1 00:00:00,600 --> 00:00:04,120 Speaker 1: The Michael Barry Joe Cheryl Atkinson is our guest. The 2 00:00:04,160 --> 00:00:08,559 Speaker 1: book is Stonewall. Cheryl, let's talk about what happened to you. 3 00:00:08,560 --> 00:00:13,119 Speaker 1: You went from being a reporter of news to being 4 00:00:14,000 --> 00:00:17,040 Speaker 1: the subject yourself, sort of an awkward state of affairs. 5 00:00:17,600 --> 00:00:21,200 Speaker 1: And CBS was a bit reluctant about how that all 6 00:00:21,239 --> 00:00:23,440 Speaker 1: came about, But talk about that if you would. 7 00:00:24,480 --> 00:00:28,160 Speaker 2: During my Benghazi coverage, my family and I had been 8 00:00:28,160 --> 00:00:32,280 Speaker 2: suffering these amazing technical disruptions in our house for a 9 00:00:32,280 --> 00:00:34,879 Speaker 2: couple of years that really peaked during the fall of 10 00:00:34,960 --> 00:00:38,159 Speaker 2: twenty twelve, but never associated that with any sort of 11 00:00:38,159 --> 00:00:41,640 Speaker 2: surveillance or intrusion. We just thought Verizon sucked, you know, 12 00:00:41,680 --> 00:00:43,920 Speaker 2: they couldn't fix the problem. A lot of it was 13 00:00:43,960 --> 00:00:46,400 Speaker 2: associated with our fires line. They'd been out of the 14 00:00:46,400 --> 00:00:50,400 Speaker 2: house so many times. But a couple of sources of 15 00:00:50,440 --> 00:00:54,080 Speaker 2: mine implied that I was probably being monitored because of 16 00:00:54,120 --> 00:00:56,920 Speaker 2: my reporting on Benghazi. And these are people who, you know, 17 00:00:57,680 --> 00:01:02,040 Speaker 2: connected and well informed. So I didn't just blow it off, 18 00:01:02,120 --> 00:01:04,560 Speaker 2: even though it sounded a little bit far fetched. And 19 00:01:04,640 --> 00:01:08,240 Speaker 2: remember this is before Edward Snowden, before we knew that 20 00:01:08,319 --> 00:01:12,040 Speaker 2: the government had confiscated records of associated press reporters or 21 00:01:12,080 --> 00:01:16,000 Speaker 2: targeted Fox News reporter as a potential co conspirator and 22 00:01:16,040 --> 00:01:19,119 Speaker 2: a leak investigation. Without that context, I really didn't think 23 00:01:19,120 --> 00:01:22,080 Speaker 2: anything was going on, but I did listen to these folks, 24 00:01:23,040 --> 00:01:27,279 Speaker 2: and long story short, someone offered to get a really 25 00:01:27,760 --> 00:01:30,920 Speaker 2: well placed forensic expert look at my computer to see 26 00:01:30,920 --> 00:01:32,759 Speaker 2: if there was something in there that they could find, 27 00:01:32,800 --> 00:01:36,120 Speaker 2: and indeed they did. They found evidence of a long 28 00:01:36,240 --> 00:01:40,600 Speaker 2: term remote surveillance and operate operating effort. 29 00:01:40,440 --> 00:01:43,800 Speaker 1: That was Patel hired by CBS or by you. 30 00:01:44,720 --> 00:01:47,080 Speaker 2: Patel was hired by CBS and that was not Patel. 31 00:01:47,160 --> 00:01:49,560 Speaker 2: So prior to Patel, oh, this was the there was 32 00:01:49,600 --> 00:01:53,040 Speaker 2: a confidential source that was really the best to look 33 00:01:53,080 --> 00:01:55,320 Speaker 2: for this sort of thing, and he found in the 34 00:01:55,360 --> 00:02:00,240 Speaker 2: computer software proprietary to a federal government agency. He said 35 00:02:00,760 --> 00:02:04,560 Speaker 2: that had monitored my keystrokes, been into the CBS system, 36 00:02:04,800 --> 00:02:08,079 Speaker 2: had activated my Skype to listen into audio in the 37 00:02:08,200 --> 00:02:10,799 Speaker 2: room when it wanted to without me knowing it, had 38 00:02:10,800 --> 00:02:13,440 Speaker 2: obtained all of my passwords, had looked through my files 39 00:02:13,480 --> 00:02:16,560 Speaker 2: and so on. They could tell the date and time 40 00:02:16,680 --> 00:02:21,520 Speaker 2: that some of the software was downloaded. They knew a 41 00:02:21,520 --> 00:02:23,920 Speaker 2: lot of specifics. So then after that I reported it 42 00:02:23,919 --> 00:02:26,239 Speaker 2: to CBS because it's a very serious thing if there's 43 00:02:26,240 --> 00:02:29,840 Speaker 2: an intrusion into your corporate system. Of course, CBS, since 44 00:02:30,040 --> 00:02:34,360 Speaker 2: my source was confidential, hired Patel that's a pseudonym, but 45 00:02:34,480 --> 00:02:37,040 Speaker 2: a computer firm of their own, who came out to 46 00:02:37,080 --> 00:02:39,200 Speaker 2: my house. I don't think he expected to find anything, 47 00:02:39,280 --> 00:02:42,120 Speaker 2: but within a couple of hours he too confirmed the 48 00:02:42,120 --> 00:02:45,760 Speaker 2: remote intrusions into my CBS laptop and also my personal 49 00:02:45,800 --> 00:02:47,520 Speaker 2: Apple desktop computer. 50 00:02:47,600 --> 00:02:50,560 Speaker 1: So two different computers, your work and your home. And 51 00:02:50,760 --> 00:02:54,080 Speaker 1: in addition to confirming what he'd found already, he found 52 00:02:54,120 --> 00:03:00,600 Speaker 1: that they had planted classified documents on your computer, the 53 00:03:00,600 --> 00:03:03,799 Speaker 1: possession of which presumably would be a crime. You can 54 00:03:03,840 --> 00:03:07,080 Speaker 1: answer to that, but that they were buried so deep 55 00:03:07,120 --> 00:03:08,440 Speaker 1: that you never would have found them. 56 00:03:08,720 --> 00:03:13,040 Speaker 2: That's according to my first analyst. When the report was 57 00:03:13,080 --> 00:03:17,160 Speaker 2: given to me as to what he found, the reporter said, 58 00:03:17,360 --> 00:03:20,320 Speaker 2: you know, did you have classified documents on the computer? 59 00:03:20,400 --> 00:03:22,800 Speaker 2: And I said no, And he said, well, there were 60 00:03:22,840 --> 00:03:25,280 Speaker 2: three on there, buried deep in your operating system, in 61 00:03:25,320 --> 00:03:27,160 Speaker 2: a place you wouldn't know about unless you're some sort 62 00:03:27,200 --> 00:03:30,760 Speaker 2: of computer with which I'm not, and it would not 63 00:03:30,919 --> 00:03:33,880 Speaker 2: necessarily be illegal for me to have them I've had 64 00:03:33,919 --> 00:03:38,360 Speaker 2: classified documents before. As long as I didn't encourage somebody 65 00:03:38,400 --> 00:03:40,760 Speaker 2: to break the law to get them for me, it 66 00:03:40,800 --> 00:03:43,680 Speaker 2: could be a crime for whoever took them. So I 67 00:03:43,720 --> 00:03:47,200 Speaker 2: guess a couple of theories, according to my sources, are 68 00:03:48,000 --> 00:03:50,880 Speaker 2: that those documents could have been used at some point 69 00:03:50,960 --> 00:03:53,520 Speaker 2: to obtain a legal wire tap against me if they 70 00:03:53,520 --> 00:03:56,680 Speaker 2: were doing a leak investigation, perhaps if they wanted to 71 00:03:56,720 --> 00:03:58,480 Speaker 2: do such a thing, Or they could be used to 72 00:03:58,560 --> 00:04:02,040 Speaker 2: frame a leaker or a whistleblower. And we now know 73 00:04:02,760 --> 00:04:07,120 Speaker 2: that this administration has heavily, heavily targeted leakers and whistleblowers 74 00:04:07,120 --> 00:04:09,200 Speaker 2: inside the government. They want to know who's talking. They 75 00:04:09,240 --> 00:04:11,240 Speaker 2: want to stop them from talking to reporters. 