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Speaker 1: From UFOs to psychic powers and government conspiracies. History is

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Speaker 1: riddled with unexplained events. You can turn back now or

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Speaker 1: learn the stuff they don't want you to know. A

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Speaker 1: production of I Heart Radio. Hello, and welcome back to

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Speaker 1: the show. My name is Nol. They call me Ben.

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Speaker 1: Our compatriot Matt will be rejoining us in the future

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Speaker 1: when we are joined as always with our super producer

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Speaker 1: Paul mission Controled decond. Most importantly, you are you, You

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Speaker 1: are here, and that makes this stuff they don't want

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Speaker 1: you to know in a way today's episode, well, it's

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Speaker 1: for all of us as always, but it is also

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Speaker 1: for a specific person, a person who is a hero

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Speaker 1: to some uh, an international criminal, a bond level criminal

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Speaker 1: to others, and a person who is still very much

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Speaker 1: free it still very much alive. We've talked about we've

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Speaker 1: talked about some nuke stuff in the in the recent past.

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Speaker 1: Nuclear weapons are so incredibly dangerous and if you think

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Speaker 1: about it, yes, human beings have created other kinds of

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Speaker 1: technology that could eventually end life as we know it, right,

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Speaker 1: like fossil fuel technology is terrible for the environment, right, Yeah,

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Speaker 1: But the problem with nukes is that nuclear technology has

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Speaker 1: the highest possibility of ending life as we know it

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Speaker 1: in the shortest amount of time, right, I mean, you know,

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Speaker 1: we it's it's easy to kick the can down the

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Speaker 1: road when it comes to like destroying the environment. You know,

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Speaker 1: if you're doing it like death by a thousand cuts style, right,

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Speaker 1: But like a nuke, a nuclear incident, a nuclear catastrophe.

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Speaker 1: Often you know, the word holocaust is attached to it.

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Speaker 1: We see what that's like, you know, in science fiction

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Speaker 1: and like Mad Max type scenarios and UH anime for example,

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Speaker 1: things like a Kira But yeah, it's UH mutually assured destruction. Yes,

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Speaker 1: and I'm very glad you brought that up at the top.

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Speaker 1: Nal mutually a short destruction is this belief in international

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Speaker 1: affairs that if two countries have nukes or have a

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Speaker 1: certain threshold of nuclear weapons, they'll be much less likely

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Speaker 1: to use them. So the idea, it's weird. The the

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Speaker 1: idea is almost to very much oversimplify it. The old

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Speaker 1: school idea of mad was that the more countries that

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Speaker 1: have nukes, the safer overall the world is from nuclear annihilation,

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Speaker 1: which is pretty crazy, and you can see the policymakers

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Speaker 1: don't believe that's true. Really clearly not. I mean, it's

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Speaker 1: such a counterintuitive thing to think that, like, the more

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Speaker 1: of this absolutely deadly, uh dangerous thing that exists, the

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Speaker 1: safer we are. That just as completely counterintuitive just to

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Speaker 1: like normal logic. But it makes sense from like a

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Speaker 1: geopolitical standpoint, because the concept of mutually assured destruction is

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Speaker 1: that if we launch at you and you know that

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Speaker 1: we're doing it, you're going to launch a counter strike

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Speaker 1: against us, and then we're both excuse my French, Uh yeah,

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Speaker 1: well the French come into play here, or at least

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Speaker 1: the French language. Mutually assured destruction is often credited with

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Speaker 1: preventing the Cold War from turning hots. But you know,

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Speaker 1: there are other people say this is this is a

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Speaker 1: really dumb idea. Should we bet the global farm on it?

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Speaker 1: But the idea is like, you know, if you fire something,

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Speaker 1: you know, the instant retaliation, it's not going to stop

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Speaker 1: your border. It could be you know, the end of

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Speaker 1: huge squaws of civilization. Yeah, you would think twice that

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Speaker 1: part is logical. But pretty much since the discovery of

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Speaker 1: nuclear weapons, of this technology, millions of people, dozens of

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Speaker 1: huge institutions, nonprofits, other countries, you name it, have all

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Speaker 1: begged the human species to step back from the precipice.

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Speaker 1: That's where we get to today's question. If all of

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Speaker 1: this is true, which it is, how did we end

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Speaker 1: up with so many nukes? How did we proliferate this

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Speaker 1: world ending technology? Why do so many countries have them today?

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Speaker 1: Because it's probably more than you think. Here are the facts.

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Speaker 1: It is certainly more than I thought. Uh not gonna lie.

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Speaker 1: Multiple countries currently have access to nuclear weapons, and understandably,

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Speaker 1: based on the conversation we're about to half the day,

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Speaker 1: many many more countries want a seat at that nuke table. Um.

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Speaker 1: Nine countries currently have these things. The United States, the

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Speaker 1: United Kingdom, France. There they are Israel unofficially, UM, Pakistan, Russia, India, China,

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Speaker 1: and North Korea. UM. And in that group again back

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Speaker 1: to that Cold War UH scenario, the United States and

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Speaker 1: Russia have by far the most Oh yeah, yeah, there,

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Speaker 1: there's still the big dogs in the game. UM. But

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Speaker 1: we have to remember that each one of those other

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Speaker 1: seven countries has tremendously dangerous capabilities here and it affects

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Speaker 1: a ton of their interactions in the global sphere. We're

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Speaker 1: talking with a superproducer Paul Mission controlled decad about this

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Speaker 1: before we went on the air, and it's something I

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Speaker 1: think we can all acknowledge. Countries with nuclear capability in

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Speaker 1: this manner simply get treated differently. And that's part of

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Speaker 1: the reason that so many countries that don't have nukes

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Speaker 1: want them, and there's so many countries that do have

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Speaker 1: nukes that kind of control the current world order are

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Speaker 1: going to fight tooth and nail to prevent other people

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Speaker 1: from having access to that technology. For some of us,

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Speaker 1: uh in the crowd today, that might be the right

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Speaker 1: and necessary thing. Right, it's a moral good, But for

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Speaker 1: other folks, it's um an imperialistic mechanism of controlling people

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Speaker 1: in just a new way they couldn't do before. And

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Speaker 1: every year, every single year, various groups call for what's

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Speaker 1: what's known as global nuclear disarmament. Let us take our

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Speaker 1: radioactive swords and turn them into plowshares, and every year, uh,

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Speaker 1: not not much happens in this regard. I mean, the

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Speaker 1: global arsenals on decline. But you know, we're centophiles here.

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Speaker 1: This reminds me of that trope in so many action

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Speaker 1: movies where there are two people and they have a gun,

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Speaker 1: they have guns. Each have a gun, They're pointed each

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Speaker 1: other and what I'm saying, all right, put it down,

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Speaker 1: and the other one's like, no, you put your gun

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Speaker 1: down first, then I'll put mind down. That's the situation

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Speaker 1: where on a global scale, like what would you do?

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Speaker 1: What would you do if Russia said, we'll get rid

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Speaker 1: of all the nuclear weapons in our arsenal? We we

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Speaker 1: will legally agree to do this as long as every

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Speaker 1: other country goes for Yeah. Yeah, that's sort of like

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Speaker 1: that story. We we talked about this in an episode

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Speaker 1: of Ridiculous History recently of the history of the expression

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Speaker 1: eating crow, and I'm not fully remembering all the details

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Speaker 1: what it had to do with an encounter between a

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Speaker 1: British soldier and an American soldier. And the British soldier

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Speaker 1: I believe, took the American soldier's gun from him, or

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Speaker 1: he kind of gave it to him for some dumb reason,

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Speaker 1: like he needed it was it wasn't working or so,

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Speaker 1: I can't quite remember. The point is he took it

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Speaker 1: from him, he held it on him, and he forced

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Speaker 1: him to eat a dead crow carcass that he had

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Speaker 1: just killed with said gun. Um Again, I'm getting the

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Speaker 1: details a little hazy. Then, of course the he gives

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Speaker 1: a back to him, which seemed crazy to me. And

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Speaker 1: then what happens. The American soldier holds the gun on

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Speaker 1: the British soldier and makes him eat a piece of

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Speaker 1: that crow too. Uh. That's just how people are, and

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Speaker 1: governments often mimic the worst and basest instincts of people

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Speaker 1: on a grand scale. Yeah, the big assumption of international

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Speaker 1: affairs is that the state is a rational actor. But

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Speaker 1: being rational does not necessarily imply anything about morality or

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Speaker 1: being good, right, It's just what seems to be the

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Speaker 1: most reasonable cost benefit at the time. And that's where

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Speaker 1: we're at. You know, we want to be careful in

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Speaker 1: this episode not too seem like we are overly propagandizing

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Speaker 1: for the US or for another country in particular. This

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Speaker 1: this is the issue. These are world enders. They could

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Speaker 1: also potentially be very clean technology when it works safely.

