1 00:00:02,720 --> 00:00:16,520 Speaker 1: Bloomberg Audio Studios, Podcasts, Radio News. 2 00:00:18,079 --> 00:00:21,680 Speaker 2: Hello and welcome to another episode of the Odd Laws podcast. 3 00:00:21,800 --> 00:00:24,160 Speaker 3: I'm Joe Wisenthal, and I'm Tracy Alloway. 4 00:00:24,520 --> 00:00:27,319 Speaker 2: Tracy, you know, I think we're roughly maybe a little 5 00:00:27,360 --> 00:00:29,840 Speaker 2: bit less than two weeks into the war in Iran. 6 00:00:29,960 --> 00:00:33,519 Speaker 2: We are recording this March twelfth, twenty twenty six, and 7 00:00:33,640 --> 00:00:35,920 Speaker 2: there are of course extraordinary number of questions about the 8 00:00:36,000 --> 00:00:39,479 Speaker 2: timing and the duration of the war. We know already 9 00:00:39,520 --> 00:00:43,080 Speaker 2: that the economic impact has been quite significant, particularly if 10 00:00:43,080 --> 00:00:46,120 Speaker 2: you just look at commodity markets. But one of the 11 00:00:46,240 --> 00:00:49,800 Speaker 2: questions that sort of may help determine timing or outcome. 12 00:00:50,240 --> 00:00:52,159 Speaker 2: I guess you know when we talked about this in 13 00:00:53,560 --> 00:00:56,800 Speaker 2: after the war in Ukraine started. Wars are about supply 14 00:00:56,920 --> 00:01:01,560 Speaker 2: chains in large sense, and quite obviously, wars are about 15 00:01:01,920 --> 00:01:04,280 Speaker 2: size and the scale of the arsenals and how fast 16 00:01:04,319 --> 00:01:05,319 Speaker 2: they can be replenished. 17 00:01:05,400 --> 00:01:08,960 Speaker 4: Right, Two things I know wars logistics, yes, and also 18 00:01:09,040 --> 00:01:10,600 Speaker 4: war is a racket. And the only reason I know 19 00:01:10,640 --> 00:01:12,920 Speaker 4: that is because I just literally downloaded the book, so 20 00:01:12,959 --> 00:01:14,440 Speaker 4: I'll know more about that in a second. 21 00:01:14,520 --> 00:01:16,080 Speaker 3: But you're absolutely right. 22 00:01:16,120 --> 00:01:19,520 Speaker 4: I do not like talking about war or conflict or 23 00:01:19,760 --> 00:01:22,600 Speaker 4: military stuff in general, but I do enjoy talking about 24 00:01:22,600 --> 00:01:23,440 Speaker 4: supply chains. 25 00:01:23,560 --> 00:01:25,520 Speaker 3: And there's one crucial supply. 26 00:01:25,280 --> 00:01:28,919 Speaker 4: Chain that we haven't really discussed in detail ever before, 27 00:01:28,959 --> 00:01:31,600 Speaker 4: but it keeps coming up more and more in this conflict. 28 00:01:32,000 --> 00:01:35,399 Speaker 2: Yeah, that's right. So obviously, you know, you see these 29 00:01:35,560 --> 00:01:37,880 Speaker 2: numbers and I don't know how real they are, but 30 00:01:38,000 --> 00:01:41,840 Speaker 2: their extraordinary. You know, that's like Iran can launch an 31 00:01:41,880 --> 00:01:46,520 Speaker 2: attack against a military base and in nearby country, et cetera. 32 00:01:46,800 --> 00:01:50,120 Speaker 2: So I'll just talk about the extraordinary efficacy of cheap 33 00:01:50,280 --> 00:01:52,560 Speaker 2: drones and so forth, and then you hear about the 34 00:01:52,560 --> 00:01:55,320 Speaker 2: extraordinary cost of basilid defense, right. 35 00:01:55,120 --> 00:01:59,480 Speaker 4: So putting on our old international relations hat. Yeah, A 36 00:01:59,520 --> 00:02:01,320 Speaker 4: lot of what we used to study was this idea 37 00:02:01,320 --> 00:02:04,320 Speaker 4: of asymmetric warfare, right, And the classic examples that would 38 00:02:04,320 --> 00:02:07,120 Speaker 4: come up would be guerrilla warfare, where you know, you 39 00:02:07,200 --> 00:02:12,840 Speaker 4: have a less well equipped army that is engaging in 40 00:02:13,280 --> 00:02:18,360 Speaker 4: exhausting skirmishes against like a better equipped, larger army, and 41 00:02:18,400 --> 00:02:20,919 Speaker 4: it's a way of like offsetting their own weaknesses against 42 00:02:20,960 --> 00:02:24,720 Speaker 4: the strengths of another force. Nowadays, we don't really have 43 00:02:24,800 --> 00:02:28,480 Speaker 4: that kind of ground conflict knock on wood, but you're 44 00:02:28,520 --> 00:02:31,560 Speaker 4: seeing it, some people say, play out in this arena 45 00:02:31,600 --> 00:02:34,160 Speaker 4: of missiles, which is really where all this conflict is 46 00:02:34,200 --> 00:02:36,520 Speaker 4: playing out is in the missile space. So you hear 47 00:02:36,560 --> 00:02:39,880 Speaker 4: these stories about like Iran is launching these drones that 48 00:02:40,000 --> 00:02:43,480 Speaker 4: cost I think twenty five thousand dollars upopo some of them, 49 00:02:43,840 --> 00:02:46,800 Speaker 4: or putting minds in the Strait of Hormuz, which are 50 00:02:46,800 --> 00:02:50,320 Speaker 4: also very cheap relative to some other tactics. And meanwhile 51 00:02:50,400 --> 00:02:53,240 Speaker 4: you hear things like, well, the UAE's missile defense system 52 00:02:53,440 --> 00:02:57,880 Speaker 4: costs like millions of dollars per pop literally per pop 53 00:02:58,120 --> 00:03:01,040 Speaker 4: against a drone. And meanwhile the US is firing you know, 54 00:03:01,120 --> 00:03:04,720 Speaker 4: interceptor missiles or whatever that cost again millions and millions 55 00:03:04,760 --> 00:03:05,240 Speaker 4: of dollars. 56 00:03:05,560 --> 00:03:07,960 Speaker 2: Yeah, and you hear and you know, again the math, 57 00:03:08,160 --> 00:03:11,320 Speaker 2: the sort of missile math, seems very lopsided. And then 58 00:03:11,400 --> 00:03:13,880 Speaker 2: of course the question is just the pure numbers and 59 00:03:13,919 --> 00:03:16,559 Speaker 2: how many do you have? And what is the capacity 60 00:03:16,639 --> 00:03:20,440 Speaker 2: to ramp up production, et cetera. All huge questions that. 61 00:03:20,400 --> 00:03:22,919 Speaker 3: Are where do missiles actually come from? 62 00:03:23,040 --> 00:03:23,679 Speaker 2: Where they made? 63 00:03:23,720 --> 00:03:24,079 Speaker 5: That's right? 64 00:03:24,080 --> 00:03:26,880 Speaker 2: Anyway, we have a ton of questions and we don't 65 00:03:26,919 --> 00:03:28,600 Speaker 2: have the answers, but we're going to learn a lot. 66 00:03:28,639 --> 00:03:31,519 Speaker 2: We have the perfect guest, someone who knows about this intimately, 67 00:03:31,560 --> 00:03:34,280 Speaker 2: someone who focuses on this entirely. We're going to be 68 00:03:34,360 --> 00:03:37,840 Speaker 2: speaking with Tom Kerrico, Senior Fellow and director of the 69 00:03:37,880 --> 00:03:41,440 Speaker 2: Missile Defense Project at CSIS, and he's going to walk 70 00:03:41,520 --> 00:03:43,120 Speaker 2: us through all of this and how to think about 71 00:03:43,280 --> 00:03:46,040 Speaker 2: the supply chain of these armaments. So, Tom, thank you 72 00:03:46,080 --> 00:03:47,520 Speaker 2: so much for coming on odd Lacks. 73 00:03:47,880 --> 00:03:49,000 Speaker 5: Hey, great to be with y'all. 74 00:03:49,440 --> 00:03:51,360 Speaker 2: Thank you so much. What do you tell us just 75 00:03:51,400 --> 00:03:53,240 Speaker 2: to begin? What do you do? What is the focus 76 00:03:53,240 --> 00:03:53,680 Speaker 2: of your work? 77 00:03:53,800 --> 00:03:56,400 Speaker 5: CSIS Center for Strategic International Studies, I would say, is 78 00:03:56,400 --> 00:03:58,600 Speaker 5: the main defense think tank in Washington, d C. It's 79 00:03:58,600 --> 00:04:01,680 Speaker 5: been around since you know, I think the sixties in 80 00:04:01,680 --> 00:04:06,000 Speaker 5: the Cold War. And within CSI asked, there's sort of 81 00:04:06,280 --> 00:04:08,800 Speaker 5: the department that focuses on hard power to focus on 82 00:04:08,840 --> 00:04:12,839 Speaker 5: defense department centric things, and within that I run the 83 00:04:12,880 --> 00:04:19,120 Speaker 5: Missile Defense Project And so basically think mud to space, uads, 84 00:04:19,400 --> 00:04:23,400 Speaker 5: cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, space sensors, you know, everything in 85 00:04:23,160 --> 00:04:26,880 Speaker 5: that window, both offense and defense is what my team 86 00:04:26,960 --> 00:04:31,040 Speaker 5: kind of studies, writes about, comments upon and hosts just 87 00:04:31,440 --> 00:04:32,839 Speaker 5: a lot of events and commentary. 88 00:04:33,839 --> 00:04:36,240 Speaker 4: Actually, before we even get into missiles, this is a 89 00:04:36,320 --> 00:04:38,160 Speaker 4: question I wanted to ask, but why do we have 90 00:04:38,440 --> 00:04:41,360 Speaker 4: defense think tanks anyway? 91 00:04:41,520 --> 00:04:42,440 Speaker 3: Like why do these exist? 