1 00:00:01,000 --> 00:00:04,480 Speaker 1: From UFOs two ghosts and government cover ups histories where 2 00:00:04,760 --> 00:00:08,320 Speaker 1: with unexplained events you can turn back now or learn 3 00:00:08,400 --> 00:00:16,479 Speaker 1: the stuff they don't want you to know. Hello, I 4 00:00:16,560 --> 00:00:19,480 Speaker 1: am Matt and I am Ben, and this is stuff 5 00:00:19,480 --> 00:00:22,800 Speaker 1: they don't want you to know. Uh. And as always, 6 00:00:22,840 --> 00:00:25,720 Speaker 1: we're with our super producer Noel here. Noel, could we 7 00:00:25,840 --> 00:00:29,320 Speaker 1: get some sirens or maybe like the remember that Cops 8 00:00:29,400 --> 00:00:31,520 Speaker 1: theme song? I'm sure we have plenty of those just 9 00:00:31,800 --> 00:00:35,760 Speaker 1: in the mixx already. Oh that's true. For anyone who's 10 00:00:35,800 --> 00:00:38,600 Speaker 1: a long time listener, you may have heard references now 11 00:00:38,640 --> 00:00:42,440 Speaker 1: our show or other shows to the sirens that occasionally 12 00:00:42,440 --> 00:00:46,720 Speaker 1: come through our super secret studio here, super super secret 13 00:00:47,120 --> 00:00:51,600 Speaker 1: in the middle of Bucket. Yeah. The neighborhood of Buckhead 14 00:00:51,680 --> 00:00:55,880 Speaker 1: in Atlanta, Georgia, for those who are not illuminated to 15 00:00:56,080 --> 00:01:01,680 Speaker 1: this idea, is full of crank people. Yeah, it's a 16 00:01:01,720 --> 00:01:05,000 Speaker 1: fair way to say it. It is the I don't know, 17 00:01:05,040 --> 00:01:09,600 Speaker 1: I guess the financial district of Atlanta. Yeah, yeah, it's 18 00:01:09,640 --> 00:01:12,280 Speaker 1: kind of like the Uh. They're right, there are some 19 00:01:12,319 --> 00:01:18,160 Speaker 1: big businesses here and some upscale areas, so one would think, hey, wait, 20 00:01:18,800 --> 00:01:22,240 Speaker 1: Matt and Ben, aren't police sirens more likely to be 21 00:01:22,280 --> 00:01:27,440 Speaker 1: associated with less wealthy areas well. The problem here is 22 00:01:27,440 --> 00:01:31,639 Speaker 1: that a lot of those sirens come from cops giving 23 00:01:31,720 --> 00:01:35,600 Speaker 1: people tickets for bad driving. Yes, there's lots of money 24 00:01:35,640 --> 00:01:39,520 Speaker 1: to be made from citations. I mean people to protect 25 00:01:39,600 --> 00:01:42,160 Speaker 1: from speeding drivers. Right. Well, there are also quite a 26 00:01:42,160 --> 00:01:44,920 Speaker 1: few drivers here. My car show host is coming out 27 00:01:45,080 --> 00:01:48,280 Speaker 1: who don't feel like they should need to obey the 28 00:01:48,360 --> 00:01:50,040 Speaker 1: rules of the room. There's no one on the road 29 00:01:50,080 --> 00:01:54,200 Speaker 1: but me and my Mercedes. Slash BMW slash whatever you 30 00:01:54,240 --> 00:01:58,400 Speaker 1: want to assert there. But for most people, just the threat, 31 00:01:58,680 --> 00:02:04,320 Speaker 1: the possibility city of being punished by the police or 32 00:02:04,560 --> 00:02:08,440 Speaker 1: cited by the police is enough of a deterrent that 33 00:02:09,360 --> 00:02:12,920 Speaker 1: we will pretend that those lines in the middle of 34 00:02:12,919 --> 00:02:16,440 Speaker 1: the road are something else other than paint. Right. The 35 00:02:16,480 --> 00:02:22,959 Speaker 1: police have a psychologically crucial role in the I guess, 36 00:02:22,960 --> 00:02:26,480 Speaker 1: the cohesion of a state, not just the United States. 37 00:02:26,960 --> 00:02:31,200 Speaker 1: And today we're talking about something that was um, that's 38 00:02:31,200 --> 00:02:34,360 Speaker 1: an idea that you had proposed force earlier, which was 39 00:02:34,400 --> 00:02:39,320 Speaker 1: the militarization of police. Well, yeah, the this topic is 40 00:02:39,320 --> 00:02:42,720 Speaker 1: coming up all over the place. I'm seeing links, tons 41 00:02:42,720 --> 00:02:47,000 Speaker 1: of links, especially on Reddit about certain instances. There was 42 00:02:47,040 --> 00:02:49,239 Speaker 1: one in Georgia not long ago. I think it was 43 00:02:49,280 --> 00:02:53,040 Speaker 1: the last month where there was a no knock drug 44 00:02:53,120 --> 00:02:56,920 Speaker 1: raid and a baby was sleeping in the room I 45 00:02:56,919 --> 00:02:59,040 Speaker 1: guess the living room with the rest of the family 46 00:02:59,120 --> 00:03:02,920 Speaker 1: and flash bang grenade landed in the crib. The child 47 00:03:03,000 --> 00:03:04,880 Speaker 1: was in a medically induced coma for a while. I 48 00:03:04,919 --> 00:03:09,400 Speaker 1: believe the child is out now the coma or I'm 49 00:03:09,440 --> 00:03:11,120 Speaker 1: not positive on that. I need to look back up 50 00:03:11,160 --> 00:03:14,560 Speaker 1: and that. Anyway, Yeah, it's all over the place. The 51 00:03:14,639 --> 00:03:17,560 Speaker 1: Cato Institute has been talking about this. What's a what's 52 00:03:18,880 --> 00:03:21,600 Speaker 1: no knock grade is when in the middle of the night, 53 00:03:21,680 --> 00:03:26,400 Speaker 1: a swat team or other form of paramilitary style police 54 00:03:26,400 --> 00:03:29,880 Speaker 1: force breaks into a home, usually just bust through the 55 00:03:29,919 --> 00:03:34,880 Speaker 1: front door and takes everybody, basically detains everyone in the 56 00:03:34,920 --> 00:03:39,720 Speaker 1: house and searches the house. And that is typically or 57 00:03:39,840 --> 00:03:44,560 Speaker 1: the threat. Theoretically, it is based on intelligence that has 58 00:03:44,600 --> 00:03:47,720 Speaker 1: been gathered, so they're not just rolling the dice and 59 00:03:47,840 --> 00:03:51,720 Speaker 1: picking a house they believe. The problem is a lot 60 00:03:51,760 --> 00:03:55,160 Speaker 1: of times the information that they're given is maybe not perfect, 61 00:03:56,360 --> 00:03:58,960 Speaker 1: or perhaps they are raiding the wrong house. There are 62 00:03:59,000 --> 00:04:02,560 Speaker 1: many instances of the wrong houses being rated than a 63 00:04:02,560 --> 00:04:04,240 Speaker 1: person and so I know we're getting a little deep 64 00:04:04,280 --> 00:04:06,800 Speaker 1: already before we're getting into this bin. These are just 65 00:04:06,880 --> 00:04:09,040 Speaker 1: the things that have been on my mind. Yeah, I 66 00:04:09,040 --> 00:04:13,240 Speaker 1: think it's important to know why you wanted to cover this. UM. 67 00:04:13,520 --> 00:04:17,360 Speaker 1: I think it's just something that I don't potentially see 68 00:04:17,400 --> 00:04:21,600 Speaker 1: myself dealing with, cross crossing fingers, knocking out wood and all. 69 00:04:22,839 --> 00:04:25,839 Speaker 1: But it is um a fear now I think that 70 00:04:25,920 --> 00:04:31,680 Speaker 1: exists across America, especially um that the police might show 71 00:04:31,760 --> 00:04:34,280 Speaker 1: up for some reason, maybe just because they have wrong 72 00:04:34,279 --> 00:04:39,160 Speaker 1: intel and busting your house. Okay, So the transformation of 73 00:04:39,240 --> 00:04:45,160 Speaker 1: perception of the police from a protective force to a uh, 74 00:04:45,400 --> 00:04:51,760 Speaker 1: punitive force. Okay, That's what's interesting here is that we 75 00:04:51,839 --> 00:04:56,400 Speaker 1: have these two groups, right, the police and the military. Uh. 76 00:04:56,440 --> 00:05:00,520 Speaker 1: And in our video series this week, we you've taken 77 00:05:00,560 --> 00:05:05,400 Speaker 1: a look at some of the intersections between the rights 78 00:05:05,440 --> 00:05:10,080 Speaker 1: of civilians or citizens and the rights and responsibilities of 79 00:05:10,320 --> 00:05:13,200 Speaker 1: police officers. We had Can You Record Police? One of 80 00:05:13,200 --> 00:05:18,080 Speaker 1: our old episodes, updated as excellent remix and classic out 81 00:05:18,120 --> 00:05:21,400 Speaker 1: there on Monday, I think of this week, and we 82 00:05:21,520 --> 00:05:26,400 Speaker 1: have another upcoming episode which is going to be about 83 00:05:26,400 --> 00:05:29,240 Speaker 1: this militarization of police topic. We found a lot of 84 00:05:29,279 --> 00:05:33,680 Speaker 1: interesting things while we were doing UH, while we're doing this. Um. 85 00:05:33,880 --> 00:05:38,680 Speaker 1: One of one of the easiest, most basic B level 86 00:05:38,920 --> 00:05:43,000 Speaker 1: if I could say that is, ways to differentiate between 87 00:05:43,000 --> 00:05:46,080 Speaker 1: the police and the military comes to us from a 88 00:05:46,120 --> 00:05:51,279 Speaker 1: guy named Radley Balco. Yes, he has a quote here. Well, 89 00:05:51,320 --> 00:05:53,400 Speaker 1: he's also it should be noted that he's the author 90 00:05:53,440 --> 00:05:55,880 Speaker 1: of several books. One of them is Rise of the 91 00:05:55,920 --> 00:05:59,200 Speaker 1: Warrior Cop, the Militarization of America's Police forces, and the 92 00:05:59,200 --> 00:06:03,400 Speaker 1: other is Kill The Rise of Paramilitary Police Raids in America. 