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Speaker 1: And so since the end of the Second War, every

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Speaker 1: single major country has considered pursuing nukes to one degree

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Speaker 1: or another. Some of them never got past that idea,

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Speaker 1: that discussion in a boardroom, and they signed stuff like

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Speaker 1: the MPT, the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty, but if you

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Speaker 1: go back, if you go back to um the forties,

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Speaker 1: you can see some pretty amazing and disturbing stories about

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Speaker 1: how the so called Allies raced against one another to

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Speaker 1: get the bomb. I mean, the these folks were aware

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Speaker 1: that Germany had an atomic or nuclear program during World

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Speaker 1: War Two. It's just very lucky for history that the

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Speaker 1: Nazis weren't successful. And as soon as the Nazi Party fell, everybody,

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Speaker 1: the Soviet Union, the US, the UK, France, uh, it

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Speaker 1: was no longer one for all, all for one. They

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Speaker 1: were snatching people totally. But it was a very speculative

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Speaker 1: history question. If the Nazis would have won and gotten

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Speaker 1: a hold of nuclear weapons, let's just say, I'm like

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Speaker 1: an alternate timeline. Do you think they would have like

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Speaker 1: nuke whole swaths of the world that they were unhappy

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Speaker 1: with to start from scratch and rebuild like in their

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Speaker 1: own image. I think it's quite possible. Um, they were

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Speaker 1: very res We're poor for a lot of the war,

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Speaker 1: which is, you know, I think one of the things

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Speaker 1: powering some of their strategies. But they would have been

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Speaker 1: kind of in the situation that the US was in

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Speaker 1: post World War Two when they were doing those experiments

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Speaker 1: on the Marshall Islands, they would have been saying, let's

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Speaker 1: test this amidst more isolated or vulnerable people. So I

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Speaker 1: think if they saw some if they saw an area

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Speaker 1: with people that they didn't consider human and that also

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Speaker 1: didn't have resources they wanted, like good farmland or something

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Speaker 1: like that, they would bomb them. But then also, um,

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Speaker 1: and this is entirely speculative history, but if if Adolf

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Speaker 1: Hitler's administration had had nuclear capability, they absolutely would have

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Speaker 1: used it. Um. So, so you're right, like it is

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Speaker 1: a philosophical conversation in that respect, right, like do you

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Speaker 1: play by the rules if even if only the rules

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Speaker 1: are well, I'm not gonna blow you up, because then

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Speaker 1: you'll blow me up. Um. But there is some kind

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Speaker 1: of moral core at work here, it seems, you know,

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Speaker 1: I mean, but it's also like largely out of self preservation.

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Speaker 1: It's it's interesting, But I guess what we're getting into

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Speaker 1: today is this moral idea of we have them and

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Speaker 1: we deserve them, but you shouldn't have them, you don't

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Speaker 1: deserve them whether because and that's not what's said obviously,

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Speaker 1: but that is the implication. Wouldn't wuldn't you say, yeah, absolutely,

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Speaker 1: And it's a question that becomes a little bit complicated,

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Speaker 1: a little more quickly than you might think. We know

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Speaker 1: that in our thread of the multiverse, in our timeline,

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Speaker 1: in our version of reality, the US did emerge the

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Speaker 1: victor from this race. There were there were other like

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Speaker 1: we all know about Operation paper Clip, where the U

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Speaker 1: S spirited away German scientists. There was a Soviet equivalent

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Speaker 1: called Operation oh Sylvia Coum, which is essentially their paper

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Speaker 1: clip or also Russian also the Soviet also which was

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Speaker 1: our code name for that operation in the West. They

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Speaker 1: were stealing these people because they were stealing their expertise.

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Speaker 1: So the Soviet and US nuclear weapons programs and the

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Speaker 1: US rocketry program are built off uh Nazi science. They're

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Speaker 1: built off at least those researchers were being supported by

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Speaker 1: the Nazi government at the time. But the US won

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Speaker 1: the race that part of it. And if the government

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Speaker 1: of the US at that time had its way, just

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Speaker 1: like you were saying, no, the U S would still

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Speaker 1: be the world's only nuclear power today, because they say,

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Speaker 1: you know, because again the analogy is something like, well,

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Speaker 1: even if I don't want guns, feminar room with you know,

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Speaker 1: a hundred nineties something other people and there's one gun,

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Speaker 1: I wouldn't be the person who has it, sure, which

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Speaker 1: is understandable from like a just a you know, logical

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Speaker 1: perspective in terms of like protecting our borders and protecting

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Speaker 1: our citizens and all that. But then it gets much

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Speaker 1: more muddy, not to mention the fact that the reason

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Speaker 1: that the USSR has nuclear capabilities is because they were

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Speaker 1: spying on the US Manhattan Project, you know when that

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Speaker 1: was underway, um, which is you know, literally what what

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Speaker 1: United States. Um. So the USSR wouldn't have had that

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Speaker 1: first place. Um. And then some of the United Kingdoms

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Speaker 1: times as allies obviously still allies, but working more closely

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Speaker 1: you know, so to speak for anyone to see right right,

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Speaker 1: your your roommate at the lab is getting real cag

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Speaker 1: now about what they're working on and what they have discovered,

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Speaker 1: because there's no longer that common purpose of World War

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Speaker 1: two nineteen them and ultimately many of the countries who

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Speaker 1: are amidst the nine nuclear ring races we just named,

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Speaker 1: ruthlessly breaking international norms, stealing absolutely whatever they could, setting

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Speaker 1: up get this clandestine networks which is going to be

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Speaker 1: somewhat ironic later in this episode. What are we talking about?

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Speaker 1: We'll tell you after a word from our sponsors. We've

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Speaker 1: returned to a lot of casual observers. There's this kind

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Speaker 1: of weird dichotomy in the world of nuclear weapons. Some

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Speaker 1: of the countries, if you just look at the list

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Speaker 1: that have nuclear weapons or we're close to attaining those

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Speaker 1: in the past, like Libya, were often considered enemies of

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Speaker 1: the West. These would be countries like Iran's nuclear capabilities,

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Speaker 1: or Pakistan or North Korea and UH. To be clear,

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Speaker 1: Iran does not, as far as we know, have nuclear weaponry,

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Speaker 1: but the guess is that they're working on it despite

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Speaker 1: their statements. So how did how did these countries which

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Speaker 1: are not particularly wealthy, managed to succeed where so many

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Speaker 1: other countries failed? UH? It turns out, folks, that the

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Speaker 1: world of nuclear weapons has a literal black market, and

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Speaker 1: it's one that's on the danger of booming. Here's where

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Speaker 1: it gets crazy. Yeah, it does sound like something out

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Speaker 1: of a Bond film. Uh you may it may have

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Speaker 1: been in a Bond film, if not a Bond film. Definitely,

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Speaker 1: things like clear and present danger. A lot of these

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Speaker 1: like Tom clam See type, you know, speculative kind of

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Speaker 1: like fiction, you know, based around history and geopolitics and

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Speaker 1: all of that. Right, um, certainly seeing the shady you know,

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Speaker 1: plutonium deals going down, even like Back to the Future.

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Speaker 1: Right remember how Doc Brown uh spoiler alert for Back

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Speaker 1: to the Future gets killed by these terrorists quote unquote

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Speaker 1: who he either stole the plutonium from or bought it

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Speaker 1: from the deal went wrong. So it's definitely a thing

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Speaker 1: you hear about people trying to buy enriched uranium on

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Speaker 1: the black market and stuff, and you think, okay, maybe

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Speaker 1: that's based in some grain of reality, but you don't

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Speaker 1: really think of it as being a huge, you know,

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Speaker 1: specter looming over everything every day. But it turns out

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Speaker 1: it very much is, and it's based on a very

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Speaker 1: real thing. And and this market, this black market you

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Speaker 1: speak of, um could very well be in danger of

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Speaker 1: getting worse. And it all goes back to this one

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Speaker 1: very very very successful UH signists and black market nuclear

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Speaker 1: operative by the name of a Q kN oh Man. Yes,

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Speaker 1: this is true. A lot of times in the course

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Speaker 1: of reporting the news media outlets will just latch onto

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Speaker 1: one person as an example of a larger systemic issue,

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Speaker 1: right because it humanizes it, it simplifies it, it it makes

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Speaker 1: it easier to understand. That's usually inaccurate, but in this

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Speaker 1: case it is very true. It goes down to one guy.

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Speaker 1: His name is Abdul Kadir Khan, and he didn't start

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Speaker 1: out as what some people would call an international science

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Speaker 1: criminal today, the man known as the father of Pakistan's

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Speaker 1: nuclear bomb uh. You know, it might surprise some of

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Speaker 1: his fans to know that he started out as a

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Speaker 1: pretty a pretty smart but bookish nuclear physicist metallurgist. He

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Speaker 1: was born in India five but he relocated to Pakistan

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Speaker 1: in nineteen fifty one, and part of the reason that

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Speaker 1: he relocated had to be at least politically motivated, because

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Speaker 1: his older siblings and some members of his family had

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Speaker 1: moved to Pakistan during the partition of India in nineteen

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Speaker 1: forty seven when Pakistan was split off into an independent state,

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Speaker 1: and they would write to Khan and his folks about

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Speaker 1: how they had these new better lives there. So he

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Speaker 1: was becoming a nationalist in a way for Pakistan. So

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Speaker 1: it made sense that he moved there. Uh. And he

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Speaker 1: was a smart guy who was a smart guy, and

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Speaker 1: he became a globe trotter just on the basis of

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Speaker 1: his intellect. He was a brilliant student. Yes, Khan was

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Speaker 1: born in India in nineteen thirty five, but moved to

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Speaker 1: Pakistan in nineteen fifty one, and he eventually got a

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Speaker 1: very illustrious scholarship where he was paid to study abroad

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Speaker 1: in West Germany. Uh. And that led to him moving

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Speaker 1: to the Netherlands, which is what led him to working

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Speaker 1: for an engineering firm in Amsterdam, where he developed a

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Speaker 1: very specific set of skills. So the the company he

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Speaker 1: worked for is pretty important. It was called the Physics

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Speaker 1: Dynamics Research Laboratory. And that in itself is you know,

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Speaker 1: it's a solid gig. It's good work if you can

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Speaker 1: get it, but it's not. It's not our smoking gun here. Uh.