92 00:04:42,520 --> 00:04:44,880 Speaker 4: Because if you think about military conflict in the US, 93 00:04:45,160 --> 00:04:49,360 Speaker 4: presumably there should just be one actor engaged in military 94 00:04:49,400 --> 00:04:52,160 Speaker 4: conflict with other states at any one moment of time, 95 00:04:52,200 --> 00:04:54,960 Speaker 4: and that's the actual US government, the Department of Defense 96 00:04:55,000 --> 00:04:58,320 Speaker 4: slash Department of War. Why do we need private actors 97 00:04:58,440 --> 00:05:04,760 Speaker 4: opining on military Harry tactic strategy, supply chains at all. 98 00:05:04,920 --> 00:05:07,600 Speaker 5: Yeah, that's a good question, that's a fair question, and 99 00:05:07,680 --> 00:05:11,320 Speaker 5: I think I would answer it with what folks coming 100 00:05:11,360 --> 00:05:15,160 Speaker 5: out of d D always say, which is is the 101 00:05:15,200 --> 00:05:20,440 Speaker 5: world's largest bureaucracy, and quite literally, they don't have time 102 00:05:20,520 --> 00:05:23,280 Speaker 5: to think that. That is what senior officials say all 103 00:05:23,320 --> 00:05:25,520 Speaker 5: the time. And when you go in you also tend 104 00:05:25,520 --> 00:05:28,440 Speaker 5: not to have new ideas, and so it's kind of 105 00:05:28,440 --> 00:05:33,360 Speaker 5: an opportunity for idea generation. And this is not my formulation, 106 00:05:33,480 --> 00:05:35,120 Speaker 5: this is what you frequently hear from people who go 107 00:05:35,160 --> 00:05:38,719 Speaker 5: in and out of government that they need those idea 108 00:05:38,800 --> 00:05:41,920 Speaker 5: generation in a way to be contracted out by those 109 00:05:41,960 --> 00:05:44,320 Speaker 5: people who have time. And so, having said that, a 110 00:05:44,320 --> 00:05:46,440 Speaker 5: lot of people who go into government come from the 111 00:05:46,480 --> 00:05:49,479 Speaker 5: think tank world, come from the policy worlds, I think 112 00:05:49,640 --> 00:05:52,240 Speaker 5: I would put it rather, and they go out. I 113 00:05:52,279 --> 00:05:56,880 Speaker 5: think they write some things, they reflect on things, and 114 00:05:56,920 --> 00:05:59,000 Speaker 5: study things, and then they kind of perhaps go back 115 00:05:59,040 --> 00:06:01,320 Speaker 5: in to together. 116 00:06:01,680 --> 00:06:05,359 Speaker 2: Let's talk about from the outside perspective. You know, you 117 00:06:05,440 --> 00:06:09,200 Speaker 2: try to estimate the size of the arsenal various different 118 00:06:09,320 --> 00:06:13,120 Speaker 2: weapons that the US has. How transparent is the government 119 00:06:13,279 --> 00:06:17,159 Speaker 2: about the size of stockpiles? And how much is one's 120 00:06:17,240 --> 00:06:20,200 Speaker 2: job from the think tank world from the outside an 121 00:06:20,240 --> 00:06:24,280 Speaker 2: exercise and triangulation, inference and so forth to be able 122 00:06:24,320 --> 00:06:27,359 Speaker 2: to understand these things. And then just like after besides 123 00:06:27,440 --> 00:06:31,080 Speaker 2: this sort of approach you take to measuring these things, 124 00:06:31,200 --> 00:06:33,040 Speaker 2: what are some of the numbers that we're talking about 125 00:06:33,080 --> 00:06:33,440 Speaker 2: right now. 126 00:06:34,600 --> 00:06:38,200 Speaker 5: Yeah, So, look, it's got a very case to case. 127 00:06:38,640 --> 00:06:40,599 Speaker 5: But I would say in many respects, although it's the 128 00:06:40,600 --> 00:06:45,039 Speaker 5: government's job to keep a number of things secret so 129 00:06:45,080 --> 00:06:47,560 Speaker 5: that the bad guys don't know exactly what we have 130 00:06:48,040 --> 00:06:50,600 Speaker 5: or how many we have, rather I would nevertheless say 131 00:06:50,600 --> 00:06:54,560 Speaker 5: that to a very large extent, we are a democracy, 132 00:06:54,920 --> 00:06:58,320 Speaker 5: and a lot of detail is available in the budget 133 00:06:58,320 --> 00:07:00,240 Speaker 5: books that go over to Congress every year. One of 134 00:07:00,240 --> 00:07:03,279 Speaker 5: the budget request, the annual Lune request, comes out and 135 00:07:03,360 --> 00:07:07,360 Speaker 5: so there is a pretty good amount of tracking. If 136 00:07:07,400 --> 00:07:10,160 Speaker 5: you want to understand what kind of defense department you have, 137 00:07:10,240 --> 00:07:12,840 Speaker 5: look at the money, and so there's a there's a 138 00:07:12,880 --> 00:07:15,840 Speaker 5: decent amount of information out there about you might say, 139 00:07:15,880 --> 00:07:20,480 Speaker 5: the garden variety missiles, the garden variety capabilities that have 140 00:07:20,560 --> 00:07:24,920 Speaker 5: to be you know, deliberated, appropriated by Congress, and then 141 00:07:25,000 --> 00:07:29,320 Speaker 5: also built by industry. And so while exact numbers are 142 00:07:29,640 --> 00:07:33,160 Speaker 5: kept sensitive, you can get pretty close in terms of 143 00:07:33,600 --> 00:07:37,440 Speaker 5: these dollars and this number of rounds you can get. 144 00:07:37,920 --> 00:07:38,760 Speaker 5: You can get pretty close. 145 00:07:38,960 --> 00:07:41,000 Speaker 4: Can you For those who haven't been following this as 146 00:07:41,040 --> 00:07:44,600 Speaker 4: intensely as you have, can you paint a schematic of 147 00:07:44,920 --> 00:07:47,800 Speaker 4: the kind of missiles where we're talking about when we 148 00:07:47,880 --> 00:07:51,200 Speaker 4: talk about the situation in Iran right now? And what 149 00:07:51,360 --> 00:07:54,840 Speaker 4: exactly are the different missile types being used for I know, 150 00:07:55,400 --> 00:07:58,640 Speaker 4: guys love talking about missile names right and being like 151 00:07:58,800 --> 00:08:01,920 Speaker 4: armchair militaries. So some people might know this already, but 152 00:08:01,960 --> 00:08:03,960 Speaker 4: for the benefit of those of us who have it, 153 00:08:04,160 --> 00:08:06,360 Speaker 4: you know, we just see a missile and it's a missile. 154 00:08:06,720 --> 00:08:09,160 Speaker 4: What are the different types that are currently being deployed? 155 00:08:09,920 --> 00:08:15,040 Speaker 5: Basically, there's platforms and there's projectiles. You know, aircraft, ground vehicles, 156 00:08:15,400 --> 00:08:17,680 Speaker 5: ships and this sort of thing. But basically, since the 157 00:08:17,720 --> 00:08:23,160 Speaker 5: nineteen sixties there's been a high, high degree of emphasis 158 00:08:23,160 --> 00:08:28,320 Speaker 5: on essentially guided missiles, precision guide of munitions of various kinds, 159 00:08:28,560 --> 00:08:35,000 Speaker 5: and also standoff capability and so you know, indirect fire cannons, guns, 160 00:08:35,040 --> 00:08:38,840 Speaker 5: this kind of thing began to be replaced by much 161 00:08:38,880 --> 00:08:41,760 Speaker 5: more over the horizon capabilities that could fly out of 162 00:08:41,760 --> 00:08:44,160 Speaker 5: good ways come back down, and especially in terms of 163 00:08:44,240 --> 00:08:46,760 Speaker 5: terminal guidance, could then find a ship on the ocean, 164 00:08:47,200 --> 00:08:51,000 Speaker 5: or find using terrain mapping or what have you. So basically, 165 00:08:51,040 --> 00:08:54,600 Speaker 5: since the kind of the precision guidance revolution in the 166 00:08:54,640 --> 00:08:58,960 Speaker 5: seventies especially, just been an enormous amount of progress. And 167 00:08:59,040 --> 00:09:02,720 Speaker 5: so frankly, this tech technological progress is no longer that 168 00:09:03,640 --> 00:09:05,920 Speaker 5: a monopoly of the United States as it perhaps once was. 169 00:09:05,960 --> 00:09:09,400 Speaker 5: It's ubiquitous even folks like Iran, North Korea and that 170 00:09:09,480 --> 00:09:13,240 Speaker 5: kind of thing habit. And so that's the baseline. And 171 00:09:13,320 --> 00:09:16,800 Speaker 5: so there's Look, there's different kinds of missile ry, and 172 00:09:16,880 --> 00:09:20,000 Speaker 5: a missile etymologically speaking, is simply that which is sent. 173 00:09:20,679 --> 00:09:26,120 Speaker 5: There's ballistic missiles, the fly gravity's rainbow mostly unpowered for 174 00:09:26,240 --> 00:09:29,600 Speaker 5: most of their flight, cruise missiles that are essentially aerodynamic 175 00:09:29,679 --> 00:09:32,840 Speaker 5: and use lift and drag to travel, some kind of 176 00:09:33,040 --> 00:09:35,920 Speaker 5: jet engine or what have you. And then there's these 177 00:09:35,920 --> 00:09:38,200 Speaker 5: new classes of things that are kind of blending. You know, 178 00:09:38,240 --> 00:09:41,600 Speaker 5: people talk about hypersonic gliders that may start off with 179 00:09:41,640 --> 00:09:44,920 Speaker 5: a ballistic push, but then have the maneuver the speed 180 00:09:44,920 --> 00:09:49,360 Speaker 5: of a ballistic missile, but the maneuverability of a cruise 181 00:09:49,400 --> 00:09:51,719 Speaker 5: missile or aircraft, you might say. And so it's a 182 00:09:51,760 --> 00:09:55,680 Speaker 5: it's a rich and diverse spectrum that has emerged over 183 00:09:55,720 --> 00:09:59,400 Speaker 5: the years. And as a former Biden administration officials said, 184 00:09:59,400 --> 00:10:02,360 Speaker 5: and I like to repe missiles truly have become weapons 185 00:10:02,400 --> 00:10:05,640 Speaker 5: of choice. It's the thing for which we reach early 186 00:10:05,679 --> 00:10:08,280 Speaker 5: and often in a conflict, and largely because of the 187 00:10:08,320 --> 00:10:12,280 Speaker 5: combination of that precision guidance and that standoff capability. And 188 00:10:12,320 --> 00:10:15,440 Speaker 5: so when the first Trump administration wanted to go hit Syria, 189 00:10:15,920 --> 00:10:18,440 Speaker 5: you know, they sent fifty nine Tomahawks, that's a cruise 190 00:10:18,520 --> 00:10:21,719 Speaker 5: missile to go get them. And in this conflict there 191 00:10:21,760 --> 00:10:24,960 Speaker 5: has been enormous, and I would say a scary amount 192 00:10:24,960 --> 00:10:27,520 Speaker 5: of missiles expended on the part of the United States, 193 00:10:27,840 --> 00:10:30,040 Speaker 5: hundreds and hundreds on the part of Iran lashing out 194 00:10:30,160 --> 00:10:33,680 Speaker 5: basically all of their neighbors with the combination of ballistics, 195 00:10:34,200 --> 00:10:38,000 Speaker 5: and a lot of these drones are essentially cruise missiles. 