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Speaker 1: and you can go check out some excerpts at stuff

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Speaker 1: you Should Read books dot com. Welcome to Stuff you

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Speaker 1: Should know a production of I Heart Radios How Stuff Works. Hey,

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Speaker 1: welcome to the podcast. I'm Josh Clark and there's Charles W.

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Speaker 1: Chuck Bryant. We are comrades in arms here at s

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Speaker 1: Y s K step. You should not let me ask

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Speaker 1: you something. When you were researching this and thinking in

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Speaker 1: your brain about talking about it, did you get nervous? No? Okay,

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Speaker 1: I guess you did a little bit. What were you

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Speaker 1: nervous about talking about the freaking KGB? Yeah? I was like,

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Speaker 1: and how they just kill anyone that they don't like? Okay,

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Speaker 1: now you know I got the most nervous ever when

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Speaker 1: we we recorded I wrote on and we recorded on

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Speaker 1: Delta Force. Really, I was really nervous. Do you think

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Speaker 1: they're gonna come kill you? I don't know. I mean

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Speaker 1: they're supposedly, they're not supposed to exist, and we were

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Speaker 1: talking about how they do exist, so I was like,

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Speaker 1: surely not. But no, I know what you're talking about.

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Speaker 1: It didn't happen in this one. So maybe this is

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Speaker 1: the one that will get me because KGB, you know,

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Speaker 1: those are the and it even says in this article,

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Speaker 1: like when you think about the knock on your door

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Speaker 1: in the middle of the night, come with us. That's

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Speaker 1: KGB ops right there, right, But that was if you

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Speaker 1: were a Russian, a Soviet citizen, which is true. It's something.

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Speaker 1: It's weird because like you you know all about the

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Speaker 1: KGB just having been raised as a Cold War kid,

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Speaker 1: you know. Um, But I never really put two and

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Speaker 1: two together that it was a really all encompassing, um

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Speaker 1: secret police kind of thing that they had going on.

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Speaker 1: Because not only were they big on spying and getting

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Speaker 1: their hands on advanced weapon technology and running disinformation campaigns

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Speaker 1: around the world and trying to destabilize the United States

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Speaker 1: and it's it's reach around the world. Um, they also

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Speaker 1: were really focused internally and domestically as well, so that

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Speaker 1: they were a secret police force that would come and

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Speaker 1: get two centers and send them off to prison camps

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Speaker 1: in the middle of the night. They basically did it all,

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Speaker 1: and all of it was geared chuck toward keeping the

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Speaker 1: Soviet Communist Party in power, and they were successful for

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Speaker 1: several decades. Actually yeah, and um, I mean from reading

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Speaker 1: this research, it seems like, I mean, they did do

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Speaker 1: all the things, but their main charge was squashing from within.

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Speaker 1: It seems like squishing your head from within. So KGB

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Speaker 1: stands for I'm gonna try and read this and Russian,

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Speaker 1: Uh commentet that's easy with a k uh ghosts dars

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Speaker 1: veny be so pass nosty. It sounds like you just

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Speaker 1: raised like an Aramaic deemon and klatu varata, so that

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Speaker 1: means an English committee for State security. Uh. They were

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Speaker 1: headquartered and we're gonna say we're a lot because technically

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Speaker 1: the KGB itself is not around anymore. It's just been

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Speaker 1: renamed though, so same stuff going on. Same place they

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Speaker 1: were and are and are now headquartered under the FSB

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Speaker 1: at lub Janka Square in Moscow, which is where the

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Speaker 1: KGB was, right, Yeah, that's what I'm saying. That's where

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Speaker 1: the headquarters was and still is. And it's this big,

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Speaker 1: you know, beautiful sort of intimidating building right there in

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Speaker 1: the square. And UM, I mean that's just par for

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Speaker 1: the course. The KGB has basically been this entity that's

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Speaker 1: changed names and official titles multiple times since the very

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Speaker 1: beginning of the U S. S r UM, but it's

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Speaker 1: still the same thing and it's there. It's actually really

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Speaker 1: instructive to UM to study it because it seems that

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Speaker 1: they are still very much up to the exact same

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Speaker 1: things that they've been doing for decades now. And everybody

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Speaker 1: very famously is well aware of UH the g r U,

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Speaker 1: which is military intelligence. But it seems that the g

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Speaker 1: r U, the FSB, UM and another group called the

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Speaker 1: UM s VR, the Foreign Intelligence Service are all basically

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Speaker 1: like the KGB. They're just it's just now been divided

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Speaker 1: into separate entities, but they're all working together. But after

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Speaker 1: the two thousand and sixteen election, everybody got a pretty

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Speaker 1: pretty obvious taste of what the KGB has long been

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Speaker 1: up to, which is trying to to meddle in American

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Speaker 1: politics and trying to sow discord among Americans and ourselves. UM.

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Speaker 1: And this is nothing new. Apparently they've been doing it

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Speaker 1: since the outset. Uh, well actually since after World War

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Speaker 1: Two at least. Yeah, I mean they've been doing this.

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Speaker 1: If you talk about sewing discord, UH, there was Operation

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Speaker 1: Pandora in the nineteen sixties, which was basically the Soviets

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Speaker 1: trying to start a race war within the US. UH

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Speaker 1: in filter trading groups like the Clan, the Jewish Defense League,

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Speaker 1: and the African American Militants posing is them making fake

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Speaker 1: pamphlets um from the different organizations and and blasting those

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Speaker 1: out to basically try and start a race war. It

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Speaker 1: didn't work, but it did create discord. Um. They've also

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Speaker 1: posed as uh, people from Antifa and Black Lives Matter,

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Speaker 1: and they're still doing the same thing today, Yeah, except

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Speaker 1: now they're doing it in this hyper accelerated manner because

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Speaker 1: things can spread so much more quickly on um on

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Speaker 1: social media, and you can turn so many people's opinions

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Speaker 1: on social media so much more quickly as well. So

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Speaker 1: there doesn't seem to be officially any any disagreement, uh

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Speaker 1: that that the Russians metal in American affairs. And I've

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Speaker 1: I have long been like, well, you know that it

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Speaker 1: doesn't excuse it, but you know, we can't ignore the

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Speaker 1: fact that America medals in other countries affairs too, and

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Speaker 1: has for a very long time too, And that is

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Speaker 1: definitely instructive also in something to pay attention to, but

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Speaker 1: first of all to what about is and but secondly,

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Speaker 1: from what I read, there's this UM scholar who wrote

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Speaker 1: this really really interesting article in the Brown Journal of

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Speaker 1: Public Affairs I believe is what it was called, Uh yeah,

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Speaker 1: Brown Journal of World Affairs. Guy named Calder Walton wrote this,

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Speaker 1: um this this article on the KGB and it's disinformation campaigns,

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Speaker 1: super readable, really exciting kind of UM. But he basically says, yes,

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Speaker 1: America has done some very very shady stuff in the

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Speaker 1: affairs of other countries and in its own affairs to like,

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Speaker 1: you know, the CIA dosing Americans with LSD to see

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Speaker 1: what happens kind of thing. Um, But the Americans and

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Speaker 1: the Brits operations just pale in scope and breadth compared

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Speaker 1: to what the KGB has done and what it seems

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Speaker 1: like the FSB is now still doing right now. Yeah.

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Speaker 1: Not not nice guys. So I just want to shout

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Speaker 1: out that, um that that article it's called Spies, election

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Speaker 1: meddling and disinformation Past and present. You should check it out. Yeah.

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Speaker 1: I mean, if you want to look into the KGB

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Speaker 1: and spying and espionage, there are so many great articles

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Speaker 1: and documentaries on YouTube that you can watch. UM, some

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Speaker 1: a little more fun than other, some very dry. The

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Speaker 1: BBC as a two parter on the KGB that's very

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Speaker 1: dry but very instructive. UM. So the KGB, if you

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Speaker 1: want to talk about that organization, you gotta go back

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Speaker 1: to pre KGB in December nineteen seventeen when Lennon created

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Speaker 1: a secret police agency called the check A c H

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Speaker 1: E k AH. They were the punishing sword of the revolutions.

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Speaker 1: They were known as and this was this was basically

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Speaker 1: the like you said, it's gone under many names. It

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Speaker 1: was the KGB before it was called the KGB. It

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Speaker 1: was there to keep leadership in power UM, imprisoning, killing

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Speaker 1: opponents both abroad and within the country, keeping people under surveillance,

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Speaker 1: censoring news UH, and basically starting the espionage program on

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Speaker 1: foreign soils UM. The Checker was followed by the O

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Speaker 1: g PU, then the KGB, then the FSB slash SVR.

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Speaker 1: But from that moment the CHECKO was formed till today

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Speaker 1: there has been a steady, continuous, basically unbroken security apparatus

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Speaker 1: that has been charged with domestic and external UM spying, surveillance, espionage,

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Speaker 1: all that jam UM from from the from the get go.

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Speaker 1: The today, they might still called themselves Checkists within the organization.