76 00:04:11,320 --> 00:04:14,640 Speaker 1: So every administration wants to stop them from talking. They're 77 00:04:14,640 --> 00:04:17,920 Speaker 1: willing to go two levels that are illegal to do so. 78 00:04:18,200 --> 00:04:22,159 Speaker 2: I think every administration wants leakers to stop. This one 79 00:04:22,160 --> 00:04:25,080 Speaker 2: has prosecuted more of them than any than all other 80 00:04:25,120 --> 00:04:28,279 Speaker 2: administrations combined, and has been I think it's agreed upon 81 00:04:28,360 --> 00:04:32,480 Speaker 2: more aggressive and more constraining even to people who aren't leaking. 82 00:04:32,520 --> 00:04:35,239 Speaker 2: People who just want to converse with the press inside 83 00:04:35,279 --> 00:04:39,200 Speaker 2: federal agencies are being suppressed from having normal conversations now. 84 00:04:39,000 --> 00:04:41,440 Speaker 1: So you're telling me that when Barack Obama says sunlight 85 00:04:41,520 --> 00:04:45,039 Speaker 1: is the best disinfectant, that he doesn't mean it. 86 00:04:45,960 --> 00:04:47,640 Speaker 2: He may have meant it at the time. I think 87 00:04:47,680 --> 00:04:49,880 Speaker 2: all the administrations mean it when they come in and 88 00:04:49,880 --> 00:04:52,200 Speaker 2: say we're going to be open and transparent, and then 89 00:04:52,240 --> 00:04:56,800 Speaker 2: the reality is far different. There's now a consensus among journalists, including, 90 00:04:57,040 --> 00:04:58,600 Speaker 2: as I like to say, those from the New York 91 00:04:58,600 --> 00:05:01,440 Speaker 2: Times in USA Today and wash A Post, Associated Press, 92 00:05:01,520 --> 00:05:04,760 Speaker 2: all the networks. We've all objected verbally and in writing 93 00:05:05,160 --> 00:05:08,640 Speaker 2: to this what we see as this administration's unprecedented crackdown 94 00:05:08,640 --> 00:05:10,400 Speaker 2: on transparency and press freedoms. 95 00:05:11,400 --> 00:05:15,280 Speaker 1: You write in the book Stonewalled by Cheryl Atkinson on 96 00:05:15,400 --> 00:05:18,520 Speaker 1: May six, twenty thirteen, I make contact with an excellent 97 00:05:18,600 --> 00:05:22,760 Speaker 1: source who has crucial information the name of the person 98 00:05:22,839 --> 00:05:27,080 Speaker 1: responsible for my computer intrusions. He provides me the name, 99 00:05:27,200 --> 00:05:31,279 Speaker 1: and I recognize it. I'm not surprised. It strikes me 100 00:05:31,360 --> 00:05:34,800 Speaker 1: as desperate and cowardly that those responsible would resort to 101 00:05:34,960 --> 00:05:38,720 Speaker 1: these tactics. That's all I can say about that. Now. 102 00:05:39,000 --> 00:05:43,640 Speaker 2: Why, there are a couple of reasons. I'm looking at 103 00:05:43,720 --> 00:05:47,080 Speaker 2: legal options, and I'm taking advice from my attorney, and. 104 00:05:47,000 --> 00:05:50,320 Speaker 1: You feel certain that you know the person who directed 105 00:05:50,320 --> 00:05:51,560 Speaker 1: that you be spied upon. 106 00:05:53,000 --> 00:05:55,039 Speaker 2: The way you phrase a question, I can't say I 107 00:05:55,120 --> 00:05:59,520 Speaker 2: know a guy who gave the top order, you know, 108 00:05:59,560 --> 00:06:02,120 Speaker 2: to make it happen. If such a thing occurred, I 109 00:06:02,160 --> 00:06:07,440 Speaker 2: do feel pretty confident I know at least a player involved. 110 00:06:08,400 --> 00:06:10,719 Speaker 2: But I'm not using the name because partly because that 111 00:06:10,839 --> 00:06:14,719 Speaker 2: source that came from a confidential human source, and partly 112 00:06:14,760 --> 00:06:19,719 Speaker 2: because of the legal action we're talking about. 113 00:06:20,080 --> 00:06:24,359 Speaker 1: And do you think that was a retaliation for coverage 114 00:06:24,920 --> 00:06:26,799 Speaker 1: from a brusque personal encounter. 115 00:06:28,320 --> 00:06:31,000 Speaker 2: I don't know if retaliation is the right word, because 116 00:06:31,480 --> 00:06:34,279 Speaker 2: it's not as though they were paying me back or 117 00:06:34,320 --> 00:06:37,120 Speaker 2: thought I would ever know about it. They were monitoring 118 00:06:37,279 --> 00:06:39,880 Speaker 2: my work. I think what they were trying to do 119 00:06:40,360 --> 00:06:44,400 Speaker 2: is go the extra step in what they tried to 120 00:06:44,440 --> 00:06:46,960 Speaker 2: do on the record, which is find out what I'm 121 00:06:47,000 --> 00:06:49,559 Speaker 2: about to report, find out who's talking to me, finding 122 00:06:49,600 --> 00:06:51,719 Speaker 2: out what I know. And I don't think I'm the 123 00:06:51,760 --> 00:06:53,919 Speaker 2: only one that they were doing this too. I would 124 00:06:53,920 --> 00:06:56,440 Speaker 2: never have known about it if I hadn't stumbled across 125 00:06:57,080 --> 00:07:00,960 Speaker 2: excellent sources. Most people don't have access to. Probably other people, 126 00:07:01,000 --> 00:07:03,840 Speaker 2: I assume other journalists were on a sort of list 127 00:07:03,839 --> 00:07:05,880 Speaker 2: that we're being looked at. I wouldn't be the only one, 128 00:07:05,880 --> 00:07:07,200 Speaker 2: but they would have no way to know it. 129 00:07:07,520 --> 00:07:11,240 Speaker 1: Thirty seconds in this segment, if the names are ever 130 00:07:11,320 --> 00:07:14,160 Speaker 1: released as to who was involved with this, will we 131 00:07:14,280 --> 00:07:15,559 Speaker 1: recognize any of those names? 132 00:07:16,400 --> 00:07:16,880 Speaker 2: I don't know. 133 00:07:17,560 --> 00:07:19,800 Speaker 1: Do you suspect that the names are big enough that 134 00:07:19,840 --> 00:07:20,800 Speaker 1: we would recognize them? 135 00:07:20,840 --> 00:07:21,240 Speaker 2: I don't know. 136 00:07:23,360 --> 00:07:27,200 Speaker 1: You're not certain that no one that we would recognize. 137 00:07:28,840 --> 00:07:30,320 Speaker 2: Wait, that's a double negative. I know. 138 00:07:30,400 --> 00:07:33,160 Speaker 1: I confused myself in the question. You're not willing to 139 00:07:33,240 --> 00:07:33,720 Speaker 1: rule it out? 140 00:07:34,760 --> 00:07:36,480 Speaker 2: You might? I don't know, and I don't know all 141 00:07:36,520 --> 00:07:38,760 Speaker 2: the names, So who knows whose names could turn up? 142 00:07:39,040 --> 00:07:41,760 Speaker 1: What does that even mean? Or with Sheryl Atkinson, the 143 00:07:41,760 --> 00:07:48,280 Speaker 1: book is stonewall coming up? These are speaks the truth 144 00:07:50,000 --> 00:07:55,600 Speaker 1: you've got the Michael Berry Show. I have maintained for 145 00:07:55,720 --> 00:08:00,400 Speaker 1: years that the reason John Bayner will not take the 146 00:08:00,480 --> 00:08:05,760 Speaker 1: actions that his membership demands, and in fact the reason 147 00:08:05,800 --> 00:08:07,720 Speaker 1: he balls in public, is that he is in the 148 00:08:07,880 --> 00:08:14,760 Speaker 1: untenable position, the unenviable position, that the Obama administration, through 149 00:08:15,080 --> 00:08:21,120 Speaker 1: their operatives, have personal information, whether it's on sexual alliances 150 00:08:21,240 --> 00:08:27,080 Speaker 1: or business deals of questionable integrity who knows it is 151 00:08:27,120 --> 00:08:29,720 Speaker 1: of course not uncommon to the culture inside the Beltway, 152 00:08:30,520 --> 00:08:33,240 Speaker 1: and I have maintained for years that that is the reason. 