to individuals. But if you had a 235 00:13:56,876 --> 00:13:59,676 Speaker 1: mild case and we're still infectious to others, we don't 236 00:13:59,676 --> 00:14:02,476 Speaker 1: want you going back out into public at that point. 237 00:14:02,996 --> 00:14:04,676 Speaker 1: And we definitely don't want you walking around and thinking 238 00:14:04,716 --> 00:14:07,396 Speaker 1: that you're effectively immune because you could be as much 239 00:14:07,436 --> 00:14:09,636 Speaker 1: of a spreader as the next person. Right, So that 240 00:14:09,996 --> 00:14:12,436 Speaker 1: these data are incredibly important and to my knowledge or 241 00:14:12,476 --> 00:14:15,876 Speaker 1: not yet available for this particular virus. So the upshot 242 00:14:15,876 --> 00:14:17,356 Speaker 1: of that for an ordinary person, just to bring it 243 00:14:17,396 --> 00:14:20,076 Speaker 1: back to the you know, our hypothetical person who's thinking, So, 244 00:14:20,116 --> 00:14:22,636 Speaker 1: now this person takes a test, it's a send away 245 00:14:22,676 --> 00:14:26,756 Speaker 1: test from a reliable deliverer. Having done due diligence, our 246 00:14:26,836 --> 00:14:30,276 Speaker 1: person now thinks that he's been exposed and has antibodies, 247 00:14:30,636 --> 00:14:33,276 Speaker 1: and he says, Okay, now I'm going to go out 248 00:14:33,316 --> 00:14:36,076 Speaker 1: and go about my business and interact with people, and 249 00:14:36,316 --> 00:14:39,236 Speaker 1: the takeaway for that person is not so fast. Yeah, 250 00:14:39,436 --> 00:14:41,796 Speaker 1: you know this was brought home poignantly to me recently. 251 00:14:41,796 --> 00:14:44,396 Speaker 1: I had a conversation with a close family friend who 252 00:14:44,476 --> 00:14:47,116 Speaker 1: called me up and said, should I take an antibody test? 253 00:14:47,156 --> 00:14:49,676 Speaker 1: I really want to be able to see my grandson? 254 00:14:50,476 --> 00:14:53,076 Speaker 1: And I said, look, I would love to be able 255 00:14:53,116 --> 00:14:55,436 Speaker 1: to tell you that a positive antibody test could safely 256 00:14:55,476 --> 00:14:58,276 Speaker 1: mean this, that you could you would be protected, but 257 00:14:58,316 --> 00:15:01,596 Speaker 1: we don't yet have that information. I so deeply understand 258 00:15:01,636 --> 00:15:05,516 Speaker 1: the yearning to have that level of security, but trained 259 00:15:05,516 --> 00:15:08,316 Speaker 1: as a doctor, I don't feel that I yet have 260 00:15:08,436 --> 00:15:11,436 Speaker 1: enough information and to say that the test result would 261 00:15:11,436 --> 00:15:13,876 Speaker 1: allow me to actually recommend that you'd be safe to 262 00:15:13,916 --> 00:15:16,516 Speaker 1: go and change your behavior in any way that you 263 00:15:16,516 --> 00:15:19,356 Speaker 1: wouldn't otherwise. And although it's hard to put numbers on 264 00:15:19,356 --> 00:15:21,796 Speaker 1: these things, how confident would you have to be? I mean, 265 00:15:21,796 --> 00:15:24,436 Speaker 1: I understand that as a physician, you want to be cautious, right. 