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Speaker 1: It's a it's a name, the Checker that that original

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Speaker 1: name is kind of stuck around if you're sort of

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Speaker 1: on the inside, UH, and they you know, there are

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Speaker 1: many ways that they can get what they want Uh,

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Speaker 1: this one was a pretty interesting example here. UM. At

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Speaker 1: one point there was a group early on in the

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Speaker 1: UH Soviet unions existence where they had some socialists, some

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Speaker 1: anti communists, um, that basically got together and they said,

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Speaker 1: we're an organization now called the Monarchist Union of Central Russia.

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Speaker 1: And what they didn't know is that the Monarchist Union

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Speaker 1: of Central Russia was actually infiltrated by so many moles.

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Speaker 1: It was a fake organization that real people joined that

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Speaker 1: were socialist and anti communist, but it was all a

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Speaker 1: big set up to get them all in one place

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Speaker 1: basically root out who they were. You know, you gotta

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Speaker 1: know your enemy, know who your resistance is. And they

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Speaker 1: found who they were and they killed them. Yeah, and

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Speaker 1: that nuts man. That Like, think about the effect that

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Speaker 1: it has, not just in in getting rid of your

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Speaker 1: opposition by forming a group where they all show themselves,

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Speaker 1: but also like that becomes legendary. Like that's one of

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Speaker 1: the first things that this this group, this security group did,

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Speaker 1: and like it basically sends a pretty clear message like

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Speaker 1: don't you can't even trust your own the people you

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Speaker 1: think that that are your allies, you know, just talk

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Speaker 1: about sewing discord among you know, opposition. That's just and

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Speaker 1: like that was a hundred years ago and it's still

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Speaker 1: like can give you chills just to think about that. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: I mean, you start a group that you think is

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Speaker 1: going to be battling your oppressor and it turns out

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Speaker 1: that group is so infiltrated that it's not even a

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Speaker 1: real group. Well I got the impression that it wasn't

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Speaker 1: even that they were infiltrated, but that the checker or

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Speaker 1: I should say that O g P. You actually started

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Speaker 1: that group to the detract people, you know what I mean. No,

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Speaker 1: that's what I'm saying. They infiltrated that that circle. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: we started this fake organization. Yeah, that's so nuts man.

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Speaker 1: So one thing that a lot of people forget, and

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Speaker 1: our younger listeners might not realize, is that back in

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Speaker 1: World War Two, the US and the USSR were allies.

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Speaker 1: We weren't like BFFs or anything like that, but we

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Speaker 1: were we had a common enemy in the Nazis, US,

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Speaker 1: the UK, the US, UM and the Soviets and UM.

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Speaker 1: I read that from this time of basically working with

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Speaker 1: the US and the UK, the USSR saw how good

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Speaker 1: we were at disinformation campaigns, and it had two effects.

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Speaker 1: It taught Soviets how to do these things. It basically said, hey,

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Speaker 1: this is a really good way to sew discord and

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Speaker 1: um to get information, fake information out um like with

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Speaker 1: your enemy. So it taught the Soviets how to do that.

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Speaker 1: But it also made the Soviets think that they just

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Speaker 1: presume that the US and the UK, we're creating the

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Speaker 1: same operations in the USSR too, So it really kind

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Speaker 1: of hardened the Soviets enemy ship of America. Like it

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Speaker 1: really kind of predisposed the uss are to be enemies

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Speaker 1: with the US and with the u K and with

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Speaker 1: the West in general. Um and it just kind of

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Speaker 1: took off from there. And just to be clear, I

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Speaker 1: saw a good distinction definition between misinformation and disinformation. Where

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Speaker 1: misinformation is clear where the source of the information is

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Speaker 1: coming from. It's just the information is faulty. So the government,

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Speaker 1: the US government is giving out like bad info about

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Speaker 1: coronavirus or something like that, that's misinformation. Disinformation is where

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Speaker 1: the information is faulty, but it's it's not clear where

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Speaker 1: this the information is coming from or where it came

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Speaker 1: from originally. It's just popped up as like a rumor

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Speaker 1: or something on social media. But the the information is

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Speaker 1: faulty either way. It's just whether the source is clear

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Speaker 1: who the sources are not. That's that's what disinformation is.

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Speaker 1: So the checker are operating in World War two. Uh,

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Speaker 1: they are spying on our Manhattan projects such that there's

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Speaker 1: one quote in here that said they knew more about

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Speaker 1: the creation of the atomic bomb than Truman did. Uh.

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Speaker 1: They've really infiltrated things. This gave them a huge leg

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Speaker 1: up in making their own bomb and their efforts to

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Speaker 1: um welcome themselves into the atomic age, like they would

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Speaker 1: have been way way behind had it not been for

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Speaker 1: their espionage efforts in there in America. Uh, there are

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Speaker 1: ways that they did this. There were spies who were

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Speaker 1: um sort of the tried and true ways to pose

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Speaker 1: as a diplomat um and actually get in an embassy

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Speaker 1: in a different country, but you're really a spy. UM.

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Speaker 1: You could also, if you've seen the movie The America

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Speaker 1: or the TV show The Americans, that's called an illegal

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Speaker 1: when you basically pass yourself off as someone of that

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Speaker 1: nation's origin. UM. After World War two, in Finland, they

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Speaker 1: would find records of infants who died at birth take

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Speaker 1: that identity and then basically become a finished persons called

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Speaker 1: a legend, and you are essentially living in that country

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Speaker 1: as an American or as a finished individual, but you

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Speaker 1: are really a secret agent for the Soviets, right, And

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Speaker 1: I mean like super duper deep cover UM, so much

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Speaker 1: so that you can expect to go live like a

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Speaker 1: pretty mundane everyday existence for years or decades as an

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Speaker 1: American or as a fin or something like that, whatever

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Speaker 1: your background wherever it says you're from UM, and then

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Speaker 1: you might be called on to assassinate somebody one day

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Speaker 1: UM or to start UM working sources. And it's not flagrant,

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Speaker 1: it's not obvious. The point is that they make kind

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Speaker 1: of UM contacts and friends with low level people at

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Speaker 1: the edges of powers, how I saw it described. But

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Speaker 1: I also saw that same person describe UM, who described

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Speaker 1: illegals like that as UM, saying that there's probably more

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Speaker 1: of them in the world today than there was even

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Speaker 1: during the Cold War. That's so scary, isn't it scary?

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Speaker 1: But here's the thing. This is one thing that I've

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Speaker 1: learned about studying the KGB. It's possible there are far

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Speaker 1: fewer illegals in the world today, maybe there's zero in

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Speaker 1: the US. But the fact is somebody said that, and

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Speaker 1: the KGBS track record is enough that it's possible that's

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Speaker 1: the case. And that's all it takes. Now all of

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Speaker 1: a sudden, people are paranoid and like, wait a minute, you,

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Speaker 1: Tulca Gabbard, are you actually a tool of the Kremlin?

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Speaker 1: Are you a plant by the KGB? Are you a

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Speaker 1: sleeper agent who's running for president? Like, people start to

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Speaker 1: get accusatory, and you can't trust anything anymore, and now

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Speaker 1: you're starting to see your enemies all over the place.

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Speaker 1: And all it took was a rumor that there's more

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Speaker 1: sleeper agents that are associated with the KGB today than

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Speaker 1: there were in the Cold War. And now everybody's paranoid

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Speaker 1: and the KGB's work is done for the day. And

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Speaker 1: that could simply be disinformation, exactly exactly. But because disinformation can,

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Speaker 1: it takes on a life of its own. That's the

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Speaker 1: point of disinformation that it makes people behave differently than

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Speaker 1: they would if they had not heard that rumor and

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Speaker 1: started to believe it. Because the other fact about disinformation

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Speaker 1: we should do an entire episode on it, I think,

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Speaker 1: is that it has to have a kernel of truth, Like,

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Speaker 1: like the Black Panthers have to suspect that the Jewish

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Speaker 1: Defense League is um there was prejudiced against them secretly,

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Speaker 1: and so like these documents that that were found or

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Speaker 1: sent to the Black Panther headquarters just proved this suspicion

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Speaker 1: that they already have or something like that, or vice versa. Um.

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Speaker 1: So it has to have like this kernel of truth

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Speaker 1: for somebody to be like, no, here's the proof, and

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Speaker 1: then it just takes off from there because people love

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Speaker 1: urban legends. I wonder if there's ever been an Army

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Speaker 1: colonel named Colonel Truth. No, No, all right, I think

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Speaker 1: we should take a break and ponder that. And uh well,

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Speaker 1: I'm back and talk about when the KGB was born.

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Speaker 1: Right after this stuff you should know, Nasham shuck stuff

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Speaker 1: you should know. So the KGB, I promised to tell you,

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Speaker 1: it's the when that little baby was born. That little

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Speaker 1: baby was born in ninety four, when the intelligence agency

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Speaker 1: that it, like I said, long been operating, was reorganized

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Speaker 1: officially finally as a KGB, with that same mission in hand.