153 00:08:33,240 --> 00:08:36,600 Speaker 1: I've had congressional staffers tell me that Bainer's drunk most 154 00:08:36,640 --> 00:08:39,520 Speaker 1: of the time, and that the administration has the goods 155 00:08:39,520 --> 00:08:42,040 Speaker 1: on him, and that it has been widely discussed, and 156 00:08:42,120 --> 00:08:45,400 Speaker 1: some of these folks have turned out to be accurate 157 00:08:46,280 --> 00:08:48,720 Speaker 1: every single time they've given me things that I didn't 158 00:08:48,720 --> 00:08:53,600 Speaker 1: trust him with. So is that so far fetched when 159 00:08:54,320 --> 00:08:57,800 Speaker 1: we now know that Cheryl Atkinson was spied upon by 160 00:08:57,840 --> 00:09:02,200 Speaker 1: the same government. Let's talk about what is at least 161 00:09:02,240 --> 00:09:06,679 Speaker 1: as troubling for me that the government was apparently presumably 162 00:09:08,800 --> 00:09:11,640 Speaker 1: spying on you, was that it didn't appear from your 163 00:09:11,679 --> 00:09:14,560 Speaker 1: book that CBS was backing you up the way you 164 00:09:14,600 --> 00:09:15,320 Speaker 1: thought they should. 165 00:09:16,800 --> 00:09:21,839 Speaker 2: I would just say the response from CBS was way 166 00:09:22,880 --> 00:09:26,160 Speaker 2: calmer and less upset than. 167 00:09:26,040 --> 00:09:27,960 Speaker 1: I thought it when they should have been shot. 168 00:09:28,240 --> 00:09:31,719 Speaker 2: I thought, any intrusion into your corporate system, whoever did it, 169 00:09:31,800 --> 00:09:34,640 Speaker 2: let's just say somebody did it. Say it's China, Say 170 00:09:34,679 --> 00:09:38,040 Speaker 2: it's some hacker. We were always led to believe through 171 00:09:38,080 --> 00:09:40,360 Speaker 2: our training, corporate training and so on. That's a super 172 00:09:40,440 --> 00:09:44,920 Speaker 2: serious affair, but it wasn't as if alarm bells went 173 00:09:44,960 --> 00:09:48,640 Speaker 2: off at the highest levels. And then from a personal standpoint, 174 00:09:48,720 --> 00:09:52,240 Speaker 2: I thought that they would send experts to my house 175 00:09:52,360 --> 00:09:56,040 Speaker 2: to examine, you know, everything from the place where an 176 00:09:56,080 --> 00:09:59,200 Speaker 2: extra fiber optics fiosline had been found dangling off the 177 00:09:59,240 --> 00:10:02,600 Speaker 2: back of my house to my personal systems, to make 178 00:10:02,640 --> 00:10:05,720 Speaker 2: sure that my sources and the future were protected, and 179 00:10:05,720 --> 00:10:08,920 Speaker 2: that CBS's interests were protected, and maybe some of my 180 00:10:09,000 --> 00:10:11,160 Speaker 2: personal interests too, since this has happened to me as 181 00:10:11,200 --> 00:10:14,160 Speaker 2: a result of my work at CBS, and I know 182 00:10:14,320 --> 00:10:18,400 Speaker 2: that when Associated Press learned that the administration had confiscated reporters, 183 00:10:19,240 --> 00:10:22,760 Speaker 2: you know, phone records, they felt improperly that they took 184 00:10:22,920 --> 00:10:25,320 Speaker 2: great deal of steps to try to protect their sources, 185 00:10:25,320 --> 00:10:28,360 Speaker 2: and they put in place special processes so that their 186 00:10:28,400 --> 00:10:30,840 Speaker 2: phones it would be harder to listen into their phones 187 00:10:30,880 --> 00:10:34,600 Speaker 2: and so on. None of that happened in my instance, 188 00:10:34,640 --> 00:10:38,440 Speaker 2: and I just thought the response just didn't seem to 189 00:10:38,480 --> 00:10:44,440 Speaker 2: make sense. With the infraction was that the reason you left? No, 190 00:10:44,720 --> 00:10:47,959 Speaker 2: I stayed another year, but I will say during the 191 00:10:48,160 --> 00:10:52,840 Speaker 2: you're under contract. Yeah, during this time period, I was 192 00:10:52,880 --> 00:10:56,000 Speaker 2: in discussions, I had initiated discussions to try to leave 193 00:10:56,040 --> 00:10:59,400 Speaker 2: ahead of contracts, So there was that tension going on 194 00:10:59,720 --> 00:11:01,760 Speaker 2: in the background. I don't know if that had anything 195 00:11:01,800 --> 00:11:04,360 Speaker 2: to do with their response to this intrusion, the fact 196 00:11:04,400 --> 00:11:08,120 Speaker 2: that I was also asking to be out of my contract. 197 00:11:08,120 --> 00:11:11,800 Speaker 2: But at some point months later, after the final CBS 198 00:11:11,840 --> 00:11:15,920 Speaker 2: forensics report came into them, I was called into the 199 00:11:15,960 --> 00:11:19,000 Speaker 2: office president the company was there, David Rhodes and the 200 00:11:19,080 --> 00:11:22,880 Speaker 2: bureau chief in Washington, and they said, in no uncertain terms, 201 00:11:22,880 --> 00:11:25,920 Speaker 2: we support you. We've got these forensics back. It confirms 202 00:11:25,960 --> 00:11:29,000 Speaker 2: the remote intrusion undeniably. We're going to put out a 203 00:11:29,040 --> 00:11:32,240 Speaker 2: press release. We're behind you one thousand percent. And by 204 00:11:32,240 --> 00:11:34,360 Speaker 2: then I believe I had agreed to stay another year. 205 00:11:34,920 --> 00:11:38,120 Speaker 2: So it's not as if they fought me or entirely 206 00:11:38,160 --> 00:11:40,120 Speaker 2: against me. I just felt like it took months and 207 00:11:40,160 --> 00:11:42,240 Speaker 2: months for them to arrive at a position I would 208 00:11:42,240 --> 00:11:43,559 Speaker 2: have thought they would have come to. 209 00:11:43,800 --> 00:11:45,520 Speaker 1: Well, would you say in the book that you were 210 00:11:45,600 --> 00:11:48,720 Speaker 1: surprised that they all of a sudden seemed ready to 211 00:11:48,760 --> 00:11:50,920 Speaker 1: go forward and charge on on this issue. 212 00:11:50,920 --> 00:11:52,479 Speaker 2: I was because it was a turnabout. 