266 00:15:24,436 --> 00:15:26,076 Speaker 1: You don't want to say to somebody you know what, 267 00:15:26,156 --> 00:15:28,116 Speaker 1: you'll be fine and then have it turn out to 268 00:15:28,156 --> 00:15:30,036 Speaker 1: be the case that they're in some small tale of 269 00:15:30,756 --> 00:15:32,996 Speaker 1: the data where they actually were still able to get 270 00:15:32,996 --> 00:15:35,516 Speaker 1: it again or to give it again. But how confident 271 00:15:35,556 --> 00:15:38,916 Speaker 1: would you have to be to say to somebody, yeah, 272 00:15:38,916 --> 00:15:41,236 Speaker 1: you know what on the whole once you've had the 273 00:15:41,276 --> 00:15:44,076 Speaker 1: positive antibody test, this is basically almost certainly going to 274 00:15:44,076 --> 00:15:46,316 Speaker 1: be all right. Though I'm making you no promises. I 275 00:15:46,356 --> 00:15:48,796 Speaker 1: would like to see the human data. So I just 276 00:15:48,836 --> 00:15:51,836 Speaker 1: told you in detail about the experiment in the monkey model. 277 00:15:52,236 --> 00:15:55,796 Speaker 1: I think that we really need some basic information from humans. Now. 278 00:15:55,876 --> 00:15:59,316 Speaker 1: Some people have been advocating strongly for actually doing what 279 00:15:59,356 --> 00:16:00,836 Speaker 1: I just told you was done to the monkeys, to 280 00:16:00,876 --> 00:16:02,836 Speaker 1: actually doing that in humans, and there's been a group 281 00:16:02,876 --> 00:16:06,356 Speaker 1: of scientists that have signed letters talking about advocating for 282 00:16:06,516 --> 00:16:09,836 Speaker 1: human trials of actually active infection. Now, this has been 283 00:16:09,876 --> 00:16:13,196 Speaker 1: done for other coronaviruses in the past, the kind that 284 00:16:13,276 --> 00:16:16,316 Speaker 1: caused common colds, and for something that causes mild symptoms 285 00:16:16,316 --> 00:16:18,996 Speaker 1: like a common cold, that may be an acceptable risk. 286 00:16:19,356 --> 00:16:21,676 Speaker 1: The question is would it be an acceptable risk here, 287 00:16:21,836 --> 00:16:26,076 Speaker 1: perhaps in a young, healthy individual. I would advocate that 288 00:16:26,076 --> 00:16:29,716 Speaker 1: that's not necessary and perhaps not ethical. In this case. 289 00:16:30,076 --> 00:16:32,796 Speaker 1: I think that there's still high enough rates of transmission 290 00:16:33,076 --> 00:16:35,796 Speaker 1: that well designed studies and high risk individuals should be 291 00:16:35,876 --> 00:16:38,236 Speaker 1: able to give us this information, not quite as rapidly, 292 00:16:38,476 --> 00:16:41,756 Speaker 1: but rapidly enough that we can interpret them. So I 293 00:16:41,796 --> 00:16:46,476 Speaker 1: think what we really need is a carefully designed epidemiological 294 00:16:46,476 --> 00:16:50,756 Speaker 1: study that aggregates all the data from everyone who's had 295 00:16:50,756 --> 00:16:54,956 Speaker 1: antibody testing and watches them carefully over time, especially in 296 00:16:54,956 --> 00:16:57,556 Speaker 1: situations where they'd be high risk if they're healthcare workers 297 00:16:57,556 --> 00:17:00,956 Speaker 1: and high incidence regions, and ask the question very carefully 298 00:17:01,076 --> 00:17:04,796 Speaker 1: and numerically, what degree of protection do we actually see 299 00:17:04,836 --> 00:17:07,796 Speaker 1: in the people who have antibodies? Do they get infected 300 00:17:07,796 --> 00:17:11,356 Speaker 1: and do they spread to their context? Are we moving 301 00:17:11,356 --> 00:17:12,956 Speaker 1: in a direction where we're going to have to rely 302 00:17:13,076 --> 00:17:15,636 Speaker 1: on two kinds of tests simultaneously, where we're going to 303 00:17:15,716 --> 00:17:19,636 Speaker 1: have to rely both on swab testing of