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Speaker 1: They were known as this this time as the Sword

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Speaker 1: and the Shield of the Communist Party. And if you're

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Speaker 1: talking about the structure of the agency itself. It depends

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Speaker 1: on who. I mean, there's a lot that we don't know,

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Speaker 1: but um, it depends on who you're asking. I've seen

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Speaker 1: anywhere from a quarter of a million two seven hundred

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Speaker 1: thousand people on staff if you count the whole extended

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Speaker 1: network of like foreign border guards and stuff like that. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: I think seven hundred thousand's the most I've I've seen,

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Speaker 1: which is a huge, Yeah, huge, huge. Compared to any

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Speaker 1: kind of like CIA or any other countries intelligence organizations,

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Speaker 1: the KGB is just massive, right. Um. The other thing

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Speaker 1: that I saw about the KGB is that you can

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Speaker 1: make a pretty good assumption that, just especially during the

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Speaker 1: Cold War, UM, that every single one of those agents

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Speaker 1: were loyal to the Communist Party. And one way that

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Speaker 1: they made sure that every single agent was loyal the

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Speaker 1: Commist Party was to basically let them know that the

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Speaker 1: other part other members of the KGB were spying on them.

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Speaker 1: There was um entire sections that were dedicated to spying

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Speaker 1: just on the armed forces, just on the military alone. Um.

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Speaker 1: And that was one of I think twenty different directorate's

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Speaker 1: um little divisions that were responsible for different kinds of

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Speaker 1: tasks or different specializations. Yeah, the official like if you

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Speaker 1: want to look at the official sort of charge of

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Speaker 1: the KGB, um it is for areas and size. It

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Speaker 1: is the struggle or an organization, I guess, the struggle

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Speaker 1: against foreign spies and agents. Uh, the exposure and investigation

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Speaker 1: of political and economic crimes by citizens. That certainly comes

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Speaker 1: as a lot uh. Protection of state borders, That's what

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Speaker 1: I was talking about, like the border um guards and

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Speaker 1: stuff like that. And then this is the big one,

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00:20:34,640 --> 00:20:39,000
Speaker 1: protection of state secrets, right and then so like those

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00:20:39,000 --> 00:20:41,359
Speaker 1: are the big four, but there every like there was

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Speaker 1: another about sixteen of them dedicated everything like making sure

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Speaker 1: that the phone and radio systems were encrypted, um, to

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Speaker 1: making sure that transportation sector wasn't infiltrated. Like the KGB

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00:20:54,000 --> 00:20:57,320
Speaker 1: had its fingers and absolutely everything. There was one directorate

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Speaker 1: that was specifically tasked with surveilling and monitoring foreigners and

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Speaker 1: people who the KGB suspected were um we're potentially dissidents

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Speaker 1: who were Soviet citizens. And they they mostly hung around

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Speaker 1: like Leningrad and Moscow because that's where most of the

347
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Speaker 1: tourists were. But that was like a whole KGB division.

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Speaker 1: That's how many people they had and how many resources

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Speaker 1: they threw at keeping tabs on the power structure and

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Speaker 1: making sure that any challenges to the power structure were

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Speaker 1: squashed in the cradle, not even strangled in the cradle,

352
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Speaker 1: squashed in the cradle. Yeah. And you know, they recruited

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Speaker 1: the best, the smartest people, the brightest people. Um. But

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Speaker 1: like you sort of mentioned, it's not like like the

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Speaker 1: KGB was something to be feared by every uh um

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Speaker 1: citizen of the Soviet Union, I think. But jo joining

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Speaker 1: the KGB to thwart that was not. It's not like

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Speaker 1: that got you out of any sort of surveillance or

359
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Speaker 1: and in fact, it may have even put you on

360
00:22:00,119 --> 00:22:02,919
Speaker 1: or a bigger microscope, who knows. Yeah, I mean they

361
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Speaker 1: they had every level of the military infiltrated with KGB agents,

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Speaker 1: like every platoon, every detachment. If you were in a

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Speaker 1: group with the military, with the military, somebody was a

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Speaker 1: KGB officer posing as a soldier. That's right in their

365
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Speaker 1: own military. It's amazing. Yeah. Uh. By the end, I

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Speaker 1: mean I think it started, like I said, by the

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Speaker 1: end of the nineteen sixties, it was firmly, firmly in

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Speaker 1: place as as the watchdog of everybody in the in

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Speaker 1: the Soviet Union. Um. And I mean again with the

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Speaker 1: like people tend to say, like, well, the the the

371
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Speaker 1: KGB was the counterpart of the CIA, but I mean

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Speaker 1: in the CIA side some shady stuff, including domestically, but

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Speaker 1: from from basically all sources. The main point of the

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Speaker 1: KGB was domestic surveillance and domestic control of domestic challenges

375
00:23:04,320 --> 00:23:10,160
Speaker 1: or dissent toward the Communist Party. That's right, um, spying

376
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Speaker 1: on people, tapping phone lines, harassing people, arresting people, exiling people. Um.

377
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Speaker 1: If you were a religious activist, good luck. If you

378
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Speaker 1: were a human rights advocate, good luck. Um. If you

379
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Speaker 1: were an intellectual, if you were just a you know,

380
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Speaker 1: part of the intellectual um sort of university system of

381
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Speaker 1: the Soviet Union, you better watch what you say because uh,

382
00:23:36,400 --> 00:23:39,080
Speaker 1: you are definitely being watched, and every word that comes

383
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Speaker 1: out of your mouth, even in a classroom, is being recorded. Yeah,

384
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Speaker 1: and I mean some if you were super high profile,

385
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Speaker 1: you might make it out with your life and your

386
00:23:48,000 --> 00:23:51,320
Speaker 1: family might get out alive, but you would be exiled

387
00:23:51,640 --> 00:23:56,080
Speaker 1: for criticizing the government. UM. A writer named Alexander soul

388
00:23:56,240 --> 00:24:02,679
Speaker 1: Ze soul zettiness and even practice that soul Zette souls

389
00:24:02,760 --> 00:24:06,719
Speaker 1: Zette Nissen. Yeah, I think that's kind of close. He Uh.

390
00:24:06,800 --> 00:24:10,399
Speaker 1: He was actually I think a science teacher who started

391
00:24:10,440 --> 00:24:13,280
Speaker 1: writing books about how bad things were in the Soviet

392
00:24:13,400 --> 00:24:17,080
Speaker 1: Union and uh eventually won the Nobel Prize for literature.

393
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Speaker 1: But um, he was eventually exiled. If you were um

394
00:24:21,680 --> 00:24:24,439
Speaker 1: less of a well known person and you were critical

395
00:24:24,480 --> 00:24:26,919
Speaker 1: of the government, you were more likely to find yourself

396
00:24:27,000 --> 00:24:30,760
Speaker 1: in the Goolag, which is a system of prison camps

397
00:24:30,840 --> 00:24:34,720
Speaker 1: that we referenced earlier, and um souls and souls En

398
00:24:34,800 --> 00:24:37,080
Speaker 1: it's in. I think I said it right that time.

399
00:24:37,160 --> 00:24:40,520
Speaker 1: I think that's right. He estimated that um about sixty

400
00:24:40,640 --> 00:24:44,760
Speaker 1: million people were sent to those camps over the course

401
00:24:44,800 --> 00:24:48,920
Speaker 1: of the twentieth century. Yeah, I mean it's it's impossible,

402
00:24:49,119 --> 00:24:52,480
Speaker 1: literally impossible to put a number on the amount of

403
00:24:53,200 --> 00:24:57,639
Speaker 1: human lives lost due to the KGB, but there are

404
00:24:57,800 --> 00:25:02,240
Speaker 1: people that have estimated, uh, like, perhaps tens of millions

405
00:25:02,280 --> 00:25:05,920
Speaker 1: of people taken out by the KGB over since its history.

406
00:25:07,280 --> 00:25:11,760
Speaker 1: It's which is Yeah, I mean, I'm no CIA apologist,

407
00:25:11,880 --> 00:25:16,080
Speaker 1: but I don't think the CIA has that, you know,

408
00:25:16,680 --> 00:25:19,480
Speaker 1: which again, I mean we we on the outside tend

409
00:25:19,520 --> 00:25:22,320
Speaker 1: to think of the KGB mostly as like the spy agency.

410
00:25:22,440 --> 00:25:26,200
Speaker 1: But yeah, they kept people in mind by killing them

411
00:25:26,280 --> 00:25:29,840
Speaker 1: or sending them to secret prisons and making them leave

412
00:25:29,960 --> 00:25:31,600
Speaker 1: in the middle of the night from their homes and

413
00:25:31,680 --> 00:25:36,359
Speaker 1: never be seen again. Um. It's just it's just completely nuts.

414
00:25:36,400 --> 00:25:42,320
Speaker 1: And the effects that that has on his societies. Just Clanton,

415
00:25:42,560 --> 00:25:47,280
Speaker 1: I can't imagine. I can, sadly, but I can't imagine.