213 00:11:52,720 --> 00:11:55,960 Speaker 1: The CBS then hired Sheryl Atkinson. By the way, as 214 00:11:55,960 --> 00:11:58,920 Speaker 1: our guest in the book is stonewalled. CBS then hired 215 00:12:00,520 --> 00:12:03,800 Speaker 1: a former NSA official or an NSA official to come 216 00:12:04,360 --> 00:12:07,520 Speaker 1: internal to CBS, and that concerned you at the time. 217 00:12:07,559 --> 00:12:11,880 Speaker 2: Why for the computers, I think that was prior to that. 218 00:12:11,960 --> 00:12:14,160 Speaker 2: I believe I'd have to look at my notes. But 219 00:12:14,280 --> 00:12:19,959 Speaker 2: around two and early twenty twelve, maybe I only learned 220 00:12:19,960 --> 00:12:22,960 Speaker 2: about this third hand when there was so much inaction 221 00:12:23,080 --> 00:12:26,080 Speaker 2: on the computer front. A colleague said to me, well, 222 00:12:26,200 --> 00:12:29,360 Speaker 2: isn't the former NSSA guy you know that heads our 223 00:12:29,400 --> 00:12:32,240 Speaker 2: computer division for CBS helping you? This is right up 224 00:12:32,240 --> 00:12:35,079 Speaker 2: his alley. And I heard of no such thing. Nobody 225 00:12:35,160 --> 00:12:37,679 Speaker 2: had spoken to me or talked to me. And I said, well, 226 00:12:37,720 --> 00:12:40,840 Speaker 2: who's the NSA guy? And I did a little research 227 00:12:40,880 --> 00:12:43,600 Speaker 2: with help, and there is a guy that I guess 228 00:12:43,720 --> 00:12:46,400 Speaker 2: came from the Obama White House and worked for the NSSA, 229 00:12:46,840 --> 00:12:51,520 Speaker 2: that Molonov, right, yeah, Joel Molanoff, who had not contacted me. 230 00:12:51,679 --> 00:12:56,640 Speaker 2: And he did send out an email after my intrusions 231 00:12:56,640 --> 00:13:00,000 Speaker 2: were confirmed, not to me, but sort of to every 232 00:13:00,160 --> 00:13:02,760 Speaker 2: buddy saying if anything like this ever happens, here's what 233 00:13:02,800 --> 00:13:05,760 Speaker 2: you should do, and you must report it and so on. 234 00:13:06,400 --> 00:13:08,720 Speaker 2: So I emailed him because I hadn't heard from him, 235 00:13:08,760 --> 00:13:10,800 Speaker 2: and I said, maybe you're not aware of my situation 236 00:13:10,960 --> 00:13:13,080 Speaker 2: because I haven't heard from you, but I know I'm 237 00:13:13,120 --> 00:13:15,560 Speaker 2: supposed to report it. I have reported it, and I 238 00:13:15,600 --> 00:13:18,440 Speaker 2: haven't heard from you, you know, any follow up? And 239 00:13:18,520 --> 00:13:21,319 Speaker 2: I didn't hear back. I emailed again, and I got 240 00:13:21,320 --> 00:13:23,360 Speaker 2: a curt response from him. I felt it was Kurt 241 00:13:23,360 --> 00:13:26,040 Speaker 2: that just said, rest assured, we're well aware of your situation, 242 00:13:26,120 --> 00:13:28,400 Speaker 2: We're taking all steps necessary, and we'll be in touch. 243 00:13:28,440 --> 00:13:30,000 Speaker 2: And then that was the last day ever heard. 244 00:13:31,080 --> 00:13:36,199 Speaker 1: Let me play a devil's advocate here or conspiracy theorist, 245 00:13:36,240 --> 00:13:39,800 Speaker 1: and let's just positive theory that CBS. 246 00:13:39,360 --> 00:13:42,679 Speaker 2: Was involved in the computer and test in the computer interrutions. 247 00:13:42,760 --> 00:13:44,480 Speaker 1: Let me just let me model that out. I'm not 248 00:13:44,520 --> 00:13:46,920 Speaker 1: asking you to say that that's what you believe. You 249 00:13:46,960 --> 00:13:49,360 Speaker 1: have not said that obviously, but let's just play that 250 00:13:49,440 --> 00:13:51,679 Speaker 1: out as if it were true. And they bring in 251 00:13:51,720 --> 00:13:54,640 Speaker 1: a guy from the NSA who could have been the 252 00:13:54,640 --> 00:13:57,520 Speaker 1: group that was spying on you all along, and he 253 00:13:57,640 --> 00:14:00,800 Speaker 1: says to every other CBS employee, because presume you weren't 254 00:14:00,800 --> 00:14:04,160 Speaker 1: the only one. Again, my crazy theory. He says, Hey, 255 00:14:04,360 --> 00:14:09,000 Speaker 1: if you think you've been hacked, let me know, but 256 00:14:09,120 --> 00:14:11,040 Speaker 1: doesn't point out that we already know one of our 257 00:14:11,040 --> 00:14:17,240 Speaker 1: employees has been That's a great way to gauge whether 258 00:14:17,600 --> 00:14:19,880 Speaker 1: employees are figuring out they're being spiedal. 259 00:14:21,200 --> 00:14:23,080 Speaker 2: I hadn't thought of it that way, but I guess 260 00:14:23,320 --> 00:14:25,800 Speaker 2: you could look at it that way. I'm trying to remember. 261 00:14:25,880 --> 00:14:28,720 Speaker 2: The wording of the email said something like if you 262 00:14:28,800 --> 00:14:32,920 Speaker 2: suspect an intrusion, here the process, and I think it said, 263 00:14:32,960 --> 00:14:37,640 Speaker 2: do not go to law enforcement specifically, and report it 264 00:14:37,680 --> 00:14:41,240 Speaker 2: to CBS. So I can see how you would come 265 00:14:41,280 --> 00:14:42,800 Speaker 2: up with that conspiracy theory. 266 00:14:43,000 --> 00:14:45,480 Speaker 1: And you're right, since the memo is clear that the 267 00:14:45,600 --> 00:14:49,600 Speaker 1: victim has a duty to report, and since Molinov has 268 00:14:49,640 --> 00:14:52,560 Speaker 1: never acknowledged my incident, nor has he contacted me, and 269 00:14:52,600 --> 00:14:54,480 Speaker 1: then you send him the email, which of course he 270 00:14:54,520 --> 00:14:57,560 Speaker 1: doesn't respond to, and then when he finally does respond, 271 00:14:57,640 --> 00:15:01,720 Speaker 1: he gives you a perfunctory response. By my reckoning, if 272 00:15:01,760 --> 00:15:05,720 Speaker 1: I'm running CBS News just from a news judgment question, 273 00:15:06,200 --> 00:15:10,000 Speaker 1: I've got a reporter that's been spied on, probably by 274 00:15:10,040 --> 00:15:13,600 Speaker 1: the government. I've got confirmation I'm running that. I mean, 275 00:15:13,640 --> 00:15:15,600 Speaker 1: this is the story of the decade. 276 00:15:16,560 --> 00:15:20,800 Speaker 2: There were some corporate officials who felt that way and 277 00:15:20,840 --> 00:15:23,480 Speaker 2: were contacting me on their own saying, why aren't we 278 00:15:23,560 --> 00:15:26,160 Speaker 2: doing this? This is way bigger than Watergate? Why aren't 279 00:15:26,160 --> 00:15:28,960 Speaker 2: we doing our own stories on it? And especially, I 280 00:15:29,000 --> 00:15:32,640 Speaker 2: think even for those who wanted to think as I 281 00:15:32,720 --> 00:15:36,440 Speaker 2: initially did, that it sounded far fetched. Once the news 282 00:15:36,480 --> 00:15:40,520 Speaker 2: came out about Edward Snowden and Associated Press and Fox News, 283 00:15:40,840 --> 00:15:42,680 Speaker 2: a lot of things seemed to fall in place. So 284 00:15:42,880 --> 00:15:45,840 Speaker 2: those who might have been very skeptical before, I think 285 00:15:45,880 --> 00:15:48,160 Speaker 2: at this point should have said, Okay, you know there 286 00:15:48,240 --> 00:15:51,040 Speaker 2: was some targeting of journalists. There was targeting of whistleblowers 287 00:15:51,080 --> 00:15:54,360 Speaker 2: going on. We know that for sure. But again, I 288 00:15:54,400 --> 00:15:58,320 Speaker 2: can't explain why there wasn't more more of a reaction. 