whether people 304 00:17:19,636 --> 00:17:21,916 Speaker 1: have the virus in real time and also on an 305 00:17:21,956 --> 00:17:24,876 Speaker 1: antibody test. Or are we heading for a world where 306 00:17:24,916 --> 00:17:28,756 Speaker 1: one of these will predominate over the other. I strongly 307 00:17:29,196 --> 00:17:32,076 Speaker 1: believe that we need both, and we need to be 308 00:17:32,196 --> 00:17:35,836 Speaker 1: very clear about what information we'll get from each of 309 00:17:35,836 --> 00:17:39,636 Speaker 1: those types of tests. The virus testing is the gold 310 00:17:39,716 --> 00:17:43,916 Speaker 1: standard for seeing who is infected with this virus SARS 311 00:17:43,956 --> 00:17:48,356 Speaker 1: CoV two, and that is what happens when people get 312 00:17:48,356 --> 00:17:51,836 Speaker 1: the nose or throat swab. Increasingly this is moving to 313 00:17:51,916 --> 00:17:54,636 Speaker 1: saliva testing, which I think is very promising and perhaps 314 00:17:54,676 --> 00:17:57,556 Speaker 1: more scalable. Those are looking for the presence of the 315 00:17:57,636 --> 00:18:03,076 Speaker 1: virus itself inside of an individual. After about a week 316 00:18:03,596 --> 00:18:05,436 Speaker 1: on average, we start to see the evidence of the 317 00:18:05,516 --> 00:18:09,316 Speaker 1: virus itself will wane, and by about two weeks or 318 00:18:09,356 --> 00:18:11,956 Speaker 1: three weeks with some variability, we'll see that people who 319 00:18:11,996 --> 00:18:16,396 Speaker 1: have been infected will start to produce antibodies against the 320 00:18:16,396 --> 00:18:18,756 Speaker 1: stars covi two and that's where we'll be able to 321 00:18:18,756 --> 00:18:21,556 Speaker 1: detect the presence of antibodies, and those will stay up 322 00:18:21,556 --> 00:18:24,116 Speaker 1: for some period of time, although the exact period of 323 00:18:24,116 --> 00:18:26,316 Speaker 1: how long they'll be detectable we still don't know. We 324 00:18:26,396 --> 00:18:29,716 Speaker 1: have to trace that out farther. But by looking at 325 00:18:29,756 --> 00:18:33,236 Speaker 1: both of those, we'll get information both about early infection 326 00:18:33,556 --> 00:18:37,796 Speaker 1: and later information about who had been infected in the past. 327 00:18:38,036 --> 00:18:40,996 Speaker 1: And if we want to accurately put together measurements of 328 00:18:41,516 --> 00:18:46,476 Speaker 1: prevalence across a population, transmission dynamics, mortality, we really need 329 00:18:46,516 --> 00:18:50,676 Speaker 1: information from both of those, and likewise, for back to work, 330 00:18:50,916 --> 00:18:53,956 Speaker 1: we also need information from both of those. We've talked 331 00:18:53,996 --> 00:18:58,036 Speaker 1: a lot now about will the antibody testing help us 332 00:18:58,036 --> 00:19:00,156 Speaker 1: determine who's safe to go back to work, and we've 333 00:19:00,156 --> 00:19:02,556 Speaker 1: talked about the pieces of knowledge that we still need 334 00:19:02,756 --> 00:19:05,996 Speaker 1: about immunity which will start to guide whether antibody tests 335 00:19:06,036 --> 00:19:07,916 Speaker 1: can tell us whether some people are safe to go 336 00:19:07,956 --> 00:19:12,116 Speaker 1: back to work. But virus testing itself is also important 337 00:19:12,156 --> 00:19:14,236 Speaker 1: for knowing who it goes back to work. One of 338 00:19:14,276 --> 00:19:16,956 Speaker 1: the key things that we know about transmission of this 339 00:19:17,076 --> 00:19:21,556 Speaker 1: virus is that it often occurs from asymptomatic individuals before 340 00:19:21,796 --> 00:19:23,916 Speaker 1: or they even know that they have symptoms, or even 341 00:19:23,916 --> 00:19:25,756 Speaker 1: some people who may never go on to have symptoms. 