416
00:25:47,400 --> 00:25:50,800
Speaker 1: I've never lived through anything like that. Yeah. And if

417
00:25:50,920 --> 00:25:53,879
Speaker 1: you know, um, if you run an organization or a

418
00:25:54,160 --> 00:26:00,160
Speaker 1: or a country or a nation from fear tactics from

419
00:26:00,160 --> 00:26:03,200
Speaker 1: the top down, that eventually is gonna bite you in

420
00:26:03,280 --> 00:26:07,520
Speaker 1: the behind. Because what that does is everyone's paranoid against

421
00:26:07,560 --> 00:26:12,040
Speaker 1: each other. Um, no one, Like in the case of Stalin,

422
00:26:12,160 --> 00:26:15,160
Speaker 1: Let's say, if Stalin didn't like what you told him,

423
00:26:15,200 --> 00:26:18,840
Speaker 1: he would literally shoot the messenger. Uh, he would execute

424
00:26:19,160 --> 00:26:24,160
Speaker 1: anyone who told him anything that didn't basically uh support

425
00:26:24,600 --> 00:26:29,280
Speaker 1: what he thought should be going on, Like it wasn't like, hey, Stalin, Um,

426
00:26:29,359 --> 00:26:31,240
Speaker 1: we found out some pretty bad stuff that's going on,

427
00:26:31,680 --> 00:26:33,320
Speaker 1: Like that's a good thing. That means we can root

428
00:26:33,359 --> 00:26:36,800
Speaker 1: these people out. He it got to a point where

429
00:26:36,800 --> 00:26:38,840
Speaker 1: they wouldn't want to go to Stalin with bad news

430
00:26:39,200 --> 00:26:42,840
Speaker 1: and that's that's not good either, No, and they had

431
00:26:42,920 --> 00:26:45,280
Speaker 1: to go to him with some news. So what they

432
00:26:45,320 --> 00:26:49,480
Speaker 1: would do it would just kind of naturally UH inclined

433
00:26:49,520 --> 00:26:54,439
Speaker 1: towards intelligence that supported their their view rather than um,

434
00:26:55,200 --> 00:26:58,320
Speaker 1: you know, something that said, hey, there's you're really unpopular

435
00:26:58,400 --> 00:27:01,200
Speaker 1: and there's there's an uprising potential really coming. They managed

436
00:27:01,240 --> 00:27:04,359
Speaker 1: to squash anything like that. But in the end, UM

437
00:27:04,760 --> 00:27:09,840
Speaker 1: this what's called sycophantic UM intelligence, where it's just basically

438
00:27:09,920 --> 00:27:12,119
Speaker 1: feeding you, telling you what you want to hear, that

439
00:27:12,240 --> 00:27:15,119
Speaker 1: that that eventually will run a foul of reality. And

440
00:27:15,200 --> 00:27:18,800
Speaker 1: that's what people credit UM with the KGB dropping the

441
00:27:18,840 --> 00:27:23,520
Speaker 1: ball on the fall of the Soviet Union back although

442
00:27:24,440 --> 00:27:28,719
Speaker 1: as we'll see, there's actually a lot of direct influence

443
00:27:28,800 --> 00:27:31,600
Speaker 1: that the KGB had on that. But there's this idea

444
00:27:31,680 --> 00:27:35,680
Speaker 1: that throughout its history there was Stalin kind of kicked

445
00:27:35,720 --> 00:27:38,160
Speaker 1: off that thing where just tell me what I want

446
00:27:38,160 --> 00:27:40,440
Speaker 1: to hear or else I'm literally going to kill you

447
00:27:41,000 --> 00:27:43,840
Speaker 1: um or two, and that that it was carried on

448
00:27:44,000 --> 00:27:49,440
Speaker 1: even long after Stalin was gone. That's sycophantic kind of intelligence,

449
00:27:49,640 --> 00:27:53,080
Speaker 1: which is really surprising because there was a really successful

450
00:27:53,720 --> 00:27:59,399
Speaker 1: organization externally. UM. It was that they think that potentially,

451
00:28:00,440 --> 00:28:04,360
Speaker 1: for as as good as they were espionage and stealing secrets, UM,

452
00:28:04,800 --> 00:28:08,480
Speaker 1: the Soviets were apparently not and I have to preface this,

453
00:28:08,600 --> 00:28:12,040
Speaker 1: let me just caveat us. This is reading American sources

454
00:28:12,080 --> 00:28:15,520
Speaker 1: about the KGB. The KGB was really good at keeping

455
00:28:15,560 --> 00:28:18,439
Speaker 1: a code of silence. There were especially towards the end

456
00:28:18,480 --> 00:28:22,160
Speaker 1: of the USSR, more and more KGB agents started to defect.

457
00:28:22,680 --> 00:28:25,000
Speaker 1: But even when they defected, we weren't sure if they

458
00:28:25,080 --> 00:28:29,000
Speaker 1: were plants, so there was still like what they said

459
00:28:29,119 --> 00:28:32,040
Speaker 1: was taken with a grain of salt. Um. But the

460
00:28:32,640 --> 00:28:36,520
Speaker 1: the idea that UM that the KGB was was very

461
00:28:36,640 --> 00:28:43,720
Speaker 1: successful in stealing secrets supports this idea now that the

462
00:28:43,840 --> 00:28:48,840
Speaker 1: Soviet Union would not have been a superpower um part

463
00:28:48,880 --> 00:28:52,280
Speaker 1: of this to two superpower polarity that ran the world

464
00:28:52,400 --> 00:28:55,960
Speaker 1: in the Cold War had it not been for stealing secrets,

465
00:28:56,200 --> 00:28:59,800
Speaker 1: which doesn't explicitly say it, but suggests that they were. Um,

466
00:29:00,000 --> 00:29:01,840
Speaker 1: they did not have the best and brightest as far

467
00:29:01,920 --> 00:29:05,480
Speaker 1: as technology and science is concerned, which is kind of

468
00:29:05,560 --> 00:29:08,080
Speaker 1: surprised to me because I've always heard that the Soviets

469
00:29:08,120 --> 00:29:10,760
Speaker 1: had really really smart scientists in their own programs too.

470
00:29:11,080 --> 00:29:13,800
Speaker 1: But this researching the KGB made it sound like they

471
00:29:13,840 --> 00:29:15,440
Speaker 1: wouldn't have been able to keep up had they not

472
00:29:15,600 --> 00:29:19,640
Speaker 1: stolen advanced weapon technology, um and built their own versions

473
00:29:19,680 --> 00:29:22,480
Speaker 1: of it. I'm I'm confused. I have no idea what's

474
00:29:22,520 --> 00:29:30,280
Speaker 1: true anymore. Yeah, welcome, It's definitely true that they're spying.

475
00:29:30,440 --> 00:29:33,560
Speaker 1: Efforts in the Cold War, especially when it comes to

476
00:29:33,680 --> 00:29:37,640
Speaker 1: nuclear armament, were very much ramped up because they were

477
00:29:37,800 --> 00:29:42,040
Speaker 1: spying with us. Yeah, but I think that they were saying, um,

478
00:29:43,960 --> 00:29:48,240
Speaker 1: they were saying, it wasn't just getting the atomic bomb,

479
00:29:48,360 --> 00:29:51,320
Speaker 1: but basically like all their advanced weapons technology was the

480
00:29:51,440 --> 00:29:54,240
Speaker 1: result of stealing it, and that the point is is

481
00:29:54,320 --> 00:29:58,040
Speaker 1: kind of a two handed compliment or backsided compliment, um

482
00:29:58,480 --> 00:30:01,560
Speaker 1: that they were really good it's stealing secrets, but that

483
00:30:01,640 --> 00:30:03,840
Speaker 1: they wouldn't have been able to be a nuclear superpower

484
00:30:03,920 --> 00:30:06,320
Speaker 1: without stealing secrets. I think that was That was what

485
00:30:06,440 --> 00:30:09,040
Speaker 1: I was, That's what I found. Well, and it also

486
00:30:09,120 --> 00:30:11,440
Speaker 1: could have been and I'm just speculating it could have

487
00:30:11,520 --> 00:30:13,040
Speaker 1: been a thing where that was such a part of

488
00:30:13,200 --> 00:30:17,920
Speaker 1: the system. Was that is, Hey, we don't need to

489
00:30:17,960 --> 00:30:20,800
Speaker 1: put resources for steps one through five because we can

490
00:30:20,840 --> 00:30:24,200
Speaker 1: steal that stuff exactly, and we can just start on

491
00:30:24,320 --> 00:30:27,280
Speaker 1: step number six or whatever once we have whatever intelligence

492
00:30:27,320 --> 00:30:30,200
Speaker 1: we need. But what do I know? I'm just a

493
00:30:30,280 --> 00:30:33,680
Speaker 1: dumb podcast. Do you want to take another break? Yeah,

494
00:30:33,760 --> 00:30:36,040
Speaker 1: let's do it. Okay, We're gonna take another break, everybody.