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Speaker 1: The The connection is that this laboratory was a subcontractor

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Speaker 1: for something with the unfortunate name of the Urinco group.

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Speaker 1: Do they make fake p for like passing the urine screens? Maybe?

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Speaker 1: They seem to do several things. One of the things

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Speaker 1: they did was operated new uranium enrichment plant. And so

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Speaker 1: Colin is kind of like a nuclear physicist version of Drake,

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Speaker 1: but for real, he started from the bottom, and so

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Speaker 1: he's worked his way up and now because his colleagues

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Speaker 1: and his bosses and his professors speak so highly of him,

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Speaker 1: he is seen as a total non security risk. Right,

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Speaker 1: let's see how the radioactive sausage is made. He learns

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Speaker 1: uh and and requires knowledge of the specific steps needed

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Speaker 1: to enrich radioactive material to weapons grade states. Uh. And

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Speaker 1: we know this because the techniques that he has expanded

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Speaker 1: upon are very specifically things that he would have picked

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Speaker 1: up during this time period. So it's, um, it's kind

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Speaker 1: of like you know how when you say it's not

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Speaker 1: even the subtle really, but you know how, you're listening

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Speaker 1: to a musician you say, oh, I can hear influences

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Speaker 1: of this earlier musician. You know, that's one of my

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Speaker 1: favorite things in the world. Then uh, as a as

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Speaker 1: a giant music. Yeah, it's great. I mean, you know

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Speaker 1: in certain certain musicians you know, don't want to wear

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Speaker 1: those influences like on their sleeve. Um, they might be

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Speaker 1: a little more subtle about it, but you know, you're

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Speaker 1: enriching uranium is a pretty specific influence. It's really hard.

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Speaker 1: It's hard to be subtle about it, right, right, and

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Speaker 1: the p one centerfuge is a pretty pretty specific Yeah. So, um,

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Speaker 1: it's so good on good on con at least for

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Speaker 1: not saying I totally made that up myself. But but

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Speaker 1: so this is the thing at this point, no matter

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Speaker 1: what you think about the person, uh, he's just he's

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Speaker 1: another physicist, and he's a smart researcher. He's good at

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Speaker 1: his job. He has a lot of insight. Um, and

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Speaker 1: yet he may have some very nationalistic feelings for his

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Speaker 1: adopted home country. But a lot of people have stuff

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Speaker 1: like that, you know what I mean. Just because somebody

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Speaker 1: is a very patriotic you can say, doesn't need to

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Speaker 1: affect their day job. And he might have just can

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Speaker 1: tinued his career as a researcher in Europe for a

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Speaker 1: long time. But there was one thing. It was an

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Speaker 1: event that changed his life in nineteen seventy four, he

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Speaker 1: learned about something. Yeah, that's what you might consider like

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Speaker 1: the twist or the pivot in the story. Right. In

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Speaker 1: May of nineteen seventy four, he learned about a secret

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Speaker 1: nuclear program that was being carried out in India. UM

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Speaker 1: and their surprise nuclear test known as Smiling Buddha. What

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Speaker 1: a great name. It's good, it's very good. I almost

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Speaker 1: we were talking about Bond villains and I was the

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Speaker 1: Smiling Buddha kind of like what was that? The Manchurion, No,

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Speaker 1: the Mandarin, you know in in in the Marvel world.

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Speaker 1: I think the Smiling Buddha is pretty good because it's

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Speaker 1: like it's, on the one hand, sort of innocuous, like

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Speaker 1: names for these types of programs often try to be.

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Speaker 1: But I also find it kind of creepy. Oh, it's

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Speaker 1: very creepy. The government of India when they admitted this,

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Speaker 1: this surprise nuclear test, uh, they verbatim described it as

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Speaker 1: a peaceful nuclear explosion. Oh cool, oh good, Yeah, peaceful

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Speaker 1: and that everyone's dead afterwards. That's nothing more peaceful than

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Speaker 1: you know, complete annihilation. The Buddha was smiling. Yeah. It's

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Speaker 1: it's interesting because you know, we know that other countries

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Speaker 1: were picking up on signals about this blake. Back in

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Speaker 1: the nineties sixties, India's government had contact of Westinghouse Electric

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Speaker 1: and he said, Hey, build our first nuclear power plant here.

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Speaker 1: So of course Uncle Sam is going to know about that.

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Speaker 1: A spoiler alert. Not to be two fingers on the

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Speaker 1: hand about connections, but yeah, Westinghouse, at least it's leaders

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Speaker 1: are chummy with the US, and I'm sure that they

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Speaker 1: have each other's phone numbers and have all kinds of

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Speaker 1: off the record conversations. Hang. Their sisters were best friends

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Speaker 1: and you know, growing up and stuff, right right, They

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Speaker 1: both went to Choke Nail, which is a prep school.

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Speaker 1: I made up. It's a horrible name for prep. It's

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Speaker 1: it really it reads. You said that, and I immediately

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Speaker 1: knew what you're talking about, thank you. So when he

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Speaker 1: learned of Smiling Buddha of this surprise nuclear test, this

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Speaker 1: set him upon the path he currently travels NOL. Did

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Speaker 1: you ever see the television show Fringe? Yeah, for sure.

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Speaker 1: I definitely didn't like watch every single episode, but I

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Speaker 1: followed it pretty regularly up front, and then I think

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Speaker 1: I fell off once it got into a little bit

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Speaker 1: more of the timy winmey stuff. I kind of got

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Speaker 1: a little confused and stopped watching it, but that's probably

390
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Speaker 1: on me, and there's some really great things in it.

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Speaker 1: Very X Files. He quite quite enjoyed the show. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: I agree with you on all points there. I've I've

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Speaker 1: complained about this in the past. I hope it's not unwarranted.

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Speaker 1: But I'm one of those people who gets irritated board

395
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Speaker 1: disinterested when I see a story descend into television rules

396
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Speaker 1: or soap opera rules where they'll say, oh, you know

397
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Speaker 1: what this really was. We're secretly related or we're destined

398
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Speaker 1: to be in lover This explains so much because you're

399
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Speaker 1: actually my brother. Yeah, it's like, not everybody needs to

400
00:25:20,880 --> 00:25:27,640
Speaker 1: be in one family because that's uh anyway, it's not

401
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Speaker 1: not just to have our little pop culture gripe corner

402
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Speaker 1: for a second. It's kind of the same thing that

403
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Speaker 1: happened with X Files. Whereas I know the people on

404
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Speaker 1: varying sides of this, but like, I like that show

405
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Speaker 1: best when it was a Monster of the Week episodic situation. Uh,

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Speaker 1: and then they tried a little too hard to grow

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Speaker 1: the red thread of that universe, and to me, that's

408
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Speaker 1: when I got a little much. That's how I felt

409
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Speaker 1: about friends too. But I know that you and Matt

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Speaker 1: uh do enjoy some of the larger X Files world,

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Speaker 1: you know, storylines. Sure, I dig it, but I feel

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Speaker 1: you like it's not a good story. He does not

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Speaker 1: ultimately have to be the story of a member of

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Speaker 1: a family dying or a member of a family being born,

415
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Speaker 1: producted by aliens right right, right, or repeatedly abducted by

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Speaker 1: aliens in the very definition of a tease. But Chekhov's

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Speaker 1: gun aside, we we know that for critics of a

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Speaker 1: Q con, I'm trying to be very fair here, he

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Speaker 1: is kind of like a fringe Monster of the Week,

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Speaker 1: but has been for decades. Um fringes Monster of the

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Speaker 1: Week episodes often concerned. They're pretty often concerned evil scientists,

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Speaker 1: scientists who had used the power of their intelligence and

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Speaker 1: their design ability to create things for nefarious or misdirected purposes,

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Speaker 1: you know what I mean. Like somebody builds a time

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Speaker 1: machine that he has to embed in his body to

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Speaker 1: travel back in time and try to save his wife

427
00:26:59,280 --> 00:27:02,600
Speaker 1: from a car accident, right right, There's always that trigger

428
00:27:02,640 --> 00:27:04,640
Speaker 1: moment that like sets them on a path of either

429
00:27:05,200 --> 00:27:11,000
Speaker 1: righteousness or you know, revenge against everyone that wronged them exactly.

430
00:27:11,119 --> 00:27:15,479
Speaker 1: And so that's what happened with a Q Kahan, And

431
00:27:15,520 --> 00:27:19,000
Speaker 1: we can dive into his career, but it gets it

432
00:27:19,040 --> 00:27:24,239
Speaker 1: gets complicated really quickly. So what we can say is

433
00:27:24,280 --> 00:27:28,520
Speaker 1: that he began making connections. He began he was the

434
00:27:28,640 --> 00:27:32,080
Speaker 1: number it was one of the number one drivers of

435
00:27:32,240 --> 00:27:36,479
Speaker 1: Pakistan's nuclear program. He didn't get along with everybody, there

436
00:27:36,480 --> 00:27:38,840
Speaker 1: were a lot of ins and outs, but he is

437
00:27:38,880 --> 00:27:43,040
Speaker 1: a huge reason that Pakistan's a nuclear armed country today.