93 00:06:03,800 --> 00:06:07,080 Speaker 1: And you can re overkill for free online via the 94 00:06:07,160 --> 00:06:10,839 Speaker 1: Cato Institute. Nice and his quote that he has here 95 00:06:11,320 --> 00:06:12,839 Speaker 1: where I guess we're going to kind of get things 96 00:06:12,920 --> 00:06:16,599 Speaker 1: rolling with this. He says, quote, these are two very 97 00:06:16,640 --> 00:06:19,719 Speaker 1: different jobs. The role of police officers is to protect 98 00:06:19,720 --> 00:06:22,880 Speaker 1: our rights and keep the peace, while the military's job 99 00:06:23,120 --> 00:06:26,920 Speaker 1: is to annihilate foreign enemies. And uh, let's go ahead 100 00:06:27,000 --> 00:06:32,200 Speaker 1: and have the whoa hold on sound effect there. Thanks Noel, 101 00:06:32,680 --> 00:06:38,120 Speaker 1: everybody who objected to that differentiation by Balco, we understand 102 00:06:38,120 --> 00:06:41,880 Speaker 1: where you're coming from. It is it is an oversimplification 103 00:06:42,279 --> 00:06:45,640 Speaker 1: to say the military's job is to annihilate foreign enemies. Uh, 104 00:06:45,760 --> 00:06:48,960 Speaker 1: some people would prefer something like something a little more 105 00:06:48,960 --> 00:06:52,880 Speaker 1: glass half ful, like to protect America's interest abroad that heah, 106 00:06:52,960 --> 00:06:58,599 Speaker 1: well that's alas uh filled with something, okay, Uh, the 107 00:06:58,720 --> 00:07:01,920 Speaker 1: role of police officers protect rights, keep the peace. Some 108 00:07:01,960 --> 00:07:04,719 Speaker 1: people would say, well, the role of police officers is 109 00:07:04,800 --> 00:07:09,040 Speaker 1: just to enforce the law and not necessarily to protect people. 110 00:07:09,440 --> 00:07:12,720 Speaker 1: But yeah, I think that it's it's sad that it 111 00:07:12,840 --> 00:07:15,920 Speaker 1: used to go without saying and it doesn't anymore that 112 00:07:16,080 --> 00:07:21,160 Speaker 1: both members of the military current and past, and uh, 113 00:07:21,320 --> 00:07:25,680 Speaker 1: members of police forces current past are also people who 114 00:07:25,680 --> 00:07:28,920 Speaker 1: would save innocent lives, you know, people who would save 115 00:07:28,960 --> 00:07:34,720 Speaker 1: criminal lives honestly absolutely, and the police and military, depending 116 00:07:34,720 --> 00:07:37,120 Speaker 1: on who you're talking to, referred to in this kind 117 00:07:37,160 --> 00:07:42,240 Speaker 1: of monolithic block figure, this entire group that you speak about, 118 00:07:43,000 --> 00:07:45,720 Speaker 1: uh if you know, if you're talking about them one 119 00:07:45,760 --> 00:07:48,720 Speaker 1: occurrence or something the way I did earlier. I kind 120 00:07:48,720 --> 00:07:51,200 Speaker 1: of talked about the police as this one thing, but 121 00:07:51,280 --> 00:07:54,080 Speaker 1: really it's just a group of individuals and each one 122 00:07:54,680 --> 00:07:57,360 Speaker 1: just as different from the last. So we kind of 123 00:07:57,400 --> 00:07:59,920 Speaker 1: have to remember that when we're talking about this subject. Yeah, 124 00:08:00,080 --> 00:08:02,480 Speaker 1: these are all human beings on both sides of this debate. 125 00:08:02,520 --> 00:08:04,680 Speaker 1: And one of the reasons that we take pains to 126 00:08:04,760 --> 00:08:10,280 Speaker 1: set this up is because the militarization of police can 127 00:08:10,320 --> 00:08:13,600 Speaker 1: be a controversial topic, and whenever you deal with the 128 00:08:13,680 --> 00:08:19,640 Speaker 1: controversial topic, one thing that unscrupulous opponents will do on 129 00:08:19,680 --> 00:08:22,280 Speaker 1: the other side of a debate to try to discredit 130 00:08:22,280 --> 00:08:27,240 Speaker 1: you or dissuade you is to rely upon emotional arguments, 131 00:08:27,320 --> 00:08:30,800 Speaker 1: you know, to say, uh, you know, like the wars 132 00:08:30,880 --> 00:08:34,920 Speaker 1: that people have been falsely led into, hinged upon emotional things, 133 00:08:34,960 --> 00:08:39,680 Speaker 1: not on facts. So what we're doing is just talking 134 00:08:39,679 --> 00:08:41,280 Speaker 1: about the facts, and we want to get it out 135 00:08:41,320 --> 00:08:43,520 Speaker 1: of the way and say that we're not talking about 136 00:08:43,559 --> 00:08:48,320 Speaker 1: these people as just some group of faceless, mindless machines. 137 00:08:48,440 --> 00:08:51,840 Speaker 1: These are these are real people. And in many in 138 00:08:51,920 --> 00:08:56,360 Speaker 1: the vast majority of cases, uh, neither members of the 139 00:08:56,400 --> 00:09:00,559 Speaker 1: military nor most police officers are responsible for the policies 140 00:09:01,000 --> 00:09:04,360 Speaker 1: that come down, right, These mandates been for for decades. 141 00:09:04,520 --> 00:09:08,400 Speaker 1: It's this difference has been rather evident between police officers 142 00:09:08,520 --> 00:09:12,240 Speaker 1: or the police force and military. And that's on all 143 00:09:12,280 --> 00:09:14,920 Speaker 1: kinds of different levels. You can look at the tactics, 144 00:09:15,200 --> 00:09:18,080 Speaker 1: you can look at their equipment, um, kind of the 145 00:09:18,120 --> 00:09:20,520 Speaker 1: methodology that they used to go about what they're doing. 146 00:09:21,080 --> 00:09:23,800 Speaker 1: And this diconomy ben was kind of taken as a given. 147 00:09:24,320 --> 00:09:29,760 Speaker 1: Basically like there is there is an absolute underlying difference 148 00:09:29,760 --> 00:09:32,240 Speaker 1: between police and military, and we know that there's some 149 00:09:32,320 --> 00:09:36,320 Speaker 1: overlap too. Write both the police and members of military 150 00:09:36,559 --> 00:09:41,160 Speaker 1: do differ from civilians in with some very expectations as 151 00:09:41,200 --> 00:09:45,280 Speaker 1: well and in practice at least different treatment under the law. 152 00:09:45,320 --> 00:09:48,240 Speaker 1: It could be something formal like a military court that 153 00:09:48,280 --> 00:09:51,800 Speaker 1: a soldier goes to, or something informal like the infamous 154 00:09:51,840 --> 00:09:56,560 Speaker 1: Blue line of loyalty where cops will band together to 155 00:09:56,640 --> 00:09:59,760 Speaker 1: protect another police officer. Well, and there's a reason they 156 00:09:59,800 --> 00:10:01,920 Speaker 1: do at a lot of times, and it's because they're 157 00:10:01,960 --> 00:10:05,240 Speaker 1: in harm's way almost constantly, well, a lot of the 158 00:10:05,320 --> 00:10:07,680 Speaker 1: time they're in harm's way, and that could be because 159 00:10:07,760 --> 00:10:12,040 Speaker 1: they're protecting themselves, protecting a civilian and other citizen, or 160 00:10:12,160 --> 00:10:15,240 Speaker 1: even you know, protecting you know, you're really good friend 161 00:10:15,280 --> 00:10:17,760 Speaker 1: perhaps who was also happening he happens to be on 162 00:10:17,800 --> 00:10:21,120 Speaker 1: the police force. Sure, or there's you know, let's not 163 00:10:21,160 --> 00:10:24,760 Speaker 1: forget that mob rule is a thing that can happen, 164 00:10:24,840 --> 00:10:28,680 Speaker 1: and there are times when police are protecting criminals so 165 00:10:28,760 --> 00:10:31,320 Speaker 1: that they could have their do rights under the law. 166 00:10:31,640 --> 00:10:36,280 Speaker 1: And let's also point out that because of the way 167 00:10:36,320 --> 00:10:42,400 Speaker 1: that um entertainment disguised as news is often presented to people. 