289 00:15:58,440 --> 00:15:59,480 Speaker 2: I only know there wasn't. 290 00:16:00,080 --> 00:16:03,000 Speaker 1: Here we go again with the constant theme as part 291 00:16:03,040 --> 00:16:09,000 Speaker 1: of a pattern, that what you expected of your employer 292 00:16:09,080 --> 00:16:12,360 Speaker 1: of twenty one year CBS was never the reaction, and 293 00:16:12,400 --> 00:16:16,000 Speaker 1: that you were disappointed, surprised, hurt by this. 294 00:16:16,960 --> 00:16:20,000 Speaker 2: I was surprised and disappointed, and I felt as though 295 00:16:21,800 --> 00:16:24,720 Speaker 2: there should be more attention paid to the news product 296 00:16:24,760 --> 00:16:26,960 Speaker 2: and the protection of the news product, and the idea 297 00:16:27,040 --> 00:16:30,760 Speaker 2: that somebody had been infiltrating our system and perhaps getting 298 00:16:30,760 --> 00:16:33,080 Speaker 2: access to our sources and our private information. 299 00:16:33,360 --> 00:16:36,960 Speaker 1: And the cybersecurity director not only never reached out to you, 300 00:16:37,160 --> 00:16:40,160 Speaker 1: didn't respond to your first email, gave you a perfunctory 301 00:16:40,200 --> 00:16:42,360 Speaker 1: response a second time, but never sat down and asked 302 00:16:42,400 --> 00:16:43,640 Speaker 1: you what exactly had happened to you? 303 00:16:44,080 --> 00:16:48,480 Speaker 2: Right Nobody from CBS ever came to my house conducted 304 00:16:48,520 --> 00:16:51,200 Speaker 2: an in depth interview. I did report it, as I 305 00:16:51,240 --> 00:16:53,320 Speaker 2: said to my bureau chief early on, but there was 306 00:16:53,400 --> 00:16:56,280 Speaker 2: just an, I guess, an intense lack of curiosity and 307 00:16:56,320 --> 00:16:58,440 Speaker 2: followed through on the part of anybody else. From what 308 00:16:58,480 --> 00:17:01,120 Speaker 2: I could tell. 309 00:17:01,360 --> 00:17:07,879 Speaker 1: Wow, that is so disturbing on a level that you 310 00:17:07,960 --> 00:17:11,879 Speaker 1: almost don't want to think about. Cheryl Atkinson is our guest. 311 00:17:12,040 --> 00:17:15,119 Speaker 1: We will continue our conversation with her coming up. The 312 00:17:15,119 --> 00:17:17,760 Speaker 1: book is stonewalled. You can get it most anywhere, and 313 00:17:17,840 --> 00:17:20,040 Speaker 1: if you can't get it where you go, then buy 314 00:17:20,080 --> 00:17:24,399 Speaker 1: it online. The most disturbing thing about this is not 315 00:17:24,520 --> 00:17:29,719 Speaker 1: the individual case. It is the factors at play and 316 00:17:29,760 --> 00:17:34,960 Speaker 1: the players at play that may be working to quash 317 00:17:35,760 --> 00:17:39,160 Speaker 1: you getting information that the media would normally provide. Look 318 00:17:39,160 --> 00:17:41,400 Speaker 1: if a guy's good at news or he isn't, those 319 00:17:41,400 --> 00:17:44,639 Speaker 1: are market related issues, and the marketplace can determine what 320 00:17:44,680 --> 00:17:51,040 Speaker 1: their ratings are. But if media outlets are assisting this 321 00:17:51,200 --> 00:17:56,840 Speaker 1: government in spinning lies, particularly where lives were lost, this 322 00:17:56,880 --> 00:17:59,840 Speaker 1: is disturbing on a level. Let's talk about Cheryl Akison 323 00:17:59,880 --> 00:18:03,160 Speaker 1: case again, she's our guest, I mean the CBS case, 324 00:18:03,560 --> 00:18:07,879 Speaker 1: going back to CBS, because to me, that takes this 325 00:18:08,000 --> 00:18:10,560 Speaker 1: to a new level if in fact CBS was involved 326 00:18:10,720 --> 00:18:14,960 Speaker 1: my allegation, not yours, but you right. Even more disturbing 327 00:18:15,000 --> 00:18:18,240 Speaker 1: word came to me that a CBS manager had convened 328 00:18:18,240 --> 00:18:21,240 Speaker 1: a private meeting with a colleague asking him to turn 329 00:18:21,280 --> 00:18:25,440 Speaker 1: over the name or names of the inside confidential sources 330 00:18:25,640 --> 00:18:28,680 Speaker 1: who had first helped me identify the computer intrusions back 331 00:18:28,720 --> 00:18:33,600 Speaker 1: in January. The colleague didn't have that information. CBS is 332 00:18:33,680 --> 00:18:39,760 Speaker 1: asking one of your colleagues, Hey, who helped Cheryl figure 333 00:18:39,800 --> 00:18:43,800 Speaker 1: out who was intruding on her computer. That's weird. 334 00:18:44,240 --> 00:18:47,080 Speaker 2: There is a lot of weird stuff. And it's funny because. 335 00:18:46,920 --> 00:18:49,520 Speaker 1: So almost like they're trying to paint you as paranoid. 336 00:18:49,680 --> 00:18:55,200 Speaker 2: Either that well, in that instance, I think they know 337 00:18:55,320 --> 00:18:57,840 Speaker 2: I wasn't paranoid. They were trying to get real information. 338 00:18:58,200 --> 00:19:01,480 Speaker 2: Who is my source, SOBS was trying to find my source. 339 00:19:01,600 --> 00:19:03,240 Speaker 1: But the only reason they could have asked you. 340 00:19:03,720 --> 00:19:05,840 Speaker 2: Well, and I had already told them I couldn't tell them. 341 00:19:05,880 --> 00:19:08,120 Speaker 1: So that's why do they need your source, other than 342 00:19:08,160 --> 00:19:11,120 Speaker 1: to determine the veracity that suggests they don't believe. 343 00:19:11,160 --> 00:19:12,960 Speaker 2: No, No, I don't think it was to determine the veracity. 344 00:19:13,000 --> 00:19:14,760 Speaker 2: I think it was to try to identify who was 345 00:19:14,800 --> 00:19:18,120 Speaker 2: talking to me from government connected people. 346 00:19:17,960 --> 00:19:21,119 Speaker 1: And helped me understand if they're on your side, they 347 00:19:21,160 --> 00:19:21,840 Speaker 1: don't need to know. 348 00:19:23,080 --> 00:19:25,439 Speaker 2: I wouldn't think so. I think it was wholly inappropriate 349 00:19:25,480 --> 00:19:27,239 Speaker 2: for them to go behind my back and ask a 350 00:19:27,240 --> 00:19:29,720 Speaker 2: colleague who a confidential source of mine was. I can 351 00:19:29,760 --> 00:19:32,200 Speaker 2: only tell you that's what happened. And it's funny when 352 00:19:32,240 --> 00:19:35,320 Speaker 2: you ask me these questions. I think about in between 353 00:19:35,359 --> 00:19:39,440 Speaker 2: all of this drama, I'm covering stories, but I'm going 354 00:19:39,440 --> 00:19:45,200 Speaker 2: into work every day with the computer intrusion, the politics 355 00:19:45,200 --> 00:19:48,439 Speaker 2: at CBS of the computer intrusion, and also trying to 356 00:19:48,440 --> 00:19:52,480 Speaker 2: cover stories with my producer. And I guess that helps 357 00:19:52,520 --> 00:19:55,080 Speaker 2: explain why I ultimately left. It just got to be 358 00:19:56,040 --> 00:19:58,480 Speaker 2: so much of the job. Instead of just covering news, 359 00:19:58,520 --> 00:20:02,439 Speaker 2: what should be easy is involved in navigating first of 360 00:20:02,480 --> 00:20:05,120 Speaker 2: all the obstacles from the targets of the stories who 361 00:20:05,160 --> 00:20:07,879 Speaker 2: don't want you doing them, that's one thing. And then 362 00:20:07,960 --> 00:20:11,520 Speaker 2: to navigate the obstacles from inside your own network, from 363 00:20:11,640 --> 00:20:14,359 Speaker 2: those who some who don't want those stories told. And 364 00:20:14,400 --> 00:20:17,920 Speaker 2: then to be navigating the politics of the computer issue. 