342 00:19:26,036 --> 00:19:27,836 Speaker 1: And the only way that we could really tell whether 343 00:19:28,076 --> 00:19:31,076 Speaker 1: people are infectious is if we screen for the presence 344 00:19:31,116 --> 00:19:34,596 Speaker 1: of the virus itself. Now this may sound unusual, but 345 00:19:34,636 --> 00:19:38,676 Speaker 1: there was an article in stat News recently about a 346 00:19:38,716 --> 00:19:42,316 Speaker 1: model for this from the adult film industry. It's almost 347 00:19:42,356 --> 00:19:44,996 Speaker 1: too good, yes go on. In response to the HIV 348 00:19:45,116 --> 00:19:49,476 Speaker 1: epidemic in a group of very high risk workers, there 349 00:19:49,516 --> 00:19:51,916 Speaker 1: had to be a model for how to figure out 350 00:19:51,956 --> 00:19:54,876 Speaker 1: how to pe get people back to work with relative safety, 351 00:19:55,716 --> 00:19:59,876 Speaker 1: because most HIV testing that done is actually based on 352 00:19:59,996 --> 00:20:04,396 Speaker 1: antibodies against HIV, but those come up relatively late. Again, 353 00:20:04,436 --> 00:20:06,916 Speaker 1: they don't come up in the earliest acute phases of 354 00:20:06,916 --> 00:20:11,076 Speaker 1: infection for HIV, they wouldn't come up for the earliest 355 00:20:11,076 --> 00:20:15,116 Speaker 1: phases of SARS CoV two. So that means that there 356 00:20:15,116 --> 00:20:17,636 Speaker 1: would be an individuals who could be acutely infected with 357 00:20:17,756 --> 00:20:21,076 Speaker 1: HIV who would be infectious before they would be detectable 358 00:20:21,116 --> 00:20:23,636 Speaker 1: with an antibody. And so the adult film industry has 359 00:20:23,676 --> 00:20:28,316 Speaker 1: come up with a very aggressive testing strategy that depends 360 00:20:28,356 --> 00:20:31,476 Speaker 1: not on the antibody tests used for most individuals, but 361 00:20:31,596 --> 00:20:35,316 Speaker 1: on actual viral testing that would sensitively detect the presence 362 00:20:35,316 --> 00:20:38,716 Speaker 1: of virus at earlier time points. And individuals have to 363 00:20:38,756 --> 00:20:41,756 Speaker 1: get tested at very regular intervals to be cleared to 364 00:20:41,836 --> 00:20:43,876 Speaker 1: go back to work. On the set of an adult 365 00:20:43,916 --> 00:20:46,676 Speaker 1: film industry, I think it's every fourteen days they have 366 00:20:46,716 --> 00:20:48,956 Speaker 1: to get clear to go back to work. And there's 367 00:20:48,956 --> 00:20:53,836 Speaker 1: a whole infrastructure set up with thought about privacy and 368 00:20:54,116 --> 00:20:56,356 Speaker 1: also coming up with a plan for how individuals would 369 00:20:56,396 --> 00:20:59,636 Speaker 1: get treated if they were to test positive, and also 370 00:20:59,676 --> 00:21:03,116 Speaker 1: how contact tracing would be done to identify people that 371 00:21:03,196 --> 00:21:06,436 Speaker 1: have been exposed. And so all this has been actually 372 00:21:06,636 --> 00:21:09,516 Speaker 1: carefully thought about in one industry where there's a high 373 00:21:09,556 --> 00:21:13,356 Speaker 1: risk of viral