168 00:10:43,160 --> 00:10:45,280 Speaker 1: You're probably not going to hear about. A lot of 169 00:10:45,320 --> 00:10:48,760 Speaker 1: the heroic stories which are often going to hear about, 170 00:10:48,880 --> 00:10:50,960 Speaker 1: are going to be the bad guy cases, you know, 171 00:10:51,040 --> 00:10:55,160 Speaker 1: the one the someone who flipped and went dirty for 172 00:10:55,600 --> 00:10:58,760 Speaker 1: a little bit of side money off drugs, or someone 173 00:10:58,840 --> 00:11:06,439 Speaker 1: who committed a war crime, because that sells more advertising space. Right. Um, 174 00:11:06,520 --> 00:11:09,840 Speaker 1: But we do know, uh, we do know that in 175 00:11:10,080 --> 00:11:14,200 Speaker 1: the United States, at least, the concept of the separation 176 00:11:14,280 --> 00:11:18,520 Speaker 1: between the police and the military is a huge deal, 177 00:11:18,679 --> 00:11:21,120 Speaker 1: and it's it's something that a lot of people may 178 00:11:21,120 --> 00:11:23,320 Speaker 1: have heard about for the first time, but it is 179 00:11:23,360 --> 00:11:26,280 Speaker 1: by no means the first time that this has been 180 00:11:26,280 --> 00:11:29,120 Speaker 1: a concern in the United States. As a matter of fact, 181 00:11:30,240 --> 00:11:34,400 Speaker 1: are older legislators that came before US were so concerned 182 00:11:34,440 --> 00:11:37,280 Speaker 1: about this that they passed a law about it, right, Yeah, 183 00:11:37,280 --> 00:11:40,600 Speaker 1: that's right, the Posse Commentatous Act of eighteen seventy eight. 184 00:11:41,400 --> 00:11:44,240 Speaker 1: So this thing was basically designed to create a clear 185 00:11:44,360 --> 00:11:49,520 Speaker 1: division between the military and the domestic forces, the police 186 00:11:49,559 --> 00:11:53,439 Speaker 1: forces in the US. So, yeah, it says that the 187 00:11:53,520 --> 00:11:58,280 Speaker 1: US military. Originally, it's aid the US military cannot intervene 188 00:11:58,280 --> 00:12:02,559 Speaker 1: in law enforcement operations, so domestic stuff that the police 189 00:12:02,600 --> 00:12:07,679 Speaker 1: would do. Um, no matter how bad Blockbuster may want 190 00:12:07,720 --> 00:12:11,000 Speaker 1: you to return that blue Ray you stole right before 191 00:12:11,000 --> 00:12:14,680 Speaker 1: the store closed, they cannot send the Marines after you. 192 00:12:15,000 --> 00:12:18,040 Speaker 1: That is a comforting thought. I mean that there still 193 00:12:18,160 --> 00:12:20,680 Speaker 1: is like one Blockbuster open I think I think it's 194 00:12:20,679 --> 00:12:25,320 Speaker 1: in Alaska. Actually there's several. I'm sorry, Blockbuster. Just a 195 00:12:25,320 --> 00:12:27,320 Speaker 1: lot of these stories closed. Farkbuster. I want you to 196 00:12:27,320 --> 00:12:29,040 Speaker 1: know that I would still be using your store if 197 00:12:29,080 --> 00:12:32,360 Speaker 1: you were open. I did until you closed. Oh gosh, yeah, 198 00:12:32,360 --> 00:12:35,600 Speaker 1: I brought it down. Sorry, man, So now my best example. 199 00:12:35,880 --> 00:12:41,640 Speaker 1: But this is not a uniform, um, not a blanket law. Right. 200 00:12:41,679 --> 00:12:44,800 Speaker 1: There exceptions, yeah, there's there are a couple of different exceptions. 201 00:12:44,840 --> 00:12:47,360 Speaker 1: There's one provision in there that says the law can 202 00:12:47,360 --> 00:12:52,959 Speaker 1: be temporarily um, I guess repealed for certain instances. And 203 00:12:53,200 --> 00:12:55,400 Speaker 1: there's even a waiver that the president can sign that 204 00:12:55,480 --> 00:12:58,760 Speaker 1: can kind of suspend the law. Yeah, like a hall 205 00:12:58,880 --> 00:13:02,480 Speaker 1: pass for the miller terry to enter into the that's 206 00:13:02,480 --> 00:13:07,040 Speaker 1: for emergency situations, right, and you know it's I think 207 00:13:07,040 --> 00:13:12,880 Speaker 1: it's been used twice in the US. Yeah, at least twice, um, 208 00:13:12,920 --> 00:13:16,440 Speaker 1: probably more than that now that that comes from a 209 00:13:16,600 --> 00:13:20,560 Speaker 1: um House stuff Works article that our buddy Josh wrote 210 00:13:20,720 --> 00:13:23,800 Speaker 1: on the Delta Force. Right, oh, yeah, that's exactly I 211 00:13:23,960 --> 00:13:28,640 Speaker 1: remember that, and they're they're a fairly mysterious thing that 212 00:13:28,720 --> 00:13:32,640 Speaker 1: we should probably cover um in a future episode two 213 00:13:32,640 --> 00:13:36,040 Speaker 1: now that I think about it. So, critics of the 214 00:13:36,200 --> 00:13:40,000 Speaker 1: current trend between the police and the military tell us 215 00:13:40,080 --> 00:13:44,679 Speaker 1: that pretty much from the jump, Posse comitatas has been 216 00:13:44,800 --> 00:13:50,160 Speaker 1: under attack by various various interest groups. And it is 217 00:13:50,200 --> 00:13:52,920 Speaker 1: true that over the decades this Act has been changed 218 00:13:53,000 --> 00:13:56,120 Speaker 1: and there have been exceptions added, and a lot of 219 00:13:56,120 --> 00:13:59,520 Speaker 1: these either existed in the original Act, like the you know, 220 00:13:59,559 --> 00:14:03,320 Speaker 1: the National Guard and state defense forces are under the 221 00:14:03,360 --> 00:14:06,480 Speaker 1: governor of a state, so those don't really apply with 222 00:14:06,520 --> 00:14:10,720 Speaker 1: Possi commatatas um, and then there are some added later 223 00:14:11,679 --> 00:14:17,640 Speaker 1: with the Insurrection Act during the Los Angeles riots. Right yeah, 224 00:14:17,679 --> 00:14:21,120 Speaker 1: that was a huge one. And then gosh, there's one 225 00:14:21,160 --> 00:14:25,040 Speaker 1: where the Attorney General can request that the Secretary of 226 00:14:25,120 --> 00:14:30,880 Speaker 1: Defense provides emergency assistance if basically a civilian law enforcement 227 00:14:30,920 --> 00:14:35,600 Speaker 1: agency can't handle a situation there they have inadequate equipment 228 00:14:35,800 --> 00:14:40,680 Speaker 1: or forces. Um L A p D attacked by Godzilla, 229 00:14:40,960 --> 00:14:43,360 Speaker 1: we can't handle that well, yeah, or if there's a 230 00:14:43,440 --> 00:14:49,000 Speaker 1: real nuclear material threat that kind of thing, radiological weapons. Yeah. Oh. 231 00:14:49,040 --> 00:14:51,880 Speaker 1: The military can also come in as a support role 232 00:14:52,360 --> 00:14:58,200 Speaker 1: for certain joints Special Operations Command stock yeah. Uh yeah. 233 00:14:58,480 --> 00:15:01,840 Speaker 1: So people still to the stay debate about whether or 234 00:15:01,840 --> 00:15:06,520 Speaker 1: not posse comitatus is being eroded, as well as the 235 00:15:06,600 --> 00:15:11,320 Speaker 1: specifics about how and when a nation's military should be 236 00:15:11,320 --> 00:15:17,880 Speaker 1: called to act domestically. Um So, this militarization, right, So 237 00:15:17,920 --> 00:15:21,320 Speaker 1: we've established that there's a history of it, and in 238 00:15:21,480 --> 00:15:26,760 Speaker 1: our video we talked about the history of swat teams 239 00:15:26,800 --> 00:15:29,440 Speaker 1: a little bit, right, Yeah. If you want to learn 240 00:15:29,480 --> 00:15:31,800 Speaker 1: more about that, please go back and watch our videos. 