495
00:30:36,120 --> 00:30:48,480
Speaker 1: That's no secret. Stuff you should know, Gosh, stuff you

496
00:30:48,480 --> 00:31:03,960
Speaker 1: should know. Man, what is going on? That's wrong? I'm

497
00:31:04,000 --> 00:31:07,240
Speaker 1: making puns left and right. It's terrible. Can we talk

498
00:31:07,240 --> 00:31:12,560
Speaker 1: about spies? Sure? Yeah, let's do it. So Uh. I

499
00:31:12,640 --> 00:31:15,400
Speaker 1: think we did a we did an espionage podcast years

500
00:31:15,440 --> 00:31:18,000
Speaker 1: and years ago. I think, yes, spies, how spies working?

501
00:31:18,240 --> 00:31:20,880
Speaker 1: Was it just spies or was it espionage as well? Well?

502
00:31:20,920 --> 00:31:26,440
Speaker 1: They go so closely together the same thing. Yeah. Uh.

503
00:31:26,600 --> 00:31:29,400
Speaker 1: The Soviets were really good at well I don't know

504
00:31:29,400 --> 00:31:31,760
Speaker 1: about really good because who knows how many times it happened,

505
00:31:32,240 --> 00:31:37,040
Speaker 1: but they had some very effective moments of turning Americans

506
00:31:37,120 --> 00:31:40,720
Speaker 1: into double agents. UM. A few notable people over the years.

507
00:31:41,720 --> 00:31:47,280
Speaker 1: A man named Aldrich Ames Uh. He was a thirty

508
00:31:47,360 --> 00:31:52,600
Speaker 1: one year CIA officer and for about nine years was

509
00:31:52,760 --> 00:31:56,880
Speaker 1: feeding the Russians or I guess it was the Soviet

510
00:31:57,000 --> 00:32:01,880
Speaker 1: Union at that time. UM, highly classified information from the CIA.

511
00:32:02,840 --> 00:32:06,840
Speaker 1: His big thing, it seemed like, was outing uh, CIA

512
00:32:07,000 --> 00:32:12,640
Speaker 1: sources and and stuff like that, like turned KGB agents. Yeah, so,

513
00:32:12,760 --> 00:32:14,320
Speaker 1: I mean there's all kinds of ways. There are other

514
00:32:14,360 --> 00:32:17,200
Speaker 1: people that fed documents. We'll get to them in a minute.

515
00:32:17,240 --> 00:32:20,960
Speaker 1: But he was outing sources and I think his actions

516
00:32:21,000 --> 00:32:23,680
Speaker 1: directly led to at least that we know of ten

517
00:32:23,800 --> 00:32:29,560
Speaker 1: CIA sources being compromised and killed. And then you know,

518
00:32:29,880 --> 00:32:33,360
Speaker 1: in the hundreds of intelligence operations that he was he

519
00:32:33,520 --> 00:32:35,720
Speaker 1: was kind of dropping the dime on And that's I

520
00:32:35,800 --> 00:32:38,080
Speaker 1: mean in addition to the like the loss of life

521
00:32:38,880 --> 00:32:41,520
Speaker 1: as far as you're the intelligence community is concerned when

522
00:32:41,560 --> 00:32:45,440
Speaker 1: you when you kill somebody like that, you're killing like

523
00:32:45,720 --> 00:32:49,640
Speaker 1: decades worth of information that the person has walking around

524
00:32:49,680 --> 00:32:52,920
Speaker 1: in their head and contacts and just general knowledge of

525
00:32:53,000 --> 00:32:56,280
Speaker 1: how things work. Um, so it's a really big deal.

526
00:32:56,320 --> 00:33:00,280
Speaker 1: In addition to again killing somebody, you're wiping out like

527
00:33:00,320 --> 00:33:03,440
Speaker 1: the institutional memory that they carry with them too, that's

528
00:33:03,480 --> 00:33:06,720
Speaker 1: been helping out the other side. Yeah. He is in

529
00:33:06,840 --> 00:33:12,120
Speaker 1: a medium security prison in Indiana today serving a life sentence. Um,

530
00:33:12,400 --> 00:33:15,840
Speaker 1: as is Robert Hansen. Uh, he's one that is a

531
00:33:15,920 --> 00:33:18,160
Speaker 1: little more. I mean he worked up until the I

532
00:33:18,200 --> 00:33:22,360
Speaker 1: think two thousand one, and they said that his espionage

533
00:33:22,400 --> 00:33:26,320
Speaker 1: was possibly the worst intelligence disaster in US history. He

534
00:33:26,440 --> 00:33:28,640
Speaker 1: made about one point four million dollars in cash and

535
00:33:28,720 --> 00:33:33,760
Speaker 1: diamonds over the years selling classified documents to the kgb

536
00:33:34,760 --> 00:33:39,840
Speaker 1: UM total double agent caught in two thousand one after

537
00:33:39,960 --> 00:33:43,960
Speaker 1: the FBI paid seven million bucks to a KGB agent

538
00:33:44,920 --> 00:33:49,280
Speaker 1: to out him as a mole Um. Very famous case. Yeah,

539
00:33:49,360 --> 00:33:52,040
Speaker 1: I remember that as well. I remember Aldred James too.

540
00:33:52,280 --> 00:33:55,120
Speaker 1: Made it really easy on people, like he was like

541
00:33:55,320 --> 00:34:00,400
Speaker 1: spending lavishly and was not that well off to begin with,

542
00:34:00,600 --> 00:34:03,120
Speaker 1: and it was just just being very flagrant about it.

543
00:34:03,480 --> 00:34:05,720
Speaker 1: I feel like Robert Hansen was a little smarter about it,

544
00:34:05,760 --> 00:34:10,640
Speaker 1: if I'm not mistaken. Yeah, who's the other guy? There

545
00:34:10,760 --> 00:34:14,680
Speaker 1: was one other guy that basically was spilling secrets about

546
00:34:14,719 --> 00:34:18,040
Speaker 1: her submarine program. I don't I don't know. There was

547
00:34:18,160 --> 00:34:22,480
Speaker 1: a There was a naval captain after World War Two.

548
00:34:23,200 --> 00:34:27,960
Speaker 1: Somebody St. John was that in the sixties that I

549
00:34:28,040 --> 00:34:30,239
Speaker 1: can't remember his first name, but someone St. John. He

550
00:34:30,320 --> 00:34:32,840
Speaker 1: was a naval naval captain. Yeah, there was a trove

551
00:34:32,920 --> 00:34:37,360
Speaker 1: of kgb UM files from an operation from the sixties

552
00:34:37,440 --> 00:34:41,120
Speaker 1: that basically confirmed he was indeed a Russian spy. Both

553
00:34:41,200 --> 00:34:45,160
Speaker 1: of the Rosenbergs were indeed Russian spies. Alder Hiss, who

554
00:34:45,239 --> 00:34:47,560
Speaker 1: I think went to his grave denying that he was

555
00:34:47,600 --> 00:34:50,120
Speaker 1: a spy, was in fact a spy for the for

556
00:34:50,280 --> 00:34:52,920
Speaker 1: the Soviets. So they did have a pretty good success

557
00:34:53,120 --> 00:34:57,520
Speaker 1: of turning Americans into informants. So did the CIA and

558
00:34:57,600 --> 00:35:02,560
Speaker 1: the KGB apparently. But um, this the stuff that they

559
00:35:02,680 --> 00:35:06,520
Speaker 1: got was was pretty useful. And again it was not

560
00:35:06,920 --> 00:35:11,560
Speaker 1: limited to advanced weapon designs but also industrial technology stuff

561
00:35:11,600 --> 00:35:14,160
Speaker 1: that we were saying, there's embargoes on this, you can't

562
00:35:14,239 --> 00:35:16,239
Speaker 1: export this. They still managed to get their hands on

563
00:35:16,360 --> 00:35:19,040
Speaker 1: this because of their contacts. Um that they turned in

564
00:35:19,120 --> 00:35:22,359
Speaker 1: the US. Um just just basically anything you would want

565
00:35:22,440 --> 00:35:26,840
Speaker 1: to keep your your economy humming along, just from from stealing.

566
00:35:27,120 --> 00:35:30,040
Speaker 1: That's how you could That's how you could do that. Yeah.

567
00:35:30,080 --> 00:35:35,200
Speaker 1: The Navy guy, his was He's the one that volunteered

568
00:35:35,280 --> 00:35:38,840
Speaker 1: himself basically by because he wanted money. It's like it

569
00:35:38,920 --> 00:35:43,200
Speaker 1: all came down to greed. He walked into Uh oh yeah, No,

570
00:35:43,280 --> 00:35:45,839
Speaker 1: I'm talking about John Anthony Walker Jr. That's who I'm

571
00:35:45,880 --> 00:35:48,760
Speaker 1: talking about. Two Okay, not St. John. Not St. John.

572
00:35:49,200 --> 00:35:52,000
Speaker 1: He was not a patron saint of hipsters. I don't

573
00:35:52,000 --> 00:35:55,360
Speaker 1: know Yeah. John Anthony Walker Jr. Is the one that

574
00:35:55,680 --> 00:35:59,759
Speaker 1: that wanted money and he volunteered by because it's not

575
00:35:59,880 --> 00:36:02,759
Speaker 1: like he was anti American who wanted to see the

576
00:36:02,800 --> 00:36:06,520
Speaker 1: Communist party thrive. He it was all motivated by greed.