438
00:27:43,200 --> 00:27:45,560
Speaker 1: And it's you know, it's if you think about it,

439
00:27:46,320 --> 00:27:52,720
Speaker 1: given the incredible, the incredibly tense relationship between Pakistan and India, Uh,

440
00:27:52,760 --> 00:27:55,640
Speaker 1: it's no surprise that he is. A Pakistani man could

441
00:27:55,640 --> 00:27:59,320
Speaker 1: have seen a nuclear powered India as an existential threat.

442
00:27:59,480 --> 00:28:02,560
Speaker 1: So he probably saw him. He probably sees himself because

443
00:28:02,560 --> 00:28:08,240
Speaker 1: he's still alive, as someone doing a right, just a

444
00:28:08,359 --> 00:28:13,680
Speaker 1: noble thing. But two agencies like the I e. A E.

445
00:28:14,640 --> 00:28:19,280
Speaker 1: Which monitors nuclear proliferation, this guy is a criminal. He's

446
00:28:19,320 --> 00:28:23,640
Speaker 1: public enemy number one, and by nineteen seventy nine, suspicions

447
00:28:23,680 --> 00:28:29,040
Speaker 1: of his role in illegal nuclear proliferation reached a fever pitch,

448
00:28:30,040 --> 00:28:32,639
Speaker 1: and his old country that he lived in during college

449
00:28:32,680 --> 00:28:35,639
Speaker 1: investigated him. It's really interesting, man. We talked about this

450
00:28:35,680 --> 00:28:36,919
Speaker 1: at the top of the show. I just wanted to

451
00:28:36,960 --> 00:28:40,080
Speaker 1: point this out here. I mean, you know, Pakistan has

452
00:28:40,160 --> 00:28:42,680
Speaker 1: a GDP of two d and seventy eight billion U

453
00:28:42,800 --> 00:28:44,720
Speaker 1: S dollars or at least in twenty nineteen it did,

454
00:28:45,120 --> 00:28:49,240
Speaker 1: and Iran has a g d P uh or had

455
00:28:49,320 --> 00:28:53,080
Speaker 1: of of almost six hundred billion dollars UM. And it's

456
00:28:53,080 --> 00:28:54,960
Speaker 1: just when we were talking about that list at the

457
00:28:54,960 --> 00:28:57,040
Speaker 1: top of the show. And this is no disparagement on

458
00:28:57,120 --> 00:28:59,960
Speaker 1: any country or saying that like you're only worth something

459
00:29:00,040 --> 00:29:02,280
Speaker 1: if you're worth a lot of money, but in terms

460
00:29:02,320 --> 00:29:05,920
Speaker 1: of like the idea of a developed nation and that

461
00:29:06,040 --> 00:29:08,840
Speaker 1: being the credentials required to have these kinds of weapons

462
00:29:08,880 --> 00:29:10,840
Speaker 1: or something, or to come by it, in terms of

463
00:29:10,880 --> 00:29:13,320
Speaker 1: like having all this cash to go into development, it

464
00:29:13,400 --> 00:29:17,560
Speaker 1: seemed like Pakistan was low on that list and compared

465
00:29:17,600 --> 00:29:21,080
Speaker 1: to some of the other countries um. And this is why,

466
00:29:21,120 --> 00:29:24,440
Speaker 1: because it turns out that it was not a natural

467
00:29:24,520 --> 00:29:28,080
Speaker 1: progression of technological investment that led to this. It was

468
00:29:28,120 --> 00:29:34,000
Speaker 1: a very specific intervention by a very specific dude. Yeah yeah,

469
00:29:34,120 --> 00:29:38,520
Speaker 1: who clearly is motivated by the belief that he is

470
00:29:39,120 --> 00:29:43,080
Speaker 1: doing what he sees as the right thing. And I

471
00:29:43,120 --> 00:29:46,040
Speaker 1: love the point you're bringing up there about GDP because

472
00:29:46,080 --> 00:29:49,240
Speaker 1: it's going to lead to our our other conversation, which

473
00:29:49,280 --> 00:29:52,080
Speaker 1: is who gets to say, who gets to say who

474
00:29:52,160 --> 00:29:55,160
Speaker 1: deserves the thing right or who has a right to this.

475
00:29:55,760 --> 00:30:00,880
Speaker 1: The Dutch government launched an investigation into con for nuclear espionage,

476
00:30:01,360 --> 00:30:04,320
Speaker 1: and the problem is that they couldn't find anything that

477
00:30:04,400 --> 00:30:09,080
Speaker 1: felt like really strong in arguable proof, so they dismissed

478
00:30:09,120 --> 00:30:13,080
Speaker 1: it due to a lack of evidence. But later in

479
00:30:13,160 --> 00:30:18,120
Speaker 1: a in a local court, he's found guilty. There's another

480
00:30:18,200 --> 00:30:22,000
Speaker 1: Dutch court and he sentenced in absentia to four years

481
00:30:22,000 --> 00:30:26,280
Speaker 1: in prison. But he sees them and he says, like

482
00:30:26,320 --> 00:30:30,840
Speaker 1: the most baller physics nerd thing you could say. He says, Look,

483
00:30:30,960 --> 00:30:35,160
Speaker 1: any information that I may have shared with anyone, I'm

484
00:30:35,200 --> 00:30:38,520
Speaker 1: not admitting that I did anything wrong. Whatever I might

485
00:30:38,560 --> 00:30:42,960
Speaker 1: have shared with whomever is freely available to people who are,

486
00:30:43,640 --> 00:30:46,520
Speaker 1: you know, maybe unlike you, smart enough to know what

487
00:30:46,560 --> 00:30:49,560
Speaker 1: they're looking for, and they'll just read the magazines that

488
00:30:49,600 --> 00:30:53,120
Speaker 1: are publicly available, or the trade journals, or the lectures

489
00:30:53,160 --> 00:30:58,640
Speaker 1: in undergraduate halls across your country. So he was pretty

490
00:30:58,720 --> 00:31:03,840
Speaker 1: much you've pled not guilty and strongly implied that the

491
00:31:03,880 --> 00:31:07,200
Speaker 1: people accused him were idiots, which I thought was a

492
00:31:07,240 --> 00:31:10,840
Speaker 1: baller move. It absolutely, it is a baller move. Um.

493
00:31:11,400 --> 00:31:14,080
Speaker 1: And you know, you we wed we alluded at the

494
00:31:14,080 --> 00:31:17,720
Speaker 1: top of the show to the fact that this guy

495
00:31:17,760 --> 00:31:22,480
Speaker 1: in Pakistan is absolutely revered, uh perhaps in the rest

496
00:31:22,480 --> 00:31:26,360
Speaker 1: of the international community. Um reviled right. Um. But there's

497
00:31:26,360 --> 00:31:28,200
Speaker 1: this really great article if you want to read up

498
00:31:28,240 --> 00:31:29,840
Speaker 1: some more on on some of the minutia of this

499
00:31:29,920 --> 00:31:33,600
Speaker 1: story in these very complicated relationships in the Atlantic that

500
00:31:33,640 --> 00:31:37,280
Speaker 1: has the fabulous name of the Wrath of Khan um

501
00:31:37,360 --> 00:31:41,080
Speaker 1: And and they specifically talk about how he is essentially

502
00:31:41,200 --> 00:31:44,720
Speaker 1: looked at as like a demigod um in in the

503
00:31:44,760 --> 00:31:48,640
Speaker 1: country and in Pakistan, second only to the founder of

504
00:31:48,640 --> 00:31:53,800
Speaker 1: the Nation of Pakistan, Mohammed Ali Jannah. And apparently the

505
00:31:53,840 --> 00:31:56,680
Speaker 1: guy's a bit of a pill, like you said, I mean,

506
00:31:56,720 --> 00:31:59,000
Speaker 1: you can imagine like he's he seems to take matters

507
00:31:59,000 --> 00:32:01,960
Speaker 1: into his own hands. But the article, the Atlantic article

508
00:32:02,000 --> 00:32:05,920
Speaker 1: talks about how he has developed quite the ego um

509
00:32:06,000 --> 00:32:12,000
Speaker 1: and uh, you know, flexes this demigod status pretty regularly. Yeah,

510
00:32:12,080 --> 00:32:15,760
Speaker 1: And it's not as if he isn't the father of

511
00:32:16,080 --> 00:32:21,480
Speaker 1: Pakistan's nuclear weaponry. There are multiple articles. I saw another

512
00:32:21,480 --> 00:32:23,520
Speaker 1: one also from the Atlantic called the Point of No

513
00:32:23,720 --> 00:32:29,240
Speaker 1: Return that is about the adulation, specifically that adoration. And

514
00:32:30,120 --> 00:32:36,080
Speaker 1: there were people who Um knew the guy before he

515
00:32:36,240 --> 00:32:40,280
Speaker 1: started this network who had a different take on him.