241 00:15:32,320 --> 00:15:35,800 Speaker 1: Um but okay, so long story short, the SWAT team 242 00:15:35,880 --> 00:15:39,320 Speaker 1: became really popular with the police and the public to 243 00:15:39,360 --> 00:15:44,760 Speaker 1: an extent and politicians. Uh. And that's because they there 244 00:15:44,760 --> 00:15:47,920 Speaker 1: were several highly publicized events where SWAT team was used 245 00:15:48,600 --> 00:15:52,240 Speaker 1: and they came out looking really good because they were effective, 246 00:15:52,360 --> 00:15:57,560 Speaker 1: They were fast and mostly effective. Right. Yeah. They became 247 00:15:58,040 --> 00:16:01,600 Speaker 1: sort of the next hot item. I mean the movies 248 00:16:01,640 --> 00:16:07,720 Speaker 1: involving swat teams, television shows. Uh. When they when they 249 00:16:08,440 --> 00:16:11,440 Speaker 1: first came out, which is towards the sixties, as we 250 00:16:11,480 --> 00:16:15,520 Speaker 1: talked about our upcoming episode. Uh, they had a fairly 251 00:16:16,280 --> 00:16:22,040 Speaker 1: narrowly defined mission and they operated in primarily urban areas, 252 00:16:22,080 --> 00:16:25,840 Speaker 1: so throughout the seventies there these they come out in 253 00:16:26,240 --> 00:16:31,200 Speaker 1: UM probably the mid sixties as a result of some 254 00:16:31,320 --> 00:16:33,640 Speaker 1: problems that the l a p D was actually having, 255 00:16:33,880 --> 00:16:38,640 Speaker 1: not Godzilla related. Well, yeah, larger firearms being used by 256 00:16:39,000 --> 00:16:43,480 Speaker 1: criminals when they were trying to respond, body armor being used, 257 00:16:44,440 --> 00:16:52,560 Speaker 1: enormous racial tension getting very close to um a unrest 258 00:16:52,680 --> 00:16:55,960 Speaker 1: that would be like a regional war. Full scale writing 259 00:16:56,000 --> 00:17:00,440 Speaker 1: was happening, Yeah, like a city war. So gradually swat 260 00:17:00,480 --> 00:17:03,200 Speaker 1: teams increase. You know, this large urban area gets one, 261 00:17:03,360 --> 00:17:06,399 Speaker 1: this one gets one. People are saying, oh, finally we 262 00:17:06,440 --> 00:17:10,359 Speaker 1: have someone for hostage negotiations or things are already on 263 00:17:10,400 --> 00:17:15,400 Speaker 1: the brink of catastrophic violence. And uh, this worked in there. 264 00:17:16,040 --> 00:17:19,560 Speaker 1: Not only their public perception continued to rise, but more 265 00:17:19,600 --> 00:17:24,119 Speaker 1: and more police departments looked at these paramilitary units favorably. 266 00:17:24,480 --> 00:17:29,440 Speaker 1: And then something crazy happened in the nineteen eighties. Well yeah, right, well, 267 00:17:29,520 --> 00:17:33,719 Speaker 1: right before the nine eighties, Nixon gave his famous speech, 268 00:17:34,440 --> 00:17:36,399 Speaker 1: or I guess it was a little talking point that 269 00:17:36,440 --> 00:17:39,200 Speaker 1: he added in about public Enemy Number one being drugs 270 00:17:39,240 --> 00:17:42,960 Speaker 1: and drug abuse. Then we get to the Reagan administration 271 00:17:43,000 --> 00:17:46,480 Speaker 1: in the eighties and we look at not that nothing 272 00:17:46,520 --> 00:17:50,360 Speaker 1: happened in between those two, because there are certainly things 273 00:17:50,400 --> 00:17:54,280 Speaker 1: that happened, but that's during the Reagan administration we had 274 00:17:54,320 --> 00:17:58,000 Speaker 1: all kinds of new funding, new equipment. Um. I think 275 00:17:58,040 --> 00:18:00,600 Speaker 1: in six we have a short up of this. In 276 00:18:00,720 --> 00:18:06,520 Speaker 1: nine six the Reagan administration had increased the Drug Enforcement 277 00:18:07,119 --> 00:18:11,120 Speaker 1: Agency and basically War on drugs um amount of money 278 00:18:11,119 --> 00:18:13,640 Speaker 1: they were spending by three times at least from one 279 00:18:13,680 --> 00:18:17,800 Speaker 1: to eighty six um. And that includes swat teams and 280 00:18:17,920 --> 00:18:21,320 Speaker 1: all kinds of other paramilitary police units all across the country. 281 00:18:21,680 --> 00:18:23,080 Speaker 1: You know, I just want to point out when you 282 00:18:23,119 --> 00:18:25,560 Speaker 1: said not that we're saying nothing happened in the seventies. 283 00:18:25,760 --> 00:18:31,600 Speaker 1: What if that's the phantom history. Nine seventies just didn't happen. 284 00:18:32,359 --> 00:18:35,080 Speaker 1: If you were born then they lied to you, go 285 00:18:35,240 --> 00:18:38,359 Speaker 1: go find the hospital, asked for the original birth certificate. 286 00:18:38,600 --> 00:18:41,480 Speaker 1: It goes so deep, man, I am, I am so kidding. 287 00:18:41,560 --> 00:18:43,919 Speaker 1: Please don't do that unless you need a copy of 288 00:18:43,920 --> 00:18:47,080 Speaker 1: your birth certificate. But um, yeah, that's right. That's a 289 00:18:47,119 --> 00:18:51,080 Speaker 1: great point. In nineteen six, Reagan did issue this National 290 00:18:51,160 --> 00:18:55,920 Speaker 1: Security Decision Directive. And this is interesting because it calls 291 00:18:56,000 --> 00:19:00,359 Speaker 1: drugs a threat to US national security and now national 292 00:19:00,440 --> 00:19:05,119 Speaker 1: security all in addition to being a legitimate concern for 293 00:19:05,320 --> 00:19:08,000 Speaker 1: a country. In the United States at least and in 294 00:19:08,080 --> 00:19:11,120 Speaker 1: a lot of Western countries. It's begun to function as 295 00:19:11,160 --> 00:19:15,240 Speaker 1: this password for unlimited money. It's like the Konami code. 296 00:19:15,480 --> 00:19:18,679 Speaker 1: That's exactly what it is. National security. Oh, thank you, 297 00:19:18,760 --> 00:19:21,200 Speaker 1: I'll take all of that. Well, sir, we really can't 298 00:19:21,240 --> 00:19:24,360 Speaker 1: handle it. National security. Okay, that's fine. Here's seven more 299 00:19:24,400 --> 00:19:28,240 Speaker 1: billion dollars. So yeah, that's that's a I know we're 300 00:19:28,280 --> 00:19:30,359 Speaker 1: being a bit tongue in cheek about it, but it does, 301 00:19:31,080 --> 00:19:34,119 Speaker 1: in this case at least unlock a hell of a 302 00:19:34,119 --> 00:19:39,760 Speaker 1: lot of funding. And the every uh, everybody is cooperating 303 00:19:39,800 --> 00:19:44,040 Speaker 1: to share information, equipment, tactics. We have a little bit 304 00:19:44,040 --> 00:19:47,520 Speaker 1: of a list of the different things, uh that that 305 00:19:47,560 --> 00:19:52,280 Speaker 1: we're passed. Right. So we talked about Reagan, but then, uh, 306 00:19:52,320 --> 00:19:56,760 Speaker 1: in nineteen nine, some other stuff happened. Yeah, Congress ordered 307 00:19:56,760 --> 00:20:02,639 Speaker 1: the National Guard to assist drug enforcement efforts, and and 308 00:20:02,720 --> 00:20:07,240 Speaker 1: because of his order, national Guard troops today still patrol 309 00:20:07,280 --> 00:20:11,399 Speaker 1: for marijuana plants and assist in basically this huge anti 310 00:20:11,480 --> 00:20:14,080 Speaker 1: drug operation and every state in the country looking for 311 00:20:14,200 --> 00:20:20,480 Speaker 1: the plants themselves. In nine, President Bush created a series 312 00:20:20,560 --> 00:20:23,960 Speaker 1: of regional task force in the d D Department of 313 00:20:24,000 --> 00:20:29,919 Speaker 1: Defense just to cooperate, just to facilitate cooperation, excuse me, 314 00:20:30,400 --> 00:20:35,119 Speaker 1: between the military and police forces. So how do we 315 00:20:35,240 --> 00:20:40,639 Speaker 1: best coordinate uh this transfer of equipment or vehicles, weaponry, 316 00:20:40,960 --> 00:20:45,520 Speaker 1: tactics training, uh, people that were on the lookout for 317 00:20:45,840 --> 00:20:48,240 Speaker 1: you know, you can also if you read between the 318 00:20:48,280 --> 00:20:52,360 Speaker 1: lines here, clearly that's a comment on wire tapping. Oh sure, well, 319 00:20:52,359 --> 00:20:54,600 Speaker 1: and keep in mind we're we're involved. The US is 320 00:20:54,640 --> 00:20:59,320 Speaker 1: involved in all kinds of narco wars all across Central 321 00:20:59,640 --> 00:21:05,160 Speaker 1: South America, and it's the military performing all of those actions. 