577
00:36:07,160 --> 00:36:09,960
Speaker 1: And he walked into an embassy in the United States

578
00:36:10,080 --> 00:36:13,520
Speaker 1: with like a a code card or something and said, hey,

579
00:36:13,600 --> 00:36:17,040
Speaker 1: I'll sell you this for three thousand dollars and they

580
00:36:17,120 --> 00:36:19,279
Speaker 1: bought it, and he was like, and you know what,

581
00:36:19,520 --> 00:36:21,440
Speaker 1: that went well, so just put me on the payroll.

582
00:36:21,840 --> 00:36:24,680
Speaker 1: And he got his family involved. He had his uh

583
00:36:24,960 --> 00:36:27,280
Speaker 1: I think he tried to get his father involved, his daughter,

584
00:36:27,440 --> 00:36:33,839
Speaker 1: his son, his wife, his son's body. Well, at one

585
00:36:33,920 --> 00:36:37,360
Speaker 1: point the Russians basically knew where all of our submarines

586
00:36:37,400 --> 00:36:42,360
Speaker 1: were at all times because and his wife was apparently

587
00:36:42,400 --> 00:36:46,320
Speaker 1: a really bad alcoholic um probably you know, in no

588
00:36:46,440 --> 00:36:49,799
Speaker 1: small part due to this, and eventually outed him after.

589
00:36:50,440 --> 00:36:53,320
Speaker 1: I mean, he was way too uh lucy goosey with

590
00:36:53,440 --> 00:36:55,080
Speaker 1: who he tried to get involved, Like you can't try

591
00:36:55,120 --> 00:36:57,239
Speaker 1: and get your whole family involved and then have them

592
00:36:57,239 --> 00:36:59,400
Speaker 1: say no, I'm not into it and then to be like,

593
00:36:59,440 --> 00:37:03,080
Speaker 1: all right, well gonna keep doing it. What's for dinner? Yeah,

594
00:37:03,360 --> 00:37:06,080
Speaker 1: she read it him out though she um would call

595
00:37:06,120 --> 00:37:09,359
Speaker 1: a bunch of times apparently, and and either chicken out

596
00:37:09,520 --> 00:37:12,719
Speaker 1: or she was really blitzed and couldn't get across what

597
00:37:12,800 --> 00:37:15,080
Speaker 1: she wanted to say. But eventually she did to an

598
00:37:15,120 --> 00:37:17,680
Speaker 1: office in Boston, and they thought, well, this is just

599
00:37:17,760 --> 00:37:19,720
Speaker 1: some drunk wife trying to get her husband in trouble.

600
00:37:21,600 --> 00:37:25,840
Speaker 1: And then eventually though, they did look into it, and

601
00:37:25,960 --> 00:37:29,160
Speaker 1: they you know, they searched the guy as house and

602
00:37:29,239 --> 00:37:32,640
Speaker 1: they found like briefcases full of classified documents and it

603
00:37:32,800 --> 00:37:37,759
Speaker 1: was just I mean, this this went on for twentysomething years,

604
00:37:37,800 --> 00:37:40,040
Speaker 1: I think. I think from what I understand, the most

605
00:37:40,080 --> 00:37:42,560
Speaker 1: damning evidence was he had one of those Russian fur

606
00:37:42,760 --> 00:37:48,359
Speaker 1: hats with the ear flaps that didn't met so UM.

607
00:37:49,680 --> 00:37:53,080
Speaker 1: The as good as they were at turning people, at

608
00:37:53,200 --> 00:37:56,120
Speaker 1: creating illegals, the sleeper agents, which may or may not

609
00:37:56,360 --> 00:37:59,680
Speaker 1: be all over the world right now. UM. One of

610
00:37:59,719 --> 00:38:02,120
Speaker 1: the thing things that KGB has long been known for

611
00:38:02,400 --> 00:38:07,240
Speaker 1: disinformation campaigns, and from reading that, um that that guy's

612
00:38:07,520 --> 00:38:12,120
Speaker 1: h article spies election meddling and disinformation past and present.

613
00:38:12,760 --> 00:38:18,320
Speaker 1: Caller Walton's article basically every every conspiracy theory that I

614
00:38:18,440 --> 00:38:24,320
Speaker 1: believed as a teenager apparently was a KGB rumor disinformation campaign.

615
00:38:24,840 --> 00:38:27,040
Speaker 1: I could not believe this as I was reading. It

616
00:38:27,160 --> 00:38:31,920
Speaker 1: was like a trip through my my, you know, formative years. Basically,

617
00:38:32,440 --> 00:38:36,440
Speaker 1: the idea that the US government created aids to target

618
00:38:36,560 --> 00:38:41,839
Speaker 1: developing countries. The idea that um that American tourists used

619
00:38:41,880 --> 00:38:44,920
Speaker 1: to go down to South America and Central America and

620
00:38:45,000 --> 00:38:47,800
Speaker 1: adopt kids so that they could harvest their them for

621
00:38:47,960 --> 00:38:53,120
Speaker 1: body parts. KGB. Get this, chuck, there's a poll I

622
00:38:53,160 --> 00:38:55,320
Speaker 1: don't remember when it was conducted, but it was sometime

623
00:38:55,400 --> 00:39:00,640
Speaker 1: after the Kennedy assassination where more Americans believed that the

624
00:39:00,800 --> 00:39:06,399
Speaker 1: CIA killed JFK. Then what the Warrant Commission concluded, which

625
00:39:06,560 --> 00:39:10,240
Speaker 1: was that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone. More Americans believed

626
00:39:10,400 --> 00:39:14,399
Speaker 1: what turned out to be a KGB disinformation campaign than

627
00:39:14,600 --> 00:39:18,319
Speaker 1: what the Warrant Commission came up with. That they came

628
00:39:18,400 --> 00:39:21,080
Speaker 1: up with the one that the CIA killed JFK. That

629
00:39:21,200 --> 00:39:23,600
Speaker 1: that was the KGB that did that. And you know

630
00:39:23,719 --> 00:39:26,560
Speaker 1: the friend of your friends, uh mom, who was on

631
00:39:26,640 --> 00:39:31,719
Speaker 1: the elevator with Eddie Murphy. KGB. That's right. Everything, I mean,

632
00:39:31,840 --> 00:39:34,399
Speaker 1: all that stuff flasher lights at somebody, and the gang

633
00:39:34,480 --> 00:39:37,960
Speaker 1: comes and kills you, k um, But it's just so

634
00:39:38,160 --> 00:39:41,040
Speaker 1: bizarre to think, like what, like no, I thought that

635
00:39:41,160 --> 00:39:43,640
Speaker 1: I talked to people about that, like late at night,

636
00:39:43,880 --> 00:39:47,840
Speaker 1: like we had conversations about this stuff. And when you

637
00:39:48,080 --> 00:39:50,560
Speaker 1: see that and when you read it and realize that

638
00:39:50,640 --> 00:39:52,520
Speaker 1: like this has been going on for years, it really

639
00:39:52,640 --> 00:39:56,920
Speaker 1: puts things into focus. Now. Um, like the two thousand

640
00:39:56,920 --> 00:40:00,800
Speaker 1: and sixteen election meddling um to the the idea that

641
00:40:00,920 --> 00:40:06,000
Speaker 1: there's like like g r U agents military intelligence agents

642
00:40:06,040 --> 00:40:09,600
Speaker 1: who are posing as members of Black Lives Matter or

643
00:40:09,760 --> 00:40:12,520
Speaker 1: who posed as like Tea Party members during the two

644
00:40:12,800 --> 00:40:17,120
Speaker 1: sixteen election, like that they um that they were actually

645
00:40:17,239 --> 00:40:21,279
Speaker 1: working for the for Russia. The idea that that that's

646
00:40:21,280 --> 00:40:23,480
Speaker 1: still going on just becomes all the all the more

647
00:40:23,600 --> 00:40:25,759
Speaker 1: clear when you look at some of their past campaigns.

648
00:40:26,960 --> 00:40:30,000
Speaker 1: Something I do occasionally, Uh, I don't know why I've

649
00:40:30,040 --> 00:40:34,400
Speaker 1: tortured myself, but sometimes I will read comments on a

650
00:40:34,480 --> 00:40:38,760
Speaker 1: Fox news dot com article, right, and someone will say something,

651
00:40:39,120 --> 00:40:40,880
Speaker 1: and then you can leave a comment about the comment,

652
00:40:40,920 --> 00:40:43,760
Speaker 1: and someone will comment like, Okay, thanks a lot, Dmitri.

653
00:40:46,280 --> 00:40:48,880
Speaker 1: That's funny. But you don't know, man. That's what they do.