196 00:10:38,000 --> 00:10:40,320 Speaker 5: When you're over one thousand colinars in range, you know 197 00:10:40,400 --> 00:10:44,200 Speaker 5: it's essentially a cruise missile, these heads, for instance. And 198 00:10:44,240 --> 00:10:48,040 Speaker 5: so then you have the missile defense world. And you know, 199 00:10:48,120 --> 00:10:50,640 Speaker 5: it wasn't that long ago when in polite society it 200 00:10:50,760 --> 00:10:53,720 Speaker 5: was conventional wisdom that it was impossible to hit a 201 00:10:53,720 --> 00:10:57,880 Speaker 5: bullet with a bullet. Over the past especially five years, 202 00:10:58,559 --> 00:11:03,640 Speaker 5: that has been completely utterly refuted, and in conflict after 203 00:11:03,720 --> 00:11:07,320 Speaker 5: conflict in Ukraine, in the Red Sea operations, in the 204 00:11:07,360 --> 00:11:10,240 Speaker 5: defense of Israel a couple of times now we've seen 205 00:11:10,240 --> 00:11:15,559 Speaker 5: an extraordinary degree of missiles being defeated by a combination 206 00:11:15,600 --> 00:11:18,360 Speaker 5: of effects, not just missile on missile, but a combination 207 00:11:18,400 --> 00:11:21,239 Speaker 5: of effects. And now you know, we're kind of surprised 208 00:11:21,440 --> 00:11:24,400 Speaker 5: when we miss at some of these things. And what 209 00:11:24,520 --> 00:11:27,640 Speaker 5: was once an American idiosyncrasy, the pursuit of this missile 210 00:11:27,679 --> 00:11:31,920 Speaker 5: defense capability is now very much a global phenomenon. After 211 00:11:31,960 --> 00:11:36,960 Speaker 5: the Ukraine conflict, especially in Europe, the European Sky Shield Initiative, 212 00:11:37,280 --> 00:11:40,680 Speaker 5: Germany buying and Israeli Aero three system for ballistic missile 213 00:11:40,679 --> 00:11:44,120 Speaker 5: defense has been a sea change. The demand signals, the 214 00:11:44,160 --> 00:11:47,680 Speaker 5: supply and demand signal of long range standoff and the 215 00:11:47,760 --> 00:11:50,280 Speaker 5: means to contend with it is very much a global phenomenon. 216 00:11:50,880 --> 00:11:53,439 Speaker 5: I'll say that the top two priorities for aid for 217 00:11:53,559 --> 00:11:57,400 Speaker 5: Ukraine over the past four years were what long range fires, 218 00:11:57,679 --> 00:12:02,120 Speaker 5: missiles and a defense. They went so fares to put 219 00:12:02,120 --> 00:12:05,280 Speaker 5: the Patriot launch rot on their currency because it has 220 00:12:05,400 --> 00:12:08,240 Speaker 5: basically kept them kept them sovereign. And these are the 221 00:12:08,240 --> 00:12:09,040 Speaker 5: top I didn't know that. 222 00:12:09,440 --> 00:12:09,840 Speaker 1: It's fun. 223 00:12:09,840 --> 00:12:11,319 Speaker 5: I've got one on my office. 224 00:12:11,840 --> 00:12:13,520 Speaker 3: Right, the currency, not the missile. 225 00:12:13,559 --> 00:12:16,359 Speaker 5: Right. I'm still trying to buy a Patriot for they 226 00:12:16,400 --> 00:12:18,200 Speaker 5: won't again working on it. 227 00:12:33,000 --> 00:12:35,600 Speaker 2: That was already extremely helpful. But just to go back, 228 00:12:35,760 --> 00:12:38,319 Speaker 2: use the word scary to talk about the sort of 229 00:12:38,440 --> 00:12:41,560 Speaker 2: volume of activity that the US has or how much 230 00:12:41,960 --> 00:12:44,520 Speaker 2: we've fired already. What did you mean by that? Unpacked 231 00:12:44,559 --> 00:12:45,600 Speaker 2: that statement a little bit. 232 00:12:46,559 --> 00:12:49,840 Speaker 5: Yeah, So let me just say that missile defense will 233 00:12:49,840 --> 00:12:52,600 Speaker 5: not win a war for you, but its absence will 234 00:12:52,600 --> 00:12:55,400 Speaker 5: lose one, or could lose one pretty quickly. And so 235 00:12:55,480 --> 00:12:58,319 Speaker 5: I said a moment ago that Ukraine the missile defense 236 00:12:58,360 --> 00:13:02,360 Speaker 5: has helped keep Ukraine sovereign right. If not for being 237 00:13:02,400 --> 00:13:06,160 Speaker 5: able to thwart these incoming era and missile attacks, it 238 00:13:06,200 --> 00:13:09,439 Speaker 5: would have been a very different situation. Let go back 239 00:13:09,440 --> 00:13:13,120 Speaker 5: to the last summer in the hundreds of missiles six 240 00:13:13,240 --> 00:13:15,920 Speaker 5: hundred and fifty projectiles from multiple parts of the Middle 241 00:13:15,960 --> 00:13:18,720 Speaker 5: East coming at Israel all at once during the Twelve 242 00:13:18,800 --> 00:13:22,120 Speaker 5: Day War. If those hundreds and hundreds of objects had 243 00:13:22,240 --> 00:13:24,559 Speaker 5: arrived all at once as they were intended to do, 244 00:13:25,040 --> 00:13:26,800 Speaker 5: in a place the size of New Jersey, it would 245 00:13:26,840 --> 00:13:31,920 Speaker 5: have been catastrophic. Surprisingly enough, almost everything was defeated. And 246 00:13:31,960 --> 00:13:37,040 Speaker 5: so it is missile defense buys time to end the 247 00:13:37,080 --> 00:13:40,640 Speaker 5: threat by other means, it does not end the threat itself. Now, 248 00:13:40,800 --> 00:13:43,600 Speaker 5: what I said last summer after that conflict ended the 249 00:13:43,640 --> 00:13:47,880 Speaker 5: Trump administration basically through the Iranians a lifeline and said, hey, 250 00:13:47,960 --> 00:13:50,880 Speaker 5: we're going to stop. I said, that's going to be 251 00:13:50,920 --> 00:13:53,400 Speaker 5: a mistake, because what's going to happen is the Iranians 252 00:13:53,440 --> 00:13:55,480 Speaker 5: are going to rebuild, and then we're going to come 253 00:13:55,520 --> 00:13:57,320 Speaker 5: and we're going to do this again in a year 254 00:13:57,440 --> 00:13:59,160 Speaker 5: or so. And I was wrong because it didn't take 255 00:13:59,200 --> 00:14:02,360 Speaker 5: a year nine months. And why that matters, and why 256 00:14:02,360 --> 00:14:06,640 Speaker 5: it's scary is because it's about capacity. Capacity of defensive 257 00:14:06,640 --> 00:14:09,800 Speaker 5: interceptors buys time, but it takes a heck of a 258 00:14:09,800 --> 00:14:12,640 Speaker 5: lot of time to produce that capacity. And so this 259 00:14:12,960 --> 00:14:16,640 Speaker 5: gets to the specter an ope coming out on this, 260 00:14:16,960 --> 00:14:20,960 Speaker 5: the specter of going Winchester, of running out of defensive interceptors, 261 00:14:20,960 --> 00:14:22,960 Speaker 5: and that would be a very bad day. And so 262 00:14:23,000 --> 00:14:25,080 Speaker 5: when you talk you hundreds and hundreds of missiles are 263 00:14:25,080 --> 00:14:28,520 Speaker 5: going to require hundreds of interceptors. That was last year 264 00:14:28,680 --> 00:14:30,800 Speaker 5: again this year, and so that's the scary part is 265 00:14:31,120 --> 00:14:34,560 Speaker 5: is the massive expenditure of these things. And I want 266 00:14:34,560 --> 00:14:38,280 Speaker 5: to quote General Kaine, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, 267 00:14:38,280 --> 00:14:40,400 Speaker 5: who said, who's asked do we have enough? And he said, 268 00:14:40,600 --> 00:14:43,280 Speaker 5: we have enough for this conflict. That is not the 269 00:14:43,320 --> 00:14:46,160 Speaker 5: same as saying that we have enough for the other 270 00:14:46,240 --> 00:14:50,440 Speaker 5: tasks that we have around the world, most significantly deterring 271 00:14:50,680 --> 00:14:53,840 Speaker 5: a conflict with China. And so we have now cut 272 00:14:53,840 --> 00:14:58,920 Speaker 5: in very substantially to our total inventory of missile defense interceptors. 273 00:14:59,440 --> 00:15:02,080 Speaker 5: The numbers, complete numbers are not not been released. We've 274 00:15:02,120 --> 00:15:04,520 Speaker 5: done a study on this from what it was last year, 275 00:15:04,560 --> 00:15:08,120 Speaker 5: and it was a lot. And so why that matters. 276 00:15:08,640 --> 00:15:12,080 Speaker 5: Right now, we're moving patriots and perhaps some FADO those 277 00:15:12,160 --> 00:15:15,040 Speaker 5: missile defense systems from South Korea and Japan to the 278 00:15:15,040 --> 00:15:19,440 Speaker 5: Middle East. That's significant because their job is to be 279 00:15:19,640 --> 00:15:23,440 Speaker 5: in the Pacific and to deter to provide a defensive 280 00:15:23,480 --> 00:15:28,520 Speaker 5: deterrent to Chinese adventurism or to North Korean adventurism or 281 00:15:28,560 --> 00:15:31,000 Speaker 5: what have you. And so you know, we've been saying 282 00:15:31,160 --> 00:15:33,920 Speaker 5: different administrations have been saying that we're going to pivot 283 00:15:33,960 --> 00:15:36,800 Speaker 5: to the Pacific since the Abomba administration. We're still kind 284 00:15:36,800 --> 00:15:40,200 Speaker 5: of waiting for that to happen. We keep lurching back 285 00:15:40,480 --> 00:15:43,720 Speaker 5: to Europe and to the Middle East. And in fact, 286 00:15:43,760 --> 00:15:47,200 Speaker 5: a lot of the administration officials in this Pentagon have 287 00:15:47,320 --> 00:15:49,040 Speaker 5: been among those who said, hey, we got to focus 288 00:15:49,040 --> 00:15:51,320 Speaker 5: on China, we got to focus on the Pacific. And 289 00:15:51,440 --> 00:15:55,280 Speaker 5: what they're doing right now is presiding over an extraordinary 290 00:15:56,080 --> 00:16:00,600 Speaker 5: vaporization of our inventory in a very short win of time. 291 00:16:00,640 --> 00:16:03,320 Speaker 5: And so what I worry about. You've heard of the 292 00:16:03,400 --> 00:16:06,800 Speaker 5: Davidson window, the former head of Indo Pecon, who said, hey, 293 00:16:07,080 --> 00:16:10,360 Speaker 5: he worries that China would be ready to move against 294 00:16:10,400 --> 00:16:12,560 Speaker 5: some of their neighbors by twenty twenty seven, what I 295 00:16:12,640 --> 00:16:16,800 Speaker 5: worry about most is that this extraordinary expenditure of stuff 296 00:16:17,600 --> 00:16:20,440 Speaker 5: is not going to be replaced in a year, absolutely not, 297 00:16:21,000 --> 00:16:22,920 Speaker 5: and that, in fact, this may kind of be a 298 00:16:22,960 --> 00:16:27,120 Speaker 5: self fulfilling prophecy of encouraging, of tempting China to do 299 00:16:27,160 --> 00:16:28,160 Speaker 5: something very bad. 300 00:16:28,480 --> 00:16:31,800 Speaker 4: Joe, I haven't heard the term going Winchester. I'm Winchester 301 00:16:32,280 --> 00:16:34,120 Speaker 4: for years and years and years. 