516
00:32:40,560 --> 00:32:45,880
Speaker 1: And interestingly, one person of former school Chum said that

517
00:32:46,200 --> 00:32:50,000
Speaker 1: cons seemed to behave like an addict of sorts as

518
00:32:50,000 --> 00:32:53,200
Speaker 1: he was starting this network that he wasn't able to

519
00:32:53,240 --> 00:32:55,760
Speaker 1: get It's like a scientist looking for that rush of

520
00:32:55,880 --> 00:32:59,440
Speaker 1: validation realization, and he wasn't able to get it from

521
00:32:59,440 --> 00:33:02,880
Speaker 1: his activity these when he returned to Pakistan, and that's

522
00:33:02,920 --> 00:33:06,720
Speaker 1: why he went rogue. Well that's the phrase they use

523
00:33:06,840 --> 00:33:09,760
Speaker 1: because the big one of the big arguments about this

524
00:33:10,560 --> 00:33:14,320
Speaker 1: is whether or not the government of Pakistan knew about

525
00:33:14,320 --> 00:33:19,000
Speaker 1: the proliferation network and helped him out for a cut,

526
00:33:19,160 --> 00:33:21,760
Speaker 1: you know what I mean, or whether he was doing

527
00:33:21,760 --> 00:33:25,719
Speaker 1: this for money or for something ideological. We're gonna pause

528
00:33:25,840 --> 00:33:28,400
Speaker 1: for a word from our sponsor and we'll be back

529
00:33:28,400 --> 00:33:30,800
Speaker 1: to talk a little bit about the network, a little

530
00:33:30,800 --> 00:33:34,280
Speaker 1: bit about as possible motivations, and then perhaps most importantly,

531
00:33:34,600 --> 00:33:46,040
Speaker 1: the bigger philosophical picture. So we're back. No, this is

532
00:33:46,160 --> 00:33:48,720
Speaker 1: one thing, um, we should we should probably clarify we

533
00:33:48,800 --> 00:33:53,840
Speaker 1: say nuclear proliferation network. We're not just talking about somebody

534
00:33:53,960 --> 00:33:59,800
Speaker 1: shipping over fully armed, fitted out, kitted out nuclear warheads.

535
00:33:59,800 --> 00:34:03,000
Speaker 1: Were like, this could be as small as PDFs of

536
00:34:03,040 --> 00:34:06,160
Speaker 1: a design. Here's how you make the center fugere. Yeah,

537
00:34:06,160 --> 00:34:09,640
Speaker 1: that's right. And and that's largely what uh, what con

538
00:34:10,360 --> 00:34:14,239
Speaker 1: stole and provided was designs right that he had kind

539
00:34:14,239 --> 00:34:17,600
Speaker 1: of uh you know, squirreled away from his time working

540
00:34:18,080 --> 00:34:22,160
Speaker 1: around that centerfuge Yeah. Yeah, And and these were also

541
00:34:22,280 --> 00:34:26,759
Speaker 1: designs that he had improved upon himself. Like one example,

542
00:34:27,520 --> 00:34:32,040
Speaker 1: so what what example would be Iraq? Before the Gulf War,

543
00:34:32,920 --> 00:34:37,640
Speaker 1: there was a there's a high likelihood that Han and

544
00:34:37,760 --> 00:34:41,120
Speaker 1: his network we're going to help make Iraq a nuclear

545
00:34:41,160 --> 00:34:44,440
Speaker 1: Howard nation, for nuclear capable nation, and then the war

546
00:34:44,480 --> 00:34:46,560
Speaker 1: in the Middle East or that version of it would

547
00:34:46,600 --> 00:34:50,320
Speaker 1: have gone very differently. But the Gulf War occurred before

548
00:34:51,000 --> 00:34:54,200
Speaker 1: they could really get to work on this. And the

549
00:34:54,360 --> 00:34:57,520
Speaker 1: kind of things that he supplied that were found after

550
00:34:57,560 --> 00:35:01,560
Speaker 1: the fall of the government, where things like very specific,

551
00:35:01,680 --> 00:35:06,040
Speaker 1: very necessary things like here is how you mold uranium

552
00:35:06,040 --> 00:35:09,560
Speaker 1: into the specific sphere you'll need for the thing you're

553
00:35:09,600 --> 00:35:13,440
Speaker 1: trying to do, Like that's that's the kind of detail

554
00:35:13,560 --> 00:35:17,400
Speaker 1: that a lot of people you wouldn't recognize the importance

555
00:35:17,440 --> 00:35:19,759
Speaker 1: of that if you were shifting through a bunch of papers, right,

556
00:35:19,800 --> 00:35:22,120
Speaker 1: you'd almost have to be a physicist, wouldn't you. Oh

557
00:35:22,280 --> 00:35:24,799
Speaker 1: of course. And then my question too about all this men,

558
00:35:24,840 --> 00:35:28,480
Speaker 1: and and forgive me if this is obvious, but it's

559
00:35:28,520 --> 00:35:31,960
Speaker 1: my understanding that you know, even with Iran, now, for example,

560
00:35:32,160 --> 00:35:36,600
Speaker 1: we know they have nuclear power, it's all about refining

561
00:35:36,640 --> 00:35:39,759
Speaker 1: it and enriching their uranium to a point where it

562
00:35:39,800 --> 00:35:44,000
Speaker 1: can be used as a nuclear weapon, and that technology

563
00:35:44,280 --> 00:35:48,200
Speaker 1: supposedly they're not quite there yet. So is that literally

564
00:35:48,360 --> 00:35:52,120
Speaker 1: what he was providing with the improvements to the centrifuge

565
00:35:52,400 --> 00:35:55,200
Speaker 1: is how to be able to enrich this product to

566
00:35:55,400 --> 00:35:58,880
Speaker 1: a weaponized state. Yeah, he was selling the ability, he

567
00:35:58,960 --> 00:36:02,440
Speaker 1: was selling the pieces the abilities to make nuclear weapons,

568
00:36:02,520 --> 00:36:06,080
Speaker 1: not just to have nuclear power. And the difference really

569
00:36:06,120 --> 00:36:09,239
Speaker 1: is a matter of degree of rinse and repeat and

570
00:36:09,280 --> 00:36:14,319
Speaker 1: the materials used. So it's it's dual use technology, which

571
00:36:14,360 --> 00:36:20,840
Speaker 1: is difficult for international observers. Iran can have the same

572
00:36:20,920 --> 00:36:25,240
Speaker 1: any country really, absolutely any country can have uh types

573
00:36:25,280 --> 00:36:28,200
Speaker 1: of centerfuges and a material that they're enriching up to

574
00:36:28,239 --> 00:36:31,760
Speaker 1: a certain amount. And that's totally that's it. That's nuclear power.

575
00:36:31,840 --> 00:36:34,960
Speaker 1: That's what's supposed to do. But then if you do

576
00:36:35,000 --> 00:36:38,120
Speaker 1: the same thing past a certain threshold, then you get

577
00:36:38,160 --> 00:36:42,840
Speaker 1: into the idea of making weapons grade materials. And really,

578
00:36:43,360 --> 00:36:48,000
Speaker 1: you know, the big difference between quote unquote nuclear power

579
00:36:48,000 --> 00:36:51,440
Speaker 1: and quote unquote a nuclear weapon is that in a

580
00:36:51,520 --> 00:36:55,359
Speaker 1: nuclear reactor, the energy is generated over some period of

581
00:36:55,400 --> 00:37:00,239
Speaker 1: time weeks, months, years, and these fission fragments are holding

582
00:37:00,320 --> 00:37:02,920
Speaker 1: up the whole time the reactors working. But in a

583
00:37:03,000 --> 00:37:06,520
Speaker 1: nuclear weapon, all of it comes out at once. That's

584
00:37:06,560 --> 00:37:09,240
Speaker 1: the that's the difference. It's just the same thing delivered

585
00:37:09,239 --> 00:37:11,320
Speaker 1: a different way, like when you get a case adia

586
00:37:11,440 --> 00:37:16,080
Speaker 1: instead of a burrito, exactly exactly. But people. But the

587
00:37:16,080 --> 00:37:19,600
Speaker 1: thing is, you know, people die in the burrito situation here.

588
00:37:19,640 --> 00:37:21,719
Speaker 1: I don't know why I chose the burrito as the bomb. Man,

589
00:37:21,800 --> 00:37:23,920
Speaker 1: I'm sorry, I'm just not well. We all know how

590
00:37:23,960 --> 00:37:25,799
Speaker 1: you feel. Well, you all know you're much more pro

591
00:37:25,920 --> 00:37:28,440
Speaker 1: case idia than I've never thought of. He was anti

592
00:37:28,440 --> 00:37:32,319
Speaker 1: burrito until this moment. Man, I'm gonna they cannot proliferate

593
00:37:32,840 --> 00:37:36,680
Speaker 1: apparently not, but proliferate they did. Uh, you know, the

594
00:37:37,200 --> 00:37:39,960
Speaker 1: real world burritos in this case, which is nuclear weapons,

595
00:37:40,440 --> 00:37:43,440
Speaker 1: directly because of the influence of this man um and

596
00:37:43,480 --> 00:37:48,160
Speaker 1: this network that he kind of established, right. Yeah, for

597
00:37:48,440 --> 00:37:54,279
Speaker 1: over twenty years, this underground nuclear conspiracy, this nuclear ring

598
00:37:54,560 --> 00:37:57,839
Speaker 1: operated out of more than a dozen countries. It's weird

599
00:37:57,880 --> 00:38:01,440
Speaker 1: because international servers see that somewhere along the line the

600
00:38:01,480 --> 00:38:04,520
Speaker 1: network flipped, like it started when he was back in

601
00:38:04,560 --> 00:38:09,080
Speaker 1: Pakistan and he was getting supplies he needed from other countries.