infection. Now, as a result of this pandemic, 374 00:21:14,196 --> 00:21:16,636 Speaker 1: all industries are at high risk of infection as people 375 00:21:16,676 --> 00:21:18,556 Speaker 1: go back to work, and I think we have to 376 00:21:18,556 --> 00:21:21,196 Speaker 1: give some similar thought. I don't mean to over extend 377 00:21:21,196 --> 00:21:24,676 Speaker 1: this analogy. HIV is a chronic virus, sarrys. CoV two 378 00:21:24,796 --> 00:21:27,516 Speaker 1: is not is something that will get cleared, and so 379 00:21:27,596 --> 00:21:30,356 Speaker 1: the dynamics are quite different. But I think we have 380 00:21:30,436 --> 00:21:34,596 Speaker 1: to think about how can we detect early cases, asymptomatic 381 00:21:34,596 --> 00:21:37,396 Speaker 1: cases and have infrastructure in place to make sure that 382 00:21:37,476 --> 00:21:41,076 Speaker 1: positive cases get treated and traced, to limit the spread 383 00:21:41,076 --> 00:21:44,676 Speaker 1: of infection and to limit mortality and morbidity. The idea 384 00:21:44,716 --> 00:21:46,996 Speaker 1: that we could borrow a protocol from the adult film 385 00:21:47,036 --> 00:21:53,236 Speaker 1: industry is its delicious and it would certainly be fascinating 386 00:21:53,276 --> 00:21:56,276 Speaker 1: if that ended up being being applied more broadly. Can 387 00:21:56,276 --> 00:21:58,476 Speaker 1: I see a totally outside the box quirky question that 388 00:21:58,516 --> 00:22:01,276 Speaker 1: I've noticed in talking to different people, I've noticed that 389 00:22:01,476 --> 00:22:05,996 Speaker 1: serious scientists all say stars CoV two, and they almost 390 00:22:06,036 --> 00:22:10,476 Speaker 1: never say COVID nineteen. Why it seems to me like 391 00:22:10,516 --> 00:22:15,316 Speaker 1: a little insider outsider code. I've actually realized this recently 392 00:22:15,716 --> 00:22:18,676 Speaker 1: talking to some people that this is confusing. I think 393 00:22:18,716 --> 00:22:21,356 Speaker 1: the simplest way to explain this is by analogy to 394 00:22:21,676 --> 00:22:25,716 Speaker 1: HIV and AIDS. AIDS is the disease caused by HIV 395 00:22:26,236 --> 00:22:29,276 Speaker 1: and STARS. CoV two is the virus that causes COVID 396 00:22:29,436 --> 00:22:32,276 Speaker 1: nineteen the disease, And so when we're really talking about 397 00:22:32,316 --> 00:22:36,716 Speaker 1: the mechanics of infection, scientists will gravitate to talking about 398 00:22:36,836 --> 00:22:39,596 Speaker 1: the name of the virus rather than the syndrome that 399 00:22:39,596 --> 00:22:42,756 Speaker 1: it causes, since there's a wide range of outcomes of 400 00:22:42,796 --> 00:22:45,236 Speaker 1: what the virus may actually do, and so COVID nineteen 401 00:22:45,316 --> 00:22:47,156 Speaker 1: is actually just the name of the syndrome. So it's 402 00:22:47,196 --> 00:22:50,676 Speaker 1: the person is suffering from COVID nineteen having been infected 403 00:22:50,676 --> 00:22:52,916 Speaker 1: with the stars CoV two exactly. And I think that 404 00:22:53,116 --> 00:22:57,756 Speaker 1: actually has been a genuine source of confusion. When will 405 00:22:57,796 --> 00:22:59,636 Speaker 1: your lab be able to be up and running and 406 00:22:59,676 --> 00:23:04,836 Speaker 1: doing its ordinary but not normal science. We have started 407 00:23:04,996 --> 00:23:10,036 Speaker 1: going back to work now at a drastically reduced capacity. 