302 00:16:34,200 --> 00:16:35,200 Speaker 5: Do you remember that. 303 00:16:35,520 --> 00:16:37,119 Speaker 3: No, it's running out of ammunition. 304 00:16:37,440 --> 00:16:37,760 Speaker 1: Yeah. 305 00:16:37,960 --> 00:16:39,720 Speaker 4: The only reason I know this is because my dad 306 00:16:39,760 --> 00:16:43,000 Speaker 4: made me watch like an inordinate amount of military movies 307 00:16:43,240 --> 00:16:47,440 Speaker 4: growing up. But anyway, I'm very curious about something you said, 308 00:16:47,440 --> 00:16:50,880 Speaker 4: which is that you can't win a war with missiles, 309 00:16:51,160 --> 00:16:54,560 Speaker 4: and it seems like miss with miss oh, I'm sorry. 310 00:16:54,280 --> 00:16:55,120 Speaker 3: With missile defense. 311 00:16:55,240 --> 00:16:58,080 Speaker 4: But with offense presumably you can, which seems to be 312 00:16:58,120 --> 00:16:59,560 Speaker 4: the strategy right now. 313 00:17:00,080 --> 00:17:02,280 Speaker 5: Well, and so let me speak to that. The joint 314 00:17:02,280 --> 00:17:06,280 Speaker 5: forest are the United States and working with Israel hit 315 00:17:06,720 --> 00:17:09,000 Speaker 5: you know, I think it's up to five thousand targets 316 00:17:09,000 --> 00:17:11,640 Speaker 5: within the first several days of the war. Well, they 317 00:17:11,640 --> 00:17:14,600 Speaker 5: were doing so from Afar, they were doing so from standoff. 318 00:17:14,880 --> 00:17:17,360 Speaker 5: And so while they're not releasing the numbers of the 319 00:17:17,359 --> 00:17:20,800 Speaker 5: Tomahawk missiles of the JASM, of the l rasms and such. 320 00:17:20,880 --> 00:17:24,240 Speaker 5: They not releasing those. One may easily surmise that a 321 00:17:24,280 --> 00:17:28,360 Speaker 5: significant number of those targets were serviced by these long 322 00:17:28,440 --> 00:17:31,600 Speaker 5: range things, of which we have finite quantities, and so 323 00:17:32,400 --> 00:17:37,000 Speaker 5: the offensive strike capabilities is also even more important as 324 00:17:37,040 --> 00:17:41,560 Speaker 5: a deterrent, and we are chewing those up by at 325 00:17:41,600 --> 00:17:44,320 Speaker 5: least the many hundreds, and it may I suspect turn 326 00:17:44,359 --> 00:17:46,760 Speaker 5: not to be thousands, and that's also part of the 327 00:17:46,800 --> 00:17:47,239 Speaker 5: scary war. 328 00:17:47,400 --> 00:17:49,359 Speaker 4: Can you give a little bit more detail on I 329 00:17:49,400 --> 00:17:53,200 Speaker 4: guess the procurement process for different types of missiles, because 330 00:17:53,240 --> 00:17:56,119 Speaker 4: I'm very curious about the thinking that goes behind, you know, 331 00:17:56,200 --> 00:17:59,280 Speaker 4: someone saying that we want to have this many long 332 00:17:59,400 --> 00:18:03,240 Speaker 4: range defensive missiles versus this many you know, maybe short 333 00:18:03,400 --> 00:18:07,240 Speaker 4: range defensive missiles. How do those decisions actually get made. 334 00:18:08,960 --> 00:18:11,040 Speaker 5: That's a good question. You know. It fundamentally comes down 335 00:18:11,080 --> 00:18:14,879 Speaker 5: to an idea, an idea of the order of battle, 336 00:18:14,880 --> 00:18:18,119 Speaker 5: of how a conflict may play out. And so you know, 337 00:18:18,200 --> 00:18:20,600 Speaker 5: this is the job of the military planners and the 338 00:18:20,640 --> 00:18:23,560 Speaker 5: joint staff to kind of think that through. And I 339 00:18:23,720 --> 00:18:26,680 Speaker 5: hypothesize this is how many how many missiles we would 340 00:18:26,760 --> 00:18:28,920 Speaker 5: need to have in theater, how many aircraft, how many ships, 341 00:18:28,960 --> 00:18:30,600 Speaker 5: And this is how we might be able to marshal 342 00:18:30,600 --> 00:18:33,840 Speaker 5: a force, and conversely, how we think the other side 343 00:18:33,920 --> 00:18:37,359 Speaker 5: might be able to marshal their marshal their forces. I 344 00:18:37,359 --> 00:18:43,320 Speaker 5: will say that the Ukraine conflict especially made folks realize 345 00:18:43,359 --> 00:18:46,240 Speaker 5: so that our estimates of what we would likely need 346 00:18:46,920 --> 00:18:50,119 Speaker 5: were dramatically too low. And so I'm just going to 347 00:18:50,119 --> 00:18:51,800 Speaker 5: give one example, but I think you're going to see this, 348 00:18:51,880 --> 00:18:54,520 Speaker 5: and in fact, there are news developments over the past 349 00:18:54,560 --> 00:18:57,919 Speaker 5: year that gratify this in different ways. That in April 350 00:18:57,920 --> 00:19:03,520 Speaker 5: of last year, the US Army quadrupled its objective acquisition 351 00:19:03,600 --> 00:19:06,639 Speaker 5: number of how many Patriot packed three missiles it needed 352 00:19:06,760 --> 00:19:10,560 Speaker 5: to buy over the next coming years. Quadrupled that number 353 00:19:10,600 --> 00:19:13,320 Speaker 5: from like three thousand and something to thirteen thousand and something. 354 00:19:14,000 --> 00:19:16,560 Speaker 5: And I think kind of behind the scenes, you're seeing 355 00:19:16,560 --> 00:19:20,000 Speaker 5: a recognition, as we've seen the Ukrainians and the Russians 356 00:19:20,160 --> 00:19:24,040 Speaker 5: use enormous numbers of projectiles or missiles of different kinds, 357 00:19:24,640 --> 00:19:27,320 Speaker 5: kind of a sinking in that oh, in an actual conflict, 358 00:19:27,359 --> 00:19:30,240 Speaker 5: this would ramp up dramatically. And so even before the 359 00:19:30,280 --> 00:19:34,639 Speaker 5: Twelve Day War last summer between Israel and Iran and 360 00:19:34,680 --> 00:19:38,720 Speaker 5: are being involved. Even before that, the Pentagon began to 361 00:19:38,760 --> 00:19:41,600 Speaker 5: do a few things, some really important things. The Biden 362 00:19:41,640 --> 00:19:45,639 Speaker 5: administration had been ramping up a number of missiles of 363 00:19:45,640 --> 00:19:49,200 Speaker 5: offensive and defensive, of various stripes. You probably remember the 364 00:19:49,280 --> 00:19:52,000 Speaker 5: discussion about attackers of whether we could spare any a 365 00:19:52,160 --> 00:19:55,840 Speaker 5: tackles to give to Ukraine, and the Bide administration didn't 366 00:19:55,880 --> 00:19:58,440 Speaker 5: at first, and then they eventually did. That was true 367 00:19:58,480 --> 00:20:02,200 Speaker 5: with a lot of munitions over the past four years. 368 00:20:03,840 --> 00:20:10,400 Speaker 5: Flash forward to last spring. Incoming Deputy Secretary Steve Feinberg, 369 00:20:10,400 --> 00:20:12,399 Speaker 5: who comes out of the private capital world as as 370 00:20:12,440 --> 00:20:16,000 Speaker 5: you listeners no doubt know, came in and began to 371 00:20:16,960 --> 00:20:20,720 Speaker 5: call in the CEOs of a number of defense companies, 372 00:20:21,040 --> 00:20:23,600 Speaker 5: and I will say metaphorically grabbed them by the lapels 373 00:20:23,640 --> 00:20:28,600 Speaker 5: and shook them to say, we need to maximize production. 374 00:20:29,240 --> 00:20:33,240 Speaker 5: You know, I respect his respect for hard power. And 375 00:20:34,000 --> 00:20:37,199 Speaker 5: over the next six months, from a basically Memorial Day 376 00:20:37,320 --> 00:20:39,080 Speaker 5: last year, over the next six months you began to 377 00:20:39,119 --> 00:20:41,920 Speaker 5: see a lot of drills and a lot of figuring 378 00:20:41,960 --> 00:20:44,840 Speaker 5: out of just how many Tomahawks and all these offensive 379 00:20:44,840 --> 00:20:48,479 Speaker 5: and defensive missiles and how much solid rocket motor production 380 00:20:48,560 --> 00:20:50,720 Speaker 5: we could do on and on and so over the 381 00:20:50,720 --> 00:20:53,520 Speaker 5: past two months since in January and February of this year, 382 00:20:54,600 --> 00:20:57,440 Speaker 5: all that work was basically publicized, and at least in 383 00:20:57,520 --> 00:21:03,440 Speaker 5: press releases it said that rethum of ramp up five munitions. 384 00:21:03,480 --> 00:21:05,920 Speaker 5: There's more to come. By the way, Lockeyed announced bad 385 00:21:06,000 --> 00:21:08,560 Speaker 5: and Pack three Patriot that they were going to quadruple 386 00:21:08,640 --> 00:21:12,159 Speaker 5: fad and go on the Patriots side from six hundred 387 00:21:12,240 --> 00:21:15,960 Speaker 5: a year to two thousand a year in production. And 388 00:21:16,200 --> 00:21:17,760 Speaker 5: we're going to go from by the way, from tomahawks 389 00:21:17,800 --> 00:21:21,240 Speaker 5: cruise missiles from fifty seven requested last year, which is 390 00:21:21,280 --> 00:21:25,120 Speaker 5: a pittance to their goal is one thousand a year 391 00:21:25,400 --> 00:21:27,760 Speaker 5: of tomahawks. And what I would say is that those 392 00:21:27,800 --> 00:21:31,160 Speaker 5: are all very sensible moves, very belated by the way, 393 00:21:32,119 --> 00:21:38,240 Speaker 5: that are properly allowing the lessons of the past a 394 00:21:38,280 --> 00:21:41,960 Speaker 5: couple of years to be applied. Break that was all 395 00:21:42,000 --> 00:21:44,639 Speaker 5: before we went to war with the Roan. And so 396 00:21:44,760 --> 00:21:49,359 Speaker 5: now the ramp it's called the munition's ramp, hasn't yet begun. 