322 00:21:05,200 --> 00:21:08,120 Speaker 1: So then they're working directly with perhaps people and you know, 323 00:21:08,480 --> 00:21:10,760 Speaker 1: if anything gets inside the United States, they're trying to 324 00:21:10,880 --> 00:21:15,000 Speaker 1: coordinate with that. So then in the d D issued 325 00:21:15,040 --> 00:21:19,080 Speaker 1: this memorandum that authorizes a transfer of equipment in tech 326 00:21:19,520 --> 00:21:22,200 Speaker 1: to state and local police. And in that same year, 327 00:21:22,320 --> 00:21:28,360 Speaker 1: Congress created the Reutilization Program, which essentially facilitated the handling 328 00:21:28,800 --> 00:21:33,639 Speaker 1: of military gear over to civilian and police agencies. So 329 00:21:34,080 --> 00:21:38,280 Speaker 1: if we look at specific numbers. What what does that mean? Exactly? Okay, 330 00:21:38,280 --> 00:21:45,240 Speaker 1: So just between and nine seven, the Pentagon distributed three thousand, 331 00:21:45,400 --> 00:21:49,600 Speaker 1: eight hundred M sixteens, two thousand, one hundred and eighty 332 00:21:49,640 --> 00:21:54,360 Speaker 1: five M fourteens, seventy three grenade launchers, and a hundred 333 00:21:54,359 --> 00:21:59,479 Speaker 1: and twelve armored personnel carriers two civilian police agencies all 334 00:21:59,520 --> 00:22:03,320 Speaker 1: across the country right one year alone, that totals up 335 00:22:03,359 --> 00:22:07,800 Speaker 1: to more than one point two million pieces of military equipment. 336 00:22:08,040 --> 00:22:11,120 Speaker 1: And this is just a brief history. So we can 337 00:22:11,119 --> 00:22:14,760 Speaker 1: now we can talk about the current state of militarization. Because, 338 00:22:14,840 --> 00:22:17,280 Speaker 1: as I believe we say in our video, whether or 339 00:22:17,359 --> 00:22:20,080 Speaker 1: not you are an opponent of this you think it's bad, 340 00:22:20,520 --> 00:22:22,439 Speaker 1: or you're an advocate of it and you think that 341 00:22:22,520 --> 00:22:25,960 Speaker 1: it's an effective way to prevent crime, no one can 342 00:22:26,040 --> 00:22:29,720 Speaker 1: deny that the police in the United States and several 343 00:22:29,720 --> 00:22:33,760 Speaker 1: other countries are increasingly militarized, both in terms of tactics 344 00:22:33,800 --> 00:22:37,000 Speaker 1: and equipment. Okay, Ben, So let's look at the current state. 345 00:22:37,040 --> 00:22:40,640 Speaker 1: We've talked about seventies, eighties, nineties, where are we right now. 346 00:22:41,760 --> 00:22:46,720 Speaker 1: In a widely cited survey, this criminologist Peter Kraska, he 347 00:22:46,760 --> 00:22:50,280 Speaker 1: found that as of seven, almost nine percent of cities 348 00:22:50,280 --> 00:22:53,920 Speaker 1: with populations fifty thousand or more had at least one 349 00:22:54,119 --> 00:22:58,080 Speaker 1: paramilitary police unit. That's twice as many in the mid 350 00:22:58,160 --> 00:23:02,200 Speaker 1: nineteen eighties. And let's stroll through some more numbers here. Uh, 351 00:23:02,240 --> 00:23:06,119 Speaker 1: this is from the Washington Post. Uh the a c L. 352 00:23:06,280 --> 00:23:10,840 Speaker 1: You released a yearlong study of this tendency and and 353 00:23:10,880 --> 00:23:15,000 Speaker 1: police forces looked at eight hundred deployments of SWAT, special 354 00:23:15,040 --> 00:23:18,760 Speaker 1: weapon and Tactics teams across twenty local, state, and federal 355 00:23:18,840 --> 00:23:22,480 Speaker 1: agencies from two thousand eleven to two thousand twelve. So 356 00:23:22,920 --> 00:23:27,359 Speaker 1: statistically speaking, this is pretty much fresh fresh out of 357 00:23:27,359 --> 00:23:32,280 Speaker 1: the pizza oven. Get right. Uh. Sixty two of those 358 00:23:32,359 --> 00:23:36,639 Speaker 1: raids survey were to conduct searches for drugs, not the 359 00:23:36,800 --> 00:23:41,800 Speaker 1: narrowly defined uh incredibly dangerous stuff. Now, of course, these 360 00:23:41,840 --> 00:23:43,760 Speaker 1: these people are putting their lives at risk when they 361 00:23:43,800 --> 00:23:47,960 Speaker 1: do this, But the uh, the interdiction of drugs was 362 00:23:48,000 --> 00:23:52,600 Speaker 1: not originally a SWAT team mission or even within their realm. 363 00:23:52,680 --> 00:23:56,480 Speaker 1: This is what we call mission creep um. Just under 364 00:23:56,520 --> 00:23:59,960 Speaker 1: eight percent where to serve a search warrant set ME 365 00:24:00,240 --> 00:24:03,760 Speaker 1: eight and ten of these SWAT raids were not initiated 366 00:24:03,840 --> 00:24:06,840 Speaker 1: to get a school shooter or a hostage taker and 367 00:24:07,040 --> 00:24:12,800 Speaker 1: escaped fellon, But to investigate someone who is still suspected 368 00:24:13,200 --> 00:24:15,800 Speaker 1: of committing a crime. Yeah, they sent the big dogs 369 00:24:16,400 --> 00:24:20,240 Speaker 1: to find someone suspected of a crime. I mean, you know, 370 00:24:20,520 --> 00:24:23,679 Speaker 1: suspected is a heck of word, because legally in the 371 00:24:23,760 --> 00:24:26,439 Speaker 1: u s you're required to say suspectful. Yeah, and and 372 00:24:26,480 --> 00:24:29,240 Speaker 1: if you are able to get a warrant, there's probably 373 00:24:29,400 --> 00:24:33,159 Speaker 1: enough evidence against you to at least what they believe 374 00:24:33,240 --> 00:24:35,840 Speaker 1: to prove, right. Yeah. So you know, we're not saying 375 00:24:35,840 --> 00:24:38,119 Speaker 1: they're all good guys or all bad guys. It's just 376 00:24:38,359 --> 00:24:41,600 Speaker 1: their suspects. But what we are saying is that some 377 00:24:41,760 --> 00:24:46,880 Speaker 1: of the reasons that SWAT teams are often justified right 378 00:24:46,960 --> 00:24:49,560 Speaker 1: as a as an expense because it's expensive to have 379 00:24:49,680 --> 00:24:52,800 Speaker 1: such a high level of training, expertise, and equipment. Um, 380 00:24:53,080 --> 00:24:57,440 Speaker 1: the common justification is to prevent violent things from happening. 381 00:24:57,720 --> 00:25:00,600 Speaker 1: But it looks like according to a cl you report, 382 00:25:00,600 --> 00:25:03,399 Speaker 1: at least that just seven percent of those SWAT raids 383 00:25:03,400 --> 00:25:07,040 Speaker 1: were for hostages, barricades, or active shooter scenarios. So kind 384 00:25:07,040 --> 00:25:10,239 Speaker 1: of the original reasoning for having a SWAT team just 385 00:25:10,400 --> 00:25:12,920 Speaker 1: in back in the day, the reason for their creation. Right. 386 00:25:12,960 --> 00:25:15,480 Speaker 1: And additionally, we'll just launch a list a couple more 387 00:25:15,480 --> 00:25:17,720 Speaker 1: effects and it's all again. According to the a c 388 00:25:17,840 --> 00:25:20,480 Speaker 1: l you study, in at least thirty six percent of 389 00:25:20,520 --> 00:25:24,959 Speaker 1: these SWAT raids studies, no contraband at all was found. 390 00:25:25,400 --> 00:25:30,200 Speaker 1: So in you know, a home invasion, right or an 391 00:25:30,240 --> 00:25:36,119 Speaker 1: active mission. Uh. And not only not only do they 392 00:25:36,160 --> 00:25:40,399 Speaker 1: not prevent violent crime, which I don't know, that's kind 393 00:25:40,400 --> 00:25:43,119 Speaker 1: of unfair to say, Matt, because it's really tough to 394 00:25:43,200 --> 00:25:49,840 Speaker 1: say that someone didn't prevent something, right, Yeah, but but 395 00:25:49,960 --> 00:25:53,760 Speaker 1: there wasn't any you know, contrabands, no illegal weapons or 396 00:25:53,920 --> 00:25:59,359 Speaker 1: counterfeit money or drugs or something like that. Uh. The 397 00:25:59,400 --> 00:26:02,399 Speaker 1: scary part is that the the a c l U 398 00:26:02,800 --> 00:26:07,360 Speaker 1: estimates that, due to incomplete police reports, this figure could 399 00:26:07,359 --> 00:26:11,800 Speaker 1: be higher than thirty six. It could be sixty. Um. Now, 400 00:26:11,840 --> 00:26:15,040 Speaker 1: we do know that there are other things that occur here, 401 00:26:15,400 --> 00:26:19,000 Speaker 1: like swat tactics are disproportionately used on people of color. 