408 00:23:10,436 --> 00:23:12,876 Speaker 1: One eighth of the lab is able to work now, 409 00:23:13,196 --> 00:23:16,516 Speaker 1: and we're able that people are going in with masks 410 00:23:16,716 --> 00:23:19,756 Speaker 1: and keeping their distance from each other and working in isolation. 411 00:23:20,116 --> 00:23:25,276 Speaker 1: To start returning to their long term projects. I again 412 00:23:25,396 --> 00:23:29,436 Speaker 1: was inspired during this period until this where people were 413 00:23:29,516 --> 00:23:32,836 Speaker 1: so excited to have a chance to do the science 414 00:23:32,876 --> 00:23:35,716 Speaker 1: that they're passionate about, even if it wasn't their actual 415 00:23:35,756 --> 00:23:38,636 Speaker 1: PhD project, to be able to take the underlying skills 416 00:23:38,636 --> 00:23:42,956 Speaker 1: that they're cultivating and apply them, and people express real 417 00:23:42,996 --> 00:23:45,716 Speaker 1: gratitude to have the ability to work on stars copy 418 00:23:45,756 --> 00:23:49,996 Speaker 1: two testing, COVID nineteen testing during this epidemic. And so 419 00:23:50,116 --> 00:23:54,276 Speaker 1: we're continuing some of this but also transitioning back to 420 00:23:54,556 --> 00:23:58,396 Speaker 1: the more long term science that we've been focused on 421 00:23:58,396 --> 00:24:02,196 Speaker 1: on crispergino engineering of human immune cells to try to 422 00:24:02,236 --> 00:24:04,756 Speaker 1: think about treating a wide range of human diseases. And 423 00:24:04,796 --> 00:24:08,316 Speaker 1: I think people are also glad to be continuing to 424 00:24:08,316 --> 00:24:11,316 Speaker 1: work on this pandemic, but think broadly about how they 425 00:24:11,356 --> 00:24:15,316 Speaker 1: can make contributions to human health even beyond that too. Well, 426 00:24:15,396 --> 00:24:18,036 Speaker 1: let me take the opportunity to thank your lab members 427 00:24:18,076 --> 00:24:20,996 Speaker 1: and you for the contribution you've made on czars Cove two, 428 00:24:21,036 --> 00:24:23,556 Speaker 1: but also for the work you're doing all the time, 429 00:24:23,916 --> 00:24:26,436 Speaker 1: and to wish you guys a good opportunity to get 430 00:24:26,476 --> 00:24:28,956 Speaker 1: back into the lab at more than one eighth and 431 00:24:29,036 --> 00:24:30,796 Speaker 1: go back to continuing to try to make the world 432 00:24:30,836 --> 00:24:32,836 Speaker 1: a little bit of a better place. Thank you very much, 433 00:24:32,836 --> 00:24:36,636 Speaker 1: Alex for your time. I walked away from my conversation 434 00:24:36,716 --> 00:24:40,596 Speaker 1: with Alex with a kind of mixed picture of developments 435 00:24:40,796 --> 00:24:44,076 Speaker 1: in the antibody testing space. On the one hand, I 436 00:24:44,156 --> 00:24:48,356 Speaker 1: heard some measured optimism from Alex that the originally not 437 00:24:48,516 --> 00:24:50,996 Speaker 1: that impressive tests that he discovered when he and his 438 00:24:51,076 --> 00:24:54,116 Speaker 1: lab went to measure the effectiveness of the antibody tests 439 00:24:54,116 --> 00:24:57,396 Speaker 1: at first are starting to get a little bit better, 440 00:24:57,756 --> 00:25:02,516 Speaker 1: especially those that are send away laboratory tests. That said, 441 00:25:02,676 --> 00:25:06,836 Speaker 1: despite this progress, Alex thinks it is still not soon 442 00:25:06,996 --> 00:25:10,316 Speaker 1: enough to tell people that once they have those