397 00:21:49,640 --> 00:21:51,240 Speaker 5: And the other kind of scary thing is it hasn't 398 00:21:51,280 --> 00:21:54,000 Speaker 5: begun because the money wasn't there, and the appropriations bill 399 00:21:54,080 --> 00:21:56,719 Speaker 5: that came out in January, I guess became law in 400 00:21:56,760 --> 00:22:02,440 Speaker 5: early February last month. The language said, oh, by the way, 401 00:22:03,080 --> 00:22:06,840 Speaker 5: we know we Congress, the appropriators know that this appropriation 402 00:22:07,000 --> 00:22:09,560 Speaker 5: is twenty eight point eight billion with a b short 403 00:22:09,840 --> 00:22:13,399 Speaker 5: of what the Pentagon requested just for munitions. And so 404 00:22:13,560 --> 00:22:15,600 Speaker 5: there's a couple of things going on here. One, we 405 00:22:15,640 --> 00:22:19,359 Speaker 5: already had that twenty eight billion and change shortfall for 406 00:22:19,600 --> 00:22:23,520 Speaker 5: Fly twenty six and then and because of that, you 407 00:22:23,600 --> 00:22:27,119 Speaker 5: can't put things on contract adambly to start this seven 408 00:22:27,200 --> 00:22:30,119 Speaker 5: year process. That is a good plan, very good plan. 409 00:22:30,920 --> 00:22:34,520 Speaker 5: And on now we have just gone and vaporized many 410 00:22:34,560 --> 00:22:38,520 Speaker 5: billions of dollars and hundreds and probably thousands of missiles 411 00:22:38,520 --> 00:22:41,000 Speaker 5: over the past two weeks. And so you put that 412 00:22:41,080 --> 00:22:44,399 Speaker 5: together and it's not a very good picture. And so 413 00:22:44,440 --> 00:22:46,480 Speaker 5: at the very minimum, Congress is going to have to 414 00:22:46,520 --> 00:22:49,639 Speaker 5: step up, I believe it for a communition supplemental in 415 00:22:49,640 --> 00:22:50,320 Speaker 5: the very near time. 416 00:22:50,480 --> 00:22:54,119 Speaker 2: So let's talk about the binding constraints to really ramping 417 00:22:54,200 --> 00:22:57,199 Speaker 2: up production, because there's clearly the political constraint, and by 418 00:22:57,240 --> 00:23:00,880 Speaker 2: political I mean appropriations. Votes have to happen to say 419 00:23:00,880 --> 00:23:05,280 Speaker 2: we're going to allocate these dollars to defense. Okay, we 420 00:23:05,440 --> 00:23:08,640 Speaker 2: understand that part there's politics that's difficult. Let's talk about 421 00:23:08,680 --> 00:23:11,720 Speaker 2: the binding physical constraints. So when you say, okay, you 422 00:23:11,720 --> 00:23:14,320 Speaker 2: want to go from fifty seven to one thousand, what 423 00:23:14,400 --> 00:23:17,320 Speaker 2: are we talking about in terms of the facilities that 424 00:23:17,400 --> 00:23:21,680 Speaker 2: we have the natural resources I imagine rare earth metals, 425 00:23:21,760 --> 00:23:26,800 Speaker 2: and certain key commodities, maybe choke points or bottlenecks in 426 00:23:26,840 --> 00:23:30,240 Speaker 2: this process. We all would love, I presume, to have 427 00:23:30,600 --> 00:23:34,720 Speaker 2: an infinite number of missile defense capabilities, etc. We would 428 00:23:34,760 --> 00:23:37,919 Speaker 2: like to not have to choose between Korea and the 429 00:23:37,920 --> 00:23:40,439 Speaker 2: Middle East, of the golf allies and so forth. But 430 00:23:40,560 --> 00:23:43,560 Speaker 2: what are the physical constraints as you see them to 431 00:23:43,680 --> 00:23:44,520 Speaker 2: ramping up production? 432 00:23:46,359 --> 00:23:50,920 Speaker 5: Yeah, well, you mentioned their unlimited supply. If I'm not mistaken, 433 00:23:50,920 --> 00:23:55,280 Speaker 5: there was a presidential tweet the other day saying that 434 00:23:55,280 --> 00:23:57,720 Speaker 5: we had a virtually unlimited supply, and I would just 435 00:23:57,720 --> 00:24:03,879 Speaker 5: say that that is a state that is problematic relatives reality. 436 00:24:03,640 --> 00:24:08,400 Speaker 5: So look, you just listed off facilities, long lead items 437 00:24:08,760 --> 00:24:13,240 Speaker 5: for production, and you'll like supply chain issues. There's also people. 438 00:24:13,680 --> 00:24:18,280 Speaker 5: There's also the workforce. You know, there's basically one facility 439 00:24:18,359 --> 00:24:22,680 Speaker 5: in Tucson, Arizona that cranks out tomahawks. For instance, There's 440 00:24:22,720 --> 00:24:24,879 Speaker 5: a small number of things, and so actually, when you 441 00:24:24,880 --> 00:24:29,240 Speaker 5: start looking at the supply chain, it is a surprising 442 00:24:29,280 --> 00:24:31,399 Speaker 5: degree and there's been a number of papers written on this, 443 00:24:31,440 --> 00:24:34,920 Speaker 5: although there's a lot more to ascertain is there's a 444 00:24:34,960 --> 00:24:36,840 Speaker 5: lot of bottlenecks, So there's a lot of soul source 445 00:24:37,160 --> 00:24:40,760 Speaker 5: for some widget and to the Pentagon's credit, over the 446 00:24:40,800 --> 00:24:43,920 Speaker 5: past several years, there's been a lot of I would say, 447 00:24:44,200 --> 00:24:47,440 Speaker 5: not naval gazing is a bad term, but a lot 448 00:24:47,440 --> 00:24:52,320 Speaker 5: of introspection trying to figure out an understand to at 449 00:24:52,400 --> 00:24:56,080 Speaker 5: least truly intellectually understand what is the supply chain. And 450 00:24:56,080 --> 00:24:59,760 Speaker 5: there's still some opacity to that. But nevertheless, the primes 451 00:24:59,800 --> 00:25:03,120 Speaker 5: that defense, prime companies and the Department have been looking 452 00:25:03,160 --> 00:25:06,679 Speaker 5: into this and I think has been illuminating in terms 453 00:25:06,720 --> 00:25:10,320 Speaker 5: of the bottlenecks and sole source issues. And so you've seen, 454 00:25:10,400 --> 00:25:15,840 Speaker 5: for instance, I would say, a series of experiments trying 455 00:25:15,840 --> 00:25:18,240 Speaker 5: to a get private capital and involved the Office of 456 00:25:18,280 --> 00:25:20,840 Speaker 5: Strategic Capital. When that was first being stood up, I 457 00:25:20,880 --> 00:25:22,520 Speaker 5: asked the guy in charge of it, I said, I 458 00:25:22,560 --> 00:25:23,919 Speaker 5: really want to know one thing, are you going to 459 00:25:23,960 --> 00:25:28,360 Speaker 5: be big enough to matter? You know, America's asymmetric advantage 460 00:25:28,440 --> 00:25:32,399 Speaker 5: to use that phrase, America's asymmetric advantages. We're a wealthy country. 461 00:25:32,560 --> 00:25:35,080 Speaker 5: We have to leverage that private wealth, and I think 462 00:25:35,080 --> 00:25:37,120 Speaker 5: there's a number of initiatives on that front that will 463 00:25:37,320 --> 00:25:40,680 Speaker 5: direct and helping to direct private capitals to the supply 464 00:25:40,800 --> 00:25:44,680 Speaker 5: chains for things that matter to defense. The other thing, 465 00:25:45,359 --> 00:25:47,760 Speaker 5: a couple of experiments going on here are investment in, 466 00:25:47,880 --> 00:25:52,520 Speaker 5: for instance, solid new solid rocket motor producers. Everybody knows 467 00:25:52,520 --> 00:25:56,359 Speaker 5: SpaceX and space launch side of the things. There's also 468 00:25:56,440 --> 00:25:59,480 Speaker 5: a lot of kind of new startup companies for solid 469 00:25:59,560 --> 00:26:02,359 Speaker 5: rocket motors. I think this is good. I think this 470 00:26:02,480 --> 00:26:05,160 Speaker 5: is necessary, and if they are big enough to matter, 471 00:26:05,160 --> 00:26:07,560 Speaker 5: then we should absolutely be doing all that. At the 472 00:26:07,600 --> 00:26:12,119 Speaker 5: same time, there is the risk that we're I like 473 00:26:12,119 --> 00:26:14,120 Speaker 5: to say, fiddling with the base and the treble knobs 474 00:26:14,520 --> 00:26:17,760 Speaker 5: and not turning up the volume. And that essentially means. 475 00:26:17,800 --> 00:26:21,359 Speaker 5: There's two big companies that do SRM solid rocket motors, 476 00:26:21,760 --> 00:26:24,560 Speaker 5: and one of them just got a billion dollar equity 477 00:26:24,560 --> 00:26:28,600 Speaker 5: stake investment by the Pentagon. That is Al three Harris 478 00:26:28,640 --> 00:26:32,760 Speaker 5: that has had Aerojet as a subsidiary. The other big 479 00:26:32,800 --> 00:26:35,800 Speaker 5: one of courses is North of Grumman, which owns and 480 00:26:36,280 --> 00:26:40,439 Speaker 5: assumed or ATK in the past and so on the 481 00:26:40,480 --> 00:26:43,800 Speaker 5: solid rocket motor front, there's these experiments going on and 482 00:26:43,880 --> 00:26:46,560 Speaker 5: these investments. The Biden administration put two hundred and sixteen 483 00:26:46,600 --> 00:26:51,080 Speaker 5: million dollars into aerojet in Canden, Arkansas, which is actually 484 00:26:51,080 --> 00:26:53,439 Speaker 5: one of the handful of places where we kind of 485 00:26:53,520 --> 00:26:56,280 Speaker 5: keep it away from polite society. You don't want big 486 00:26:56,320 --> 00:26:59,280 Speaker 5: things blowing up near cities, which is one of the 487 00:26:59,359 --> 00:27:03,800 Speaker 5: challenges of reduction as well. A third type of experiment, 488 00:27:03,840 --> 00:27:06,680 Speaker 5: and this is coming out of steam Feinberg in particular, 489 00:27:07,280 --> 00:27:10,639 Speaker 5: is that in this plan, this initiative to get this 490 00:27:10,800 --> 00:27:14,400 Speaker 5: munitions ramp, he's doing something very different, which is he's 491 00:27:14,440 --> 00:27:17,920 Speaker 5: asking the primes to lean in on their own dime. 492 00:27:18,920 --> 00:27:21,159 Speaker 5: And when I say lean on their own dimes, I 493 00:27:21,160 --> 00:27:23,840 Speaker 5: mean a lot of dimes, because we're talking about double 494 00:27:23,920 --> 00:27:28,640 Speaker 5: digit billions. He's basically asking the companies to pony up 495 00:27:29,080 --> 00:27:33,359 Speaker 5: out of their internal funds, publicly traded companies again to 496 00:27:34,400 --> 00:27:38,159 Speaker 5: on spec begin to invest in these facilities. Now, if 497 00:27:38,160 --> 00:27:41,760 Speaker 5: you're a publicly traded company, that's sticking your neck out, 498 00:27:42,119 --> 00:27:45,800 Speaker 5: and there has been the customer here, THEDOD is a 499 00:27:45,840 --> 00:27:49,960 Speaker 5: monopsony in terms of buying things that blow up the 500 00:27:50,000 --> 00:27:53,359 Speaker 5: customer has not been very reliable over the years, and 501 00:27:53,440 --> 00:27:56,359 Speaker 5: of all the things DD buys, munitions has been a 502 00:27:56,440 --> 00:27:59,560 Speaker 5: sine wave up and down, lots of very cyclical and 503 00:27:59,600 --> 00:28:02,800 Speaker 5: so that hurts the certainty of industry to be able 504 00:28:02,840 --> 00:28:07,920 Speaker 5: to invest and hire and buylong lead items, et cetera. 