602
00:38:09,080 --> 00:38:12,680
Speaker 1: So it it started as an import network, and then

603
00:38:12,719 --> 00:38:18,240
Speaker 1: Pakistan successfully launched their nuclear weapons program, but it didn't

604
00:38:18,280 --> 00:38:22,600
Speaker 1: stop for calling. It evolved into an export network. So

605
00:38:22,680 --> 00:38:24,600
Speaker 1: this is where like you were saying, oh, this is

606
00:38:24,600 --> 00:38:27,759
Speaker 1: where they started exporting stuff to Iran, to Libya, to

607
00:38:27,880 --> 00:38:31,359
Speaker 1: North Korea. And uh, those three cases, by the way,

608
00:38:31,400 --> 00:38:35,080
Speaker 1: are solidly proven, not conspiracy theories. That's how the nukes

609
00:38:35,080 --> 00:38:38,280
Speaker 1: got there, that is why they were there today, except

610
00:38:38,320 --> 00:38:41,920
Speaker 1: in the case of Libya when Muhamar Gadaffi agreed to

611
00:38:42,160 --> 00:38:45,960
Speaker 1: step back from his nuclear program and was rewarded with

612
00:38:46,000 --> 00:38:48,920
Speaker 1: the fall of his regime. And while we're doing an

613
00:38:48,920 --> 00:38:51,400
Speaker 1: info dump, I guess i'll just say it for anybody's

614
00:38:51,440 --> 00:38:55,680
Speaker 1: wondering why the Gadaffi regime was finally brought down. When

615
00:38:55,719 --> 00:38:58,040
Speaker 1: it was brought down, part of it was that they

616
00:38:58,080 --> 00:39:01,399
Speaker 1: would not have a nuclear deterrent. But the bigger part,

617
00:39:01,440 --> 00:39:06,040
Speaker 1: the big motivation was France, which wanted to control the

618
00:39:06,200 --> 00:39:09,279
Speaker 1: currency at the time. Gaddafi was moving away to an

619
00:39:09,280 --> 00:39:13,840
Speaker 1: African dinar kind of like an African euro and France

620
00:39:13,880 --> 00:39:16,400
Speaker 1: didn't want it because they controlled the franc that was

621
00:39:16,560 --> 00:39:18,759
Speaker 1: used in that area. But then I have to ask

622
00:39:18,800 --> 00:39:23,600
Speaker 1: if CON's network was supplying, uh, you know, stuff to

623
00:39:23,840 --> 00:39:29,040
Speaker 1: Iran and Libya, why don't they have nukes. Well, yeah,

624
00:39:29,280 --> 00:39:33,720
Speaker 1: Libya walked back their program through international agreement. Uh. And

625
00:39:34,120 --> 00:39:37,360
Speaker 1: Iran is like the one of the number one worries

626
00:39:37,520 --> 00:39:42,160
Speaker 1: for the West and Israel. So Iran has more eyes

627
00:39:42,280 --> 00:39:45,759
Speaker 1: on them and more punishments through the forms of sanctions

628
00:39:45,760 --> 00:39:49,080
Speaker 1: and stuff. They have nuclear capability. But also if you

629
00:39:49,120 --> 00:39:51,720
Speaker 1: ask the government of Iran, they would say they don't

630
00:39:51,760 --> 00:39:55,680
Speaker 1: want nuclear weapons, right, But but I guess, yeah, that's

631
00:39:55,719 --> 00:39:57,239
Speaker 1: that's a really good point in terms of like the

632
00:39:57,280 --> 00:39:59,560
Speaker 1: optics of it all. But yeah, that's what they say.

633
00:40:00,040 --> 00:40:02,920
Speaker 1: It is clear though to me that Pakistan was Khan's

634
00:40:03,000 --> 00:40:07,160
Speaker 1: major concern. He literally wanted to save the country because

635
00:40:07,200 --> 00:40:10,480
Speaker 1: they had lost so many wars, you know, against India

636
00:40:10,520 --> 00:40:13,360
Speaker 1: for example, or conflicts, and they felt he felt that

637
00:40:13,400 --> 00:40:16,280
Speaker 1: they were like under the thumb of this other country,

638
00:40:16,320 --> 00:40:18,319
Speaker 1: and he wanted to bring them up and lift them

639
00:40:18,360 --> 00:40:20,120
Speaker 1: up out of that and give them a seat at

640
00:40:20,160 --> 00:40:22,719
Speaker 1: the table. And that's why he's revered there because he's

641
00:40:22,800 --> 00:40:25,840
Speaker 1: he's looked at as like a savior type figure. Yeah, exactly,

642
00:40:26,080 --> 00:40:30,799
Speaker 1: nailed it. So suppliers contractors for the network came from

643
00:40:30,880 --> 00:40:34,279
Speaker 1: countries all across Europe. There were some contractors in Malaysia.

644
00:40:34,960 --> 00:40:39,160
Speaker 1: The big question for international observers is was this in

645
00:40:39,280 --> 00:40:45,279
Speaker 1: fact a private network run by private entities with one

646
00:40:45,360 --> 00:40:49,360
Speaker 1: guy Khan having connections with a state level entity, that

647
00:40:49,440 --> 00:40:53,080
Speaker 1: being the country of Pakistan, or was the government of

648
00:40:53,160 --> 00:40:57,080
Speaker 1: Pakistan actively assisting him because some of the flights, some

649
00:40:57,120 --> 00:41:00,879
Speaker 1: of the equipment flights that have been traced happened on

650
00:41:02,040 --> 00:41:05,280
Speaker 1: planes owned by the government of Pakistan. So I feel

651
00:41:05,280 --> 00:41:09,399
Speaker 1: like facets or factions of the of the government were

652
00:41:09,400 --> 00:41:12,200
Speaker 1: at least assisting him, even without even if without the

653
00:41:12,239 --> 00:41:15,560
Speaker 1: government's overall knowledge. And then there's one other thing that

654
00:41:15,640 --> 00:41:19,680
Speaker 1: we should mention. Uh, we're not in any way saying

655
00:41:20,320 --> 00:41:24,520
Speaker 1: stuff that is untrue to CON's reputation, and we're not

656
00:41:24,640 --> 00:41:28,680
Speaker 1: leveling accusations at him because he publicly admitted that he

657
00:41:28,760 --> 00:41:33,120
Speaker 1: has done this multiple times. And this is scary to

658
00:41:33,200 --> 00:41:36,360
Speaker 1: a lot of people who like the current nuclear world

659
00:41:36,520 --> 00:41:38,920
Speaker 1: order because it means first you can do this and

660
00:41:38,960 --> 00:41:41,560
Speaker 1: get away. Canas eighty five years old as we record,

661
00:41:41,640 --> 00:41:45,240
Speaker 1: he's a freeman. Many people have affiliated with this network

662
00:41:45,920 --> 00:41:48,360
Speaker 1: never saw a day in jail, or never saw a

663
00:41:48,440 --> 00:41:51,480
Speaker 1: year in jail at least, and they're fine. In many cases.

664
00:41:51,520 --> 00:41:54,960
Speaker 1: They're not just free, they're very wealthy. Uh. Secondly, it

665
00:41:55,000 --> 00:41:58,240
Speaker 1: looks like some of these regulatory bodies can be powerless. Thirdly,

666
00:41:58,600 --> 00:42:00,719
Speaker 1: there don't seem to be a lot of smart controls.

667
00:42:00,960 --> 00:42:03,360
Speaker 1: But I would say no. Most importantly, that's something you

668
00:42:03,480 --> 00:42:05,920
Speaker 1: and Paul and I were talking about before we rolled.

669
00:42:06,360 --> 00:42:10,839
Speaker 1: Who gets to decide right who? Who has there? We

670
00:42:10,920 --> 00:42:15,120
Speaker 1: know there is no like ancient right to decide because

671
00:42:15,239 --> 00:42:19,200
Speaker 1: nuclear weaponry didn't exist until very recently. So who gets

672
00:42:19,239 --> 00:42:23,399
Speaker 1: to be the master of the toys here? Whoever's got

673
00:42:23,440 --> 00:42:27,040
Speaker 1: the most of them? I would assume, uh, you know

674
00:42:27,120 --> 00:42:30,960
Speaker 1: who who holds the keys? To the Kingdom of nuclear weaponry.

675
00:42:30,960 --> 00:42:34,360
Speaker 1: And I mean I think the United States would fancy

676
00:42:34,440 --> 00:42:38,640
Speaker 1: it as that being US. Uh, and certainly flexes that

677
00:42:38,719 --> 00:42:41,880
Speaker 1: muscle plenty in the form of sanctions, in the form

678
00:42:41,960 --> 00:42:45,239
Speaker 1: of trying to you know, international agreements are kind of

679
00:42:45,320 --> 00:42:48,640
Speaker 1: leading the charge in these conversations. Um, but hell, we're

680
00:42:48,640 --> 00:42:51,399
Speaker 1: not going to dismantle our nukes. You're kidding you, Stay

681
00:42:51,400 --> 00:42:54,240
Speaker 1: away from our nukes. We're the we're the good guys.