antibodies 443 00:25:10,436 --> 00:25:13,716 Speaker 1: that they can go around treating life as normal, because 444 00:25:13,716 --> 00:25:17,196 Speaker 1: we still do not know what degree of immunity, if any, 445 00:25:17,396 --> 00:25:21,556 Speaker 1: is being conferred by the antibodies. For that will need 446 00:25:21,636 --> 00:25:25,356 Speaker 1: more time and more research. Alex also points out that 447 00:25:25,516 --> 00:25:27,916 Speaker 1: going forward, to get people back to work and get 448 00:25:27,916 --> 00:25:31,476 Speaker 1: the world open, we're going to need much more testing, 449 00:25:31,796 --> 00:25:34,716 Speaker 1: both testing of people who currently have the virus and 450 00:25:34,916 --> 00:25:39,956 Speaker 1: also antibody testing. So more tests remain a crucial desideratum 451 00:25:40,156 --> 00:25:44,076 Speaker 1: for reopening the economy, and last and definitely not least 452 00:25:44,396 --> 00:25:48,516 Speaker 1: Alex suggested that we may actually already have an available 453 00:25:48,596 --> 00:25:51,316 Speaker 1: model from industry that helps us know how to get 454 00:25:51,356 --> 00:25:54,596 Speaker 1: people back to work, the model of the HIV testing 455 00:25:54,756 --> 00:25:58,676 Speaker 1: protocols put in place by the adult film industry. If 456 00:25:58,676 --> 00:26:00,836 Speaker 1: it turns out that the adult film industry has something 457 00:26:00,876 --> 00:26:04,036 Speaker 1: significant to contribute to getting people back to work, that 458 00:26:04,116 --> 00:26:06,636 Speaker 1: will be one of the great surprises. Let us just 459 00:26:06,836 --> 00:26:12,996 Speaker 1: say of this entire strange COVID nineteen pandec and although 460 00:26:13,036 --> 00:26:16,276 Speaker 1: this may sound a little different immediately following a conversation 461 00:26:16,276 --> 00:26:19,236 Speaker 1: of adult films, until the next time I speak to you, 462 00:26:19,636 --> 00:26:23,956 Speaker 1: be careful, be safe, and be well. Deep background is 463 00:26:23,996 --> 00:26:27,156 Speaker 1: brought to you by Pushkin Industries. Our producer is Lydia 464 00:26:27,236 --> 00:26:30,676 Speaker 1: gene Cott, with research help from zooe Win and mastering 465 00:26:30,676 --> 00:26:35,196 Speaker 1: by Jason Gambrel and Martin Gonzalez. Our showrunner is Sophie mckibbn. 466 00:26:35,716 --> 00:26:39,036 Speaker 1: Our theme music is composed by Luis Guerra. Special thanks 467 00:26:39,036 --> 00:26:42,756 Speaker 1: to the Pushkin Brass, Malcolm Gladwell, Jacob Weisberg, and Mia Loebell. 468 00:26:43,436 --> 00:26:46,396 Speaker 1: I'm Noah Feldman. I also write a regular column for 469 00:26:46,476 --> 00:26:49,876 Speaker 1: Bloomberg Opinion, which you can find at Bloomberg dot com. 470 00:26:49,916 --> 00:26:54,236 Speaker 1: Slash Feldman. To discover Bloomberg's original slate of podcasts, go 471 00:26:54,316 --> 00:26:58,516 Speaker 1: to bloomberg dot com slash podcasts. And one last thing. 472 00:26:58,956 --> 00:27:02,076 Speaker 1: I just wrote a book called The Arab Winter, A Tragedy. 473 00:27:02,476 --> 00:27:04,436 Speaker 1: I would be delighted if you checked it out. You 474 00:27:04,436 --> 00:27:06,076 Speaker 1: can always let me know what you think on Twitter 475 00:27:06,316 --> 00:27:09,316 Speaker 1: about this episode, or the book or anything else. My 476 00:27:09,396 --> 00:27:12,996 Speaker 1: handle is Noah R. Feldman. This is deep background