365 00:20:18,119 --> 00:20:20,359 Speaker 2: And yes, some bosses. When I was first trying to 366 00:20:20,440 --> 00:20:25,080 Speaker 2: leave CBS a year before I did, I heard were 367 00:20:25,160 --> 00:20:27,919 Speaker 2: whispering or trying to spread around that I was paranoid. 368 00:20:27,960 --> 00:20:31,800 Speaker 2: Even though they had the forensics that had confirmed the intrusion, 369 00:20:31,880 --> 00:20:34,920 Speaker 2: they hadn't publicly acknowledged it yet. That would be still 370 00:20:34,960 --> 00:20:37,600 Speaker 2: to come, but they were implying to some people that 371 00:20:37,680 --> 00:20:39,399 Speaker 2: I was paranoid over the whole thing. 372 00:20:40,240 --> 00:20:42,719 Speaker 1: You write in the book Stonewall. The next morning, CBS 373 00:20:42,760 --> 00:20:45,560 Speaker 1: This Morning briefly interviews me about the case. It's generating 374 00:20:45,600 --> 00:20:48,000 Speaker 1: a great deal of interest and requests for interviews from 375 00:20:48,000 --> 00:20:51,560 Speaker 1: other news media. The only non CBS entity that the 376 00:20:51,800 --> 00:20:54,080 Speaker 1: company wishes me to speak with is Bill O'Reilly from 377 00:20:54,119 --> 00:20:56,560 Speaker 1: the old Rally Factor on Fox News. I fly to 378 00:20:56,600 --> 00:21:01,159 Speaker 1: New York and appear on his evening program. What was 379 00:21:01,240 --> 00:21:05,200 Speaker 1: limiting you to O'Reilly? An attempt to Bolster that because 380 00:21:05,200 --> 00:21:07,359 Speaker 1: they felt like that would get the story out, or 381 00:21:07,480 --> 00:21:09,240 Speaker 1: was it an attempt to bury the story. 382 00:21:10,359 --> 00:21:12,520 Speaker 2: I don't think they thought they would bury the story 383 00:21:12,600 --> 00:21:16,440 Speaker 2: because he is so widely viewed. I think the way 384 00:21:16,480 --> 00:21:18,760 Speaker 2: they described it to me is they would we would 385 00:21:18,800 --> 00:21:24,040 Speaker 2: do one big outlet that had asked for an interview. Again, 386 00:21:24,240 --> 00:21:26,680 Speaker 2: I had battled in the last couple of years at 387 00:21:26,720 --> 00:21:30,560 Speaker 2: CBS any media which they didn't want me to do 388 00:21:30,640 --> 00:21:35,440 Speaker 2: a lot of media appearances that were wanting to promote 389 00:21:35,640 --> 00:21:38,160 Speaker 2: great news stories and great work that we had done. 390 00:21:38,760 --> 00:21:42,119 Speaker 2: They really dialed back on me having appearances sometimes. I 391 00:21:42,200 --> 00:21:44,320 Speaker 2: was told they didn't want me to do appearances because 392 00:21:44,359 --> 00:21:47,520 Speaker 2: they thought I would be asked about CBS controversies unrelated 393 00:21:47,560 --> 00:21:49,840 Speaker 2: to me that they didn't want me speaking to. And 394 00:21:49,880 --> 00:21:53,240 Speaker 2: I said, well, I'm perfectly capable of answering questions about 395 00:21:53,280 --> 00:21:56,040 Speaker 2: my stories and not answering questions about other people's stories. 396 00:21:56,080 --> 00:21:58,919 Speaker 2: But there was a great deal of clamping down the 397 00:21:59,000 --> 00:21:59,760 Speaker 2: last year or two. 398 00:22:01,000 --> 00:22:07,200 Speaker 1: Meanwhile, Senator Widen is it pronounced widen yep has a 399 00:22:07,400 --> 00:22:11,320 Speaker 1: Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, in his crosshairs, and 400 00:22:11,359 --> 00:22:13,560 Speaker 1: he accuses him of not giving a straight answer to 401 00:22:13,600 --> 00:22:17,320 Speaker 1: the Senate Intelligence Committee three months before, Widen had asked 402 00:22:17,359 --> 00:22:20,800 Speaker 1: Clapper at the March twelfth, twenty thirteen hearing, does the 403 00:22:20,920 --> 00:22:24,639 Speaker 1: NSSA collect any type of data at all on millions 404 00:22:24,680 --> 00:22:29,120 Speaker 1: of or hundreds of millions of Americans? And you point 405 00:22:29,160 --> 00:22:31,640 Speaker 1: out that not only does Clapper lie by saying no, 406 00:22:32,200 --> 00:22:35,000 Speaker 1: but you get to his body language and all what 407 00:22:35,119 --> 00:22:35,680 Speaker 1: happened there. 408 00:22:36,240 --> 00:22:37,760 Speaker 2: You want to read that little part because I don't 409 00:22:37,760 --> 00:22:39,919 Speaker 2: rememb exactly what I wrote, but I did find it 410 00:22:40,040 --> 00:22:41,200 Speaker 2: very interesting when I wrote. 411 00:22:41,000 --> 00:22:44,320 Speaker 1: Those, sir. Clapper replies, quickly shaking his head and pressing 412 00:22:44,320 --> 00:22:47,520 Speaker 1: the fingers of his right hand against his forehead, almost 413 00:22:47,520 --> 00:22:52,600 Speaker 1: shielding his eyes from making direct contact as he looks down, down, up, down, 414 00:22:53,080 --> 00:22:58,000 Speaker 1: all inside of about two seconds, it does not. Widen repeats, 415 00:22:58,000 --> 00:23:02,480 Speaker 1: eyebrows raised, not whittinge. Clapper continues shaking his head and 416 00:23:02,520 --> 00:23:06,200 Speaker 1: begins stroking his forehead with the four fingers. These are 417 00:23:06,240 --> 00:23:10,640 Speaker 1: cases where they could inadvertently perhaps collect but not wittingly. 418 00:23:11,119 --> 00:23:14,119 Speaker 1: Clapper looks up and down fifteen times by my account, 419 00:23:14,560 --> 00:23:16,600 Speaker 1: in the span of that brief. 420 00:23:16,680 --> 00:23:20,359 Speaker 2: Answer, and we now know I didn't say he lied, 421 00:23:20,480 --> 00:23:23,840 Speaker 2: because that's putting a motivation in someone's head. He acknowledged 422 00:23:23,880 --> 00:23:26,520 Speaker 2: the information he gave was false, and he had different 423 00:23:26,520 --> 00:23:28,760 Speaker 2: reasons for why he gave the false information. But we 424 00:23:28,840 --> 00:23:33,639 Speaker 2: now know that, of course they were monitoring in some 425 00:23:33,760 --> 00:23:36,080 Speaker 2: way hundreds of millions, collecting data on hundreds. 426 00:23:35,800 --> 00:23:40,119 Speaker 1: Of Edward Snowden. For that, that's right, But at that 427 00:23:40,200 --> 00:23:42,040 Speaker 1: point we didn't know who Edward Snowden was. 428 00:23:42,200 --> 00:23:45,639 Speaker 2: Right, and Widen knew the reason Wyden was asking the questions. 429 00:23:45,640 --> 00:23:48,800 Speaker 2: Widen on the Intelligence Committee was privy to information long 430 00:23:48,880 --> 00:23:52,760 Speaker 2: before he was aware. He was aware long before we 431 00:23:52,760 --> 00:23:56,280 Speaker 2: were that this was happening, and felt that it was wrong, 432 00:23:56,400 --> 00:23:58,560 Speaker 2: this collection of data, and was trying to bring it 433 00:23:58,560 --> 00:24:01,240 Speaker 2: to light in a public format a way that wouldn't violate, 434 00:24:01,560 --> 00:24:04,439 Speaker 2: you know, intelligence restrictions. And that's why he was so 435 00:24:04,560 --> 00:24:07,679 Speaker 2: outraged to hear Clapper's answer, because Widen knew his answer 436 00:24:07,720 --> 00:24:08,080 Speaker 2: was wrong. 