402 00:26:19,400 --> 00:26:22,760 Speaker 1: If you just look at the numbers, um, there's usually 403 00:26:22,800 --> 00:26:27,600 Speaker 1: fourced century swat deployments involved a fourth century battering ram 404 00:26:27,680 --> 00:26:30,320 Speaker 1: boot explosive device. And then and over half of those 405 00:26:30,400 --> 00:26:34,560 Speaker 1: raids the police find fail to find anything. Really any 406 00:26:34,600 --> 00:26:37,919 Speaker 1: kind of weapon, um, but the presence of which is 407 00:26:37,960 --> 00:26:40,280 Speaker 1: cited for the reason of these violent tactics. So they 408 00:26:40,440 --> 00:26:42,760 Speaker 1: will go in saying, well these this guy's armed or 409 00:26:42,840 --> 00:26:45,080 Speaker 1: this group is armed. But then they won't find anything. 410 00:26:45,119 --> 00:26:47,159 Speaker 1: And there's another question there that goes back to the 411 00:26:47,200 --> 00:26:50,480 Speaker 1: safety of the people conducting these things. How do you 412 00:26:50,640 --> 00:26:53,240 Speaker 1: know if they're not armed? Right? Well, yeah, and if 413 00:26:53,600 --> 00:26:55,439 Speaker 1: you think they may be armed, how do you not 414 00:26:55,520 --> 00:26:59,880 Speaker 1: go in guns blazing and throwing flash bangs. So yeah, 415 00:27:00,080 --> 00:27:05,199 Speaker 1: so this is our this is our overall look with 416 00:27:05,280 --> 00:27:10,560 Speaker 1: a little more detail about the nature of militarization in 417 00:27:10,560 --> 00:27:13,720 Speaker 1: this day and age, in this state. And when we 418 00:27:13,760 --> 00:27:18,439 Speaker 1: return from a word from our sponsor will get into 419 00:27:18,960 --> 00:27:28,160 Speaker 1: some of the scarier conspiratorial stuff. Oh man, I don't 420 00:27:28,160 --> 00:27:30,879 Speaker 1: know if I can call these beats much more. I 421 00:27:30,960 --> 00:27:33,400 Speaker 1: swear beat farming is not what Dad said it would be. 422 00:27:33,960 --> 00:27:38,000 Speaker 1: It's just hard work all day, all night, and then 423 00:27:38,040 --> 00:27:42,080 Speaker 1: all the next day. Oh man, I wonder what's on TV. 424 00:27:42,160 --> 00:27:44,280 Speaker 1: Oh can't watch TV. I got a harvest rest of 425 00:27:44,280 --> 00:27:47,720 Speaker 1: these beats. Oh excuse me, excuse me? Their friends you 426 00:27:47,760 --> 00:27:51,119 Speaker 1: want to get in here, Well you've left the door open, 427 00:27:51,200 --> 00:27:54,000 Speaker 1: But never mind. Out I would have rammed it down anyway. 428 00:27:54,080 --> 00:27:57,080 Speaker 1: I couldn't help. But over here on the wire tap 429 00:27:57,480 --> 00:27:59,919 Speaker 1: that you're having a you're having a tough time at 430 00:28:00,000 --> 00:28:03,280 Speaker 1: your day job. What what is that exactly? Well, I've 431 00:28:03,280 --> 00:28:05,320 Speaker 1: been farming beats on this farm, has been in my 432 00:28:05,359 --> 00:28:09,640 Speaker 1: family of seven generations. Uh, you know, it's tough. Yeah, 433 00:28:09,720 --> 00:28:13,000 Speaker 1: it's a it's a noble profession for sure, but it 434 00:28:13,080 --> 00:28:16,280 Speaker 1: also seems like it could be one fraught with problems. 435 00:28:16,280 --> 00:28:19,240 Speaker 1: What what kind of problems do you have farming these beats? Well, 436 00:28:19,320 --> 00:28:22,120 Speaker 1: sometimes the beats are too close together, and they may 437 00:28:22,119 --> 00:28:24,920 Speaker 1: make it like a double beat harder, and it's harder 438 00:28:24,920 --> 00:28:26,600 Speaker 1: for those to get them out. Some of the machine 439 00:28:26,600 --> 00:28:29,760 Speaker 1: realiable malfunction. A lot of times there's not enough water. 440 00:28:30,080 --> 00:28:32,399 Speaker 1: That's one of the biggest problems. To be honest, Well, 441 00:28:32,560 --> 00:28:35,399 Speaker 1: what would you say if I told you that we 442 00:28:35,440 --> 00:28:38,760 Speaker 1: could not only fix your problems, but give you an 443 00:28:38,880 --> 00:28:41,959 Speaker 1: entirely new set of problems that you've never seen before. 444 00:28:42,440 --> 00:28:45,120 Speaker 1: To be honest, I'm not really interested much in that. 445 00:28:45,200 --> 00:28:48,120 Speaker 1: Maybe I can get a do you have a brochure? 446 00:28:48,240 --> 00:28:52,960 Speaker 1: Just imagine instead of this beat up old tractor, what 447 00:28:53,080 --> 00:28:57,680 Speaker 1: if you had a tank, a mind resistant ambush proof 448 00:28:58,200 --> 00:29:02,880 Speaker 1: vehicle with armor. Now, now you got me, don't worry. 449 00:29:03,080 --> 00:29:06,800 Speaker 1: You'll have armor too, and those other beat farmers are 450 00:29:06,800 --> 00:29:10,440 Speaker 1: going to be absolutely no possible potential threat that they 451 00:29:10,520 --> 00:29:14,760 Speaker 1: might someday be if you're also armed with armor piercing rounds, 452 00:29:14,760 --> 00:29:18,720 Speaker 1: because believe me, friend, those other beat farmers already have armor. 453 00:29:19,120 --> 00:29:22,320 Speaker 1: Now do you have any money, Yes, we have. We 454 00:29:22,360 --> 00:29:25,959 Speaker 1: have so many minds, we have mind launchers. Certainly, just 455 00:29:26,320 --> 00:29:31,280 Speaker 1: from the military surplus of the past four minutes alone, 456 00:29:31,640 --> 00:29:36,840 Speaker 1: we have produced enough armor and war grade weaponry to 457 00:29:36,920 --> 00:29:42,280 Speaker 1: supply your beat farm for decades to come. Are you interested? Well, 458 00:29:42,320 --> 00:29:45,560 Speaker 1: that depends, uh how much? How much are we talking here? 459 00:29:45,600 --> 00:29:47,520 Speaker 1: Because you know I don't exactly make a lot of 460 00:29:47,520 --> 00:29:52,200 Speaker 1: money beats. Yes, okay, not to worry. Are you a terrorist? No? 461 00:29:52,880 --> 00:29:59,280 Speaker 1: Do you sell drugs? No? Then it's free. What yes, sir, 462 00:29:59,440 --> 00:30:03,800 Speaker 1: that's right, free just for doing your parts. Are I 463 00:30:03,840 --> 00:30:06,760 Speaker 1: am not kidding? I am legally not allowed to make jokes. 464 00:30:06,960 --> 00:30:10,120 Speaker 1: Oh my god, I can't believe. I feel like luckiest 465 00:30:10,160 --> 00:30:12,320 Speaker 1: man in the world. Bring it in, boys. Oh, we're 466 00:30:12,360 --> 00:30:16,200 Speaker 1: also giving you an army. Oh the power. I could 467 00:30:16,240 --> 00:30:19,720 Speaker 1: feel the power. Yes, that's right. Whether you're a law 468 00:30:19,800 --> 00:30:24,720 Speaker 1: enforcement or librarian, a fat farmer, or anything between. We 469 00:30:24,960 --> 00:30:28,600 Speaker 1: two can help you here at Military Surplus f t 470 00:30:29,120 --> 00:30:32,760 Speaker 1: W dot gov and that stands for or the war. 471 00:30:33,400 --> 00:30:36,760 Speaker 1: That's right, So do your part and help us use 472 00:30:37,040 --> 00:30:41,000 Speaker 1: up this gigantic military surplus that we have built. The 473 00:30:41,080 --> 00:30:47,080 Speaker 1: American way, we just got too many tanks. Military Surplus 474 00:30:47,160 --> 00:30:48,480 Speaker 1: F t W dut dove is not the part of 475 00:30:48,520 --> 00:30:51,080 Speaker 1: the United States Government, the government of Mexico, Canada, the Bahamas, 476 00:30:51,160 --> 00:30:53,760 Speaker 1: or any other Gribbean nations. Military Surplus f W duck dove. 477 00:30:53,840 --> 00:30:56,320 Speaker 1: He is not legally a recognized charity and cannot see donations. 