505 00:28:08,160 --> 00:28:10,080 Speaker 5: And that's why you need multi year pro caumer That's 506 00:28:10,080 --> 00:28:12,080 Speaker 5: why you need a seven year window, and that's why 507 00:28:12,080 --> 00:28:14,840 Speaker 5: this whole ammunitions plan makes sense if we can get 508 00:28:14,880 --> 00:28:15,919 Speaker 5: it off the ground. 509 00:28:31,800 --> 00:28:33,359 Speaker 4: Joe I was going to say we should sound the 510 00:28:33,400 --> 00:28:35,920 Speaker 4: monopsy clacks him, but I don't think we want any 511 00:28:36,160 --> 00:28:40,960 Speaker 4: loud noises on a podcast about missiles. Tom, What about 512 00:28:41,080 --> 00:28:44,680 Speaker 4: if we can't ramp up production really quickly? There are 513 00:28:44,760 --> 00:28:47,560 Speaker 4: existing missiles out there, although to your point, there's a 514 00:28:47,640 --> 00:28:52,160 Speaker 4: dwindling stockpile, but our missiles like I don't know, shoes 515 00:28:52,280 --> 00:28:54,360 Speaker 4: or a jacket. Can you just like tap your allies 516 00:28:54,400 --> 00:28:56,880 Speaker 4: and say, well, we loaned you a missile, can we 517 00:28:57,040 --> 00:28:59,400 Speaker 4: have it back and use it now? And then, if so, 518 00:28:59,560 --> 00:29:02,479 Speaker 4: what is that actually mean for some of our allies 519 00:29:02,480 --> 00:29:07,040 Speaker 4: who are still engaged in conflict like Ukraine. I see 520 00:29:07,280 --> 00:29:10,080 Speaker 4: there's a there's a headline out there right now saying 521 00:29:10,080 --> 00:29:13,040 Speaker 4: that in recent weeks Ukraine's F sixteen jets have been 522 00:29:13,040 --> 00:29:15,560 Speaker 4: starved of US made missiles, and now we have other 523 00:29:15,640 --> 00:29:18,400 Speaker 4: allies like the Gulf States, who need some of their 524 00:29:18,440 --> 00:29:19,680 Speaker 4: missiles more than ever. 525 00:29:20,760 --> 00:29:23,880 Speaker 5: So you raise a really good point, and I'll tell 526 00:29:23,920 --> 00:29:27,080 Speaker 5: you if I had a nickel for every time the 527 00:29:27,120 --> 00:29:29,560 Speaker 5: Trump administration one point oh or two point zero said 528 00:29:29,600 --> 00:29:32,040 Speaker 5: to our allies, hey, you need to spend more on defense. 529 00:29:32,120 --> 00:29:33,720 Speaker 5: You need to be buying more American That was just 530 00:29:33,720 --> 00:29:36,800 Speaker 5: an executive order a couple of weeks ago saying, you know, 531 00:29:36,840 --> 00:29:40,040 Speaker 5: we shall use the sale of American weapons to our 532 00:29:40,120 --> 00:29:42,880 Speaker 5: allies as an instrument of foreign policy. We've always kind 533 00:29:42,920 --> 00:29:45,880 Speaker 5: of done that basically since forever. But it was, you know, 534 00:29:46,000 --> 00:29:47,640 Speaker 5: a little bit of chest beating and saying, hey, you 535 00:29:48,280 --> 00:29:52,000 Speaker 5: our friends need to buy more American made products. And 536 00:29:52,080 --> 00:29:55,240 Speaker 5: there's good reason for that. America makes the best of 537 00:29:55,280 --> 00:29:58,320 Speaker 5: the kind of exquisite Crown jewels, capabilities for seekers and 538 00:29:58,400 --> 00:30:03,120 Speaker 5: things that hit molt with bullets, to be sure, But 539 00:30:03,240 --> 00:30:06,600 Speaker 5: there is also a problem. There are eighteen countries there 540 00:30:06,640 --> 00:30:09,160 Speaker 5: used to be nineteen, now eighteen countries that operate the 541 00:30:09,200 --> 00:30:14,960 Speaker 5: Patriot Missile Defense System globally, and the Biden administration had 542 00:30:15,000 --> 00:30:20,040 Speaker 5: to suspend the deliveries of Patriot missiles to basically everybody 543 00:30:20,320 --> 00:30:22,800 Speaker 5: a couple of years back because they had to send 544 00:30:22,800 --> 00:30:26,880 Speaker 5: more to Ukraine. Right, So, in terms of our allies, 545 00:30:27,000 --> 00:30:29,680 Speaker 5: it's actually that on the one hand, we're telling them 546 00:30:29,880 --> 00:30:34,200 Speaker 5: buy more of American stuff, and then the second thing is, oh, 547 00:30:34,240 --> 00:30:35,960 Speaker 5: but we might not be able to fulfill your orders 548 00:30:35,960 --> 00:30:39,120 Speaker 5: of the things you already bought. Like that's the problem. 549 00:30:39,120 --> 00:30:41,680 Speaker 5: That's one of the big reasons why this ramp needs 550 00:30:41,680 --> 00:30:44,240 Speaker 5: to happen is not merely for US needs, but also 551 00:30:44,480 --> 00:30:48,200 Speaker 5: to provide this the deliveries that we want our friends 552 00:30:48,200 --> 00:30:51,560 Speaker 5: and allies to be equipped with, and we want them 553 00:30:51,560 --> 00:30:55,000 Speaker 5: to buy not just because we have some commercial interest 554 00:30:55,160 --> 00:30:57,680 Speaker 5: a lot of times US taxpayer and set footing the 555 00:30:57,680 --> 00:30:59,640 Speaker 5: bill for some of these things, but because we want 556 00:30:59,640 --> 00:31:03,640 Speaker 5: interact operability. We want Australia and Japan to be operating 557 00:31:03,680 --> 00:31:07,240 Speaker 5: Tomahawk and just destroyers so that our just destroyers and 558 00:31:07,320 --> 00:31:10,520 Speaker 5: our Tomahawk weapons system they can all work together and 559 00:31:10,880 --> 00:31:12,800 Speaker 5: the whole be more than more than the s of 560 00:31:12,840 --> 00:31:16,200 Speaker 5: its parts. So there has been a lot of leaning 561 00:31:16,280 --> 00:31:20,480 Speaker 5: on the Europeans to send stuff to the Ukrainians, and look, 562 00:31:20,480 --> 00:31:22,640 Speaker 5: it is their backyards. It kind of makes sense for 563 00:31:22,680 --> 00:31:27,400 Speaker 5: them to be ponying up for their security. You know, 564 00:31:27,640 --> 00:31:31,480 Speaker 5: the polls pull into remembers the Soviet boot quite well, 565 00:31:31,640 --> 00:31:33,520 Speaker 5: and they in a handful of other countries have been 566 00:31:33,640 --> 00:31:37,560 Speaker 5: especially at the tip of the forefront to help to 567 00:31:37,600 --> 00:31:40,560 Speaker 5: help the Ukrainians. So this is very much a global 568 00:31:40,560 --> 00:31:43,840 Speaker 5: phenomenon and there are to your point, a lot of 569 00:31:44,760 --> 00:31:49,400 Speaker 5: entangling relationships in terms of the deliveries of systems the 570 00:31:49,440 --> 00:31:54,560 Speaker 5: acquisition of systems. You know, Denmark, for instance, just decided 571 00:31:54,600 --> 00:31:57,360 Speaker 5: they were going to buy a French Stamptee air defense 572 00:31:57,400 --> 00:32:00,600 Speaker 5: system rather than Patriot, not because Patriot was better, and 573 00:32:00,920 --> 00:32:03,680 Speaker 5: frankly it wasn't because of the whole Greenland thing. It 574 00:32:03,760 --> 00:32:06,600 Speaker 5: was because of schedule, because there's a long queue of 575 00:32:07,200 --> 00:32:11,720 Speaker 5: partners that want that stuff and sometimes you need stuff 576 00:32:11,800 --> 00:32:13,960 Speaker 5: sooner as opposed to the best. 577 00:32:14,400 --> 00:32:16,720 Speaker 2: Can you talk about you know, at the very beginning, 578 00:32:16,720 --> 00:32:20,320 Speaker 2: we talked about the asymmetry of these very ostensibly very 579 00:32:20,400 --> 00:32:23,480 Speaker 2: cheap drones and very expensive missile defense, saying you just 580 00:32:23,520 --> 00:32:26,080 Speaker 2: think if they're really if the drones are as cheap 581 00:32:26,280 --> 00:32:29,600 Speaker 2: as advertised, there could just be quite a lot of 582 00:32:29,640 --> 00:32:32,520 Speaker 2: them and you could chew through that missile defense. How 583 00:32:32,560 --> 00:32:35,200 Speaker 2: do you talk to us about that math? How real 584 00:32:35,400 --> 00:32:38,280 Speaker 2: are these numbers that you see, like twenty thousand dollars 585 00:32:38,320 --> 00:32:42,200 Speaker 2: drone versus four million dollar defense missile, because that seems 586 00:32:42,200 --> 00:32:44,360 Speaker 2: pretty brutal, But how do you see that equation? 587 00:32:45,720 --> 00:32:48,520 Speaker 5: I have to say that has to be the most 588 00:32:49,320 --> 00:32:54,240 Speaker 5: repeated cliche that's put out to the most repeated headline. 