654
00:40:49,080 --> 00:40:53,160
Speaker 1: They infiltrate message boards and they infiltrate social media and UM,

655
00:40:54,040 --> 00:40:58,399
Speaker 1: like you you never know, like, uh, yeah, it's it's

656
00:40:58,480 --> 00:41:02,759
Speaker 1: just it's really staggering that this kind of stuff still

657
00:41:02,800 --> 00:41:04,880
Speaker 1: goes on to this degree and there's nothing we can

658
00:41:04,960 --> 00:41:09,120
Speaker 1: do about it. Yeah, for real. So so let's um,

659
00:41:09,480 --> 00:41:11,719
Speaker 1: let's step back for a second, because we kind of

660
00:41:11,840 --> 00:41:14,759
Speaker 1: hopped ahead. But I want to go back into KGB history.

661
00:41:14,880 --> 00:41:19,920
Speaker 1: KGB was around from nine and we said earlier that

662
00:41:20,200 --> 00:41:24,520
Speaker 1: the UM the KGB had a direct role in the

663
00:41:24,600 --> 00:41:28,279
Speaker 1: fall of the USSR, and they did because there was

664
00:41:28,360 --> 00:41:32,560
Speaker 1: a KGB um head who was appointed by garbage Off

665
00:41:32,719 --> 00:41:35,840
Speaker 1: because he thought that he was an intelligent, moderate person

666
00:41:36,280 --> 00:41:38,200
Speaker 1: who was open to new ideas, and to turn out,

667
00:41:38,239 --> 00:41:39,799
Speaker 1: he was and he was part of that same old

668
00:41:39,920 --> 00:41:43,200
Speaker 1: KGB establishment um who wanted things to say the way

669
00:41:43,280 --> 00:41:46,919
Speaker 1: that they were. And Um, he actually led a coup

670
00:41:47,440 --> 00:41:49,920
Speaker 1: against gorbach Off I did. I was too young to

671
00:41:50,000 --> 00:41:52,200
Speaker 1: know what was going on, but there was a coup

672
00:41:52,320 --> 00:41:55,080
Speaker 1: against Corbach where he was under house arrest for a minute.

673
00:41:55,680 --> 00:41:59,160
Speaker 1: And Um the coup finally failed because it became clear

674
00:41:59,239 --> 00:42:01,920
Speaker 1: that the military he wasn't wasn't in on it or

675
00:42:02,040 --> 00:42:04,520
Speaker 1: wasn't going to take part in it. Um. But It

676
00:42:04,680 --> 00:42:08,960
Speaker 1: eventually led directly within months to the downfall of the USSR,

677
00:42:09,040 --> 00:42:10,960
Speaker 1: the breakup of the u s SR, because in the

678
00:42:11,040 --> 00:42:14,160
Speaker 1: meantime they had elected for the first time a democratically

679
00:42:14,200 --> 00:42:18,879
Speaker 1: elected president, and when Gorbachof saw that basically this coup

680
00:42:19,040 --> 00:42:22,080
Speaker 1: was a vote of no confidence in him, he stepped aside,

681
00:42:22,560 --> 00:42:25,759
Speaker 1: separated the Communist Party from the presidency, and all of

682
00:42:25,800 --> 00:42:28,200
Speaker 1: a sudden, the USSR wasn't there anymore. It was just

683
00:42:28,360 --> 00:42:33,359
Speaker 1: Russia because the satellite states started saying, um, hey, we're independent. Now,

684
00:42:33,719 --> 00:42:37,640
Speaker 1: we'll see you later. Soviet Union and the USSR fell apart,

685
00:42:38,160 --> 00:42:42,799
Speaker 1: kicked off by this coup that the KGB initiated. Yeah,

686
00:42:42,880 --> 00:42:46,720
Speaker 1: and I think yelston uh or yells excuse me, officially

687
00:42:46,719 --> 00:42:50,160
Speaker 1: split it up, right Yeah, yeah, he he said, KGB,

688
00:42:50,280 --> 00:42:52,880
Speaker 1: you're dissolved. We're gonna break you up into the FSB

689
00:42:53,600 --> 00:42:56,840
Speaker 1: and the UM do the same stuff, right exactly, but

690
00:42:56,960 --> 00:42:59,040
Speaker 1: just do it separately. I figure if I separate you

691
00:42:59,160 --> 00:43:02,440
Speaker 1: guys might be less evil. And apparently that was not

692
00:43:02,600 --> 00:43:06,799
Speaker 1: the case. Yeah. And apparently, uh, not apparently, but very

693
00:43:06,840 --> 00:43:10,239
Speaker 1: famously Putin came straight out of the KGB. Uh. He

694
00:43:10,440 --> 00:43:13,960
Speaker 1: was a KGB agent in the mid nineteen seventies. Uh,

695
00:43:14,239 --> 00:43:18,920
Speaker 1: supposedly because he saw a movie about Russian spies and

696
00:43:19,280 --> 00:43:22,279
Speaker 1: I guess thought it was awesome. Yeah, I said that

697
00:43:22,480 --> 00:43:24,879
Speaker 1: I want to do that. There's a picture of him

698
00:43:24,920 --> 00:43:27,200
Speaker 1: in one of these articles where he's in the seventies

699
00:43:27,239 --> 00:43:30,280
Speaker 1: wearing like this Newsy cap and just looking super seventies.

700
00:43:30,760 --> 00:43:34,239
Speaker 1: But he also looks like Putin man, just complete poker face.

701
00:43:34,640 --> 00:43:37,520
Speaker 1: He's staring off camera at something. Who knows what he's

702
00:43:37,560 --> 00:43:40,960
Speaker 1: taken in. It's it's it's a really cool picture. There's

703
00:43:40,960 --> 00:43:44,400
Speaker 1: another picture, too, supposedly of him posing as a tourist

704
00:43:44,480 --> 00:43:47,440
Speaker 1: standing next to Ronald Reagan. Oh my god, have you

705
00:43:47,480 --> 00:43:51,160
Speaker 1: ever seen that picture? Oh? It's nuts. It's just so great.

706
00:43:51,280 --> 00:43:53,799
Speaker 1: But then you're like, is that Putin? And I went

707
00:43:53,880 --> 00:43:56,160
Speaker 1: and looked, and it turned out that there is still

708
00:43:56,280 --> 00:43:59,040
Speaker 1: disagreement of whether it's him or not. But most people

709
00:43:59,120 --> 00:44:01,319
Speaker 1: say that that's not him, that he would have been

710
00:44:01,440 --> 00:44:04,880
Speaker 1: in uh Dresden at the time, he wouldn't have been

711
00:44:04,920 --> 00:44:08,080
Speaker 1: in the Soviet Union. I'm looking now, Oh my god,

712
00:44:08,239 --> 00:44:11,200
Speaker 1: that certainly looks like Putin, doesn't it. But the official

713
00:44:11,280 --> 00:44:14,160
Speaker 1: line is that is not Putin with this little camera

714
00:44:14,239 --> 00:44:17,800
Speaker 1: around his neck right and so Putin was not just

715
00:44:17,960 --> 00:44:20,480
Speaker 1: in the KGB. He became the head of the FSB.

716
00:44:20,920 --> 00:44:24,400
Speaker 1: And this is a real testimony to just how powerful

717
00:44:24,840 --> 00:44:29,600
Speaker 1: the KGB and the KGB's remnants or successors remain. He

718
00:44:29,719 --> 00:44:33,800
Speaker 1: went from head of the FSB to the President of Russia.

719
00:44:34,040 --> 00:44:35,840
Speaker 1: That was the step that he took. And he was

720
00:44:35,880 --> 00:44:38,279
Speaker 1: not the first person to do that. Other KGB heads

721
00:44:38,280 --> 00:44:40,000
Speaker 1: had worked their way up to become the head of

722
00:44:40,040 --> 00:44:42,680
Speaker 1: the Communist Party and the de facto head of the

723
00:44:42,760 --> 00:44:45,319
Speaker 1: Soviet Union at the time. So all of this kind

724
00:44:45,360 --> 00:44:47,480
Speaker 1: of goes to show you that that nothing, even the

725
00:44:47,560 --> 00:44:50,839
Speaker 1: fall of the USSR, really did anything to slow down

726
00:44:50,920 --> 00:44:55,000
Speaker 1: the KGB, and that the advent of technology helped kind

727
00:44:55,040 --> 00:44:58,040
Speaker 1: of actually speed things up quite a bit. Yeah, and

728
00:44:58,080 --> 00:45:01,200
Speaker 1: if you think those murders um or a thing in

729
00:45:01,280 --> 00:45:04,440
Speaker 1: the past, that is certainly not the case. I remember,

730
00:45:04,640 --> 00:45:08,360
Speaker 1: as I'm sure you do, in two thousand six Alexander

731
00:45:09,040 --> 00:45:13,680
Speaker 1: uh Littnovinko, Levinenko, Letvinenko, he was the one that was

732
00:45:13,800 --> 00:45:17,840
Speaker 1: killed by the radioactive uh polonium two tin that was

733
00:45:17,960 --> 00:45:23,000
Speaker 1: dropped in his beverage. And uh, they they have a

734
00:45:23,160 --> 00:45:26,279
Speaker 1: history of doing like that's a really awful way to die,

735
00:45:26,400 --> 00:45:28,799
Speaker 1: and they have a history of killing people in really

736
00:45:28,840 --> 00:45:33,800
Speaker 1: awful ways because it sends that message, um that you know,

737
00:45:33,960 --> 00:45:36,040
Speaker 1: not only can you die, but you're gonna die in

738
00:45:36,080 --> 00:45:39,279
Speaker 1: a really awful, awful way and everyone's gonna know. Um.