478 00:30:56,320 --> 00:30:59,440 Speaker 1: Military Serplus ft W duckup is legally part from any comments, consideration, 479 00:30:59,560 --> 00:31:01,880 Speaker 1: or statement regarding privatized military is the International Criminical Cort 480 00:31:01,920 --> 00:31:03,800 Speaker 1: the s S, the UN or NDC, brought to you 481 00:31:03,880 --> 00:31:14,200 Speaker 1: by Illumination Global Unlimited and we're back. Uh So that's 482 00:31:14,200 --> 00:31:16,880 Speaker 1: a little bit of a tongue in cheek commercial for sure, 483 00:31:17,760 --> 00:31:22,160 Speaker 1: but it leads us seamlessly into some of the conspiracy 484 00:31:22,400 --> 00:31:27,280 Speaker 1: theories about militarization of the police. Right Yeah, Now, if 485 00:31:27,320 --> 00:31:30,800 Speaker 1: you're the chief of a local police department, you can 486 00:31:31,000 --> 00:31:35,360 Speaker 1: kind of have your own military on a very small scale, right, 487 00:31:35,400 --> 00:31:39,200 Speaker 1: and that's what the opponents would say. Uh, I guess 488 00:31:39,280 --> 00:31:41,280 Speaker 1: before we dive into this, one point I do want 489 00:31:41,280 --> 00:31:45,400 Speaker 1: to make is that for cash strapped police precincts in 490 00:31:45,800 --> 00:31:50,080 Speaker 1: rural areas or something, uh, this is a gigantic boon. 491 00:31:50,600 --> 00:31:54,240 Speaker 1: And indeed it would be a little bit thick headed 492 00:31:54,280 --> 00:31:56,600 Speaker 1: to walk away from this because you know, things like 493 00:31:56,680 --> 00:32:00,840 Speaker 1: body armor and bulletproof helmets absolutely nest a theory too. Right. 494 00:32:01,560 --> 00:32:04,800 Speaker 1: But the one of the big conspiracy theories, of course, 495 00:32:05,200 --> 00:32:09,480 Speaker 1: is that there is a what Huffington's Post called a 496 00:32:09,520 --> 00:32:16,560 Speaker 1: police industrial complex, the idea that private corporations that manufacture 497 00:32:16,680 --> 00:32:20,320 Speaker 1: arms and weapons have made these big agreements with the 498 00:32:20,440 --> 00:32:24,760 Speaker 1: US government and that they're making military hardware that no 499 00:32:24,800 --> 00:32:28,360 Speaker 1: one actually needs. Well, yeah, you get the money. Somebody 500 00:32:28,400 --> 00:32:30,920 Speaker 1: has to take it now that we've manufactured it, or 501 00:32:30,920 --> 00:32:33,760 Speaker 1: else we just lost a whole bunch of money and 502 00:32:33,800 --> 00:32:35,880 Speaker 1: then someone will notice and we won't get as much 503 00:32:35,880 --> 00:32:38,920 Speaker 1: money for our our budget next our next funding cycle. Right, Like, 504 00:32:38,960 --> 00:32:41,560 Speaker 1: if you don't use the entirety of your budget, then 505 00:32:41,600 --> 00:32:43,880 Speaker 1: it looks as though you should get your budget cut 506 00:32:44,000 --> 00:32:46,720 Speaker 1: next year. You've got to increase the budget. So the 507 00:32:46,880 --> 00:32:50,120 Speaker 1: what's interesting about this theory is that there is a 508 00:32:52,160 --> 00:32:54,800 Speaker 1: there's a little bit of plausibility to it, because we 509 00:32:54,880 --> 00:32:58,520 Speaker 1: know one of the strange one of the strange things 510 00:32:58,560 --> 00:33:03,360 Speaker 1: about legs slating an agreement that goes past, you know, 511 00:33:03,480 --> 00:33:06,200 Speaker 1: two or four years, is that the people who sign 512 00:33:06,240 --> 00:33:10,320 Speaker 1: it are often not in office to see what happens later, 513 00:33:10,480 --> 00:33:12,480 Speaker 1: see the effects of it, whether it's a good idea, 514 00:33:12,560 --> 00:33:16,760 Speaker 1: whether it's a smart one, whether there are too many 515 00:33:17,160 --> 00:33:20,600 Speaker 1: jets or not enough jets. And and this is something 516 00:33:20,880 --> 00:33:25,080 Speaker 1: that is a common concern in the world's militaries as well. 517 00:33:25,640 --> 00:33:27,360 Speaker 1: You know, if we just look at the F thirty 518 00:33:27,400 --> 00:33:32,240 Speaker 1: five debacle going on now, and then there's the and 519 00:33:32,280 --> 00:33:35,160 Speaker 1: then there's the other idea, a little bit more conspiratorial, 520 00:33:35,920 --> 00:33:42,400 Speaker 1: which is that maybe the companies themselves are pushing this 521 00:33:42,800 --> 00:33:46,200 Speaker 1: for a new market. Yeah. Have you ever heard of 522 00:33:47,920 --> 00:33:54,480 Speaker 1: Urban Shield Expo? Uh? I have. I don't mean to 523 00:33:54,520 --> 00:33:58,040 Speaker 1: say that much of it that was good though, we 524 00:33:58,080 --> 00:34:01,960 Speaker 1: mentioned this I think every year in Oakland, California. Right. Yeah, 525 00:34:02,000 --> 00:34:06,880 Speaker 1: this is where they essentially invite as many police departments 526 00:34:06,880 --> 00:34:11,160 Speaker 1: and sheriff departments of local police out there and basically 527 00:34:11,160 --> 00:34:15,560 Speaker 1: it's this huge expo, think comic Con but with military 528 00:34:15,600 --> 00:34:20,520 Speaker 1: grade weapons for your department, right yeah, And these these 529 00:34:20,600 --> 00:34:26,440 Speaker 1: vendors are advertising various various hardware, but they're also training 530 00:34:26,520 --> 00:34:30,480 Speaker 1: sessions on things like how to diffuse a bomb or 531 00:34:30,560 --> 00:34:35,440 Speaker 1: how to uh run points on a raid. It's essentially 532 00:34:35,760 --> 00:34:38,400 Speaker 1: it really is just a gun show with more equipment, 533 00:34:38,480 --> 00:34:40,000 Speaker 1: because if you've ever been to a gun show, you 534 00:34:40,000 --> 00:34:43,040 Speaker 1: know there's all kinds of things like training available to 535 00:34:43,080 --> 00:34:46,719 Speaker 1: you there. Well, now, let's talk about one of the 536 00:34:46,760 --> 00:34:51,759 Speaker 1: conspiracy conspiratorial ideas, because it's not just one idea that 537 00:34:51,960 --> 00:34:57,040 Speaker 1: is uh maybe the furthest from mainstream discourse, but it's 538 00:34:57,080 --> 00:34:59,879 Speaker 1: something that a lot of people are really worried about, right, Yeah, 539 00:35:00,040 --> 00:35:02,480 Speaker 1: this this is the idea that the reason all of 540 00:35:02,480 --> 00:35:04,680 Speaker 1: these weapons are in the hands of the local police 541 00:35:04,719 --> 00:35:09,480 Speaker 1: is because the government or someone is preparing for mass 542 00:35:09,480 --> 00:35:14,240 Speaker 1: civil unrest. And this goes back to the FEMA camps theories. 543 00:35:14,280 --> 00:35:18,600 Speaker 1: This goes back to I mean there's so many the 544 00:35:18,680 --> 00:35:22,719 Speaker 1: ammunition buy up. Yeah, there are a lot of aspects 545 00:35:22,760 --> 00:35:24,640 Speaker 1: to this, and there are a lot of pieces. To 546 00:35:24,680 --> 00:35:27,880 Speaker 1: be honest, they're not necessarily connected at least to that 547 00:35:28,000 --> 00:35:30,880 Speaker 1: head of the octopus thing, but there are a lot 548 00:35:30,920 --> 00:35:36,200 Speaker 1: of interesting let's say happenings, right, Yeah, some I can't 549 00:35:36,200 --> 00:35:40,160 Speaker 1: remember who it was. It was either somebody on our 550 00:35:40,320 --> 00:35:43,799 Speaker 1: Facebook or our Twitter, which you can you can hang 551 00:35:43,800 --> 00:35:47,080 Speaker 1: out with us there as well, anytime you wish. Matt 552 00:35:47,080 --> 00:35:49,520 Speaker 1: and I are on there all the time. Uh. On 553 00:35:49,360 --> 00:35:53,120 Speaker 1: one of those somebody said, somebody said conspiracy if I'm 554 00:35:53,120 --> 00:35:56,759 Speaker 1: a conspiracy theorist, or maybe you're a coincidence theorist. Yeah 555 00:35:56,760 --> 00:35:59,880 Speaker 1: that man, where was that? I think that was on YouTube? 556 00:36:00,040 --> 00:36:03,319 Speaker 1: Maybe I was on YouTube? Okay comment, Yeah, that that 557 00:36:03,440 --> 00:36:05,640 Speaker 1: made me laugh and I thought that was a well 558 00:36:05,680 --> 00:36:08,800 Speaker 1: written turn of phrase. But yeah. We also have videos 559 00:36:08,920 --> 00:36:12,640 Speaker 1: on the Second Civil War, the people who wanted to succeed. 560 00:36:13,120 --> 00:36:18,000 Speaker 1: And that's really interesting because as you and I know, uh, 561 00:36:18,360 --> 00:36:22,520 Speaker 1: groups of people in the United States attempt to succeed 562 00:36:22,719 --> 00:36:25,520 Speaker 1: way more often than you would think, way more often 563 00:36:25,520 --> 00:36:28,360 Speaker 1: than you even hear about. Yes, so much more often. 