589 00:32:54,480 --> 00:32:56,680 Speaker 5: You know, I think the Irenians heads are a little 590 00:32:56,680 --> 00:32:58,600 Speaker 5: bit more than twenty thousands. Of course, there's lots of 591 00:32:58,600 --> 00:33:00,960 Speaker 5: really super small short and stuff, but when they're talking 592 00:33:00,960 --> 00:33:03,520 Speaker 5: about going to a couple of thousand kilometers, I think 593 00:33:03,520 --> 00:33:07,240 Speaker 5: the numbers quoted someone fifty and eighty thousand. There's some 594 00:33:07,280 --> 00:33:11,360 Speaker 5: poetic justice that we capture some of those sh heads 595 00:33:11,360 --> 00:33:15,320 Speaker 5: in an American company reverse engineered them. They're called Lucas 596 00:33:16,480 --> 00:33:19,840 Speaker 5: Lucas drones, and we sent some some of them back 597 00:33:20,120 --> 00:33:22,960 Speaker 5: at Ukraine, and the quoted cost for that I think 598 00:33:23,160 --> 00:33:26,400 Speaker 5: was I think was thirty thousand dollars. So that's good. 599 00:33:26,520 --> 00:33:30,280 Speaker 5: You need affordable mass, you need a treatable mass, and 600 00:33:30,320 --> 00:33:34,640 Speaker 5: so that phenomenon. Look, Ukraine is producing millions millions per 601 00:33:34,760 --> 00:33:37,640 Speaker 5: year of many of them are very very small, but 602 00:33:37,840 --> 00:33:42,880 Speaker 5: millions of drones, I mean, it's darkening the sky as 603 00:33:42,880 --> 00:33:45,560 Speaker 5: it were. Most of them don't last there long. Most 604 00:33:45,560 --> 00:33:49,000 Speaker 5: of them may only fly once, for instance, and so 605 00:33:49,160 --> 00:33:52,920 Speaker 5: that is certainly a phenomenon, a major trend. But you know, 606 00:33:53,040 --> 00:33:57,920 Speaker 5: going back to the cost per round, people like to 607 00:33:57,920 --> 00:34:00,320 Speaker 5: count the cost of a missile because it's kind of 608 00:34:00,320 --> 00:34:02,920 Speaker 5: easy to count. The things that are harder to count, 609 00:34:02,960 --> 00:34:06,000 Speaker 5: that are frankly bigger is often the massive quantities of 610 00:34:06,080 --> 00:34:10,000 Speaker 5: jet fuel that are used to drop much cheaper gravity bombs, 611 00:34:10,280 --> 00:34:14,080 Speaker 5: and so I think it is actually rather misleading to 612 00:34:14,360 --> 00:34:17,640 Speaker 5: just look at the cost of the Patriot or the 613 00:34:17,680 --> 00:34:20,120 Speaker 5: cost of the standard missile or what have you. If 614 00:34:20,160 --> 00:34:23,200 Speaker 5: you had to throw one thousand drones to have the 615 00:34:23,239 --> 00:34:28,680 Speaker 5: same effect as one twelve hundred kilometer range Tomahawk missile, 616 00:34:28,800 --> 00:34:30,880 Speaker 5: you might not even be able to get there. Tamahawk 617 00:34:31,000 --> 00:34:33,320 Speaker 5: missiles are longest range missile and it's got five hundred 618 00:34:33,360 --> 00:34:36,480 Speaker 5: pound warhead. These drums don't have that kind of warhead, 619 00:34:36,480 --> 00:34:38,799 Speaker 5: so therefore they don't have the kind of effect. So 620 00:34:38,880 --> 00:34:40,480 Speaker 5: there's a It really comes down to what is it 621 00:34:40,480 --> 00:34:42,719 Speaker 5: you're trying to do? And oh, by the way, the 622 00:34:42,760 --> 00:34:46,960 Speaker 5: platforms and it's the whole operational cost that matters, including, 623 00:34:47,000 --> 00:34:50,440 Speaker 5: by the way, the cost of operational failure. You know, 624 00:34:50,640 --> 00:34:52,960 Speaker 5: I'd like to say I've had plenty of admirals say 625 00:34:53,000 --> 00:34:55,560 Speaker 5: this on stage with me at Suisias over the years, 626 00:34:55,719 --> 00:34:58,799 Speaker 5: because I always asked this point. A ship captain, when 627 00:34:58,840 --> 00:35:01,520 Speaker 5: he sees a cruisemuscile come into his ship is not 628 00:35:01,560 --> 00:35:03,720 Speaker 5: going to pull out his slide role or his pocket 629 00:35:03,719 --> 00:35:06,640 Speaker 5: calculator and say what's the cost of that hoo the 630 00:35:06,920 --> 00:35:09,040 Speaker 5: drone and what is the cost of the missile? We're 631 00:35:09,040 --> 00:35:11,920 Speaker 5: going to do that. No, they're going to protect the ship. 632 00:35:13,000 --> 00:35:15,840 Speaker 5: They are going to go for mission success. And so 633 00:35:16,400 --> 00:35:20,240 Speaker 5: you say, well, that's value versus cost, and that's true. 634 00:35:20,480 --> 00:35:23,480 Speaker 5: But the cost, the real cost of the Iran operation 635 00:35:24,280 --> 00:35:26,200 Speaker 5: is not going to be the munitions. It's going to 636 00:35:26,200 --> 00:35:30,759 Speaker 5: be the enormous steaming of the USS forward from Venezuela 637 00:35:31,560 --> 00:35:33,520 Speaker 5: to the Middle East. It's going to be the people 638 00:35:33,880 --> 00:35:35,920 Speaker 5: and all in the jet fuel and all of these 639 00:35:35,960 --> 00:35:38,520 Speaker 5: other things. And by the way, with the facility repair, 640 00:35:39,080 --> 00:35:41,960 Speaker 5: those things are going to eclipse the cost of the munitions. 641 00:35:42,280 --> 00:35:47,200 Speaker 5: So nevertheless, defense is hard. It is hard to hit 642 00:35:47,239 --> 00:35:51,439 Speaker 5: an incoming screaming rantry vehicle from four hundred klometers away, 643 00:35:51,440 --> 00:35:54,879 Speaker 5: for instance, And so defense of the interceptors are going 644 00:35:54,920 --> 00:35:58,680 Speaker 5: to be more expensive than offensive ones. That's just a fact. 645 00:35:58,719 --> 00:36:01,520 Speaker 5: And that's again why missile defenses won't win a war. 646 00:36:01,600 --> 00:36:04,640 Speaker 5: They can only buy you time to win that to 647 00:36:04,760 --> 00:36:06,600 Speaker 5: end the threat by other means. And that's why you 648 00:36:06,760 --> 00:36:09,520 Speaker 5: have all these other things as well. And I'd like 649 00:36:09,560 --> 00:36:13,480 Speaker 5: to say, you could throw a thousand cheap UAVs into 650 00:36:13,480 --> 00:36:15,080 Speaker 5: the sky and it won't do the job of a 651 00:36:15,120 --> 00:36:17,520 Speaker 5: single patriot. Interceptor. Capability matters too. 652 00:36:17,800 --> 00:36:21,319 Speaker 4: So you mentioned ending the threat just then, And this 653 00:36:21,400 --> 00:36:23,720 Speaker 4: is the other big question that I and I imagine 654 00:36:23,719 --> 00:36:26,560 Speaker 4: a lot of other people have at the moment. With 655 00:36:27,000 --> 00:36:31,000 Speaker 4: a ground conflict, you can kind of envision an endpoint 656 00:36:31,160 --> 00:36:34,800 Speaker 4: where you know, an army comes marching into a state 657 00:36:34,880 --> 00:36:37,920 Speaker 4: capital and that's pretty much the end of the conflict. 658 00:36:38,080 --> 00:36:41,840 Speaker 4: With missile warfare, it seems like it can go on 659 00:36:42,280 --> 00:36:46,280 Speaker 4: for a very long time, and I'm not quite sure 660 00:36:46,520 --> 00:36:51,640 Speaker 4: what the defining point is at which two sides basically say, okay, 661 00:36:51,960 --> 00:36:54,839 Speaker 4: we're done. Now someone's one and someone's lost. 662 00:36:56,200 --> 00:36:57,880 Speaker 5: Yeah. Well, and that was the case in the nineteen 663 00:36:57,880 --> 00:37:01,080 Speaker 5: eighties between the between Iran and Iraq, for instance, lots 664 00:37:01,080 --> 00:37:03,960 Speaker 5: of lots of missiles going back and forth. So you've 665 00:37:04,000 --> 00:37:08,440 Speaker 5: hit on a couple important points there. One, as is 666 00:37:08,520 --> 00:37:11,560 Speaker 5: often observed, it's really hard to do everything with their power. 667 00:37:12,640 --> 00:37:15,480 Speaker 5: It's hard to know if you have destroyed things on 668 00:37:15,480 --> 00:37:18,480 Speaker 5: the ground without being there. And that's why I said, 669 00:37:18,719 --> 00:37:20,640 Speaker 5: you know there there is at least going to be 670 00:37:20,680 --> 00:37:23,200 Speaker 5: the need. Whether that need is met or not, there's 671 00:37:23,239 --> 00:37:25,799 Speaker 5: going to be the need to have some forces on 672 00:37:25,840 --> 00:37:29,480 Speaker 5: the ground, could be special forces, could be partners from 673 00:37:29,520 --> 00:37:32,560 Speaker 5: other countries, but there's going to be that felt need 674 00:37:32,640 --> 00:37:35,400 Speaker 5: to figure out did we hit that underground missile city 675 00:37:36,000 --> 00:37:41,120 Speaker 5: for instance, uh point two. You know, everybody, myself, other folk. 676 00:37:41,120 --> 00:37:44,360 Speaker 5: We're getting nervous when day by day would go on 677 00:37:44,480 --> 00:37:49,120 Speaker 5: and the Iranians kept launching. So the good news is 678 00:37:49,160 --> 00:37:52,600 Speaker 5: that the curve is flattening was a phrase from the 679 00:37:52,600 --> 00:37:56,040 Speaker 5: cod COVID years to flatten the curve of the rate 680 00:37:56,080 --> 00:37:58,200 Speaker 5: of fire. And so you take a look at the 681 00:37:58,760 --> 00:38:01,839 Speaker 5: press conferences, that's a very good development that they've gone 682 00:38:01,880 --> 00:38:05,839 Speaker 5: from hundreds a day to smaller numbers. That reflects that 683 00:38:05,880 --> 00:38:10,240 Speaker 5: we are somehow doing something, hitting the launchers, hitting the missiles, 684 00:38:10,520 --> 00:38:12,800 Speaker 5: hitting the command and control or at least the commanders, 685 00:38:13,320 --> 00:38:17,799 Speaker 5: perhaps decentralized commanders. That is a good sign. And add 686 00:38:17,840 --> 00:38:20,440 Speaker 5: to that that we've now gotten This is the two 687 00:38:20,480 --> 00:38:23,280 Speaker 5: most important words from one of the recent press releases 688 00:38:23,320 --> 00:38:28,400 Speaker 5: from Chairman General Kane is he said the words munitions transition, 689 00:38:29,239 --> 00:38:31,600 Speaker 5: which is to say, we don't have to keep using 690 00:38:32,360 --> 00:38:35,359 Speaker 5: one thousand range Tomahawks because the Rangeys don't have air 691 00:38:35,360 --> 00:38:38,480 Speaker 5: defenses anymore. We can use gravity bombs, of which they 692 00:38:38,520 --> 00:38:41,000 Speaker 5: are plentiful. Still had to flying back and forth, and 693 00:38:41,000 --> 00:38:44,239 Speaker 5: that's not cheap. You can fly back your jadeams, your 694 00:38:44,280 --> 00:38:47,000 Speaker 5: small damar bombs. And there was a press release i 695 00:38:47,000 --> 00:38:49,840 Speaker 5: think over the weekend that we were transferring a bunch 696 00:38:49,880 --> 00:38:53,040 Speaker 5: of munitions to Israel, and when you look at it 697 00:38:53,120 --> 00:38:56,080 Speaker 5: and you look what's in that list, it was gravity bombs. 