739
00:45:39,440 --> 00:45:44,440
Speaker 1: Dating back to Trotsky who went to Mexico City and

740
00:45:45,280 --> 00:45:49,120
Speaker 1: someone came up behind him, Ramon Mercader with a ice

741
00:45:49,280 --> 00:45:53,799
Speaker 1: axe and sunk it three inches into his brain. He said,

742
00:45:53,800 --> 00:46:00,160
Speaker 1: how do you like this projection? Oh my god, was

743
00:46:01,239 --> 00:46:03,320
Speaker 1: actually so bad. I think that was brilliant. Thank you.

744
00:46:04,080 --> 00:46:07,120
Speaker 1: I was hoping you come around that it was really good.

745
00:46:07,480 --> 00:46:11,480
Speaker 1: I got you mergator projection. That's lovely. Um. But yeah,

746
00:46:11,560 --> 00:46:14,080
Speaker 1: he killed him with an ice axe, but he lived

747
00:46:14,160 --> 00:46:16,520
Speaker 1: for a day. I thought I'd always heard the story

748
00:46:17,200 --> 00:46:18,960
Speaker 1: and I always thought that he just like planted him

749
00:46:18,960 --> 00:46:21,879
Speaker 1: in the brain and that was it. But Trotsky got

750
00:46:21,960 --> 00:46:24,200
Speaker 1: up and was like fighting him off, and people came

751
00:46:24,239 --> 00:46:26,759
Speaker 1: in and kicked this guy's butt and he survived in

752
00:46:26,840 --> 00:46:28,800
Speaker 1: the hospital for like a full day after this before

753
00:46:28,840 --> 00:46:32,200
Speaker 1: he died. Well, yeah, Livin Yanko, he survived long enough

754
00:46:32,239 --> 00:46:34,719
Speaker 1: that he helped solve his own murder. There's a really

755
00:46:34,760 --> 00:46:39,200
Speaker 1: great guardian art um on it called Alexander Livinnanko, the

756
00:46:39,239 --> 00:46:42,480
Speaker 1: man who solved his own murder, and h it's definitely

757
00:46:42,560 --> 00:46:45,879
Speaker 1: worth reading for sure. Yeah, I mean just a couple

758
00:46:45,880 --> 00:46:49,360
Speaker 1: of years ago. Uh, what was that guy's name, Screepall,

759
00:46:50,400 --> 00:46:53,320
Speaker 1: Sergey Screepall. He was he was the one with the

760
00:46:53,400 --> 00:46:55,880
Speaker 1: nerve poison. He wasn't killed. There was an attempt on

761
00:46:56,000 --> 00:46:59,440
Speaker 1: his life though, Yeah, but it was just just like

762
00:46:59,520 --> 00:47:01,720
Speaker 1: every time you think, man, this is cold war stuff,

763
00:47:02,480 --> 00:47:04,680
Speaker 1: it just pops up in the news again. You're like, man,

764
00:47:04,840 --> 00:47:07,239
Speaker 1: it's still happening. Yeah, And I mean we should say

765
00:47:07,480 --> 00:47:10,160
Speaker 1: both of those attacks were in London. Like this wasn't

766
00:47:10,200 --> 00:47:12,279
Speaker 1: in Russia or Moscow or anything like that. This was

767
00:47:12,360 --> 00:47:15,480
Speaker 1: in London. These guys lived in London in exile, and

768
00:47:15,560 --> 00:47:20,480
Speaker 1: they were still murdered in London through like radioactive material

769
00:47:20,600 --> 00:47:23,040
Speaker 1: and nerve gas that was smuggling in the country. And

770
00:47:23,239 --> 00:47:26,000
Speaker 1: that actually is as kind of goes to stand as

771
00:47:26,080 --> 00:47:30,040
Speaker 1: evidence that there still are these illegals, these um deep

772
00:47:30,120 --> 00:47:33,759
Speaker 1: cover sleeper agents that are working for what used to

773
00:47:33,800 --> 00:47:37,200
Speaker 1: be the KGB and is now the FSB. Yeah, and

774
00:47:37,239 --> 00:47:39,840
Speaker 1: that's why it's a really big deal, uh, that a

775
00:47:39,920 --> 00:47:42,040
Speaker 1: president of the United States would want to cozy up

776
00:47:42,040 --> 00:47:46,160
Speaker 1: to somebody like Putin, who uh is making great efforts

777
00:47:46,239 --> 00:47:49,719
Speaker 1: to put who he wants in office. Yeah, I mean

778
00:47:49,800 --> 00:47:53,839
Speaker 1: that's it's just pure and simple, like, that's unbelievable. Absolutely,

779
00:47:53,960 --> 00:47:57,839
Speaker 1: Chuck Well said, are you got anything else? I got

780
00:47:57,960 --> 00:48:01,839
Speaker 1: nothing else but rage. So if this floated your boat,

781
00:48:01,880 --> 00:48:05,560
Speaker 1: go check out spies, election meddling and disinformation passed in presents,

782
00:48:05,680 --> 00:48:09,560
Speaker 1: create article, check out Alexander let Vin Yanko, the spy

783
00:48:09,840 --> 00:48:13,120
Speaker 1: who solved his own murder, the man who'd solved his

784
00:48:13,160 --> 00:48:15,319
Speaker 1: own check out the Big Think. They had a good

785
00:48:15,360 --> 00:48:18,440
Speaker 1: one called the History of the KGB and its Legendary Methods.

786
00:48:19,000 --> 00:48:20,840
Speaker 1: So I think you'll like all three of those. And

787
00:48:20,920 --> 00:48:22,839
Speaker 1: since I said I think you'll like all three of those,

788
00:48:22,920 --> 00:48:27,360
Speaker 1: is time for listener mate. Uh, this is about the

789
00:48:27,440 --> 00:48:30,600
Speaker 1: heroine lozenges. Remember that when I wondered if they were

790
00:48:30,640 --> 00:48:34,520
Speaker 1: still around? So this is from Martin. Hey, guys, in

791
00:48:34,560 --> 00:48:36,359
Speaker 1: the Heroin episode, Chuck was wondering if there are only

792
00:48:36,400 --> 00:48:41,200
Speaker 1: still uh heroin lozenges lying around somewhere, and Jock Josh

793
00:48:41,360 --> 00:48:44,920
Speaker 1: quickly refuted, But Chuck, you have been vindicated. I work

794
00:48:44,960 --> 00:48:51,680
Speaker 1: in an unnamed museum and an unlamed unlamed location in Canada.

795
00:48:51,719 --> 00:48:53,680
Speaker 1: I'm not even gonna say where in Canada even though

796
00:48:53,760 --> 00:48:57,320
Speaker 1: he does. And we have four different packages for heroin

797
00:48:57,440 --> 00:49:02,000
Speaker 1: lossages from Bear. They're underwalking Key, of course. We received

798
00:49:02,080 --> 00:49:04,160
Speaker 1: them in a donation from a local pharmacy that closed

799
00:49:04,200 --> 00:49:07,000
Speaker 1: down in the thirties and they gave the museum a

800
00:49:07,080 --> 00:49:10,760
Speaker 1: wide array of drugs to add to the collection. Along

801
00:49:10,840 --> 00:49:13,480
Speaker 1: with the heroin, we also have a bottle of arsenic

802
00:49:14,000 --> 00:49:18,600
Speaker 1: and two packets of amphetamines. One package has two pills missing.

803
00:49:20,160 --> 00:49:22,640
Speaker 1: Oh man, I love the show you guys are keeping

804
00:49:22,680 --> 00:49:24,759
Speaker 1: me saying during quarantine, I steadily make my way through

805
00:49:24,760 --> 00:49:28,799
Speaker 1: your back catalog. That is from Martin Nice Martin, Um,

806
00:49:29,160 --> 00:49:31,640
Speaker 1: that was much appreciated. Thanks for shining some light on

807
00:49:31,719 --> 00:49:33,759
Speaker 1: that one. Uh And if you want to shine some

808
00:49:33,920 --> 00:49:36,120
Speaker 1: light forest, we love that kind of thing. You can

809
00:49:36,200 --> 00:49:39,840
Speaker 1: send us an email to Stuff podcast at iHeart radio

810
00:49:39,960 --> 00:49:44,960
Speaker 1: dot com. Stuff you Should Know is a production of

811
00:49:45,000 --> 00:49:47,719
Speaker 1: iHeart Radio's How Stuff Works. For more podcasts for my

812
00:49:47,800 --> 00:49:50,600
Speaker 1: heart Radio, visit the iHeart Radio app, Apple Podcasts, or

813
00:49:50,600 --> 00:49:52,200
Speaker 1: wherever you listen to your favorite shows.