682
00:42:54,640 --> 00:42:57,680
Speaker 1: Have you seen our our our hats and we're all

683
00:42:57,680 --> 00:43:02,319
Speaker 1: in Uncle Sam costumes at this point totally. Um. It's

684
00:43:02,320 --> 00:43:06,600
Speaker 1: a good point because it looks all countries in some

685
00:43:06,680 --> 00:43:10,319
Speaker 1: shape or form, except maybe like Sweden, and I take

686
00:43:10,360 --> 00:43:14,480
Speaker 1: that back, have some level of corruption, you know, whether

687
00:43:14,520 --> 00:43:17,560
Speaker 1: they're corrupt to the core, you know, that's all a

688
00:43:17,640 --> 00:43:20,520
Speaker 1: matter of debate, you know, but I think we all know,

689
00:43:20,640 --> 00:43:24,400
Speaker 1: like we said, governments and governing bodies being sort of

690
00:43:24,440 --> 00:43:30,120
Speaker 1: the like, you know, organizational personification of the dark heart

691
00:43:30,200 --> 00:43:33,399
Speaker 1: of man, right. Uh, it's sort of unavoidable that there's

692
00:43:33,400 --> 00:43:35,719
Speaker 1: gonna be some rot in these in these countries, and

693
00:43:35,719 --> 00:43:38,640
Speaker 1: there certainly is. The United States. I think we maybe

694
00:43:38,640 --> 00:43:41,160
Speaker 1: have a little more faith in our processes or whatever

695
00:43:41,719 --> 00:43:44,400
Speaker 1: that maybe we you know, we have some restraint and

696
00:43:44,640 --> 00:43:47,480
Speaker 1: we're like some kind of Bellweather of the economy. Whatever.

697
00:43:47,600 --> 00:43:50,440
Speaker 1: All that stuff is again totally up for debate, but

698
00:43:50,520 --> 00:43:52,760
Speaker 1: I think we would argue there are countries that should

699
00:43:52,760 --> 00:43:56,080
Speaker 1: not have this stuff because they are corrupt to the core, right. Yeah,

700
00:43:56,160 --> 00:43:59,879
Speaker 1: And then there are questions too about guide ee ide all.

701
00:44:00,400 --> 00:44:04,040
Speaker 1: So one of the things that got hammered into my

702
00:44:04,120 --> 00:44:09,000
Speaker 1: head by by some professors was that certain countries could

703
00:44:09,040 --> 00:44:13,560
Speaker 1: never have nuclear weapons because they were considered theocracies. And

704
00:44:13,640 --> 00:44:15,560
Speaker 1: one of the big things they would say, like one

705
00:44:16,040 --> 00:44:17,880
Speaker 1: I'm not going to name names here, but one of

706
00:44:17,880 --> 00:44:22,200
Speaker 1: the examples that that I heard pretty frequently was somebody saying, look,

707
00:44:22,840 --> 00:44:26,880
Speaker 1: you don't want Saudi Arabia having a nuclear bomb because

708
00:44:27,080 --> 00:44:30,560
Speaker 1: it is a kingdom that is governed by a very

709
00:44:30,600 --> 00:44:35,560
Speaker 1: specific type of Islam. And they were saying, you know,

710
00:44:35,600 --> 00:44:38,080
Speaker 1: the belief in Islam is not the problem, but a

711
00:44:38,160 --> 00:44:42,880
Speaker 1: government steered by a religion with nuclear weapons is the problem.

712
00:44:42,960 --> 00:44:46,280
Speaker 1: And then I guess, in an attempt to look less Islamophobic,

713
00:44:46,840 --> 00:44:49,799
Speaker 1: this same professor would say, and by that, I mean

714
00:44:50,080 --> 00:44:52,600
Speaker 1: I would never want Vatican City to have a nuke.

715
00:44:52,960 --> 00:44:56,359
Speaker 1: The Pope should not have nuclear warheads, which I thought

716
00:44:56,440 --> 00:44:59,000
Speaker 1: was a fair argument. You know, the pope is like

717
00:44:59,080 --> 00:45:03,719
Speaker 1: specialized in other things, I imagine, but that that's their argument. Like,

718
00:45:04,320 --> 00:45:06,920
Speaker 1: but what it's missing is that there is a note

719
00:45:07,000 --> 00:45:11,880
Speaker 1: of imperialism right when we are saying when a nuclear

720
00:45:11,920 --> 00:45:14,600
Speaker 1: powered country that, by the way, is the only country

721
00:45:14,640 --> 00:45:18,600
Speaker 1: to deploy nuclear weapons in the field of war, knowing

722
00:45:18,680 --> 00:45:22,600
Speaker 1: that a country still considers itself like the moral as

723
00:45:22,680 --> 00:45:26,640
Speaker 1: you said, bell Weather, it's it's got some questions. You know,

724
00:45:26,719 --> 00:45:29,920
Speaker 1: there's some holes to poke there, because I'm not sure

725
00:45:30,520 --> 00:45:33,759
Speaker 1: you can square some of the imperialistic actions that the

726
00:45:33,800 --> 00:45:37,120
Speaker 1: country has taken over the past centuries with that kind

727
00:45:37,160 --> 00:45:39,120
Speaker 1: of that kind of belief, you know what I mean

728
00:45:39,160 --> 00:45:44,840
Speaker 1: that that was it called sometimes American exceptionalism. Yeah, manifest

729
00:45:44,920 --> 00:45:47,960
Speaker 1: destiny means the way you know, well, I mean I

730
00:45:48,000 --> 00:45:49,880
Speaker 1: just think those things are kind of related, right, this

731
00:45:50,040 --> 00:45:53,000
Speaker 1: idea of striving for this like you know, let's take

732
00:45:53,000 --> 00:45:55,080
Speaker 1: it as far as we can possibly go, you know,

733
00:45:55,239 --> 00:45:58,760
Speaker 1: and that's sort of Uh, one could argue the seeds

734
00:45:58,800 --> 00:46:04,160
Speaker 1: of megalomania and uh, a kind of psychosis of never

735
00:46:04,200 --> 00:46:08,440
Speaker 1: being satisfied. It's it's a question that we don't have

736
00:46:08,520 --> 00:46:10,759
Speaker 1: the answer for and a lot of people don't have

737
00:46:10,800 --> 00:46:14,400
Speaker 1: the answer right now either. Now, sure there's a clear

738
00:46:14,520 --> 00:46:18,480
Speaker 1: argument to be made. I think that, uh, there are

739
00:46:18,560 --> 00:46:22,359
Speaker 1: some countries that probably shouldn't have nuclear weapons. But then

740
00:46:22,400 --> 00:46:25,440
Speaker 1: there's also the argument to be made that asks should

741
00:46:25,480 --> 00:46:28,920
Speaker 1: any country have a nuclear weapon? We can't close the

742
00:46:28,960 --> 00:46:30,799
Speaker 1: door on this one, you know what I mean. The

743
00:46:30,920 --> 00:46:34,400
Speaker 1: radioactive horses have left the barn. Nuclear weapons are going

744
00:46:34,480 --> 00:46:37,080
Speaker 1: to be a reality now and with that comes this

745
00:46:37,160 --> 00:46:40,640
Speaker 1: kind of black market. A q CON through this conspiracy,

746
00:46:40,800 --> 00:46:45,480
Speaker 1: proved that with enough motivation and know how, you can't

747
00:46:45,600 --> 00:46:50,359
Speaker 1: really stop other countries from learning about this stuff. So

748
00:46:51,200 --> 00:46:55,480
Speaker 1: before we end, we should we should give you an

749
00:46:55,600 --> 00:46:59,480
Speaker 1: update on Con today. Like like we said earlier, he

750
00:46:59,760 --> 00:47:03,879
Speaker 1: is a live he is in his mid eighties, he's

751
00:47:03,920 --> 00:47:07,600
Speaker 1: living in Pakistan still. Uh, he is not in jail.

752
00:47:07,840 --> 00:47:10,960
Speaker 1: He's in good terms with the government. He's super popular,

753
00:47:11,120 --> 00:47:14,680
Speaker 1: actually domestically with the conservative sides. It's crazy, man. I

754
00:47:14,719 --> 00:47:17,040
Speaker 1: just had to add. You know, we talked briefly about

755
00:47:17,040 --> 00:47:21,560
Speaker 1: how he sort of embraced this demigod status um and

756
00:47:21,600 --> 00:47:24,440
Speaker 1: he did it in the most open manner possible. He

757
00:47:24,480 --> 00:47:27,120
Speaker 1: didn't act like a criminal. He acted like a king

758
00:47:27,640 --> 00:47:31,680
Speaker 1: Um and he you know, would uh speak publicly and

759
00:47:31,760 --> 00:47:35,680
Speaker 1: do you know, seminars and talk about everything from you know,

760
00:47:35,800 --> 00:47:39,680
Speaker 1: science to history, pontificate on things like poetry. He was

761
00:47:39,719 --> 00:47:42,560
Speaker 1: a huge fan of of poetry. Apparently again this is

762
00:47:42,560 --> 00:47:45,560
Speaker 1: a from this Atlantic article of the Wrath of Khan Um.