437 00:24:08,400 --> 00:24:12,840 Speaker 1: Why would Widen Why would Clapper answer instead of saying, 438 00:24:12,880 --> 00:24:15,919 Speaker 1: as he often does, let's talk about this in private, 439 00:24:15,960 --> 00:24:18,960 Speaker 1: we'll talk about that in public. Coming up, our guest 440 00:24:18,960 --> 00:24:23,320 Speaker 1: is Sheryl Atkinson. The book is Stonewalled, third degree black belt. 441 00:24:24,040 --> 00:24:26,520 Speaker 2: I just tested for fourth and I think I passed. 442 00:24:26,720 --> 00:24:28,440 Speaker 1: Oh, we need to get can you get Chad in here. 443 00:24:28,560 --> 00:24:32,320 Speaker 1: Chad our Chad Naganishi is an MMA fighter. 444 00:24:33,480 --> 00:24:34,320 Speaker 2: I don't want to fight anything. 445 00:24:34,359 --> 00:24:36,440 Speaker 1: Yeah. Yeah, it's a Japanese name and he's from Hawaii 446 00:24:36,480 --> 00:24:38,760 Speaker 1: and he grew up with bjpenn. He fought with bjpen 447 00:24:39,119 --> 00:24:40,760 Speaker 1: That's what he does every day. There's one of them 448 00:24:40,800 --> 00:24:41,080 Speaker 1: that he. 449 00:24:41,160 --> 00:24:42,040 Speaker 2: Can kick his butt. 450 00:24:42,119 --> 00:24:44,320 Speaker 1: You think you could, yeah, okay, it'd be fun, y'all 451 00:24:44,359 --> 00:24:46,639 Speaker 1: could do. We could have some striking exercises or something. 452 00:24:47,080 --> 00:24:49,800 Speaker 1: But he there's one of the disciplines that he says 453 00:24:49,840 --> 00:24:53,399 Speaker 1: it's real easy. Is that it taekwondo. Yeah, he doesn't 454 00:24:53,400 --> 00:24:55,480 Speaker 1: respect like you could be you know, fourth degree and 455 00:24:55,480 --> 00:24:57,679 Speaker 1: he's like, that's like a brown belt in karate. 456 00:24:57,960 --> 00:25:00,560 Speaker 2: It may be Oh, which one w answer. 457 00:25:00,720 --> 00:25:03,119 Speaker 1: He's such a big fan of your work and an 458 00:25:03,160 --> 00:25:07,119 Speaker 1: admirer that he's remaining silent on the subject. Okay, well 459 00:25:07,400 --> 00:25:09,320 Speaker 1: that's as you could. You want to find him, though. 460 00:25:09,359 --> 00:25:11,040 Speaker 2: I could. I could kick an apple off the top 461 00:25:11,080 --> 00:25:11,360 Speaker 2: of his. 462 00:25:11,320 --> 00:25:18,800 Speaker 1: Head high heels the William Till experience. Back to the 463 00:25:18,840 --> 00:25:21,600 Speaker 1: matter at hand. We ended that interview ran out of time. 464 00:25:22,280 --> 00:25:25,359 Speaker 1: Why would the NSA director even lie? Why would he 465 00:25:25,440 --> 00:25:29,280 Speaker 1: answer the question knowing he's lying on the record. I mean, look, 466 00:25:29,800 --> 00:25:35,600 Speaker 1: Roger Craiger, Roger Clemens had to come back to Washington 467 00:25:36,119 --> 00:25:39,560 Speaker 1: and spend millions on a Rusty Harden here in legal 468 00:25:39,600 --> 00:25:42,359 Speaker 1: fees over whether he shot steroids in his butt? 469 00:25:42,600 --> 00:25:44,400 Speaker 2: Was he was he an essay director at the time, 470 00:25:44,480 --> 00:25:47,159 Speaker 2: or wasn't he director of national intelligence? 471 00:25:47,320 --> 00:25:48,800 Speaker 1: Yeah? Do you say national intelligence? 472 00:25:48,880 --> 00:25:49,120 Speaker 2: Yeah? 473 00:25:49,840 --> 00:25:50,360 Speaker 1: Why not say? 474 00:25:51,720 --> 00:25:53,199 Speaker 2: I mean? And I point out in the book the 475 00:25:53,240 --> 00:25:56,040 Speaker 2: best answer if you didn't want to tell something that 476 00:25:56,160 --> 00:25:58,240 Speaker 2: wasn't true would be to say, let's go to closed 477 00:25:58,240 --> 00:26:01,159 Speaker 2: session or I can't talk about that and open session. 478 00:26:01,240 --> 00:26:03,359 Speaker 2: I don't know why he gave that answer, especially in 479 00:26:03,440 --> 00:26:05,520 Speaker 2: light of the fact that Wyden claims he sent over 480 00:26:05,520 --> 00:26:08,199 Speaker 2: the question I believe a day in advance, so that 481 00:26:08,280 --> 00:26:09,680 Speaker 2: he would know to expect it. 482 00:26:09,680 --> 00:26:11,439 Speaker 1: So they would have debated it. And he knew he 483 00:26:11,480 --> 00:26:13,600 Speaker 1: was lying, or he knew he wasn't telling the truth 484 00:26:13,600 --> 00:26:14,000 Speaker 1: to use. 485 00:26:13,920 --> 00:26:17,480 Speaker 2: Your language, he knew he's giving an accurate information. 486 00:26:17,840 --> 00:26:19,960 Speaker 1: Yes, I yeah. 487 00:26:20,040 --> 00:26:23,560 Speaker 2: I can't explain why. And I guess he thought maybe 488 00:26:23,680 --> 00:26:25,720 Speaker 2: Widen couldn't really call him on it because it was 489 00:26:25,760 --> 00:26:29,080 Speaker 2: based on, you know, intelligence Widen couldn't talk about in public, 490 00:26:29,160 --> 00:26:30,639 Speaker 2: so maybe he'd never have to address it. 491 00:26:31,520 --> 00:26:34,240 Speaker 1: We were talking off airon will conclude the hour with 492 00:26:34,359 --> 00:26:39,680 Speaker 1: this conversation about your concerns as a longtime newsperson, as 493 00:26:39,680 --> 00:26:42,679 Speaker 1: a person that's watched the events of our nation, and 494 00:26:42,800 --> 00:26:48,119 Speaker 1: a person with a relatively newfound willingness to look at 495 00:26:48,119 --> 00:26:50,920 Speaker 1: conspiracy theories twice because sometimes it turns out they're true. 496 00:26:52,080 --> 00:26:55,200 Speaker 1: And we were talking about theories that are out there 497 00:26:55,320 --> 00:26:57,760 Speaker 1: with regard to these protests that keep popping up. Eric 498 00:26:57,800 --> 00:27:01,800 Speaker 1: Garner and New York and of course Ferguson and the 499 00:27:01,960 --> 00:27:05,520 Speaker 1: tie in from al Qaeda or ISIS or different groups 500 00:27:05,840 --> 00:27:08,280 Speaker 1: that are much more sophisticated than they ever were to 501 00:27:08,480 --> 00:27:11,639 Speaker 1: use civil unrest as a means of infiltration. 502 00:27:12,800 --> 00:27:16,560 Speaker 2: We have heard evidence in the last year or so 503 00:27:17,640 --> 00:27:22,720 Speaker 2: of the successful ways that terrorist type organizations can recruit. 