564 00:36:28,920 --> 00:36:32,520 Speaker 1: And uh, you know around the United States alone, dozens 565 00:36:32,560 --> 00:36:35,680 Speaker 1: and dozens of apocalyptic groups think the world will end, 566 00:36:35,800 --> 00:36:39,920 Speaker 1: so they don't care what's gonna happen next year. They 567 00:36:40,000 --> 00:36:42,919 Speaker 1: don't care. I'm not saying they're violent by any means. Well, yeah, 568 00:36:43,000 --> 00:36:47,160 Speaker 1: you just when you lose, when you lose that desire 569 00:36:47,640 --> 00:36:50,680 Speaker 1: to live on for the next, for the future, what's 570 00:36:50,719 --> 00:36:54,880 Speaker 1: coming future. It's a little terrifying and and because and 571 00:36:54,920 --> 00:36:56,640 Speaker 1: of course when you think about it, it would be 572 00:36:56,680 --> 00:37:02,000 Speaker 1: this massive swell of problems if these succession movements were 573 00:37:02,040 --> 00:37:05,239 Speaker 1: advertised on the news, right, which is why we very 574 00:37:05,400 --> 00:37:10,160 Speaker 1: rarely hear about these active functioning groups. And it makes 575 00:37:10,200 --> 00:37:14,120 Speaker 1: you think maybe the news is controlled. Ben Yeah, well, 576 00:37:14,160 --> 00:37:17,960 Speaker 1: maybe the news will succeed in uh start their own countries, right, 577 00:37:18,160 --> 00:37:21,280 Speaker 1: but then also you know the same thing will happen 578 00:37:21,800 --> 00:37:28,360 Speaker 1: in other large countries like China is constantly working to 579 00:37:28,719 --> 00:37:33,480 Speaker 1: keep these various disparate groups and territories united and to 580 00:37:33,760 --> 00:37:40,320 Speaker 1: quell rebellions, right, so those rebellions are often not advertised 581 00:37:40,360 --> 00:37:42,200 Speaker 1: in the Chinese news the way they are in the 582 00:37:42,239 --> 00:37:46,200 Speaker 1: United States. Yea, the Internet itself is controlled so much 583 00:37:46,239 --> 00:37:50,400 Speaker 1: they're trying to stop You saw the I forget I 584 00:37:50,600 --> 00:37:54,880 Speaker 1: think it's a John Oliver piece maybe about the Genemen 585 00:37:54,920 --> 00:37:59,760 Speaker 1: Square protests. Uh that happened every year. But the Internet 586 00:37:59,840 --> 00:38:03,919 Speaker 1: is trolled so heavily that they've actually blocked phrases, all 587 00:38:03,920 --> 00:38:06,120 Speaker 1: these different phrases the groups have been trying to put 588 00:38:06,160 --> 00:38:08,600 Speaker 1: out there to refer to the tienam And Square massacre, 589 00:38:09,080 --> 00:38:11,799 Speaker 1: and now all of them are blocked. You know, it's 590 00:38:11,800 --> 00:38:14,840 Speaker 1: really strange. I don't know if this is still the case, 591 00:38:15,680 --> 00:38:20,600 Speaker 1: but um, using in the past using UH the internet 592 00:38:20,680 --> 00:38:24,480 Speaker 1: in some parts of China, not only would it be monitored, 593 00:38:24,719 --> 00:38:29,200 Speaker 1: but there'd be these little like cartoon cop characters who 594 00:38:29,200 --> 00:38:31,000 Speaker 1: would show up and say, hey, you know, just for 595 00:38:31,000 --> 00:38:34,600 Speaker 1: your safety, keeping an eye on you. And the weirdest 596 00:38:34,640 --> 00:38:37,520 Speaker 1: thing was, man, the weirdest thing was they have blue eyes. 597 00:38:38,239 --> 00:38:40,200 Speaker 1: So if you ever get a chance to look up 598 00:38:40,200 --> 00:38:43,160 Speaker 1: these characters, yeah, this is my my One of my 599 00:38:43,200 --> 00:38:45,480 Speaker 1: old professors pointed this out, and he and I talked 600 00:38:45,520 --> 00:38:46,759 Speaker 1: about it for a while, and I still don't know 601 00:38:46,800 --> 00:38:49,640 Speaker 1: what's going on there, but it is It is true 602 00:38:49,800 --> 00:38:56,680 Speaker 1: that the possibility of domestic unrest, it is a historic 603 00:38:57,600 --> 00:39:01,319 Speaker 1: UH is an historic threat to any empire. And if 604 00:39:01,320 --> 00:39:04,920 Speaker 1: you look at just the size of the United States 605 00:39:05,400 --> 00:39:10,200 Speaker 1: and the elements that it brings together. I were I 606 00:39:10,360 --> 00:39:12,680 Speaker 1: one of the chess masters of the country, I would 607 00:39:12,719 --> 00:39:18,200 Speaker 1: also be concerned with domestic unrest and national security. You know, 608 00:39:18,320 --> 00:39:20,400 Speaker 1: it is a real thing. But a lot of people 609 00:39:21,080 --> 00:39:25,520 Speaker 1: Jane and John Q Public are are very concerned that uh, 610 00:39:25,600 --> 00:39:28,839 Speaker 1: for some reason a group might come down on them. Uh. 611 00:39:29,080 --> 00:39:32,080 Speaker 1: The you know, if you look at what happened in 612 00:39:32,120 --> 00:39:35,920 Speaker 1: the wake of Hurricane Katrina, Uh, that raised a lot 613 00:39:35,920 --> 00:39:38,560 Speaker 1: of people's concerns as well. And then I have to 614 00:39:38,600 --> 00:39:41,200 Speaker 1: say there there are quite a few things that John 615 00:39:41,239 --> 00:39:43,680 Speaker 1: and Jane Q public in the US might be a 616 00:39:43,680 --> 00:39:47,000 Speaker 1: bit ticked off about a ton of little things, a 617 00:39:47,000 --> 00:39:50,080 Speaker 1: couple really big things. And that's what we're gonna be 618 00:39:50,160 --> 00:39:52,760 Speaker 1: talking about next week. Well that's what we talked about 619 00:39:52,760 --> 00:39:55,440 Speaker 1: every week, isn't it. But we're gonna be covering some 620 00:39:55,520 --> 00:39:59,799 Speaker 1: very specific things, um, about the food we put into 621 00:39:59,800 --> 00:40:03,240 Speaker 1: our bodies, about the things that are added to that food. Right, 622 00:40:03,400 --> 00:40:07,719 Speaker 1: And it's a highly controversial subject, but we're gonna look 623 00:40:07,760 --> 00:40:11,520 Speaker 1: at it and see what we can find. So in 624 00:40:11,560 --> 00:40:14,680 Speaker 1: the meantime, we would, as always like to thank you 625 00:40:14,760 --> 00:40:18,000 Speaker 1: so much for uh taking some time to check out 626 00:40:18,040 --> 00:40:21,640 Speaker 1: our show. We are overdue for listener mail episodes brings. 627 00:40:22,000 --> 00:40:25,000 Speaker 1: Send some of those to us if we haven't replied yet. 628 00:40:25,080 --> 00:40:28,200 Speaker 1: Don't you worry. We are storing these up and checking 629 00:40:28,239 --> 00:40:32,200 Speaker 1: our list twice like some sort of weird um duo 630 00:40:32,360 --> 00:40:35,799 Speaker 1: Santa clause. I don't know. Yeah, yeah, the pieces of 631 00:40:35,800 --> 00:40:37,920 Speaker 1: the Joker. I have a huge external hard drive. Now 632 00:40:38,000 --> 00:40:41,080 Speaker 1: that's just pumping emails and stuffing. It's true. Yeah, and 633 00:40:41,160 --> 00:40:44,520 Speaker 1: we do have a naughty, nice algorithm, but that is 634 00:40:44,560 --> 00:40:46,480 Speaker 1: not true. But what is true is that you can 635 00:40:46,560 --> 00:40:49,040 Speaker 1: find us on Facebook. You can find us on Twitter. 636 00:40:49,360 --> 00:40:51,279 Speaker 1: We have a website where you can find all of 637 00:40:51,320 --> 00:40:54,680 Speaker 1: our videos and all of our podcasts. We'll eve into 638 00:40:54,719 --> 00:40:57,640 Speaker 1: a blog occasionally. Our website is stuff they don't want 639 00:40:57,680 --> 00:41:01,160 Speaker 1: you to know dot com. Oh, remember that we mentioned earlier. 640 00:41:01,680 --> 00:41:04,560 Speaker 1: We're just a hot skip and digital jump away. You 641 00:41:04,600 --> 00:41:08,360 Speaker 1: can write to us directly at conspiracy at how stuff 642 00:41:08,360 --> 00:41:16,480 Speaker 1: works dot com. For more on this topic another unexplained phenomenon, 643 00:41:16,760 --> 00:41:20,719 Speaker 1: visit test tube dot com slash conspiracy stuff. You can 644 00:41:20,760 --> 00:41:23,359 Speaker 1: also get in touch on Twitter at the handle at 645 00:41:23,440 --> 00:41:24,560 Speaker 1: conspiracy stuff