763
00:47:45,920 --> 00:47:49,680
Speaker 1: He he did a really interesting thing. Um. We we

764
00:47:49,719 --> 00:47:53,759
Speaker 1: talked about kind of the the idea of political corruption

765
00:47:53,920 --> 00:47:56,439
Speaker 1: and and there's no secret that Pakistan has a very

766
00:47:56,560 --> 00:47:59,799
Speaker 1: rife history of of political corruption. And it's a little

767
00:47:59,840 --> 00:48:02,360
Speaker 1: too complex to go into right here, but apparently they

768
00:48:02,400 --> 00:48:04,960
Speaker 1: have a lot of I guess you could call them

769
00:48:05,040 --> 00:48:08,560
Speaker 1: civilian governments, these kind of little mini governments throughout in

770
00:48:08,600 --> 00:48:11,239
Speaker 1: different kind of for lack of a better term, townships

771
00:48:11,320 --> 00:48:14,719
Speaker 1: or areas or villages or whatever. And there's a lot

772
00:48:14,760 --> 00:48:18,399
Speaker 1: of palm greasing that goes on, and understandably a lot

773
00:48:18,400 --> 00:48:20,640
Speaker 1: of people of power get away with a lot of

774
00:48:20,680 --> 00:48:23,759
Speaker 1: stuff pretty openly, right. And the thing that con did

775
00:48:23,920 --> 00:48:29,040
Speaker 1: was he built a weekend house that illegally drained into

776
00:48:29,280 --> 00:48:34,640
Speaker 1: the drinking water of rawal Pindi, which is um the

777
00:48:34,760 --> 00:48:38,600
Speaker 1: capital of the rawal Pindi Division. Again, like the the

778
00:48:38,640 --> 00:48:41,279
Speaker 1: townships and principalities and the idea of the regions in

779
00:48:41,840 --> 00:48:45,839
Speaker 1: uh Pakistan are not fully known to me. I don't

780
00:48:45,880 --> 00:48:49,720
Speaker 1: have a good grasp of it, but a pretty prominent place.

781
00:48:50,320 --> 00:48:54,239
Speaker 1: It's in the Punjab area of Pakistan. Um and he

782
00:48:54,480 --> 00:48:59,920
Speaker 1: built this lake illegally draining into like waste into rawal

783
00:49:00,000 --> 00:49:04,400
Speaker 1: Pindi's water supply. Um. He did it as a flex,

784
00:49:04,560 --> 00:49:06,919
Speaker 1: saying look at me, Look how much power I have.

785
00:49:07,400 --> 00:49:09,400
Speaker 1: I can do this and no one's gonna stop me.

786
00:49:09,880 --> 00:49:11,880
Speaker 1: And you think that people living there would have a

787
00:49:11,920 --> 00:49:13,960
Speaker 1: problem with that and be like, yo, you thought we

788
00:49:14,000 --> 00:49:16,000
Speaker 1: thought you were a guy. Why are you pooping in

789
00:49:16,000 --> 00:49:18,520
Speaker 1: our drinking water? But it turns out they loved him

790
00:49:18,520 --> 00:49:20,839
Speaker 1: for it and thought it was an awesome flex and

791
00:49:20,920 --> 00:49:23,480
Speaker 1: respected the balls that he had it took him to

792
00:49:23,520 --> 00:49:27,560
Speaker 1: do that. There's also some editorializing in that Atlantic article,

793
00:49:27,880 --> 00:49:31,320
Speaker 1: and they did they consider him when they're talking about

794
00:49:31,360 --> 00:49:34,920
Speaker 1: that this house in particular, they do one of those

795
00:49:34,920 --> 00:49:39,920
Speaker 1: things where they try to slip in character character notes

796
00:49:39,960 --> 00:49:42,640
Speaker 1: based on descriptions of physical appearance. They call them like

797
00:49:42,680 --> 00:49:45,960
Speaker 1: a soft banquet fed man or something like that. Okay,

798
00:49:46,440 --> 00:49:49,520
Speaker 1: that it felt a little little tilting the scales, but

799
00:49:50,200 --> 00:49:51,759
Speaker 1: wrath of colon and the other one we mentioned the

800
00:49:51,800 --> 00:49:56,840
Speaker 1: Point of No Return are really good articles for further insights. Obviously,

801
00:49:56,880 --> 00:49:59,560
Speaker 1: Wrath of Cain has a lot of a lot more

802
00:49:59,560 --> 00:50:02,799
Speaker 1: biograph tical details. It feels a story like it really

803
00:50:02,800 --> 00:50:05,520
Speaker 1: does kind of give you a movie cinematic kind of

804
00:50:05,560 --> 00:50:08,240
Speaker 1: view of this guy's life, which is larger than life,

805
00:50:08,280 --> 00:50:13,040
Speaker 1: you know, right right, And uh, this, this maybe gives

806
00:50:13,120 --> 00:50:16,440
Speaker 1: us something we can end on here. So he thought

807
00:50:16,480 --> 00:50:19,720
Speaker 1: it is crucial to point out that he did feel

808
00:50:21,000 --> 00:50:23,200
Speaker 1: he did feel like he was doing the right thing, like,

809
00:50:23,320 --> 00:50:25,520
Speaker 1: at least in the beginning, he was on kind of

810
00:50:25,520 --> 00:50:29,520
Speaker 1: this one man mission to save Pakistan from India because

811
00:50:29,520 --> 00:50:34,920
Speaker 1: he thought India wanted Pakistan's demise. Uh. And along the

812
00:50:34,960 --> 00:50:39,239
Speaker 1: way he had some mission creep because selling nukes to

813
00:50:39,600 --> 00:50:43,560
Speaker 1: selling nuclear capabilities to North Korea doesn't really help you

814
00:50:43,600 --> 00:50:47,080
Speaker 1: protect yourself from India unless you just need the cash,

815
00:50:47,239 --> 00:50:48,840
Speaker 1: and that would have to be a lot of cash.

816
00:50:49,160 --> 00:50:51,120
Speaker 1: But this is the one thing that got got me.

817
00:50:51,640 --> 00:50:55,439
Speaker 1: People said he was abrasive, maybe single minded. Some people

818
00:50:55,480 --> 00:50:58,759
Speaker 1: said he was a little meglomaniacal. But was he right

819
00:50:58,800 --> 00:51:01,919
Speaker 1: about Pakistan? I think he was. I think they would

820
00:51:01,920 --> 00:51:04,680
Speaker 1: have been destroyed. You think so? I say that that

821
00:51:04,760 --> 00:51:09,800
Speaker 1: seems to be somewhat of a consensus at least of people.

822
00:51:10,000 --> 00:51:12,759
Speaker 1: You know, they're familiar with these conflicts that you know,

823
00:51:12,800 --> 00:51:16,919
Speaker 1: they likely would have tried to snuff them out, absorb them,

824
00:51:17,040 --> 00:51:19,960
Speaker 1: or just you know, annihilate them or subjugate them into

825
00:51:20,040 --> 00:51:23,440
Speaker 1: a vassal state or something like that. It's a I mean,

826
00:51:23,480 --> 00:51:26,359
Speaker 1: it's a complex question. We want to hear from you.

827
00:51:26,960 --> 00:51:31,200
Speaker 1: Will the new illegal nuclear trade ever be stopped? Will

828
00:51:31,239 --> 00:51:34,640
Speaker 1: it continue the way that the red market Oregon trade

829
00:51:34,640 --> 00:51:37,960
Speaker 1: continues apace in the modern day? Let us know. We

830
00:51:38,040 --> 00:51:40,839
Speaker 1: try to be easy to find online. Yep, you can

831
00:51:40,840 --> 00:51:45,080
Speaker 1: definitely find us online. We are conspiracy stuff on Facebook

832
00:51:45,120 --> 00:51:49,759
Speaker 1: and Twitter, and we're conspiracy Stuff show on Instagram. Um.

833
00:51:49,800 --> 00:51:51,160
Speaker 1: And you can also give us a call one eight

834
00:51:51,239 --> 00:51:53,360
Speaker 1: three three S T D W I t K to

835
00:51:53,440 --> 00:51:55,160
Speaker 1: leave a voicemail that could end up on one of

836
00:51:55,200 --> 00:51:57,680
Speaker 1: our weekly listener mail episodes. Just give us your name

837
00:51:57,920 --> 00:51:59,319
Speaker 1: or what to call you and make sure you let

838
00:51:59,360 --> 00:52:01,120
Speaker 1: us know if it's okay to use it. Uh, and

839
00:52:01,239 --> 00:52:03,040
Speaker 1: you might you might hear yourself while you're at it.

840
00:52:03,080 --> 00:52:06,200
Speaker 1: Why not leave us a review on Apple Podcasts? Yes,

841
00:52:06,480 --> 00:52:10,680
Speaker 1: every every single review helps. Uh, immensely enjoy them with

842
00:52:10,719 --> 00:52:13,160
Speaker 1: that phone number one eight three s T T W

843
00:52:13,400 --> 00:52:16,160
Speaker 1: y t K. It's getta give you three minutes. Those

844
00:52:16,200 --> 00:52:18,799
Speaker 1: are your three minutes. Um. Do let us know, as

845
00:52:18,880 --> 00:52:21,080
Speaker 1: we always say, uh, if you have a kick ass

846
00:52:21,160 --> 00:52:23,920
Speaker 1: nick date and let us know what's on your mind.

847
00:52:24,520 --> 00:52:27,000
Speaker 1: Unless so, if we can use your story and your

848
00:52:27,120 --> 00:52:30,759
Speaker 1: voice on air. If you are dealing with something that's

849
00:52:30,800 --> 00:52:33,520
Speaker 1: not a three minute story, never ever since to yourself,

850
00:52:34,120 --> 00:52:37,560
Speaker 1: you can write to us directly with the full shebang

851
00:52:37,719 --> 00:52:40,120
Speaker 1: at our good old fashioned email address where we are

852
00:52:40,520 --> 00:53:01,799
Speaker 1: conspiracy and I heart radio dot com. Stuff they don't

853
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Speaker 1: want you to know is a production of I heart Radio.

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Speaker 1: For more podcasts from my heart Radio, visit the iHeartRadio app,

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Speaker 1: Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to your favorite shows