504 00:27:22,760 --> 00:27:26,600 Speaker 2: How can they get Americans and Europeans? How are they 505 00:27:27,080 --> 00:27:28,840 Speaker 2: speaking to them in such a way that some of 506 00:27:28,880 --> 00:27:31,880 Speaker 2: them want to join the cause. And it's been said 507 00:27:31,920 --> 00:27:35,919 Speaker 2: that they are able to play on the disenfranchisement and 508 00:27:35,960 --> 00:27:40,320 Speaker 2: the anger of those who feel disenfranchised, And this is 509 00:27:40,359 --> 00:27:45,000 Speaker 2: what they did, according to intelligence sources in other countries 510 00:27:45,080 --> 00:27:49,920 Speaker 2: where they prayed on civil unrest that existed, they saw 511 00:27:50,000 --> 00:27:53,399 Speaker 2: an opening. They used meaning the terrorists social media to 512 00:27:53,480 --> 00:27:56,159 Speaker 2: exacerbate it where they whereby they could move into the 513 00:27:56,280 --> 00:28:00,840 Speaker 2: vacuum as they've done and make inroads. One wonders, as 514 00:28:00,880 --> 00:28:04,800 Speaker 2: we see this civil unrest over the racial incidents, or 515 00:28:04,800 --> 00:28:08,639 Speaker 2: the alleged racial incidents here in the United States, would terrorists, 516 00:28:09,040 --> 00:28:11,240 Speaker 2: who we know are trying to make inroads in this 517 00:28:11,320 --> 00:28:14,760 Speaker 2: country and damage this country seize upon this or see 518 00:28:14,800 --> 00:28:19,919 Speaker 2: it at least as an opportunity to get an advantage 519 00:28:19,920 --> 00:28:22,359 Speaker 2: in the chaos, and perhaps even to recruit some of 520 00:28:22,400 --> 00:28:25,240 Speaker 2: the young, disenfranchised people. 521 00:28:25,200 --> 00:28:30,040 Speaker 1: Which wouldn't be new. It was the Gangster Disciples or 522 00:28:30,080 --> 00:28:33,479 Speaker 1: the King Street. I can't remember the group, but I 523 00:28:33,520 --> 00:28:37,760 Speaker 1: saw a story on this out of Chicago when Kadafi 524 00:28:37,960 --> 00:28:42,360 Speaker 1: was after Reagan had struck Kadafi's tent and killed his daughter, 525 00:28:42,400 --> 00:28:45,160 Speaker 1: and Kaddafi was looking for ways to attack us back. 526 00:28:45,200 --> 00:28:46,840 Speaker 1: And of course there was Locker Bee and everything that 527 00:28:46,880 --> 00:28:49,760 Speaker 1: went along with all that, And there was a conviction 528 00:28:50,400 --> 00:28:55,640 Speaker 1: for a black gang in Chicago. They had received I 529 00:28:55,640 --> 00:28:58,120 Speaker 1: think it was a million bucks in a payout, plus 530 00:28:58,160 --> 00:29:01,560 Speaker 1: the cost of doing it. There was The plan was 531 00:29:01,600 --> 00:29:05,400 Speaker 1: to drive these trucks full of gasoline empty the trucks 532 00:29:05,440 --> 00:29:07,880 Speaker 1: all at one time into the sewer system and light it. 533 00:29:08,320 --> 00:29:10,960 Speaker 1: And it was an attempt by Kaddafi to test what 534 00:29:11,000 --> 00:29:13,040 Speaker 1: you could do. He wasn't sure it would work, but 535 00:29:13,080 --> 00:29:14,760 Speaker 1: they had it all and you know, they nailed him. 536 00:29:14,760 --> 00:29:17,840 Speaker 1: The guys went to jail for a long time. Kaddafi 537 00:29:18,640 --> 00:29:21,760 Speaker 1: paid It was at least a million. There were allegations 538 00:29:21,760 --> 00:29:23,720 Speaker 1: that it was up to three or four for Lewis 539 00:29:23,760 --> 00:29:30,360 Speaker 1: Farrakhan's mosque in Chicago, a rather odd charitable gesture. You've 540 00:29:30,400 --> 00:29:32,360 Speaker 1: had a series of these sort of because if you're 541 00:29:32,360 --> 00:29:36,120 Speaker 1: going to look to exploit the discontented in America, young 542 00:29:36,200 --> 00:29:38,880 Speaker 1: black youths would seem to be an easy way to go. 543 00:29:39,000 --> 00:29:40,120 Speaker 1: You throw some cash at them. 544 00:29:40,360 --> 00:29:44,960 Speaker 2: And you saw Farakhan's language recently speaking about killing them, 545 00:29:45,040 --> 00:29:48,440 Speaker 2: meaning I guess white police officers are killing one of 546 00:29:48,480 --> 00:29:51,200 Speaker 2: theirs when they killed one of ours, meaning a young 547 00:29:51,320 --> 00:29:55,640 Speaker 2: black or black youth. So I do think there's reason 548 00:29:55,680 --> 00:29:59,520 Speaker 2: to watch for that possible attempted exploitations some terrorists or 549 00:29:59,640 --> 00:30:01,880 Speaker 2: not st stupid And this are the very types of 550 00:30:01,880 --> 00:30:03,440 Speaker 2: scenarios I would imagine they look. 551 00:30:03,360 --> 00:30:06,240 Speaker 1: For Kwan al Lex, who is a new Black Panther 552 00:30:06,360 --> 00:30:09,520 Speaker 1: leader here in Houston, and we disagree on a lot 553 00:30:09,520 --> 00:30:12,000 Speaker 1: of issues. But he told me off air and then 554 00:30:12,080 --> 00:30:14,320 Speaker 1: was willing to come on air and talk about at 555 00:30:14,320 --> 00:30:17,719 Speaker 1: the Black mosque that he attends, or that he was attend, 556 00:30:17,760 --> 00:30:20,360 Speaker 1: it was a different one than he attends. He noticed 557 00:30:20,400 --> 00:30:22,720 Speaker 1: all of a sudden these Middle Eastern men coming in 558 00:30:23,200 --> 00:30:26,400 Speaker 1: and they were very hush hushed in the way they 559 00:30:26,400 --> 00:30:28,280 Speaker 1: were going about their business, and it was odd. This 560 00:30:28,480 --> 00:30:33,240 Speaker 1: was not a Saudi temple or a Saudi mosque, and 561 00:30:33,320 --> 00:30:36,640 Speaker 1: these guys were showing up, and he sensed that something 562 00:30:36,800 --> 00:30:39,640 Speaker 1: very odd was going on. We've heard from him and 563 00:30:39,680 --> 00:30:44,320 Speaker 1: others that Middle Eastern Muslims are going into American prisons 564 00:30:44,800 --> 00:30:50,040 Speaker 1: and that they target young black men to recruit presumably 565 00:30:50,080 --> 00:30:52,600 Speaker 1: to Islam. But what we're seeing with the recruiter out 566 00:30:52,640 --> 00:30:55,959 Speaker 1: of Oklahoma is recruiting them for Islam, is meaning recruiting 567 00:30:56,040 --> 00:30:58,080 Speaker 1: them to behead in these. 568 00:30:57,920 --> 00:31:02,120 Speaker 2: Cases something to watch for. And I would imagine and 569 00:31:02,240 --> 00:31:04,840 Speaker 2: think that our intelligence experts are looking out for that 570 00:31:05,080 --> 00:31:08,640 Speaker 2: even as their you know, is these situations are developing 571 00:31:08,680 --> 00:31:10,400 Speaker 2: this country. They have to be looking at that. 572 00:31:11,440 --> 00:31:14,400 Speaker 1: Well, let me conclude by saying that I appreciate the 573 00:31:14,400 --> 00:31:18,000 Speaker 1: good work you have done professionally over all these years. 574 00:31:18,000 --> 00:31:20,440 Speaker 1: But particularly over the last few years. I think it's 575 00:31:20,480 --> 00:31:24,560 Speaker 1: been brave to stand up against and expose what has 576 00:31:24,600 --> 00:31:26,880 Speaker 1: happened to you, and I think we're a better republic 577 00:31:26,920 --> 00:31:27,400 Speaker 1: because of it. 578 00:31:27,720 --> 00:31:29,640 Speaker 2: Well, thank you for having me and have me on 579 00:31:29,880 --> 00:31:32,040 Speaker 2: such a long form where we could really talk about 580 00:31:32,080 --> 00:31:33,800 Speaker 2: some of this in a meaningful way. I appreciate it. 581 00:31:33,760 --> 00:31:35,280 Speaker 1: It's a long form. It didn't seem like a. 582 00:31:35,280 --> 00:31:37,600 Speaker 2: Long time, no exactly. 583 00:31:39,240 --> 00:31:42,240 Speaker 1: If you like The Michael Berry Show in podcast, please 584 00:31:42,440 --> 00:31:46,560 Speaker 1: tell one friend, and if you're so inclined, write a 585 00:31:46,680 --> 00:31:51,720 Speaker 1: nice review of our podcast. 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