698 00:38:56,400 --> 00:38:58,279 Speaker 5: And the reason that we've gotten there is we no 699 00:38:58,320 --> 00:39:00,719 Speaker 5: longer have to do the standoff stuff. It's good we 700 00:39:00,760 --> 00:39:02,839 Speaker 5: can now do the stand in you know, flying over 701 00:39:02,880 --> 00:39:05,479 Speaker 5: top and dropping these things. But to your point, it's 702 00:39:05,520 --> 00:39:07,880 Speaker 5: still hard to do all that from the air, and 703 00:39:07,920 --> 00:39:10,880 Speaker 5: there is going to be that uncertainty, which is why, frankly, 704 00:39:11,680 --> 00:39:13,960 Speaker 5: you're not going to have perfect military certainty from the air. 705 00:39:14,719 --> 00:39:16,759 Speaker 5: To really end this, you're going to have to have, 706 00:39:16,960 --> 00:39:18,480 Speaker 5: I would say, a political change. 707 00:39:18,800 --> 00:39:22,200 Speaker 2: Tom Karako, thank you so much for coming on. Odd luck. 708 00:39:22,600 --> 00:39:24,719 Speaker 2: I learned a lot from this. Really appreciate you. 709 00:39:24,640 --> 00:39:26,440 Speaker 5: Taking your time. Thanks all, really enjoying. 710 00:39:39,600 --> 00:39:42,319 Speaker 2: I've never heard that going Winchester. That's like a cut 711 00:39:42,440 --> 00:39:43,480 Speaker 2: that comes up in movies. 712 00:39:44,480 --> 00:39:47,880 Speaker 4: You know, my dad's he flew the fifty two bombers 713 00:39:47,920 --> 00:39:52,600 Speaker 4: in Vietnam. So yeah, I have very mixed feelings about 714 00:39:52,640 --> 00:39:53,040 Speaker 4: all of this. 715 00:39:53,600 --> 00:39:58,880 Speaker 2: Defense procurement strikes me as an extremely difficult I don't know, 716 00:39:59,000 --> 00:40:03,080 Speaker 2: game theory equal briand problem to get right. And you know, 717 00:40:03,160 --> 00:40:07,800 Speaker 2: you because you have the monopsony buyer. It's a monopsony buyer, 718 00:40:07,800 --> 00:40:11,080 Speaker 2: but it's also political and the political winds are going 719 00:40:11,120 --> 00:40:15,400 Speaker 2: to change. You have, you know, companies that are naturally 720 00:40:15,440 --> 00:40:18,319 Speaker 2: profit seeking and profit maximizing, and many of them, and 721 00:40:18,360 --> 00:40:20,239 Speaker 2: he alluded to this and we didn't talk about it 722 00:40:20,280 --> 00:40:24,080 Speaker 2: that much, are monopoly sellers, right, Like, if there's one component, 723 00:40:24,200 --> 00:40:26,960 Speaker 2: if they're in we know all about how with advanced 724 00:40:26,960 --> 00:40:30,440 Speaker 2: supply chains of complicated things, you might have millions or 725 00:40:30,520 --> 00:40:33,279 Speaker 2: thousands of parts that go into it and some of 726 00:40:33,320 --> 00:40:36,120 Speaker 2: these parts may be produced by one company. Maybe there's 727 00:40:36,160 --> 00:40:39,480 Speaker 2: like a shiny mirror or something somewhere there's only produced 728 00:40:39,480 --> 00:40:42,440 Speaker 2: by one optical factory somewhere in the United States. Then 729 00:40:42,480 --> 00:40:45,240 Speaker 2: you have the buy American requirements. So then further narrows 730 00:40:45,440 --> 00:40:48,880 Speaker 2: supply chains, et cetera. So you have monopolies and monopsonies 731 00:40:49,200 --> 00:40:52,279 Speaker 2: facing off. And then you know, how do you get 732 00:40:52,400 --> 00:40:56,560 Speaker 2: sustained spending, sustained procurement through the ebbs and tides of 733 00:40:56,600 --> 00:40:59,080 Speaker 2: a war. Extremely difficult challenge. 734 00:40:59,120 --> 00:41:03,759 Speaker 4: It's it's such a weird ecosystem of players in military procurement. 735 00:41:03,920 --> 00:41:06,400 Speaker 4: And the other thing is like, most of the time, 736 00:41:06,760 --> 00:41:11,480 Speaker 4: what you're planning for is a hypothetical conflict, right, If 737 00:41:11,480 --> 00:41:14,640 Speaker 4: an actual conflict emerges, then I guess you have some 738 00:41:14,719 --> 00:41:17,000 Speaker 4: more certainty to a degree about what you need to 739 00:41:17,080 --> 00:41:19,919 Speaker 4: actually fight it. But you know, if just a few 740 00:41:20,000 --> 00:41:22,319 Speaker 4: years ago, if you're sat there and you're going like, 741 00:41:22,360 --> 00:41:25,000 Speaker 4: should we be buying stuff for or with a ranch? 742 00:41:25,040 --> 00:41:29,160 Speaker 4: Would we be buying stuff for China doing something with Taiwan? 743 00:41:29,360 --> 00:41:33,399 Speaker 4: Like these are very different theaters of war. And I 744 00:41:33,400 --> 00:41:37,120 Speaker 4: imagine that if you're a procurement officer, like the temptation 745 00:41:37,320 --> 00:41:39,880 Speaker 4: must be to you always want to have the best, 746 00:41:40,040 --> 00:41:44,399 Speaker 4: like newest, shiniest stuff, and so I'm just fascinated by 747 00:41:44,440 --> 00:41:47,080 Speaker 4: how people actually make those decisions in the face of 748 00:41:47,120 --> 00:41:51,520 Speaker 4: both monetary limits and physical reality and political reality as well, 749 00:41:51,560 --> 00:41:55,480 Speaker 4: which we kind of we glided past, but for obvious reasons. 750 00:41:55,800 --> 00:41:58,360 Speaker 2: Have you seen the photos, I mean, there are photos 751 00:41:58,400 --> 00:42:03,399 Speaker 2: of the US packing up bad missile defense systems from 752 00:42:03,440 --> 00:42:04,000 Speaker 2: South Korea. 753 00:42:04,160 --> 00:42:04,840 Speaker 3: I have not seen that. 754 00:42:04,960 --> 00:42:06,640 Speaker 2: Yeah, if you just search for it, it's kind of 755 00:42:07,200 --> 00:42:10,920 Speaker 2: it feels very when you see the photos. You do 756 00:42:11,000 --> 00:42:13,520 Speaker 2: not feel like, oh, we're a major superpower. It's like, oh, 757 00:42:13,560 --> 00:42:16,520 Speaker 2: here are these missiles. Sorry, we're taking we have to 758 00:42:16,520 --> 00:42:19,160 Speaker 2: move them elsewhere because we don't have enough right now. 759 00:42:19,400 --> 00:42:24,560 Speaker 2: It's pretty it's pretty shocking, but you know, likes it's hard. 760 00:42:25,080 --> 00:42:27,520 Speaker 2: It's hard to argue against the fact that we seem 761 00:42:27,560 --> 00:42:29,799 Speaker 2: to be spread very thin these days. The war in 762 00:42:30,200 --> 00:42:34,600 Speaker 2: Ukraine continues to go on, obviously, there's this new war 763 00:42:34,920 --> 00:42:37,400 Speaker 2: in Iran, and then as you mentioned, you know, at 764 00:42:37,480 --> 00:42:40,600 Speaker 2: least since the Obama administration, they've been talking about the 765 00:42:40,600 --> 00:42:45,040 Speaker 2: pivot to Asia and so forth, and that keeps not happening. 766 00:42:45,120 --> 00:42:48,960 Speaker 2: But there are obligations on the ground there. The whole 767 00:42:48,960 --> 00:42:50,359 Speaker 2: thing seems to spread very thin. 768 00:42:50,680 --> 00:42:53,360 Speaker 4: War is logistics and a racket. 769 00:42:53,560 --> 00:42:54,600 Speaker 3: Yeah, shall we leave it there? 770 00:42:54,680 --> 00:42:55,239 Speaker 5: Let's leave it there? 771 00:42:55,239 --> 00:42:55,680 Speaker 3: All right? 772 00:42:55,760 --> 00:42:58,160 Speaker 4: This has been another episode of the aud Loots podcast. 773 00:42:58,280 --> 00:43:00,279 Speaker 3: I'm Tracy all the Way. You can follow me at 774 00:43:00,320 --> 00:43:01,680 Speaker 3: Tracy Alaware. 775 00:43:01,320 --> 00:43:04,040 Speaker 2: And I'm Jill Wisenthal. You can follow me at the Stalwart. 776 00:43:04,160 --> 00:43:07,400 Speaker 2: Follow our guest Tom Karrico, He's at Tom Caroco. Follow 777 00:43:07,440 --> 00:43:11,080 Speaker 2: our producers Carmen Rodriguez at Carmen Arman, dash Ol Bennett 778 00:43:11,080 --> 00:43:13,919 Speaker 2: at Dashbot, and Kilbrooks at Keilbrooks. And for more Odd 779 00:43:13,960 --> 00:43:16,600 Speaker 2: Loss content, go to Bloomberg dot com slash odd Lots 780 00:43:16,600 --> 00:43:19,000 Speaker 2: for the daily newsletter and all of our episodes, and 781 00:43:19,040 --> 00:43:20,920 Speaker 2: you can chat about all of these topics twenty four 782 00:43:20,920 --> 00:43:25,040 Speaker 2: to seven in our discord Discord dot gg slash od logs. 783 00:43:25,120 --> 00:43:27,279 Speaker 4: And if you enjoy odd Lots, if you like it 784 00:43:27,360 --> 00:43:30,000 Speaker 4: when we talk about where missiles actually come from, then 785 00:43:30,040 --> 00:43:33,080 Speaker 4: please leave us a positive review on your favorite podcast platform. 786 00:43:33,440 --> 00:43:36,000 Speaker 4: And remember, if you are a Bloomberg subscriber, you can 787 00:43:36,000 --> 00:43:38,920 Speaker 4: listen to all of our episodes absolutely ad free. All 788 00:43:38,960 --> 00:43:40,719 Speaker 4: you need to do is find the Bloomberg channel on 789 00:43:40,800 --> 00:43:43,160 Speaker 4: Apple Podcasts and follow the instructions there. 790 00:43:43,520 --> 00:43:44,320 Speaker 3: Thanks for listening,